HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
“All Human Rights for All”:
The United Nations and Human Rights
in the Post-Cold War Era
Jean-Philippe Thérien* & Philippe Joly**
Abstract
This article analyzes how the post-Cold War era has led to a transformation
of the United Nations (UN) human rights ideology. The first part examines
the United Nations discourse, and explains how it has been influenced
by the objective of making human rights more universal and indivisible.
The second section focuses on a set of global policies that illustrate how
the UN has sought to put in practice the principle of “all human rights
for all.” Although the impact of UN ideology remains limited, this study
demonstrates that the world body has shown growing determination in
introducing human rights considerations into global politics.
I.	Introduction
The fifteen monographs published as part of the United Nations Intellectual
History Project (UNIHP) have provided convincing evidence that “ideas
and concepts . . . are arguably the most important legacy of the United
Nations.”1
Building on the innovative work of the UNIHP, this article seeks
*			Jean-Philippe Thérien is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Director of the
Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité internationale (Center for International Peace and
Security Studies) at Université de Montréal.
**		Philippe Joly received his Master’s degree in Political Science from the Université de Montréal
in 2013.
				 The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Kathleen Angers, Madeleine
Bélanger Dumontier, Elizabeth Laval, and Hugo Lavoie-Deslongchamps in the preparation of
this article. They also wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada and the Fonds de recherche du Québec—Société et culture for their financial
support.
		1.	 Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij & Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas that Changed the World 39 (2009).
Human Rights Quarterly 36 (2014) 373–396 © 2014 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Vol. 36374 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
to enrich the ongoing discussion on the role of ideas in UN activities. The
analysis here focuses on human rights, a subject which is increasingly seen
as constituting “a routine part of international relations.”2
The specific contribution that this study proposes to make is twofold.
First, on the empirical level, it examines the evolution of UN ideas since
the end of the Cold War, a theme which until now has remained underresearched.
Second, on the theoretical level, it uses the notions of ideology
and global public policy to further the debate initiated by the UNIHP
contributors.3
More specifically, the article argues that over the past two
decades the United Nations has developed an ideology of human rights
centered on the overarching objective of promoting “all human rights for
all.” Encapsulating principles of indivisibility and universality, this objective
is the driving normative force behind the global policies currently advocated
by the United Nations in the area of human rights.
The notion of “all human rights for all,” which was popularized in the
1990s, is clearly in line with the UN ideology that took shape in the 1940s
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Nevertheless,
as will be seen below, the UN approach to human rights has undergone
significant changes over the past twenty years. Traditionally regarded as
a secondary concern of global governance, human rights have gradually
emerged as a crosscutting issue constituting a cornerstone of UN activity,
alongside security and development. Throughout this evolution, no other
norm has been more important in guiding the discourse and practices of the
organization than the idea that the United Nations mission is to promote
“all human rights for all.”
II.	 UN Ideas: Some Conceptual Issues
To account for the new significance that human rights hold in the functioning
of the United Nations requires a good grasp of how the organization’s ideas
are structured and how they bear on practice. To this end, a review of the
literature on ideology and global public policy offers a number of insights
and rich avenues of analysis.
Notwithstanding certain pioneering studies, the notion of ideology has
never been systematically used in the analysis of international relations and
institutions.4
This is surprising in two ways. First, the concept of ideology is
		2.	 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations 317 (3rd ed., 2012). See also
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd ed., 2013).
		3.	 See Jean-Philippe Thérien, Human Security: The Making of a UN Ideology, 26 Global
Soc’y 191 (2012); Jean-Philippe Thérien, The United Nations and Human Development:
From Ideology to Global Policies, 3 Global Pol’y 1 (2012).
		4.	 See Robert W. Cox, Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections
on Some Recent Literature, 33 Int’l Org. 257 (1979); Craig N. Murphy, What the
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 375
widespread in political science, most notably in the fields of political theory
and comparative politics. Contrary to the “end of ideology” thesis, many
political scientists agree that ideologies have always been, and continue
to be, at the very heart of political life.5
Second, it is remarkable that the
development of constructivism—a theory centered on the role of ideas—has
not led international scholars to pay more attention to ideologies. Granted,
the discipline of international relations has partly corrected this deficiency
through the development of adjacent concepts such as knowledge and cul-
ture.6
But as this analysis demonstrates, the notion of ideology can bring a
distinctive added value to the study of international processes.
For this added value to be realized, two conditions need to be fulfilled.
The first involves adopting a neutral rather than a polemical version of the
concept of ideology. In current political debates it is commonly assumed
that ideology refers to a distorted view of reality. Politicians rebuke their
adversaries for using “ideological” rhetoric. It should be recalled, however,
that social science proposes a less pejorative, more heuristic conception of
ideology. Manfred Steger, for example, has defined ideologies as “comprehensive
belief systems composed of patterned ideas and claims to truth.”7
Similarly, John Schwarzmantel has asserted that ideologies provide “overall
views of how society should be organised.”8
Consequently, Schwarzmantel
has pointed out, “it is hard to see how [ideologies] could be seen as dis-
pensable.”9
To benefit from the added value of the concept of ideology in the study
of world politics, one also has to acknowledge that every political institution
active in the international arena has an ideology. In other words, international
organizations such as the United Nations, national governments, and
transnational actors all have a general view of how the world should be
organized. While it is true that most political ideologies emerged within the
framework of the nation-state, their values and norms have been consistently
			 Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New
International Economic Order Ideology, 27 Int’l Stud. Q. 55 (1983); Mark L. Haas, The
Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (2005); Manfred B. Steger, The Rise
of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on
Terror (2008); Manfred B. Steger, Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twentyfirst
Century (3rd ed., 2009).
		5.	 See Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (1996); John
Schwarzmantel, Ideology and Politics 25–27 (2008); The Oxford Handbook of Political
Ideologies (Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, & Marc Stears eds., 2013).
		6.	 See The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Peter Katzenstein
ed., 1996); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999); Michael
N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global
Politics (2004).
		7.	 Steger, The Rise of the Global Imaginary, supra note 4, at 5.
		8.	 Schwarzmantel, supra note 5, at 27.
		9.	 Id. at 26.
Vol. 36376 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
applied to international debates. Inasmuch as “the new age of ideology is
global,” that trend appears to be stronger than ever.10
The notion of ideology has two significant advantages for the study of
international institutions such as the United Nations. First, in comparison
with the notion of idea, the concept of ideology is based on a more holistic
approach to human thought.11
It draws attention to the fact that ideas are
hardly free floating entities but, instead, are formulated and develop within
a given intellectual context. For its full meaning to be retrieved, an idea
must be situated within its environment, that is, in relation to the other ideas
with which it combines to form a system of ideas. As such, the notion of
ideology allows one to better grasp how ideas are constructed and ordered.
