Origins and Consequences of Prosocial Behavior
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism
Dealing with Emergencies:
When Would Yon Help a Stranger in Distress?
Altruism: Disregarding the Rewards
and Costs of Helping
Evolutionary Explanations for Helping:
Is Helping in ()ur Genes?
Exploring Diversity   Cultural Differences
in Helping
Empathy: The Heart of Altruism |       Prosocial Collectivism and Prmciplism: j       Is* There More Than Egoism and Alrruism?
1   Emotions and Norms
i       amotions and Attributions:
J       The Feelings of Helping
I      Overhclpiiig: Killing with Kindness
|      Norms and Helping: Standards of Aid
\       Receiving Help: Is It Better to Give
|       Eh an to Receiver
]   Increasing Prosocial Behavior
!       Rewarding Prosocial Behavior
i       Modeling and Helping
j       Experiencing a Helpers High:
'.       The Rewards of Helping
f      'leaching Moral Behavior: Do As I Say
Nor (Necessarily) As I Do i       Values Clarification and Mora! Reasoning: \       Instruction in Morality ;       The Informed Consumer of Social Psychology )       Increasing Helpfulness
A Lesson in Helping
~~| ake Geller will leave his Medway j [Massachusetts] home this morning in a lift-equipped van that will take him and his parents to _J Phoenix, where he will be a fresh-
man at Arizona State University.
The trip will be one of the longest and most difficult of his life. Geller, 19, has muscular dystrophy, which makes any type of travel an elaborate effort.
But after Geller s parents drop him off on August 17, he will not be alone. His lifelong friend, Jack Buchholz, will be his roommate and serve as his personal care attendant.
While many people have been amazed by Buchholz's dedication to his friend, Buchholz himself is unfazed.
"Its not that big a deaf" he insisted. "Waking up a half hour earlier in the morning is not that difficult.5'
Buchholz will get Geller, who uses a wheelchair, out of bed every morning, dress =: him, and kelp him shave and shower. At night, he will undress him, help him with such r;iui!thie barhrnom chores as brushing his teeth, and pur bint into bed. . . . rv.':.: Celler says he is grateful to Bucchoiz for the sacrifices he has made, and Geller hopes to •.eJW#peisonal care attendant in the next lew months to help him at school and take the burden oft- \\\<t friend
But do not expect them to be spending an> less time together.
'> .i pan, they re inseparable," said George Murphy, the director of the computer camp where ifiL two have spent the last few summers. 'Their personalities mesh together so well J^W they're a great team. I think of them as a pair of super-heroes, each with his own strength."
/,;/.( um» .>'■■/ Ink Biuhhoi" a,t a>< ia\epj,abh pan
L OOK I N G  A HE A D
m vTikh die news is often bad, fack Buchholz's willingness to sacrifice his energies h)i Jake Celler stands out. People like him, and others who make exceptional sac-J-rti unu.iL..>. 'ict, such behavior is an essential—and nor, it turns out, altogether ri oi human behavior, and social psychologists have sought to answer the questions h*| unt^i what circumstances, we help our fellow humans.
' cnaptLr, wl. examine prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is helping behavior that lU*»- i lie help mav be trivial, such as picking up a dropped piece of paper for a .Pl ^'traorduiarv, such as rescuing a child who has fallen through the ice in a partly vSi' ^ m,t) he premeditated and thoughtful, as when volunteers collect money for
prosocial behavior: Helping behavior that benefits others.
265
H nr.ping
267
Chapter 8 Helping
charity, or impulsive, as when a person rushes heroically into a burning car to save a trapped mother and child. The common thread tying together prosocial behaviors is the benefit that flows to others from an individuals helping actions.
We first consider the roots ol helping behavior. We begin by examining prosocial behavior in emergencies, detailing the forces that lead people to intervene—or not to intervene— in a crisis, We then rurn to altruistic behavior, helping that requires self-sacrifice. After examining whether any helping behavior can be entirely altruistic, wc question whether such behavior may be genetically programmed. We also consider how empathy, attributions, and emotions relate to helping, and we examine societal norms, or standards, that promote helping.
Finally, we consider practices that are designed to increase prosocial behavior. We discuss how rewards and helpful models bring about increased prosocial behavior. We also speculate on rhe adequacy' of methods for directly teaching moral behavior and moral reasoning. In sum, after teading this chapter, you'll be able to answer these questions: & What is prosocial behavior, and how is it exhibited in emergencies!1 4- What is altruism, and does it have generic mors? How do emotions and attributions affect helping? Whai societal norms, or standards, promote helping? 4' How can we increase prosocial behavior?
Micp Gics, a resident of Holland, risked her lite every day for more than 2 years ro Iced and provide a place to hide Anne Frank and her family during the Nazi Holocaust. Lenny Skutnik repeatedly jumped into rhe freezing Potomac River to rescue vie rims of a plane crash. "I just did what 1 had to do," explained Skuuiik brer, ^ Hundreds of people ol all ages rushed to help residents of Oklahoma after a devaating series of tornadoes leveled whole towns and killed over 50 people. Although their own homes were safe, many felt compelled to help suangevs who lived hundreds of miles away. What makes people like these so helpful? Social psychologists have long pondered the question, and they have come up with a variety of answers. We'll investigate rhe maid, considerations that go into helping, beginning with the way in which people react during emergency situations.
Dealing with Emergencies:
When Would You Help a Stranger in Distress?
Suppose you were in an experiment, talking to a small group of students over an intercorp, and you suddenly heard one of them say the following: ;5
Fer-umT think 1-1 netd-et-ii-if- could-er-er-somchody er-er-er-er-cr-cr-et give me a lutf .. give me a little help here because-er-I-er-l'm-er-er-h-h-having a-a-a real problein-cr-iagh now and I-er-if somebody could help me out it wou!d-it-would- cr-er s-s-sure be-sure be good . . . becausc-et-there-er-er-a cause her-huh-I've gor a-a one of lhe-er-sei-er-er-tfnri| coming on and-and- and I could realiy~er-u.se some help so if somebody woidd-er-givt me a little h- help-uh-er-er-cr-er-er c-could somcbodv-er-er-help-er-us-us-iis [choking ; sounds), . , . I'm gonna die-cr-er-Fm . . . gonna die-er-bclp-er-er-seizure-er- [choking sounds, then silence]. (Latane and Darley, 1970. p. 379) :
Most of us probably assume that if wc were in such a situation, we'd rush into action, tr> to see how we could help the victim.
Unfortunately, must of us would be wrong. According to the results of a landmark study carried out by social psychologists Bibb Latane and John Darley—first mentioned in Chapter 1—and a series ol experiments that followed, the poor victim would probably have been better off with just a single companion, rather than with a group.
Diffusion of responsibility: Where more is less. Latane and Darley's research confirmed that the greater the number of people present in a situation in which help is required, die less likely it is that any one person will provide it—a phenomenon they labeled diffusion of responsibility. Diffusion of responsibility is the tendency for people ro feel that responsibility for acting is shared, or diffused, among those present. The more people that are present in an emergency, then, the lower is any one individual's sense of responsibility—and tiie less likely it is that a person will feel obligated to help. In contrast, with fewer people present ro share the responsibility for helping, the more likely it is thar help will be provided (Darley & Latane, 1968: Latane & Darley, 1970; Latane & Nida, 1981; Kalafat, FAias, & Gara, 1993; Swim & Hyers, 1999).
Such reasoning has been proved sound in literally hundreds of experiments. For example, in the experiment using the seizure "emergency" described above-—which was, m reality, staged by the experimenters to test the theory—-Latane and Darley found clear evidence for the diffusion-of-responsibility phenomenon. In the study, participants, placed in groups of either two, three, or six people, heard the faked seizure over the intercom. As predicted, the more people who supposedly could overhear the seizure, the less likely it was that any one person would provide help. Specifically, when just two people were present {the bystander and victim), 85% of the participants helped. In contrast, when two bystanders and the victim were present, 62% provided aid; and when five bystanders and the victim were present, only 31% helped (Darley &. kirane. 1968).
The concept of diffusion of responsibility helps to explain—although not pardon—a considerable number of everyday incidents that exemplify "Bad Samaritanism." For instance, perhaps you recall the true events depicted m the Jodie Foster movie The Accused, in which a New England woman was savagely raped on a pool table in a bar as dozens of onlookers .stood idly by. Police accounts describe her crying and begging for help, and yet not one pctson came to her aid. While she was being repeatedly raped by several men, one customer did trv ro call the police, but he dialed a wrong number and gave up. Finally, the woman broke away Tom the rapists and fled the bar, dazed and half-naked. A passing motorist stopped and drove her to a telephone, where she called for help.
I he concept of diffusion of responsibility allows us to speculate on the social psychological sim inon that permitted the rape to proceed without intervention. Because the bar was ciowdcd, each of the patrons could (eel little individual responsibility for helping the victim. Instead, the obligation for helping was shared among the many people present, a diffusion that lowered the likelihood that any one person would be sufficiently moved by the victim's plight to help her. Ironically, if fewer people had been in the bar, the victim's picas might well ...have been answered.
Help emurgencies: A model. Although the diffusion-of-rcsponsibility phenomenon ^planus parr of what goes into making the decision to help, it is just one of the factors that accounts tor helping in emergency situations, As illustrated in Figure 8-1, several distinct dcusiuu-making points must be traversed ro determine whether helping will occur. Specifically they include:
■■■■ >\'>!ur,iva person, event, or situation that potentially mi.l\ require help. For even the potenrial lu helping ro exist, an individual must notice the circumstances thar may requite assistance
Ot M.1I11C sou.
* Liu-;jircting the event as one thai n-cjiiirei help. Simply noticing an event is no guarantee thar ■someone will provide help, ff the event is ambiguous enough, onlookers may decide that it lullv is not an emergency at all (Shotkmd, l 985; Bickman, 1994).
diffusion of responsibility: The
tendency for people to feel thar responsibility for aeting is shared, or diffused, among those present.
268
Chapter 8 Hfiiing
Chapters Helping
269
pluralistic ignorance: A state chat occurs when bystanders in an emergency or ambiguous situation use rhe behavior of others to determine whether help is actually required.
Noticing a person, event, or. situation that potentially may require help
interpreting the event as one that requires help
Assuming responsibility
FIGURE 8-1 Latane and Darky's Model of Helping in an Emergency
According to the research, the decision to help is made in several steps, [bm-rct: Lar-inc & Darky, 1970.)
mcrgency occurs, it is unlikely more iikelv the inex-
People are olten motivated to decide that a situation is noi an emergency. Defining the iidi.ition as ■i romine, nonemergency event means that no further psychological (and physical.) effort is required. We may thus be primed to discount information chat would lead us to conclude dial n situation is an emergency and conversely, especially at ten rive to information suggesting that there is no emergency (Wilson & Petttiska, 1984).
Similarly, viewing other bystanders who aie not themselves intervening may help bolster rhe interpretation that the event is not an emergency (Harrison & Wells. 1991). Wc ma convince ourselves that it the situation really were an emergency, then others would be jiniip-V ing in to help. Such a mind-set is due to pluralistic ignorance, a phenomenon in whid bystanders in an emergency or ambiguous situation ii.se rhe behavior of others to dereni whether help is actually required (Taylor, 1982; Milkr & McFarlond, 1987; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Schrneder & Prentice. 1998). Each person in the situation mistaken!v c assumes, based on the behavior of the oibcrs, that help is unnecessary. As a resuli, no one •• intervenes.
