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Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism:

Economic have-nots and cultural backlash

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Abstract: Rising support for populist parties has disrupted the politics of many Western societies. What explains this phenomenon? Two theories are examined here. Perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism -- the *economic insecurity* perspective--emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. Alternatively, the *cultural backlash* thesis suggests that support can be explained as a retro reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change. To consider these arguments, *Part I* develops the conceptual and theoretical framework. *Part II* of the study uses the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries. *Part III* compares the pattern of European party competition at national-level. *Part IV* uses the pooled European Social Survey 1-6 (2002-2014) to examine the cross-national evidence at individual level for the impact of the economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of voting for populist parties. *Part V* summarizes the key findings and considers their implications. Overall, we find the most consistent evidence supporting the cultural backlash thesis.

Keywords: populist parties and leaders, radical right, elections, democracy, cultural value change, economic insecurity

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Populist leaders like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Norbert Hoffer, Nigel Farage, and Geert Wilders are prominent today in many countries, altering established patterns of party competition in contemporary Western societies. Cas Mudde argues that the impact of populist parties has been exaggerated.¹ But these parties have gained votes and seats in many countries, and entered government coalitions in eleven Western democracies, including in Austria, Italy and Switzerland.² Across Europe, as we will demonstrate, their average share of the vote in national and European parliamentary elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, from around 5.1% to 13.2%, at the expense of center parties.³ During the same era, their share of seats has tripled, from 3.8% to 12.8%. Even in countries without many elected populist representatives, these parties can still exert tremendous ‘blackmail’ pressure on mainstream parties, public discourse, and the policy agenda, as is illustrated by the UKIP’s role in catalyzing the British exit from the European Union, with massive consequences.

The electoral fortunes of populist parties are open to multiple explanations which can be grouped into accounts focused upon (1) the demand-side of public opinion, (2) the supply-side of party strategies, and (3) constitutional arrangements governing the rules of the electoral game.⁴

This study examines two theories on the demand-side. Perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism -- the *economic inequality* perspective--emphasizes the consequences for electoral behavior arising from profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. There is overwhelming evidence of powerful trends toward greater income and wealth inequality in the West, based on the rise of the knowledge economy, technological automation, and the collapse of manufacturing industry, global flows of labor, goods, peoples, and capital (especially the inflow of migrants and refugees), the erosion of organized labor, shrinking welfare safety-nets, and neo-liberal austerity policies.⁵ According to this view, rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the left-behinds has fueled popular resentment of the political classes. This situation is believed to have made the less secure strata of society – low-waged unskilled workers, the long-term unemployed, households dependent on shrinking social benefits, residents of public housing, single-parent families, and poorer white populations living in inner-city areas with concentrations of immigrants-- susceptible to the anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering exploited of populist movements, parties, and leaders, blaming ‘Them’ for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’.

Another related account, the *cultural backlash* thesis suggests that the surge in votes for populist parties can be explained not as a purely economic phenomenon but in large part as a reaction against

progressive cultural change. This argument builds on the 'silent revolution' theory of value change, which holds that the unprecedentedly high levels of existential security experienced by the people of developed Western societies during the postwar decades brought an intergenerational shift toward post-materialist values, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, generating rising support for left-libertarian parties such as the Greens and other progressive movements advocating environmental protection, human rights, and gender equality.⁶ A large body of empirical evidence documents these developments, which first became evident in affluent societies during the early-1970s, when the postwar generation first surfaced into political relevance, bringing an era of student protest.⁷ This cultural shift has sometimes been depicted as an inexorable cultural escalator moving post-industrial societies steadily in a more progressive direction, as opportunities for college education have expanded to more and more sectors of the population and as younger cohorts have gradually replaced their parents and grandparents in the population. But it has been clear from the start that reactions to these developments triggered a counter-revolutionary retro backlash, especially among the older generation, white men, and less educated sectors, who sense decline and actively reject the rising tide of progressive values, resent the displacement of familiar traditional norms, and provide a pool of supporters potentially vulnerable to populist appeals.⁸ Sectors once culturally predominant in Western Europe may react angrily to the erosion of their privileges and status.

Yet the analytical distinction drawn between economic inequality and cultural backlash theories may also be somewhat artificial. Interactive processes may possibly link these factors, if structural changes in the workforce and social trends in globalized markets heighten economic insecurity, and if this, in turn, stimulates a negative backlash among traditionalists towards cultural shifts. It may not be an either/or question, but one of relative emphasis with interactive effects.

To consider these arguments, *Part I* unpacks the conceptual and theoretical framework. We argue that the classic economic Left-Right cleavage in party competition is overlaid today by a new Cultural cleavage dividing Populists from Cosmopolitan Liberalism. *Part II* of the study uses the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries. Factor analysis is used to confirm that cultural and economic items form two distinct dimensions of party competition, as theorized. The items are summed into cultural and economic scales which are then used to identify the ideological location of European political parties. The reliability of estimates is checked and confirmed using independent measures. *Part III* presents the comparison of European party competition at national-level, using these scales, along with evidence of changes over time of the old Left-Right

cleavage based on the declining salience of economic issues in party manifestos and class voting in the electorate. The cultural and economic scales generate a four-fold typology which distinguishes European parties located on the Populist Left and Populist Right. *Part IV* turns to the pooled European Social Survey 1-6 (2002-2014) to examine the cross-national evidence at individual level for the impact of economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of contemporary voting for populist parties. Multivariate logistic regression models analyze the evidence for the economic and cultural theories, with controls. *Part V* summarizes the key findings and considers their implications.

The conclusion highlights several main findings. First, the results of analyzing the demographic and social controls confirm that *populist support in Europe is generally stronger among the older generation, men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities*, patterns confirming previous research.⁹ The exact reasons underlying these relationships remain unclear, however, and these are theoretically open to interpretation. For example, educational effects may arise from the way that schooling shapes subsequent socio-economic status, job security and salaries, and career opportunities, or it may be the way that formal learning and cognitive skills typically strengthen social tolerance and progressive values.

Looking more directly at evidence for the *economic insecurity thesis*, the results of the empirical analysis are mixed and inconsistent. Thus populist parties did receive significantly greater support among the less well-off (reporting difficulties in making ends meet) and among those with experience of unemployment, supporting the economic insecurity interpretation. But other measures do not consistently confirm the claim that populist support is due to resentment of economic inequality and social deprivation; for example, in terms of occupational class, populist voting was strongest among the petty bourgeoisie, not unskilled manual workers. Populists also received significantly *less* support (not more) among sectors dependent on social welfare benefits as their main source of household income and among those living in urban areas.

By contrast, even after applying social and demographic controls, *all of the five cultural value scales proved consistent predictors of voting support for populist parties and pointed in the expected direction*; thus populist support was strengthened by anti-immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global and national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement. The fit of the model also improves considerably.

Overall we conclude that cultural values, combined with several social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent and parsimonious explanation for voting support for populist parties; their

contemporary popularity in Europe is largely due to ideological appeals to traditional values which are concentrated among the older generation, men, the religious, ethnic majorities, and less educated sectors of society. We believe that these are the groups most likely to feel that they have become strangers from the predominant values in their own country, left behind by progressive tides of cultural change which they do not share. Older white men with traditional values- who formed the cultural majority in Western societies during the 1950s and 1960s - have seen their predominance and privilege eroded. The silent revolution of the 1970s appears to have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today. In the longer-term, the generation gap is expected to fade over time, as older cohorts with traditional attitudes are gradually replaced in the population by their children and grand-children, adhering to more progressive values. In the short-term, however, the heated culture wars dividing young and old have the capacity to heighten generational conflict, to challenge the legitimacy of liberal democracy, and to disrupt long-established patterns of party competition.

I: Theoretical framework

The 2016 presidential election campaign in the United States reflects the phenomenon of populism. Many commentators have found it difficult to understand the rise of Donald Trump. How could such a polarizing figure and political neophyte surge to become the potential standard-bearer for the GOP – much less have any chance of entering the White House? He has been sharply attacked by conservatives such as George Will, establishment Republicans such as Jeb Bush, social liberals such as Elizabeth Warren, and socialists such as Bernie Sanders. His rhetoric peddles a mélange of xenophobic fear tactics (against Mexicans and Muslims), deep-seated misogyny, paranoid conspiracy theories about his rivals, and isolationist ‘America First’ policies abroad. His populism is rooted in claims that he is an outsider to D.C. politics, a self-made billionaire leading an insurgency movement on behalf of ordinary Americans disgusted with the corrupt establishment, incompetent politicians, dishonest Wall Street speculators, arrogant intellectuals, and politically correct liberals. The CNN exit polls across all the 2016 GOP primaries and caucuses from Iowa onwards revealed that the education gap in support for Trump was substantial; on average, only one quarter of post-graduates voted for Trump compared with almost half (45%) of those with high school education or less.¹⁰ A gender gap was also evident; on average, across all GOP primaries and caucuses, 39% of men voted for Trump compared with 33% of women. Despite being located on opposite sides of the aisle, Trump’s rhetoric taps into some of the same populist anti-elite anger articulated by Bernie Sanders when attacking big corporations, big donors, and big banks.

