Power, Well-being, Oppression, and Liberation: Points of Departure This chapter describes our basic approach to critical psychology. We begin with power because it is pivotal in attaining well-being and in opposing injustice. Then, we explore the remaining three foundational concepts of our work: well-being, oppression, and liberation. We discuss how these basic notions inform critical psychology practice. We pay particular attention to the need to cross boundaries in levels of intervention and disciplinary orientations. We also address the issue of clear communication and sensitivity to contextual considerations. We conclude with a brief overview of the book. Power Psychologists associated with critical psychology share an important insight: power and interests affect our human experience, our understanding of it, our definition of it, and our attempts to change it (Parker, 1999; Sloan, 2000). Discussing power in an interview, Foucault (1997) made the point that, In human relationships, whether they involve verba] communication such as we are engaged in at this moment, or amorous, institutional, or economic relationships, power is always present: I mean a relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other. So I am speaking of relations that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power relations are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all (Foucault, 1997: 291-2). Unlike typical psychological research, in which power is regarded as a variable existing 'out there,' affecting the behaviour of the people we study or treat, critical psychologists contend that power suffuses our very own actions as psychologists. We use our power to study power. Furthermore, we use our power to define power in such a way that we are not affected by it! This is not just a game of words. We find many examples of psychologists' 'declaration of independence' 6 FOUNDATIONS POWER, WELL-BEING, OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION 7 from power (Herman, 1995). They usually come in the form of claims to objectivity and value-neutrality, announcing that psychologists study people 'out there' in a manner that is not affected by their own interests and power. For a long time, many of us were not even aware that power would be so pervasive and invisible at the same time. Power impregnates the very ways we think about power, psychology, and problems (Henriques et al., 1984). Power operates in subtle ways because it is hidden under a mantle of neutrality. In critical psychology we try to understand how our own power and subjectivity influence what we do and feel and study (Walkerdine, 1997). Our objective in this exercise is not to develop a new cadre of removed experts on power, but rather to use these insights in the pursuit of health and well-being. Once we accept that power and interests affect what we do, we don't accept the premise that research is neutral, that interventions are not affected by politics, and that we are just healers. We have a doubting attitude towards the goals of the psychological industry (Rose, 1985, 2000). We just can't take it for granted that psychology pursues human welfare in a manner that is just and fair. Psychologists have contributed, direcdy and indirecdy, wittingly and unwittingly, to oppressive domestic and foreign policies. In her 1995 book, The Romance of American Psychology, Ellen Herman documents the involvement of psychologists in formulating shameful policies. Although malevolent intent cannot necessarily be ascribed, psychologists helped to shape racist and inequitable policies, in the USA and abroad. Herman documents psychologists' involvement in project Camelot. This was a project funded by the US Department of Defence in the 1960s. It was designed to use social science to fight national liberation movements around the world. While some psychologists were uncomfortable with the idea of producing knowledge for military purposes, the majority regarded the project as a research opportunity that legitimized their role in public affairs. Many, in fact, were at pains to pronounce their neutrality, even as they endeavoured to produce research for the repression of liberation movements. The point of this story is not to inculpate the behavioural scientists who worked for Camelot, but rather to show that psychologists are capable of claiming neutrality even as they offer advice on how to dominate other countries. 'Camelot's antiseptic language often emphasized the allegedly apolitical character of behavioural science, referring, for example, to "insurgency prophylaxis" rather than counterrevolution. Even at the height of the Cold War, psychology offered a convenient way to avoid all mention of capitalism, communism, or socialism' (Herman, 1995: 170-1). If we learned anything from Camelot, it is to realise how much power we have as psychologists. One thing is for sure, what looks neutral to a US psychologist looks very political to the average citizen of developing countries. Camelot cannot be discounted as an aberration, for subtle and overt abuses of power are quite prevalent in psychology and the mental health professions (Parker et al., 1995; Pilgrim, 1992). To break the silence around power, critical psychologists try to understand how cultural norms and systems of social regulation shape human experience. We see this, for example, in Walkerdine's (1996, 1997) efforts to comprehend the survival and coping mechanisms of working-class people, in Montero's (1993) and Martin Baro's (1995) work on power and ideology in Latin America, and in the writings of Burman (1996) and colleagues