The Virtue of Multiculturalism
Personal Transformation, Character, and Openness to the Other
Blaine J. Fowers and Barbara J. Davidov
University of Miami
The social, intellectual, and moral movement known as
multiculturalism has been enormously influential in psychology.
Its ability to reshape psychology has been due to
its ethical force, which derives from the attractiveness of its
aims of inclusion, social justice, and mutual respect. The
cultivation of cultural competence, presented as a developmental
process of acquiring self-awareness, cultural
knowledge, and skills, is an important emphasis in the
multicultural literature. The authors place the cultural
competence literature in dialogue with virtue ethics (a
contemporary ethical theory derived from Aristotle) to
develop a rich and illuminating way for psychologists to
understand and embody the personal self-examination,
commitment, and transformation required for learning and
practicing in a culturally competent manner. According to
virtue ethics, multiculturalism can be seen as the pursuit of
worthwhile goals that require personal strengths or virtues,
knowledge, consistent actions, proper motivation, and
practical wisdom. The authors term the virtue of multiculturalism
openness to the other and conclude by describing
how attention to cultural matters also transforms virtue
ethics in important and necessary ways.
Keywords: multicultural, cultural competence, character,
virtue
The social, intellectual, and moral movement known
as multiculturalism has had a tremendous impact in
psychology. Psychologists continue to revise training
models, service delivery, and research endeavors to
address the concerns raised by this movement (American
Psychological Association [APA], 2002, 2003). Multiculturalism
is, appropriately, a multivocal movement, and it is
impossible to capture the full range of perspectives in a
single article. For this reason, we focus on multicultural
counseling and therapy. Although there are many viewpoints
in this area as well, a significant center of gravity has
emerged around the three-component developmental
model of cultural competence comprising awareness,
knowledge, and skills. Multicultural experts first articulated
this model over 20 years ago (APA, 1993; Arredondo et al.,
1996; Sue, Arredondo, & McDavis, 1992; Sue et al., 1982),
and it evolved into the APA’s (2003) “Guidelines on Multicultural
Education, Training, Research, Practice, and Organizational
Change for Psychologists” (henceforth referred
to as the Multicultural Guidelines).
Discussions of the multicultural movement in general,
and of cultural competence in particular, frequently emphasize
the ways that unreconstructed therapeutic theory and
practice are harmful to ethnic minorities by contributing to
their oppression and marginalization. For example, Sue and
Sue (2003) stated,
Counseling and psychotherapy have done great harm to culturally
diverse groups by invalidating their life experiences, by defining
their cultural values or differences as deviant and pathological, by
denying them culturally appropriate care, and by imposing the
values of the dominant culture upon them. (p. 8)
This emphasis on reducing harm exemplifies the deeply
ethical intent of multicultural perspectives. This ethical
core is also clear in the positive aims that this movement
promotes: social understanding, inclusion, affirmation, and
harmony in a pluralistic world. The core of this movement
is a principled ethical argument that a monocultural psychology
is not simply less accurate or generalizable, but
positively distortive and oppressive. Multiculturalists stress
that failure to appreciate the importance of cultural identity
and to combat oppression do not merely render psychology’s
promotion of human welfare less effective. Rather,
multiculturalists argue persuasively that such ethical failings
undermine the very legitimacy of psychology (Arredondo,
1999; Comas-Dı´az, 2000; Pedersen & Ivey, 1993;
Sue & Sue, 2003). Therefore, understanding the ethical
bases of the multicultural outlook is crucial to comprehending
both its power and its limitations (Fowers & Richardson,
1996).
The Multicultural Guidelines (APA, 2003, p. 379)
strongly state the ethical argument for cultural competence
by reference to the principles of the APA Ethics Code:
Psychologists are called on “to be competent to work with
a variety of populations (Principle A), to respect others’
rights (Principle D), to be concerned to not harm others
(Principle E), and to contribute to social justice (Principle
F . . .).” Although multicultural authors frequently make
reference to the Ethical Principles of Psychologists in this
way, there is no systematic, well-articulated theory of ethBlaine
J. Fowers and Barbara J. Davidov, Department of Educational and
Psychological Studies, University of Miami.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Blaine
J. Fowers, Department of Educational and Psychological Studies, P.O.
Box 248065, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124. E-mail:
bfowers@miami.edu
581September 2006 ● American Psychologist
Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association 0003-066X/06/$12.00
Vol. 61, No. 6, 581–594 DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.61.6.581
ics for the multicultural movement. These writers generally
state the ethical underpinnings of this movement simply in
terms of avoiding harm and injustices or as a matter of
providing effective service.
One of the purposes of this article is to explore the
resources of a systematic and well-articulated ethical theory
for enriching and enhancing psychology’s responsiveness
to cultural concerns. As we have noted above, multiculturalism
is a deeply ethical movement. Psychologists’
ability to work toward the ethical aims of multiculturalism
and to teach their students to do so will be significantly
strengthened by the development of an explicit and systematic
ethical theory for multiculturalism.
Although there are many ethical theories that could be
fruitfully engaged for this purpose, we see virtue ethics as
particularly illuminating for cultivating cultural competence
because of its emphasis on personal transformation
and developing the personal strengths that allow one to
pursue multiculturalism’s worthwhile aims. No doubt, others
could make a good case for the benefits of Kantian,
utilitarian, Buddhist, or other perspectives, and we would
welcome such endeavors. We focus on virtue ethics in this
article to allow us to explore, in some depth, how its rich
conception of social and moral relations can provide a deep
and nuanced ethical theory for multiculturalism. We are not
proposing virtue ethics as a substitute for multicultural
viewpoints. Rather, we suggest that viewing multiculturalism
through the lens of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics
through the lens of multicultural thought, can illuminate
and enrich both perspectives.
There has been a strong revival of interest in virtue
ethics in moral philosophy (Hursthouse, 1999; Sherman,
1989), and character has garnered increasing interest
among psychologists (Fowers, 2005; Keyes & Haidt, 2003;
Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Snyder & McCullough, 2001).
Virtue ethics is a theory of ethics that centers on the
concept of human flourishing, which is the full expression
of our humanity. Virtues are the character strengths that are
necessary for flourishing, and a primary emphasis of virtue
ethics is the cultivation of these character strengths as the
pathway for ethical action. In virtue ethics, acting rightly
grows out of good character, which contrasts with principle-based
ethics, in which acting rightly amounts to following
principles or rules. Contrasts of the two ethical
theories tend to be lengthy and can be found elsewhere
(Hursthouse, 1999; Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996; Slote,
1995). Although Aristotle’s (ca 330 BCE/1998) The Nicomachean
Ethics is the primary source for virtue ethicists,
his thought has been modified and supplemented in important
ways to render it consistent with contemporary sensibilities
(Fowers, 2005; Hursthouse, 1999; MacIntyre, 1981;
McDowell, 1996; Sherman, 1989; Wiggins, 1980).
We also show how the virtue framework highlights
other crucial aspects of multiculturalism that have not
received sufficient attention. For example, we suggest that
personal transformation is central to multicultural training.
Virtue ethics provides a deep and illuminating account of
this personal transformation and places this individual experience
within the context of the collective effort to
achieve the goods associated with a greater appreciation of
diversity in our profession and society.
Another potential contribution of virtue ethics to multiculturalism
is that the virtue perspective emphasizes the
powerful connection between what a profession sees as
worthwhile (e.g., psychological well-being) and the personal
strengths that professionals need to pursue that good.
There is an intrinsic relationship between the aims we seek
and the personal characteristics necessary for this pursuit.
In broad terms, psychotherapy clients come to therapists
seeking relief from their psychological pain. They reveal
their pain to therapists, making themselves vulnerable.