Unfortunately, in such situations the reality may be quire different. Like us, the othe people present may feel uncertain about what to do, and they may be looking to others to figure out the appropriate course of action. Pmt when all the people in a situation sec nc -; responding, they make the same, erroneous attribution, and everyone becomes immobii If people are able to move beyond pluralistic ignorance and understand the true morivat behind the collective inactivity of the onlookers, they arc more likely to intervene. Obvious; id an ambiguous situation, comrmmicarion with others helps to end rhe state of plural's ignorance.
•  Assuming responsibility. If people notice an event and determine that it is an emergency, i \ have readied a major decision point. At this point, they ask themselves whether they dif > take responsibility for helping. This is the point at which diffusion o( responsibility may occur; If many others are present, rhe burden of helping is seen to be shared, and helpin any one person is less likely to occur.
Of course, diffusion of responsibility is not the only reason that people may not be hi-!1 ■ ful in an emergency. Sometimes people take no responsibility because they don't know ihcy oughr to do and they lack the expertise to intervene effectively. For instance, if sorn
with apparent medical expaltse h present when a medica ... that a person without medical training will feel compelled to offer aid; n pert person will defer to the specialist.
One study, conducted on die subways of New York, illustrated this point nicely. In the experiment, rese.ii cVici s arranged for a bogus crisis to occur, m which a p.usengiri appeared to collapse, with blood trickling our die corner ot his mouth. Other passengers were considerably less likely to intervene when an appareni medical school "intern" was present than when no such person was present. Not unreasonably, those without medical training readily deferred to the supposed expertise of [he intern (Piliavui & Piltavin- 1 972).
Ironically, fear of unwanted legal ramifications may prevent experts from becoming involved in providing emergency medical assistance. For example, physicians have been successfully sued for intervening unsuccessfully in emergency situations. In response, many states have passed "Good Samaritan" laws, which prevent medical and other professionals from being sued for pmviding unsuccessful assistance in emergencies (Northrop. 1990; Taylor, 1990; Rosenberg, 1992).
Moreovei, people who furnish emergency help are sometimes viewed suspiciously by onlookers. A person who is providing aid mav be seen by late-arriving onlookers as the possible source of ihe harm that befell the victim—a phenomenon dubbed confusion of responsibility (Cacioppo. Petty, Ik Losch, 1 98b). Awareness of the confusion-of-responsibllity phenomenon may in fact suppress a person's willingness ro provide aid during an emergency. ; Deciding how to provide assistance. Ii people reach this step in the sequence, they must choose from a variety of potential forms of assistance. Should they call the police? Provide medical assistance? Ask another bystander to get help?
Because the potential choices lor helping vary so widely, helpers must weigh i he costs and benefits of each potential action, employing a kind of psychological calculus. In an emergency, people quickly tally bo tlx the actual and psychological costs of providing particular kinds ol aid. For instance, indirect forms of aid. such as getting others to help, are less costly than direct aid. Ar the same rime, various types of help bring different kinds of rewards. You can expeci (o receive more gratitude and approval when you leap imo a pond to save a drowning child than when you merely call the child's plight to the attention of a nearby police officer.
Many experiments have confirmed that as rhe costs ol helping increase, relative to the rewards, helping is less likely to occur (Bell et a!., 199S; Yec & Greenberg, 1998). One example comes from a classic study involving theology smdeni.s who were on their way w give a talk either on the Good Samaritan parable—which emphasizes the importance o( helping— or on a subject having nothing to do with helping (Oarley & Batson, 1973). 'lo control rhe cost of helping, the researchers manipulated the degree to which the students were laic in arriving to give their talk.
(>i"t rlit way to give men tailv. participants passed a confederate, planted by the experimenters, who was slumped on the ground in an alley, coughing and groaning. Would the theology students help?
aether vol, decide to help dii.s [K'lMiri depends on a number of uch as whether you help, whether
file to I " thuikhe no
>ou puLi.ive ii is an emergency Wiution, and how many others ' '"^presrn t.
conftision of responsibility: A state-in which observers assume that a person who is actually aiding a victim is in someway responsible for rhe emergency situation.
ClKPTT.R 8
271
.1 don't have time for sharing and " caring when I'm moving and shaking."
1000 iiobert Manknfffmm i/irwonbankcotu. Aiirighh reserved.
The answer depended on whether rhe participants were lata Participants who were late y (which corresponded io a greater cost for helping) were less likely to provide hc.Jp than participant; who had ample time. Ironically, the topic of (heir talk b;id no effect on iheir helping ' behavior, participants about to speak on the virtues of helping were no more likely to provide y help than those who had rehearsed a speech on another subject.
\V/c should not sink into despair over the unwillingness of. the tardv tiuoiopy students to . help the confederate. Subsequent research suggests that their lack ol help mav have been induced by their perception that the 'greater good" would be fulfilled by rheii arriving at the talk on rime, thereby helping a larger number ol people, than by their slopping to help a lorn' -person in need (Baison et ak, 1978).
Cleady, chert, die kind of assistance to be offered in an emergency situation is selected hi y par l by an assessment ol the personal rewards and costs of helping. Tallying the rewards and ■ costs of various types of helping, people make a decision about what kind of assistance rhev will provide.
Hdpmg hi the emerge my—-the final step. Afrer weighing the rewards and costs oi uirerveiuug . *: in an emergency situation, people finally reach the srage of action. However, their mteuuon ;■ io help does not guarantee that their help will be effective, For instance, if bystanders deudi.. ■ .g co phone the police for help, diey may find chat route Mocked: They might not be able to ~ y hnd a phone, or the phone may be broken. Fven if they decide to intervene diretdv: they may be frozen with tear and unable to act. The decision to help, then, does not guarantee . . -: that those in need will receive the aid they require. !
Altruism: Disregarding the Rewards and Costs of Helping
Latane and Darley's mode] emphasizes- the rational weighing of the rewards arid costs helping, However, in some cases a logical analysis of the benefit's and expenses of helping ul*y; not satisfactorily explain why helping occurred. For example, a cost-reward analysis do*
not convincingly explain why a medic would risk his own life during fierce combat just to retrieve the body of a dead soldier so that it can be sent back to the soldier's family.
Io explain such situations, some social psychologists have proposed the concept of .lirruism: helping behavior that is beneficial to others bur requires clear self-sacrifice. In altruism, helpers have no expectation of receiving rewards, and they expect no condemnation front others if they do not provide help (Fisenbctg, 19&6; Batson, 1990b, 1991; Batson .nl, 1999).
Many forms oi helping can be considered altruistic: running into a burning house to rescue a stranger, sheltering Jews in Nazi-occupied countries during World War II, adopting a baby born with AIDS. In each of these cases, the costs (or potential costs) to the helper are significant, far outweighing possible rewards.
Some experts have criticized the notion of al caustic behavior. They argue that if wc analyze various helping situations closely, we can often identify potential rewards even in behavior that at first seems completely altruistic, for instance, a helper may gain greater self-esteem, may receive praise from others, or may be the recipient of enormous gratitude and a sense of obligation on the part of the victim. Hence, psychological rewards may lie behind seemingly altruistic behavior (Batson, 1990a; Anderson, 1993; Serow, 1993; J. tin ron, 1997).
A number of social psychological studies have examined altruism and the question of whether a behavior can be totally altruistic (Shapiro & Cabbard, 1994). For instance, some investigators have focused on altruism, and helping in general, as a type of personality trait. The concept of an altruistic personality suggests diat certain individuals have enduring personality characteristics that consistently lead cheni to help (BierfiofT, Klein, & Kramp, 1991; Ashtonetah, 1998).
Despite the appeal of the notion that some people are consistently helpful, evidence for the existence of a consistently altruistic personality type has nor been found. Most research suggests that people are not invariably helpful or, for that mailer, unhelpful. Instead, whether particular individuals act in a prosocial manner depends on their personality and the specifics ol the situation. Furthermore, no single pattern of specific, individual personality traits determines prosocial behavior. Rather, the way that specific personality factors fir together, as well as the demands of the particular situation, determines whether a person will help (Carlo et ak, 1991; Knight ct ak, 19(>4).
Research has shown, however, that some groups of people are more helpful than others, for instance, some studies have suggested that men exhibit slightly higher levels of helpfulness, in general, than women (Eagly. 1987). However, the greater helpfulness of men may be more apparent than real and may depend largely on the type of situation in which it has been studied, b'or instance, men snow particularly high levels of helping when they are being observed by others and when the victim is a woman (F.agly &C Crowley, 1986). Such results suggest that men may be motivated as much by their desire to exhibit strength and mastery as by altruistic intentions (Erdle et ak. I 992).
In contrast, the type of help offered by women may be more nurturing than the help offered by men (George et ak, 1998). For instance, one study found that women were more likely than men to say they would help a friend in need (Belansky & Boggiano, 1994).
Evolutionary Explanations for Helping: ,s Hhwng in Our Genes?
^ 'hen art elephant is injured and falls to the ground, other elephants will try to help h gel up "gain. When a mother grouses chicks arc threatened by a predator, she will pretend to have a broken wing- -calling attention to her presence—in order to divert the predator's attention from l>h clucks. When a bee hive is threatened, bees will seek to protect the hive by stinging the l>?tt udc:: The act oj stinging, however, results in eerrain death to the bee. (Sikes, 1971; Trivers. ■ Wihon, 1975)
altruism: 1 lei ping behavior that is beneficial to others but requires clear ielf- sacrifice.
altruistic personality: A concept suggesting that eerrain individuals have enduring personality characteristic*, rbar consistently lead them to help.
272
Chapter &
273
In an extraortlinrny ciSc of primate help-giving, this femalr gorilla (shown with her baby, named Kooia) went ro iIkv aid of a boy who fell into hci habitat at a zoo in Illinois.
Such seemingly" altruistic behaviot seems co fly in che face of Darwin's notion of"natural -selection, or "survival of the Fittest.'1 '.['he theory oi evolution stresses that organisms are genetically programmed to behave in ways that enable them to survive long enough to pass on their genes to future generations. Therefore, we won Id not expect animals to engage in behavior that has no benefit to themselves and actually can threaten their existence. Helping other members or die species, particularly when it incurs costs to themselves, seems to be unusual behavior for animals thar are instinctually programmed toward self-preservation.
