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Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table: Analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Talks on Jerusalem (1993–2015)
Article  in  Israel Studies · October 2016
DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.21.3.09
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Israel Studies 21.3  •  doi 10.2979/israelstudies.21.2.09 179
Lior Lehrs
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table:
Analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Talks on Jerusalem (1993–2015)
ABSTRACT
The question of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and its resolution is crucial for the overall success of efforts to resolve the
conflict. The article explores the negotiating processes that took place
between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the question of Jerusalem
since the Oslo Accords (1993), with attention to the Camp David Process
(2000–1) and the Annapolis Process (2007–8). Assessment of these processes
reveals on the one hand that the question of Jerusalem posed one of
the major—if not the main—obstacles to agreement in past negotiations,
but on the other hand, it shows a gradual process in which the parties have
drawn closer and understandings have begun to emerge on most issues.
It also discusses and analyzes challenges that the negotiators needed to
address regarding the manner in which the negotiations over Jerusalem
were conducted.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and of the national, religious, and political discourse on both
sides. Its resolution is therefore crucial for the overall success of efforts
to resolve the conflict. Yet, an in-depth historical review of the negotiations
between Israel and the PLO reveals that throughout more than 20
years—from September 1993 to 2015—the two sides held substantive talks
about Jerusalem only on two brief occasions: during the talks that occurred
between July 2000 and January 2001 under the administration of Ehud
180  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
Barak on the Israeli side and Yasser Arafat, then Palestinian Authority chairman,
on the Palestinian side, and during meetings between Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and the Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas (Abu Mazen) towards the end of the Olmert administration in 2008.
Academic publications have discussed the Israeli-Palestinian final
status negotiations; many focus on the failure of the Camp David process
(1999–2001), others discuss more specifically the issue of Jerusalem.1 These
negotiations yielded differing, often conflicting, versions, assessments, and
interpretations, thus leading to uncertainty and lack of clarity. The article
contributes to the existing literature by outlining as clear and credible a
picture as possible of the negotiations over the future of Jerusalem since 1993
until today (2015), including the Camp David Process and the Annapolis
Process. It identifies areas of agreement and disagreement and analyzes the
manner in which the negotiations were conducted, using theoretical tools
from the literature on negotiation and conflict resolution.
These talks constitute an important aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, even though they did not produce an agreement. Although
both the Camp David process (2000–01) and the Annapolis process (2007–
08) were guided by the assumption that “nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed”, the understandings reached during these negotiations are significant
in the political arena and in the eyes of both sides and of the international
community. These understandings will also presumably continue to
influence any future negotiations.
Those attempting to analyze and evaluate the developments from 1993
until today could argue that judging by the outcome, the efforts to reach
an agreement on the question of Jerusalem failed, and all of the target dates
set along the way have passed with no agreement achieved. In each round
of negotiations, Jerusalem was a central obstacle to reaching a peace agreement.
Different scholars discussing the peace negotiations on Jerusalem
have highlighted the obstacles and the complexities that Jerusalem presents,
and have described it—especially Jerusalem’s holy sites—as an issue that
is indivisible (Hassner) and non-negotiable (Baker), and almost impossible
to solve or to find a compromise.2 Analysis of the public discourse
on both sides further creates an impression that vast gaps exist between
them and that one would be hard-pressed to find a way out of the current
predicament.
However, an in-depth assessment of the process reveals an alternative
picture. The article presents an analysis of the negotiations and exposes a
gradual process in which the parties have drawn closer, the gaps between
their positions on Jerusalem have diminished, understandings have begun
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  181
to take shape on most issues, and creative ideas for bridging differences have
emerged. During the periods in which negotiations on Jerusalem occurred,
the parties successfully shifted the issue from slogans and myths to practical
and detailed discussion of the range of topics that comprise the issue. They
made an effort to outline points of understandings based on a process of
differentiation among the various geographical areas in Jerusalem, finding
different solutions for different areas, acknowledging the situation on the
ground and attempting to bypass the sovereignty obstacle.
The negotiators also had to cope with challenges regarding the manner
in which the negotiations over Jerusalem were conducted. These challenges
derived from the importance and sensitivity of this issue on both sides and
the fact that Jerusalem is considered a protected value. The main challenges
posed were internal legitimacy and public opinion; preparedness before
the negotiations; timing of discussions on Jerusalem; inclusion of different
stakeholders; and negotiations over history, religion, and narratives.
The article is based on various academic studies, memoirs of Israelis,
Palestinians, and Americans involved in the negotiations, interviews, diplomatic
documents, and media reports. The documents of the PLO’s Negotiations
Support Unit (NSU) that were exposed by Al Jazeera and The Guardian
served as an important and complementary source for this research. It
begins with a historical survey of the negotiations over Jerusalem from the
Oslo Accords (1993) to the third administration of Binyamin Netanyahu
(2013–15). It then outlines points of agreement and disagreement reflected
in the negotiating process regarding the four issues that form the question
of Jerusalem: Arab and Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the Old
City and the “Historic Basin” (or “Holy Basin”), the Western Wall and
Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif, and the border regime and municipal
administration of the two capitals. The final section analyzes the negotiating
process and the main challenges that the negotiators faced during the
process. It discusses lessons and conclusions that can be drawn from this
process and its relevance to theoretical discussions on conflict resolution
and negotiation.
HISTORICAL SURVEY
The Declaration of Principles signed between Israel and the PLO in 1993 (the
“Oslo Accords”) held that the two sides would address the issue of Jerusalem
during final status negotiations. In May 1996, the deadline for final status
negotiations to begin, Israel held elections that brought the Netanyahu
182  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
government to power. Under this government’s rule, negotiations focused
on implementing the interim agreement, and their efforts yielded the
“Hebron Agreement” in January 1997 and the “Wye River Memorandum”
in October 1998. During this time there were no negotiations over final
status agreement issues, including Jerusalem.