Good psychotherapists respond to this suffering and vulnerability
with skill and knowledge, but the value of their
interventions is strongly dependent on the care and concern
they demonstrate. This caring response is characteristic and
habitual for good therapists. In other words, such therapists
have the character strength of compassion (cf. Drane, 1994;
Meara et al., 1996). Within normal human limits, if a
therapist is not reliably compassionate, one would have
questions about how well that therapist is suited to the
profession.
Similarly, in order to pursue the aims of multiculturalism
(e.g., inclusion), a psychologist has to be characteristically
open-minded toward and interested in various dimensions
of diversity. Thus, a culturally competent
therapist is one who acts knowledgeably and consistently
with openness to the other. We argue that openness to the
other is a character strength for two reasons. First, it is
necessary for pursuing multicultural aims successfully.
Second, to be culturally competent, one must be able to
interact consistently with sensitivity to cultural differences.
Blaine J.
Fowers
582 September 2006 ● American Psychologist
Because this openness is often hard-won, we focus particularly
on the personal transformation and growth that multiculturalism
calls on us to undertake. Multicultural training
and practice are thus oriented toward bringing out the best
in psychologists and their students rather than settling for
rule following or the possession of a set of skills that may
or may not be used. We have no doubt that many multiculturalists
agree with this emphasis on becoming a better
human being through multiculturalism. The virtue framework
crystallizes and concentrates on the elevating aspects
of multiculturalism, whereas the language of cultural competency
refers to this elevation obliquely.
Multiculturalism also challenges virtue ethics in a
very productive manner. Conceptions of virtue are invariably
culture bound to some degree, in spite of commonalities
among various accounts of good character. One of the
important questions in contemporary virtue ethics is its
capacity to accommodate pluralism. Systematically integrating
multiculturalism into modern virtue ethics requires
significant alterations in virtue ethics to accommodate
openness to cultural differences and pluralism. We conclude
the article by outlining the intriguing and significant
possibilities afforded by such a transformation of virtue
ethics.
Modern Qualms About Virtue
There are many differences between multiculturalism and
virtue ethics. One apparent, but deceptive, difference is that
virtue ethics is sometimes seen as belonging to the political
right and multiculturalism to the political left (Bernstein,
1994; Wolfe, 2001). If we accept such polarizing political
simplifications, we severely constrain the contributions of
both perspectives. At their best, multiculturalism and virtue
ethics have much to say to people across the political
spectrum about how to enrich and deepen their personal
and professional lives.
Virtue is often misconstrued as a religious concept or
frequently seen as a Christian framework. We present
virtue ethics from a secular viewpoint, relying on classical
sources (primarily Aristotle’s [ca 330 BCE/1998] The
Nicomachean Ethics) rather than contemporary political or
religious doctrines. Virtue concepts have been articulated
and practiced in many cultures and times, including in
historical warrior societies such as that of the Lakota
(Sioux) and the Homeric Greeks, in Eastern traditions such
as Buddhism and Confucianism, and in more recent Jewish,
Christian, and Victorian traditions (Aquinas, 1273/1952;
MacIntyre, 1981; Woodruff, 2001). Each of these traditions
can provide helpful perspectives on virtue, but we have
chosen to focus on Aristotle for several reasons. The most
important is that Aristotle (ca 330 BCE/1998) presented a
systematic, wide-ranging, subtle, and powerful account of
virtue. He was the originator of virtue theory in Western
civilization, and all subsequent Western theorists of virtue
owe a large debt to his views. A flood of recent scholarly
attention to Aristotelian virtue ethics has made it more
accessible and applicable to contemporary concerns. It is,
however, clear to us that Aristotle does not have the last
word, and one of our aims is to examine virtue ethics
critically to ascertain which alterations are necessary to
more fully incorporate a multicultural perspective.
One way to see the necessity of amending Aristotle’s
ethics is in the importance of acknowledging, but disavowing,
Aristotle’s views on men and women and on slavery.
He saw men as morally superior to women by nature and
accepted slavery. Ancient authors saw the inequality between
men and women and a nonracial form of slavery as
part of the natural social order, and they rarely questioned
these notions. In the contemporary world, we rightly repudiate
the ancient world’s views on these injustices, but it is
anachronistic to expect Aristotle to have done so. Although
his views on women and slavery are unacceptable, they do
not disqualify his work as a whole, because these views are
not integral to his account of the virtues. Contemporary
discussions of virtue (including ours) unequivocally assume
the equality of men and women and the unacceptability
of slavery or exploitation. In this way, contemporary
sensibilities about diversity have already helped to reformulate
virtue ethics.
Indeed, this is one of the ways in which we see that
Aristotle did not have the last word on ethical questions.
We can fruitfully reinterpret and reappropriate his ethical
views—while repudiating his views on inequality—and
pursue a dialogue between virtue ethics and multiculturalism.
We are presenting an Aristotelian ethical framework
as a beginning point to explore how virtue ethics might be
helpful in multicultural theory, practice, and training. If the
intersection of these viewpoints seems fruitful, then further
exploration of multiple virtue perspectives will enrich this
conversation.
Barbara J.
Davidov
583September 2006 ● American Psychologist
A Virtue Ethics Framework for
Multiculturalism
We describe six central features of virtue and show how
these features encompass and illuminate important aspects
of multiculturalism and deepen our understanding of them.
According to virtue ethics, living well is (a) animated by
the pursuit of worthwhile goods (or goals) that (b) require
personal strengths or virtues that are (c) informed by
knowledge of virtues, (d) expressed through consistent
actions, (e) motivated by a wholehearted desire to seek the
goods, and (f) pursued wisely. In the best kind of actions,
these elements combine seamlessly to promote human
flourishing. Each of these six elements of virtue is essential
in Aristotle’s views on human flourishing and virtue.
Promoting multiculturalism undoubtedly engages us
in the pursuit of worthwhile goods. Embracing cultural
differences surely requires strength of character, which we
term openness to the other, knowledge about openness to
the other (including the general and specific aspects of
culture that inform openness and make it possible), and
consistent action along the lines of this knowledge, action
that is motivated by an unconflicted respect and interest in
those who are culturally different from oneself and that is
guided by wise choices. In what follows, we examine how
these six features of virtue ethics provide an illuminating
framework for enhancing our engagement with cultural
differences and fostering excellence in multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism’s Pursuit of Worthwhile
Goods
Aristotle (ca 330 BCE/1998) began his primary ethical
work The Nicomachean Ethics as follows: “Every art and
every simple inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit,
is thought to aim at some good” (p. 1). Virtue ethics
emphasizes that our actions are aimed at bringing some
good or goal into being. One of the key aspects of developing
good character is to adopt worthwhile goals (e.g.,
psychological well-being, inclusion) as one’s own. The
goals that individuals espouse and pursue help to define
them as one kind of person or another. Persons of good
character are naturally attracted to aims that are seen as
worthwhile within a profession or community. (Later we
discuss the possibility that individuals, communities, and
professions can be misguided regarding their aims.) Because
they have taken on these aims, these individuals
spontaneously act to bring their goals into being. Virtue
ethics underlines the connection between attraction to
worthwhile aims and spontaneous and consistent action on
behalf of those goals. This connection can enhance our
multicultural teaching by focusing it on the goods we want
to bring about and reminding us to present multicultural
aims in ways that inspire students to embrace them.
Advocates of multiculturalism propose a number of
goods toward which the movement aims. Our success in
training for and maintaining culturally competent practice
in psychology is dependent on our clarity about these goals.
In particular, as virtue ethicists frequently emphasize, the
better we understand what is good, the more we will be
inspired to pursue that good in a wholehearted or unconflicted
manner.