dealing with social regulation and resistance. In this book we are interested in translating into practice what we know about the psychological, cultural, social and political sources and effects of power. Power is multifaceted and omnipresent. There is material and psychological power, there is the power of the psychologist and the power of the client, power of parents and power of children, power to define mental illness and power to resist labels. Power, in our view, refers to the capacity and opportunity to fulfil or obstruct personal, relational, or collective needs. We note three primary uses of power: (a) power to strive for well-being, (b) power to oppress, and (c) power to resist marginalization and strive for liberation. In each instance, the exercise of power can apply to self, others, and collectives; and can reflect varying degrees of awareness with respect to the impact of one's actions. Whereas people may be oppressed in one context, they may act as oppressors in others. Power affords people multiple identities as individuals seeking well-being, engaging in oppression, or resisting domination. Within a particular context, such as the family or work, individuals may exercise power to facilitate the well-being of some people but not of others. Across contexts, people may engage in contradictory actions that promote personal or collective well-being in one place but that perpetuate oppression in others. Due to structural factors such as social class, gender, ability, and race, people may enjoy differential levels of power. Degrees of power are also affected by personal and social constructs such as beauty, intelligence, and assertiveness; constructs that enjoy variable status within different cultures. The exercise of power varies not only across contexts, but also across time. Within a particular setting or relationship, people may occupy different roles at different times, making the exercise of power a very dynamic process. Our concept of power merges elements of agency with structure or external determinants. Agency refers to ability and volitional activity, whereas structure refers to opportunity. The exercise of power is based on the juxtaposition of wishing to change something, on one hand, and having the opportunity to do so, on the other. Opportunities are afforded by social and historical circumstances. Adverse conditions block new opportunities. Ultimately, the outcome of power is based on die constant interaction and reciprocal determinism of agency and contextual dynamics. Power is not tantamount to coercion, for it can operate in very subtle and concealed ways, as Foucault demonstrated in detailed historical analyses of population control (1979). Eventually, people come to regulate themselves through the internalization of cultural prescriptions. Hence, what may seem on the surface as freedom may be a form of acquiescence whereby citizens restrict their life choices to fit socially sanctioned options. In his book Powers of Freedom, Rose (1999: 88) claimed that: Disciplinary techniques and moralizing injunctions as to health, hygiene and civility arc no longer required; the project of responsible citizenship has been fused with individuals' projects for themselves. What began as a social norm here ends as a personal desire. Individuals act upon themselves and their families in terms of the languages, values and techniques made available to them by professions, disseminated through the apparatuses of the mass media or sought out by the troubled through the market. 8 FOUNDATIONS Thus, in a very significant sense, it has become possible to govern without governing society-to govern through the 'responsibilized' and 'educated' anxieties and aspirations of individuals and their families. Internalized social prescriptions have direct implications for the self-perception of people with problems. Although coercion has not disappeared from the treatment of the mentally ill, we have, today, treatment methods characterized by kindness and compassion. However humanitarian, this trend is not without side effects, for it turns responsibility for problems and solutions inward. In the absence of apparent coercion, and in the presence of overt caring, there is nobody but oneself to blame for difficulties. The humanization of treatments of the insane encouraged the internalization of the difficulties they exhibited. The mad then had to take responsibility for cure, and the kind treatment which replaced the rods and whips would work its way inwards. The conscience of the mentally ill would act as a self-discipline all the more efficient than the social discipline of the general hospital (Parker et ai, 1995: 7). Power, then, emanates from the confluence of personal motives and cultural injunctions. But, as we have seen, personal motives are embedded in the very cultural injunctions with which they interact. Hence, it is not just a matter of persons acting on the environment, but of individuals corning into contact with external forces that they have already internalized. Thus, we cannot take at face value that individual actions evolve from innate desires. Desires are embedded in norms and regulations. This is not to adopt a socially deterministic position however. For even though a person's experience is gready shaped by the prescriptions of the day, agency is not completely erased. We concur with Martin and Sugarman (2000: 401) who claimed that: While never ceasing to be constructed in sociocultural terms, psychological beings, as reflection-capable, intentional agents, are able to exercise sophisticated capabilities of memory and imagination, which