Social Cognition, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2008, pp. 791-799
FLUENCY AND THE DETECTION
OF MISLEADING QUESTIONS:
LOW PROCESSING FLUENCY ATTENUATES
THE MOSES ILLUSION
Hyunjin Song and Norbert Schwarz
University of Michigan
When asked, "How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the
Ark?" most people respond "Two" despite knowing that Noah rather than
Moses was the biblical actor. Two experiments tested the role of processing
fluency in the detection of such semantic distortions by presenting questions
in an easy or difficult to read print font. As predicted, low processing
fluency facilitated detection of the misleading nature of the question and
reduced the proportion of erroneous answers. However, low processing
fluency also reduced the proportion of correct answers in response to an
undistorted question. In both cases, participants were less likely to rely
on their spontaneous association when the font was difficult to read, resulting
in improved performance on distorted and impaired performance
on undistorted questions. We propose that fluency experiences influence
processing style.
When asked, "How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?" most
people respond "Two" despite knowing that Noah rather than Moses was the actor
in the biblical story (Erickson &: Mattson, 1981). This Moses illusion bears on
an important aspect of human communication: Under which conditions are distortions
in utterances and texts likely to be noticed? Previous research addressed
a variety of plausible accounts (for a comprehensive review see Park & Reder,
2003), including the possibility that recipients are cooperative communicators
(Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1996) who notice the distortion, but simply correct for it
by responding to what the questioner must have meant. Yet making participants
aware that the text may be distorted, or asking them to identify such distortions.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the Association for Psychological
Science, New York, May 2006.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to the authors at Department of
Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, Ml 48109-1043.
E-mail: hyunjin.song@umich.edu; norbert.schwarz@umich.edu.
791
792 SONG AND SCHWARZ
does not eliminate the effect (e.g., Bredart & Modolo, 1988; Reder & Kusbit, 1991),
in contrast to what a conversational cooperation account would predict.
The currently best supported explanation holds that "distortion detection involves
a two-pass process—the first to flag a potential mismatch and the second to
invoke a careful inspection that might confirm an erroneous term in the question"
(Park & Reder, 2003, p. 282; see also Reder, 1987, 1988). Distorted questions pass
the first stage when the semantic overlap between the question and the person's
knowledge provides a sufficient match (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1995; Metcalfe,
Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Park & Reder, 2003), as is the case for the Moses question
(e.g., Moses and Noah are both characters in the Old Testament, who received
commands from God that were related to water). Low feature-overlap, on the
other hand, reliably attenuates or eliminates the Moses illusion (e.g., Erickson &
Mattson, 1981; van Oostendorp & de Mul, 1990); for example, it is not obtained
when Moses is replaced by "Nixon" in the above quesfion. The observation that
distortions remain urmoticed under conditions of sufficient feature overlap is consistent
with the assumption that "many of our cognitive operations are driven
by familiarity-based heuristics rather than careful matching operations" (Park &
Reder, 2003, p. 283).
Taking the notion of familiarity-based heuristics seriously, we go beyond the
focus on feature overlap and test whether other variables that influence impressions
of familiarity also influence the detection of distortions in text. One of these
variables is the fluency with which text can be processed, which can be manipulated
through easy or difficult to read print fonts (for a review see Schwarz, 2004).
We assume that low familiarity triggers more systematic processing and renders
it less likely that people report the first answer that comes to mind. Accordingly,
they should be more likely to notice distortions in text and less likely to fall prey to
the Moses illusion, resulting in improved performance on distorted questions. On
the other hand, low familiarity may also lead people to second guess their answers
to undistorted questions, potentially hurting performance in that case. Next, we
elaborate on the underlying logic and review selected findings.
FLUENCY, FAMILIARITY, AND PROCESSING STYLE
People correctly assume that familiar material is easier to process than novel material
(Schwarz, 2004). Applying this naive theory, they infer familiarity from high
processing fluency, even when the fluency merely results from presentation variables
like high figure-ground contrast, long exposure times, or easy-to-read print
fonts (for reviews see Kelley & Rhodes, 2002; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004;
Schwarz, 2004). In memory research, this fluency-familiarity link gives rise to erroneous
recognition judgments (e.g., Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) and strong
feelings of knowing (e.g., Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). Whittlesea and colleagues
(1990), for example, reported that parficipants were more likely to misidenfify
novel words as previously seen when they were easy rather than difficult to process
due to the visual clarity of the presentation format. Perceived familiarity, in
turn, feeds into other judgments, including judgments of truth.