The Multicultural Guidelines (APA, 2003) nicely
summarize the goals of multicultural training as promoting
“respect and inclusiveness for the national heritage of all
cultural groups” (p. 382) and the development of a culturally
informed psychology in which psychologists
assume the responsibility for contributing to the advancement of
cultural knowledge, sensitivity, and understanding. In other
words, psychologists are in a position to provide leadership as
agents of prosocial change, advocacy, and social justice, thereby
promoting societal understanding, affirmation, and appreciation
of multiculturalism against the damaging effects of individual,
institutional, and societal racism, prejudice, and all forms of
oppression based on stereotyping and discrimination. . . . Psychologists
are uniquely able to promote racial equity and social
justice. (p. 382)
Clearly, multiculturalism has a deeply ethical agenda,
promoting social goods including mutual understanding,
mutual affirmation, cooperation, inclusion, equity, and social
justice (Sue et al., 1998). It is easy to see how such
attractive goals have inspired arduous and heartfelt efforts
in reforming psychology and society, particularly if one
contrasts these goals with their opposites (prejudice, discrimination,
oppression, and injustice). Virtue ethics highlights
the way in which the worthiness of these multicultural
goods inspires devotion to them. Understanding the
capacity of the multicultural movement to transform the
power structure of psychology and society requires a recognition
of the attractiveness of these goods to individuals
from the majority culture (Fowers & Richardson, 1996). It
is also important to recognize that there is a plurality of
goods, which are sometimes consistent and sometimes conflicting
both within particular communities and across communities,
which we discuss in the final section.
The Character Strength Necessary for
Seeking Multicultural Ends
Pursuing worthy goals such as mutual affirmation, inclusion,
and equity requires the capacity to recognize and
appreciate differences in cultural beliefs and practices. Psychologists
can promote these goals only if we develop the
capacity to be open to those who differ from us culturally.
This openness to the other is a character strength or virtue
because it is intrinsically tied to the ability to promote the
aims of multiculturalism, and psychologists have to be
open to the other consistently to pursue these goals. We
believe that the cultivation of this openness is a key aspect
of multicultural training.
Multiculturalists understand that the virtue of openness
to the other is generally not naturally present in
individuals and is often at variance with previous socialization.
Racism, ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and other ingroup
biases are commonly internalized as individuals are
enculturated into cultural, racial, religious, and other wellestablished
groups (Fiske, 1998; Hewstone, Rubin, & Wil-
584 September 2006 ● American Psychologist
lis, 2002; Triandis, 1994). The alteration of the psychological
and social bases of this in-group bias that is necessary
for multicultural training and practice requires sustained
and strenuous efforts. Training in multicultural therapy
aims to replace these biases with cultural competence,
which many authors conceive of in a three-part model
comprising self-awareness, knowledge, and skills. Multicultural
training is, in part, the process of transforming
internalized ethnocentrism by accepting the cultural relativity
of one’s worldview.
Sue and Sue (2003) defined the first component of
cultural competence, personal awareness, by saying that “a
culturally competent helping professional is one who is
active in the process of becoming aware of his or her own
assumptions about human behavior, values, biases, preconceived
notions, personal limitations, and so forth” (pp.
17–18). This means that good multicultural practice begins
with active self-exploration, which leads to self-awareness
of one’s personal and culturally inherited understandings
(APA, 2003; Comas-Dı´az, 2000; Pope-Davis & Dings,
1995). Pedersen and Ivey (1993) believe that cultural
awareness is essential because it “helps people become
aware of the intentional priority they give to selected attitudes,
opinions, and values. They are able to compare and
contrast their own viewpoint with alternative points of view
accurately” (p. 20). This awareness allows an individual to
recognize that his or her worldview is an internalization of
a particular cultural perspective rather than universal truth.
The process of becoming aware of one’s values, biases,
and limitations is no mere cataloging of sources of
error but the starting point for self-exploration and personal
transformation through which psychologists learn to recognize
the way that their own experiences, heritage, and
standpoints influence how they see themselves and others.
Cultural self-exploration teaches us that our perspectives
are limited, partial, and relative to our own backgrounds.
We learn the distressing fact that all of the taken-forgranted,
obviously true presumptions and practices that we
absorbed in our enculturation are part of one worldview
among many and open to question from many different
standpoints. During this prolonged and unsettling process
of recognizing the cultural relativity of our cherished convictions,
we must give up the comforting ethnocentrism,
sense of cultural superiority, and unrecognized privilege
that is often part of our untutored cultural outlook (APA,
2003; Cushman, 2001; Kiselica, 1998). The goal of multiculturalism
is not to undermine allegiance to one’s own
social group but to clarify that others have similarly legitimate
commitments to their own ways of life that are
worthy of respect. Nevertheless, surrendering ethnocentrism
involves the loss of a sense of cultural superiority and
centrality that might engender genuine grief and dislocation.
It also entails “owning up to painful realities about
oneself, our group, and our society” (Sue et al., 1998, p.
61). Therefore, this process requires “an unusual level of
openness and sensitivity toward personal and professional
change” (Daniels & D’Andrea, 1996, p. 169).
This personal transformation involves confronting
“the emotional impact of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings
associated with cultural differences” particularly the responsibility
we might have for a “racist, oppressive, and
discriminating manner” of “deal[ing] with persons of color
. . . . Culturally competent therapists accept responsibility
for their own racism, sexism, and so forth and attempt to
deal with them in a nondefensive, guilt-free manner” (Sue
& Sue, 2003, pp. 18–19). The psychological processes of
categorization and a favorable bias toward members of
one’s own group are relatively automatic and tend to operate
below conscious awareness (Brewer & Brown, 1998;
Fiske, 1998; Hewstone et al., 2002). This means that it
requires significant effort to come to recognize those biases,
some discomfort in setting them aside, and ongoing
exertion and practice to change one’s perceptions and actions
(APA, 2003). In describing his personal experience as
a White psychologist working toward cultural competence,
Kiselica (1998) noted that even “deciding whether to engage
in multicultural training can be unsettling and anxiety
provoking” (p. 6). He found that the actual experience of
“cross-cultural education and counseling can spark serious
introspection . . . [and] painful self-discovery” and that
“achieving a nonracist, White identity typically involves a
long and painful process” on the way to “significantly
positive personal and professional growth” (pp. 6–8). Sue
et al. (1992) added that cultural competence requires individuals
to engage in an ongoing process of “constantly
seeking to understand themselves as racial and cultural
beings and . . . actively seeking a nonracist identity” (p.
482, italics added). In other words, cultural competence
involves profound changes in our self-understanding and
sense of who we are.
The Multicultural Guidelines suggest many strategies
for personal transformation, including “increased contact
with other groups”; cultivating empathy for culturally different
others; “actively seeing individuals as individuals
rather than as members of a group”; changing “the perception
of us versus them to we or . . . [recategorizing] the
out-group as members of the in-group”; and actively working
toward “increasing . . . [one’s] tolerance” (APA, 2003,
p. 384). All of these strategies are effortful, continuous
activities that require psychologists to counteract deeply
entrenched socialization experiences and relatively automatic
psychological processes over a significant period and
adopt a more inclusive standpoint.
The authors of the Multicultural Guidelines acknowledged
that culture-centered training “moves into what is
viewed as more personal domains” and introduces “material
many students have never thought about, may not care
about, and may have reluctance to engage in” (APA, 2003,
p. 387). Given the arduousness of this process and the
demands of questioning one’s lifelong loyalty to and the
presumed universality of one’s cultural worldview, trainees
and psychologists frequently fear making these difficult
changes and resist them (Jackson, 1999; Kiselica, 1998;
Mio & Awakuni, 2000; Sue et al., 1998). For this reason,
585September 2006 ● American Psychologist
Arredondo (1999) clarified that it takes “courage to change
and to work cross-culturally” (p. 104).