The question of Jerusalem also arose in the context of the peace treaty
between Israel and Jordan, signed on 26 October 1994, whereby Israel recognized
the “special role” of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with respect
to Islam’s holy places in Jerusalem, and promised to ascribe “high priority”
to Jordan’s historical role in these places during final status negotiations.3
Substantive negotiations on a final status agreement began only after
Ehud Barak’s government came to power ( July 1999) and after the failure
of negotiations along the Israeli-Syrian track in March 2000.4 The issue of
Jerusalem was officially introduced into the negotiations for the first time
during the Camp David Summit in July 2000. Before the summit, Barak
instructed Israel’s delegates not to engage in substantive negotiations over
Jerusalem and to delay this issue “to the very end”.5 In his view, the question
of Jerusalem should be raised for discussion only at the summit because
he feared that a substantive discussion of Jerusalem could sabotage (“blow
up”) the process in terms of the public discourse in Israel.6 Barak requested
that the delegates not record any stances regarding Jerusalem and not to
formulate draft documents or agreements on this issue.7
From the outset of the Camp David Summit, it appeared that the issue
of Jerusalem would be at the heart of the discussion. Shlomo Ben-Ami,
Israel’s senior negotiator with the Palestinians, stated on the summit’s first
day that it would be a “Jerusalem Summit” and asserted that Jerusalem
would be the “make or break” issue of the agreement.8 Dennis Ross, the US
Middle East envoy during Clinton administration, also said at the beginning
of the conference that Jerusalem was undoubtedly the most difficult
issue to resolve.9 The summit ended in failure, with dispute regarding sovereignty
over the Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif emerging as a main
obstacle to agreement.10
Meetings between the two sides did not stop after the failure of the
Camp David summit. They continued throughout the summer and even
after the onset of the Intifada in September 2000. Talks were held, among
other places, at Bolling Air Force Base (December 2000) and in Taba
( January 2001). In December 2000, President Bill Clinton presented an
outline of parameters for agreement.11 Although these efforts did achieve
some progress, they did not produce an agreement. During the governments
of Ariel Sharon, from 2001 to 2006, the two sides did not conduct
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  183
negotiations on Jerusalem or on any final status issues. Under the Quartet
“Roadmap” (submitted to Israel and the Palestinians in April 2003), the
parties would have negotiated the issue of Jerusalem during the third stage,
which was scheduled to conclude in 2005, but this provision was never
implemented.12
In January 2005 Abbas was elected as president of the Palestinian
National Authority and in March 2006 the Kadima Party won the Israeli
General Election, leading to a government headed by Ehud Olmert. In
November 2007 the Annapolis Conference renewed the final status negotiations,
but at Israel’s request the negotiating teams did not address the issue
of Jerusalem, which was raised only in talks between Olmert and Abbas.
During these negotiations each side presented a map detailing a proposed
solution for Jerusalem, but the talks were suspended following Olmert’s
resignation and Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, and they were not
renewed after the Netanyahu came to power in March 2009.13
The second Netanyahu government (2009–13) was characterized by a
return to political stalemate alongside continuing efforts to renew direct
negotiations on a final status agreement. In July 2013, a few months after
the inception of the third Netanyahu government, the parties agreed to
renew negotiations following mediation efforts by US Secretary of State
John Kerry.
They agreed that all core issues would be placed on the table, and they
set a timetable of nine months to reach an agreement. At the center of this
round of negotiations was an American attempt to establish a framework
agreement that would address the core issues and serve as a basis for further
negotiations. The question of Jerusalem arose during the talks only in
very general terms, in an attempt to agree on a vague formula concerning
Jerusalem without getting into the details. The Palestinians insisted that the
paragraph on Jerusalem would include a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem,
but the Israelis only accepted wording that would mention “Palestinian
aspirations” for a capital in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem was one of the
disagreements as well as the security arrangements in the Jordan Valley and
Israel’s demand to be recognized as a Jewish state. The negotiations entered
into a deadlock and collapsed in April 2014.14
In addition to the official negotiations, the issue of Jerusalem was
part of unofficial peace initiatives such as The Beilin-Abbas Document
(1995),15 the Ayalon-Nusseibeh statement of principles ( June 2003),16 and
the Geneva Initiative (December 2003).17 There were also track two initiatives
that dealt only with Jerusalem, such as the Amirav-Husseini document
(2000),18 the “Jerusalem Old City Initiative” raised by a group of former
184  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
Canadian diplomats (2005–10),19 and the Al-Ju’beh-Sher document on the
Holy Places in Jerusalem (2006).20 Moreover, proposals on the future of
Jerusalem were also created by think tanks and research institutions, such as
the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF), the Jerusalem Institute for
Israel Studies ( JIIS), and the International Peace and Cooperation Center
(IPCC).21
POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT
The question of Jerusalem’s future is particularly complex and sensitive
given its historical, religious, national, and social aspects. Yet an analysis
of the negotiating history indicates that differences in positions have actually
diminished and areas of agreement have emerged. Nonetheless, it is
important to recall that these talks are grounded in the understanding that
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. Accordingly, the concessions
and agreements reached are not binding, and positions could change as circumstances
change. Domestic political changes (such as the Israeli government
changes in 2001 and 2009) also resulted in a retreat from previously
held positions and a refusal to resume negotiations at the point at which
they had been suspended.
In both negotiating processes, Barak and Olmert sought to cross the
Rubicon on the question of Jerusalem when their rule was ending and their
coalition was collapsing. Barak arrived at Camp David after the political
parties Shas, Mafdal, and Yisrael Be’aliyah had pulled out, and the Bolling
and Taba talks took place after Barak announced his resignation and called
for elections. Olmert’s proposal to Abbas was presented after Olmert’s
announcement of his intention to resign and a day before the election
primaries within the Kadima party, at which Tzipi Livni was elected party
chair.
The following discussion outlines the areas of understanding that
emerged during the talks on Jerusalem, as well as the remaining points of
dispute, regarding the four core issues over Jerusalem.
EAST JERUSALEM NEIGHBORHOODS
The future and the status of Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and
of Jewish neighborhoods constructed after 1967 in East Jerusalem is one
of the main topics of negotiation. There are 313,000 Palestinian residents
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  185
living in the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and 201,000 Jewish
residents living in the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (which the
Palestinians consider as settlements).22
During the Camp David process the parties reached an understanding
on the formulation of an arrangement whereby sovereignty in East
Jerusalem would be divided along demographic lines, thus granting Israeli
sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods and Palestinian sovereignty over
Arab neighborhoods. With this agreement, the Israeli side was relinquishing
its original position (before Camp David) opposing Palestinian
sovereignty in any part of East Jerusalem. During Camp David, Israel
offered that the “external” Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem (such
as Kafr Aqab and Beit Hanina) would be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty
while the “internal” Arab neighborhoods (such as Silwan, Sheikh
Jarrah, and Abu-Tor) would be granted municipal Palestinian autonomy
under Israeli sovereignty. Only after Camp David did Israel give up its
proposal for different sovereignty regimes in “external” versus “internal”
Arab neighborhoods and agreed to Palestinian sovereignty in all of the
Arab neighborhoods.23
The Palestinian side relinquished its original demands that Jerusalem’s
borderline follow the “Green Line”—the 1949 armistice line.24 Significantly,
the Palestinians agreed to this formulation as part of a territorial
swap based in principle on the borderlines of 4 June 1967. Initial steps
towards this formulation took place at Camp David, but it only emerged
as an agreement during the Bolling and Taba talks,25 and it was included
as part of the “Clinton Parameters”. Both sides accepted this formulation
during the talks between Olmert and Abbas, and it served as a basis for
the Palestinian map presented during the Annapolis process and Olmert’s
September 2008 proposal.26
Despite an agreement in principle on this issue, the main point of
contention related, and continues to relate, to the neighborhood of Har
Homa ( Jabel Abu Ghneim for Palestinians). The Palestinians are not prepared