Second, the notion of ideology also draws attention to the fact that political
ideas are geared toward practice. “Linking belief and practice,” writes
Steger, “ideologies encourage people to act while simultaneously constraining
their actions.”12
When international institutions defend an ideology
in their public discourse, their motives are neither purely intellectual nor
disinterested. Rather, their goal is to reshape the real world in accordance
with their beliefs. Arguably, this is as true of the United Nations as it is of
other political actors.
The literature on global public policy opens a useful complementary
path for studying the ideas of international institutions. This literature is of
interest primarily because it provides a conceptual framework to clarify the
above noted practical dimension of UN ideology. Indeed, it is through global
policies that the UN tries to put its ideas into effect, whether in the field of
human rights or elsewhere. Combining the notions of ideology and global
policy seems to be especially justified because over that past few years public
policy analysts have emphasized the role of ideational and normative factors
in policy making.13
Above all, their analytical insight points to the need to
go beyond the widespread tendency to simply set the UN “rhetoric” (i.e. its
ideology) against “reality” (i.e. the policies it supports).14
As yet, the field of global public policy has not been extensively explored
and the subject remains rather peripheral to the traditional concerns of public
policy specialists. Still, as evidenced by the recent creation of the scholarly
journal Global Policy, more and more observers consider that the collective
	10.	 Steven Weber & Bruce W. Jentleson, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition
of Ideas 19 (2010).
	11.	 See Freeden, supra note 5, at 48.
	12.	 Steger, The Rise of the Global Imaginary, supra note 4, at 5.
	13.	 See The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Peter A. Hall ed.,
1989); Robert E. Goodin, Martin Rein & Michael Moran, The Public and its Policies,
in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy 5–6 (Michael Moran, Martin Rein, & Robert E.
Goodin eds., 2006); Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (Daniel Béland & Robert
H. Cox eds., 2011); Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of A Dangerous Idea (2013).
	14.	 Jolly, Emmerij & Weiss, supra note 1, at 252.
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 377
action problems associated with “the intensification of globalisation” have
forced a restructuring of political power.15
The new dynamics have engendered
the need for global policy making, a form of policy making that is both
multi-agential and multi-scalar. Global policy making in no way implies the
advent of a global government, but it highlights the fact that political decision
makers and territories worldwide are more and more interconnected.
The concept of global public policy arose in response to the proliferation
of new common policy problems stemming from a greater interdependence
among states. In face of these problems, Wolfgang Reinicke explained in
the late 1990s, governments must rely more and more on cooperation to
achieve their policy objectives and maintain their sovereignty.16
This approach
to global policy was later refined with the recognition of the need
to move from a “state-centric” to a “polycentric” vision of governance.17
Such a rethink seemed appropriate for two reasons. First, though states continue
to be the main policy makers in the international system, the role of
non-state actors in the development of public policies is clearly on the rise.
International institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and business
are increasingly involved in shaping collective decisions in a number
of issue areas. Second, the reconfiguration of political agency has resulted
in overlapping processes of policy making, which take place simultaneously
at the global, regional, national, and local levels. As Jan Aart Scholte put it,
“in polycentric circumstances no site or level of governance has one-way
sway over the others.”18
A global public policy outlook is particularly suited to an analysis of
the UN human rights ideology. Indeed, human rights may be conceived as
a “global policy space” where states and a wide range of non-state actors
interact to promote specific rules and values.19
Owing to normative and
operational factors, the UN enjoys a unique status within that global space.
On the normative plane, thanks to its Charter and universal membership, the
UN represents the most tangible expression of what is often referred to as
the “international community.” With regard to operations, the UN has more
human and financial resources involved in the human rights global policy
space than any other single actor. In sum, human rights is one of the issue
areas where the UN has the capacity to “extend credibility and legitimacy”
to global governance efforts.20
	15.	 David Held, Patrick Dunleavy & Eva-Maria Nag, Editorial Statement, 1 Global Pol’y 1
(2010).
	16.	 See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? 70–71
(1998).
	17.	 See Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction 185–223 (2d ed., 2005).
	18.	 Id. at 202.
	19.	 William D. Coleman, Governance and Global Public Policy, in The Oxford Handbook
of Governance 680 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
	20.	 Randall W. Stone, Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy
1 (2011).
Vol. 36378 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Focusing mainly on the international civil service of the United Nations,
which is less affected by national interests than the organization’s intergovernmental
components, this article looks at how the post-Cold War era
has led to a transformation of the UN human rights ideology. The first part
examines the UN discourse and shows how it has been influenced by the
objective of making human rights progressively more universal and indivisible.
The second section focuses on a set of global policies that illustrate
how the United Nations has sought to put in practice the principle of “all
human rights for all.” Overall, this study sheds new light on the intellectual
and political leadership of the United Nations in global affairs.
III.	 The UN Discourse on Human Rights
Since the end of the Cold War, three major changes have affected the UN
ideology and discourse on human rights. First, human rights have become
far more important than before in UN affairs. Although the United Nations
was always interested in human rights—the Charter proclaims the objective
of “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all”—for a long time human rights remained aspirational
and peripheral in its activities. However, the international landscape has
changed in such a way that human rights now have a much higher status
on the UN agenda.
Second, the UN increasingly defines human rights as an indivisible
whole. This approach contrasts with the segmented approach that characterized
UN human rights ideology for decades. It is important to recall that the
UDHR, adopted in 1948, was supposed to be followed by a single treaty.
However, the postwar human rights regime was in fact split into two covenants
with distinct “generations” of rights. The first generation, concerning
civil and political rights, and the second one, dealing with economic, social,
and cultural rights, were often regarded “not as two sides of the same coin
but as competing visions for the world’s future.”21
Having distanced itself
from this long prevailing outlook, the UN now insists more than ever on the
interdependence and the holistic nature of human rights.
Third, the UN places greater emphasis on the universal nature of human
rights. While it is true that the UN has always endeavored to defend
the universality norm and the rights of the most vulnerable, in reality these
concerns were often reduced to a “sideshow” to the East-West and NorthSouth
conflicts.22
Since the 1990s, the changes on the world political scene
	21.	 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000: Human
Rights and Human Development iii (2000).
	 22.	 David P. Forsythe, The UN and Human Rights at Fifty: An Incremental but Incomplete
Revolution, 1 Global Governance 299 (1995).
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 379
have given the UN far greater leeway to promote the application of human
rights to all countries and individuals.
These three changes—to be examined more closely below—may not
have amounted to a “revolution” in the UN human rights ideology. Yet they
have been significant enough to suggest that the end of the Cold War has
brought about a major shift in UN attitudes. This shift has been captured by
the UN itself in one mantra-like phrase: “all human rights for all.”