in interaction with theories of self can create possibilities for present and future understanding and action that are not entirely constrained by past and present sociocultural circumstances. Resistance and collusion with oppressive structures co-exist. Indeed, contradictions abound. Humanists, for instance, wished to promote individual well-being without recognizing their contribution to the status quo by individualizing sources of suffering (Prilleltensky, 1994). They wished to advance personal liberation without changing social oppression. Well-being Well-being is achieved by the simultaneous and balanced satisfaction of personal, relational, and collective needs. In Table 1.1 we show the main values comprising the three domains of well-being and their respective needs. O & in ill GO o in g o 5 2 E'€ o a; ro O -a a. & t "d | E w> E a: c _ O ra E ra o .1= J» a I - o -O E V5 a) ran q o cd f iijii slis.-i ,o Ooaj-J=:.fcso>rouC .tn u m w u c nj+ir w wi BO o 3 i> c E _ .3 E S ai o-s c fs§iili Q_ "> in . cl a. u "d id Dp ~ as 3 ■ — — - °- Q_ u m aj 5 *j S. k si- 'S-a o c ro O JW ^♦j-d q q^=r=^k-TO TOO.tiO u F'w o «1 g « Q c cx a u o o 3 C/5 u O (rt ■3 § s »35 o > £ *: S-o £ J° ? e cu a. .E co Sr .» o E g -o cj a; c ^ S-to CJ o o J£ i/i ca ||| or tu ell (0 1 DO t S2 c .9 = -o ^ o a> o jx: c *ii O In > n n ■B £ oj -o & • to -5= a 111 1 OÖ S a. o Iii o o .22 a. o .c in U» f--- f If J 3-So * a> c o a) £ BS - E a. (U o _ o o (J a> Q- 'S g «Iii o to a> c Z ajf o a)^ cm — o If - °- ra ^ «. "> - E — iE .9 ° — Wl "(5 S. s I 8 c i. ra •II I ft II 5 I ui rsl £: T3 Z= ") >= c C — oj to cu Ml o o K = U 3 ^ O 0> C O 3 GO r S c c i. u a. 2 q t5 O Q. a. in 82 — £ = to "O TO TS s; = £ .u ll o y 1 ° From text deconstruction to therapy to community activism, critical psychologists have an important role to fulfil. To promote well-being and to resist oppression we believe that critical psychologists have to cross boundaries, develop clear communication with service recipients, and attend to contextual diversity. Crossing boundaries Awareness of power and politics did not necessarily come from within psychology. Rather, they came from disparate fields such as the sociology of knowledge, critical social theory, cultural studies, women's studies and radical politics. Without critiques from other disciplines, it would be hard for psychology to reflect on its own assumptions. We welcome such interrogations. These critiques forced psychology to look at its self-perception of healer and scientist (Rose, 2000). Much like other disciplines threw light into psychology's role in society, allied fields helped to conceptualize human problems in broader terms. Hence, we biow from sociology and biology and political economy that psychological symptoms are related to unemployment and organic malfunctions and class systems. The complexities of human beings extend far beyond the reach of psychology. Crossing boundaries means not only looking at other sources of knowledge, but also at different levels of analyses. Traditionally we have looked into the 'mind' and its intra-psychic mechanisms for explanations of personal and interpersonal conflicts. We propose to broaden analyses of problems and sites of intervention to other ecological levels. In practical terms, this means more than a token recognition of family, community, and societal dynamics; it means a comprehensive view of how these parameters shape the life experience of the people we work with. But if holistic understanding is challenging, systemic intervention is harder yet. Connecting therapy with community interventions and social action may be difficult but not impossible. Communication of meanings Working across fields and with people who are often marginalized requires sensitivity to language. Language itself can be a source of oppression or a vehicle of solidarity. How can we expect to create bonds of solidarity when the people we work with do not even understand what we mean. Never mind our clients, even our colleagues and students sometimes don't understand what we're talking about. Obscuring language feeds into self-perceptions of stupidity in many people. We can't collaborate with community members when the terminology we use prevents access to knowledge. Critical psychologists are not immune to alienating people due to obfuscating language. The type of psychology we are promoting requires close collaboration with a range of people whose formal education may be different from ours. For us, promoting understanding is a matter of respect. We don't believe that we'll lose something by communicating in simple language, but we do believe that we'll lose a lot by alienating partners. Language 20 FOUNDATIONS should build bonds of solidarity and not walls of alienation. But this is far from calling for a simplification of issues. The risk is not simplification of issues, but alienation from those we wish to work with. Freire (1975) showed how people with very little formal education could reach sophisticated levels of sociopolitical understanding. This was achieved through a process of popular education. Practice in context Critical psychology practice is always in context. But if contexts vary, as they invariably do, how can we apply a set of critical psychology principles across settings and cultures? We take it for granted that different contexts will have varied configurations of power and varied perceptions of well-being. We are not talking only about different cultures, but also about cultures within cultures, and subcultures within subcultures. Heterogeneity is often the norm and not the exception when dealing