to have the agreed-upon principle apply to this neighborhood, and
they demand its evacuation, both because it was constructed after the 1993
Oslo Accords and because of its location, which they argue undermines
the territorial contiguity between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, isolating Beit
Safafa.27 Israel, by contrast, does not differentiate between this and other
Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Under Olmert’s proposal, Har
Homa is part of the Israeli side of Jerusalem. Regarding the environs of
Jerusalem, the parties dispute the annexation of Givat Ze’ev and Ma’ale
Adumim as part of the Israeli side of Jerusalem. This dispute also relates to
186  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
the scope of the territory to be annexed and the width of the corridor that
will connect between these localities and Jerusalem.28
In the discussions regarding “East Jerusalem”, each side defined this
term and its boundaries differently. The Israelis discussed the border according
to the municipal boundaries as defined by Israel after the 1967 war (70
square kilometers), while the Palestinians stressed that they were referring
to “East Jerusalem” as it was defined before the 1967 war (6 square
kilometers).29
THE OLD CITY AND THE HISTORIC BASIN
The Old City contains historic and religious sites of great significance for
the three monotheistic religions, placing it at the heart of negotiations
over Jerusalem. Many observers use the term “Historic Basin” or “Holy
Basin”, which covers—in addition to the Old City compound—other
areas such as the historic sites of Mount Zion, the City of David, and
Mount of Olives.30
Negotiations on the future of the Old City and the Historic Basin followed
two courses towards a potential solution: division of sovereignty, on
the one hand, and a special or an international regime, on the other. As a
matter of principle, the Israeli side preferred a solution based on a “special
regime” that does not require division of sovereignty.31 The Palestinian side
demanded agreement on the division of sovereignty first, with negotiations
on practical arrangements and creative administrative solutions taking place
only after such initial agreement.32
FIRST OPTION ‒ DIVISION OF SOVEREIGNTY
During the Camp David process the parties made progress regarding division
of sovereignty within the Old City. They agreed to Israeli sovereignty
over the Jewish Quarter and Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and
Christian Quarters. The Palestinians had agreed to accept Israeli sovereignty
over the Jewish Quarter even before the Camp David Summit, which they
reaffirmed at various stages of the negotiations in the presence of American
and Israeli representatives.33 Indeed, the Palestinian proposal submitted
during the Annapolis Process was based on this acceptance, and this was
also the Palestinian position presented to US mediator George Mitchell in
2010.34
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  187
Initially Israel objected to any Palestinian sovereignty within the Old
City, but during the Camp David Summit Barak indicated that he would
accept Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian Quarters.35
Although he retreated from this position towards the end of the summit,
the matter of his acceptance was repeatedly raised during the Bolling and
Taba talks alongside Israeli reservations indicating a preference for a solution
entailing a special regime with no division of sovereignty.36 In the discussion
on dividing sovereignty in the Old City, the Armenian Quarter was
a matter of dispute. During negotiations that took place under the Barak
administration, Israel demanded sovereignty over the Armenian Quarter.
The Palestinians rejected this, but agreed to Israeli sovereignty over Jewishowned
houses in the Armenian Quarter situated near the Jewish Quarter.37
The areas beyond the Old City walls—the City of David and Mount
of Olives—also remain in dispute. Israel demands sovereignty, whereas the
Palestinians are prepared to accept their administration by Israel subject to
Palestinian sovereignty: “Anything that does not grant you full sovereignty
there is acceptable to us.”38
A similar dispute exists regarding the question of sovereignty over two
sites within the Old City walls: the Western Wall tunnel and the Tower of
David.
SECOND OPTION—
SPECIAL OR INTERNATIONAL REGIME
During the Annapolis process, Olmert and Abbas discussed the possibility
of an international solution. Olmert proposed that the Holy Basin be
administered by an international trusteeship regime composed of Israel,
the Palestinian state, the US, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.39 Abbas neither
accepted nor rejected Olmert’s overall proposal, but according to a New
York Times article based on separate conversations with Abbas and Olmert,
the former agreed to this concept in principle while expressing reservations
regarding some of its elements.40
However, disagreements emerged over the borders of this regime.
Olmert sought to have it include—in addition to the Old City—areas such
as the Mount of Olives and the City of David, but the Palestinians object to
an international regime that would extend beyond the Old City and cover
parts of the Palestinian neighborhoods of A-Tur and Silwan, which would
then be excluded from the territory of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians
posed the option of including territory from the Israeli side, such as the
188  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
Mamilla cemetery, within the regime (for the sake of symmetry). Another
dispute is the question of sovereignty under such an arrangement—the
Palestinians oppose postponement to a later stage.41
During the Camp Davis process, it appears that Israel’s proposal for a
“special regime” in the Old City was offered without clarifying the nature of
such a regime. In Olmert’s proposal (2008) Israel took a first step in drawing
a framework for a “special regime” proposal; however, in this case, too,
it only outlined general principles with many open questions and further
discussions about the details.
THE WESTERN WALL AND THE TEMPLE MOUNT/
AL-HARAM AL-SHARIF
The Western Wall and the Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif are located
within the Old City, but their religious and national importance to both
sides earned them special and separate attention during negotiations.
During the Camp David process an understanding was developed
whereby the Western Wall would be under Israeli sovereignty. Arafat agreed
to this before the Camp David Summit, and the Palestinians reiterated this
position throughout the negotiations.42 Concerning the management of
the compound of Al-Haram Al-Sharif/the Temple Mount (as a separate
question from the issue of sovereignty at the site) both sides agreed that it
would come under Palestinian administration, that the status quo at the
site would remain and that no excavations would be conducted therein.
If an agreement is reached on an international regime in the Holy
Basin as Olmert proposed, then both sites would be included under this
regime. Despite these points of understanding, the question of sovereignty
over Al-Haram Al-Sharif/the Temple Mount was the main obstacle during
the Camp David Summit, and the various compromise proposals that were
raised failed to produce an agreement.
At Camp David, Israel made clear that it would not relinquish sovereignty
over the site, but its representatives proposed formulations that
would grant Israel what they called “symbolic sovereignty”, without undermining
Palestinian control over the site, such as the concept of Palestinian
guardianship or custodial sovereignty at the site. The Palestinians rejected
these and demanded full Palestinian sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharif.43
After the Camp David Summit various actors raised proposals for a solution
to this problem, including international sovereignty, suspended sovereignty,
divine sovereignty, and horizontally divided sovereignty.44 Yet, all of them
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  189
failed in reaching a breakthrough. Disagreement also emerged regarding
the delineation of Israeli sovereignty at the Western Wall. The Palestinians
agreed to Israeli sovereignty only over the “Wailing Wall” (60 meters),
not over the entire Western Wall (470 meters including the Western Wall
tunnel) as Israel demanded.45 Two other points of dispute that emerged
during the Barak era were Israel’s demands for a prayer area within the
Temple Mount and for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish connection
to the site.46
TWO CAPITALS:
BORDER REGIME AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
The Israeli-Palestinian agreement regarding the establishment of two capitals
in Jerusalem requires, in turn, an administrative regime that would
ensure effective management of the city and coordinate relations between
the two capitals. This regime would have to address two main questions: the
nature of the border between the different parts of the city and the nature
of the relationship between the municipalities regarding municipal issues
such as planning, transportation, and infrastructures.
The parties agreed that two capitals be established in Jerusalem with
two separate municipalities and a joint body would oversee municipal coordination.47
This issue, however, was only discussed peripherally regarding
the question of Jerusalem and was not mentioned in either the Clinton
Parameters or Olmert’s proposal. A dispute erupted between the parties
over the nature of the border regime to be implemented between the two
sides of the city. The Palestinians voiced support for an “open city” regime
without an internal physical border between the two capitals and continued
connection and freedom of movement between the two sides of the city.