One explanation for the phenomenon of animal helping comes from evolutionary' psy- -chology, which considers the biological roots of behavior. Focusing on how organisms pass on their genes to future generations, evolutionaty approaches suggest drat helping actually • advances die goal of strengthening die species as a whole (Paris, 1994; Sober ÖC Wilson, . 1998). ^ How does this happen? Proponents of evolutionary approaches argue that natural selco :: tlon occurs at die level oi genes, not individuals. Rather than seeking to preserve diem.selves, then, organisms have as their goal the preservation of their genes. What this implies is that.-, individuals who share one's genes—ones kin—are likely to help the general goals of natural r selection (Barber, 1994). For instance, when a mother aids her child at the expense of her.. own well-being, the mother is actually ensuring the continuation of her gene pool, because : the child has a relatively high percentage of similar genes. :;
Hut what of nonkin, who do not share similar genes? Why should they he the recipient1; [ of seemingly altftii-srie behavior? The answer is reciprocity, rhe notion that wc help ;-members of die species because we (or our kin) will receive help from others in rhe fi ConsequenrU, helping increases the probability that our genes will be protected for luni" reproduction (Nowak, May, & Sigmund, 1995; Sigmund, 199s)). • In some ways, evolutionary explanations make sense. They certainly help explain such p'1^ ■. norciena as why we are more likely to run into a burning house to save our own children due-; the children of our neighbors (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kifayama, 1994; Wilson & Vbct. ■ 19.94; Reeve, 199K). Yet, evolutionary approaches have many critics. Because evolution1'! \ explanations arc based more on non human species than on human behavior, they do no \ into account the higher cognitive abilities of humans. In addition, they do not provide in rhe way of specific predictions about the conditions under which people will be he *' -,l : Furthermore, rhey do not explain why different cultures vary so much in term:; of their fulness, as we sec next. Still, beeause no evidence convincingly rules our evoiuti'1''-'1, approaches as an explanation for altruism, rhey lemain viable, although quire specuia<iW
TABLE 8-1
rhe number of helpful acts that occur during children's play varies according m culture In a mj.vey, children m the Phdippmes. Kenya, and Mexico showed higher levels of helpfulness than ' children in Japan, rhe United States, and India.
country
Philippines Kenya Mexico japan
Urn red States India
Sonne: Whiting & Whiting, 1975.
NUMBER OF HELPFUL ACTS
156 148
97 86 60
Cultural Differences in Helping
Does culture affect helping behavior? The clear answer is yes. For instance, people living on Israeli kibbutzim, or collective farms, tend to show greater helpfulness and even different reasoning about morality than members of the dominant culrurc in the Unired States (Mann, 1080; Fucks eral., 1986).
Differences in altruistic behavior are linked to the way in which a cultures children are raised. For instance, one cross-cultural study found that children's helping behavior, as judged from observations made while they were playing, varied substantially in different cultures (see Table 8-1). Children in the Philippines, Kenya, and Mexico were most altruistic, whereas children in the Uniccd States scored among the lowest. These differences appeared to be related to the degree of children's involvement wirh family obligations. In those cultures in which children had to cooperate with other family members to do chores or to help in the upbringing of younger children, altruism was greatest. In contrast, when a culture promoted competition—such as in the United States-—altruism was lowest (Whiting &. Whiting, 1975; Whiting cV Edwards, 1088).
Similarly, different cultures vary in the ways they view reciprocity, die notion that we help because we expect to receive help from others in the future. Yet, significant differences exist in views ol reciprocity across various cultures. For temple, Hindu Indians see reciprocity as a moral obligation, whereas college students in the United Stares consider reciprocity HMiioie of a personal choice (A'loghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993; Miller & Bersoff, 1994;
empathy: The Heart of Altruism
|>«p«e rhe evidence against the existence of consistent altruistic behavior, not all investiga-. A audoncd rhe issue. For instance, according to C. Daniel Batson and colleagues, «.me helping behavior is motivated solely by the goal of benefiting someone else and ^^epreiCnts what cotdd be described as altruistic behavior. Bur he argues thar our altru-s inntdd ro certain cases; It occurs only when we experience empathv for the person in son, 1990a; Barson, 1998). '
•^ilBarson, IS
Empathy is an emotional response corresponding ro rhe feelings of another person. Wk 1 * m-c a person in distress, ihey feel that persons suffering; when rhey cncounier a per*
empathy: An emotional response corresponding to the feelings of another person.
...... ..." "
Vi *-.
lÄilllll
-I,
i
Chapter i
Egoistic Motivation
Low Empathy «j (Weak emotional response corresponding |_. to other's feelings) §
Person i Requiring I Help I
H/gfi Empathy (Strong emotional ' ,
response corresponding 1" to other's feelings) V.
Experience f» Personal fs Distress j
Experience . Other's fCf. Suffering |
Helping motivated j by desire to mm
reduce stress
Reduction of personal distress
Helping motivated | by desire to reduce j^; other's stress        : ,
Reduction } of other's distress
empathy-aluuism hypothesis: The
theory that empaihy lies ar the heait of altruisiic behavior.
Altruistic Motivation
egoi
ism: Behavior motivated by self-benefit.
FIGURE 8-2   The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis According to Ramon's empathy-altruism hypothesis, experiencing cmparhy motivares people to reduce others distress. In conrrast, egoistic motivation leads to helping due to a desire to reduce ones own personal distress. (Swrm? Batson, »•>'>].)
who is sad, they experience the persons sadness. According to Batson s empathy-altruism hypothesis, empathy lies at the heart of altruistic behavior. As can be seen in the bottom half of Figure 8—2, experiencing true empathy motivates people to reduce other people's distress. In contrast, people may help only because helping reduces their own personal distress or produces pleasure at meeting another's needs. In this case (illustrated in the top half of Figure 8—2), they arc acting with egoism, behavior motivated by self-benefit (Batson & ,; Olcson, 1991; Batson, 1991).
Finding support tor die empathy-altruism hypothesis is difficult, because to distinguish . altruistic from other motivations we must assess underlying morive.s thai can be inferred ; only indirectly Ironi behavior. However, researchers have come up with some ingenious-T experimental solutions to this problem (Batson, 1991; Davis. 1994; Davis. Luce. 6l Kratts, : 1994; Batson & Weeks, 1996; Batson cx al., 1999).
For example, support for Batson s reasoning comes from a study that directly compared"; the empathy—alu'insm hypothesis with the negative state relief model, which—we']] consider later in the chapter- -suggests that helping is based on an effort to end unpleasant emotions that come from observing a victim's plight. In the experiment, participants listened to an account of a female college student who was having difficulty completing an imports"' ~. assignment because of illness and then were given the opportunity to help (Dovidio, Allen, .• &Schroeder, 1990). * '
The experimenters manipulated the degree of empathy for rhe woman by telling parti ipants eilher that they should imagine how rhe woman felt, thereby inducing high einpatl > or that they should simply observe rhe circumstances being described, inducing low emp>' \ thy. In addition, participants were given the opportunity to help the woman either on t ]: specific problem that they heard about or on a different problem. } The researchers rtasoned that if empathy were the source of helping, participant* wou ; be motivated to relieve rhe students immediate, particular problem—-not to solve her pro lem s in general. Consequently, if rhe empathy—altruism hypothesis were valid, participants the high-cmpadw ("imagine ) condition would show high levels of helping on the same pro lem and low levels of helping on a dillctenr problem. Conversely if rhe negative state model were valid, helping should occur regardless of wherher the problem were the same"' different, because the goal of the egoistic motivation would he to reduce the helper's neg^H emotions, which could be accomplished by helping on any task.
70 60 ; 50 40 30 20 10 0
• Imagine
High-empathy condition Observe
Low-empathy condition
Different problem
FIGURE 8-3 Empathy Leads to Helping Supporting die empathy-altruism hypothesis, die results nf the Dovidio. Allen, and Schroeder 11990) Miidy showed that the degree nf helping varied according to whether participants could help solve a current problem or a diffeienc one. When helping was possible on the current problem, participants who were asked to identify with the woman's feelings—the high-empathy condition—were
more apt to help than those ..      . ,
who had been asked merely to Same :
observe. Conversely helping ,. "problem-
did not differ significantly between high- and low-empathy conditions when a different problem was involved. uW-<v: Dovidio, Allen, & ScbioeJcr, 1990.)
As you can see from Figure 8-3, the experiment supported the empathy—altruism prediction. Helping levels varied according to whether participants could help on the same or a different problem. When helping was possible on the same problem, participants who were asked to identify with the woman's feelings were more likely to volunteer than were those who had been asked merely to observe. Conversely, when helping was possible for a different problem, the difference in helping between high- and low-empathy conditions was not significant.
Findings from other research also support the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Shaw, Batson, &. iodd, 1994; Batson et ah, 1995; Sibicky, Schroedcr, 6V Dovidio, 1995). For instance, in one recent study participants identified as high or low in empathy were led to be successful on a task meant to help another person, but they failed to relieve the other persons need tliuiugh no fault of their own. Although iow-empathy participants showed little mood change as a rcsuh of their failure, the mood of high-empathy participants declined substantially (Batson & Weeks, 1996).
Even chough many studies support the empathy-altruism hypothesis, no final word can be said on the ultimate validity of the hypothesis. Plausible alternatives to the hypothesis abound. For instance, one suggestion is that helping is motivated not by selfless altruism but by rhe potential 'empachic joy" an individual experiences when helping others (Smith, Keating, & Stotktnd, 1989; Cialdini, 1991; Warren & Walkt 1996; Cialdini et ah, 1997; Neuberg et al.
alternatives,
.- Pi
991; Roberts &c Strayet;
1997; Neubcrget ah, 1997). Although a plausible hypothesis, the empathic joy explanation remains only one of sev-cul reasonable hypotheses. To date, no experiment has unequivocally suppoited any of the
rmorc, even if helping behavior is motivated by empathy-induced altruistic behav-K>r. such help is not without cost. For instance, although altruism may benefit a particular .individual, it may come at the expense of the larger group. For example, a business execu-, tlve ni,iy keep an ineffective employee employed out of concern for the employees welfare, "lit the company and customers may suffer. Similarly, sbecpherders may overgraze their 1'eids not nut of selfishness but to feed their families (an altruistic motive). The problem in k°th cases is that, the altruism results in a cost to rhe grearer good. Even altruism, then, can .i'W us downside (Batson et al., 1999).
276
Chapter 8 Helping
Chapter 8
277
TABLE 8-2
PRINCIPLE___
Egoism Altruism
Prosocial collectivism Prosocial principlism
CHAKAC.TLR1STICS
Behavior motivated by self-beacht
Helping hehavior that is beneficial to others but
requires clear self-sacrifice
Helping behavior whose goal is to increase the
welfare of a group or collective
Helping behavior with the goal of upholding some
broad moral principle
prosocial collectivism: Motivation with the goal of increasing the welfare of a group or collective.
prosocial principlism: Motivation with the goal of upholding some moral principle.
Prosocial Collectivism and Principlism: Is There More Than Egoism and Altruism?
According ro Daniel Batson, the debate between egoism and altruism has contributed to a lack of attention to two other, potentially important, forms of motivation that may underlie prosocial behavior: collectivism and principlism (Batson, 1994). Prosocial collectivism is motivation with the goal of increasing the welfare of a group or collective, whereas prosocial principlism is motivation with the goal of upholding some moral principle.
Prosocial collectivism can be seen in efforts to help members of various groups, even if . one docs not belong to the group. For instance, we may wish, to support members ot various racial or ethnic groups, the homeless, or gays and lesbians, although we ourselves are not members of such groups. Although collectivism sounds in some ways similar to altruism— acting for the benefit for others—it is differem: Altruism focuses on the welfare of another, single individual, whereas collectivism targets members ot a group. The group may he small (marriage partners or a couple), or it may be large (members of a race or religion), but it is a group of some sort. In the words of Robyn Dawes and colleagues, the concern is "nor me or thee but we" (Dawes, van de Kragt, &. Orbell, 1988,1.
In contrast, prosocial principlism has a more abstract goal: the support of some broad moral principle such as justice or equality. Supporters of principlism reject the existence or altruism, because altruism is too often based on empathy. Similarly, they disavow collectivism, because it singles out particular groups of individuals to the exclusion of others. Instead, proponents of principlism suggest that adherence to broad principles, such as "love thy neighbor as thyself," can produce prosocial behavior.