with seemingly discrete ethnic or minority groups. Each group subsumes subgroups with different prescriptive and proscriptive codes and beliefs. We cannot talk in general terms about all people with disabilities, or all people with psychiatric problems or all gays and lesbians. Sensitivity to context means exploring our unique cultural heritage, taking the time to listen to the concerns and world views of others, and finding means of establishing a dialogue. James and Prilleltensky (in press) described a model of practice that attends to the interface among psychologists, their cultural values and assumptions, the ethnic identity of clients, and the unique position of the client within a subculture. The model alerts practitioners to potential projections of their own unchecked assumptions. This results in heightened sensitivity to the role of practitioners' and clients' cultures. Furthermore, it enables dialogue in dealing with diversity. Book organization This chapter has provided an overview of the central notions guiding our work in critical psychology. Chapter 2 introduces a framework for assessing the impact of theory, research, and action and provides a rationale for the values we believe in. Furthermore, we discern the basic parameters constructing the subject matter of psychology, including views about knowledge and ethics. Part II of the book deals with training. We provide guidelines for preparing critical psychologists to work in applied settings, in research, and in teaching. The field of critical psychology needs models of training. Part III describes, in six chapters, the application of critical psychology tenets to practice in clinical and counselling, educational, health, community and work settings. The last part of the book deals with the topics of integrations and transformations. We reflect on the need, and the struggle, to integrate critical psychology across settings and levels of intervention. The last three chapters of the book deal with change. They tackle, respectively, agents, processes, and objects of change. Theory, Research, and Action: Oppressive and Emancipatory Effects In this chapter we try to discern the oppressive and emancipatory effects of what psychologists do. What we do falls generally within the domains of theory construction, grounded investigations, and action. In all of our roles there are inherent beliefs driving our efforts. Theory Theories define, represent, and explain phenomena. As such, they are powerful tools. They can portray humans as active or passive, altruistic, or driven to violence. Whichever rendition of behaviour we prefer, the subjects of the theory are affected by the theory itself. We already know the effects of portraying women and Jews and blacks and migrants as inferior. A psychological theory of inferiority justifies policies of domination and engenders subjugation (Moane, 1999; Parker et al., 1995). Theories serve constraining or emancipatory purposes. Consideration of the potential oppressive effects of theories is an integral aspect of critical psychology. In our view, the confining effects of theorization ensue from three main sources: (a) the incomplete depiction of phenomena, (b) the affixing of people to immovable moulds, and (c) the obviation of power in theory construction itself. How do they work? When we ignore crucial factors in explaining phenomena we run the risk of affirming relations of inequality and oppression. For example, when we ascribe women's unhappiness to unresolved 'inner' conflicts and we neglect 'outer' domestic violence, drudgery and unrelenting childminding, we formulate descriptions and prescriptions that focus on mentalistic accounts. These accounts render the objective conditions of inequality unaccounted and unaltered. As the subjects of such theorizing, women may surmise that they are not good at coping and that they need to change something within themselves. By leaving out objective conditions of suffering, the theory configures a phenomenon in psycho-terminology. As the recipient of such theorizing, the individual turns 21 22 FOUNDATIONS THEORY, RESEARCH, AND ACTION 23 inwards in search for solutions. This is an unjust outcome in that it internalizes problems and leads to self-deprecation. By failing to interrogate oppressive conditions within its domain, the theory normalizes the very circumstances which may have caused the suffering. Because of its emphasis on the personal interpretation of events as causation of distress, rational emotive theory is particularly prone to incomplete descriptions of phenomena; although the same can be alleged of cognitive behavioural and certain psychoanalytic theories (Prilleltensky, 1994). Predominant theories of personality, clinical, and abnormal psychology have been historically susceptible to this type of reification. That is, the treatment of human behaviour as if it were an 'in-itself,' an entity abstracted from its social context (Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1997; Sampson, 2001; Sloan, 1997). This charge is akin to psychological essentialism, whereby behaviour is explained in reductionistic terms of singular character traits (Martin and Sugarman, 2000). These traits and categories 'homogenize, essential-ize and naturalize as individual psychological qualities what are features of people's historical and current circumstances' (Burman et«/., 1996:73). Affixing people, the objects of psychological theories, to set patterns and identities is another conduit of oppression. When we declare that somebody is psychologically disturbed we are not only describing but also prescribing