Abu Ala explained that the term “open city” means “to have [an] Israeli
check . . . those coming into the city from the Israeli side, and a Palestinian
check . . . for those coming into the city from the Palestinian side, with
different models of coordination and cooperation in municipal services.”48
The Israelis opposed the idea of “open city”, demanding a clear and firm
physical border within the city, with the option of an “open city” inside the
borders of the Old City or the Holy Basin.49
Overall, the negotiators clearly engaged in an important process of
joint learning, narrowing the gaps between them, and looking for creative
ways to solve the remaining obstacles. Three types of processes mainly
enabled this.
190  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
First, differentiation among geographical areas and areas of life within
Jerusalem allowed the negotiators to address different needs and sensibilities
in different areas, and to find different solutions for different areas. By
dividing the concept of Jerusalem into sub-issues, the sides could engage in
more practical and detailed discussion of specific questions and problems.
The negotiators differentiated between Arab and Jewish neighborhoods,
“external” and “internal” neighborhoods, and the old and the new city.
They also addressed specific holy and historic sites.
Second, the negotiators acknowledged and recognized the situation on
the ground and aimed to minimize the necessary changes regarding ongoing
life in the city. This principle was illustrated, for example, in the agreed
formula for the neighborhoods, in the understanding to maintain the
status quo at the Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif, and in the proposed
concept of an “open city”.
Third, both sides sought creative ways to bypass the sovereignty issue,
which was the main obstacle concerning the area of the Holy Basin/the
Old City, and especially the holy sites. This attempt was based on the
understanding that in the discussion regarding the holy sites, if the parties
reached an understanding on the questions of management and security
arrangements, the obstacle of sovereignty would mainly be a symbolic
issue.
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON JERUSALEM—
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In addition to the main issues at the heart of the negotiations on Jerusalem,
the importance and the sensitivity of the question of Jerusalem yielded
challenges and dilemmas regarding the manner in which negotiations over
Jerusalem were conducted. These questions are discussed in the literature
on conflict resolution and negotiations, and the negotiations on Jerusalem
can serve as a case study to analyze them. These negotiations are a classic
example of negotiations on a “protected/sacred value”—values that a society
or community views as essential to its identity, and therefore it resists any
compromising, dividing, or sharing of them.50 It is much harder and more
complicated to have pragmatic and rational negotiations on an issue that
is considered a protected/sacred value, and it created different problems in
the negotiations process.
The following section discusses five challenges and questions faced
during the negotiations on Jerusalem.
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  191
INTERNAL LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC OPINION
The fact that Jerusalem is considered a protected/sacred value by both sides
magnifies the importance of domestic public opinion as a factor in the
negotiations. The negotiators’ challenge was to reach a compromise on an
issue that is considered a public taboo, and to “sell” it to the public.
The negotiation process on Jerusalem was shaped and influenced by
domestic considerations related to public opinion and Jerusalem’s significance
in the Israeli and the Palestinian consciousnesses. This shows
the crucial need to negotiate on this issue with the domestic public while
negotiating with the other side—the process Putnam termed a “two-level
game”—and trying to delineate the contours of the “win-set”, which
includes all possible agreements that could secure an internal majority.51
As Gilead Sher stated “This was not a game of Poker in which each player
tries to guess what cards the opponent is holding” but rather it was a series
of questions that each side “directs towards itself, towards its own public.”52
When Barak presented his proposal on Jerusalem during the final stage of
the summit, he addressed the internal dimension, stating that this proposal
represented the outermost line of concessions that he would be able to
convey to the Israeli public.53 This factor also influenced the Palestinian
leadership. Arafat told Clinton during the summit that “The Palestinian
leader who will give up Jerusalem has not yet been born. I will not betray
my people or the trust they have placed in me.”54 On both sides the leaders
also had a Diaspora audience with which to contend.
The domestic public opinion dimension is especially important given
the Israeli legislative requirement of a public referendum on any decision
to withdraw from East Jerusalem (or the Golan Heights) if such decision
cannot secure the support of at least 80 Knesset members.55
Against the background of the public taboo in Israel regarding the issue
of Jerusalem, Barak sought to avoid addressing the issue before the Camp
David Summit in order to prevent the coalition from collapsing. Consequently,
however, he also refrained from activities that would prepare public
opinion for compromise on this issue. During his speech to the Knesset
just before leaving for Camp David, Barak affirmed his commitment to a
“united Jerusalem under our sovereignty”.56 Ben-Ami claims that on the
eve of the summit he advised Barak not to avoid the question of Jerusalem
but rather to “raise it to the level of an open public discussion”.57 According
to Ben-Ami, “Slogans and election propaganda about ‘dividing the
city’ terrified many and unnecessarily paralyzed us” in terms of the ability
to formulate a fair compromise.58
192  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
After the Camp David Summit, however, the taboo regarding compromise
on Jerusalem was broken, and a more free and open discussion
developed. In light of the summit there were some efforts to spark a public
debate on the issue, including a publicized tour of East Jerusalem Arab
neighborhoods initiated by Knesset members and public figures, with the
aim of exposing the “conventional lie”, as they termed it, regarding the
unity of the city, and declarations of support by famous Jerusalem personalities
(including the former Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek) for Barak’s
negotiating position regarding compromise on Jerusalem.59 During the
Olmert era, too, efforts were made to prepare public opinion for a compromise
on Jerusalem, and Olmert and Minister Haim Ramon even discussed
the matter publicly.
Public opinion surveys in Israel indicate that public opinion changed
after Camp David. During the mid-1990s only a small percentage expressed
support for conceding territories in East Jerusalem (in 1995 only 7% were
prepared to transfer the area of East Jerusalem—or parts of it—to the Palestinians;
in 1998, 10% were prepared to transfer East Jerusalem to Palestinian
sovereignty). In July 2000, however, with the backdrop of Camp David,
37% of survey respondents supported the option of Palestinian sovereignty
in East Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods, and this figure remained relatively
steady over the coming years (40% in July 2002, 37% in September 2007,
39% in July 2008, and 44% in December 2012).60
PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiations and decision-making processes during the course of negotiations
require extensive preparatory work including comprehensive analysis
of and familiarity with the issue as well as a discussion of all the objectives,
the possible courses of action, the costs and risks of each alternative, and the
formulation of tactics alongside an outline of strategic goals.61 Moreover,
internal discussion on each side about the definition of its core negotiating
interests, stated objectives, priorities, and consequent red lines is another
dimension regarding preparations. Each negotiating party has “Maximum
Concession Levels” (MCL), defining the most that each is willing to concede
to reach an agreement.62 However, when a discussion about a compromise
on an issue is a public taboo and politically risky—such as in the
case of Jerusalem—it can create an obstacle for the preparation process.
The challenge is how to be prepared without risking the political power
and the negotiations.
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  193
During the Barak era negotiations, there was a lack of Israeli preparation
for negotiations on Jerusalem prior to the Camp David Summit,
both in terms of government agencies’ groundwork and in the form of an
in-depth internal discussion among decision makers. The Peace Administration
established within the Prime Minister’s Office and the Planning
Division of the IDF General Staff was not permitted to work on this
issue.63 Gilead Sher recounts that at the start of the summit he and Amnon
Lipkin-Shahak (a member of the Israeli negotiation team in Camp David
and a former IDF Chief of Staff) complained to Barak about the absence
of a “discussion amongst ourselves” regarding red lines and the question
of “what is Jerusalem”. Barak responded, “We have internal red lines—real
ones—which everyone will be able to feel by basically defining the vital
interests of the country”, but he did not elaborate further.64 This lack
of preparation was especially problematic given that it was the first time
serious negotiations were to occur between Israel and the PLO on the
permanent status of Jerusalem.
