chapters of this bonk, we should give this arpjmcnl a fair hearing. After all, nich * cnt u-al investigation of globalization's alleged
novelty Mid its rdalioiLShip tu iTKideTiiUy icre closely nloyrt another question ln>ily debated in global studies: What docs a proper chronology and historical pertodizuUon of globalization look like? Let us turn to Chapter 2 to find answers to these
question*.
16
Chapter 2
Globalization and history: is globalization a new phenomenon?
If we asked an ordinary person on the busy streets of global cities like New York, Shanghai, or Sidney about the essence of globalization, the answer would probably invnlve some reference to growing forms of connectivity ruelled by exploding; information and. «mmnunication technologies. People might point lotheiT ultra-thin laptop computers; all sorts of mobile device* such as Cloud-connected smart wireless phones and tablets like the popular irhone or the Kindle Fire; powerful Internet search engines like Google that sort in a split-second through gigantic data sets; individual video-postings on YouTube; ubiquitous social networking sates like IVittrr; the rapidly enrpanding blogospherv,
S.lUllll'- U.HO ii .i-l j-.l 1-.T CUHlVrtlM.1 HI >'l\>- il'.llT.lClH-l- .1-11
computer and vjdrm ganies; tlie new generation of super-jetliiMfs like the Airbus A380 or BueinRS Ureamlinet; and the international space station.
As important as technology is for the intensification uf global connectivity, it provides only a partial explanation for the latest wave of globalization since the ].<Nt<i*. Yet, it would be foolish li 1 rimy thnt Ihest- new iunovatuHls have played a erAicial role in tin-compression of world-time and world-space The Internet, in particular, has assumed a pivotal function in facilitating globah»tiufi thmugh the creation of the World Wide Wrh that connects billions »f individuals. civi] soaery associations, and
17
governments- Since must of these technologies have been around for less than three decade*, it seems to make sense tn agree with those commentators who claim that globalization is, indeed, a relatively new pbenurnmun.
Still, the dHinition of glcibaliiatiutl we arrived at in the previous chaptrr rtjesses the dynamic nature of the phenomenon. The global expansion of social relations and the rise of the global imaginary are gradual processes with deep historical roots. The engineer* who developed personal compute™ and supersonic jet planes stand on the shoulders erf earlier innovator* wi» treated the steam engim*. tin- cotton gin, the telegraph, ihe ponograph, the telephone, the typewriter, the internal-combustion engine, Bnd electrical appliance*. These products, in turn, owe their existence to much earlier technological uiventuwis such as the telescope, the compass, water wheel*, windmills, gunpowder the printing press, aJid oceangoing ship*- In nrdei 10 acknowledge the full historical record, we might reach hack evem further to such momentous technological and social achievements as the production of paper, the development of writing, the invention of the wheel, the dnmert.iCB.tiuu of wild plants ami animals, the slow outward migration of our comnum African ancestors, and, tinnllv, the emergence of language at the dawn of human evululinn.
Thus, the answer to the question of whether glnbauzatkni constitutes a new phenomenon depends upon lww far we are a illing to extend the web of causatiun that resulted in those recent technologies and social arrangements that most people have come to associate with our buzzwmrd. Some scholars roi*sciouily limit the historical scope of globalbalion tn the pOMSM era in order to capture it* contemporary uniqueness. Others arc willing to c\tend this timeframe to iucIikI* the ground-breaking development* of the last two centuries. Still others argue that .dobalif-atkrii really represents the continuation and extension of cumplex prnceises that began with the rmerjfrnce-of mudenuty
is
and die capitalist wmrld system in the 1500». And a few remaining researchers refuse to confine global ration to time penudi measured in mere decades or centuries, RatheT. they suggest that these processes have been unfolding fur millennia.
No doubt, each of these (.xmitTKiinj; perspectives mutants important insights. As we will see in subsequent chapters, the advocates uf the first approach have marshalled impressive evidence for their view that the dramatic expansion and acceleration of global exchange* since the ]°SOs ^presents n quantum leap in the history of globalization. the proponents of the second view correctly emphafije the tight connection between contemporary forms of globalization and the explosion of technology known as tlie Industrial Revolution. The representatives of the third perspective rightly point to the significance of the time-space compression that occurred in the lb'lh century when Eurasia. Africa, and the Americas Hrst became connected by enduring trade routes, Finally, the advocate* ot the fourth approach advance a rather sensible argument when they insist that any truly comprehend e account of globalization falls short without the inrcorpu ration of ancient developments and etMlunng dynamic* into our planetary history.