More than likely, ail four major forms of motivation—egoism, altruism, prosocial col lertivism. and prosocial principlism (summari/.ed in lable 8-2)—underlie helping at different times, depending on the circumstances, who is doing the helping, and the type of help required. One challenge for social psychology is to sort out these different motivations to learn the best ways of improving people's helpfulness.
According to the phenomenon of diffusion of icsponsibilhy the greater the number ol people present in an emergency, the lower the likelihood that any one person will pro\h c help.
According to one model of helping hehavior, a person must pass through several d«*um points before determining to offer help.
The question of whether truly altruistic behavior «rxisr< is a difficult one, confounded by
many possibly self-serving motivations.
Prosocial behavior varies across the i^endeis and acioss u.ilture<«. s   According to Batsan, empathy, rather than egoism, lies at the heart or altruistic behavior. Also important are prosocial collectivism and principlism.
K   What is the relationship between the number of bystanders present during an emergency and ta) the odds that any single, particular bystander will provide aid, and (b) the odds that sorrienne will provide aidr
-   How does pluralistic ignorance affect rhc likelihood rhat a situation will be interpreted as an emergency:" What factors might motivate a person io misinterpret emergency situations? Does the principle of reciprocity—thai we help others in the hope of receiving help in the future tor ourselves or our km—operate among strangers? If so, how?
'   NX'hv mighr U.6, children have scored low on a cross-cultural measure of altruism? Can this be changed:" Should it:"
How might an evolutionalv approach explain prosocial collectivism and principlism:
t I.. . !<'.'! J-' 'J IV ! '1 'r/i\>
You're walking clown a busy citv street, and an unshaven, disheveled man, wearing dirty clothes and carrying a sign that says, "I'm homeless/' comes up to you. In a loud voice, he asks for some spare change to buy some food.
How do you respond? The way in which you interpret the mans requesr, your mood, and the. standards for helping that vou employ may well influence your response to the man's request. We turn now to the role played by attributions, emotions, and norms in determining helping behaviors.
Emotions and Attrirutions: The Feelings of Helping
According to rhe attributhmal model of helping and cmotiosis, you may experience anyone of a number of emotions at the moment you're approached by a man asking for help: sadness over his plight, annoyance at being accosted on the street, disgust that the government has not been able to solve the problem of homelessncss, happiness that you have a joV and do not have to beg tor food, fear that the man may be deranged and is about to rob you. The specific emotion you experience may well determine whether you'll agree to his request or refuse u.
The arrnbunonal model suggests that when you initially are approached by the stranger, your general physiological arousal increases due to the uncertainty of the siuiaiion. To understand and label the arousal, you initiate an atrributional assessment process in which you ana-l/^ the cause underlying the persons need foi help. If you attribute his need to internal. Lontiollable causes—he's lazy or lies a drunk—the emotion will likely be a negative one. ^-o.nersely. if vou arrnbiue his need to external causes that the victim is unable to control-lies beer, trying u> find a job tor months and hasn't been able lo find one because the econ-'"tiy is bad—your emotions will be more sympathetic and positive (Meyer & Mulheriu, l^0; Wcmer. 198«. 1 996; Menec & Perry, ! 998; see Figure 8-4).
v'ltunatelv. the emotions you experience help determine whether you will provide help 'OuoU-tv, ; 995). According to trie attnbutional model, if the emotions the person evokes are
>b
•Posirh        -ii . °u""vu"u,w'111UUC1' " luu amotions tne person evokes are
4„ f ' "Ll moK apt t0 helP' A ncSarive emotional response will probably discourage 011 horn pmudingaid ' 5
Vrnm TKl am,hutlonal modd J"St examined assumes that we approach
^  g Mm ,aons in an emotional state that is not already positive or negative. But suppose «'»itd 1 J   1 ,U tUv dQd ' °U fceI on r°P of lhe wwr!d" Are you more likely to help than you K 'U rhc end of"a lonS> upsetting day, when you are in an awful mood?
attributions! model of helping and emotions; A model suggesting that die nature of an atmbution. for a request for help dctei mines a person's emotional response and me help provided.
When confronted with a request for help, we are likely ro experience a range of emotions. Whether we help or not is deiennined by the particular nature ol the emotions aroused by xhe request.
CHAS>1ER8 Htl.l'INC
279
278
Stranger's request for spare change
External attribution-Bad economy is the cause of the stranger's plight
Positive ■
emotional
response
Helping
Physiological arousal
negative stale relief (NSR) model:
The model clrai -seeks to explain tile ]-r;;i[lnnsllip becv.'een bull mood and helping behavior by focusing on the conse^nenees of prasocial behavior for the help provider.
Analysis of situation i in order to label arousal
Internal attribution'-Laziness is the cause of the stranger's plight
Negative , emotional l»« response r
Not helping i
HGUIIE 8-4   An Atmbruirmal Analyse of Helping The acLnburional model of hdpmg .he way in which peopie arrribure d,,r phy.olo^ arou,<i~ * ,h,, th« will provide help. ,.W, B«d on '*«>.*V & lm'
'1 he answer is a definite yes. People who are in a good mood are considerably more apt ;. io help than those who are not ((prison, Chavlin, cV" Millet, 19S8; Hiscubcrg, 199U R, A. ; Bacon, 1997). And it does nor rake much ro bring on a good mood: Something us simple as:4'-finding, a dime in a pay phone or .smelling coHee and cookies in a mall is enough to make ;iTf person more likely to help others in need (bsen & Levin, 1972; R. A. Baron, 1997).
Ol course, it yon plan to use these findings to choose a good-mood moment to ;isk ymir."^' boss for a raise, you'd better move quickly. Good moods do not last loo long, and helpful-/!; nesv drops oil after only a few minutes (Isen, Clark, & Schwartz/, i 976).
A pttion in a good mood is more likely ro help for several possible reasons. For one dung the circumstances (hat pur people in a good mood may lead them to focus their attention -c on themselves. Because of tins, they may be reminded of the societal standaRls that th'-y lenmed as children about the importance of helping, and cheiir thought processes may lead/-? to greater helpfulness. Similarly, the good mood may activate a whole network of posing--, memories, leading to recollections of previous favorable experiences in which helping./? occurred. Finally, people may want ro mainlain their good mood, and acting helpfully tow; another person may help them sustain their good feeling.-, (Salovcy & Rodin. 1 98t: CarbeiV.^ Charlin, & Miller! 1988: Salovcy & Roscnhan, 1989; Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, )<»«»;/.
Wegener & IVtty, 1994).
If good moods lead people to behave more prosocially, does it follow that being in a had,/ mood will lead to a lower likelihood of helping? In this case the answer is: It depends.
Had moods often foster lower levels of helping rhan neutral moods. Howe\eu the) d*1* s some! imes lead to more helping, and in other cases make: no difference at all ((_ iakhnh J rick, & Bauniann, 1982; feldr. jagodztnski, &c McKmley, 1997). One explanation for thfS;; confusing state of affairs is provided by the negative state relief mode! proposed bv soei<il phf'^ rhologist Robert Cialdini (Cialdini et ah, 1987; Ciaidini & Fuitz, 1990).
The negative state relief (NSR) model seeks to explain the relationship between h3<-; mood and helping behavior In focusing on die consequences of prosocial beh,,1 mt h'1^''"
for an exam if we think that our own bad mood might thereby be improved (Manucia, Ban-mann, &c Cialdini, 1984; Schaller & Cialdini, 1990),
On the other hand, if people perceive that helping will do nothing to benefit (heir mood -or, even worse, if helping will make them feel bad—they will do nothing to provide aid. In • upport of such reasoning, studies show that younger children, who have not yet learned die rewards of helping, are less apt than adults to be helpful if they're in a blue mood (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976).
Others argue that the NSR model does not tell the full story regarding the relationship between negative mood and helping. One alternative explanation suggests that negative mood influences what people think about, which in turn influences the tendency to be helpful. If their mood arouses inward-focused thoughts, such as despair, helplessness, and ihoughts of personal inadequacy, people are unlikely to help others. In contrast, if their mood leads them to look outward, such as to the unfortunate plight of the person who nueds help, a negative mood can increase the incidence of helping (Rogers et ah, 1982; pvszczvnski & Green berg, 1987; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990; Salovey, Mayer, & Rosenhan, 1991).
ft is also possible that a negative mood changes the feelings of responsibility that people have tor the welfare of others (Gibbons & Wicklund, 1982; Aderman & Berkowitz, 1983). It a bad mood leads people to feel less responsibility for others, then helping will be inhibited. Conversely, if an unpleasant mood increases people's sense of responsibility—perhaps hecause it raises their level of guilt—then the mood will be associated with more helpfulness.
seiping improve one's mood? 'The relationship between mood and helping is not a one-way street. Although we've been considering how good and bad moods affect helping, we can also examine how helping affects mood.
According to social psvchologist Peter Salovey, people may provide help for others pre-cisclv in order to regulate their moods over the long term. Helping may do more than give them a momentary emotional boost: It also mav bolster their spirits over long periods of tunc, People's awareness that they have been helpful in the past may permit them to view themselves more positively in the future. Ultimately, their .self-concept may rise due to their prior helpfulness (Salovcy, Mayer, & Roseirhan, 1991).
Considering the long-term benefits that helping brings to mood provides a way of at least partially understanding some of the more extraordinary instances of helping, in which the immediate consequences are quite negative. For example. Christians who helped Jews escape hum Nuzis during World War II pur themselves at substantia! risk, while probably feeling little immediate satisfaction from their actions. In the long run, however, they could look back ':n dir.,; hehavior wii'i pride, thereby uplifting their mood, in fact, interviews wdth rescuers ■tad their relatives show that they experienced pleasure from their actions long after the war had ended (Olincr cV Oliner, 1988).
Ovfiijif lpinc: Killing with Kindness
1 here are different wnys of .assassinating a man ■  by pistol, sword, poison, or moral assassination. They are the same in their results except thai the last is more cruel.
—Napoleon 1, Maxim; (18lM-18i5)
A^umiing to iocial psychologists Daniel Gilbert and David Silvern, Napoleon had it right: . 1 he way to injure a fellow person most grievously is not through physical means, but by injur--'nghis :,r bCi- character. And one of the best ways to accomplish such injury is by ottering 'lLIp hi   >vay that makes the recipient seem incapable, inept, and generally incompetent— that Gilbert calls overhelping (Gilbert 6V Silvern, 1996). ■:- _  Gilbtrt suggests that overhelping occurs when an individual tries to damage an observers ■: "-^pie.YMon of a person by offering help in achieving a goal in such a way that the persons ■^uess is .dewed as due to the help and not to the person's efforts or characteristics. Conse-■•s than being viewed positively, as a sign ol hard work or superior ability, the
overhelping: The olkring of help in a way that makes the recipient seem incapable, inept, and generally m;".ompeier.:.