and proscribing behaviour. Myriad stereotypes and labels are ascribed to groups and individuals, labels they cannot easily get rid of. These imputations constrain the horizons of the targets of stereotypes. Albeit in innocent ways, theories of development, personality and delinquency operate in a similar fashion. When our vocational preoccupation is with accurate diagnosis and prediction, it is not surprising that we spend endless time categorizing people (Sampson, 2001). However beneficial for communication purposes, diagnoses carry within them the risk of narrowing the self-perception of clients. Innocent as they might, explanations of human behaviour tend to limit the possibilities of change. Once assigned to a category, and the category is in the public domain, the person is the carrier of newly imposed restrictions on what he or she can be (Burman et al., 1996; Sampson, 2001). The obviation of power in theory construction itself can also have negative repercussions. What has been variously called the 'view from nowhere' or 'god's view' refers to the illusion that theories are independent of their creators. As such, they are only representations of something that exists 'out there', irrespective of our own subjective and socially constructed position. In perpetuating this chimera, we hide our power to define and categorize. When power is concealed, we feed into the mirage of detached truth. We present interpretations as facts, and we deny that power and social location play a role in our accounts of social events. This lack of reflexivity perpetuates the public's view that our renditions are uncontaminated by subjectivity. Such perception is instrumental in psychology's role as agent of social control. If power is nowhere to be seen, and science is all that we do, why should people suspect our motives, especially when many of us don't even realize that power contaminates our work? As a result, we deprive people of the opportunity to question how we define them and how we treat them. As no power motives are seemingly involved, and as psychologists stand as representatives of science and professionalism, there is no need to interrogate the knowledge base or the subjectivity of the professional. While some theories constrain and limit, others open up new horizons of opportunities. Some theories describe how people can plan, act, and change. Describing factors and processes that lead to personal and social change can be both instrumental and therapeutic on its own. Theories that explain how to promote personal, relational, and collective well-being at the same time can be very helpful in the process of emancipation. Similarly, theories that account for marginalized voices counteract explanations that derive exclusively from seats of privilege. Finally, theories that disentangle unjust discursive practices in our culture contain emancipatory potential; they disclose the many overt and covert ways in which people undermine each other and perpetuate systems of regulation. Once deconstructed, these practices are easier to critique, resist, and alter. Research Research can be oppressive or emancipatory, not only in its outcomes but in its very processes as well. We examine here both aspects of research. 'Research findings' do not come from nowhere, they come from an interaction of the values and assumptions of the researcher with the particular historical representation of the phenomenon under study. Chesler (1989), Ussher (1991), and Wilkinson (1997), among others, reviewed diverse strands of research that portray women as inferior to men, as more excitable, as less capable of working under pressure, and, of course, as more suited for house work. These conclusions were advanced as 'truths'. The way in which these conclusions were derived and protecred power and privilege was never questioned. On the contrary, power and privilege were never meant to be discussed in the context of scientific research. Chesler (1989:106) wrote that 'many female patients view themselves as "sick" or "bad" and commit themselves, quite voluntarily, to asylums or to private psychiatrists'. This distinct oppressive outcome has also been part of research with people with disabilities. As Woodill (1992) put it, 'few of us have escaped the researchers' scrutiny of their seemingly pathological fixation on the limitations and negative aspects of disability. We have been portrayed as sick, helpless, and incompetent; incapable of living independently' (2). The research relationship itself can also be demeaning of participants. Oliver (1992) recounts the exploitation of people with disabilities in the research process. In their capacity as research participants, persons with disabilities often endure the disabling gaze of researchers who look for data more than dignity. Insensitive researchers engage in 'othering' of 'those who have been exploited and subjugated' (Fine, 1994:72). Several authors accentuate the need to amplify participants' voices, not only in the final report, but also in the very construction and negotiation of the research relationship (Goodley, 1996; Morris, 1992; Nelson, Ochocka et *L, 1998). We support the concept and practice of research partnerships. Establishing a collaborative research relationship is a central part of our vision. In such a relationship, partners decide together the means and ends of the investigation, bearing in mind the different skills that each partner brings to the table (Nelson, PriUeitensky, and 24 FOUNDATIONS THEORY, RESEARCH, AND ACTION 25 MacGillivary, 2001). There is no attempt to pretend equality in partnerships. Rather, there is