The process of developing cultural competence does
not have an end point (Pedersen & Ivey, 1993; Sue et al.,
1982). Sue and Sue (2003) asserted that it is necessary to
continue “to explore and learn about issues related to
various minority groups throughout [one’s] professional
career” (p. 21). In discussing the prevalence of covert,
unintentional racism, Mio (Mio & Awakuni, 2000) disclosed
an incident in which he expressed this form of
racism. He then related, “I have to be continually vigilant,
or my covert, unintentional racism will . . . become insidiously
ingrained in me . . . if something that I think or do is
pointed out as unintentionally racist, I will immediately
attempt to eliminate it from my repertoire of responses” (p.
22, italics added). This disclosure suggests that even someone
as well-versed as Mio has to be vigilant and active in
eliminating racist thoughts or actions. His willingness to do
so immediately and wholeheartedly exemplifies the character
excellence we are discussing in this article.
This extensive and ongoing self-transformation process
involves the trainee in very personally significant
ways, and it clearly parallels the cultivation of character
strengths. Aristotle (ca 330 BCE/1998) described the process
of learning character strengths such as honesty, courage,
or justice in very similar terms: “Neither by nature,
then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather
we are adapted by nature to receive them, and [they] are
made perfect by habit” (p. 28). This learning requires
teaching, feedback, modeling, and guidance from those
who already exhibit the character strength. One acquires
character strengths intentionally, through gradual efforts,
by practicing them, by identifying and counteracting contrary
desires, by altering one’s cognitions in line with one’s
knowledge about the virtue, and by becoming the kind of
person who habitually engages in these cognitions and
actions.
One begins by acting and thinking in the ways that
persons of good character do. These thoughts and actions
become habitual through doing them again and again,
which results in all of this becoming second nature. As a
result, individuals of character identify with these traits,
rather than merely acting as if they were honest, courageous,
or open to the other. Virtues are known as character
strengths because acquiring a virtue means making it characteristic
of oneself. The spontaneous enactment of generosity,
honesty, courage, or openness to the other is a
hallmark of virtue that grows out of making these traits
second nature (i.e., internalizing them). We suggest that
cultural competence, or openness to the other, is a character
strength, because developing it so closely matches the
character development process. Becoming a person who is
characteristically open to the other requires us to elevate,
intentionally and substantially, the kind of persons that we
are through self-transformation. Significant character development
can occur in a relatively brief period of time, but
developing character strength and cultural competence require
ongoing attention and effort throughout one’s life.
Experts in cultural competence have always described it as
a long-term, aspirational aim. Seeing cultural competence
as a character strength is quite consistent with the conceptualization
of cultural competence “as a developmental
life-long process” that does not have an end point (Sue et
al., 1998, p. 31).
Knowledge Informing Openness to the Other
One of the key ways to change oneself as a cultural being
is to learn to understand culture and cultural interaction in
new ways. Sue and Sue (2003) discussed the second component
of cultural competence in terms of psychologists’
knowledge about clients’ cultural worldviews, cultural politics,
and institutional barriers to good services. Although
multiculturalists have debated which types of knowledge
are most important, there is wide agreement that cultural
competence is dependent on having some knowledge of
cultural questions and practices. We cannot do justice to
the robust literature on the knowledge base for culturally
competent professionals, so we will have to be content
simply to mention some of the key topics and refer interested
readers to the extensive literatures on these issues.
We touch on two forms of knowledge: general knowledge
relating to cultural variation, interaction, and politics and
specific knowledge about the cultural groups with which
one is professionally engaged.
Some of the key aspects of general knowledge involve
understanding the workings of discrimination, prejudice,
and oppression and the ways that cultural bias has permeated
society and the mental health professions (ComasDı´az,
2000; Ivey, 1995; Sue & Sue, 2003). For example,
Sue and Sue (2003) asserted that culturally competent
therapists “should understand the value assumptions (normality
and abnormality) inherent in the major schools of
therapy and how they may interact with values of the
culturally different” (p. 21).
Sue et al. (1992) emphasized that this knowledge is
not simply informational but is also highly personalized:
Culturally skilled counselors possess knowledge and understanding
about how oppression, racism, discrimination, and stereotyping
affect them personally and in their work. This allows them to
acknowledge their own racist attitudes, beliefs, and feelings.
Although this standard applies to all groups, for White counselors
it may mean that they understand how they may have directly or
indirectly benefited from individual, institutional, and cultural
racism. (p. 482)
Other relevant topics that cultural competence requires
a knowledge of include a general definition of culture,
socialization processes, racial identity formation, the
importance of within-culture variation, the intersection of
multiple ethnic identities, the stigmatizing aspects of membership
in a minority group, immigration, and acculturation
(APA, 2003; Axelson, 1999; Pedersen & Ivey, 1993).
Many authors emphasize the importance of having
specific knowledge about frequently encountered cultural
groups. Commentators frequently caution psychologists to
be careful of exaggerating within-group similarities or be-
586 September 2006 ● American Psychologist
tween-groups differences (Axelson, 1999; Corey, Corey, &
Callanan, 2003; Sue & Sue, 2003) as they gain and use this
understanding of cultural particularity. Nevertheless, obtaining
specific knowledge of the history, experience, cultural
values, and family organizations of cultural groups is
widely seen as essential to cultural competence (Axelson,
1999; Falicov, 1998; Herring, 1999; Hong & Ham, 2001;
Parham, 2002). This knowledge “provides the documentation
and factual information necessary to understand another
culture” (Pedersen & Ivey, 1993, p. 20). This emphasis
is apparent in the many chapters and books devoted to
working with particular ethnic, racial, and cultural groups
(Falicov, 1998; Hong & Ham, 2001; Mio & Awakuni,
2000; Parham, 2002; Sue, Ivey, & Pedersen, 1996; Sue &
Sue, 2003).
It is clear from this extensive literature that culturally
competent practice is crucially dependent on general and
specific knowledge about culture. If we do not have some
grasp of the general workings of culture and of how an
individual’s culture is relevant to his or her behavior, we
are less likely to know what counts as cultural openness.
This knowledge requirement is crucial for any virtue. For
example, courageous or just actions are based, in part, on
an understanding of what counts as courage or justice. If an
individual lacks the relevant knowledge, then attempts to
act courageously, generously, or openly with the other are
likely to be misguided or incomplete (Aristotle, ca 330
BCE/1998). Knowledge about cultural matters helps to
elevate naive goodwill to a solid capacity to reach out to
others across cultural differences. The more one understands
about cultural matters, the more likely one will be
able to act with openness toward others in a consistent and
well-founded manner.
In most respects and in a similar fashion, the cultural
competence model and virtue ethics recognize the importance
of knowledge to acting in the best ways. The contribution
that a virtue perspective can make to an understanding
of the role that knowledge plays in good practice is to
highlight the transformative aspect of knowledge. The
transformative power of knowledge is mentioned in many
writings on cultural competence, but authors often understate
it somewhat, describing knowledge more as a possession
or a resource at the disposal of the practitioner. Virtue
ethics zeroes in on the ways that knowledge transforms
psychologists and encourages us to gain and teach the kind
of knowledge that makes us better professionals. For example,
knowledge as a possession allows a psychologist to
recognize racial inequity in a detached way, whereas transformative
knowledge also motivates a psychologist to act to
redress the inequity in service of the individual’s deep
commitment to racial equity. Transformative knowledge
elevates one’s character in such a way that redressing
injustice is seen as the sensible action to take when individuals
or organizations perpetrate inequity. We suggest
that transformative knowledge captures and underscores
what is best in multiculturalism, and the virtue ethics
emphasis on cultivating good character through transformative
knowledge helps to highlight this crucial idea in
multicultural practice.
From a virtue ethics perspective, the best kind of
knowledge transforms individuals through shaping their
characters. This knowledge provides psychologists with an
understanding of what is significant about cultural matters
and helps us gain the maturity to recognize that our heritages
do not provide final or universal truth. Through the
internalization of transformative knowledge, psychologists
can become the kind of persons who consistently and
knowledgeably act with openness to the other.