But Trump and Sanders are far from unique. There are historical precedents in America exemplified by Huey Long's Share Our Wealth movement and George Wallace's white backlash. And Trump's angry nativist rhetoric and nationalistic appeal fits the wave of populist leaders whose support has been swelling in many Western democracies.¹¹ During the last two decades, in many countries, parties led by populist authoritarian leaders have grown in popularity, gaining legislative seats, reaching ministerial office, and holding the balance of power. Recently we've seen notable gains for the Swiss People's Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swedish Democrats, Greece's Golden Dawn, and the Danish People's Party. Both the center-left and center-right are concerned about the popularity of Marine Le Pen's Front Nationale, Matteo Salvini's Northern League, and Geert Wilders's Party for Freedom. In Eastern Europe, the success of the neo-fascist Jobbik party in Hungary pushed the ruling Fidesz party even further to the right; leading them to build a wall against the wave of migrants flooding across Europe. It's not just Europe, either; Latin America also has populist leaders on the economic left of the political spectrum, exemplified by Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Evo Morales in Bolivia.¹²

Populist parties do not have to gain many votes to exert substantial influence; in Britain, for example, the UK Independence Party won only one seat in the May 2015 general election. Nevertheless, its populist rhetoric fueled rabid anti-European and anti-immigration sentiments in Britain, pressuring the Conservatives to call the EU Brexit referendum. The escalating consequences have been profound and catastrophic both at home and abroad, instigating Britain's messy divorce from the European Union, the resignation of the Prime Minister, David Cameron, challenges to the Labour leadership, prospects for disintegration of the United Kingdom as a unitary state, deep uncertainty in financial markets, an outbreak of hate speech attacking immigrants, and calls by other populist parties to hold similar referenda over EU membership in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and elsewhere.¹³

The concept of populism

What exactly is populism? There are many interpretations of this concept, and numerous attempts to identify the political parties and movements that fall into this category.¹⁴ Cas Mudde has been influential in the literature, suggesting that populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: *anti-establishment*, *authoritarianism*, and *nativism*.¹⁵ Firstly, populism is understood as a philosophy that emphasizes faith in the wisdom and virtue of ordinary people (the silent majority) over the 'corrupt' establishment. Populism reflects deep cynicism and resentment of existing authorities, whether big business, big banks, multinational corporations, media pundits, elected politicians and government officials, intellectual elites and scientific experts, and the arrogant and privileged rich.

Ordinary people are regarded as homogeneous and inherently 'good' or 'decent', in counterpart to dishonest elites ('Crooked' Hillary/'Lyn' Ted).¹⁶ Secondly, populists also characteristically display authoritarian leanings, favoring the personal power exerted by strong and charismatic leadership which is thought to reflect the will of the people. Populists also favor direct forms of majoritarian democracy for the expression of the voice of the people, through opinion polls, referenda and plebiscites, rather than the institutional checks and balances and the protection of minority rights built into processes of representative democracy.¹⁷ Finally, by 'ordinary people', populist discourse typically emphasizes nativism or xenophobic nationalism, which assumes that the 'people' are a uniform whole, and that states should exclude people from other countries and cultures. Populism favors mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation and development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, labor and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values. Hence Trump's rhetoric seeks to stir up a potent mix of racial resentment, intolerance of multiculturalism, nationalistic isolationism, nostalgia for past glories, mistrust of outsiders, traditional misogyny and sexism, the appeal of forceful strong-man leadership, attack-dog politics, and racial and anti-Muslim animus. "Populism" is a standard way of referring to this syndrome, emphasizing its allegedly broad roots in ordinary people; it might equally well be described as xenophobic authoritarianism.

We view Populist values as representing one pole of a cultural continuum on which Cosmopolitan Liberal values are located at the opposite pole; this dimension is depicted heuristically on the vertical axis in Figure 1. The word 'cosmopolitan', which derives from the Greek word *kosmopolitês* ('citizen of the world'), refers to the idea that all humans increasingly live and interact within a single global community, not simply within a single polity.¹⁸ It thus captures the antithesis to nativism. The conceptual distinction between cosmopolitans and locals has been part of the social sciences ever since Robert Merton developed it to study small town America during World War II.¹⁹ Cosmopolitan values emphasize the value of open national borders, shared multicultural values, diversity of peoples and lifestyles in outward-looking and inclusive societies. Since World War II, connections among peoples of different nations have become more cosmopolitan, with multiple networks linking their lives. The belief that one lives in a homogenous nation-state is weakened by flows of workers, expatriate employees, tourists, students, refugees, and diaspora communities.

Moreover, Cosmopolitan ideas emphasizing open borders and open societies are combined with Liberal values which challenge the authoritarian component of populism, emphasizing the importance of horizontal checks and balances in the institutions of representative democracy, protection of minority

rights, participation through elections and membership of political parties, tolerance of social, intellectual, and political diversity, the process of pluralistic bargaining and compromise, the contribution of scientific expertise for rational policymaking, and the post-war architecture of global governance and international cooperation. Social liberalism is also linked with support for equal rights for women and minorities, flexible rather than fixed gender roles, fluid gender identities and LGBT rights, environmental protection, and secular rather than religious values.

Previous analyses of parties in Western Europe have often associated populism with the Right, using terms such as ‘radical right’, ‘far right’, or ‘extremist right’ parties.²⁰ But it is increasingly recognized that this fails to capture certain core features of populist parties around the world, such as in the Americas, Eastern Europe, and Asia, where populist parties often favor economic left-wing policies.²¹ For example, President Hugo Chavez was a charismatic leader railing against the ‘predatory’ political elite, economic austerity measures, and the United States when attempting a socialist revolution in Venezuela. In the United States, historically the Populist Party founded in 1891 was on the left, an anti-elite rural movement critical of capitalism, especially banks, associated with organized labor. Similarly, Donald Trump’s speeches trampling on conservative orthodoxies, by advocating protectionist trade barriers, renegotiating NAFTA, and raising import tariffs against Chinese goods, is arguably located on the Populist Left, far away from the economic philosophy of neo-conservatives, although his argument favoring business tax cuts is more right-wing. For these reasons, as illustrated in Figure 1, in this study the new cultural cleavage dividing Populists and Cosmopolitan Liberals is viewed as orthogonal to the classic economic class cleavage, which dominated West European party competition during post-war decades.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

Figure 2 depicts how parties are expected to map onto the value cleavages, illustrated by the case of Germany. Thus the horizontal axis depicted in this heuristic model locates Communists, Socialists and Social Democratic parties on the economic Left, favoring state management of the economy, economic redistribution through progressive taxation, and strong welfare states and public services. By contrast, Liberal, Conservative, and Christian Democratic parties on the economic Right favor free markets and private enterprise, a more modest role for the state, deregulation, and low taxation. The ideological position of green parties is predicted to be most clearly favoring Cosmopolitan Liberal values. Based on this heuristic model, some Populist parties, like the German Republikaner, UKIP, and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which favor markets over the state, are expected to be located on the economic Right of the horizontal axis. By contrast others, like Ataka in Bulgaria and Jobbik in Hungary, which advocate policies

of redistribution and social protection, are expected to be located on the economic Left. The next section of the paper operationalizes this model and classifies European parties based on expert assessments of their policy positions.

Why is populism on the rise?

Populism is not new; van Beyme suggests that this movement has historically experienced at least three successive waves.²² But the era during the late-twentieth century has seen a substantial resurgence in their popularity. What explains contemporary developments? Observers commonly offer historical narratives, focused upon certain events and particular circumstances, to account for the rise of individual populist parties and leaders in each case. For example, American commentators have speculated that the success of Donald Trump in the GOP primaries reflected a racist reaction to the election (and reelection) of the first African-American president to the White House.²³ It has also been thought to rest upon the appeal of the out-spoken candidate and heated rhetoric triggered by a backlash against 'No drama Obama's' reserved personality, rational control, and cool style.²⁴ It can also be regarded as the inevitable outcome of the Tea Party tilt pushing the House Republican leadership further to the right and partisan gridlock in Congress, with Trump inheriting the mantle of Sarah Palin.²⁵ Similarly, the way that Brexit catalyzed support for UKIP and populist movements elsewhere in Europe is open to nation-specific explanations, including the decision by the Conservative party leader, David Cameron, to offer a referendum on Britain's European Union membership as a way to appease Euro-skeptics within his party, the cynical but failed strategy that Boris Johnson followed by heading the 'Leave' campaign in an (unsuccessful) attempt to advance his prospects for leadership of the Conservative party, the role of the tabloid headlines in stoking euro-skepticism, public miscalculations by Leave voters under-estimating the impact of their actions, and the capacity of referenda to mobilize protest voting.

Nation-specific events such as these are proximate causes that help to explain why things worked out as they did within a given country-- but they do not explain why the vote for populist parties across many countries has roughly doubled in recent decades. A general theory is needed, to explain this.

Comparative explanations for the electoral success of populist parties can be sub-divided into three categories,²⁶ emphasizing: (i) the *institutional rules of the game* regulating the market for party competition (such as ballot access laws, effective vote thresholds, types of electoral systems, and political finance regulations);²⁷ (ii) the *supply-side* strategic appeals of party leaders and political parties as Downsian rational actors when deciding whether to emphasize either ideological or populist appeals

within this institutional context;²⁸ and/or, (iii) the *demand-side* role of voter's attitudes, values, and opinions.

Within this last category, many accounts have sought to explain the attitudes of voters.²⁹ Explanations for the factors driving *changes* in mass support for populists have commonly emphasized either (1) economic inequality and deprivation, focusing on grievances arising from structural changes transforming post-industrial economies, or (2) cultural accounts, emphasizing the role of changing cultural values. What do these theories suggest?

Theories of growing economic inequality in knowledge societies

The argument that populism reflects rising socioeconomic inequalities within affluent societies has long historical roots – for example, it was applied during the 1950s and 1960s in classic accounts by the fathers of political sociology, Seymour Martin Lipset and by Daniel Bell, to explain the appeal of fascism in Weimar Germany, Poujadism in France, and McCarthyism in the United States. Each of these movements was seen as an authoritarian reaction against modernity, with support concentrated mainly among the *petite bourgeoisie* – small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants, self-employed artisans, and independent farmers – squeezed between the growing power of big business and the collective clout of organized labor.³⁰ Stimulated by fears of downward mobility and loss of social status, fascist parties and extremist movements were thought to tap fears and insecurities among those who lost out to industrialization. As Lipset and Bell argued: “Extremist movements have much in common. They appeal to the disgruntled and psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and the authoritarian persons.”³¹

Echoing and updating these concerns, prominent contemporary theorists such as Esping-Anderson argue that during the early twenty first century affluent societies saw the emergence of a new under-class concentrated among poorly-educated populations.³² In this view, some residual elements of the appeal of authoritarian movements can still be detected among the *petit bourgeoisie*, but populist rhetoric is thought to have fallen upon its most fertile ground among the low-skilled, blue collar underclass, with low wages and minimal job security, most vulnerable to social risks, who have tumbled through the cracks of the welfare state within affluent societies.³³ Thomas Piketty's influential thesis has brought renewed attention to rising levels of wealth and income inequality.³⁴ In recent decades, the real income of most people in developed Western nations has stagnated or declined; despite substantial economic growth, the gains have gone almost entirely to the top ten percent of the population, largely to the top one percent. Economic inequality has been exacerbated by growing automation and outsourcing,

globalization and growing mobility of capital and labor, the erosion of blue-collar labor unions, neo-liberal austerity policies, the growth of the knowledge economy, and the limited capacity of democratic governments to regulate investment decisions by multinational corporations or to stem migration flows.