A.	 A Growing Concern
For twenty years, UN rhetoric has expressed a growing interest in human
rights. As noted by Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, “[i]t seems that no [UN]
document is now complete without reference to human rights.”23
According
to David Forsythe, the rate at which Secretaries-General have raised this
subject since the end of the Cold War has followed “almost a straight line
progression.”24
This quantitative development has been furthermore accompanied
by qualitative changes. Human rights are henceforth described as a
“cross-cutting” issue, closely associated with other fundamental missions of
the UN. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban Ki-moon have, each
in his own way, underscored the need “to integrate human rights into all
aspects of the Organization’s work.”25
Long considered a minor aspect of UN activities, human rights now
constitute an essential element of the world body’s identity. In this regard,
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace marked a decisive step by identifying human
rights as one of the three “great objectives of the Charter,” alongside
peace and development.26
A decade later, while acknowledging the “significant
and welcome elevation of the importance of human rights in the
work of the Organization,”27
Annan proposed to go even further by attributing
“equal weight and attention”28
to the three key purposes of the United
	23.	 Roger Normand & Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal
Justice 320 (2008).
	24.	 Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, supra note 2, at 80.
	 25.	 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, Delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/63/1 (12 Aug.
2008).
	 26.	 United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/277S/24111
(17 June 1992) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace].
	 27.	 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, Delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 113, U.N. Doc. A/61/1 (16 Aug.
2006).
	 28.	 Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Hails Africa’s Decade-long Progress
in Development, Security, Human Rights in Address to African Union Summit in Gambia,
UN Press Release SG/SM/10548 (3 July 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2006/sgsm10548.doc.htm.
Vol. 36380 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Nations. Ban embraced his predecessor’s approach and even borrowed a
key idea from him, stating, “We must make human rights our third pillar.”29
Based on the conviction that each of the organization’s three “pillars”
is to be defined in relation to the two others, the UN discourse has often
stressed that human rights are constitutively linked to security and development.
Annan and Ban have declared, each in turn, “we will not enjoy
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development,
and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.”30
Both
leaders have also used the image of the triangle to emphasize the interdependence
of the three basic UN concerns. In In Larger Freedom, for instance,
Annan maintained that the organization’s overarching objective should be
“to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and peace.”31
The angles
of the UN triangle correspond to “three freedoms which all human beings
crave—freedom from want, freedom from war or large-scale violence, and
freedom from arbitrary or degrading treatment.”32
From the UN perspective,
the pursuit of these three kinds of freedom make up a single political project,
because “[u]nless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”33
The new UN ideology is not restricted to reviewing the position of human
rights in the organization’s priorities. It has also insisted on the need
to go beyond the promotion of human rights and focus more on their direct
protection. Boutros-Ghali, for example, pointed out that in the absence of
a system of effective guarantees, the human rights recognized by the UN
were in danger of remaining “dead letters.”34
Later, Annan and Ban both
called on the international community to turn its attention to the “challenge
of implementation.”35
Not surprisingly, successive UN High Commissioners
for Human Rights have also stressed the urgent need to push human rights
	29.	 Ban Ki-moon, Address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (11 July 2007),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=100.
	 30.	 United Nations Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (21 Mar. 2005) [hereinafter In
Larger Freedom]. See also United Nations Secretary-General, Human Security: Report
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/64/701 (8 Mar. 2010) [hereinafter Human
Security].
	31.	 In Larger Freedom, supra note 30, ¶ 12. See also Human Security, supra note 30, ¶
10.
	32.	 Press Release, United Nations Information Service, Secretary-General Says Global
Outlook “Heart and Soul” of Macalester College at Global Citizenship Institute Inauguration
in Saint Paul (22 Apr. 2006), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/
en/pressrels/2006/sgsm10425.html.
	33.	 In Larger Freedom, supra note 30, ¶ 17.
	34.	 Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the Opening of the
World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/22 (12 July 1993),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/1f6f899067e6a-
078c125690a0031ce8d?Opendocument [hereinafter Opening World Conference].
	 35.	 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, Delivered to the General Assembly, ¶ 80, U.N. Doc. A/62/1 (31 Aug.
2007).
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 381
diplomacy beyond standard-setting. In the words of Mary Robinson, High
Commissioner from 1997 to 2002, the UN has a special role to play in
“bringing the human rights vision closer to the lives of individuals.”36
Later,
Louise Arbour and Navi Pillay would also repeatedly affirm that “implementation
of human rights norms should be at the forefront of our common
activities and objectives.”37
B.	 The Indivisibility Norm
In the 1990s the United Nations began to show more and more resolve
in defending the principle of the indivisibility of human rights. Until then,
civil and political rights advocates had stood in opposition to economic and
social rights defenders in “a shouting match characterized by attacks and
denunciations.”38
It is noteworthy that already in 1986 the Declaration on
the Right to Development had introduced the prospect of unifying to some
degree the “dichotomy of freedoms” proclaimed by the United Nations.39
But the real turning point in this process of convergence came with the
Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993.
At the opening of theVienna meeting, Boutros-Ghali called into question
any hierarchical ranking of the various rights, stating that “civil and political
rights and economic, social and cultural rights are equally important
and worthy of attention.”40
The conference’s final declaration very explicitly
underscored the “universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”
nature of human rights.41
Following Vienna, the idea that human rights
form an indivisible “package” was established as a fundamental tenet of
UN ideology.42
This was reiterated most notably in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome, which made clear that all human rights must be treated “on the
same footing and with the same emphasis.”43
	36.	 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Annual Report 2001: Implementation
of Activities and use of Funds 15 (2002), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
AboutUs/annualreport2001.pdf.
	37.	 OHCHR, Annual Report 2008: Activities and Results 5 (2009), available at http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Press/OHCHR_Report_2008.pdf.
	38.	 Thomas G. Weiss & Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey
262 (2010).
	39.	 Desmond McNeill & Asunción Lera St. Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights: The
Role of Multilateral Organisations 46 (2009).
	 40.	 Opening World Conference, supra note 34.
	 41.	 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, § I, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (12
July 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
	42.	 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate & Kelly-Kate Pease, The United Nations
and Changing World Politics 176–78 (7th ed., 2014).
	43.	 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (15 Sept. 2005).