Openness to the Other in Consistent Action
This consistency in action is highlighted in the third (skills)
component of cultural competence, which describes the
psychologist as “actively developing and practicing appropriate,
relevant, and sensitive intervention strategies and
skills in working with his or her culturally different client”
(Sue & Sue, 2003, p. 18). No amount of knowledge by
itself is sufficient for cultural competence without action.
Sue and Sue emphasized this in their description of all three
key characteristics (self-awareness, knowledge, and skills)
of culturally competent professionals, because each of the
three elements prominently features the term actively. They
clearly wanted to call attention to the personal involvement
and behavioral enactment of this capacity. Arredondo
(1999) clarified the centrality of action succinctly: “It is at
the intervention level that the true test of competency lies”
(p. 104). The Multicultural Guidelines (APA, 2003) similarly
emphasize actively learning, teaching, practicing, and
researching the cultural dimension of psychology.
The necessity of action shows another parallel with
virtue in that there is no such thing as a virtuous thought or
feeling that is unaccompanied by behavior. It would be
laughable to claim that one had courageous feelings in the
absences of behavioral bravery or that one had generous
thoughts without following through with generous actions.
In the same way, openness to the other is only real when
one enacts it.
Experts on multiculturalism devote significant attention
to the development of skills. This emphasis is a way to
bring the self-awareness and cultural knowledge into effective
professional activity. This raises important questions.
What do we mean by skills? Can we adequately
describe and teach cultural competence in terms of behavioral
capacities, or do we need to conceptualize cultural
competence in terms that involve the person of the psychologist
in a more thorough way? Virtue ethics suggests
the latter and provides a rich language for description,
exploration, and teaching of the virtue of openness to the
other.
Multicultural specialists have a variety of views on the
nature of skills, ranging from recommending very general
capacities (Sue & Sue, 2003), to suggesting that the generic
practical skills psychologists learn may require “culturecentered
adaptations” (APA, 2003, p. 390), to outlining
rather specific capabilities (Arredondo et al., 1996; Pedersen
& Ivey, 1993). These authors generally see skills as
587September 2006 ● American Psychologist
being integrated with personal awareness and cultural
knowledge, but their discussions of culturally competent
actions tend to focus on intervention skills and strategies,
and these terms do not do justice to the depth of personal
involvement required for cultural competence. One of the
ways that a virtue ethics framework can contribute to the
aims of multicultural thought is by providing a richer
description of how awareness, knowledge, and action are
intertwined in the practice of excellences such as openness
to the other.
On the one hand, there are advantages to limiting
cultural competence to observable behaviors or skills.
American professional psychology is comfortable with the
concept of behavioral skills because behaviors appear to be
specifiable, which confers on them a sense of objectivity
that is favored in this psychology tradition. Behaviors are
relatively easy to describe, teach, and measure in a systematic
manner, and one can identify competence criteria for
them.
On the other hand, despite the advantages of seeing
cultural competence in terms of behavioral skills that one
possesses, this description may be too thin and superficial
to capture fully the richness and depth involved in cultivating
cultural competence. As we described above, cultural
competence frequently requires significant personal
transformation, shifts in self-understanding, and changes in
motivation and affect regarding cultural issues. We suggest
that a character development approach captures the richness
and personally transformative aspects of cultural competence
more fully than a straightforward skills perspective.
At its best, cultural competence involves becoming a
particular kind of person or developing one’s character
toward excellence in responding to cultural matters. In
other words, cultural competence is not simply the possession
of self-knowledge, information about culture, and
behavioral capacities that may or may not alter the psychologist
as a person. Rather, one must internalize and
embody this knowledge in a profound way, making it part
of one’s character, not just an addition to one’s behavioral
repertoire. This transformation of character makes it possible
for psychologists to extend respect and affirmation to
people with various heritages spontaneously and reliably
and to do so in an informed and appropriate manner.
Multiculturalists are calling on us not just to improve our
therapeutic technique but to elevate our humanity. We
believe that multicultural specialists are advocating significant
personal transformation and involvement in becoming
and acting in a culturally competent manner and that
the language of skills and strategy does not do justice to
these aims.
One way to see that cultural competence involves
more than the possession of knowledge and behavioral
capacity is to focus on Sue et al.’s (1992) suggestion that
culturally competent professionals “are comfortable with
differences that exist between themselves and clients in
terms of race, ethnicity, culture, and beliefs” (p. 482).
These authors were not suggesting mere tolerance of or
skilled forbearance with others but rather an unconstrained
involvement with those who are culturally different and an
awareness of those differences. This comfort goes beyond
the cognitive and behavioral elements of skills and directly
involves an affective/motivational set that grows out of a
heartfelt appreciation of and interest in cultural differences.
Being comfortable with people from various cultural
heritages does not involve a repudiation or disregard for
one’s own background. Rather, it is the ability to value
one’s own cultural commitments and to be comfortable
with those who do not share those convictions and practices.
This ease with cultural difference is a mark of the
profound maturity that allows one to be fully committed to
a way of life without insisting on its ultimate superiority or
universal truth value. This maturity and depth of internalization
goes well beyond what is required for learning
behavioral strategies and involves the entire person of the
psychologist in a way that is described much better from a
character development perspective than a behavioral skills
perspective. This deep internalization of cultural relativity
replaces the individual’s natural ethnocentricity (Fiske,
1998; Triandis, 1994) and the naturally powerful loyalty
toward the individual’s own culture (Fowers, 2001), which
is why personal transformation is so essential to openness
to the other. Of course, navigating the tensions and ambiguities
of cultural differences with particular clients is very
complex. Our general statements here about maturity in
matters of culture are only gestures pointing at how therapists
can maintain their own cultural identities and intervene
within other cultural systems in a respectful and
knowledgeable way.
Perhaps most important to note is that if behavioral
skills were independent of the goals to which they were
applied and of the kind of person who used them, then any
technique, including culture-centered skills, could be used
for any end, not just to benefit clients and not necessarily in
a culturally respectful way. In other words, if skills and
motives are separable, therapists who are not genuinely
committed to multiculturalism could use their cultural
skills to manipulate clients, to induce them to conform to
the therapist’s views more effectively, or simply to appear
culturally sensitive. To give a related example, many of the
listening skills (e.g., reflecting feelings, validation) that
were developed to assist in psychotherapy have become
standard methods used by customer service personnel to
calm and mollify unhappy customers whether the objectives
of the customer service personnel are consistent with
the customer’s best interests or not.
We are not suggesting that any multicultural authors
would condone the manipulative or exploitive use of cultural
competence. In fact, they take great pains to emphasize
that the proper motivation is a crucial element of
cultural competence, as we show below. The central point
here is that unless we explicitly address cultural competence
at the level of character, we encourage the separation
of behavioral strategies from multicultural goals that opens
the door to such manipulation. Advocates of cultural competence
do not want to equip just anyone with techniques
for working effectively with those who are culturally dif-
588 September 2006 ● American Psychologist
ferent from themselves, regardless of the trainee’s motives
and goals. Rather, multicultural trainers want to facilitate
the kind of personal change that leads to a genuine and
consistent openness to those who are culturally different
from oneself and to respectful, beneficial, and mutually
enlightening involvement. If we fail to see that cultural
competence is inseparable from the goals of cultural respect,
affirmation, and social justice, we are just as likely to
train culturally competent manipulators as culturally sensitive
psychologists.
