Ill p.illiii tii .n IntrudtHJlionj new economic configuration often subsumed under ihe term "HclubaJiEaticm''—was plucked from the entrails of the uld. Volcker, Reagan, Thatcher, and Deng Xaioping all look minority arguments thai had long been in circulation and made them majoritar-ian (though in no case without a protracted struggle). Reagan Hii• iu^.i11 i.i iii ihe minority tradition that srretched back within the Republican Party to Barry Ooldwatcr in the early l%Os. Deng saw the rising tide of wealth and influence in Japan, Taiwan, I long Kong, Singapore, and Mouth Korea and sought to mobilize market socialism instead of central planning to protect and advance the interest-, ot tin- (.Ivncsr sure. Vkkci ii id Thatcher h.nh plucked from the shadows nf relative obscurity a particular doctrine ilui went under (he name oi Lneoliheralism' and transformed ii iniu the ..in-i-il guiding principle of economic thought and management. And it is with this doctrine -it* origins, rise, and implications— that I am here primarily concerned.1 Neoliberalism is in ihe first instance a theory of political tuv-nomic practices thai proposes that human well-being can best he advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional frame-work characterized bv strong private property rights, flee inarki/ls, and free trade-. Tht: role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices, The state has to guarantee, for example, the qualitv and integrity of money. Tt must also set up those military, defend police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private propcm rights and to guarantee, by force if need he, the proper funcrioning of markets. Furthermore* if markets do not exist {in areas; such as land, water, education, health care, social security; or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by stale action if necessary. Bui beyond these laiks the state should m* venture. State interventions in mat keis (once created) must he kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the xtate cannot possihh possess enough in format if in to second-guess market signabv. (prices) and because powerful Lnrcresi groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit. There has even where been an emphatic turn towards neolibcr-alism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 197ft*. Deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of ihe state from mam area*. uf social provision have been all too common Almost all slates, from those newly minted after the collapse of the Soviet Lmon to old-style social democracies and weliare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at lost some indieies and practices accordingly, Post-apartheid South Africa quick I ■, embraced iie»lihcralism, and cv en contemporary China, as we shall see, appears in he headed in this direction. Fiirtherinore,4he advo- | cites of the neoliberal way now occupy positions of considerable influence in education {the universities and many 'think tanks"), in ■he media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key siatc institutions (treasury departments, the central hanks), and also in those international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Dank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and trade, j Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of dis- f course. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point ' where it has become incorporated into ihe common-sense way j m.iiv, of us interpret, live in, and understand the world, The prttee**. or neo I iher a Ligation has, however, entailer much 'creative destruction', not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers [even challenging traditional Ibrms of state sovereignty J but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart. In so far as nei(liberalism values market exchange as 'an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs', it emphasizes the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace/ It holds that the social good will be mavirni/cd by maximizing the reach and frequence of market transactions, and il seeki to bring all human action (om the domain of ihe market This requires technologies of information ereaiion and capacities in accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use massive databases lt> guide decisions in the global marketplace. Hence neoliberalism's intense interest in and pursuit of information technologies (leading some 1 3 Introduction to proclaim the emergence of a new kind of'information society'). These teehnolikpes have compressed the risjrtp densitv of market transactions in both space and time- They have product*] a particularly intensive burst of what I have elsewhere called 'timc-spacc i oppression' J he greater rhf geographical range (hence the emphasis on 'globalization") and rhc shorter the term of market contracts the better. This latter preference parallels Leonard's famous description of the postmodern condition as one where 'the temporary contract' supplants 'permanent institutions in the professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and international domains, as well as in political affairs'. The cultural consequences of the dominance of such a marLct ethic ate legton, as I earlier showed in /"*«• Cumiiiion of PoitM&Jermty.' While many general accounts of global transformations and theit cflccts art now available, what is generally missing — and this is the pap this book aims 10 till- is the poutieal-eeunumic story of where neoliberalization came from and bow it proliferated so corn prehensive.lv on the world stage Critical engagement with that story suggests, furthermore, a framework for identifying and constructing alternative political and economic arrangements. I have benefited in recent times fnmi cornier sat ions with Gerard Lhimcnil, Sam Gindin, and I .tin Pamtch. I have more long standing debts to Masao Miyoshi, Giovanni Arrighi. Patrick Bo ml, (jndi K»tz, Neil Smith. Bertell Oilman, Maria Katka, and Erik Swyngedouw. A conference on neoliberahsm sponsored by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Berlin in November 2001 first sparked my interest in this topic. I thank the Provost at the CUNY Graduate Center, Bill Kelly, and my colleagues and students primarily hut not exclusively in the Anthropology Program lor their interest and support. I absolve everyone, of course, Irom jm responsibility for the results, Freedom's Just Another Word . For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced thai appeals to our intuitions and instincts. In our nines and our desires as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit, If successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common seme as to be taken for granted and not open to question. The founding figures of neolib-a I thought took political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as "the central values ot civilization'. In so doing they chose wisely, for these arc indeed compelling and seductive ideals. These valors, ihc> held, were threatened not only by fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but bv all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgements for those of individuals ftee to choose. C armcepts of dignity and Individual freedom are powerful and appealing in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in eastern Furopi and the So. iet Union before the end of the Cold Wat as well as the saudenis in Tiananmen Square. The student movements that swept the world in 1 liMnr-.'.' Though Ukiih.i 's tuIls icij> hast been illegal when imposed hy an occupying power, thes would become legal if confirmed by a 'sovereign1 yovernnnmi. The interim government, appointed by the US. that took over at the end of June 2004 was declared 'sovereign'. But it only had the power to confirm existing laws. Before the handover, Bremer multiplied the number of laws to specify frcc-markct and free-trade rules Ln minute detail (on detailed mailers such as copyright laws, and intellectual property rights), expressing the hope ihai these institutional arrangements would 'tale on a life and momentum "f their own1 such that they would prove very difficult lo reverse,1 According to neoliberal theory, the sorts of measures that Bremer outlined were both necessary and sufficient lor the creation nf wealth and ihcrciorc fur the improved well-being of the population at large. The assumption that individual freedoms arc guaranteed by freedom of iht: market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking, ami it has lung dominated the US stance towards the rest of the world.' What the US evidently | sought to impose by main force on Iraq was a state apparatus, fthnsc fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profii-aHle capital accumulation mi the part of hoth domestic and foreign capital I call this kind of sjalL_a[H,iara[iis a ns/tfilfrti! '.lalt. The freedoms it embodies reflect the interests of private properlv owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital. Bremer invited the Iraqis, in short, to ride their horse of freedom straight into the neoliberal corral. The first experiment with neoliberal state limitation, ii is worth rivalling, occurred in Chile after Pinochet's coup on the "little Septemb-r I lib* of lQ73 {almost ihins \uars 10 ihe day before Bremer's announcement of the regime lo be installed in Iraq), The coup, against tiic democratically elected government of Salvador Allciiiie, was promoted by domestic business elites threatened by Alleiide's drive towards socialism. It was backed by US corporations, ihe CIA, and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger It violently repressed all llie sodal movciiienls and political •a 1 9- Z 41 S < í a-S í = = 5 - c z z Jj Ha i i-1 lil] Hl ££3 ■Sil! j e SB-Si" £ 1 fiji * I B 5Í j E 1-5.B * ť -e — u "Ei Ľ: n "řš II .t -s I s i £ö Ij £ iflj. ■ - - — ~ Hill Hli! i iiij H ^ ■ - S H S b 11j fr * 21*1 c - 1 C ľ * ti i J " lt C ° T) * tri k 3-s Juh L g 1 i. ž S t ■ "I* tf 5 S F 2 p í Ju K. ■- Freedom1* Ju*,t Ann it her Word .,. prevent the rc-emergenv* of inter-slate