The contemporary version of the economic inequality argument links these developments directly with rising mass support for populism, which is understood to reflect divisions between the winners and losers from global markets, and thus whether lives are economically secure or insecure.³⁵ In this argument, economic vulnerability is conducive to in-group solidarity, conformity to group norms, and rejection of outsiders. When threatened, groups are thought to seek strong, authoritarian leaders to protect them from what are perceived as dangerous outsiders seen as threatening jobs and benefits.³⁶ Anxiety arising from contemporary events - boatloads of migrants and refugees flooding into Europe, images of the aftermath of random acts of domestic terrorism in Paris, Brussels, and Istanbul, and austerity measures-- are blamed for exacerbating economic grievances linked with rising income inequality, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and stagnant wages.

These developments are commonly assumed to have been particularly important for the electoral fortunes of European parties. In the center-right, growing secularization across the continent and empty church pews have eroded the traditional electoral base of Christian Democratic parties.³⁷ Meanwhile, on the left, social individualization and fragmentation are believed to have eroded the mass membership of traditional collective organizations, social networks, and mass movements that used to mobilize working class communities, exemplified by workers' cooperatives and trade unions.³⁸ Collective movements and organized labor, which functioned in the past as a channel for the mobilization and expression of working class grievances, have found their negotiating powers increasingly constrained by global markets and multinational corporations. Socialist and social democratic parties in the center-left have found their electoral base eroded by the shrinking numbers of industrial workers in their rust-belt heartlands, forcing them to widen their electoral appeals as catch-all parties to attract public-sector professionals.³⁹ Socially-disadvantaged groups, Betz suggests, are most prone to blame ethnic minorities and migrant populations for deteriorating conditions, loss of manufacturing jobs, and inadequate welfare services. Populists often advocate protectionist policies like trade barriers and tariffs, and they commonly attack governments for failing to provide the growing prosperity and sense of shared community that was characteristic of postwar societies (hence Trump's slogan of 'Make America Great Again'). The failure of center-left parties to restore a sense of security and prosperity to the unemployed and under-privileged in affluent societies, this account argues, means that their traditional supporters have fled to populist parties which promise

to restore the past golden age.⁴⁰ Therefore, drawing upon these arguments, the economic insecurity thesis explains populism as a product of growing income inequality, grievances among the losers from global markets, disaffection with mainstream center-left parties, and loss of faith in the capacity of the mainstream parties to respond to these concerns.⁴¹

What systematic empirical evidence would support this argument? If the economic insecurity thesis is correct, the logic predicts that mass support for populism should be observed to be concentrated among economically marginalized sectors who are the main losers from global markets, technological advances, and knowledge societies. Thus populist votes should be strongest among unskilled workers, the unemployed, those lacking college degrees, house-holds dependent on welfare benefits as their main source of income, and those living in inner-city urban areas, such as in London, Paris, Amsterdam and Munich, which typically attract some of the highest concentrations of foreign-born residents. Populist support should also be predicted by subjective feelings of economic insecurity, such as among those reporting difficulties in making ends meet.

Some previous systematic empirical evidence supports the economic argument; for example, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers report that radical right support at individual-level in Western Europe was significantly stronger among the unemployed, blue-collar workers, and less educated sectors, as well as among men.⁴² Yet these were individual not macro-level effects: for example, they did not find stronger voting for these parties in nations with higher unemployment rates.⁴³ In a five-nation comparison, Niedermayer also found that white collar employees and professionals are consistently under-represented in the electorates of radical right parties, although he also demonstrated that the proportion of blue-collar workers and those with low educational achievement varied substantially among different parties such as the Austrian FPÖ, the German Republicans, and the Danish Progress Party.⁴⁴ At the same time, however, previous research suggests several reasons to doubt the more mechanical version on the economic argument. Hence a decade ago one study concluded that: "We should look skeptically upon the idea that the radical right is purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment among the 'new social cleavage' of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas, or that their rise can be attributed in any mechanical fashion to growing levels of unemployment and job insecurity in Europe. The social profile is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest."⁴⁵ Mudde is equally doubtful about purely-economic explanations for the rise of populism.⁴⁶ Moreover populist parties have also arisen in several of the most egalitarian European societies, with cradle-to-grave welfare states, containing some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, exemplified by Sweden and Denmark.

The cultural backlash thesis

An equally common alternative account is provided by the cultural backlash thesis. This perspective emphasizes that populist support can be explained primarily as a social psychological phenomenon, reflecting a nostalgic reaction among older sectors of the electorate seeking a bulwark against long-term processes of value change, the 'silent revolution', which has transformed Western cultures during the late twentieth century. This account predicts that support for populism will be especially strong among those holding traditional values and retro norms, including older generation and the less-educated groups left behind by progressive cultural tides.

The rise of progressive values

A substantial body of survey-based research has now documented the cultural transformation that has occurred during the last half century in Western societies, exemplified by growing support in public opinion for post-materialist over traditional values, and by the organizational expression of these values in the late-twentieth century through the rise of new cultural issues, social movements, and political parties.⁴⁷ Developments are exemplified by increased tolerance among the younger cohorts and the college educated living in Western societies for the expression of diverse forms of sexuality, LGBT rights, same-sex marriage and varied family units, and more fluid gender identities; more secular values, habits, and ethical norms; open-mindedness towards migrants, refugees, foreigners, and multicultural diversity of lifestyles, foods, and travel; and cosmopolitan support for international cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral agencies like the United Nations and EU.⁴⁸ In affluent countries, cultures have gradually been transformed by growing support for progressive post-materialist values through successive processes of generational replacement.

About 45 years ago, it was argued that "a transformation may be taking place in the political culture of advanced industrial societies. This transformation seems to be altering the basic value priorities of given generations as a result of changing conditions influencing their basic socialization."⁴⁹ Subsequent birth cohort analysis, based on hundreds of surveys carried out from 1970 to 2008, indicates that post-war birth cohorts actually did bring an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-materialist values, as younger cohorts gradually replaced older ones in the adult population.⁵⁰ This analysis also reveals clear period effects, reflecting current economic conditions: the intergenerational difference persist, but in times of insecurity, all cohorts shift toward more Materialist views-- and with economic recovery, they shift back toward their long-term baseline, so that across this 38-year span, given cohorts remain at least as Post-materialist as they were at the start.

The cultural shift has been linked with the rise of Green parties, as well as progressive social movements and transnational activist organizations reflecting values such as environmental protection, LGBT rights, racial and gender equality, overseas aid, and human rights. As post-materialists gradually became more numerous in the population, they brought new issues into politics, leading to a declining emphasis on social class and economic redistribution, and growing party polarization based around cultural issues and social identities.⁵¹ Post-materialists tend to emerge from the more secure and college-educated strata in Western societies and they are relatively favorable towards progressive social change and humanistic values. Over recent decades, the World Values Survey shows that Western societies have been getting steadily more Post-materialist on many social issues, especially among the younger generation and well-educated middle class.⁵² At the same time, however, citizens have also become more critical towards established political institutions and authorities, including becoming less trusting of political parties and parliaments in representative democracies.⁵³

The cultural counter-reaction to the silent revolution

These developments have been widely confirmed by survey evidence.⁵⁴ But from the start, these developments triggered negative reactions among older traditionalists who felt threatened by the erosion of the values which were once predominant. In particular, it is well-established that education, age, and gender are strong predictors of support for progressive values. Socialization theory suggests that core values are adopted during early childhood and adolescence. Age reflects the process of long-term generational turnover, as the younger birth cohort with post-materialist values, who grew up in affluent Western welfare states, gradually come to replace their parents and grandparents, who had experienced less secure upbringings during the inter-war decades. A substantial body of evidence confirms that growing up with high levels of existential security is conducive to open-mindedness, social tolerance and trust, secularization, and acceptance of diversity.⁵⁵ As well as generational cleavages, gender may also play a role in cultural trends: traditional patriarchal values about fixed sex roles, once the predominant view in Western societies, have gradually been displaced by progressive, feminist tides favoring social norms of gender equality and interchangeable sex roles in the home and workplace, more diverse forms of marriage and families, as well as societal shifts for women's roles in the knowledge economy and in politics.⁵⁶ Over time, therefore, the traditional values often held most strongly by the older generation, less educated sectors, and men have gradually become out of step with the changing cultures of contemporary Western societies, with this displacement generating resentment, anger, and a sense of loss. The more rapid the pace of value change challenging the predominant groups, the more heated the

culture wars are likely to become. This phenomenon may be linked to political developments to account for the well-established pattern whereby men are consistently found to give greater support for populist parties.⁵⁷

Hostile or intolerant attitudes towards migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, commonly directed against refugees, asylum-seekers, and guest-workers in Europe, especially towards Muslims, are expected to be an important source of resentment. Many other scholars have tied support for populist parties to attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration.⁵⁸ For Betz, for example, the ascendancy of these parties is generated primarily by a public backlash directed against rising numbers of immigrants and asylum-seekers, and the failure of mainstream governing parties to curb these numbers and protect national identities through effective public policy regulations.⁵⁹ As Betz's claims: *"It should come as no surprise that the emergence and rise of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe coincided with the growing tide of immigrants and particularly the dramatic increase in the number of refugees seeking peace, security, and a better life in the affluent societies of Western Europe. The reaction to the new arrivals was an outburst of xenophobia and open racism in a majority of West European countries....This has made it relatively easy for the radical populist Right to evoke, focus, and reinforce preexisting xenophobic sentiments for political gain."* Though this is a frequent claim, previous studies have reported only mixed evidence linking the number of migrants in a country directly with levels of voting support for radical right parties.⁶⁰