Numerous studies showed that familiar statements are more likely to be accepted
as true. This is the case when perceived familiarity derives from actual previous
exposure (e.g., Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz,
MOSES ILLUSION 793
2005) as well as when it derives from fluent processing, li'or example, Reber and
Schwarz (1999) found that statements like "Orsono is a city in Chile" were more
likely to be judged true when the color contrast of the print font made them easyrather
than difficult-to-read. Similarly, McClone and Tofigbakhsh (2000) observed
that substantively equivalent statements were more likely to be accepted as true
when presented in a rhyming (e.g., "woes unite foes") rather than a non-rhyming
form (e.g., "woes unite emenies"). This familiarity-truth Link reflects that the familiarity
of a statement serves as a social consensus cue—if it seems familiar, we
presumably heard it before and the belief may be widely shared (for a review see
Schwarz, Sarma, Skumik, & Yoon, 2007). Accordingly, manipulations that increase
the perceived familiarity of a belief also increase estimates of how many people
share it (Weaver, Carcia, Schwarz, & Miller, 2007). Perceived social consensus, in
turn, can serve as a basis for assessing the truth value of beliefs, as Festinger (1954)
suggested—if many believe it, there's probably sometliing to it.
These observations indicate that familiar material is more likely to be accepted
as true. Civen its apparent truth value, familiar material may also receive less scrutiny
and less detail-oriented processing than unfamiliar material. Consistent with
this conjecture, familiar persuasive messages receive less systematic processing
than unfamiliar ones (Claypool, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2004; Garcia-Marques
& Mackie, 2001) and the familiarity of a person description increases stereotyping,
which presumably reflects a heuristic rather than systematic processing strategy
(Smith, Miller, & Maitner, 2006).
Finally, people report more confidence in the accuracy of their own thoughts
when they are easy rather than difficult to bring to mind (for a review see Petty,
Brinol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007). In combination, these diverse findings indicate
that fluently processed material seems more familiar, is more likely to be accepted
as true and less likely to be scrutirüzed. Moreover, people may have more conHdence
in the associations triggered by such material and may be less likely to
second guess them.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
Building on this work, the present studies address the role of processing fluency
in the detection of distortions in texts. To manipulate processing fluency, we presented
an undistorted control question and the Moses question (Experiment 1) or a
variant (Experiment 2) in an easy or difficult to read print font. Consistent with the
research reviewed above, we assume that the text seems less familiar when presented
in a difficult- rather than easy-to-read font and that low familiarity triggers
more systematic processing. Accordingly, participants who are asked, "How many
animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?" should be less likely to rely on
their spontaneous association (Two) and more likely to scrutinize the text when
the text is difficult to read, realizing that the biblical actor was not Moses. Hence,
low fluency should improve performance on distorted questions. However, processing
fluency may also affect participants performance on an imdistorted control
quesfion, like "which country is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket
knives?" The less familiar the text seems, the fewer participants may rely on their
spontaneous association (Switzerland); if so, low fluency may potentially impair
performance on an undistorted question.
794 SONG AND SCHWARZ
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket knives.
FIGURE 1. Easy-to-read (top) and difficult-to-read (bottom) font samples.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Pretest of Font Ease. Five undergraduates read the sentence "Switzerland is famous
for cuckoo clocks, banks and pocket knives" printed in grey Brush Script MT
font with font size 12; another five read the same sentence in black Arial font with
font size 12. The sample sentences are presented in Figure 1. Participants rated the
ease with which they could read the text (1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy). Confirming
the intended variation in ease of reading, they reported that the Arial font
was easier to read (M = 6.8, SD = .45) than the Brush Script MT font (M = 4.2, SD
= 1.3), i(8) = 4.22, p < .01.
Main Experiment. Thirty-two undergraduates participated for course credit. They
were randomly assigned to an easy- vs. difficult-to-read condition. The instructions
(modeled after Erickson & Mattson, 1981) read, "You will a read couple of trivia
questions and answer them. You can write the answer in the blank. In case you
do not know the answer, please write 'don't know.' You may or may not encounter
ill-formed questions which do not have correct answers if taken literally. For
instance, you might see the question 'Why was President Gerald Ford forced to
resign his office?' In fact, Gerald Ford was not forced to resign. Please, write 'can't
say' for this type of question."
Depending on condition, participants were presented with two questions printed
in a hard-to-read or easy-to-read font, as described above. The first (control)
question did not have a distortion. It read, "Which country is famous for cuckoo
clocks, chocolate, banks, and pocket knives?" (Switzerland). The second, distorted
question read, "How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?"
(taken from Erickson & Mattson, 1981). This question replaces the correct actor,
Noah, with Moses and should be answered "can't say." Answering "2" indicates
the Moses illusion.