geopolitical rivalries that had led to iIil- war. To ensure domestic peace and tranquillity, some sort of class compromise between capital and labour had to be constructed. The thinking at the time k perhaps nest represented by an influential text by two eminent social scientists, Robert I'iM and Charles Lindblom, published in 1953. Both capitalism and communism in their raw forms had failed, they argued. The only «u>, ahead was to construct the right blend of state, market, and democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, wcll-bcui^, and stability ' Internationally, a new world order was. constructed through the Brctton Woods, agreements, and various inwi Millions* such at the United Nations, the Wurld Rank, the IMF, and the bank of International Settlements in Basics were set up to help stabilize international relations. Free trade in goods was encouraged under a system of fixed exchange rates anchored by the US dollar's convertibility into gold at a hxed pi ice. Fixed etchan^c rates were incompatible with free flows of capital rhat had to be controlled, but the US had to allow iIil- free flow of the dollar beyond its borders if the dollar was to function as the global reserve currency. This system existed under the umbrella protection of US military power. Only the Soviet Union and the t!old War plan:J limits on its global reach. A variety ofsocial democratic, Christian democratic and dirigisitr states emerged in Europe aiici the Second World War. The US itself turned towards a liberal democratic state form, and Japan, under the close supervision of the US, built a nominally democratic but in practice highly bureaucratic state apparatus empowered to oversee the reconstruction of that country. What all of these various state forms had in common was an acceptance thai the state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens, and that stale power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, ir necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes lo achieve these ends. Fiscal and monetary policies usually dubbed 'Kcynesian' were widely deployed in dampen business cycles and to ensure reasonably full employment. A 'classcompromise' between capital and lahnuT was generally advocated as the key guarantor of domes ik- pciii and tranquillity. States actively intervened in industrial policy and Freedom's Just Another Word .., moved to set standards tor the social wage by constructing a variety of welfare systems (health care, education, and the like). _ This form of political-economic organization is now usually referred to as 'embedded liberalism1 lo signal how market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in other instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy.11' State-led planning and in some instances state ownership of key sectors (coal, steel, automobiles) were not uncommon (for-example in Britain, France, and llalv}. The iteuliheral project is to disembed capital from these constraints, * Embedded liberalism delivered high rates of economic growth in the advanced capitalist countries during the 1950s and l**60s" In part this depended on the largesse of the US in being prepared to run deficits with the rest of the world and to absorb any excess product within its borders. This system conferred benefits such as expanding export markets (most ohviousb for Japan but also unevenly across South America and to some other countries of South-Bast Asia), but attempts to export 'development' to much of the rest of the world largely stalled. For much of the Third World, particularly Africa, embedded Liberalism remained a pipe dream. The subsequent diivc towards neoliberalizarion after luSD emailed little material change in their impoverished condition. In the advanced capitalist countries, redistribute polities (including some degree of political integration of working-class trade union power and support for collective bargaining), controls over the free mobility of capital 4some degree of financial repression through capital controls in particular), expanded public expenditures and welfare state-building, active state interventions in the economy, and some decree uf planning ot development went hand in hand with relatively high rates of growth. The business cycle was successfully controlled through the application of Kcyncsian fiscal and m*.nTtaty policies. A social and moral economy (sometimes supported by a strong sense of national identity) was fostered through the activities of an interventionist state. The State in effect became a force field that ink-mali/cd class relations, Working class institutions such as labour unions and political in 11 Freedoms Just Anuther Word . .. parties, i if i he lefl had a very real influence within the state apparatus, By the end of the LHW>0s embedded liberalism began to brat diwn, both internjtjünally and within domestic L-cnniimii'v Signs Of J ScTLOUH Crisis id capital aLCUitiLilali'Hi were t:stnwhcri' .ipp.1T cm L ncmplov nieiu and inllaiion um: both surging everywhere, u. communis!