At the same time, we argue that xenophobia is only one part of a much broader cultural backlash among the older generation, rejecting many other liberal and cosmopolitan values diffusing throughout post-industrial societies. This argument has started to emerge among scholars— although the role of generational change is often over-looked and the evidence remains indeterminate. Hence Ignazi theorizes that the value shift of the 1960s and 1970s was originally linked to the emergence of left-libertarian parties like the Greens, but that it also produced a reactionary backlash among those who continued to hold traditional moral values in Western Europe, a 'silent counter-revolution' that helps the populist right.⁶¹ Similarly, Bornschieer has argued that a new cultural cleavage identifies extreme right parties in several West European societies.⁶² Bustikova also suggests a parallel process in Eastern Europe, where populist right success is attributed to resentment against ethno-liberal minority parties that have managed to extract policy concessions.⁶³ Hostility towards the European Union has also been depicted as due, at least in part, to perceptions that membership represents a cultural threat.⁶⁴ For example, in the

run up to the Brexit referendum, Curtice found many British people regarded EU membership as economically beneficial but they also expressed concern about the cultural consequences.⁶⁵

On the supply-side of the equation, any resentment about cultural trends needs an organizational outlet for expression. Populist movements, leaders, and parties provide a mechanism for channeling active resistance. Hence Trump's slogan 'Make America Great Again' – and his rejection of 'political correctness' - appeals nostalgically to a mythical 'golden past', especially for older white men, when American society was less diverse, U.S. leadership was unrivalled among Western powers during the Cold War era, threats of terrorism pre-9/11 were in distant lands but not at home, and conventional sex roles for women and men reflected patrimonial power relationships within the family and workforce. The Brexit Leave campaign and UKIP rhetoric also harkens back nostalgically to a time before joining the EU, more than forty years ago, when the Westminster parliament was sovereign, society was predominately white Anglo-Saxon, manufacturing factories and extracting industries – producing steel, coal, cars - still provided well-paying and secure jobs for unionized manual workers in the Midlands and North, and despite decline from its glory days of empire, Britain remained a major economic and military power leading the Commonwealth. Similar messages can be heard echoed in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Donald Trump, and other populist leaders. This nostalgia is most likely to appeal to older citizens who have seen changes erode their cultural predominance and threaten their core social values, potentially provoking a response expressing anger, resentment, and political disaffection.

What evidence would support this thesis? Value change is strongly predicted by birth cohort, education and sex. If the cultural backlash thesis is true, then this argument predicts that the strongest support for populist parties will be observed among the older generation, men, those lacking college education, and among traditionalists most opposed to progressive cultural values, such as in their attitudes towards sexuality, religion, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and tolerance of foreigners. Goring economic insecurity and rising levels of social inequality may also reinforce cultural shifts, suggesting an interaction effect where traditional values will be found to be strongest among poorer and older sectors of the electorate.

II: Measures and evidence

Two arguments are common in the literature seeking to explain contemporary mass support for populist parties: economic accounts, which focus on rising levels of income insecurity and grievances among the losers from global markets, and cultural accounts, which emphasize a generational backlash reacting against long-term shifts in progressive and liberal social values. To examine the individual level

survey evidence for each of these theories, we first need to establish a consistent way to distinguish and classify populist parties according to the heuristic model illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

Populism is conceptualized in this study as reflecting a loose political ideology emphasizing faith in the ‘decent’, ‘ordinary’ or ‘little’ people over the corrupt political and corporate establishment, nationalist interests (Us) over cosmopolitanism cooperation across borders (Them), protectionist policies regulating the movement of trade, people and finance over global free trade, xenophobia over tolerance of multiculturalism, strong individual leadership over diplomatic bargaining and flexible negotiations, isolationism in foreign and defense policies over international engagement, traditional sex roles for women and men over more fluid gender identities and roles, and traditional over progressive values. The cultural cleavage divides Populism from Cosmopolitan Liberalism, which favors the free flow of people, ideas, capital, and cultures across national borders, and pluralistic forms of governance based on respect for the protection of minority rights and checks and balances in decision-making processes.

For empirical evidence to classify where parties fall on this spectrum, we turn to the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of political parties within each country.⁶⁶ The CHES dataset asked experts knowledgeable about European political parties to estimate the ideological and policy positions of political parties in the country with which they were most familiar. The study covered in total 268 political parties in 31 European countries, including all EU member states as well as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.⁶⁷ The most recent CHES survey was conducted between December 2014 and February 2015. Factor analysis with principle component rotation examined the dimensionality of thirteen selected indicators contained in the dataset, where experts rated the position of European parties on a range of Populist items, such as support for traditional values, liberal lifestyles, and multiculturalism, as well as their economic stance towards market deregulation, state management of the economy, and preferences for either tax cuts or public services.

[Table 1 about here]

The results of the factor analysis presented in Table 1 confirm that the cultural and the economic cleavages form two distinct and consistent dimensions of party competition, as theorized. The items listed in each column were then summed into cultural and economic scales, each standardized to 100 points. The classic scale depicted on the horizontal axis of Figure 3 below divides the economic Left (favoring regulated markets, state management of the economy, wealth redistribution, and public spending) from the economic Right (favoring deregulation, free markets, opposing redistribution, and favoring tax cuts). The cultural cleavage depicted on the vertical axis divides populists (favoring traditional social values,

opposing liberal lifestyles, promoting nationalism, favoring touch law and order, opposing multiculturalism, against immigration, opposing rights for ethnic minorities, supporting religious principles in politics, and supporting rural interests) from cosmopolitan liberals (taking the opposite position of all these indices).

To double-check the external validity and reliability of the CHES measures, the results were compared with an independent study, the Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffe expert judgment survey of European Political Parties, conducted in 2010.⁶⁸ This study used a similar methodology to estimate the scores of political parties in 38 European countries, with a focus on populist issues such as nationalism and immigration. The two datasets proved to be highly correlated in the perceived position of parties on the ideological scales, lending confidence to the CHES estimates.⁶⁹ In addition, for face-value validity, the list of parties ranked according to the CHES cultural scale was comparing and confirmed with previous attempts at classifying populist parties.⁷⁰ The precise dividing line between populist and other types of political party families inevitably remains somewhat fuzzy, for example where leaders from other mainstream parties adopt some of the xenophobic rhetoric or the restrictive immigration policies espoused by extremist leaders. But the comparison with the existing literature suggested that the category of 'populist parties' could be defined and operationalized empirically as those which scored more than 80 points on the standardized 100-point CHES cultural scale. The classification and scores of European populist parties included in our study are listed in Appendix A.

Finally, we turned to the pooled European Social Survey (2002-2014) to examine the cross-national micro-level evidence for both the core arguments. The advantage of this survey is that the pooled dataset across six waves contains 293,856 respondents, providing a large-enough sample of the European public in 32 countries to identify the electoral base of smaller parties with some degree of reliability. Cases were weighted by post-stratification weights including design weights. Scholars have developed several scales to measure populist attitudes in the general population.⁷¹ Supporters of populist parties are measured in this study by their voting preferences, with robustness checks used to see whether similar patterns are evident when predicting party affiliations. Multivariate logistic regression models analyze the evidence for the economic and cultural explanations.

The selected variables and the coding are listed in Technical Appendix B. The models include standard social and demographic controls, including sex, age, education, and ethnicity. Economic inequality was monitored through selected indicators of occupational class (using the Goldthorpe schema), experience of unemployment, households dependent upon social benefits (excluding pensions)

for their main source of income, urbanization, and subjective feelings of income insecurity. Principal Component Factor analysis with Varimax Rotation was used to determine the dimensionality of a range of cultural items which were included in all waves of the ESS and which were expected to be particularly salient for the division between Populist and Cosmopolitan Liberal values. Five values scales were produced through this process, including scales on attitudes towards immigration, trust in global governance, trust in national governance, authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement. The value scales were each standardized to 100-points, for ease of comparison. All models were checked by tolerance tests to be free of problems of multicollinearity. The inclusion of items consistently asked across all rounds of the ESS maximized the size of the pooled sample of populist voters, and therefore strengthened confidence in the reliability of the results, although unfortunately it also restricted the full range of items which ideally could be included, for example concerning gender equality. The descriptive means and standard deviations of all the items are presented in Appendix C.

III: Classifying and comparing political parties

As a first step in the analysis, the two ideological scales from the CHES dataset can be used to compare the perceived location of European political parties, according to experts. When European parties were classified on both these scales, using the CHES data, the resulting map of European party competition is illustrated in the scatter-gram presented in Figure 3.

(Figure 3 here)

The top-right quadrant reflects the position of the *Populist Right* parties, such as the UK Independence Party, the Swiss People's Party (SVP), and the Polish Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy or KNP). These are all economically libertarian and pro-market, socially conservative on traditional values, and deeply Euro-skeptic in orientation. For example, since the early-1990s, under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, the Swiss People's Party has promoted a philosophy of national conservatism, advocating a limited role for government and the welfare state. Its economic policies oppose deficit spending, government regulation of environmental protection, military engagement abroad and closer ties with NATO. On cultural issues it has highlighted euro-skepticism, strict asylum laws, and opposition to multiculturalism and immigration, for example the party pushed successfully for an initiative to ban the construction of minarets, which subsequently became an amendment to the Swiss Constitution. Chaired by Albert Rösti, following the 2015 federal elections, and spurred by fears of the European migration crisis, the SVP became the largest party in the Federal Assembly, winning around one third of the seats.

Figure 3 also shows the *Populist Left* parties, located in the top left quadrant. Many parties in this category are located in Central and Eastern Europe, exemplified by Bulgarian Ataka (Attack), which is ultra nationalist and xenophobic, especially anti-Muslim, while also advocating classic left-wing economic and social policies, such as restoring state ownership of major industries and increased spending on education, welfare and healthcare.⁷² Other parties on the Populist Left are illustrated by the Hungarian Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) and Golden Dawn in Greece, two racist, anti-immigrant, nationalistic, and euro-skeptical parties, while also advancing a radical critique of global capitalism. Populist Left parties were particularly common in post-Communist Europe. Some survey evidence suggests that Trump's appeal also falls into this category: it is culturally populist, emphasizing anti-immigration policies and rhetoric, blended with some economically-left positions, for example on protecting social security and Medicare, supporting public health insurance, infrastructure spending, and protectionism on trade, although signals about his policy positions remain fluid, and continue to change over successive campaign speeches.⁷³

By contrast, the parties located in the bottom right quadrant are those which reflect the *Cosmopolitan Liberal Right*, favoring socially progressive values and neo-liberal free markets while also advocating more open borders for the free movement of capital and labor. This category is exemplified by the Lithuanian Liberals Movement of the Republic, allied with Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and Austrian NEOS (the new Austria and Liberal Forum).