Virtue ethics highlights the essential connections between
person, goal, and action. The character development
model emphasizes that the individual’s goals and motives
are central to acting well (Aristotle, ca 330 BCE/1998). The
pursuit of goals such as cultural respect, affirmation, and
social justice require us to be or become respectful, affirming,
and just individuals, not simply to possess respect,
affirmation, and justice skills. These kinds of goals are
inseparable from acting habitually in ways that embody the
aims. The language of skills and strategies understates
these essential connections. We are suggesting that the
character model provides a better fit to cultural competence
than a purely behavioral skills account can. Of course,
learning and practicing behaviors plays an integral role in
the cultivation of character, but it makes a great deal of
difference whether mastering particular behaviors is the
end point or just part of becoming the kind of person who
spontaneously exhibits cultural competence. A characterbased
approach emphasizes that the only way to be culturally
competent in the way multicultural authors intend is
for psychologists to employ cultural knowledge and behavioral
capacity with the appropriate motives and to act
wholeheartedly in pursuit of the goods of multiculturalism.
Virtue theorists describe character as a settled disposition
to act well—those who act well reliably have character
strengths, but those who do so intermittently do not.
For example, we would not consider someone who gives
money or time episodically, because of an ulterior motive
or under duress, to be generous, whereas an individual who
gives consistently enacts generosity as a character trait.
Although even occasional acts of generosity, loyalty, and
openness to the other are beneficial, we would only consider
them evidence of character when they are part of a
reliable pattern of action that indicates a settled disposition
to pursue what is good. Therefore, at best, culturally competent
actions are more than behavioral capacities drawn
from a repertoire possessed by a psychologist; they are
actions that grow out of a settled disposition to act consistently
with openness to the other. Clearly, our discipline
needs professionals who are genuinely and reliably open to
those who are culturally different from themselves rather
than individuals who have the ability to appear open when
it suits their purposes. For these reasons, culturally competent
actions are more an expression of one’s identity and
deepest commitments than strategies or techniques that one
deploys.
The Motivational/Affective Dimension of
Openness to the Other
Multiculturalists place a great deal of explicit emphasis on
the cognitive and behavioral aspects of culturally competent
practice. Virtue ethics can help us to make the affective
domain, an essential element of character, a more explicit
and informative part of what it means to be open to the
other. As we saw above, wholehearted openness to the
other requires more than having knowledge and acting on
that knowledge. Psychologists can act knowledgeably but
do so out of a grudging compliance. We can also act in a
culturally informed manner but for manipulative purposes.
For this reason, one’s motivation is a crucial element of
professional activity.
Aristotle (ca 330 BCE/1998) and contemporary virtue
ethicists have noted three ways in which being well-motivated
is essential to the best kind of actions. First, character
shows in how well our emotions are aligned with our
actions, and persons of character act well gladly and spontaneously
rather than reluctantly because they have internalized
the goods they are pursuing. Character strength is
evident in this wholehearted way of acting well, because
one acts resolutely, without regret or internal conflict. The
full development of the virtue of openness to the other
would involve being able to engage with culturally different
others with genuine interest and without experiencing
distaste, culturally based distrust, or defensiveness. This
harmony of emotion and action is a necessary component
of the best kind of activity, because our motives for action
and our emotional experience of the activity can either
resonate with and enhance what we are doing or create
disharmony and thereby undermine our actions. The person
of character acts with a clear concordance of emotion,
thought, and action. There may be times when that concordance
is something of an achievement, but this concordance
is what differentiates the person of character from
those who struggle with conflicting motivations and reluctant
compliance.
Second, one of the ways that our emotions reveal the
kind of person we are shows up in the types of things that
elicit feelings of delight or pleasure in us and by the sorts
of things that pain us. To take a simple example, we can
experience fascination and pleasure at learning about the
mores of another culture or we can be put off by the
differences that contrast with our own way of life. Persons
who find pleasure in learning about the worldview and
practices of those who are culturally different from themselves
have made openness to the other a part of their
characters.
Successful persistence in the difficult and prolonged
self-transformation of becoming culturally competent requires
substantial motivation, the source of which highlights
the third way our affective experience is crucial for
character. This motivation grows out of our emotional
attachment to the goods we pursue through our actions.
When we come to recognize a goal as truly worthwhile for
us, we are drawn to it and we naturally desire its achieve-
589September 2006 ● American Psychologist
ment. For example, good scientists act honestly out of love
for truth; good therapists persevere with difficult clients
because they value human flourishing. Thus, when we have
cultivated a love for what is good, we do not have to
struggle with inner conflicts about whether or not to pursue
that good. We want to do what is best wholeheartedly.
Herman (1996) described an architecture of desire in
which our desires and emotions are responsive to reason
and to being shaped by intentional habituation. She suggested
that we can learn to want what our reason tells us is
best. This architecture of desire indicates how we can learn
to respond well to the difficulties of combating racism and
other forms of oppression in ourselves and our profession,
how majority individuals can recognize and relinquish their
privilege, and how we can become genuinely interested in
cultural matters rather than grudgingly responding to those
different from ourselves. The evolution of desire points to
a pathway for acting ethically without oppressing one’s
affective life.
From a virtue ethics standpoint, this desire to act well
grows out of the attractive vision of a world that features
cultural sensitivity, mutual understanding and affirmation,
inclusion, social justice, and the reduction of prejudice and
oppression. Mio and Awakuni (2000) suggested that majority
individuals who become committed to multiculturalism
do so partly from “a sense of moral outrage when they
viewed prejudice and discrimination against others” and a
desire to “help work toward creating a more just world” (p.
67), and some people were taught by their parents “the
importance of fighting prejudice and discrimination” (p.
68). Pursuing these aims requires us to become the kind of
professionals who value these ideals and make them our
own. Promoting multicultural aims becomes, for many,
“simply a part of who they are and they cannot imagine not
engaging in allied behavior”; they “[describe] it as essential
to how they see themselves” (p. 75).
The attention that virtue ethics devotes to emotional
concordance helps us to see how psychologists and trainees
can best be motivated to undergo self-examination and
self-transformation willingly because they are attracted to
worthwhile ideals. From a virtue ethics perspective, teaching
these goals and focusing on the positive goods that we
can attain is crucial to effective training in cultural competence.
We believe that the ultimate goal of this training is
to help trainees become the kind of persons who genuinely
want to embody cultural competence because they see
value in the social aims this competence can enable. Multicultural
authors consistently allude to the harmony of
emotion, motivation, and behavior that virtue ethics
highlights.
Practical Wisdom in Openness to the Other
According to Sue and Sue (2003), “Multicultural counseling
and therapy can be defined as both a helping role and
process that uses modalities and defines goals consistent
with the life experiences and cultural values of clients,
recognizes [the] . . . individual, group, and universal dimensions”
of client identities, uses “universal and culturespecific
strategies and roles . . . , and balances the importance
of individualism and collectivism in the assessment,
diagnosis, and treatment of client and client systems” (p.
16). This vision is admirably broad and encompasses many
important issues and concerns involved in working with
those who are culturally different from oneself. Yet its very
breadth and scope highlight the complexity and ambiguity
of cultural intercourse. The question is, how do we accomplish
these goals? How do we decide which modality to
use, which goals are consistent with our clients’ cultural
values, whether to focus on the individual, group, or universal
dimensions of clients’ identities, or how to balance
individualism and collectivism?
Pedersen and Ivey (1993) raised similar questions
when they defined skill as “being able to do the right thing.
Adequately trained people will have the skills to match the
right method to the right situation in the right way” (p. 18).
Parenthetically, although these authors did not acknowledge
the fact, they were using Aristotle’s standard formulation
to convey that proper action is a matter of getting
one’s motives and actions right for the particular circumstances.
Compare their wording with Aristotle’s (ca 330
BCE/1998) description of the generous individual as one
who “will give to the right people, the right amounts, and
at the right time . . . and that too with pleasure or without
pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from
pain” (p. 80).