a conscious effort to remember where people are coming from, what is their power position in the partnership, and what can be done to promote solidarity. In Part II we discuss methods for striking a research alliance with people who have not usually thought of themselves as equals to academics. Action Rose (1985, 1999, 2000) pointed out that theory is rarely divorced from social demands. In the case of psychology, instruments and concepts are devised to serve specific expectations. This is why it is important to attend not only to theory but also to the social demands shaping psychology. Psychology's role as an administrative science cannot be understood as the application of a psychological knowledge of normality, gained through theoretical reflection or laboratory investigation, to a domain of practical problems. On the contrary, it was through attempts to diagnose, conceptualise and regulate pathologies of conduct that psychological knowledge and expertise first began to establish its claims for scientific credibility, professional status and social importance (Rose, 1985:226). Much to psychology's chagrin, Rose and others (Baritz, 1974; Danziger, 1990; Herman, 1995), document psychological applications to placate discontent, to foment conformity, and to support the status quo. We wish we could speak in the past tense, but collusion with systems of regulation persist. Critical psychologists try to operate in the name of resistance and emancipation, not conformity. However, we are still trying to learn the best ways to do that and we are still overshadowed by many practices rooted in the status quo. Values, assumptions, and practices In this section we introduce a framework for the evaluation of psychological approaches and for the construction of alternative practice. The framework, consisting of values, assumptions, and practices, is briefly depicted in Table 2.1. The framework lists the values required for the promotion of personal, relational, and collective well-being. Next to these values we pose questions for the evaluation of diverse approaches. We also mention a series of assumptions that distinguish psychological orientations, from research and knowledge to ethics. The third part of the framework addresses practices regarding problem definition, the role of agents and type of intervention. Values Values are principles that guide behaviour (Prilleltensky, 1997). They serve as reminders of what we regard important in personal, relational, and collective Domain Table 2.1 Framework for assessing psychological approaches Questions Values for Personal well-being Caring and protection of health Self-determination Relational well-being Human diversity Collaboration and democratic participation Collective well-being Distributive justice Support for community Assumptions about Power in relationships Professional ethics Research and knowledge The good life The good society Practices regarding Problem definition Role of client Role of helper Type of intervention Time of intervention Focus of intervention Does it promote the expression of care, empathy, and concern for the physical and emotional well-being of other human beings? Does it promote the ability of individuals to pursue their chosen goals without excessive frustration and in consideration of other people's needs? Does it promote respect and appreciation for diverse social identities? Does it promote the peaceful, respectful, and equitable process whereby citizens have meaningful input into decisions affecting their lives? Does it promote the fair and equitable allocation of bargaining powers, resources, and obligations in society? Does it support vital collective structures that promote the well-being of the entire community? Who has more power in relationships? Are there attempts to share power? Does ethical framework employed invite input from consumers? Are service recipients part of ethical decision-making processes? To what end is knowledge used? Is knowledge subordinate to morality or independent from it? What philosophy of science guides research? What conceptions of the good life are promoted? Are these based on self-interest or cooperation? What conceptions of the good society are promoted? Are these based on the pursuit of equality or personal gain at the expense of others? What factors are included and excluded from problem definition? Are psychological as well as sociological and economic factors taken into account? Is client active or passive? To what extent does client participate in decisions affecting his or her well-being? Is helper a true collaborator or a removed expert imparting advice? Does intervention focus exclusively on intra-psychic factors, or does it include systems affecting clients? Is intervention reactive or proactive? Does psychologist wait until victims of unhealthy environments seek help or does he/she try to prevent problems? Does intervention focus only on reducing deficits or also on enhancing competencies? domains. In order to attain holistic well-being, we need to attend to these three dimensions at the same time. Each individual finds him or herself on the receiving and giving ends of values. If values are seriously considered, they get translated into actions. These actions affect both the performer and the recipient of the behaviour. The performer may be a single individual or a group. At times, it will be difficult to identify the precise originator of a cultural practice or belief, but ultimately, it is people who construct, co-construct and reconstruct values in society (Crossley, 2000). The recipient of values is the 26 FOUNDATIONS