RESULTS
Distorted Question. As predicted, a difficult-to-read print font attenuated the
Moses illusion. As shown in Table 1,88% (15 out of 17) of the participants answered
2 in response to the Moses question when the font was easy to read, whereas only
53% (8 out of 15) did so when it was difficult to read, z = 2.5, p < .02 (contrast on
proportions, Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). Conversely, when the font was easy to
read, 6 (1 out of 17) of the participants provided the correct answer "can't say,"
MOSES ILLUSION
TABLE 1. Frequency of Answers in Experiment 1
Easy to read
Hard to read
Easy to read
Hard to read
% Whale or fish
88 (15/17)
53 (8/15)
% Switzerland
88(15/17)
53 (8/15)
Moses Question (Distorted)
% Don't know
6(1/17)
7(1/15)
Switzerland Question
% Don't know %
6(1/17)
20(3/15)
% Can't say
6(1/17)
40 (6/15)
(Undistorted)
Other countries
6(1/17)
26(4/15)
795
"/« Total
100(17/17)
100(15/15)
% Total
100 (17/1 7)
100(15/15)
whereas 40% (6 out of 15) did so when the font was diificult to read, z = 2.66, p <
.01.
Undistorted Question. None of the participants answered 'can't say' to the control
question, indicating that they did not consider it distorted. Nevertheless, the print
font affected their answers, as shown in Table 1. When the font was easy to read,
88% (15 out of 17) of the participants correctly answeied Switzerland, whereas
only 53% (8 out of 15) did so when it was difficult to read, z = 2.5, p < .02. Moreover,
participants were more likely to name a country other than Switzerland when the
font was hard (26%; 4 out of 15) rather than easy (6%; 1 out of 17) to read, z = 2.27,
p < .03, and more likely to report that they 'don't know' (20%, 3 out of 15 vs. 6%, 1
out of 17, for hard- and easy-to-read fonts, respectively), z = 1.97, p<.05.
In sum, low processing fluency, induced through a difficult-to-read print font,
improved performance on a distorted question and impaired performance on an
undistorted question, as theoretically predicted. Experiment 2 tests the robustness
of this finding with a different distorted question.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
This experiment followed the procedures of Experiment 1, except that the distorted
question read, "In the biblical story, what was Joshua swallowed by?" (taken
from Erickson & Mattson, 1981). This question replaciîs the correct actor Jonah
with Joshua and should be answered with "can't say"; answers like "whale" or
"fish" indicate the illusion. Sixty undergraduates participated for course credit
and were randomly assigned to the easy- or difficult-to-read condition.
RESULTS
Distorted Question. As shown in Table 2, the results replicate the earlier findings.
47% (14 out of 30) of the participants answered "fish" or "whale" in response to the
Joshua question when the font was easy to read, whereas; only 23% (7 out of 30) did
so when it was difficult to read, z = 2.09, p < .04 (contrast on proportions, Rosenthal
796 SONG AND SCHWARZ
TABLE 2. Frequency of Answers in Experiment 2
Easy to read
Hard to read
Easy to read
Hard to read
% Whale or fish
47(14/30)
23 (7/30)
% Switzerland
63(19/30)
50 (15/30)
Joshua Question (Distorted)
% Don't know
30 (9/30)
37(11/30)
Switzerland Question
% Don't know %
20 (6/30)
37(11/30)
% Can't say
23 (7/30)
40(12/30)
(Undistorted)
Other countries
17 (5/30)
13 (4/30)
% Total
100(30/30)
100(30/30)
% Total
100(30/30)
100(30/30)
& Rosnow, 1985). Conversely, 40% (12 out of 30) correctly answered "can't say"
when the font was difficult to read, whereas only 23% (7 out of 30) did so when it
was easy to read, z =1.41, p =.16. Finally, 9 participants (30%) in the easy-to-read
condition and 11 participants (37%) in the hard-to-read condition reported that
they did not know the answer, reflecting that the Jonah story is less well known
than the Noah's Ark story used in Experiment 1.
Undistorted Question. Participants answers to the undistorted question also followed
the pattern of Experiment 1, although the differences failed to reach sigrüficance
(see Table 2). Again, more participants answered "don't know" when the
font was difficult rather than easy to read, z =1.48, p =.14, and fewer provided the
correct answer "Switzerland," z = 1.02, ns.