How do we get it right in cultural matters? One of the
most challenging aspects of learning cultural competence is
that it is an open-ended process, with virtually no hard and
fast rules about how to relate well to those who differ from
one culturally. The answers that we must painstakingly
work out to these important but difficult questions do not
provide generally valid formulations, because there is so
much variability across and within cultures and between
specific situations. We can become more capable of addressing
cultural questions, but we will never have universally
applicable rules for doing so because there are always
many considerations and nuances associated with each
situation.
Of course, there are general injunctions to respect
others’ viewpoints and to promote intergroup justice, but
the proverbial devil is in the details. Even when we have
relatively clear principles, we must decide how to apply
them in highly specific contexts and with the particular
individuals or concerns with which we are engaged. In each
instance, we must decide what counts as respect with those
whose social practices differ from our own. Even more
problematically, we must work out the meaning of justice
at the confluence of different traditions of fairness or at the
intersection of majority and minority groups.
This complexity is not really new, nor is it particular
to cultural intercourse. Aristotle called attention to the
impossibility of formulating universal rules for acting well
over two millennia ago. Virtue ethics devotes considerable
attention to discerning how to make wise choices and to act
well given the various situations we encounter in the absence
of an algorithm for the ethical life. Aristotle used the
590 September 2006 ● American Psychologist
term practical wisdom to refer to the capacity to recognize
what is important in a situation and to respond well and
fittingly to it. Practical wisdom provides flexibility and
sensitivity in responding to culture. Accordingly, acting
well is not so much a matter of following rules, but of
cultivating excellence in character, from which appropriate
action will naturally ensue. We cannot do justice to the
complex topic of practical wisdom in this article, but we
provide an outline and refer interested readers to more
extensive accounts published elsewhere (Fowers, 2001,
2003, 2005; Sherman, 1989; Wiggins, 1980).
For simplicity’s sake, we describe practical wisdom in
terms of three components even though these elements are
inseparable in practice. The first component is the ability to
see what is important about the particular circumstance we
face, to sort out what is central and what is peripheral so
that we can respond to what is vital rather than being
distracted by less important concerns. Encounters with the
culturally different do not come prelabeled as a particular
sort of occasion, so we must discern what is at stake
through a clear-sighted reading of the circumstances (Sherman,
1989). In other words, we have to recognize that a
particular occasion represents an example of culturally
based miscommunication or offers an opportunity to dialogue
about matters such as acculturation, oppression, identity
development, and so forth.
According to virtue ethics, wisdom grows out of affective
as well as cognitive engagement with our circumstances,
because adequate interpretations of situations are
often only possible when we have certain feelings, whether
those emotions are compassion, anger, love, or revulsion.
Our emotional reactions help to mark out and define the
ethically salient features of the situation. For example,
indignation in the presence of egregious injustice is a
hallmark of recognizing that injustice. The absence of
indignation would suggest an insufficient recognition of the
injustice or an indifference to it. Indeed, we might miss
some of what is truly relevant if we see dispassionately,
without engaging our emotions. Sherman (1989) underlined
the importance of proper emotional engagement by
saying that “without emotions, we do not fully register the
facts or record them with the sort of resonance and importance
that only emotional involvement can sustain” (p. 47).
The second component of practical wisdom is recognizing
how to pursue one’s overall aims in a particular
situation. For example, consider a client who is a recent
immigrant and struggling to obtain a job commensurate
with the training and experience she had in her country of
origin. She presents in a particular session feeling dysphoric
and incompetent following an unsuccessful job interview.
A therapist could attend to intrapsychic aspects of the
dysphoria, to normalizing the frequent demoralization of a
job search, or to cultural factors. Good therapy would likely
involve all three foci, but the trick is to recognize which of
these three foci are appropriate at a particular time. A
therapist who is open to the other will recognize opportunities
for exploring how her job seeking involves cultural
facts (e.g., acculturation, worldviews, or discrimination) so
that she does not attribute her difficulties entirely to her
abilities. When appropriate, helping her to learn bicultural
competencies and to deal with the politics of discrimination
can go a long way toward assisting her in her job search.
The third component is the ability to choose the appropriate
action given the specific situation and the goals
that are relevant to it. Aristotle highlights the fact that when
we choose a course of action, we deliberate about what is
better and worse and select what we think is the best of the
available options (Sherman, 1989).
Wise choices also involve an effort to harmonize our
several ends with what is currently possible. Of course, the
professional objectives we seek are irreducibly heterogeneous
to some extent, and at times, these ends may not be
entirely harmonious. In such cases, we have to assess the
relative importance of our goals and choose the course of
action that best serves the most important ends or that best
incorporates the largest share of our aims. We cannot make
such choices in advance or in the abstract. Rather, we must
engage in careful deliberation about the specific circumstances
we face and about how our goals come into play on
a particular occasion. The more successful we are in fashioning
our professional activities in a pattern of coherent,
mutually supportive endeavors, the less frequently we will
have to choose between them in this way. Some conflict
and tension are inevitable, however, unless we sacrifice
large portions of our professional activities for the sake of
simplicity and freedom from such tension. Good judgment
involves choosing a course of action that best addresses our
most important concerns and best harmonizes our multiple
aims.
The Virtue of Multiculturalism
We can now summarize openness to the other as a character
strength that highlights the essential components of
cultural competence and provides a unifying framework for
training and practice. Psychologists who have cultivated
the character strength of openness to the other recognize
and embody the ethical importance of multiculturalism and
internalize its aims of social justice, cultural respect, and
mutual affirmation. The desirability of these goals motivates
these psychologists to engage in the extensive
self-exploration, self-critique, and personal transformation
required to cultivate openness to the other. These psychologists
act in reliably culturally sensitive ways, and their
professional activities have been transformed by their cultural
self-awareness, knowledge about other cultural
groups, and understanding of general features of culture.
This educational process is ongoing as psychologists continue
to seek knowledge and cultivate habits of action and
affect toward making cultural competence second nature.
As psychologists’ ability to understand and enact culturally
sensitive practices grows, their actions go beyond
simply putting knowledge and behavioral skill into action,
because they engage in respectful, inclusive, and just actions
wholeheartedly, out of a genuine, abiding interest in
cultural matters. In short, successful training would lead
psychologists to become the kind of persons who engage in
591September 2006 ● American Psychologist
culturally competent behavior spontaneously, with heartfelt
desire, and for the best reasons.
Successful multicultural training also helps psychologists
address the complex issues of culture with good
judgment. The wisdom to do so grows out of being able to
understand one’s overall goals, identify what is most important
in a given situation, and choose a response that fits
the circumstances and helps to advance multicultural aims.
We suggest that this construal of the virtue of openness
to the other captures the essential features of multiculturalism
in a systematic, unifying, and enriching way,
one that can contribute to our efforts to train psychologists
to offer the best kinds of services. At the same time, the
virtue of openness to the other also challenges standard
accounts of virtue in interesting and provocative ways that
we now outline.
The Challenge of Pluralism for Virtue
Ethics
Although virtue ethics can be discussed in an abstract
manner, with general statements about formal relationships
among virtues, goods, practical wisdom, and character education,
as we have done in this article, actual virtues and
the good that they serve are always embedded within and
expressions of a historical culture. The catalog of virtues
and goods differs across cultures, as does the specific
meaning of a given virtue. For example, honor held a
prominent position among ancient Greek and Victorian
virtue systems, but contemporary writers do not accord
such importance to honor. As modern readers, we recognize
that Aristotle tied his original account of the virtues to
the limited democracy of the Athenian city state and the
privilege he and his students enjoyed. In this appropriation
of Aristotle’s thought, we have significantly modified his
account to make its application appropriate to contemporary
American society. Accounts of virtue inevitably
change over time along with the evolution of the traditions
in which they are situated.