-controlled LRed Bologna' in Italy, on the- revolutionär iransformatii m of Portugal in the wake of the collapse of fascism, on ihr turn towards a more open market sialism and ithas i if 'Kuwommunism', particularly Ln Italy (under (he leadership of Berlinguer) and in Spain (under the influence of Carrillo),oron the expansion of the strong social dentoLraiK welfare state tradition in Scandinavia. The left assembled considerable popular power behind such projf nmrnts, coming close to power in 11 Freedom's Just Another Word ... Itary and actually acquiring state power in Portugal. France, Spain, and Britain, while retaining power in Scandinavia. Lvcn in the L'nitcd States., a Congress controlled hy the I Jtniocrai ic Party legtf- lalL'd a liLitft wave nf re^ulati htv refium in ihe early 19711k (signed inlet law \n Richard Nimn, a Republican president, whrn in (he process even went so far as to remark that L»e are all Keynesians now'y, gowrningt very thing from environmental protection to occupational safety and health, civ il rights, and consumer protection.'^ Bur the led liiiled to go much beyond traditional social democratic and LTWiSuratisI solutions and these had bv the mid- If "(X pi ■■.:i inconsislenl with the rei|uirt:menls of capilal accumulatum. The effect was to polarize debate between those ranged behind social democracy and central planning on the one hand (who, when in powder, as m the case of the British Labour Party, often ended up trying to curb, usually tor pragmatic reasons, the aspirations of tliL-ir i>wn constituencies), and the interests, of all chose concerned viilh liheTalinu i:ur|KnatL- and husiness power and re-L-slablishmg markel freedoms , liL^turical-^HdTtiorSl-~anH~~ctistui^ 'invl i l li l Hjnal arranmnnents all shaiJetl i'.h1, antl how th*^ pniieia« iff ncxiliberaIization actually ticcurred 13 s e tí s« 1 i 111 i "a 1 ŕ j - - 10 r! l*J »JCJ ILOUlÄDldllÄlf. Freedom's Just Another Word . » 40 35 30 as 20 15 19» 19« 1»45 1355 i»5 1979 IBflS ~i-1— i Figure 1.2 The wealth craih ufthc l¥70s: share of assets held bj the top !%oftiwuspo|)uiiii«i, \ ami Amcncan Danomicj, .-imincan ft«iic) m an .iff tf timnf. Intfualuy. continuing apace because the estate tax (a tax »n wealth) is being phased out and taxation on income from investments and capita] fains is being diminished, while taxation on wages and salaries is maintained. The L'S is not alone in this: the top 1 per cent of income canters in Britain have doubled their share of the national income from 65 per eeni to I j percent since l°rJ2. And when we look further afield we set extraordinary concentrations of wealth and power emerging ill iwer the place. A small and powerful oligarchy arose in Russia after neolibt-ral 'shock therapy' had been administered there in the 1990s. Extraordinary surges in income inequalities and wealth hait occurred in-China as it has adopted frec-market-orienicd practices. The wave of privatization in Mexico after 1W2 catapulted * lew individuals (such as Carlos Slim) almost overnijcht into Fortune's list of the world's wealthiest people. Globally, 'the countries of Eastern Europe and ilic CIS have registered some of the largest increases ever -, - in wmbJ inequality, OECD countries also It 17 Freedom's Just Another Word ma i97a -Total pay rank 10 .....Total pay rank 50 --Told pay rank 100 - Total pay average 100 The Irst throe curves show lha roe af the pay cr CEOs according to tmir rank in tha Iih iif iMimiuialnni 10th, 10th, and 100th. Tha atflarcxjnw(-—■—} corresponds to tha *ver*s* pay qi Hi* 100 CEOs with tilgher ranrnrfiaratiani. Ncn» that 1.000 m*ar* 1.000 tlm*» the average sat»v 4.0 3.5 3,0-?.S 2.0 Ufr 1j0 o-s 00 I I I ism ma -Tcp.OOO2»t4lrjp4O4in20OOl .....Tcp .00001% (top 1 Dl n 2000$ KM» Figure 1.4 The ccinccutrulMm of ut-ildi and earning power in the US: CF.O rumuiuTJliur. in relation to average I- S saljrk -. 1970 ■ >W\ and wcahh share* a( the richest lami!i«. -3Mi2 Siune: Diunerul and Levy, 'Nculibcri] Inccfne Trendi' I* ľreedom's Just Another Word .. . registered big increases in inequality alter the 1980s', while 'the income gap between the fifth of the wen-Id's people liv-ing in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to ] in 1997, up from IW to I in 1990 an J .W to I in I960'" While there are excep-iliinm this irend (several East and South-East Asian countries have so far contained income inequalities within reasonable bounds, as has France—sec Figure 1 J), the cs idenet KirungU sujr \ gests that the ncolibcril turn is in some way and to some degree I associated with the restoration or reconstruction of the power of / economic elites. * \ We can, rherefurr. interpret neoliberalization either as a nntpiau project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a pvUtuai profce-i to re establish the conditions tor capital accumulation and io restore ihe pm-ft of . economic elites- In what follows I shall argue thai the second of these objectives has Hi practice dominated. Neoliberalization has mn been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation^ liui q has suco/wled remarkably well in restoring" or in some "instances (as in Russia and China) creatirty. the power nf an economic elite. 