Finally, many parties are located in the *Cosmopolitan Liberal Left*, including green parties such as the Francophone Ecolo in Wallonia and the German Greens, as well as several traditional European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. These parties are typically internationally-minded, supporting multilateral institutions of global governance, cooperation, and humanitarian engagement, fluid national borders and open societies, as well as economic regulation and welfare states.

The vertical axis on Figure 3 reflects the polarization between two contrasting worldviews: a Cosmopolitan Liberal outlook motivated by Post-materialist and Self-expression values—and a populist, xenophobic-authoritarian outlook. The growing prominence of Post-materialist values in the late 1960s and the 1970s stimulated a cultural backlash almost immediately. As Inglehart pointed out more than 25 years ago:

“Environmentalist parties have begun to emerge in many societies in which the electoral system doesn't tend to strangle new parties. Why? The environmentalist cause is only one of many Postmodern issues favored by Postmaterialists. This electorate is distinctive in its entire worldview:

they are relatively favorable to women's rights, handicapped groups, gay/lesbian emancipation, ethnic minorities and a number of other causes. But the environmental cause has emerged as the symbolic center of this broad cultural emancipation movement...

Nevertheless, the rise of Postmaterialist causes has given rise to negative reactions from the very start. The French student protest movement was able to paralyze the entire country in May, 1968; but it led to a massive shift of working class voters, who rallied behind De Gaulle as the guarantor of law and order, giving the Gaullists a landslide victory in the June, 1968 elections. In the same year, student protesters in the U.S. were able to bring down Lyndon Johnson, but they alienated much of the traditional Democratic Party electorate-- many of whom threw their support to a reactionary candidate, George Wallace, enabling Richard Nixon to win the Presidency. The 1972 elections were something of a replay, except that this time normally Democratic voters who were repelled by the seeming radicalism of the McGovern campaign supported Nixon: for the first time in history, white working class voters were about as likely to vote for the Republican as for the Democratic candidate. The aftermath of these events transformed the two parties, but the U.S. still has a two party system, with the same party labels as before: superficially, the system seems unchanged.

Though Postmaterialist-led parties emerged in both The Netherlands and Belgium during the 1970s, West Germany was the scene of the first breakthrough by an environmentalist party in a major industrial nation. Postmaterialist protest had manifested itself as dramatically in Germany as in the United States or France, but it was only in 1983 that the Greens were sufficiently strong and well organized to surmount Germany's 5 per cent hurdle and enter the West German parliament-- bringing a significant structural change to German politics. But more recently, the Greens have been pitted against a Republikaner party characterized by cultural conservatism and xenophobia. In the 1994 national elections, the Greens won 7 percent of the vote. The Republikaner, on the other hand, were stigmatized as the heirs of the Nazis and won only two percent of the vote, which was insufficient to win parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, xenophobic forces have already had a substantial impact on German politics, motivating the established parties to shift their policy positions in order to coopt the Republikaner electorate. These efforts even included an amendment to the German constitution: to cut down the influx of foreigners, the clause guaranteeing free right of political asylum was eliminated in 1993, in a decision supported by a two-thirds majority of the German parliament.

The rise of the Green Party in Germany has also had a major impact even though only a small portion of the electorate votes for it... Their greatest impact on German politics has been in forcing the established parties, from the Christian Democrats to the Social Democrats, to adopt pro-environmentalist positions in order to compete for the Greens' voters. The Greens and the Republikaner are located at opposite poles of a new political dimension, as Figure 2 suggests. If we simply judged by their labels, this might not seem to be the case: the Republikaner do not call themselves the Anti-Environment Party; nor do the Greens call themselves the Pro-Immigrant Party. But, in fact, their constituencies are disproportionately Materialist and Postmaterialist, respectively; and these parties adopt opposite policies on the relevant issues. The older parties are arrayed on the traditional economic Left-Right axis, established in an era when political cleavages were dominated by social class conflict. On this axis (the horizontal dimension of Figure 3) both elites and mass electorates place the Party of Democratic Socialism (the East German ex-communists) on the extreme Left, followed by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, with the Christian Democrats at the Right of the spectrum. Though both elites and masses tend to think of the Greens as located on the Left, they represent an entirely new Left. Traditionally, the Left parties have been based on a working class constituency, and advocated a program that called for nationalization of industry and redistribution of income. In striking contrast, the Postmaterialist Left appeals primarily to a middle class constituency and is only faintly interested in the classic program of the Left. For example, Postmaterialists are not necessarily more favorable to state ownership than are Materialists, as evidence cited below indicates. But Postmaterialists *are* intensely favorable to the Left position on Postmodern issues-- which frequently repel the traditional working class constituency of the Left.

The vertical axis on Figure 2 reflects the polarization between Postmodern and Fundamentalist values, reflecting differences in people's subjective sense of security. At one pole, we find a Postmodern openness to ethnic diversity and changing gender roles; and at the opposite pole we find an emphasis on familiar values (often rooted in traditional religion), in the face of insecurity... Fundamentalist movements continue to emerge among the less secure strata of even the most advanced industrial societies, with people reemphasizing traditional values in times of stress.”⁷⁴

A cultural backlash against Post-materialist values has been present ever since they first surfaced into political relevance in the late 1960s. But in the 1970s and 1980s, the most dramatic phenomenon was the rise of progressive movements and parties such as the Greens. In that era, cultural backlash

parties, such as France's National Front, were relatively small. Today, they have become important parties in many countries and Donald Trump has become the candidate of a major party in the U.S.

Rising voting support for populist parties

In recent decades, Populist parties have gained growing support among the electorates of developed countries. Based on ParlGov data, and applying the party classification described above, the graph in Figure 4 illustrates the growing share of the vote for both Populist Right and Populist Left parties since 1970 in national and European parliamentary elections across European countries.⁷⁵ This suggests that a rise occurred during the 1970s, and a surge of support during the 1980s and 1990s, before a subsequent slow down or levelling off in the last decade. The mean share of the vote for Populist Right parties rose from 6.7% in the 1960s to 13.4% in 2010s. During the same period, their average share of seats rose in parallel from 5.9% to 13.7%. The mean share of the vote for the Populist Left parties rose from 2.4% in the 1960s to 12.7% in 2010s, while their share of seats increased on average from 0.12 to 11.5% during the same decades. Gains were particularly dramatic following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe. Most recently, the 2014 European Parliament elections also saw a surge of support for Populist parties such as France's National Front, Italy's Five Star Alliance, the Danish People's Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the United Kingdom Independence Party.

(Figure 4 here)

The success of populists varies substantially among European societies, however, and support can prove highly volatile and erratic over time, if weakly-institutionalized parties are unable to replace a charismatic leader and if they lack a strong extra-parliamentary organizational base. Thus, in the UK, the British National Party and the National Front were both eclipsed by the UK Independence Party. Figure 4 illustrates the share of the vote for populist parties in national elections across two dozen European states from 1970 to 2016. It is apparent that their share of the vote varies even among relatively similar post-industrial knowledge economies, neighboring states with shared cultures, and states using broadly similar majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, for example the contrasts observed between Norway and Sweden, between Austria and Germany (with radical right parties heavily restricted by the German constitution), and between Britain and France. This suggest that both supply-side factors and the institutional rules of the game are important parts of the comprehensive explanations accounting for the fortunes of specific populist parties.

The changing policy agenda

Further evidence from the analysis of manifesto data also demonstrates the shifting battle-ground of European party competition and the rise of the Cultural cleavage. During post-war decades, the pattern of party competition in Western Europe was based on divisions between communist and socialist parties on the Left and economically conservative and classical liberal parties on the Right which were divided primarily over issues of Keynesian economic management, redistributive taxation, and welfare state spending. During the 1950s and 1960s, mainstream parties prioritized bread-and-butter economic and social policy issues in their policy platforms -- such as unemployment, inflation, taxation, trade union rights, public services, health-care, housing, education, and welfare -- mobilizing class cleavages and partisan affiliations in the electorate. Other policy divisions, such as those over foreign policy and international relations, usually played a more minor role in electoral politics, and these largely reinforced the economic divisions in party competition. The major political parties were established in an era when economic issues of growth, jobs, taxes and inflation were dominant and the working class was the main base of support for socialist, communist and social democratic parties.

Today economic inequality remains a major issue, dividing the winners and losers from global markets and free trade. The classic economic issues did not disappear by any means. But their relative prominence declined to such an extent that by the late-1980s, as shown in Figure 5, non-economic issues had become more prominent than economic issues in Western political party campaign platforms. The growing salience of progressive values in society has generated the gradual emergence of a new Cultural cleavage in party competition that has undermined the post-war party systems. Today, many of the most heated conflicts are cultural – based on issues such as immigration, the threat of terrorism, abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and more fluid gender identities and support for progressive change on these issues increasingly comes from well-educated younger generations of Post-materialists, largely of middle class origin.

[Figure 5 here]

Figure 5 illustrates how the issues emphasized in political party platforms evolved from 1950 to 2010, in thirteen Western democracies (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States). This figure shows the declining emphasis on economic issues; party programs were dominated by these issues until around 1968, when issues raised by student protest briefly dominated the agenda. Economic issues again dominated political discussion from 1970 to the early-1980s, when non-economic issues began to take over. For the last two

decades, non-economic issues have consistently dominated party competition and rival manifesto platforms by a wide margin.

The decline of class voting

Moreover, the social class foundation of economic Left and Right party competition has also shifted. A long-standing truism of political sociology, since the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, is that working class voters tend to support the parties of the Left, and middle class voters those of the Right, throughout Western society.⁷⁶ This was an accurate description of reality around 1950, but the tendency has grown steadily weaker. The rise of cultural issues tends to neutralize social class-based political polarization. The social basis of support for the new policies of the Left has increasingly come from middle class sources-- but, at the same time, a substantial share of the working class has shifted their support to populist parties.