Vol. 36382 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
The indivisibility norm gave rise to the hope that after “decades of neglect,”
economic, social and cultural rights might at last receive the same
attention as civil and political rights.44
In their arguments supporting this
idea, Annan and Ban both denounced the tendency of some states to adopt
a selective approach towards rights. “One cannot pick and choose among
human rights, ignoring some while insisting on others,” Annan asserted,
“[o]nly as rights equally applied can they be rights universally accepted.”45
A decade later, Ban expressed a similar view in support of the principle of
the interdependence of rights: “we cannot be selective in promoting human
rights. We must address the full spectrum of rights with equal force—civil,
cultural, economic, social and political.”46
Every High Commissioner for Human Rights has contributed to the
promotion of a new balance between the two generations of rights. Mary
Robinson, an ardent critic of the deregulation of capitalism and its effects
on women, placed economic, social, and cultural rights at the heart of her
discourse and work.47
For her part, Louise Arbour forcefully defended the
notion that extreme poverty was “one of the greatest threats to the respect
of human dignity.”48
And Navi Pillay has regularly referred to the need to
construct an international regime in which all rights “are realized without
distinction.”49
An important effect of the new accent placed on the indivisibility of
rights was to facilitate the emergence of a human rights approach to poverty
reduction and development. Bertrand Ramcharan, who was Acting High
Commissioner from 2003 to 2004, has aptly noted that such an approach
“was a long time in coming” but that it is “increasingly being recognized
internationally.”50
The main assumption of a rights-based perspective is that
poor people have not only needs but entitlements as well. By actively promoting
this vision, UN ideology has been instrumental in legitimizing the
idea that poverty is both the cause and the consequence of human rights
“violations” that can be subject to legal prosecution.51
In addition, the UN
ideology has helped to inflect the debate on poverty by shifting it toward
the objective of empowerment and away from moral considerations.
	44.	 Normand & Zaidi, supra note 23, at 320.
	45.	 Kofi A. Annan, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Illuminates Global Pluralism
and Diversity (10 Dec. 1997), available at http://www.un.org/rights/50/dpi1937.htm
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
	 46.	 Ban Ki-moon, Remarks to the Human Rights Council, UN News Centre (25 Jan. 2011), available
at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1052.
	47.	 See David P. Forsythe, Mary Robinson, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights Vol. 4, at 348
(David P. Forsythe ed., 2009).
	 48.	 William A. Schabas, Louise Arbour, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights Vol. 1, supra note
47, at 90.
	49.	 OHCHR, Annual Report 2008, supra note 37, at 5.
	50.	 OHCHR, Human Rights and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework iii (2004).
	51.	 OHCHR, Claiming the Millennium Development Goals: A Human Rights Approach 7 (2008).
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 383
C.	 The Universality Norm
Another feature of the UN discourse over the past twenty years is its new
emphasis on the need to make human rights universal. The promotion of
this universality norm has followed two itineraries. On one hand, the UN
has focused unprecedented attention on vulnerable social groups; on the
other hand, it has rejected all forms of cultural relativism when it comes to
human rights. “Ensuring that everybody is able to enjoy their human rights”
has now become a central goal of UN ideology.52
To be sure, the notion of universal rights has always been a major source
of inspiration for the UN. But as noted by Boutros-Ghali, the end of the Cold
War made possible “a deeper understanding [. . .] and respect for the needs
of the more vulnerable groups of society.”53
Today, the UN lays far greater
stress than before on the idea that the protection of the rights of vulnerable
groups and disadvantaged persons is a catalyst for social integration.54
An
important problem facing the UN, however, is that “[f]ar too often, people
who need their rights most know their rights least.”55
The new attention
paid to the rights of women, children, and cultural minorities provides a
particularly apt illustration of the United Nations post-Cold War approach.
Wishing to go beyond the principle of gender equality inscribed in the
Charter, the UN has stepped up its efforts to define and support women’s
rights more effectively. The Vienna Conference thus asserted that the rights
of women are “an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human
rights.”56
Two years later the Beijing Conference on Women proclaimed,
“Women’s rights are human rights.”57
This powerful formula, often echoed
by UN leaders, has served as a normative justification for numerous policy
initiatives.
Children’s rights have been another high profile issue of the post-Cold
War era. Adopted unanimously in 1989, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child has fostered a remarkable international consensus and left a deep
imprint on UN discourse. In 2002, while reporting on the progress made
since the 1989 accord, Annan wrote, “[t]here is no task more important than
building a world in which all of our children can grow up to realize their
	52.	 United Nations, The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All 16 (2007).
	 53.	 Agenda for Peace, supra note 26, ¶ 81.
	54.	 See United Nations, The United Nations Development Agenda, supra note 52, at 40–41.
	 55.	 Ban Ki-moon, Remarks to the High-Level Panel on Human Rights Mainstreaming at the
Human Rights Council in Geneva, UN News Centre, 1 Mar. 2013, available at http://
www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1777#.
	 56.	 Vienna Declaration, supra note 41, § I, ¶ 18.
	57.	 UNGA, Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and
Peace, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20
(17 Oct. 1995).
Vol. 36384 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
full potential, in health, peace and dignity.”58
On the twentieth anniversary
of the Convention, Ban stated, “children should always have the first claim
on our attention and resources,” thus confirming in his turn the extent of
the UN responsibilities regarding the rights of children.59
Finally, the last two decades have seen the United Nations focus ever
more attention on the rights of cultural minorities. A year after the adoption
of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities,60
the Vienna Conference affirmed “the
obligation of States to ensure that persons belonging to minorities may exercise
fully and effectively all human rights.”61
Minority rights were vigorously
reaffirmed at the 2001 Durban World Conference against Racism.62
The
case of indigenous peoples epitomizes the new UN concern for minorities.
Widely perceived as a major normative innovation, the 2007 Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples went beyond anti-discrimination and
recognized the right of indigenous peoples to “participate fully” in all aspects
of social life.63
Since then, the UN official discourse consistently defends
indigenous peoples as “equal members of the United Nations family.”64
The promotion of the universality norm has also been based on the
rejection of cultural relativism. In this connection, the Vienna Conference
provided a “decisive rebuff of arguments [. . .] against the full implementation
of internationally recognized human rights.”65
At the opening of the meeting,
Boutros-Ghali defined human rights as the “common language of human-
ity.”66
He also made clear that ideological splits and economic disparities
“cannot interfere with the universality of human rights.”67
The Declaration
adopted at the close of the conference affirmed that the universality of human
rights was quite simply “beyond question,”68
a view that soon became a
touchstone principle of UN ideology. For example, at the fiftieth anniversary
of the UDHR, Annan stressed that “[h]uman rights, properly understood
	58.	 United Nations, Kofi A. Annan, We the Children: Meeting the Promises of the World Summit
for Children, at Preface (2001).
	59.	 Ban Ki-moon, Remarks on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, UN News Centre, 20 Nov. 2009, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=651.
	 60.	 UNGA, Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (18 Dec. 1992).
	 61.	 Vienna Declaration, supra note 41, § I, ¶ 19.
	62.	 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, 31 Aug.–8 Sept. 2001, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12, at 6 (2001).
	63.	 UNGA, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/61/295, art. 5 (13 Sept. 2007).
	64.	 Ban Ki-moon, Remarks at Opening of the Ninth Session of the UN Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues, UN News Center (19 Apr. 2010), available at http://www.un.org/
apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=790.
	65.	 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights 23 (3rd ed., 2007).