While the short chronology outlined below- is necessarily fragmentary and generál, it identifies trve historical periods that jre separated from each other by significant accelerations in the pare of social exchanges as well as a widening of their geographical scope. Thus, w could sav lhat glubalizalion is an ancient process that, over many centuries, has crossed ^.11?-.11 m qualitative thresholds. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that my chronology does not necessarily impb a linear moulding of history, nor does it advocate a conventional rUirooentric perspective of world history. Full of unanticipated -urpnses, violent tw ists, sudden punctuations, and dramatic
-.Lis. tin. Iiislory.::: »|n|i.i!|Aiiinr. has .n-.nKv:i all :n;i|ii regions and cultures of Otir planet.
19
The prehistoric period (10.000 kj-3500 m f)
Let us hegin 12.000 years ago when small bands of hunters and gatherers reached die southern tip of South Ami-rica. This event marfced th* end of the lung process of settling all five continents that v* a> begun by our hominid African ancestors more than one millinn years ago, Although some major island groups in the Pacific and the Atlantic were IKK inhabited until relatively recent times, the truly global dispersion of our species was finally achieved. The successful endcnvnuT of tlie South American nomads reMed on the migrator? achievements of their Siberian ancestors who had cruised the Bering Strait into North America at least a thousand years earlier.
In this earliest phase of globalization, contact i of hunter and gatherer bands spread all aver the world was |   geographically limited and mostly coincidental. Thi* t!     i c
mude of social interaction changed dramatically about lrt.OOO |   years ago when humans took the crucial step of producing their own food. As a result of several factors; including the natural occurrence of plant* and animals suitable tor domestication as well as continental difference* in area and total population siae, only certain regions located on or near die vast Eurasian land mats proved to he idW for these growing agricultural settlements. These areas were located in the Fertile Crescent north-central China. North Africa, northwestern India, and New Guinea. Ot-i time, food surpluses achieved by these early fanners and herder* led to population Increases, the establishment nf permanent s-illnges, and the construction of fortified Luwns
Roving bands of nomads lost out to .«rft]ed tribes, chiefdomi. and. ultimately, powerful stales hosed on agricultural fond production. (See Map 1). The decentralized, egalitarian nature uf hunter and gatherer groups was replaced by centralized and highly stratified patriarchal social structures headed by chiefs and priests vdia v. ere exempted from hard manual labour. Moreover, for tlte first
tinii' in human hi«tnry. thr-v farmingsocieties wieneahle ti)
support I wo additional social classes whose members did not piirticipnte in fivmi production. One group consisted nf full-lime craft specialists who directed their creative energies toward the invention nf new technnlngiex, such ax powerful iron tools, beautiful ornamente made of precious metals, complex irrigation canal*, snphistirated pottery and hasketry. And monumental building structures. The other group whs comprised of
pmfMsinnal hurrniic rats and snldien whn vimuld later play a Ley
role in the monopolization of the means of violence in tbe hands
nf a few rulers, thr prrrUe áriím ntiiijf ať Ux\d surpluses mil miiij
for the growth and survival of (It* centralized state, the acquisition
cif new tfiritnry, thr r-stahlishment of permanent trade mutes, and
the systematic exploration of distant regions
For tbe most part, however, globalization in the prehistoric period wax severely Limited. Advanced forms of technolog- capable of overcoming existing geographical and social obstacles were largely ahsent: thus, enduring lung-distance interactions never materialized, It was only toward the end of this epoch that
centrally administered forms nf agriculture, religion, iMireancriuy.
and warfare slowly emerged as the key agents of intensifying
modes nf social exchange that would involve a growing number ut"
societies in many regions of the world,
Perhaps the best way of characterizing the dynamic of this earliest
phase of globalization would be to call it 'divergence'— people and
social connections stemming from a single origin but moving and diversifying greatly over time and >]bi».
The premodern period (3500 bce -1500a.)
The invention of writing in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and central China between 35O0and 2000 bce (sec Illustration 3j roughly
coincided with the invention of the wheel around 30ŮO BCE In
Southwest Asia. Marking ihe close of the prehistorie period, these
;j, ,w; rluji lJ»j tablet wild cnm/ifiwin u ritlng. ď.l"tOO-l*l li i » t
monumental invention* amounted to one of those trdinohtgiiral and social boosts Out moved globaliution tn a iiev> lew]. Thanks to the auspicious easl-west urienlatlun of Eurasia's major continental axit—* geographical feature thai had already facilitated the rapid spread of crops and animik suitable for food production along die same latitudes —die diffusion of these new technologies to distant parts of the continent occurred within only a few centuries. Tlie importance of these inventions for the strengthening of globalixalinn processes should he obvious. Among other tilings, the wheel spurred crucial illfrastructural innovations such bs animal-drawn carts and permanent roads thai allowed tor the faster and more efficient transportation of people and goods, tu addition to the spread of ideas *nd invention*.
writing grwitfylhrilitaird the coordination of complex social activities and thus ciicou nijji-H larpr state forrnatwns. Of the sizeable tcrril<irial units llial aitisr during this period, only the Antics civilizations Df South America managed to grow into the mighty [nra Empire without the benefit* at either the wheel or the written word.