1 he theorcrical Utopiantim of neoliheral argument has, Fconclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatocr needed to be done to achieve this goal. 'ITie evidence suggests, morw¥erh that when neohberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles arc either abandoned or become so Twisted as io be unrecognizable. This in no way denies the power of ideas to act as a force for historical-geographical change. Bur it does point to a rrgnvr- wiwinn htrwccn ihe power of neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of nwililxraliyarion_that_havf n-antrnrmed Jmw global capitalism has been working oyer rhcJasi liua decades. The Rise of MeolibenU Theory Ncoliberalism *s a potential antidote to threats to the capitalist social order and as a solution to capitalism's ills had long been lurking in ihe wings of public policy. A small and exclusive group of passionate advocates—mainly academic economists, historians, and philosophers—had gathered together around ihe renowned 19 KrMdQm'ls Just Another tt'-urd . .. Austrian political philosopher Kricdrlch von Hayek to create the V1iini PfltTm Society {named after the Swiss spa. where rhey first met) in 1947 (the notables included 1 Jidvig von MLsex, the economist Milton Friedman, and even, lor n time, the noted philosopher Karl Popper). The founding statement of the society read as iollows: Tlw centraI values of civilizationire- in danger. Over large stretchesof rlie earth h hit('ju.- ihe essential conditions of human dignity and freedom hive ilrcaUv Jisippcircd. In cither* ibev irr under emcitiint me:iuee I rum the develnifiineni <\( ciiTKnt lendrik i< s i:-l |-■ i:11■. ■. the Mum (if iht individual and the vxihrntary group are progressively undermined t>y tpiM uf arbitrary power Even tint mwt precious possession of Vit^ierii Math, freedom of thought and expression, is. threatened by the spread i>l creeds which, eluiiciinu I lit.- [>ni ikte ii-f kilctuiicv miicii in Hit' poniixm ul a TniTHirily, neck n ul power in which they can suppress and obliterate nil vtews hut their nwri. The group holds thai these devetooinentB have been fostered by the uruwih uf a view ■ i r >i i -.1 tits which denies all absolute moral standards and by the jTinvth uf theories •-. i,._', question lie desirability of [he rulr uf l.ivi It hciULi further that the) have been kislcred bj i decline tit licJtcl m private property and the erampentive market; inn- withnut the diffused power and initiative 3RsnciaTe hefort: lht law inl nuduc-es its own hi jscs, rctldcring ironie fnhn 1> Rijclfefeller's perstiiul crudu etched in stnne in the Rockefeller Center in New York City; where he places Llhe supreme worth of the individual' abo« all dse. And there are, as we shall see, enough contradictions in the neoliberal position to render evolving neoliberal practices (vis-a-vis issues such as monopoly poucr and market failures) unrtjcopiizahle in relation to the- seeming puriij, uf uculilie-rjL diu-Irme V\^ijiu^e t.> pay lari'ln! jllinliim, 1 hKrcfcirc:, to ihe tension between the ih<'nri nl1 rn-nlilieralisrn anil the actual praematiL"?i of. neohberalization. Hayek, authör of Ley texts such as The Cmttitutwtt of Lihtrsy, prescicitr'y argued that the turtle for ideas was key; and that it iniuld -priihahh take at least a generation for thar hank to be won, niM mils n^iin-.' Marxism I ml against so saw as an emerging consensus Ihr pursuing a mised economy Fearful of how the alliance with the Soviet Union and the command economy constructed within the L'S during the Second World War might play out politically in a post-war setting, they were ready to embrace anything from McCarthyJBm to neo-liberal think-tanks to protect and enhance their power. Yet this movement remained ink lhc margins uf both pohev and acadcmic inflneiuc unlil lhe moulded years of [lie l97fK Al thai [joint il began to movie centre-stage, particularly in the US and Britain, nurtured in various well-financed think-tanks (offshoots of the Mont Pelerin Society, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs in Ijondon and the Heritage Foundation in Washington), as well as through its growing influence within the academy, particularly at ihe I'nivL-rsin of C Diieago, where Milton Friedman dominated. N'e^liberal i henry gained m academic respectability by (He award of the Nobel Prize in economics to I la yd in 1974 and Friedman in 1976, This particular prize, though it assumed the aura of Nobel, had nothing 10 do with the other prizes and was under the tight control of Sweden's banking elite. Neoliberal theory; particularly in its mcHlLlai :sl :-;..i^\ lujjri In i\lt1 practical influence in a var \*'f\ of pvilicv lii-lds. During I he Carter presidency, for example., deregulation of the economy emerged as one of the answers to the chronic state of stagflation that had prevailed in the US throughout the 197fc. Dut the dramatic consolidation of neolibcralism