THEORY, RESEARCH, AND ACTION 27 person affected by the expression of values. When parents enact caring and compassion through nurturing, their children are the immediate recipients of the values. When a worker invites colleagues to be part of an interesting and rewarding project, he or she is enacting values of sharing, collaboration, and participation. By definition, well-being is a holistic concept consisting of personal, relational, and collective domains. Each domain reflects distinct needs. Needs, in turn, are met by value-driven actions; actions aimed at the self, others, and the collective. Table 2.1 formulates questions associated with each value. These questions facilitate the evaluation of different psychological approaches. The promotion of only one set of values is inadequate and insufficient to meet the vast range of needs required for well-being. In our recent book Promoting Family Wellness and Preventing Child Maltreatment (Prilleltensky, Nelson, and Pcirson, 2001), we show how psychological and material resources, social programmes and government policies must attend to personal, relational, and collective needs. Our study found that liberal philosophies of personal responsibility focus primarily on the individual domain and lead to victim-blaming. On the other hand, countries with collectivist orientations support citizens in need with adequate resources. Our review shows that we have to provide resources, programmes, and policies that attend not only to the needs of the individual child, but to the needs of the family and the community as a whole. This could never be achieved without promoting social justice at the same time as individual well-being. To thrive, young people require more than caring and compassion, they require high-quality educational and recreational facilities and they require parents with decent jobs. Assumptions Values intersect with assumptions to produce modes of practice. We may be more or less conscious and articulate about our assumptions, but they influence our actions nevertheless. Power is exercized through assumptions, and, like values, assumptions can result in harmful or health-enhancing outcomes. Will our power as professionals threaten the voice of consumers? Will our position of expertise reshape the experience of clients in terms that are foreign to them? Our questioning of assumptions is in line with Rose's call for critical reflection. According to him, it is 'a matter of introducing a critical attitude towards those things that are given to our present experience as if they were timeless, natural, unquestionable: to stand against the maxims of one's time, against the spirit of one's age, against the current or received wisdom' (Rose, 1999:20). This stance contests the merit of prevalent ethical and epistemological paradigms alike. Assumptions about research and knowledge have a great impact on our practice as theorists, clinicians, researchers and teachers. Do we subscribe to positivist models that study behaviour out of context, or do we try to understand psychological problems in their natural surroundings? The epistemological orientation we espouse will have repercussions for the lives of the people we work with. If we explain psychological suffering exclusively in intra-psychic terms we obviate experiences of victimization and social alienation. Knowledge gives us the power to redefine the experiences of the subjects of psychological interventions. Whose knowledge do we regard as more valid, ours as experts or theirs as (in)experts? Foucault reminded us that 'knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power ... It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power' (Foucault, 1980:52). Our power as psychologists, then, generates different kinds of knowledge that are not necessarily reflective of truth, but of our power to define truth. To the extent that our version of truth may be coloured by our social location of privilege, its emancipatory effects are uncertain. Presuppositions about the 'good society' and the 'good life' also inform practice. We use these terms in their philosophical sense of entities that are worth pursuing and justifying. In essence, these two constructs embody the social and political philosophy of citizens. A good life is a life of meaning, fulfilment and satisfaction. Similarly, a good society is one where personal lives can thrive. People usually have criteria against which they assess their lives. Each person has a preconceived notion of what is meaningful and worthy in life (Crossley, 2000). Autonomy may be celebrated by some, interdependence by others. Government intervention may be advocated by left-wingers, privatization by right-wingers. Our social location will influence what wc think is 'right' and 'appropriate' for our clients. Practices Values and assumptions culminate in practice, practices that can have empowering or disempowering effects. Each time psychologists define problems, assign roles to themselves and their clients, and determine an intervention, they are enacting values and assumptions with multiple consequences. Problem definition is not just a professional act but a political one as well. When psychologists deflect human problems to the mental domain, the social domain remains unchallenged. If the role assumed by the psychologist is one of a partner in solidarity, one in which there is respectful listening and attention to internal and external sources of oppression, it is more likely that the outcomes will be empowering. This is not so when the psychologist defines, in expert fashion, the ills of others, in disregard for the dissenting voice of the client, which is interpreted away as resistance. Time, type, and focus of intervention also have potentially liberating or limiting effects. Comprehensive interventions have a better chance of positive outcomes than, for example, individual treatment alone (Prilleltensky, Nelson, and Peirson, 2001). Reactive interventions, by definition, do not come into play until people have experienced a great deal of suffering. Why wait when we can identify and prevent some of the risk factors leading to suffering and oppression? 