COMBINED ANALYSIS
To assess the robustness of the results across both experiments, we used Rosenthal's
(1978) procedures for combining results of independent studies. This analysis
corifirms the overall reliability of the observed patterns. When the question was
distorted, participants were less likely to give an erroneous substantive answer, z =
3.26, p < .002, and more likely to recognize the distortion (as indicated by answering
'can't say'), z = 2.89, p < .004, when the font was difficult rather than easy to
read. When the question was undistorted, participants were less likely to give a correct
substantive answer, z = 2.5, p < .02, and more likely to report that they "don't
know, z = 2.45, p < .02, when the font was difficult rather than easy to read.
DISCUSSION
The present studies extend our understanding of the role of processing fluency in
human judgment. Earlier research indicated that fluently processed material seems
more familiar (Keiley & Rhodes, 2002; Schwarz, 2004), is more likely to be accepted
as true (McGlone & Tofighbaksh, 2000; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), and less likely
to be scrutinized (Claypool, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2004; Garcia-Marques &
Mackie, 2001). Moreover, opinions based on fluently processed material are held
with greater confidence (Petty et al., 2007), whereas disfluent processing reduces
MOSES ILLUSION 797
confidence and fosters decision deferral (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson,
2007). Our findings suggest that the same iogic applies to the process of question
answering. When the question is easy to process, the content seems familiar
and people rely on the first answer that comes to mind, probably feeling that the
answer is pretty obvious. When the question is difficult to process, the material
seems less familiar and people may be less inclined to assume that their first association
is the correct one.
How this affects performance depends on the nature of the question. When the
question is distorted—as in "How many animals of each kind did Moses take on
the Ark?"—closer consideration reveals that Moses was not the biblical actor and
hence one's spontaneous answer "2" does not apply. But the same signal of low familiarity
may make one wonder whether Switzerland is nially the land of cuckoo
clocks and pocket knives, fostering an erroneous "don't know" response. Hence,
low processing fluency improves performance when one's spontaneous answer is
wrong, but impairs performance when one's spontaneous answer is correct.
Note that this diverging influence of processing fluency on answers to distorted
and undistorted questions is incompatible with a potential concern arising from
our use of print fonts as a fluency manipulation. Reading a question printed in a
difficult font presumably requires more attention and this alone may be sufficient
to facilitate distortion detection. Yet increased attention would not predict the observed
impaired performance on an undistorted question. Next we turn to the
broader implications of these findings.
Detecting Distortions in Text
Most accounts of the Moses illusion assign a prominent role to the semantic overlap
between the question and participants kiiowledge (for a review see Park & Reder,
2003). Our findings suggest that semantic overlap is just one of the many variables
that facilitate fluent processing, giving rise to a feeling of familiarity. Hence, any
of the variables known to affect processing fluency should also affect the size of
the Moses illusion, consistent with the observation that "many of our cognitive
operations are driven by familiarity-based heuristics rathei- than careful matching
operations" (Park & Reder, 2003, p. 283). Relevant variables include semantic (e.g.,
Reder, 1988) and phonetic (e.g., Shafto & MacKay, 2000) similarity as well as all
presentation variables that facilitate fluent processing (for a review see Reber et al.,
2004). In the case of visual presentations, prime candidates include the readability
of the print font (as in the present studies), the degree of ligure-ground contrast,
the presence or absence of visual noise, and exposure frequency and duration. In
the case of auditory presentations, prime candiciates include the acoustic clarity of
the presentation and the presence or absence of distracting noise. Moreover, presentation
variables that impair processing fluency should lose their impact when
participants attention is drawn to them, thus inviting an attribution of the experienced
difficulty to the contextual variable rather than the to-be-processed material
(see Schwarz, 2004, for a review).
Ironically, these variables run counter to what common sense would suggest.
When asked to advise a communicator on how to present material in a way that
minimizes the detection of semantic distortions, most readers would probably opt
for presentation formats that "hide" the distortion rather than for presentation
798 SONG AND SCHWARZ
formats that facilitate easy processing. Yet our data suggest that it is exactly easy
processing that interferes with distortion detection, presumably by fostering the
perception that the material is familiar.
Fluency and Processing Styte
From a broader perspective, the subjective experience of processing difficulty may
influence individuals' processing strategies in ways that parallel the influence of
other experiential "problem" signals. Previous research found, for example, that
sad moods (e.g.. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990) or bodily avoidance feedback
(e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2000) foster more detail-oriented analytic processing,
presumably because they alert the person of a potential "problem" that requires
attention (for comprehensive reviews see Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore,
2007). Consistent with this conjecture. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Norwick
(2006) reported that manipulations that increased experienced processing difficulty
improved participants' performance on reasoning tasks by evoking a more
analytic processing style. This possibility provides a promising avenue for future
research.
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