as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state Level in the advanced capitalist world occurred in the United States and Hriiain in 1979. In May of that year Margaret Thatcher was elected in Britain with a strong mandate to reform the economy, Under the influence of Keith Joseph, a very active and committed publicist and polemicist with strong connections to the ncohberal institute of Economic A flair*, she accepted lhat keyncsianism had to be abandoned and that monetarist 'supply-side' solutiuns wen- essential In cure (he stagflation thai had characterized the British economy during the 1970s. She recognized that this meant nothing short of a revolution in fiscal and social policies, and immediately signalled a fierce determination to have done with the institutions and 12 Freedom's Just Another Word political ways of the social democratic state rhat had been consa>li dated in IJrnain after 1945. 'litis entailed confronting trad* union power, attacking all forms of social solidarity that hindered com-pciiiiic lie nihility (such as those expressed through municipal gov-iioaoiL-, jiuI including the power of many professionals and their associations!, d ismantling or rolling back the commitments of the welfare state, the privatization of public enterprises (including social housing), reducing raxes, encouraging enircprcniorial initio live, and creating a favourable tmsine^ climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment (particularly from Japan).-There was, she famously declared, 'no such thini' .i- sncim, only individual men and women1 —and, she s ubsequendy added, their families. All forms of social solidarity were to be dissolved in favour of jndj viduahsm, priMte property, personal responsibility and familv values, The ideological assault along these lines thai flowed from Thatcher's rhetoric was relentless.17 'Economics are the method', she saidL Lhut the object is to change the soul/ And change it she did, though in ways that were by no means comprehensive and complete, let alone free of political costs. In October 1979 Paul Voider, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank under President ( jrier, engineered a draconian shift in US monetary policy.Ik The long standing commitment in the LIS liberal democratic seme to the principles of the New Deal, which meant broadly Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies with full employment as the key objective, was abandoned in favour of a policy designed to quell inflation no matter what the consequence* might be for employment. 'I'he real rare of interest, which had t often been negative during the dnuhlc-digit inflationary surge of the 1970s, was rendered posilive by fiat of the Federal Reserve (Figure 1.5). The nominal rate of interest was raised overnighr and, after a few ups and downs, by July 1981 stood close to 20 per cent. Thus began 'a long deep recession that would empty factories and break unions in the US and drive debtor countries to the brink of insolvrncy, beginning the long era of structural adjustment'.11'This, Volekcr argued, was the unly way out of the grumbling crisis of stagflation thai had characterized the US and much of the global economy throughout the 1970s. The Volekcr shock, as it has since come to be known, has to be 2$ 1'iceilom'sJllM \iioltier Word .. a 8-7-e-5-4-3-2-n v r ^ v \ ' T x A J/ *t-\ l' \ M *■ \ f | I v -1- V v /• -2' 1| r a- nn 1975 1945 1495 - uYrtad Slaie* --France Figure 1.5 The "Vulekcr shock.': nun-em entx in the resl rate of interest, US and Prance, l'*m JiHU |M Dum*iiil *nd Lt*i, Carnal Rentrftwi. interpreted as a necessary but not sufficient condition for neo-libcralization. Some central hanks had long emphasized antt-tnllationan fiscal responsibility and adopted polities that were closer to monetarism than to Key new an orthodoxy. In the Wcsi (icmiau lj.sc i his derived from historical memories of the runaway inflation that had destroyed the Weimar Republic in die IV] Mcinr. out {Lirier in luSII proved crucial, even though t Jirter had shifted uneasily towards deregulation (of airlines and trucking) as a partial solution to the crisis of stasia tion. Reagan's advisers were convinced that Volekcr's monetarist 24 Freedom's Jusl Another Word . . , 'medicine' for a sick ami stagnant economy whs right on target. Voider was supported in and reappointed to his position as chair of the Federal Reserve. The Reagan administration then provided the requisite political backing through further deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and attacks on trade union and professional power. Reagan faced down PATCX). the air traffic, controllers' union, in a Lengthy and bitter strike in 1981, This signalled an all-out assault on the powers of organized labour at the very moment when the Volcker-insptred recession was generating high levels of unemployment (ID per cent or more). But PATCO was more than an ordinary union: it was a white-collar union which had the character of a skilled professional association. Ii was, therefore, an icon of middle-class rather tlun working-cla** unionism, The effect on the condition of labour across the fKurd was dramatic—perhaps best captured by the fact that the Federal minimum wage, which stood on a par with the poverty level in 1*>B0, had fallen to 30 per cent below that level by 1990. The long decline in real wage levels then began in earnest. Reagan's appointments to positions of power on issues such aw environmental regulation, occupational safety, and health, took the I960 1965 1970 1975 19«) 1986 1990 1996 2000 Figure 1.6 The attack on labour: real wages and productivity in the US, 19*0-2000 .Vmior ftillin. Omtwr vfDnrtm. 