[Figure 6 here]

As Figure 6 demonstrates, social class voting declined markedly from 1950 to 1992. If 75 per cent of the working class voted for the Left, while only 25 per cent of the middle class did so, one would obtain a class voting index of 50. This is about where the Swedish electorate was located in 1948-- but by 1990 the index had fallen to 26. Norway, Sweden and Denmark have traditionally manifested the world's highest levels of social class voting, but they all showed sharply declining levels of social class voting during this period.⁷⁷ In the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany in the late 1940s and early-1950s, working class voters were more likely to support the Left than middle class voters, by margins ranging from 30 to 45 percentage points. By the 1980s, class voting had fallen to the lowest levels ever recorded in Britain, France, Sweden and West Germany. By the 1990s, social class voting in most democracies was less than half as strong as it was a generation earlier. In the U.S., it had fallen so low that there was virtually no room for further decline. Income and education had become much weaker indicators of the American public's political preferences than religiosity or one's stand on abortion or same-sex marriage: by wide margins, those who opposed abortion and same-sex marriage supported the Republican Presidential candidate over the Democratic candidate. The electorate had shifted from class-based polarization toward value-based polarization. Growing emphasis on cultural issues had strongly positive consequences—but it also drew attention away from the classic economic redistribution issues. From the 1930s to the 1970s, working class-oriented parties of the center Left had played a major role in Western countries, electing governments that implemented redistributive policies, from progressive

income taxes to health care and social security programs that reduced economic inequality and increased existential security. Emphasis on these programs faded.

IV: Analyzing mass support for European populist parties

What is the mass basis of support for populist parties and, in particular, what is the role of economic and cultural factors? To examine the cross-national evidence, we draw upon the pooled European Social Survey, covering the period 2002-2014. Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression models predicting voting for a populist party in the previous national election. Model A includes the demographic and social controls, including age, sex, education, religiosity, and belonging to an ethnic minority. Model B adds several indicators closely associated with economic inequality and social deprivation, including the Goldthorpe class schema, experience of unemployment, living on benefits, urbanization, and subjective economic insecurity (reported difficulty of living on current household incomes), all of which may predict populist support. Model C adds the cultural value scales associated with populist ideology, including attitudes towards immigration, global governance, trust in national governments, authoritarian values, and self-position on the left-right ideological scale. Model D presents the full model combining all variables, including interaction effects linking attitudes with economic insecurity.

The models highlight several main findings.

First, the results in Model A with controls confirm that several standard social and demographic factors are consistently associated with voting for populist parties. Age is a significant predictor of voting support, with younger voters proving less likely to vote for populist parties than older generations (see Figure 8). This provides some initial support to the cultural change argument emphasizing generation gaps. The consistent gender gap, documented in many previous studies, is also further confirmed here, with men proving more favorable towards populist parties than women. Education also proves significant, as expected, with populist parties winning greater support from the less educated sectors of the population (although this effect becomes insignificant later in models D and E). Strength of religiosity, a strong indicator of a wide range of traditional values, is also positively associated with voting for populists. Not surprisingly, given populist xenophobic rhetoric, members of ethnic minorities are less inclined to support these parties. In short, Populist support is greatest among the older generation, men, the less educated, ethnic majority populations, and the religious. It is also noteworthy that these relationships persist as stable across successive models. This confirms the profile found in earlier studies, although the exact reasons underlying these relationships remains unclear and open to alternative interpretations.⁷⁸

Educational effects, for example, could be attributed either to their role in determining subsequent life-chances, or to the values, knowledge, and cognitive skills typically acquired from formal schooling. These findings cannot by themselves definitively rule out either the economic insecurity argument or the cultural backlash thesis.

[Table 2 and Figures 8 and 9 about here]

Model B looks more directly at whether indicators of economic insecurity are associated with voting for populists, with the controls already discussed. The results of the analysis are mixed and inconsistent across alternative measures of economic insecurity. The Goldthorpe occupational class scheme is included in the model; here the results suggest that compared with Managers and Professionals (the default category), all other class strata are positively linked with support for populist parties. But, as early sociological theories suggested, the strongest populist support (according to the Beta coefficients) remains among the petty bourgeoisie – typically small proprietors like self-employed plumbers, or family-owned small businesses, and mom-and-pop shop-keepers - not among the category of low-waged, unskilled manual workers.⁷⁹ Figure 9 illustrates this pattern. In support of the thesis, experience of unemployment was linked positively with populist voting. Subjective insecurity (reported difficulties of living on current household incomes) was also significant in this model, although the effect reversed in Model C, once cultural attitudes were added. Moreover, contrary to the economic insecurity thesis, populists received significantly *less* support (not more) among those dependent on social benefits as the main source for their household income (defined as excluding pensions, to reduce contaminating with the age effects). Populist voting support was also concentrated in rural villages, rather than inner-city urban areas which typically have higher levels of resident foreigners and social deprivation. The overall fit of Model B does not improve much from Model A alone. Further tests, for example with a different occupational class schema, also suggest that the results are sensitive to the exact model specification rather than robust. In short, the economic insecurity thesis is only partially supported by this model – with unemployment the clearest socio-economic indicator of populist voting support.

Model C enters all the five cultural value scales expected to predict voting support for populist parties, including anti-immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global governance, mistrust of national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement. All the cultural indicators are significantly linked with populist voting and the coefficients point in the expected direction. The fit of the model (measured by Nagelkerke R^2) also improves considerably from earlier models when these variables are added, although still relatively modest, and the controls remain consistent and stable.

In summary, Model C combining social controls and cultural attitudes provides a consistent and parsimonious account of populist voting in Europe.

To explore further, Model D tests the effects of combining the economic and cultural indicators, with controls. The results largely confirm the observations made following the earlier models. The demographic and social controls and the cultural attitudes remain stable predictors of populist support. The only major change to the economic variables is that the effects of economic insecurity reverse direction.

Finally, Model E tests the effects of adding all the variables discussed so far along with interaction effects for subjective insecurity (reported difficulties of living on household income) combined with each of the attitudinal scales. The aim of this model is to explore the claim that subjective economic insecurity helps to drive traditional attitudes which, in turn, strengthen support for populist parties. The results in Model E show that the control variables remain constant except for education, which becomes insignificant. Among all the interaction terms, populist support can only be attributed to a combination of economic insecurity and authoritarian values. The other interaction effects point in the incorrect direction or become insignificant. Moreover, Model E does not greatly improve the overall goodness of fit compared with Model C.

The analysis in Table 2 leads us to conclude that Model C provides the most satisfactory and parsimonious account. This suggests that the combination of several standard demographic and social controls (age, sex, education, religiosity and ethnic minority status) with cultural values can provide the most useful explanation for European support for populist parties. Their greatest support is concentrated among the older generation, men, the religious, majority populations, and the less educated -- sectors generally left behind by progressive tides of cultural value change. The electoral success of these parties at the ballot box can be attributed mainly to their ideological and issue appeals to traditional values.

U.S. Attitudes

Can similar factors explain support for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S presidential elections? At this stage of the contest, it obviously remains too early to tell with any certainty. Nevertheless, evidence from the U.S. component of the 2011 World Values Survey (WVS), conducted long before the 2016 campaign, throws interesting light on potential support for populism in America. Well before the Trump phenomenon, a substantial education gap can be observed in American approval of authoritarian leaders. The WVS asked whether Americans approved of "*Having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with congress or elections.*" Figure 10 shows a consistent education gap and there has been growing support

for this statement since 2005. By the most recent wave in 2011, almost half -- 44 percent -- of U.S. non-college graduates approved of having a strong leader unchecked by elections and Congress. Only 28 percent of college graduates did so.

(Figure 10 about here)

This is not an isolated finding or a quirk of fieldwork. If we examine some classic measures of tolerance towards sexual liberalization and value change – including towards homosexuality and abortion the less-educated show much lower levels of tolerance. The education gap also appears to widen slightly over time, suggesting that differences in cultural values and social tolerance have expanded, rather than shrunk. This initial evidence has to be treated as only indicative and incomplete at present, but it will be possible to examine the basis of support for Trump more closely after the November 2016 U.S. presidential elections, when evidence from such sources as the American National Election Study become available, along with long-term data from the 7th wave of the World Values Survey.

V: Conclusions and discussion

Extensive research indicates that since about 1970, affluent Western societies have seen growing emphasis on post-materialist and self-expression values among the younger birth cohorts and the better-educated strata of society. This has brought rising emphasis on such issues as environmental protection, increased acceptance of gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community. This cultural shift has fostered greater approval of social tolerance of diverse lifestyles, religions, and cultures, multiculturalism, international cooperation, democratic governance, and protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. Social movements reflecting these values have brought policies such as environmental protection, same sex marriage, and gender equality in public life to the center of the political agenda, drawing attention away from the classic economic redistribution issues. But the spread of progressive values has also stimulated a cultural backlash among people who feel threatened by this development. Less educated and older citizens, especially white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies, resent being told that traditional values are ‘politically incorrect’ if they have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries. As cultures have shifted, a tipping point appears to have occurred.

The story of long-term cultural change in Western societies, and the emergence of new Green parties and progressive social movements building upon these values, is a familiar one widely documented in a long-series of previous studies.⁸⁰ During the era from 1970 to 1990, the main story was the rise of Post-materialist issues. In recent decades, however, in Western democracies the backlash against cultural

change has become increasingly prominent. Throughout advanced industrial society, massive cultural changes have been occurring that seem shocking to those with traditional values. Moreover, immigration flows, especially from lower-income countries, changed the ethnic makeup of advanced industrial societies. The newcomers speak different languages and have different religions and life styles from those of the native population—reinforcing the impression that traditional norms and values are rapidly disappearing. The evidence examined in this study suggests that the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies. Long-term processes of generational change during the late twentieth century have catalyzed culture wars, for these changes are particularly alarming to the less educated and older groups in these countries. It is not an either/or story, for the two sets of changes may reinforce each other in part—but the evidence in this study suggests that it would be a mistake to attribute the rise of populism directly to economic inequality alone. Psychological factors seem to play a more important role. Older birth cohorts and less-educated groups support populist parties and leaders that defend traditional cultural values and emphasize nationalistic and xenophobia appeals, rejecting outsiders, and upholding old-fashioned gender roles. Populists support charismatic leaders, reflecting a deep mistrust of the ‘establishment’ and mainstream parties who are led nowadays by educated elites with progressive cultural views on moral issues.