The later prettiodern period was the age uf empires. As Mime States sucenrded in exLabLisbiire perrrowieTrt rule avei other states, the resulting vast trrritnrial acrumulatSons fanned the bails of the- Egyptian Kingdoms* the Persian Empire, the Macedonian Empire, the American Empires of the Artees and the Iness, the tinman Empire, the Indian Empires, the Hwantinc (umpire, the Islamic Caliphates, die Holy Roman Empire, the Afrir-nn Empires uf Gliana. Mali, mid Songhay, ami the Ottoman Empire. All of these empires faxrtrred the multiplicatHm and etfenrinn nf lung-distance communk'-atHHi and the exchange of culture, technology, commodities, and disease*. The must enduring and technologically arjvnnerd of iliese vast prcmodnn conglomerates was undiiubtrdly the Chinese Empire. A closer InoV at its histtm reveals some nf the early dynamics of globalization.
After centuries nf warfare Iwlwevil     erfll independent states, the Qin Emperor's armies, in 221 ih;k, finally unified large portions in' northeast China. For the next 1,700 vobts, suwrssive dynasties kntiwn as ibit- Hail. Si.li.Tims, Yuan, and Millg tilled an empire supported by vast bureaucracies thai wnuld extend its Influence to such distant regions as tropical Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean, India, and fcast Africa (see. Illustration +), Dazzling artistry and brilliant philosophical achievements stimulated new discoveries In other fields nf knowledge such as
artrurwatlv, mathematics, and chemistry The long Iist4>f'majur technolngirnl innovationsachieved in China during the pranodern period include redesigned plowshares, hydraulic engineering, gunpowder, the tapping nf natural gas. the
I. I lie Ureal Wall i»l"t li ii>». 1*0' " '" tae 7"' eenlary v. v. b> w m-linnls. «u rnliirKVil :nn1 n-huill n-|K-a1edb
compass, mcehnnical clicks, pa|wr, printing, lavishly embroidered silk fabrics, and sopbisticated metalworkitlg techniques, The constructiun of vast Irrigation systems consisting nf hundreds of small canals enhanced the regions jc.rit.uJtur.fll productivity while at the saint lime providing for one <d'lhe best river transport systems in the world. The codification of law and the fixing of weights, measures, and values of coinage riwtered the expansion i>f trade and markets. The sLandardi^aliun of the size of cart axles and the roads they travelled on allowed Chinese merchants for the first time to make precise calculations as to the desired quantities nf imported arid exported goods.
The most extensive of these trade routes wris the Silk Kuad. It linked tin L'lnae-eand the Roman Empires, with Parthian traders serving as skilled intermediaries- Even i,:suo years after the Silk Koad first reached the Italian peninsula, in 50 bce,
35
om oni n ^.tJQU^ jpnnp[jiMi«ift!M r.
30
Tci be surf, religion V, arfare within Europe also created itx share nf dislocation and displacement ful Caucasian population* Mmiium. r. *s a result of these protracted armed conflicts, military alliances and political arrangements underwent continuous modificatkHi. Thii highlights the crucial role uf warfare as a catalyst of globalization. Evulving irom IheWestpli^an.itatM.system, the Mn-vrriKn, territorial nation-state emerged in lSth-celllury Europe as the modern container of social life. As die eariy modem period drew to a close, inierdepeudencies among lution-States wen? multiplying ax wrll as. increasing in density.
The modern period (1750-1980)
By the late lath century, Australia and the Pacific islands were
slowly incorporated intotlie liuropean-domi Hated network of political, ecunumic, and cultural exchange. Increasingly confronted with Stories uf die 'distant' and images of countless 'Others', Europeans and their descendant on odieronntirieTits tuuk it upon themselves to assume the role of the world's guardians* of civdizarion and morality. In spate of their persistent claims tn univrrsal kadei-slup, however, they remained strangely oblivious to their racist prai'tiee-s and the appalling conditions i:<l inequality that existed both within their own societies and between the global North and South. Fed by a steady stream of nutLTials and resources llur. uriginated mostly in Other region* of the wof Id, Western capitalist enterprises gained i ji stature. Daring
resist pnwrrii.il gcmc-rnniejital ■cojlItijIs, ereinorniccntrepceiieurs and their academic counterparts began to spread ■ philosophy of individualism and rational self-interest that glorified the virtues i it'nil idealized l-apilalixt .system supposedly based upon the
■'idi r.lial wi-ixii-,:-- iit'11 n. 1:ri: :iiark:'l nr..: i1> ' iv. - 1 ■ 1« I .i.h.1.