	 66	 Opening World Conference, supra note 34.
	67.	 Id.
	 68.	 Vienna Declaration, supra note 41, § I, ¶ 1.
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 385
and justly interpreted, are foreign to no culture and native to all nations.”69
And Ban subsequently endorsed this approach, stating that “[w]here there
is tension between cultural attitudes and universal human rights, universal
human rights must carry the day.”70
In denouncing cultural relativism, the UN clearly signaled that human
rights were a precondition rather than a product of development. To quote
the Human Development Report 2000, “human rights are not [. . .] a reward
of development. Rather, they are critical to achieving it.”71
Annan espoused
this notion, explaining that “[h]uman rights are as fundamental to the poor
as to the rich.”72
For Annan, far from being a privilege of the well-to-do or
a result of Western domination, human rights constituted the foundation of
universal human dignity. Reiterating his predecessor’s vision, Ban argued that
one of the fundamental UN missions was “to shine the light of human rights
everywhere, including the darkest corners of the world.” In this endeavor,
he insisted, there could be “no exceptions.”73
To sum up, since the end of the Cold War, the UN discourse on human
rights has changed significantly. Informed by social-democratic liberalism, it
attributes far greater importance to human rights than ever before. Cast in
terms of indivisibility and universality, the UN rhetoric also shows sounder
internal logic. Yet the full significance of the ideology of “all human rights
for all” can only be understood by looking at the organization’s efforts to
put it into practice.
IV.	 Global Human Rights Policy-Making
UN aspirations in the area of human rights are still a long way from corresponding
to the realities of world politics. In both the North and the South,
violations of human rights are everyday occurrences. It is nevertheless remarkable
that, since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has set up
a coherent framework of public policies aimed at reducing the gap between
its ambitious discourse and effective respect for human rights. Among these
practical initiatives the most significant are related to the mainstreaming of
human rights and the creation of two institutions: the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council.
	69.	 Annan, Universal Declaration, supra note 45.
	70.	 Ban Ki-moon, Remarks at Event on Ending Violence and Criminal Sanctions Based
on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity [as delivered], UN News Centre (10 Dec.
2010), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.
asp?statID=1034.
	71.	 UNDP, supra note 21, at iii.
	72.	 In Larger Freedom, supra note 30, ¶ 140.
	 73.	 Ban Ki-moon, Address to the Council of Europe, UN News Centre (19 Oct. 2010), available
at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=983.
Vol. 36386 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
A.	 Mainstreaming Human Rights
Since the 1990s, the mainstreaming of human rights has come to the fore as
a new orientation of UN governance, and human rights have been the focus
of greater attention “throughout the UN system.”74
Reflecting the desire to
better integrate human rights in all UN activities, the notion of mainstreaming
represents the ultimate organizational objective of contemporary UN
human rights ideology. It comes as no great surprise that the mainstreaming
policy has generated “uneven” results.75
That said, the UN new approach
has helped to start a rebalancing of political versus social rights promotion,
and to universalize the whole range of human rights.
The impact of human rights mainstreaming can be observed in the
development and security fields. In the realm of development, the mainstreaming
of human rights has led to improved inter-agency coordination.
New norms were institutionalized in 1998 with the signature of a partnership
agreement between the OHCHR and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP).76
As of 2004, in the wake of Annan’s report on UN
reform, the so-called “Action 2” initiative broadened the original partnership
to include the OHCHR, the UN Development Group (UNDG), and the
Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs. The explicit goal of Action
2 was to provide coordinated inter-agency support to UN country teams
in order to better integrate human rights into their development work.77
In
2009, Action 2 was transformed into the UNDG Human Rights Mainstreaming
Mechanism, which involved all UN development agencies, funds, and
programs. The purpose of this mechanism was to assist national human rights
institutions and to “further strengthen system-wide coherence” on human
rights mainstreaming.78
Inter-agency coordination was fostered by the articulation of a common
human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development. Until the early 2000s
UN agencies had put forward an array of conceptions of the relationship
between development and human rights. In 2003, the cacophony was reduced
thanks to the Stamford Common Understanding, which established an
institutional consensus around the three “essential attributes” of the HRBA.79
	74.	 Julie A. Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era 4 (2d ed.,
2009).
	 75.	 Gerd Oberleitner, A Decade of Mainstreaming Human Rights in the UN: Achievements,
Failures, Challenges, 26 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 386 (2008).
	76.	 See id. at 368.
	77.	 See United Nations Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda
for Further Change, Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (9 Sept.
2002).
	78.	 UNDG, Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism: Summary of the Operational Plan
2011–2013, 2 (2011), available at http://www.mdtf.undp.org/document/download/8302.
	79.	 OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation
15 (2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf.
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 387
The Common Understanding stipulated that all development cooperation
programs should further the realization of human rights.80
It also specified
that the standards resulting from international human rights treaties “guide all
development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of
the programming process.”81
Finally, the Stamford agreement indicated that
“[d]evelopment cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities
of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim
their rights.”82
Even though the HRBA is the subject of ongoing discussion in
the UN, the principles of the Stamford Common Understanding have clearly
led UN country teams to be more mindful of the social and economic rights
of “vulnerable groups.”83
Because security remains largely subject to an intergovernmental logic,
the policy of human rights mainstreaming could not be implemented as
systematically in that area as it was in the development activities of the UN.
Once the Cold War came to a close, however, the spirit of mainstreaming
began to shape UN security practices. In 1991 and 1992 the Security Council
adopted resolutions 688 and 794 concerning, respectively, the repression
of Iraqi Kurds and the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.84
These resolutions
introduced “a new line of argument” to the effect that human rights violations
can threaten international peace and security.85
The trend of linking
international security to respect for human rights was confirmed in 2005 when
UN members accepted the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect.”86
Despite
the inconsistency typical of the Security Council’s attitude, the fact remains
that its decisions are influenced more and more by human rights issues.87
In applying this new approach, the Security Council took groundbreaking
initiatives aimed at protecting civilians in armed conflicts. In particular,
since 1999 a number of resolutions have been adopted in favor of protecting
children and women affected by armed conflicts. One such resolution that
			 See also United Nations, The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation:
Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies (2003), available at http://www.
hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-
a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies.
	80.	 United Nations, The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation, supra note
79.
	81.	 Id. at 16.
	82.	 Id. at 35.
	83.	 See UNDG, Mainstreaming Human Rights for Better Development Impact and Coherence
(2012), available at http://www.mdtf.undp.org/document/download/7508; United
Nations, Guidelines for UN Country Teams on Preparing the CCA and UNDAF (2009),
available at http://www.undg.org/docs/9879/WGPI_2007-CCA-and-UNDAF-Guidelines-
FINAL-February-2009-LOCKED.doc.
	 84.	 S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (5 Apr. 1991); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(3 Dec. 1992).
	85.	 Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions: Between Remedy and Ritual 143 (2007).