■ At
Chapter. 8     Hfí ping 281
3-5   Participant's goal:
Help     _ Hinder
2.5 2
1.5 1
0.5 0
Average ability
Above-average abiitty
FIGURF, 8-5 Overíiclpínjr, When a job candidate supposedly bad onfv average ability, par lic ipa uc^ in a smdv who were asked to help the ;ob seeker provided a relatively high amount of aid, whcicas pauieipants motivated to hinder ihe average-ability job applicant provided relatively little help. However, when the job candidate was supposedly above average in ability and participants goal was to help the job seeker, participants actually provided relatively little help, in contrast, participants who weie seeking to kinder a high-abiliry jub candidate provided morčhel^ in the candidate—a case ot overhelping. (Sotme: Adapted from GiiteiT     Silver;!. 1 y')o. I
persons success is attributed to the efforts of the helper or to sheer luck. In addition, over- -•••„ helping can actually prevent success, inducing the recipient ot the aid to fail.
For instance, consider -i manager ;u a cookie factory, whose rival at work is asked by the ; company president Lo complete a complex, difficult report on the amount of peanuts being /■ consLiincd in the production of peanut butter eookies. One way for the manager to sabotage . -the rival is to schedule a long meeting, during which the manager provides an overwhelm- \; ing amount of data on peanuts—current peanut tarn; production figures in Georgia, the ... latest weather in Georgia, rhe amount of peanuts that are used in peanut butter, and so forth. '.,
If ch^ amount of data is simply overwhelming, the rival may spend hours sifting dmmgh it. As a consequence, the report is delayed .md the reputation of the rival suffers. At i be same •;'." rime, the manager looks good, because he is viewed as having helpfully provided the \nh>i-mation needed 10 produce the report. Another scenario is possible, however. Suppose the rival.:; produces an excellent report. Here, the. president of die company may attribute the success of die report ro the data supplied by the manager. In either case, the 'helping" provided by -the manager has made the recipient look bad—a clear-cut case of overhelping. "!
Gilbert and SUvera found .support for the occurrence ol overhelping in a series ol exper-intents. For instance, participants in one study were told their goal was either to help ol hinder (depending on condition) a job applicant who was trying to solve word problems m order to get the job. When die job candidate supposedly had only average ability, participant-:;,; trying to help the job seeker provided relatively substantial aid. On the other hand, paitit-- ? ipanr,s motivated to hinder rhe average-ability job applicant provided relatively htile help-" } a case of underhelping. ;
The story was very different when the job candidate supposedly had far-above- average abil, icy. In this case, participants whose goal was to help the job seeker actually provided relative!?..' little help. In contrast, participants who were seeking to hinder the high-ability |ob cW' -r-date provided more help to the candidate, making it appear that the candidate could sliced, only because of die help—a clear case or overhelping (see Figure 8—5),
Of course, overhelping works only under certain conditions. People are most likely to ovcrheip when they think that they are actually providing insufficient help, but that the help will be considered effective by observers, If they are wrong, overhelping may backfire. For instance, sometimes help will be so effective that the person, actually succeeds. If observers attribute the persons success to his or her own efforts or abilities, then overhelping will have tailed (from the overhelpers point of view, at least).
At the same time, overhelping can be an effective sabotage strategy, particularly in cases in which the help actually worsens a person's performance but is thought (mistakenly) byr observers to improve it. People can-—and sometimes do—kill by kindness, providing useless aid to those they wish to see fail. Not all helping, then, is helpful.
Norms and Helping:
SlANDARDS OF AlD
1 'he United Way, the largest charity in the United States, frequently employs a formula to suggest how much money people should contribute on a regular basis. Called the '"Fair Share,11 it implies that people ought to donate a fixed percentage of their income in order to shoulder their part of the burden of caring for the needy.
Ihe ability of the Fair Share concept to produce large donations—which, it turns our, it docs quite impressively for the United Way—rests on societal norms about helping. Norms are general standards or expectations regarding appropriate behavior. When people are taught, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," "Kindness is its own reward," and 'Tie who helps others helps himself," they are learning the norms that society holds dear.
Norms of social responsibility. One of the most fundamental societal norms that encourage helping behavior is the norm of social responsibility. The norm of social responsibility
suggests that people should respond to die reasonable needs of others, and that all people have „ societal obligation to aid those in need (Rutkowski, Cruder, & Romer, 1983; Bornsrein, 094; linger ccThumuluri, 1997). The norm of social responsibility is particularly influential when those requiring help are seen to be dependent or lacking the capacity to help. Thus, obligations to children, who are clearly dependent, arc felr especially keenly themselves (hcrkowiiz, 1972; Harrell, 1994).
At the same rime, the norm of social responsibility is so broad that it sometimes can be inter-preted in ways that permit people to sidestep helping others. Thus, people might justify not giving change to a panhandler by the rationalization that true social responsibility lies in discouraging begging. Furthermore, norms that encourage helping must be experienced internally;-!^; not possible to force people to help and expect them to become more helpful in the furttre, as we discuss in the Applying Social Psychology box.
Norma of reciprocity.   If you agree with the sayings " What goes around, comes around," - .ut for tat," or "an eye for an eye," then you probably adhere to the norm of reciprocity', The iwnn or reciprocity asserts that we should help others because they have helped us in .• !ta past or may help us in tire future.
Nouns of reciprocity are found in almost every culture, We see them manifested when a ^uJcnt lends his car to his roommate with the expectation that the roommate will let him Doirow his compact disc player at some point in the future. Similarly, people may donate to ^ h,ii;ri( ". uh [In: understanding that if they ever lose their jobs and need help, they will have fta tiglu to ask for charity because of their prior contributions (Gouldner, I960; Miller & "eisofK h>94; Uebara, 1 995; Burger et ah, 1997).
Hie noun of reciprocity is powerful. Indeed, people who have been helped not only recip-A-ute help to the specific individuals who have helped in the past, but also are more likely a help oner people. However, their help may not be as generous to others as it would v*t(> the specific person who initially provided them help (Lemer & Mcindl. 1981).
uorm.v. General standards or expectations regarding appropriate behavior.
norm »f social responsibility: 1 In
norm suggesting that people should respond to the reasonable needs of others, and thar all people have a societal obligation to aid those in need.
minii of reciprocity: The norm asserting chat we should help others because they have helped us in the pnst or may help us in rhe luuire.
, i
\idtiik'•Wcfi^P*- ^»Hg^' last—<.
■-"'"hJ.. > r'Si. "—tit*,*.* ■'šaČlzr &3H&< *   * Jt-J"
2K2
HF!
Applying Social Psychology
Mandatory Volunteers A Contradiction in Term^?
By the end of their senior year, ail students must have engaged in some form or coiiimunitv service oi ar least *> hours a week over the course oi a term. F.xamples or community service include working at a shelter tor the homeless or soup kitchen, tutoting, holding an internship in a human service agency, oi work)u{* wuh children m an after-school program.
Sound like a good idea ior a school requirements It does to many high schools and colleges, which have instituted required community service programs to encourage students rn become involved in their community. One reason lor such requirements is to increase the probability that people will volunteer in the future, resulting in an increase in community7 volunteers.
I here s a hitch, though; According to a study bv social psychologists Arthur Srukas, Mark Snvder, and F. Gil CI anil 999), such programs may have unintended consequences, In fact, they found that those who felt forced into volunteering due to a requirement ended up saying they were less hkcly to vof-tmrcer in the future.
In cite fust of two studies, the researchers surveyed a group of students required to enroll in a college service-learning course. They found that students who had prior volunteer experience, but who saw themselves as required to participate m the service-learning course, had lowered intentions to volunteer m the future. Participation in the course, then, had the ironic etfecr ol reducing their interest in future volunteer work.
In the subsequent study, the results of the survey were supported. In the experiment, a group ot participants woe required to carry out a volunteer" acrivitv—reading to the blind, For
participants who prior to the experiment said ihev were unlikely . to volunreer in the future, being forced to volunteer in the study \ led to lower intentions to volunteer. On the other hand, for'/, those who prior to the experiment felt that they would have volunteered even if they were weren't required to, being forced to volunteer had little effect on their willingness to participate in the future. >.
\Vhy would requiring volunteer work make participants less J hkcly to volunteer m the future? One explanation is that corn- ■ mumty service requirements may alter people's perceptions of whv they help. Instead of seeing themselves as willing voiun-teer.s, their forced participation may lead to the view that the ^ sole reason they are helping is to fulfill a requirement. Conse-quently, thev arc unable to view themselves as volunteers doing// good deeds, and they may be less eager to volunreer in the< future, furthermore, as we first discussed in Chapter 5, forced/; participation in anv activity may lead to reactance, hostility and;/ anger that results from the restriction of one's freedom (Brehmi; &l Brchm, 19S1). If people experience reactance as a result of being required to volunteer, they may seek to reestablish iheu . sense of I tecdom by downgrading volunteertsm.
The results ol the studies suggest that "mandatory volunteerism may have a downside. Rather than producing a aups ; of willing volunteers, community service requirements im\ lead to volunteers v/ho are actually less hkcly to volunteer in the future. To be successful, then, community service programs must make people volunteer m as uncoercive a matinet a* ; possible.
personal norms: Our own pi
sc rue- of obligation to help a s person in a specific sin
Personal norms. Sometimes the most potent norms arc not the general ones handec c to us by society. Instead, they arc our personal norms, our own personal sense of obi i it to help a specific person in a specific situation.
Consider, for example, a girl whose parents die in an auto crash and who is subscque raised by an elderly uncle. When she is older, her sense of obligation to help her unc i be profound— bur it is not necessarily accompanied by a sense of responsibility towai J. elderly in general. Indeed, ii may be that I lie woman expends mosi of her resources on uncle and has little sense of obligation to society as a whole.
Personal norms also help explain devotion to particular political causes. For instai '■ the 1960s, strongly committed civil rights workers often displayed an unusually stron; 1 of identification with their parents whom they viewed as holding high moral stand"-1 In raising their children, these parents taught a philosophy that included an cmph; the rights of others and the obligation to help others. Rather than adhering onh ro
^eneral societal norms, then, the civil rights workers viewed themselves as following a set of more personal standards based on their parents' standards (Rosenhan, 1970.).
Norms deterring helping. Perhaps you've seen photos of people carefully avoiding a person sprawled face down on the sidewalk of a city. 1 his lack of care for someone so obviously in need reflects what has been called a norm of noninvoLvement, a standard of behavior that causes people to avoid becoming psychologically (and physically) entangled with others.
The norm of noninvolvement is sometimes adopted by urban dwellers, who face so much stimulation char they may attempt to distance themselves from nonacquaintances (Milgram, 1977a), Furthermore, people in cities may experience insecurity about contact with individuals very different irom themselves. Adopting a norm of noninvolvement permits them to remain detached from the needs of these others (Fischer, 1976; fvlatsui, 1981).
Norms acting to detet helping provide an understanding of one of the nagging problem^ found in our cities: the reluctance ol people to act prosocially. Consistent with the stereo-tvpc of the cold-hearted, unfriendly city dweller, people living in urban areas are less prone to help others than people living in rural areas—-whether the help required is direct or indirect, whether bystanders ate present or not, and regardless of the age or gender of the victim. Furthermore, the higher the population density and the greater the cost of living in a city, me lower the level of helping behavior. Table 8-3 shows the top 20 cities ranked in one study in terms of overall helpfulness (Hedge & Yousif, 1992; Levin c ci ah, 1994; Bridges 6V Coiidy. 1996).
lutrigumgly, it is not true that people raised in rural areas are inherently more helpful; when living in a city they too begin to act less helpfully. City life seems to bring out the worst in people—at least when it comes to the likelihood of behaving prosocially.