At the same time, the study suggests several directions for further research. It is important to conduct additional robustness tests, including using alternative models of voting for leftwing and rightwing populism, and using models of partisan affiliations with populist parties (not just voting), to replicate the results and see whether these lend further confidence to the main findings reported here. The pooled ESS from 2002-2014 allows sufficient cases to examine support for smaller parties, but this strategy does not account for dynamic patterns. Further cross-national time-series evidence also needs to be scrutinized, such as from the Eurobarometer series or national election studies, to examine longer-term trends in cultural attitudes and populist voting support since the early-1970s, establishing more convincing evidence of linkages theorized between *changes* in cultural values and *changes* in populist support in Europe. All of these steps would potentially provide additional insights into this phenomenon.

It is important to understand this topic since it is apparent that the consequences of the rise of populism continue to play out and they are likely to be profound. Populist forces have already proven decisive for the outcome of the British referendum on membership in the European Union in June 2016, with their leaders igniting anti-immigrant and nativist sentiments in England. The outcome has generated

a deep financial, political, and constitutional existential crisis within the United Kingdom. Britain's decision to withdraw from the EU threatens to reenergize populist forces across Europe. Support for populism also exists in the United States, which Donald Trump has been able to exploit. His rejection of "political correctness" seems particularly appealing to older, religious white traditionalists who find themselves left behind by growing support in America for such issues as same-sex marriage, rights for transsexuals, gender equality for women in politics, and immigration rights. Moreover the rejection of progressive values is embedded among the Republican base, not simply confined to the views of Donald Trump; for example, in 2016 the GOP platform is extreme in promising to promulgate strict traditionalist views of the family and child-rearing, homosexuality and gender, demanding that lawmakers use Christianity as a guide, encouraging the teaching of the bible in public schools, opposing same-sex marriage, disapproving of gay and transgender rights, barring military women in combat, declaring pornography a 'public health crisis'.⁸¹ These retro policies appeal deeply to those intolerant of progressive values – but this is a shrinking sector swimming against the tide of generational value change in the American electorate. If the cultural backlash argument is essentially correct, then this has significant implications; the growing generational gap in Western societies is likely to heighten the salience of the cultural cleavage in party politics in future, irrespective of any improvements in the underlying economic conditions or any potential slowdown in globalization. The orthogonal pull of cultural politics generates tensions and divisions within mainstream parties, as well as allowing new opportunities for populist leaders on the left and right to mobilize electoral support, although it still remains challenging for populist parties to build an organizational base and to sustain any temporary breakthroughs if they enter government coalitions and become part of the establishment. The net result is that Western societies face more unpredictable contests, anti-establishment populist challenges to the legitimacy of liberal democracy, and potential disruptions to long-established patterns of party competition.

Table 1: Dimensions of party competition in Europe

| CHES Variable name | Description | Cultural cleavage | Economic cleavage |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Galtan | Favor traditional values | .943 | |
| Sociallifestyle | Opposes liberal social lifestyles | .923 | |
| Nationalism | Promote nationalism | .918 | |
| Civlib_laworder | Favors tough law and order | .916 | |
| Multiculturalism | Against multiculturalism on immigrants | .904 | |
| Immigrate_policy | Against immigration | .880 | |
| Ethnic_minorities | Opposes rights for ethnic minorities | .864 | |
| Religious_principle | Supports religious principles in politics | .787 | |
| Urban_rural | Supports rural interests | .737 | |
| Deregulation | Favors market deregulation | | .956 |
| Econ_interven | Opposed to state economic intervention | | .925 |
| Redistribution | Opposed to wealth redistribution | | .894 |
| Spendvtax | Favor cuts in taxes and services | | .890 |

Notes: CHES 2014 expert survey of political party positions in 31 countries, including all EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, Dec 2014-Feb 2015. Factor analysis with rotated varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. "2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey." Version 2015.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Table 2: Models of voting for populist parties

| | A: Controls | | | B: Controls + Economic security | | | C: Controls + Cultural Values | | | D: Combined model | | | E: Interaction model | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------|------|-----|---------------------------------|------|-----|-------------------------------|------|-----|-------------------|------|-----|----------------------|------|-----|
| | Beta | SE | Sig | Beta | SE | Sig | Beta | SE | Sig | Beta | SE | Sig | Beta | SE | Sig |
| CONTROLS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Age (years) | .007 | .001 | *** | .006 | .001 | *** | .005 | .001 | *** | .004 | .001 | *** | .004 | .001 | *** |
| Sex (male) | .380 | .021 | *** | .341 | .022 | *** | .319 | .022 | *** | .286 | .023 | *** | .289 | .023 | *** |
| Education | -.086 | .008 | *** | -.062 | .009 | *** | -.026 | .008 | *** | -.011 | .009 | N/s | -.007 | .009 | N/s |
| Religiosity | .123 | .004 | *** | .122 | .004 | *** | .084 | .004 | *** | .087 | .004 | *** | .087 | .004 | *** |
| Ethnic minority | -.952 | .043 | *** | -.915 | .069 | *** | -.760 | .069 | *** | -.720 | .070 | *** | -.731 | .070 | *** |
| ECONOMIC INEQUALITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Routine non-manual | | | | .180 | .027 | *** | | | | .221 | .028 | *** | .217 | .028 | *** |
| Petite bourgeoisie | | | | .372 | .032 | *** | | | | .261 | .033 | *** | .257 | .033 | *** |
| Skilled manual worker | | | | .243 | .038 | *** | | | | .280 | .039 | *** | .271 | .039 | *** |
| Unskilled manual worker | | | | .217 | .035 | *** | | | | .225 | .036 | *** | .219 | .036 | *** |
| Unemployed (3 months+) | | | | .082 | .025 | *** | | | | .150 | .025 | *** | .150 | .025 | *** |
| Live on social benefits | | | | -.409 | .067 | *** | | | | -.304 | .068 | *** | -.289 | .068 | *** |
| Subjective economic insecurity | | | | .025 | .013 | * | | | | -.081 | .014 | *** | -.080 | .088 | N/s |
| Urbanization | | | | -.068 | .031 | *** | | | | -.077 | .009 | *** | -.078 | .027 | *** |
| CULTURAL VALUE SCALES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Anti-immigration | | | | | | | .016 | .001 | *** | .016 | .001 | *** | .024 | .001 | *** |
| Mistrust global governance | | | | | | | .005 | .001 | *** | .005 | .001 | *** | .007 | .001 | *** |
| Mistrust national governance | | | | | | | .003 | .001 | *** | .003 | .001 | *** | .008 | .002 | *** |
| Authoritarian values | | | | | | | .008 | .001 | *** | .008 | .001 | *** | -.003 | .002 | N/s |
| Rightwing self-placement | | | | | | | .314 | .005 | *** | .314 | .005 | *** | .306 | .013 | *** |
| INTERACTION VAR | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Anti-immigration * EconInsecure | | | | | | | | | | | | | -.004 | .001 | *** |
| Mistrust global gov * EconInsecure | | | | | | | | | | | | | -.001 | .001 | N/s |
| Mistrust natgov * EconInsecure | | | | | | | | | | | | | -.003 | .001 | *** |
| Authoritarian * EconInsecure | | | | | | | | | | | | | .005 | .001 | *** |
| Rightwing * EconInsecure | | | | | | | | | | | | | .003 | .006 | N/s |
| Constant | -3.7 | | | -4.1 | | | -4.8 | | | -7.1 | | | -7.1 | | |
| Nagelkerke R ² | .032 | | | .036 | | | .128 | | | .128 | | | .130 | | |
| % correctly predicted | 94.5 | | | 94.5 | | | 94.6 | | | 94.5 | | | 94.5 | | |

Notes: Logistic regression models predicting whether respondents voted for a populist party (1) or not (0). Sig *** .001, ** .01, * .05, N/s Not significant. Note that Managerial/Professional is the excluded occupational class category. Note that ‘Subjective economic insecurity’ is measured by whether respondent reported that it was comfortable or difficult to live on their present household income, using a 4-point scale where ‘very difficult’ was high.

Source: The European Social Survey Cumulative File Rounds 1-6 (ESS1-6). **N. 182217**

Figure 1: Heuristic model of party competition in Western societies






Figure 2. The Left-Right and the Cultural Value Cleavages illustrated in German party competition.




Source: Ronald Inglehart, 1997: *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P.245 (originally Figure 8.3).

Figure 3: Classification of European political parties



Notes: For the scale components, see Table 1. Party scores on both dimensions are standardized to 100-point scales. **Source:** 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey


Figure 4: Mean vote share for populist parties in European societies



Note: The mean share of the vote won by Populist-Left and Populist-Right parties in national parliamentary and European parliamentary elections in 24 European societies. The classification of types of parties is based on the CHES dataset. See Table 1 for the indices.

Source: Calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow. 2016. *Parliaments and governments database* (ParlGov) 'Elections' dataset: <http://www.parlgov.org/>


Figure 5: Voting support for populist parties by country, 1970-2016



Note: The mean share of the vote won by all types of populist parties in national parliamentary and European parliamentary elections in 24 European societies. The classification of types of parties is based on the Ches dataset. See Table 1 for the indices.

Source: Calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow. 2016. *Parliaments and governments database* (ParlGov) 'Elections' dataset: <http://www.parlgov.org/>


Figure 6. Rising salience of non-economic issues in the party manifestos of thirteen Western Democracies, 1950-2010



Notes: Scores on the vertical axis are calculated by counting the number of economic issues, and non-economic issues mentioned in each party’s electoral manifesto for the most recent election, weighted by each party’s share of the vote in that election, giving equal weight to each country.


Source: Party Manifestos data from Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States, in Zakharov (2013).

Figure 7. The trend in social class voting in five Western Democracies, 1947-1992.




Source: Ronald Inglehart.1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p255.