Written in ib*7 by the German political radicals Fieri Manaihi I'rii'drieh hiiecl-. llw |u\*iigi' hcl.iwtaken fifiMU theirnutimis Communist Afanifetft} captures the qualitative shift in social relations I lint pushed glubaiixatinn tn a new level in (lie modern perind.
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countrieslikethe United Statescif America, Canada,and Australia took advantage of this boost in productivity. By the early 20th century, these countries entered the world stajje as fcireex to he reckoned with At the same time, however, thej' made sign ificant efforts Icj cuntnd these large migratory ilows. in the process ins cnting novel forme of bureaucratic control and developing new
surveillance techniques designed to accumulate outre information
About nationals while keeping 'undesirables'out.
When the accelerating process of iTfcdustTMlization sharpened
i'SLrfjci^ Jbi|iunLifj in wealth and wcllbci.iHf Iwynmd bearable
limits, many working people in the global North began to organize LliL'iii^'hi", |xiLim-ii]h in variuus labtHjr [oovemenLs and socialist parties. However, their idealistic cnl Is for intwiwrtional class sulidanlv went largely uidieeded. Instead, ideologies thai translated the national imaginary into rrtnemr political programs captured lite imagination ol uiillioiui of people around the world. There is no question thm intrnrtiUr rivalries intensified nt the outset of the 20th century as * result of mass migration, urbanization, rolnnial competition, ;ind thr excessive liberalization of world trade. The ensuing period of extreme nationalism culminated in two dcvnstatinj; world wont, genocides, a long global economic depression, and hostile measures to protect narrowly conceived political communities.
The end nl'Wnrld War I] .saw the expliMHhn hxI two puweitul all miic I k -nihs that killed 200.000 Japanese, most of them
Chilians. Nothingdid mnre toconvince people around the w<wlcl
of the linked fate of geographically and politically separated
'nations'. Indeed, the global imajrinary found a horrifying
expression in the Cold-War acronym 'MAD" (mutually assured
clestructumj. A more punitive result was the process ut'
decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s that slowly revived global llows and international Exchanges. A new political order of sovereign but interdependent nation-states anchored in the charter erf llie United Nations raised the pratquect of global
democratic governance llimwrr. such cosmopolitan hopes quickly t.idi'd ,is the Cold War divided the woTld fnrtnurlonjfdet-adw into two antagonistic upheTes: a liberal-capitalist "First World' dominated hy the United Stales, and an authoritarian-sixialist 'Second \V:>r|i.|' i/on1 rolled by the Soviet L'lliofi. Both bloc* sought tu establish their political and ideological dominance in die "Ihiftl World'. Indeed, superpower ounfrcKilatioili like the Cuban Missile Crisis raised the speclrv of a global conflict capable of destroying \ irtually all life on our planet-
The contemporary period (from the 19o0i)
As we noted at the beginning ol dlis chapter, the drnmatir creation, expansion, and acceleration of worldwide iiiterdepcndcncies and jdolsd exchanges that have occurred since the early työüa represent yet another quantum leap m the history
of globalization. Thr best wa> of characterizing this latest glnhali*atiuü wave would be to call it conver^ecicv'—different nnd widely spared people and social connections corning tn|$rther mnne rapidly than ever before. This dynamic received another bOQSt with the WSJ I cnllajwe of the rtimmunkst Soviet Kmnirr and 'nenliberal' attempts to create a sinjde global market Indeed, the deregulation of national economies combined with the Information and Communication Technology (ICTj Revolution kicked glohalization into a new gear, The unprecedented development of horizontal networks of interactive communk-ltfinr* that connected the local and global was made pcKsihle through the worldwide diffusion of lhc Internet, wireless eonimunication, digital mediiu and online social networki ng t<xib.
But hnw exactly lias globalization accelerated in these last three decades? Why docs what has been happening justify- the rreation nffl huJJwcird that not only captured the public Imagination, but hajalsu elicited conflicting emotumal responses.? Is eontempoTury glnholiratkin a good o* a'bad'thlTig?Trimugiuiul this book we will consider possible answers to these crucial questions. In doing