Receiving Help: Is It Better to Give Than to Receive?
;\ classmate, who has rmished her classroom project early, turns to you and offers to help you finish what you are doing. Instead of reacting whh gratitude, you leel a combination of anger, embarrassment, and annoyance. You reject her help, with a cold "No thanks."
i norm ornomnvolvcmcnr, the standard that allow, lw lo avoid becoming psychologically and . k illy entangled with othe.s. permits people to remain detached from die very teal needs of othei
283
norm of noninvolvement; A standard of behavior that causes people to avoid becoming psychologically (and physically) cnrajjgled wirh oiliers.
284        Chapti-i< 8 Hllping
Chapter 8 Helping
285
tä3l1 8 3
CITY
Rochester, NY
Houston, TX
Nashville, TN
Mem phis,TN
Knoxville.TN
Louisville, ky
Si. Louis, MO
Detroit, MT
E. Lansing, Ml
Chattanooga, TN
Indianapolis, IN
Cühimbus, OT 1
Canton, OH Kansas City, MO
Worcester, MA Santa Barbara, CA I   Dallas, TX !   San Jose, CA J   San Diego, CA \  Springfield, MA_
threat to
The model that in which help hether the help
elf-esteem model:
u-gues rhar the way ; offered influences i viewed as positive or negative.
RtGION'	POPULATION11	SCO!!!."	RANK
NE	Ivl	10.8 1	
S	L	10.74	2
S	M	10.69	3
S	M	10.66	'i
S	S	10.62	5
S	s	10.58	h
NC	I,	10.58	7
NC	L	10.55	8
NC	S	10.54	9
S	s	10.54	10
NC	M	10.46	11
NC	M	10/12	12
NC	S	10.35	13
NC	M	10.33	14
NF.	S	10.24	15
W	S	10.17	16
s	L	10.13	17
w	M	10.11	18
w	L	10.05	19
NE	S	9-92	20
"NE ;"- northeast, S = south NC ~ north central, and W - west.
M = meclium (950,000-1,450,000), L -~ large (>2,000,000). Based mesii^jwmetnpohtan
-aqe of standardized scort
or primary statistical area for 1989. 'Awn
•■ small (350,000-650,000), ; for me.tropol S(M= 10, SD ='1.0) for the
six Measures:
Docs this ioun.d familiar? It might, because .such a reaction is common. Recipients of help are not always so grateful lor the help that they are offered. In fact, some research sug- > gests that recipients, of aid may be psychologically worse off than before they receive any ■{ help. In (act, in many cases, the self-esteem of recipients drops after receiving help from-others.
According to the threat to self-esteem model, the way in which help i.s offered infill- '. enccs whether the help is viewed as positive or negative (Fisher. Nadlcr, & Whitchcr-A)agna,:-i 1982; Fisher, Nadler, & DePaulo, 1983). Several factors produce negative consequences tot' :> recipients' self-esteem. For example, help that emphasizes the higher ability or status of a., donor is likely to produce threats to the recipients sell-esteem. Furthermore, help that pre-:.! vents a recipient from reciprocating (and thereby iulfHling societal norms of reciprocity) 'V;, likely to be seen as threatening. Help that is given grudgingly or out of guilt is also viev-.>.« ; as threatening. Finally, people with high self-esteem typically react more negatively to V than those with low self-esteem. \ Fortunately, help can be provided in several ways that do not threaten self-esteem. Arnold; the most nonrhreatcning kinds of aid are the following (Fisher et ah, 1982; Searcy cc Eis berg, 1992; Shell & Fisenberg, 1992, 1996):
Aid from donors with positive characteristics and motivation ; i"* Aid from siblings and older relatives *  Aid char can be reciprocated by the recipient
* Aid that does not threaten the recipient's autonomy and sense of control
* Aid that is offered, rather than asked for
* X{d LnaE comcs from donors with relatively low resources or expertise
The most effective aid, then, occurs when recipients feel that the donor likes and is interested in them and views them as independent and autonomous. Furthermore, a person most readily accepts help when it is clear that it will increase the recipient's likelihood of future success.
REVIEW AND RETHIN
According ro the atrhbutional model oi helping and emotions, people in a potential helping situation attribute causes to a person's need for help, and they either help or don't help depending on their attributions.
s   People's moods affect their helping behavior, with good moods generally contributing to a
higher incidence of helping and bad moods having mixed effects. 1  The negative state relief model suggests that even bad moods can induce people to be helpful
if the people believe that helping will improve their moods.
Helping affects people's moods positively, sometimes for a long time.
Individual helping behavior is influenced by both societal norms and personal norms.
Would the attributions! model of helping predict diat a well-employed veteran would be more or less likely than a nonvercran to help a man holding an "Unemployed Vietnam Veteran" sign? Why or why not?
I low does helping affect a persons mood? Can this phenomenon explain altruistic behavior? What aspects of a helping situation affect whether a person in a bad mood will help? Docs a charity thai offers benefits to poor children in another country depend on different societal norms than a charity that Incuses on curing a disease, such as cancer or heart disease, s hat potential givers may one day contract? What norms do the two. charities depend on? Why?
i low uo personal norms and societal norms differ? How might they clash or complement each other?
Is the norm of noninvoivemcnt related to the principle of diffusion of responsibility? How do they differ?
INU"- '.riMG PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
l'j/( wali^e you left your wallet on the bus, and you give up hope of ever seeing it again. But ■'o/ihth,, Lally that evening asking how to return the wallet to you.
fwu toddlers are rough housing when one suddenly begins to cry. 7 he other child rushes to fetch • hn own security blanket and offers it to his playmate.
forwinq on a lonely country road, you see a car stopped on the shoulder, smoke pouring from !f->e hood. 1'he driver waves to you frantically and instinctively you pull over to help, putting 'istdv Thoughts of your appohitments as well as your personal safety, (Kohn, 1988, p. 34)
Although the acts ol violence, terrorism, crime, and war that dominate the head J i ties may lead us at times to think otherwise, helping is a central aspect, of human behavior. Indeed, instances of prosocial behavior are part of most peoples everyday lives—acts as .simple as holding the door for a stranger or picking up and replacing a package that has toppled from a grocery store shelf. In the remainder of this chapter, we consider some social psychological Findings that suggest ways of increasing helping behavior.
Rewarding Prosocial Behavior
If you've ever received a reward for good conduct, you know the potency of reinforcement. We learn at an early age that acting prnsocially brings rewards. Ar the most basic level, tor example, parents reward children for sharing and behaving generously and punish them for selfishness. But, as social learning theory suggests, we also learn to be helpful by observing the behavior of others, vicariously experiencing the rewards and punishments that others receive. Ultimately, we model the behavior ol those who have been rewarded (Bandurn, 1974. 1977. 1978).
At first, prosocial behavior is guided through direct reward and punishment. One early experiment showed that when candy was provided to 4-year-old children who shared a. marble, their sharing behavior increased (Fischer, .1963). But as children become older, verbal reinforcement becomes equally effective. In another study, 12-year-old children's donations; • to charity increased following verba! approval (Midlarsky, Bryan, &. Brickman, 197.-51.
Just as positive reinforcement can promote increases m helping, negative reinforcement and punishment diminish the likelihood of future helping behavior. For instance, in one-study, a confederate on a .street corner in Ohio asked participants for directions (Moss & Page, 1972). To some participants, she offered thanks for the help she received, whereas to others, she said, L'l cannot understand what you're saying. Never mind, I'll ask someone else."
Further down the street, participants encountered a second conlederate, who dropped a-small bag but continued walking, pretending not to notice the dropped bag. Participants who had received the verbal punishment from the ungrateful confederate were less likely to pn>-vide help to the second confederate than those who had received thanks earlier. The moral::/ Verbal gratitude for helpful deeds is apt to increase helping, whereas verba! punishment is,,, likely to discourage helping behavior. ■><
Modeling and Helping I
Just as Columbia University was about to begin a major land raising drive, it announced.* gift of $25 million by John W. Kluge, a 1937 graduate of Columbia and chairman of the?; Metromedia Company.
The announcement was no coincidence. It reflected the belief—well suppomal h> a| wealth of social psychological research—that the example of a generous model can nurture > the generosity of others. In both adults and children, the observation of someone behaving;, prosocially leads to increased prosocial behavior on rhe part of the observer. The reverb holds true as well: If a model behaves selfishly, observers tend to act more selfishly rhernseby -(e.g., Spivey & Prentice-Dunn. 1990; Grusec, 199l;Janoski & Wilson, 1995). f
Social psychologists James Bryan and Mary Ann Test demonstrated the importance of V; helpful model in a classic studv (Bryan 6V. Test, 1967). In the field experiment, people drr- * nig along a busy Los Angeles highway passed a woman whose cat seemed to have i flit f>ff •} but who was receiving help in changing it from an apparent passerby. Coincidemallv, a tjifc£-i-ter mile down rhe road, another woman seemingly had a ftar tire.
In actuality, the entire scene was an elaborate .set-up, designed to deterniuiv many people driving by would stop and help the (second) woman in distress. ihef*(i"i at which people stopped was compared with another condition in which passersby" did '^l first see a helpful model. The results were clear. In the no-model condition, just 3^ o^1- ' 4,000 pusscrsby stopped, whereas in rhe helpful-model condition, more than twice & lRf1'1 ; people (98) stopped to offei aid. (We might note, of course, that in neither condiuo^-'"v rhe incidence of helping terribly impressive.)
Not <ml, do people ,omcnmes report that helping and volunteering provides a sort of physical "high bm aUu that the feelings linger beyond the actual act of helping. Many people said they experience poMtive h-elmgs simply by recalling instana-s in which they helped.
Liter research confirms that the consequences of viewing a helpful model are powerful and lasting! Grusec, 1982, I 991; Grusec & Kuczynski, 1997). But why do helpful models lead to greater prosocial behavior on die part of observers? There arc several reasons. For one tlimg, li" we see models being rewarded for their helpfulness, vvc learn through the basic processes ol social learning that prosocial behavior is desirable. In addition, though, models aci as salient reminders of society's norms about the importance of helpftdness. They show us. in a concrete way. how socially desirable behavior may be enacted in a particular situation, thereby pavmg die way for out own prosocial behavior. In other words, they make it aster to do what wc know we should do (Iiensel, 1991).
Thus, modeling rroes bevnnd simply mimicking the behavior of others, and it plays a particularly significant developmental roie as wc move through childhood into adulthood. As ..we get older, wc build general rules and principles in a process called abstract modeling. Rather tlian always modeling others specific behaviors, we begin to draw generalized principles that ii'Kltrhc the behaviors we have observed. Hence, alter observing several instances in which ■! model is rewarded for acting in a prosocial manner, we initiate a process in which wc infer <uhI leai n the meaning ol such acts, and we build and internalize our own model of behav-
in an altruistic fashion.