	86.	 See Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, supra note 2, at 26–27.
	87.	 See id. at 74–77.
Vol. 36388 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
attracted considerable media attention set up a monitoring and reporting
mechanism on the recruitment and use of child soldiers.88
The mainstreaming of human rights also brought about a significant
change in UN peace operations. Directed toward peacebuilding, every
“second generation” operation launched after the end of the Cold War has
paid attention to the protection of human rights.89
Admittedly, peacebuilding
efforts continue to be torn between a “liberal” and a “republican” approach
toward human rights; nevertheless, peace operations in recent years have
consistently recognized that achieving long term political stability requires
the creation of a “culture of human rights.”90
Finally, the Security Council has institutionalized new practices in order
to subject individuals responsible for massive human rights violations to
international criminal law. In the aftermath of the massacres in Yugoslavia
(1993) and Rwanda (1994), the Council established ad hoc penal tribunals
to prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.91
More recently, at the end of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and East Timor, the
Council assisted both countries in creating special criminal courts.92
Lastly,
the Security Council also submitted to the International Criminal Court cases
of massive human rights violations in Sudan (2005) and Libya (2011).93
The mainstreaming of human rights in UN activities has not resulted in
the paradigm shift that some had hoped for. World politics remain largely
defined by the principle of sovereignty and power relations, especially when
it comes to security and economic matters. Yet, at the same time, current
UN policies attribute greater importance to human rights than was previously
the case. In this evolutionary process, the notion of mainstreaming
has provided a governance framework that has helped orient and legitimize
decision making.
B.	 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
The creation of the OHCHR in 1993 is another UN initiative that has had a
profound influence on the recent evolution of the human rights global policy
	88.	 See S.C. Res. 1612, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (26 July 2005).
	 89.	 Melissa Labonte, Peacebuilding, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights Vol. 4, supra note 47,
at 197–98. See also David P. Forsythe, The UN Security Council and Human Rights: State
Sovereignty and Human Dignity 9 (2012).
	90.	 Labonte, Peacebuilding, supra note 89, at 199. In peacebuilding operations, a liberal
approach towards human rights typically focuses on the promotion of political and
economic competition. By contrast, a republican approach emphasizes the principles
of representation, deliberation, and participation. See Michael Barnett, Building A Republican
Peace: Stabilizing States After War, 30 Int’l Security 87 (2006).
	91.	 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), http://www.icty.org/;
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), http://www.unictr.org/.
	92.	 See Forsythe, The UN Security Council and Human Rights, supra note 89, at 10.
	93.	 Id.
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 389
space. As Julie Mertus noted, the OHCHR “has consistently increased the
relevance of human rights issues within the United Nations and improved
human rights practices at the regional, national, and local levels.”94
As a
unique source of technical expertise and political leadership, the OHCHR
has helped to concretize the ideology of “all human rights for all” in an
innovative way.95
The origins of the OHCHR go back to the period just after the Second
World War. In 1947 the French jurist René Cassin, one of the authors of the
UDHR, proposed to mandate an attorney general for human rights.96
This
proposal was taken up again in various forms during the Cold War but was
always stymied by the ideological divisions then prevailing in international
affairs. In both the East and South, the attorney general project raised fears
that the position would serve to promote a Western vision of human rights
centered on civil and political rights. As of the mid-1980s, however, international
attitudes began to change significantly. The diffusion of democratic
norms and the UN recognition of the right to development paved the way
for a new compromise on the principles of the universality and indivisibility
of human rights. With the end of the Cold War this nascent compromise
was given a decisive political boost.
At the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, “support for the
OHCHR proved to be extremely broad and strong.”97
The assembled governments
thus agreed to create a post of High Commissioner, who would be
responsible “for the promotion and protection of all human rights.”98
A few
months later the General Assembly resolution that instituted the OHCHR
assigned it four ambitious tasks: 1) coordination of human rights-related
activities throughout the UN system; 2) establishment of norms; 3) direct
protection of human rights; and 4) advocacy.99
Today, the OHCHR is identified as “the leading UN entity on human
rights.”100
This status has been enshrined through the High Commissioner’s
ranking as UN Under-Secretary-General, and his or her membership in the
four executive committees of the organization (Peace and Security, Economic
and Social Affairs, Development Cooperation, and Humanitarian Affairs).101
It is important to note as well that within the human rights community the
	94.	 Mertus, supra note 74, at 36.
	 95.	 Theo van Boven, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Encyclopedia
of Human Rights Vol. 5, supra note 47, at 175.
	96.	 Id. at 173.
	97.	 Mertus, supra note 74, at 12.
	 98.	 Vienna Declaration, supra note 41, § II, A, ¶ 18.
	99.	 See UNGA, Res. 48/141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (20 Dec. 1993).
100.	 OHCHR, Annual Report 2011 21 (2012), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/allegati/downloads/0_Whole_
OHCHR_Report_2011.pdf.
101.	 See Mertus, supra note 74, at 13.
Vol. 36390 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
High Commissioner enjoys great moral authority, especially in light of the
fact that the incumbents—half of them women thus far—have often displayed
independence when taking positions.102
The OHCHR has considerable human and financial resources to fulfill
its mandate as compared with the scant resources that were available to
promote human rights before the institution was created. In 2011 it had 1,131
employees: 555 (49 percent) in Geneva, 555 in the field (49 percent) and
21 in New York (2 percent).103
Meanwhile, the institution’s regular budget
has constantly increased, going from under $3 million in 1995 to almost
$152 million in 2010–2011.104
A key aspect of this evolution is no doubt
the proportion of expenditures devoted to field missions (48 percent). In fact,
the expansion of the OHCHR’s fieldwork has been described as “the most
influential development to have occurred since the establishment of the post
of the High Commissioner.”105
Thanks to its active in-country presence the
OHCHR has often been compared to the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Refugees, one of the most credible and efficient multilateral agencies.106
In charge of mainstreaming human rights in UN policies, the OHCHR has
helped to give a concrete form to the ideology of indivisible and universal
rights. Thus, the principle of indivisibility of human rights is reflected in every
aspect of the operations of the OHCHR. The organization’s bureaucratic
structure and thematic strategies clearly testify to a desire to strike a balance
between civil and political rights on one hand, and economic, social and
cultural rights on the other. In its own way, each of the programs of the
OHCHR opposing discrimination, combating inequality and poverty, defending
the rights of migrants or protecting human rights in armed conflicts puts
forward a holistic approach designed to promote the effective application
of democratic principles and the empowerment of people.
The OHCHR furthermore contributes in different ways to making human
rights universal. For one thing, it should be recalled that one of the
fundamental missions of the OHCHR is to encourage the universal ratification
and implementation of all major international human rights agreements.