This lack of preparedness can be explained in the context of Barak’s
concerns about a possible leak that would spark a public outcry and a political
crisis, which could have resulted in the collapse of his political coalition
and derail the peace process.
The Camp David Summit, in this parameter, proved to be a turning
point. During and after the summit, the Israeli side began to engage in
a substantive and thorough discussion on the question of Jerusalem, the
core Israeli interests in the city, and proposed solutions. Examples include
an extensive internal discussion amongst the Israeli delegation to Camp
David on 17 July 2000, post-summit consultations with experts such as
Prof. Ruth Lapidot and Dr. Menachem Klein regarding creative solutions
for Jerusalem, and various assessments of the issue with participation of
security establishment personnel, among others.65 “What was appropriate
and correct to do before Camp David,” wrote Ben-Ami, that is, “to gather
proposals and scenarios for Jerusalem, sadly we only began to do after the
Summit.”66
The overall lack of clear preparation at the Israeli governmental level
on the issue of Jerusalem highlights the important role played by nongovernmental
organizations over the years: convening Israeli-Palestinian
meetings, conducting studies, and floating proposals that later assisted the
official negotiators. Track two and non-governmental bodies influenced the
official talks, and ideas moved from track two to track one.67
The Palestinian side, meanwhile, did undertake preparatory work on
the issue of Jerusalem, coordinated primarily by the Orient House and the
194  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
PLO’s NSU. The Palestinian delegation to Camp David, however, did not
include experts on this issue (foremost among whom was Faisal Husseini,
who was responsible for the issue of Jerusalem within the PLO).68 Abu
Ala criticized the preparatory work undertaken on the issue of Jerusalem,
claiming the Palestinian delegation was not sufficiently prepared for the
Taba talks. He wrote, “We had not constructed a clear vision of what we
hoped to get from this round of talks . . . We had no negotiation strategy
agreed in advance . . . within our negotiation team all of us took different
and sometimes contradictory views of the current situation and what our
objective should be.”69
TIMING OF DISCUSSIONS ON JERUSALEM
During both negotiating processes regarding a permanent agreement, a
question arose about the timing of discussions on Jerusalem: Was it better to
discuss Jerusalem at the start of talks or postpone it to the end? Throughout
the Barak era, the Israeli negotiators were instructed to delay discussions
about Jerusalem, and the talks preceding the Camp David Summit did not
address the issue in a substantive manner. During the Annapolis process,
Israel refused to discuss Jerusalem, and negotiations on this issue took place
only within the Olmert-Abbas channel.
Discussion of Jerusalem was postponed largely as a consequence of
domestic Israeli considerations, concerns about public criticism in the event
of a leak, and the possibility of the government collapsing, given that in
both cases the government coalition included parties that opposed any talk
of compromise on Jerusalem. US President Barack Obama also raised the
issue of postponing discussion of Jerusalem in a speech in May 2011. He
proposed that negotiations could begin with a discussion of borders and
security, and only later would the parties discuss the issues of refugees and
Jerusalem.70
The logic underpinning postponement of the most sensitive and difficult
issues to a later stage of the negotiations derives from the assumption
that such deferral prevents negotiations from collapsing early and facilitates
a process in which the parties can build trust and become committed,
thus providing them with the tools needed to address the most difficult
issues at a later stage more effectively. Balakrishnan, Patton, and Lewis, for
example, present a bargaining strategy for business negotiations whereby
negotiations begin with a discussion of the less important issues, based
on the assumption that after a certain investment of time and money, the
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  195
“sunk cost” effect will influence negotiations and foster a commitment to
complete the process and reach an agreement.71 Mitchell points to a similar
negotiating strategy whose objective is to enable the development of mutual
trust, negotiating norms, and group processes that assist the parties later in
dealing with the more difficult issues.72
This approach can be problematic, as it might actually endanger
negotiations. In our case the main problem stems from the interrelated
nature of the core issues under negotiation and the assumption that an
Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement would be based on a package
deal that covers all the issues. Ben-Ami asserts that “Gestalt”—“everything
versus everything”—was the guiding principle throughout negotiations.
He writes that he emphasized to Barak that unless Jerusalem is included
in the “basket” of discussion topics, it would not be possible to formulate
trade-offs between the various issues and “we will not achieve what we seek”
in terms of territory or the refugee issue.73
Moreover, when one party unilaterally postpones an issue under negotiation,
it causes the second party to doubt the seriousness of the first party’s
intentions, encourages the second party not to disclose the extent of its flexibility
on other issues, and prevents progress towards the final and decisive
stage of the negotiations (the end game). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, it
has been argued that an agreement would have to be based on Israel conceding
the Temple Mount in exchange for the Palestinians conceding “the right
of return”. Consequently, postponing discussions about Jerusalem could
undermine efforts to explore the option of such a package deal and could
encourage the Palestinians not to reveal their cards on the refugee issue.
Notably, in both 2000 and 2008 the Palestinians made their own connection
between the issues of Jerusalem and refugees, proposing that postponement
of one issue also entails postponement of the other.74 Hisham Abd
Al-Razzaq, who served as the prisoner affairs minister for the Palestinian
Authority, asserted in 2002 that if Israel were “clearer” on the question of
Jerusalem, then the Palestinians would be clearer on the refugee issue.75
NEGOTIATIONS WITH MANY STAKEHOLDERS
Jerusalem has importance not just for Israelis and Palestinians, but also for
the three monotheistic religions, millions of believers all over the world,
and many actors—states, international organizations, religious bodies, and
other organizations, whose interests also need to be taken under consideration
in negotiations. The question in negotiations processes with different
196  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
parties and stakeholders is how to include different actors and address their
interests and needs in order to make them part of the solution and not part
of the problem. Inclusion of different stakeholders can also strengthen the
legitimacy of the peace process, while exclusion can turn the actors into
peace spoilers.
For example, the question of inclusion and involvement of Arab countries
in the negotiating process surfaced throughout the negotiations on
Jerusalem, in light of the relevance of the city for the entire Arab and
Muslim world. Arafat repeatedly emphasized at the Camp David Summit
that this issue goes beyond the Palestinian context: “A billion Muslims will
never forgive me if I don’t receive full sovereignty in East Jerusalem. I do
not have a mandate to compromise,” he told Clinton. “It’s not me; it’s the
entire Muslim world.”76 Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, stated after
the Camp David Summit that “No one in the Arab world has the right to
compromise on East Jerusalem or the Al-Aqsa Mosque.” King Abdullah of
Jordan also said that Arafat is neither entitled nor able to make a decision
about Jerusalem without the support and backing of all Arabs.77
After the Camp David Summit various ideas were raised for including
Arab actors in the search for a solution regarding Al-Haram Al-Sharif/
the Temple Mount. For example, Ben-Ami proposed granting custodianship
over the site to an alliance of “the three kings”: Jordan, Morocco, and
Saudi Arabia;78 the Palestinians proposed that sovereignty be granted to
the Organization of the Islamic Conference;79 and Clinton too proposed
an international solution incorporating Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and
Morocco alongside the five permanent members of the Security Council.80
These proposed solutions were intended to grant Arab and Islamic legitimacy
to an agreement on Jerusalem and to reinforce moderate Arab states.