EXl'LRiiNCENG A Hhl.pi-r's HlCH: THE REWARDS of HELPING
;J*}(ju an- a longdistance runner, vou may experience a physical "high"' during or after your ruri. StiJ-i a runners high typically consists ofkdin^s of well-being, calmness, and sometimes
■^upusmgly. some research suggests that similar physical responses may occur as a icsuit soniethine much less exhausting—helping other people. According to the results of a stale survey oi women who had helped others in some way, the majority reported feel--  IMn. actual pleasant physical sensation while they were helping (Luks, 1988). In fact, those 0 "-Ugagtxl both in helping and physical exercise frequently reported that the positive sen-"■'!!>'<s were quite similar
Helping
289
288
Chap r er 8 Hi-lpinc;
60
■■High"    Stronger/ : more energetic
Wann
Calmer/
less depressed
Greater Fewer aches self and pains, worth
FIGURK 8-6   How Does It Feel to Help? Most people report that helping; provides a kind of physical "high." (.Ww: Uks, l'«8.]
As you can see in Figure 8-6, the actual response to helping differed among respondents. ;;• Approximatelv half reported feeling "high" in some way, and more than rwo-ilfths said that helping made them feel stronger or more energetic. A significant proportion said they felt "warm" or "calmer and less depressed," and almost one-fifth said they felt greater self-worth and experienced (ewer aches and pains due to their prosocial behavior.
The positive feelings that arose from helping also lingered beyond the actual period of help-.' tog behavior. Most respondents said they experienced positive (eel'mgs whenever rhey remem- -
bored their helping activities.
These findings are consistent with intriguing research that has been done on reactions to.: donating blood. According to the research of social psychologist jane Piliavin. and collaborator^ people who habitually give blood may experience increasingly positive reactions tol-;: lowing each donation. The positive emotional response leads habitual givers to become, in a very real sense, psychologically addicted to the donation proeess, and it increases the he-, queucy with which they will give blood in the future (Piliavin, Evans. & Callero, 1984;
Piliavin & Callcro, 1991).
In sum, prosocial behavior may bring its own special reward—a helpers high. (For another perspective on die benefits of helping, see the accompanying Speaking of Social Psychology Iws.
Do
Teaching Moral Behavior: Do As I Say, Not (Necessarily) As !
Despite emphatic intentions to avoid it, more than one parent has fdll.cn back on the adage "Do as 1 say, not as I do." The old dictum tends to emerge when a child points ovit some inconsistency between the parem's prior behavior and what the parent is now telling the child to do. i-"wlien such an admonition occurs, parents are cng^in^ in a fundamental form of mon! education. People often use moral exhortations and preaching in an effort to promote altruistic and prosocial behavior. Ir rums out, though, that such an approach is not renibly effts* tive. For example, in comparison with models who act generously, a model who preach generosity is considerably less effective in eliciting donations (e.g., Grusec oc Skubiski, 197W Of course, not all exhortations to behave in a prosocial manner are doomed To failure. Or' key to the success of moral prompts is the attribution made by rhe targets of these prompt
n they do behave in a prosocial manner. Specifically, the effectiveness of preaching depends on the degree to which the preaching suggests rhat the enactment of moral behavior is related to someone's moral character, instead of simply representing a reaction to external pressure. Fmi example, exhorting people to do good because of their underlying positive qualities I underneath we're all good") is more effective than telling people ro help in order to receive an external reward ('other people will owe you a debt of thanks").
Consequently, when people arc led to believe that moral behavior demonstrates that they have high personal moral standards, they will he more likely to behave altruistically in rhe future. Conversely, 10 the extent rhat they are led to attribute their altruistic actions to external, situational pressures, they will be less apt to behave helpfully in the future (I-eppcr, 1983; Grusec & Dix, 1986; Grusec, 1991; Grnsec, Rudy, & Marrini, 1997).
Attnbutiona! approaches suggest that sreering people toward the development of internal attributions for their prosocial behavior is an effective means of promoting more helping in die future. It is quite consistent with techniques used by charitable organizations, which sometimes engineer future large donations by attempting to obtain only tiny ones at First,
for .instance, one successful slogan is "even a dollar will help." The motto represents a double-barreled strategy. First, once we have given even a small amount, we are likely to experience the positive reinforcemerirs thai a charity dispenses to any giver—a thank-yoti note, s membership card, and an explanation of how useful the contribution will be to the cause.
Second, the donation of even a small amount of money may be sufficient to allow us to modifv our attributions about ourselves. Once we ye given a donation in the past- we may-come to sec ourselves as donors motivated by an internal trail of generosity, as opposed to being motivated by external prompts. For borh reasons, then, when asked for donations in die luture, we may increase the size of our gifts (Dillard, 1991; Gorassini & Olson, 1 995).
Values Clarification and Moral Reasoning:
Instruction in Morality
when the United Stares initiated forma! schooling in the 1 9th century, one of the primary goals was to provide education m moral values. Slowly, however, educational objectives changed, and today the teaching of moral values occurs only rarely. In fact, the teaching of \ahk i is a highly politically charged notion, associated wirh particular political ideologies.
At rhe same time, certain basic prosocial values arc universal, regardless of people's politico! orientation. For example, few people would dispute the general importance of helping others, fo instill the value of prosocial behavior, educators have developed several approaches (Damon, 19S9). Among the primary methods they have identified are values clarification tci hni'jucs and the teaching of moral reasoning.
\-atisrs clarification is a procedure in which students are encouraged to become aware ol then current values, to consider how their values were formed, and how their values may differ hum those of others. Although there are several values clarification techniques, one of the fiiusi prevalent is 'Tather-Or Forced Choice1' (Simon, hlowe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972). In 'Ins piocedure, teachers ask questions that raise two conflicting underlying values, such as Do you identify more with a Honda Civic or a Mercedes?" Forced to choose and explain one ul die two alternatives, students find that their underlying values come to the sutfacc. hi addition, by producing cognitive conflict between particular values, the technique may provide insight into the assumptions about prosocial behavior that students hold.
Of course, the values clarification merhod does have potential drawbacks. For one thing, -'hhougn it makes people aware of their values, it docs not provide thern a means to resolve undulyhig conflicts. Furthermore, it really ism designed ro teach new values; it only pro-■ kle\v a framework for understanding existing ones.
A muie direct means for promoting prosocial values in schools is an attempt to increase
lut-1 of sophistication of people's moral reasoning. 1 he underlying assumption here is that hy improving people's reasoning powers, we can ultimately induce them to behave in more asocial ways.
l§iÄ&
'7n a disaster, the first priority for services goes to the disaster relief personnel. "
Gerard A. Jacobs
Red (Jross Volunteer Year of Blah: 1952
Education:        B.A., Classical Languages, Xavicr University;
Jvl.A., Clinical Psychology, Xavier Umversitv; Ph.D., Clinical/Community Psychology, University of South Florida
Home: Vermillion, South Dakota
The Red Ctoss, through its tireless efforts to provide humanitarian care in times of war and peace, has come to symbolize prosociai and altruistic behavior. Whether at the front lines ol a major international conflict or on the front lawn of a burning single-family home, the Red Cross is there to provide comfort and aid. Established by Clara Barton in 1881. the-Red Cross involves more than 1 million active volunteers. Among them is Gerard Jacobs, National Const)Irani" for Disaster Mental Health, who was on alert as Hurricane Bertha headed toward the United States in July 1996.
"In every one of the states that the hurricane was expected to bar, disaster services were . busy getting teams together and preparing to feed and house people evacuated from their homes," he reports. "Disaster health services bring in health nurses to take care of physical needs, and disaster mental health services are put in place to meet the emotional and psy-v. etiological needs of the people affected."
Within I day of receiving notice. Red Cross volunteers are in place and ready to provide aid, according to Jacobs. Of the thousands of people who work with the Red Cross, about 95% are, like Jacobs, unpaid vohtnrecis.
One procedure foi increasing ihc sophistication oi moral reasoning involves the discussion of nioial dilemmas. Students who are forced io articulare their moral reasoning and to hear the conclusions reached bv others are better able to come to grips with the complexity of the issues entailed by moral dilemmas, furthermore, the cognirive conflict created by class discussion can lead siudcuts to a better understanding of other students' logic and perspectives. Through the process of discussion, then, students' reasoning abilities may increase (0 higher, nunc sophisticated levels (Reimer. Paulino, & J lersch, 1983).
Assuming that these techniques are successful in raising the level ot moral thinking, doc elevated moral dunking translate into behavior that is more socially responsible? The answer is mixed. Some research finds that moral judgments are related to prosociai behavior (Catlike & Kohlberg, 1987; Janssens oc Dekovic, 199/j. in contrast, other studies suggest that uV relationship between moral judgments and moral behavior is more tenuous. Understanding, the diiierencc between right and wrong does not invariably lead people to behave in a moral-fash ion (Dariev & Schulrz, 1990).
We should not think, then, that the values inherent in prosociai behavior are easy "J convey in the classroom, But the possibility exists that people can be taught io appreciate merits of helping other1;, and 'bat rlieir own conduct will improve as. a consequence.
*,   ^      7-„_______-
'7 /?e reason I volunteered h I hat I could see the n^eds of people, and I wr.nted to help/'
"In a disaster, the first priority for services goes to rhe disaster relief personnel. It is essentia! to keep them healthy and functional so they can help others. Then we provide services iu rhe people affected by the disaster," he say1;.
Although rhe Red Cross has always provided traditional disaster sendees, emergency services to military personnel, and the most advanced blood program in the world, rhe organization has moved only recently into the area ot mental health services, assuming a formal role in that area in 1991, according to Jacobs.
Relief efforts are shared between local emergency workers and Red Cross people. The idea is for the Red Cross to supplement and complement local efforts, not to supplant them. For instance, Jacobs notes, when Flight ^27 crashed in Pennsylvania in September 1994, a local mental health team had already jumped into action while Red Cross mental health disaster volunteers were being brought1 in.
'The local people were well trained and in place," he says. "We provided some support in areas rhar they were less strong in, and we did some outreach work. The job of the Red Cross is to augment the local disaster plan and to try to respond ro the specific needs of the local workers. Basically, we get there as quickly as we can and try to fill whatever gaps exist.
Our role differs in each community. What we do depends on the resources of die community and the disaster plan that is in effect. In a disaster like a hurricane, services are typically provided at a Red Cross facility to anyone who comes seeking the service," Jacobs says.
What motivated Jacobs to become one of millions of people who contribute their time and expertise to the Red Cross?
" The reason I volunteered is that 1 could see the needs of people, and I wanted to help," Jacobs said. "T noted that the need for disaster mental health helpers was going unmet, and I volunteered to try and change that.
' for me it is a sense of knowing that 1 am tine small piece of a puzzle that must be completed in order to meet people's needs."
iNCkcASiNc Helpfulness
longhout this chapter we have considered a variety of techniques for increasing pro-i'll behavior. Let's summarize some of the main si raregies that can be derived from our
Th
mjci
discussion
- II" you need heln, he explicit and personal. In an emergency situation, explicitly ask tor the kind of help that is required. Don't just say, "Help!" Instead, say, 'Tve fallen and hurt my icg— call an ambulance.A victim should try to make eye contact with a passerby and direct uie call for help ro him or her, (hereby personalizing rhe situation and reducing rhe possibility of diffusion ol responsibility. Do anything that can reduce the ambiguity of the situation.
Viivatc norms appropriate for helping. If you are raising funds tor a chanty, make use of the powerful norms of society that support helping behavior. Remind people rhar there is a duty to help those less fortunate (norm of social responsibility), or that donations of blood permit ii:t:m to be recipients ol blood themselves later on (norm of reciprocity), hormei students can ot- reminded rhat they received scholarships when they were in college and they now have a ehanuc to help others by contributing to rheii alma mater (personal norms).