In addition, the body’s geographic deployment attests to a wish to provide
assistance and training on all continents. In 2012 the OHCHR ran twelve
country and stand-alone offices in addition to thirteen regional offices, was
involved in fifteen peace missions, and coordinated eighteen human rights
advisers.107
The decentralization of its operations allows the organization to
102.	 See Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, supra note 2, at 84–85.
103.	OHCHR, Annual Report 2011, supra note 100, at 22.
104.	 Id. at 23. See also Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions, supra note 85, at 91.
105.	 Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions, supra note 85, at 91.
106.	 See Alfred de Zayas, José Ayala Lasso, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights Vol. 1, supra note
47, at 130–32.
107.	 See OHCHR, Annual Report 2011, supra note 100, at 8 and 22.
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 391
exercise influence virtually everywhere, including most of the poorest and
least safe countries in the world. Finally, the OHCHR endeavors to promote
the universality norm by attending to the improvement of human rights for
all individuals. In accordance with the UN discourse that advocates the goal
of social inclusion, its activities consistently focus on vulnerable groups:
women, children, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities,
and sexual minorities.
The establishment of the OHCHR represents one of the greatest innovations
in the recent history of multilateral cooperation. Of course, the OHCHR
still faces persistent power struggles, disputes over its mandate, and financial
constraints. Gerd Oberleitner has aptly summed up the organization’s challenges,
stating that it had a “mission impossible” because it is “part servant at
the disposal of governments, part shield against those very governments.”108
Even so, the OHCHR has pushed the international politics of human rights
“beyond . . . standard-setting,” and its actions have strengthened the norms
of the indivisibility and universality of rights.109
Compared to the Cold War
period the OHCHR has clearly given unprecedented momentum to human
rights diplomacy.
C.	 The Human Rights Council
UN efforts to translate the ideology of “all human rights for all” into global
policy culminated with the creation of the Human Rights Council (Council)
in 2006. Because of its inter-governmental nature and its broad mandate,
the Council is often perceived to be the “central pillar” of the UN human
rights system.110
Though it remains the object of harsh criticisms, the Council
has contributed nonetheless to further institutionalizing the principles of
universal and indivisible rights.
The Council replaced the Commission on Human Rights (Commission)
established in 1946. Over its sixty-year existence, the Commission had
some undeniable success in setting human rights standards and in examining
gross violations of human rights, particularly those related to apartheid
and colonialism.111
As of the 1960s, the Commission’s innovation was
exhibited with the creation of special procedures: a series of investigation
mechanisms implemented by independent experts, special rapporteurs, or
working groups for the purpose of monitoring specific countries and rights.
At the turn of the millennium, however, the Commission was assailed from
108.	 Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions, supra note 85, at 89.
109.	 Mertus, supra note 74, at 35.
110.	 In Larger Freedom, supra note 30, ¶ 146.
111.	 See Jarvis Matiya, Repositioning the International Human Rights Protection System: the
UN Human Rights Council, 36 Commonwealth L. Bull. 314 (2010).
Vol. 36392 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
all sides for its “eroding credibility and professionalism.”112
Debates were
plagued by accusations of selectivity from countries of the South. Membership
became a source of rising tension in 2002 when Syria was elected to
the Commission and the United States was not. This adversarial climate
seriously undermined the Commission’s otherwise significant work but it
also helped create a “surprising degree of consensus” around the need to
reform the UN human rights system.113
Following proposals made by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change and the Secretary-General, the 2005 World Summit
provided an ideal setting for designing a new institution that would remedy
the Commission’s deficiencies. Although the world leaders who convened
in New York rejected Annan’s most ambitious reform plans, they did reach
a political agreement on the creation of a Human Rights Council. In the
ensuing months, institutional arrangements were ironed out and adopted
by the General Assembly, opening “a new era” in the human rights work
of the United Nations.114
The promotion from Economic and Social Council subsidiary to the
General Assembly gave the Council more authority and a higher political
profile. In becoming “accountable to the full membership of the UN,” the
Council took a major step towards universalizing the monitoring of human
rights.115
Several other institutional changes were introduced to depoliticize
the human rights system and increase its legitimacy. In particular, to move
away from regional horse-trading, it was determined that election to the
Council would require a majority vote in the Assembly. Also, to end de
facto permanent membership for powerful countries, states would serve
a maximum of two three-year terms. The geographic balance in seats was
readjusted to reflect current population figures. Finally, the human rights
record of candidate countries would inform the election process and membership
would be suspended in the event of gross human rights violations.
The reform also steered the new human rights body towards increased
efficiency. For instance, the Council was to convene at least ten weeks per
year in three sessions, compared to the previous annual six-week gathering
in the spring. More fundamentally, the Council mandate emphasized the
objective of “strengthening the capacity of Member States to comply with
112.	 The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility ¶ 283 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/
en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf [hereinafter HLPTCC].
113.	 Philip Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the
New UN Human Rights Council, 7 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 186 (2006).
114.	 Press Release, Secretary-General, “The Eyes of the World are Upon You,” Secretary-General
Says in Address to First Meeting of Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10520
(19 June 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10520.doc.
htm.
115.	 Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Working Together 24 (Joachim Müller ed.,
2010).
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 393
their human rights obligations.”116
Furthermore, it was hoped that improved
efficiency would go hand in hand with a “change in culture” from confrontation
to cooperation.117
This new mindset would help members focus on
issues of substance “rather than who is debating and voting on them.”118
The Council also embodied the universality and indivisibility principles at
the heart of the UN human rights ideology. Its founding document reaffirmed
that “all States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems,
have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”119
To uphold those principles, the Council set up three innovative
devices as part of its institution-building package: new special sessions,
enhanced special procedures, and a universal periodic review (UPR).
Any state can now call special sessions on human rights emergencies.
These sessions “should allow participatory debate, be results-oriented and
geared to achieving practical outcomes.”120
So far, some special sessions
have addressed global issues such as the impact of the economic, financial,
and food crises on human rights. Others have looked at country situations,
including those of Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Palestine, Sri Lanka, and Syria.
While critics still deplore the persisting “selectivity” of such sessions, they
do offer a new protection tool and, hence, have helped to put UN principles
into practice.
Special procedures—the Commission’s most celebrated achievement—
are “at the heart of the Council’s work.”121
Their multiplication since 2006
has confirmed the predominance of thematic over country mandates, thereby
reinforcing the universality norm, since “all States are, at least in principle,
equally under scrutiny.”122
Covering themes such as the right to water and
sanitation, human rights and transnational corporations, and environmental
rights, the new special procedures mandates have also supported the indivisibility
of rights by helping to shift the balance in favor of socio economic
rights. Under the Council, special procedures have generated discussions
that have been “unprecedented in their vitality, the depth of interaction
[. . .], and the level and nature of participation.”123
It is still a challenge for
116.	 UNGA, Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/251, at 2 (3 Apr. 2006) [hereinafter Human
Rights Council].