28 FOUNDATIONS THEORY, RESEARCH, AND ACTION 29 The oppressive and emancipatory potential of values, assumptions, and practices Values, assumptions and practices can be construed and enacted in emancipatory or oppressive ways. Table 2.2 denotes conditions under which they can promote liberation or collude with repressive forces. Personal values like self-determination and autonomy, which arc only a part of well-being, can become burdensome when they are the main values of a society. When happiness is ascribed to personal effort, unhappiness becomes a reflection of personal failure. In cases of misfortune, the conflation of self-determination with personal responsibility produces self-blame. Autonomy and assertion, however, can be used to empower people as well. When we invoke self-determination to instill hope, the belief in personal power can be empowering (Snyder et al., 2000). But just as there can be reverence for personal values, so there can be a veneration for collective values. When the good of the collective is imposed as primary, as in the case of some communal societies such as the Russian kolkhoz (collective farm) and in Cuban society, calls for solidarity are used to renounce personal needs. Any set of values is subject to the risk of distortion and misappropriation for tyrannical ends. In and of themselves, values do not necessarily advance oppression or liberation; their effects depend on the context and the purpose for which they are invoked. According to Sen (2001:10), The same values and cultural norms can be extremely successful at one phase of development, but less so at another. What we have to look at is not the general excellence of one set of values over all others, but the specific fit of particular values Table 2.2 Oppressive and emancipatory potential of values, assumptions, and practices in psychology Oppressive Emancipatory Values for Personal well-being When belief in individualism When belief in self-determination leads to self-blame leads to personal empowerment Relational well-being When participatory processes When participatory processes obstruct social action and afford voice and choice mask inequality Collective well-being When the good of the When bargaining powers, resources collective comes at the and obligations in society are shared expense of individual needs equitably Assumptions about Good life When success and failure When meaning is ascribed to are ascribed to personal interdependence merit alone Power in relationships When power differentials When power differentials are are ignored or reproduced acknowledged and dealt with Practices regarding Problem definition When pathologize When deblame Role of client When promote passivity When promote empowerment Role of psychologist When arrogate power When share power Type of intervention When intra-psychic When oppressive social conditions interventions ignore social are addressed conditions with the nature of the problems that are faced in a given - but parametrically variable -situation. The contingent nature of the contribution that values make is important to seize. The outcomes of practices can be rarely dichotomized into oppressive or emancipatory. However, certain discourses and procedures are more likely to lead to one outcome or another. When psychologists ignore social and political antecedents of problems, and when they arrogate power, they are more likely to abide by the reigning and oppressive status quo. Empowering practices, on the other hand, strive to raise consciousness about the societal origins of problems and seek to share power. Social ideals of equality cannot be pursued in relations that promote inequality. The way we do things is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself. Hence, we do not accept domination in therapeutic relationships, however minimal, strategic or momentary. implementation challenges In the first two chapters of the book we have outlined our approach to critical psychology. Although we have presented views from various authors and orientations within critical psychology, we readily acknowledge that our philosophy may not represent all the varieties of critical psychology. Ours is an applied orientation that seeks to promote personal and social change to attain health and welfare. We resonate with Reicher's (1997) challenge for critical psychologists (94): 'If we are to be successful in being taken seriously, we must ask how critical psychology can supply not only a set of ideas but also a set of practices'. We also readily acknowledge the danger of jumping to interventions before we are clear about our own limitations. The concepts outlined in this part of the book reflect our intellectual and political commitments. As such, they are circumscribed to our heritage, knowledge and identity. Our challenge is to promote action and to remain open to challenge at the same time. We dedicate the next two parts of the book to training and applications. We use the framework of values, assumptions and practices for doing psychology critically in diverse mainstream settings.