Helping
293
HAiTtRři Helping
i" Act as a helpful model. If you wish odier* Lo contribute 10 a worthy cause, make sure diey know char you have already made vour own eonnibuiion.
'7?  Personalize help. Because we are more apt to help those tor whom wc feel empathy, efforts should be made to show the human side ol rhose in need. It is relatively c.isy to refuse-, to help rhe abstract stereotype of "people on welfare.' Tr is far more dillicu.lt to refuse help to a par- -licular single mother who has just given birth and who is on welfare because her husband lias-deserted her.
Use of these strategies should increase the probability that help will be provided. Of course, no approach works every time; there arc no guarantees that people will show the care for others that represents the best side of humanity. Still, as social psychologists—along with other students of human behavior—clarify and refine their understanding of prosocial behavior, the promise exists of a betterment of the human condition rhat will help us all.
RtVIEW AND RETHINK
Positive reinforcement and observation of helpful models are effective in increasing helping behavior.
ri   fn some ways, helping is its own reward- producing a "helpers high" that tends to increase the incidence of future prosocial behaviors.
In teaching moral behavior, practice is more effective than preaching, but appeals to peoples \'. underlying moral character can also be effective. '■   Two techniques for moral instruction thar have been used in the United States ate values ^ (.larification and practice in moral reasoning. 1 fowever, the link between mural rhmkmg and moral behavior is tenuous.
v   What is abstract modeling, and how does it relate to prosocial behavior? r -'   Compare the effectiveness of moral exhortations with modeling in increasing prosocial behavior.
Describe the values clarification approach to increasing prosocial behavior. Under what conditions would such an approach be most successful?
Identify some common fund-raising techniques that rely on the principles of encouraging prosocial behavior discussed in this chapter. Do advertisers of commercial products use similar techniques?
LOOKING BACK
d how is it exhibited in emergencies'
hers. Its roots and motivate"
What is prosocial behavior, !.   ftosocid behavior is helping behavior that benefits od
acting is shared™ those present-discourages helpmg
The mote people p**'
3.   According to one model oi helping, among the steps that a person takes in emerge cics are noticing a person, event, or situation that potentially may require help; interpreting the event as one that requires help; assuming le.sponsibility; deciding how to provide assistance; and actually helping, (p. 267)
What is altruism, and does it have genetic roots:
4.   One source of debate among social psychologists is whether altruism— helping behavior that is beneficial to others but requires self-sacrifice—actually exists. Rewards-costs analyses of helping suggest that some reward is always inherent in any act of helping, (p. 271)
5-   The question of whether some people have an altruistic personalitv-—a set of dispositional characteristics that consistently lead them to act helpfully—is also open. However, most research suggests that people do not invariably behave altruistically, and there ate gender and cross-cultural differences in helping behavior, (p. 271)
6.   According to evolutionary approaches, rhcre may be genetic roots to helping behavior, with individuals working together to preserve their genes and the genes of their close relatives. The. principle of reciprocity—rhe notion that we help others because we expect to receive from others future help for ourselves or our kin-—is used to support evolutionary explanations, (p. 272)
How do emotions and attributions affect helping?
7. Although some researchers suggest thar people are largely egoistic, or motivated by self-benefit, others suggest that altruism can occur when people experience empathy for needy persons. Tmpathy is an emotional response corresponding to the current emotions of another person. According ro rhe empathy—altruism hypothesis, it is empathy that motivates us to help, rather than the desire to reduce our own unpleasant reactions to victims'" needs, (p. 273)
8. Two other forms of motivation thar may underlie prosocial behavior are prosocial collectivism -the desire to increase the welfare of a group—and prosocial princi-plism—the desire to uphold moral principles, (p. 276)
9. I- lie attributional model of helping and emotions suggests that uncertainty related ro a person in need leads to an increase in arousal. When people atrribute rhe need foi help to internal, controllable causes, they fee) negative emotions; when they attribute the need to external, uncontrollable causes, their emotions are positive. Negative emotions discourage helping, whereas positive ones increase the likelihood of helping, (p. 277)
10. People in good moods are more likely to help than those in neutral moods. On the other hand, being in a bad mood docs not invariably produce a decrease in helping. According to the negative state relief model, people in a bad mood may be helpful if they think that their mood will be improved by helping. In contrast, it they perceive that helping will not improve their mood, they will be unmotivated to help. (p. 278)
u. ii.
■ii norms, or standards, promote helping?
ao emergency, the less likely k is thar any individual will take respons,
ent at for helping, (p. 267)
Underlying helping behavior are several norms—socieral standards or expectations Jtgardmg appropriate behavior. The norm of social responsibility suggests that people should respond to the reasonable needs of others. The norm of reciprocity states that we should help others because they have helped us in the past or may neip us m die future, finally, individuals have personal norms, their own sense of obligation to help a specific person in a specific situation. On the other hand, some "oi iu,\ deter helping, such as the norm of nonmvolvement. (p. 281)
294
ííhU'INÍ,
12. Tlie threat to self-esteem model suggests diai the way in which help is offered influences whether the help is viewed as positive or negative. Help that emphasizes the donors higher ability or status, prevents the recipient from reciprocating, and is given grudgingly or out of guilt is likely to produce negative reactions from recipients, (p. 284)
How can we increase pro socialbehavior?
13. One means of increasing prosocial behavior is ro provide direcr positive reinforcement, or reward, for instances of helping behavior. Another technique involves observation of helpful models, because the observation oi someone behaving proso-cially leads to increased prosocial behavior on the part of the observer. The reverse; also holds true: If a model behaves selfishly, observers tend ro act more selfishly themselves, (p. 286)
14. There is evidence that helping provides its own rewards, producing a sort of "helpers high" that can lead to a higher incidence of helping in rhe future, (p. 287)
15. Another technique to encourage helpful behavior is to use moral admonitions, urging people to behave prosocially. However, in comparison with models who act helpfully, a model who preaches helpfulness is considerably less effective, (p. 288)
16. Atttibtitional approaches suggest that steering people toward the development of internal attributions for their prosocial behavior is an effective means of promoting more helping behavior in the future, (p. 289)
17. Other techniques have been used to produce increased prosocial behavior. One is values clarification, a procedure in which people are encouraged ro examine their values*. The notion behind the technique is that students will become aware of thcir currcnt values and perhaps reexamine them. (p. 289)
18. in addition, attempts have been made to increase the sophistication of moral reasoning through the discussion of moral dilemmas. However, it is not clear that changes in reasoning capabilities about moral issues result in increased helping behavior.
(p. 290)
O^iLiJCUt:
As we've seen, the roots o( helping are multifaceted. In considering the variety of complex;:: explanations lor prosocial behavior, we come to the understanding chat helping is brought about not just by one simple cause but by a variety of factors operating jointly,
Before we proceed to our examination in Chapter 9 of aggtessioti, the opposite side oi .■ the coin from the helping behavior we discussed in this chapter, return to the prologue., of this chapter, about the help that Jack Buchholz provides to Jake Geller, who suffers horn,; muscular dystrophy. Consider these questions:
1. What do you think is the primary motivation behind Jack Buehholz's willingness W. help Jake Geller?
2. Discuss BuehhoJA helping in terms of at least three different explanations of help- ■.;,•<, ing that were considered in this chapter (e.g., altruism, egoism, evoludomuv explanations, the helper's high, empathy, societal norms, etc.),
3. Discuss evidence that supports and refutes the idea that Buehholz's helping is truh' altruistic. What arc possible benefits that Bttchhol? receives from acting as C helper?
4. Based on the research on personality and helping, do you think that Buchlr general, a particularly helpful individual? Why?
Sil»
m
5 ^7^^^^^^^^,^^
Chai'tľr 8 Helping
Key Terms ano Concepts
altruism (p. 271) altruistic personality (p. 271) attnbutional model of helping and cmoti„ (p. 277)
tonfusion of responsibility (p. 269) diffusion of responsibility (p. 267) egoism (p. 274) empathy (p. 273)
empathy-altruism hypothesis (p. 274) negative state relief (NSR) model (p. 278) noun of noninvolvement (p. 283)
norm of reciprocity (p. 281) norm of social responsibility (p. 281) norms (p. 281) overhelping (p. 279) personal norms (p. 282) pluralistic ignorance (p. 268) prosocial behavior (p. 265) prosocial collectivism (p. 276) prosocial principlism (p. 276) threat to self-esteem model (p. 284)
Library ofCongruss Uiialogiiig-iii-Pulilicauon Data
Feldman, Robert S. (Rnhnt Stephen).
Social psychology: Robert S. Feldman.—3td ed. p.un.
iiu.luJVs hibliographicj] rcferer.cES and index. ISIiN 0-13-02747^ (.,ik. p^r) 1. Social psychology. 1. 1 itlc. HM 1033 .F4 2001
302 ■ dc21 00-033992
VP/Editorial Director: Laura Pearson
Executive Editor; Bill Webber
Development Editor: Barbara Muller
AVP and Director of Production and Manufacturing:
Barbara Kittle Managing Editor: Mary Rottino Project .Manager: Lisa M. Cuidonc Prepress and Manufacturing Manager: Nick Sklitsis Prepress and Manufacturing Buyer: Tricia Kenny Creative Design Director: Leslie Osher Art Director/Interior Designer: Anne Bonanno Nieglos Cover Design: Thomas Nery
Chapter Opener Art Creation: Bruce Killmer
Art Manager: Cuy Ruggiero
Line Art Coordinator: Mirella Signoretro
Photo Research: Linda Sykes
Image Specialist: Beth Boyd
Manager, Rights and Permission: Kay Dcllosa
Director, Image Resource Center: Melinda Reo
Director of Marketing: Beth Gilletr.
Marketing Manager: Sharon Cosgrove
Copycditor: Kathy Primo
Proofreader: Rainbow Graphics
Indexer: Niels Buessem, Andovcr Publishing Services
To Kathy, my love,
Acknowledgments for copyrighted material may be found beginning on p. 587, which commutes an extension of this copyright page.
Cover art © Julia Lapine. Represented by Carolyn Potts and Associates, Inc.
This book was set in 10.5/12 Garamond by Lithokraft II and was printed by Von Hoffman Press. The cover was printed by The Lehigh Press, Inc.
© 2001, 1998, 1995 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. A Division of Pearson Education Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America 10987654 3 2
isbn Q-13-D27M7T-ß
Prentice-Hall International (UK) Limited, London Prentice-Hall of Australia Pty. Limited, Sydney Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., Toronto Prentice-Hall Llispanoamertcana, S.A., Mexico Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi Prentice-Hal! of Japan, Inc., Tokyo Pearson Education Asia Pte. Ltd., Singapore Editoria Prentice-Hall do Brasil, 1 ,tda., Rio ds Janeiro
THIRD EDITION
ROBERT   S. FELDMAN
www.prenhallxom/feldman
JDxpand your knowledge of key concepts in Social Psychology, Third Edition1. Connect to this FREE online study guide to review each chapter's material, take practice tests, research topics for course projects, and more!
See you online!
si '
|s  SOCW PSYCH . 3RD 81 PH
FJtEWTiCiE HALL
Upper Saddle River, MJ 07458
08
a
)0
Jl
ft m f U
8 > z
THIRD EDITION
4 1
THIRD
D   I   T   I   O N
ROBERT    S . FELDMAN
9780130274793