117.	 Press Release, Secretary-General, “The Eyes of the World are Upon You,” supra note
114.
118.	 HLPTCC, supra note 112, ¶ 285.
119.	 Human Rights Council, supra note 116, at 1.
120.	 Human Rights Council, Institution-Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/1 (18 June 2007), ¶ 128.
121.	Alston, supra note 113, at 215. See also Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions,
supra note 85, at 54–62.
122.	 Oliver Hoehne, Special Procedures and the New Human Rights Council—A Need for
Strategic Positioning, 4 Essex Hum. Rts. Rev. (2007).
123.	 Yvonne Terlingen, The Human Rights Council: A New Era in UN Human Rights Work?,
21 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 176 (2007).
Vol. 36394 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
mandate holders to enter some countries, session time allocated to their
reports remains limited, and poor funding constrains follow-up, but overall
the transition to the Council has strengthened special procedures.
The UPR is the Council’s “one entirely new mechanism.”124
It also provides
one of the best examples of how the universality principle has been
incorporated into UN human rights policies. Under the UPR mechanism,
every four years all UN member states undergo a peer review that assesses
their respect and implementation of all human rights. In a typical UPR session,
the state under review begins by presenting a national human rights
report prepared in consultation with civil society. It then responds to comments
and questions and hears recommendations informed by the input of
UN members and other stakeholders. Governments ultimately remain “parties
and judges at the same time” because they are free to determine their
implementation commitments.125
Yet in its own modest way the UPR has
contributed “something new and different to human rights monitoring.”126
In particular, observers have noted the “substantial success in injecting human
rights concerns raised by NGOs into the UPR process.”127
All states
participated in the first UPR cycle, and as the second cycle began in 2012
the Council’s focus was likely to shift towards “implementation of the accepted
commitments.”128
While the jury is still out on the UPR’s impact
on the ground, this mechanism certainly has added political strength to
universality and indivisibility norms.
The creation of the Council resulted from complex political negotiations.
As Ramcharan explains, there are inherent contradictions between
its fundamental nature as “a political body and its lofty values mandate.”129
Others have suggested that the changes introduced by the Council are “largely
procedural.”130
Clearly, such criticisms cannot be dismissed. Yet one should
not overlook the fact that the Council is often viewed as “the cornerstone”
of recent UN reform efforts.131
The Council may provide further evidence
that the politics of international human rights evolves at a painfully slow
124.	 Gareth Sweeney & Yuri Saito, An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN
Human Rights Council, 9 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 203 (2009).
125.	Matiya, supra note 111, at 321.
126.	 Rhona Smith, “To See Themselves as Others See Them”: The Five Permanent Members
of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, 35
Hum. Rts. Q. 28 (2013).
127.	 Lawrence C. Moss, Opportunities for Nongovernmental Organization Advocacy in the
Universal Periodic Review Process at the UN Human Rights Council, 2 J. Hum. Rts.
Prac. 123 (2010).
128.	 Press Release, Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Holds General Debate on
Universal Periodic Review (16 Mar. 2012), available at www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11980&LangID=E.
129.	 Bertrand Ramcharan, The UN Human Rights Council 123 (2011). See also Rosa Freedman,
The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment 297 (2013).
130.	 Normand & Zaidi, supra note 23, at 338.
131.	 Reforming the United Nations, supra note 115, at 24.
2014 UN and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era 395
pace, but its very existence brings strong institutional support to the UN
human rights ideology.
V.	Conclusion
This article has shown that since the end of the Cold War the United Nations
has maintained a consistent ideology of human rights through both its
discourse and a series of global public policies. In addition to proclaiming
the promotion of human rights a political objective comparable to peace
and development, present day UN ideology is exceptionally steadfast in
asserting the indivisibility and universality of human rights. The policy of
human rights mainstreaming as well as the creation of the OHCHR and the
Council clearly illustrate UN efforts to translate this ideology into practice.
In highlighting the United Nations aspirations and accomplishments,
this article of course has only provided a partial view of the human rights
global policy space. It is a well-known fact that the state of human rights in
the world lags far behind UN ideals. According to the approach used here,
this situation can be ascribed to the UN being only one actor among many
in the “global competition of ideas.”132
In the realm of human rights, as in
most areas, states remain the key political forces of international relations.
And states are often inclined to contest the principles of the indivisibility
and universality of human rights as advocated by the UN.
Many countries of the North continue to oppose the indivisibility principle
and to regard civil and political rights as more important than economic
and social rights. It is telling, for instance, that wealthy states persist in seeing
the right to development as a set of moral rather than legal commitments.
Even when they agree to discuss economic rights, these countries uphold
a hierarchical approach to human rights and often place the rights of investors
above those of workers. As for countries of the South, they remain
mistrustful of the universality norm. Their support for universal principles
is often diluted by clauses emphasizing “respect for national sovereignty
and territorial integrity,” and the need to “tak[e] into account the political,
historical, social, religious and cultural particularities of each country.”133
All in all, it is obvious that states resist any human rights ideology that
puts in doubt their own definition of the national interest. The particularity of
the last two decades lies elsewhere. It resides in the fact that an organization
such as the UN has managed to build an international compromise around
“all human rights for all,” and shown growing determination in introducing
132.	 Weber & Jentleson, supra note 10, at 17–60.
133.	 Non-Aligned Movement, Final Document, 16th Summit of Heads of State or Government
of the Non-Aligned Movement, Tehran, 26–31 Aug. 2012, at 133.
Vol. 36396 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
human rights considerations into global politics. Critics are no doubt right
to point out that the impact of UN ideology remains limited. Yet it is most
certainly on the rise and, as one expert suggests, for many people in many
countries that has meant “progress.”134
134.	 Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 Am. J. Int’l
L. 807 (2006).
2014 Contributors 505
Jean-Philippe Thérien is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Director
of the Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité internationale (Center for International
Peace and Security Studies) at Université de Montréal.
Carmel Williams, Ph.D., is a Research Associate and Fellow of the Harvard School
of Public Health, FXB Center for Health and Human Rights. She has worked in
international health program management for over 10 years, and has research interests
in rights-based approaches to program design and program impact on health
systems. She is currently teaching New Zealand’s first postgraduate course in health
and human rights in development practice.
René Wolfsteller is a Ph.D. student at the University of Glasgow, funded by the College
of Social Sciences. His research focuses on the sociological analysis of human
rights discourses as practices of subject-formation.
Alicia Ely Yamin is a Lecturer on Global Health and Director of the Health Rights
of Women and Children Program at the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at
Harvard University. Her career focuses on the intersection of health, human rights, and
development bridges academia and activism. She has published dozens of scholarly
articles and various books relating to health and human rights.Yamin regularly advises
UN agencies on global health, human rights, and development issues.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.