It should be recalled that the inclusion of Jordan as part of the solution in
Jerusalem is in line with Israel’s commitment to Jordan in the peace treaty.
These ideas also permeated Olmert’s proposal of establishing an international
trusteeship regime that would administer the Holy Basin and
include Jordan and Saudi Arabia alongside Israel, the Palestinian state, and
the US. In a 2011 interview Olmert refused to say whether he had held talks
with Saudi Arabia and Jordan regarding this proposal, saying that “Some
things are not written down even in books”.81
The Christian bodies were also stakeholders that wished to be part of
the peace process. Church leaders in Jerusalem expressed concern that the
negotiating parties were ignoring the Christian aspect of the issue. During
the Camp David Summit, the heads of the Latin Patriarchate (RomanCatholic
Church), Greek-Orthodox Church, and Armenian-Orthodox
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  197
Church approached Clinton, Barak, and Arafat, requesting that their voices
be heard. The church leaders objected to the proposed concept of divided
sovereignty between the two Christian quarters of the Old City, whereby
the Armenian Quarter would be under Israeli sovereignty and the Christian
Quarter would be under Palestinian sovereignty, and they demanded an
international guarantee that would ensure the followers of all three monotheistic
religions freedom of worship and freedom of access to the holy
places. This position is close to that of the Vatican, which carefully follows
the progress of negotiations on Jerusalem.82
NEGOTIATIONS OVER HISTORY, RELIGION,
AND NARRATIVES
During discussions on Jerusalem at the Camp David Summit, alongside
formal agenda items such as sovereignty, municipal administration, and
security arrangements, the actual talks were permeated by historical, theological,
and mythical disputes. Jerusalem’s centrality to both Israeli and
Palestinian national and religious identities and historical narratives naturally
arises in negotiations. It raises the dilemma of whether negotiators
should address this aspect in the process and in the agreement, and if so,
when and how.
Historical and religious claims served as part of the basis for demands
during the negotiations. Concerning the Temple Mount, for example,
Barak stated that “A Jewish prime minister cannot transfer sovereignty to
Palestinians, because the Holy of Holies resides under the surface.”83 When
an argument erupted on this issue, Arafat recalled the “Pact of Umar”
between Umar Ibn Al-Khattab and Patriarch Sophronius.84
The Israeli demand for Jewish prayer rights on the Temple Mount
provoked much anger on the Palestinian side. Arafat described this request
as an Israeli plan to undermine Muslim rule in the place and told Clinton
that if the Israelis insist on their demand to pray at the “Haram” an Islamic
revolution would erupt.85 The issue of the Temple Mount/Al-Haram AlSharif
also sparked stormy historical, theological arguments between the
sides on the question of whether the First Temple indeed stood at that
site.86 The Palestinians argued in response to the Israeli demands that this
area was not the actual site of the Jewish Holy Temple; Arafat even asserted
that the Holy Temple had been located in Nablus, not in Jerusalem.87
Due to such Palestinian claims and non-recognition of the sacredness of
the place for Jews, Ben-Ami suggested during the Bolling talks that the
198  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
Palestinians issue a declaration recognizing the Jewish connection to the
site and acknowledging that it is a “holy place for Jews”.88
This debate highlights the complexity of engaging in historical,
religious, and identity-based issues during negotiations, and of raising
demands that these issues be incorporated into agreements. Scholars vary
in their views on how to address historical narratives and religion in conflict
resolution processes.89 Some claim that these elements embody the very
core of the conflict and therefore, its resolution requires truly engaging with
them. Others claim that negotiations should focus on pragmatic policy
issues and not engage in religious questions or debates about myths, where
compromise is impossible. There are also those who assert that declarations
on these issues have no significance and that sacrificing important assets in
exchange for such declarations is a waste of potential.
Intermediate solutions are also possible in this context, such as a
general recognition by each side of the existence of the other side’s narrative.
Regarding the Temple Mount, the Geneva Initiative proposed a
formulation by which the Palestinian side recognizes the “unique religious
and cultural significance of the site to the Jewish people”, and a group
of Palestinian intellectuals proposed in a November 2000 statement that
both sides recognize the “spiritual and historical affinities” of each side to
particular sites or areas.90
CONCLUSIONS
A thorough examination of past rounds of negotiations reveals that gaps
narrowed on the four main issues that constitute the question of Jerusalem,
and that boundaries of possible compromise were drawn. We can identify a
framework of basic principles that have emerged with respect to these four
issues, which in turn provide a basis for future discussions.
Points of compromise emerged as follows: on the issue of Arab and
Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the “Clinton principle”—Jewish
neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under
Palestinian sovereignty; on the issue of the Old City and Holy Basin, division
of sovereignty on the basis of the “Clinton principle” or the solution
of an international regime; on the issue of the Western Wall and Temple
Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif, Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and
a solution for Al-Haram Al-Sharif/the Temple Mount that will allow Palestinian
control while addressing needs stemming from the Jewish affinity
to the place and from security considerations; and finally, on the issue of
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  199
“two capitals”, two municipalities in Jerusalem with a special mechanism
for coordination and cooperation.
These negotiations were conducted under difficult and complicated
conditions, given that Jerusalem is a protected value and discussions of
compromise was a public taboo. These conditions created different challenges
that the negotiators had to address, regarding issues such as public
opinion, preparations for the negotiations, timing of the discussion on Jerusalem,
the inclusion of different stakeholders, and how to address history
and religion in the negotiation process.
Ultimately an agreement was not reached and the framework was
shelved due to the stalemate in the peace process. The gaps between the
peace proposals on the future of the city and the ongoing reality on the
ground have continued to grow throughout the years. The fact that the
peace negotiations occurred within a time frame of over 20 years without
reaching an agreement has created time and incentive for actors—official
and private—to change the situation on the ground and to create a fait
accompli that will establish irreversible facts in order to influence future
negotiations or prevent a possible agreement based on lines outlined in
previous negotiations.
There were intensified efforts following the Camp David Summit by
private Israeli organizations to encourage Jewish settlements inside Arab
neighborhoods, with the primary goal of changing the demographic lines
in Jerusalem and adding obstacles that would make the Clinton formula
almost impossible to implement. While the number of these activities is
still quite small—involving around 2,000 people—it is a significant process.
In a similar vein, different actors have attempted to challenge and change
the Status Quo at the Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif. The lack of an
agreed-upon solution and the continuing state of uncertainty have created
tension and escalation in Jerusalem, exemplified by the violent events that
took place in East Jerusalem in summer 2014.
Despite the different obstacles to an agreement on Jerusalem and to a
peace agreement in general, if conditions and circumstances are ripe in the
future, the framework of principles that was outlined in previous negotiations,
as well as the insights on how to conduct the negotiation process,
can serve as a basis for future negotiations on the complex and sensitive
issue of Jerusalem.