There is a paradoxical quality to the cultural particularity
of virtue conceptions that is common to all wellestablished
worldviews. Because specific virtue perspectives
represent a particular cultural standpoint, there is
some danger of conservative ethnocentrism (Kitchener,
1996; Vasquez, 1996). At the same time, various versions
of virtue ethics and of cultural understandings of what is
best for humans in general often do claim to be valid for all
humans, not just for those who participate in these particular
traditions.
Just as members of cultural groups take their perspectives
to be self-evidently true, most descriptions of virtue
ethics, as expressions of culture, do not include a selfcritical
dimension that would promote an ongoing evaluation
of the goods, practices, and character ideals that comprise
the tradition. Philosophers and others debate the
validity, shape, and catalog of virtue ethics, but the notion
of ongoing internal self-revision or self-examination at a
cultural level has not been incorporated fully by virtue
ethicists. This absence of an explicit form of self-revision is
a serious shortcoming of virtue ethics that we may be able
to remedy, in part, by integrating a virtue of openness to the
other.
Openness to the other begins with the necessity of
taking seriously the truth claims that cultural groups make
in order to understand culture and its expressions fully
(MacIntyre, 1998). Participants in historical cultures typically
do not see their worldview as one among many but as
the viewpoint. Culture prescribes an understanding of human
nature, of what is good for humans, and of the practices,
customs, and beliefs that are conducive to its concepts
of human being and human good. The vast number of
cultural perspectives are famously inconsistent with each
other, so their truth claims obviously cannot all be valid
and universal. The now generally accepted multicultural
view takes a clear position that it is both inconceivable and
undesirable that any one cultural viewpoint can be accorded
overall superiority. This suggests that values, virtues,
and ethics are culturally relative.
How can we simultaneously take multiple perspectives
on truth and goodness seriously? The starting point
for this is the same as for all considerations of culture—we
must begin with our own standpoint. We must engage in
the cultural self-reflection so widely advocated by multiculturalists
so that we can gain an initial understanding of
our own standpoint and the powerful ways that it shapes
our identities and grounds the convictions and commitments
that help to constitute our lives and our profession.
Prior to such self-reflection, we automatically and unreflectively
take our inherited worldviews for granted and accord
them authority regarding our choices and the merit of our
actions.
In our multicultural society, we have many opportunities
to see that our ways of life are not universally held
and to see that culturally different others are equally attached
to their worldviews. As we engage with individuals
and groups who are culturally different from us, openness
to their otherness presents many opportunities to seek to
understand their points of view, to share our perspectives
with them, and to explore what each culture esteems. This
process can be seen as a cultural dialogue (Cushman, 2001;
Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Richardson, Fowers, &
Guignon, 1999).
The richest form of dialogue is not merely an exchange
of interesting information but a process in which
the interlocutors actively question their own perspectives
and include the other as a partner in their cultural selfexploration
and learning (MacIntyre, 1998; Richardson,
2003; Richardson et al., 1999). Dialogue involves selfexploration
as much as learning about the other, the articulation
of one’s own previously implicit values and assumptions
as much as learning what is valued by the other.
This kind of exchange can lead to greater self-understanding
as well as appreciation for the other. It can also help
one to recognize and begin to address inconsistencies,
tensions, and blind spots in one’s heritage. Every worldview
has such shortcomings, and cultural standards and
592 September 2006 ● American Psychologist
values sometimes become seriously misguided (e.g., Nazism,
McCarthyism). This kind of dialogue can be a very
productive way to question the values and standards of
one’s cultural community in light of another point of view.
At its best, dialogue is challenging and enriching, and it
results in greater clarity about and often alterations in one’s
own worldview. Cultural dialogue introduces profound
possibilities for self-examination and self-transformation in
the ways that members of any culture understand what is
good for them, what is praiseworthy, and how to bring that
goodness into being.
Therefore, if we see openness to the other as a virtue,
it is not merely another virtue alongside justice, courage,
and generosity. Rather, it constitutes a transformative addition
to almost any catalog of the virtues. It is transformative
because a genuine openness to the other requires the
willingness to allow the other to call one’s own deepest
beliefs and commitments into question. This openness constitutes
an invitation to dialogue with culturally different
others in which both points of view are compared, contrasted,
and questioned.
Cultural dialogue occurs continually between cultural
groups in consistent contact at an implicit level at the
intersection of customs, self-understandings, economic exchanges,
and so forth. It can also become an explicit
conversation in therapeutic and scholarly endeavors when
culture is a significant element in these pursuits. Dialogue
provides a way both to take cultural truth claims seriously
and yet avoid the tendency to claim universal truth. No one
can predict the directions that this kind of dialogue will
take. It is an open-ended endeavor that requires courage
and a steadfast commitment to learning. The aims of this
kind of conversation are to better appreciate the truths in
each perspective, to better articulate and live up to the
truths in one’s own cultural standpoint, and to address the
tensions and shortcomings in one’s worldview.
Considered theoretically, virtue ethics is amenable to
critical examination and questioning. One saving grace of
Aristotle’s conception of virtue ethics is the recognition
that no one has the last word on the best kind of life. He
repeatedly denied that the ethical truth could be stated in a
definitive, once-and-for-all formulation (McDowell, 1996).
Nor did he give any kind of foundational argument for the
superiority of ancient Athenian mores. Rather, he began
philosophical reflection on how best to live within his own
cultural milieu. The stress on a universal ethic or a general
account of the good life is distinctly modern, and it would
be unwise to read such claims back onto Aristotle.
In fact, Aristotle taught that part of what constitutes
the best kind of life is the ongoing exploration of what is
highest and finest for us as humans. Some of that exploration
will take place within the limited range of views and
practices in a given historical culture. It is clear, however,
that a cultural group can greatly multiply its resources and
possibilities for cultural and personal self-reflection if the
group can compare and contrast its way of life with other
forms of life. In this way, openness to the other and the
dialogue it promotes provide an invaluable resource for this
ongoing exploration of what is good.
At a practical level, it is incumbent on therapists to
prepare themselves for this kind of dialogue prior to engaging
in it with clients. Therapists must become comfortable
with the questions and issues that other cultural perspectives
raise about their own worldviews so that when
these questions arise in a therapeutic encounter, they are
able to respond with openness to dialogue rather than
self-assertion or defensiveness. Moreover, given the power
differential inherent in the therapeutic relationship, therapists
must be particularly sensitive to how their position of
power can make it possible to wield inappropriate influence
on a client’s cultural commitments. In the give and take of
cultural questioning that occurs implicitly and explicitly in
every therapeutic encounter, both the therapist’s and the
client’s ordinary understandings about how best to act and
live are called into question. It is in this dialogue that the
hard-won maturity and the character strength of openness
to the other allow a therapist to guide the discussion in a
manner that allows clients to question and examine their
own worldviews without presuming that superior answers
are available within the therapist’s cultural perspective.
Given the complexity and scope of such discussions, there
is no general, step-by-step algorithm that can automatically
direct cultural dialogue in beneficial directions. For this
reason, cultural dialogue is dependent on the therapist’s
character strength and practical wisdom rather than on a set
of rules.
We have argued that reconceptualizing cultural competence
as the virtue of openness to the other provides an
illuminating perspective on this vital capacity. The virtue
perspective provides a systematic way to recognize and
integrate the goals of multiculturalism with the dispositional,
cognitive, emotional, motivational, behavioral, and
wisdom capacities necessary for practicing cultural competence.
Above all, virtue ethics clarifies that openness to
the other is much more than learning information and
acquiring behavioral skills. It requires being or becoming
the kind of person who seeks intercultural contact and is
committed to the goods of multiculturalism. The virtue of
openness to the other also enhances virtue ethics by incorporating
the importance of engaging in dialogue with
other cultural traditions. This dialogue opens promising
avenues for cultural self-reflection, self-critique, learning,
and engagement. The virtue of openness to the other is a
transformative capacity that can help existing cultural
and virtue traditions to remain vibrant, self-reflective,
and open-ended.
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