Figure 8: Populist support by cohort




Source: ESS1-6, European Social Survey Cumulative File Rounds 1-6

Figure 9: Populist support by class



Source: ESS1-6, European Social Survey Cumulative File Rounds 1-6

Figure 10. The education gap in American approval of authoritarian leadership, 2011



Note: Q: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with congress and elections.**” Proportion of Americans agreeing with either ‘Very/fairly bad or ‘very/fairly good’.

Source: World Values Survey, 6th wave (2011) www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Technical appendix A: Classification of Populist parties

| Country | Party abbreviation | Name in English | Economic Left- Right party scale | Populism party scale | Classification |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Austria | FPO | Freedom Party of Austria | 53.6 | 89.7 | Populist-Right |
| Belgium | VB | Flemish Block | 54.8 | 87.1 | Populist-Right |
| Bulgaria | ATAKA | Attack | 14.0 | 96.7 | Populist-Left |
| Bulgaria | VMRO-BND | Bulgarian National Movement | 32.6 | 90.5 | Populist-Left |
| Bulgaria | NFSB | National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria | 36.5 | 87.2 | Populist-Left |
| Bulgaria | BBT | | 37.2 | 81.2 | Populist-Left |
| Croatia | HSS | Croatian Peasants Party | 44.4 | 90.0 | Populist-Left |
| Croatia | HDSSB | Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja | 46.7 | 88.4 | Populist-Left |
| Croatia | HSP | Croatian Party of Rights | 49.6 | 95.3 | Populist-Left |
| Croatia | HSP-AS | Croatian Party of Rights – Dr. Ante Starcevic | 53.8 | 93.7 | Populist-Right |
| Croatia | HDZ | Croatian Democratic Union | 62.7 | 81.2 | Populist-Right |
| Czech Rep | USVIT | Freedom Union | 47.2 | 85.7 | Populist-Left |
| Denmark | DF | Danish People's Party | 44.0 | 84.3 | Populist-Left |
| Finland | Sp-P | Finnish Party-True Finns | 40.2 | 90.6 | Populist-Left |
| France | FN | National Front | 47.2 | 89.1 | Populist-Left |
| France | MPF | Popular Republican Movement | 67.3 | 93.0 | Populist-Right |
| Germany | NPD | National Democratic Party | 44.5 | 95.4 | Populist-Left |
| Germany | AfD | Alternative for Germany | 81.3 | 87.6 | Populist-Right |
| Greece | XA | Golden Dawn | 18.4 | 100.1 | Populist-Left |
| Greece | ANEL | Independent Greeks | 44.1 | 94.8 | Populist-Left |
| Greece | LAOS | Popular Orthodox Rally | 52.0 | 93.5 | Populist-Right |
| Greece | ND | New Democracy | 64.1 | 81.6 | Populist-Right |
| Greece | Syriza | Syriza | | | Populist-Left |
| Hungary | JOBBIK | Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary | 31.0 | 98.9 | Populist-Left |
| Hungary | Fidesz | Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union | 45.9 | 87.7 | Populist-Left |
| Italy | Fdl | Brothers of Italy | 49.8 | 93.0 | Populist-Left |
| Italy | LN | Northern League | 64.7 | 89.1 | Populist-Right |
| Italy | M5S | Five Star Movement | | | |
| Latvia | NA | National Alliance | 60.5 | 81.4 | Populist-Right |
| Lithuania | DK | The Way of Courage | 37.0 | 81.5 | Populist-Left |
| Luxembourg | ADR | Alternative Democratic Reform | 63.1 | 91.6 | Populist-Right |
| Netherlands | PVV | Party for Freedom | 51.1 | 81.8 | Populist-Right |
| Netherlands | SGP | Political Reformed Party | 64.1 | 92.1 | Populist-Right |
| Norway | FrP | Progress Party | 67.5 | 80.7 | Populist-Right |
| Poland | PiS | Law and Justice | 33.0 | 83.4 | Populist-Left |
| Poland | SP | United Poland | 35.1 | 87.9 | Populist-Left |
| Poland | KNP | Congress of the New Right | 101.0 | 84.3 | Populist-Right |
| Romania | PP-DD | People's Party – Dan Diaconescu | 33.1 | 84.6 | Populist-Left |
| Slovenia | SDS | Slovenian Democratic Party | 82.3 | 84.2 | Populist-Right |
| Slovenia | NSI | New Slovenia – Christian People's Party | 82.4 | 83.5 | Populist-Right |
| Slovakia | SNS | Slovak National Party | 49.1 | 97.3 | Populist-Left |
| Slovakia | KDH | Christian Democratic Movement | 55.2 | 85.7 | Populist-Right |
| Spain | | Podemos | | | Populist-Left |
| Sweden | SD | Sweden Democrats | 48.1 | 93.8 | Populist-Left |
| Switzerland | EDU/UDF | Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland | 55.2 | 88.8 | Populist-Right |
| Switzerland | SVP/UDC | Swiss People's Party | 76.9 | 89.5 | Populist-Right |
| Turkey | MHP | National Action Party | 52.5 | 85.5 | Populist-Right |
| United Kingdom | UKIP | UK Independence Party | 87.2 | 91.8 | Populist-Right |
| United Kingdom | NF | National Front | | | Populist-Right |
| United Kingdom | BNP | British National Party | | | Populist-Right |

Source: Calculated from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)

Technical appendix B: The variables and coding used in the multivariate analysis

| ESS 1-6 variable | Question topic | Study coding |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| PARTY PREFERENCES | | |
| Prvtcat | Party voted for a populist party in last general election in each country | Voted for a populist party (1) or not (0) |
| Clsparty | Feel closer to a populist party than all other parties | Close to a populist party (1) or not (0) |
| SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS | | |
| Eduvlva | Highest level of education, ES – ISCED | Categories from low (1) to high (5) |
| agea | Age of respondent | In years |
| rlgdgr | Strength of religiosity | Low (0) to High (10) |
| Malesex | Sex | Male (1) Female (0) |
| Ethnic | Belong to minority ethnic group in country | Ethnic minority (1), not (0) |
| ECONOMIC INEQUALITY | | |
| Hincsrca | Social benefits are the main source of household income | Unemployment/redundancy benefits or Any other social benefits or grants (1)/ Else (eg wages)=0. |
| Hincfel | Subjective economic insecurity: Reported difficulties about living on household's income | 4-pt scale from 'Living comfortably on present income' (1) to 'Very difficult on present income' (4) |
| Uemp3m | Ever been unemployed for more than 3 months | Yes (1), No (0) |
| Class | ISCOCO Occupation recoded into the Goldthorpe class schema (Manager is the default category excluded in models) | Manager/prof (1), Lower managerial (2), Petty bourgeoisie(3), Skilled worker (4), Unskilled worker (5) |
| Urbanization | Urbanization scale | Big city (5), Suburb (4), Town (3), Village (2), Rural (1) |
| CULTURAL ATTITUDES | | |
| Anti-Immigration scale | Imbgeco, imueclt, imwbcnt | Scale 0-100 |
| imbgeco | Immigration bad or good for country's economy | Scale 0-10 |
| imueclt | Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants | Scale 0-10 |
| imwbcnt | Immigrants make country worse or better place to live | Scale 0-10 |
| Mistrust of global governance | Trstun, trstep | Scale 0-100 |
| trstun | Trust in the United Nations | Scale 0-10 |
| trstep | Trust in the European Parliament | Scale 0-10 |

| ESS 1-6 variable | Question topic | Study coding |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Mistrust of national governance | Trstplt,stfgov,stfdem | Scale 0-100 |
| trstplt | Trust in politicians | Scale 0-10 |
| stfgov | How satisfied with the national government | Scale 0-10 |
| stfdem | How satisfied with the way democracy works in country | Scale 0-10 |
| Authoritarian values | Importance of obey, safe, rules, strong government, tradition. | Scale 0-100 |
| Safe | Important to life in secure and safe surroundings | Scale 1-6 |
| Rules | Important to do what is told and follow rules | Scale 1-6 |
| Behave | Important to behave properly | Scale 1-6 |
| Stgov | Important that government is strong and ensures safety | Scale 1-6 |
| Trad | Important to follow traditions and customs | Scale 1-6 |
| Rightwing ideology scale | Rightwing self-placement on the left-right ideological scale | Left (0) to right (10), |

Notes: Items were selected to be consistent across all rounds of the survey, unless otherwise noted. Scales were summed from each of the relevant items and standardized to 100-points for ease of comparison.

Source: ESS1-6, European Social Survey Cumulative File Rounds 1-6

Technical appendix C: Descriptive statistics and distribution of all variables

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|---------------------------------------|----------|----------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| CONTROLS | | | | | |
| Age of respondent, calculated years | 292,463 | 14 | 99 | 45.53 | 18.560 |
| Sex (1=men, 0=women) | 293,570 | .00 | 1.00 | .4813 | .49965 |
| Highest education, low to high | 292,120 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 3.0414 | 1.33303 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .0600 | .23742 |
| Strength of religiosity | 291,072 | 0 | 10 | 4.77 | 2.978 |
| ECONOMIC INSECURITY | | | | | |
| Class: Routine Non-Manual | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .2562 | .43655 |
| Class: Petty bourgeoisie | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .1136 | .31736 |
| Class: Skilled manual | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .0910 | .28768 |
| Class: Unskilled manual | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .1362 | .34305 |
| Experience of unemployment | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .2600 | .43862 |
| Main household income: state benefits | 293,856 | .00 | 1.00 | .0394 | .19461 |
| Feeling about household's income | 286,189 | 1 | 4 | 2.10 | .892 |
| Urbanization | 292,891 | 1 | 5 | 2.87 | 1.228 |
| CULTURAL VALUES | | | | | |
| Anti-Immigration scale | 264,585 | .00 | 99.00 | 49.8010 | 21.25399 |
| Mistrust of Global governance scale | 246,837 | .00 | 100.00 | 48.0717 | 23.37193 |
| Mistrust of national governance | 269,430 | .00 | 99.00 | 42.1833 | 20.69676 |
| Authoritarian values scale | 272,694 | 16.50 | 99.00 | 72.5757 | 14.35910 |
| Placement on left right scale | 248,697 | 0 | 10 | 5.16 | 2.205 |
| Valid N (listwise) | 183,237 | | | | |

Source: ESS1-6, European Social Survey Cumulative File Rounds 1-6

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