200  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
Notes
I would like to express my gratitude to Meir Kraus, Director General of the Jerusalem
Institute for Israel Studies ( JIIS), Amnon Ramon and Caroline Kahlenberg
for their advice and feedback on my research project. I am also indebted to the
Israel Studies editor and anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments. This
article is dedicated to the memory of the late Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Head
of JIIS (2003–2013), who was a mentor, colleague and friend.
1.	 Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David
and Taba?,” International Security 28.2 (2003): 5‒43; Jerome Slater, “What Went
Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli‐Palestinian Peace Process,” Political Science
Quarterly 116.2 (2001): 171‒99; Myron J. Aronoff, “Camp David Rashomon: Contested
Interpretations of the Israel/Palestine Peace Process,” Political Science Quarterly
124.1 (2009): 143‒67; Menachem Klein, Breaking the Taboo ( Jerusalem, 2001);
Dore Gold, The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the
Holy City (Washington, DC, 2007).
2.	 Ron E. Hassner, “To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts Over Sacred Space and
the Problem of Indivisibility,” Security Studies 12.4 (2003): 1‒33; Alan Baker, “Is
Jerusalem Really Negotiable? An Analysis of Jerusalem’s Place in the Peace Process,”
Jewish Political Studies Review 24 (2012): 72‒95.
3.	 Article 9.2 of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.
4.	 According to the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (1999), Israel was obligated
to conduct redeployment of troops in the West Bank. At the beginning of
2000, PM Barak agreed, as part of this obligation, that Israel would transfer the
control of the three villages located near Jerusalem outside of the municipal border
(the villages of Abu Dis, Azariyya, and Sawahara al-Sharqiyya) to full Palestinian
control but eventually, mainly due to internal political pressure, he withdrew from
this promise and did not implement it. See Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 10.
5.	 Gilead Sher, WithinTouching Distance: Negotiations towards Peace, 1999–2001
(Tel-Aviv, 2001), 85, 88, 106, 109 [Hebrew]; Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New
York, 2005), 612.
6.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 85.
7.	 Ibid., 121; Shlomo Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard: Travels to the
Limits of the Peace Process (Tel-Aviv, 2004), 88 [Hebrew].
8.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 141; Sher, Within Touching Distance,
154.
9.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 149.
10.	 Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, eds., Camp David Summit,
What Went Wrong?: Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians Analyze the Failure of the
Boldest Attempt Ever to Resolve the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (Brighton, 2005);
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,” New
York Review of Books, 9 August 2001.
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  201
11.	 Clinton Parameters, http://www.geneva-accord.org/images/file/The%20
CLinton%20Peace%20Plan.pdf.
12.	 US State Department, “Roadmap to Solution of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,”
30 April 2003, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/April/2003
0430134837relhcie0.3930475.html.
13.	 See the different versions on the close of the negotiations; Ehud Olmert,
“How I Almost Brought Peace,” Yediot Ahronot, 28 January 2011; Akiva Eldar,
“Who Is the Objector?” Ha’aretz, 7 February 2011 [both in Hebrew]; Saeb Erekat,
“The Political Situation in Light of Developments with the US Administration and
Israeli Government and Hamas’ Continued Coup d’etat, December 2009,” http://
www.ajtransparency.com/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/201218211239109728.html;
George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York, 2010), 409–10; Bernard Avishai, “A
Plan for Peace That Still Could Be,” New York Times Magazine, 7 February 2011.
14.	 Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon, “How the Israel-Palestine Peace Deal
Died,” New Republic, 20 July 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118751/
how-israel-palestine-peace-deal-died.
15.	 Yossi Beilin, Manual for aWounded Dove (Tel-Aviv, 2001), 267‒80 [Hebrew].
16.	 http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/AyalonNusseibeh_eng.htm.
17.	 http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/english.
18.	 Moshe Amirav, The Palestinian Struggle for Jerusalem ( Jerusalem, 2002),
62‒3 [Hebrew].
19.	 http://www1.uwindsor.ca/joci/.
20.	 Gilead Sher and Nazmi Al-Ju’beh, The Holy Places in Jerusalem Old City—
Guidelines for a Future Arrangement (Rome, 2008).
21.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 28‒42.
22.	 According to data of the Central Bureau of Statistics as of late 2014.
23.	 Dani Yatom, The Confidant (Tel-Aviv, 2009) 378, 381‒2 [Hebrew]; Martin
Indyk, American Peace (Tel-Aviv, 2009), 316 [Hebrew]; Ben-Ami, A Front without a
Rearguard, 166, 182, 204; Ross, The Missing Peace, 667, 671‒2, 688; Akram Hanieh,
“The Camp David Papers,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30.2 (2001): 84.
24.	 Ahmed Qurie, Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine (London, 2008), 178,
204‒5; Sher, Within Touching Distance, 159, 170, 184.
25.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 76; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 323; Beilin, Manual for a
Wounded Dove, 216; Moratinos Non-Paper (by EU Ambassador Miguel Moratinos
as an unofficial summary of the Taba talks) http://www.geneva-accord.org/images/
file/Moratinos%20document.pdf.
26.	 Meeting Minutes: Borders with Erekat, Qurei and Livni, 4 May 2008, The
Palestine Papers—Aljazeera; Olmert, “How I Almost Brought Peace,” 38.
27.	 Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 305, 355; Menachem Klein, The Geneva Initiative: An
Insider’s Account ( Jerusalem, 2006), 141 [Hebrew]; Meeting Minutes: Borders with
Erekat, Qurei and Livni, 4 May; Trilateral—US, Israel, and Palestine, 15 June 2008,
The Palestine Papers—Al Jazeera.
202  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
28.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 75‒6; Meeting Minutes: Borders with Erekat,
Qurei, and Livni.
29.	 Qurie,BeyondOslo,313–4;NSU,“JerusalemNon-Paper,June2010,”http://www.
nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Non-Peper/Jerusalem%20Non-Paper-%20Final%20%20
June%202010.pdf.
30.	 Amnon Ramon, ed., The Historic Basin of Jerusalem—Problems and Possible
Solutions ( Jerusalem, 2010).
31.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 364, 373, 380; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 356.
32.	 Khaled Al-Gindi, e-mail interview with the author, 25 March 2011.
33.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 115, 117; Indyk, American Peace, 312,
330; Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat and David Hale, 17 September 2009: Saeb
Erekat and George Mitchell, 21 October 2009 http://transparency.aljazeera.net/
en/projects/thepalestinepapers/201218211125875573.html.
34.	 Meeting Minutes: Borders with Erekat, Qurei, and Livni, 4 May 2008;
Mohammad Yunis, “Abbas Will Present Mitchell with Written Proposals for an
Arrangement, and Netanyahu Links Discussion of These with Direct Negotiations,”
Al-Hayat, 3 July 2010 [Arabic]; Natasha Mozgovaya and Avi Issacharoff,
“On Eve of Netanyahu-Obama Meeting, Abbas Offers Jerusalem Compromise,”
Ha’aretz, 4 July 2010.
35.	 Indyk, American Peace, 316‒7; Ross, The Missing Peace, 685; Ben-Ami, A
Front without a Rearguard, 183; Yatom, The Confidant, 395.
36.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 366, 379; Sher, Within Touching
Distance, 357; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 352‒64.
37.	 Sher, WithinTouching Distance, 410; Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard,
443; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 313‒5, 355; my interview with Shaul Arieli, 12 April 2011.
38.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 366, 379, 443‒4; Klein, Breaking
the Taboo, 77; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 254‒6, 313, 316; Sher, Within Touching Distance,
219, 410.
39.	 Olmert, “How I Almost Brought Peace,” 39‒40; Shimon Shiffer, “Olmert’s
Legacy,” Yediot Ahronot, 29 January 2009 [Hebrew]; Avishai, “A Plan for Peace
That Still Could Be”.
40.	 Avishai, “A Plan for Peace That Still Could Be”.
41.	 Talking Points and Questions, Abbas and Olmert, 16 September 2008, Palestine
Papers—Aljazeera; Avishai, “A Plan for Peace That Still Could Be”; Khaled
Al-Gindi, e-mail interview with the author, 25 March 2011.
42.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 115, 117; Ari Shavit, “The Day Peace
Died,” Ha’aretz, 14 September 2001; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 357; Indyk, American
Peace, 312, 330.
43.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 205; Ross, The Missing Peace, 705;
Danny Yatom, Shutaf Sod (Tel-Aviv, 2009), 407; Hanieh, “The Camp David
Papers”, 83.
44.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 250, 265; Ben-Ami, A Front without a
Rearguard, 244‒6, 268, 281; Indyk, American Peace, 338‒40.
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  203
45.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 74; Indyk, American Peace, 360; Sher, Within
Touching Distance, 382.
46.	 Israel’s demand regarding Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount was raised
for the first time at Camp David but not raised again during the Taba talks (Shaul
Arieli, interview with the author, 12 April 2011). In the Bolling meetings, Ben-Ami
proposed full Palestinian sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharif in exchange for Palestinian
public recognition of the sacred nature of the place for the Jewish people
and a Jewish prayer area within a delineated compound and under the supervision
of a body agreed upon by both sides, Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 375.
Ben-Ami’s Israeli colleagues were surprised by his proposal and saw it as deviating
from their instructions. The Palestinians rejected Ben-Ami’s proposal.
47.	 Klein, The Geneva Initiative, 140‒1; “Moratinos Non-Paper”.
48.	 Meeting Minutes: Qurei, Erekat, and Livni, 22 January 2008; On the Palestinian
position on the border regime, see Faisal Husseini, “The Holy City Must Be
Ruled Fairly,” Los Angeles Times, 9 July 2000; NSU, “Jerusalem Non-Paper, June
2010”; NSU, “PLO Permanent Status Interests in Jerusalem for MOP, 1 September
2009: http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/document/4797.
49.	 Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 312‒3; Klein, The Geneva Initiative, 140‒1; “Moratinos
Non-Paper”; Qurei, Erekat, and Livni, 22 January 2008.
50.	 Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, “Reframing Sacred Values,” Negotiation
Journal 23.3 (2008): 221‒46; Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca, “Protected Values,”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70.1 (1997): 1‒16.
51.	 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel
Games,” International Organization 42.3 (1988): 427‒60.
52.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 207.
53.	 Ibid., 419.
54.	 Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” 85.
55.	 Ze’ev Segel, “Law Requiring Referenda for Land Concession will Polarize
Israelis,” Ha’aretz, 23 November 2010.
56.	 PM Ehud Barak Speech, Discussion of the Issue of “The Summit in
Washington Initiated by the Prime Minister,” Knesset, 10 July 2000.
57.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 124.
58.	 Ibid., 178‒9.
59.	 Beilin, Manual for a Wounded Dove, 135; Sher, Within Touching Distance,
212; “Prime Minister Ehud Barak—The People of Jerusalem Are Behind You,”
Ha’aretz, 25 July 2000.
60.	 These figures are based on the Peace Index Survey of the Tami Steinmetz
Center for Peace Research, http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/.
61.	 Roy J. Lewicki and Joseph August Litterer, Negotiation (Homewood, IL,
1985), 45‒73.
62.	 Christopher R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (New York,
1981), 234‒5.
204  •  israel studies, volume 21 number 3
63.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 32. Shaul Arieli, interview with the author, 12
April 2011.
64.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 165.
65.	 Ibid., 175‒82, 246; Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 173‒80, 244.
66.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 244.
67.	 Manuel Hassassian, “Final Status Negotiations on Jerusalem—An Inside
Look,” PASSIA, 13 March 2001 http://www.passia.org/jerusalem/meetings/2001/
13march/; Menachem Klein and Riad Malki, “Israeli-Palestinian Track 2 Diplomacy,”
in Bridging the Divide, ed. Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem, and Juliette Verhoiven
(Boulder, CO, 2006): 111‒34; Esra Cuhadar, “Assessing Transfer from Track
Two Diplomacy: The Cases of Water and Jerusalem,” Journal of Peace Research 46
(2009): 641‒58.
68.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 37‒42.
69.	 Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 324.
70.	 President Obama’s speech, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/05/19/​remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa.
71.	 P. V. (Sundar) Balakrishnan, Charles Patton, and Phillip A. Lewis, “Toward
a Theory of Agenda Setting in Negotiations,” Journal of Consumer Research 19.4
(1993): 641‒2.
72.	 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, 224‒5.
73.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 23, 141.
74.	 Ibid., 221; NSU email Re: Refugees and Jerusalem Issues—Bargaining
Chips, The Palestine Papers—Al Jazeera, 24 July 2008.
75.	 Are Hovdenak, “Trading Refugees for Land and Symbols: The Palestinian
Negotiation Strategy in the Oslo Process,” Journal of Refugee Studies 22.1 (2008): 39.
76.	 Sher, Within Touching Distance, 193.
77.	 Ibid., 245; Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 149.
78.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 243‒5.
79.	 Ross, The Missing Peace, 721; Indyk, American Peace, 341; Sher, Within
Touching Distance, 266.
80.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 246.
81.	 Ehud Olmert, interview with Channel 2 News, 5 February 2011, http://www.
mako.co.il/news-military/israel/Article-8086c418b27fd21004.htm.
82.	 Klein, Breaking the Taboo, 53.
83.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 146.
84.	 Ibid., 117.
85.	 Indyk, American Peace, 309; Sher, Within Touching Distance, 174.
86.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 219, 229.
87.	 Ross, The Missing Peace, 718; Marc Howard Ross, “Competing Narratives
and Escalation in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” Sphera
Publica 3 (2003): 189‒208.
88.	 Ben-Ami, A Front without a Rearguard, 375.
89.	 Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, Justice and Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table  •  205
(London, 2015); Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict:
History’s Double Helix (Bloomington, IN, 2006).
90.	 The Geneva Accord, 24; Klein, The Geneva Initiative, 146; “An Urgent Statement
to the Israeli Public by a Group of Palestinian Academics and Activists, 17
November 2000,” Palestine-Israel Journal 7.3–4 (2000).
LIOR LEHRS is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem and a Doctoral Fellow at the Harry S. Truman
Institute for the Advancement of Peace. He is author of “Prisoners Release,
Justice and Reconciliation: Between Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine,”
Politika 25 (2015) [Hebrew].
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