25 Freedom's Just \ tu uher Word Freedom's Just Another Word campaign against big government to ever higher levels. The deregulation of everything from airlines and telecommunications to finance opened up new nines of untrammelled market freedoms for powerful corporate interests. Tax breaks on investment effect ivelh subsidized ihe movement of capital away liom the unionized north easi and midwest and into the non-union and -weakly regu Laied south and west. Finance capital increasingly hwilsed abroad for higher rales ol return. l^industriali/atiun at home and moves to take production abroad hccanie much more common. The mar- Íket, depicted ideologically as the way to foster competition and Ln nova con, became a vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly power. C'jorporale taxes were reduced dramatic-all v, and the top personal tax rate was reduced from 7(1 to 2S iter cent in what whs lull..,1.1- 'the largest tax cut in history' (Figure 1,7), And so began the momentous shift towards greater social inequality and the restoration or economic power to the upper class. There was, however, one other concomitant shift thai also impelled ihe movement towards neohbcralizaiion during ihe ~i—™ I I i i—i-1—i—i—i—i—i—i—r~ 1915 1925 1936 1945 19H 1966 1975 1985 1965 2005 — Tax rate lor hiflhssl bracket .....Tas rat* tor towwl brackM Figure 1.7 The tax revolt nf rtte upper class: US la\ rates fur higher and lower brackets, 1913-2003 Sturrr. LKirm-nil Hid l>vv, 'SsnliherÉl Income Trtndb'. 2* 1970s. The OPEC oil price hike that came with the oil cmhargo of 1973 placed vast amounts of financial power at the disposal of the ■nl-producing states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi. We now know front Hritish intelligence reports that the LS na.s actively preparing m invade these countries in 1973 in order to restore the flow of oil and bring down oil prices. We also know that (he Saudis agreed at that time, presumably under military pressure if not open threat from the US, to recycle all of their petrodollar through the New York investment hanks. ^ The latter suddenly found themselves in command of massive funds for which they needed to find profitable outlets, The options within the US, given the depressed economic conditions and Low rates of return in the mid-1970s, were not good. More profitable opportunities had to he sought out .lbnwid. <_>ov ernmcnts seemed the safest hct because, as Walter Wriston, head of Citibank, famoudi put it, governments can't nun cor disappeai. And mam ^meTn-ments in the developing world, hitherto starved of fundv were anxious enough to borTiow. Fur this to occur required, however, open entry and reasonably secure conditions for lending. The New York investment hanks looked to the US imperial tradition both to prise open new investment opportunities and to protect their foreign operaiions. Ihe LS imperial tradition had been Ions?in the making, and to great degree defined itself against ihe imperial traditions of Britain, France, Holland, and other European powers." While the US had loved with colonial conquest at the end of the nineteenth century, it evolved a more open svstem of imperialism without colonies during the twentieth century. The paradigm case was worked out in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 19o0s, when US marines rtclt deployed In ;;i:Hc-.: '. S interests Ihii found themselves embroiled in a lengthy and difficult guerrilla insurgency led by Sandinck The answer was 10 And a local strongman—in this case Snnio/.v and to provide economic and military assistance to him and his family and immediate allies so that they could repress or buy off opposkion and accumulate considerable wealth and power tor themselves. In return they would always keep their country open to the operations of US capital and support, and if necessary promote US interests, both in the country and in the region (in the \icaraguan case, Central America) as a whole. This was the model 27 Freedom's Just Another Word . . . that was deployed after the Second World War (luring the phase of global decolonization imposed upon the European powers at US insistence. For example, the CIA engineered the coup that overthrew ihe democratically elected Mosaddeq government in Iran in 1953 and installed the Shah of Iran, who gave the oil contracts 10 US companies (and did not return the assets To ihe Hriiish cum panics that Mossadeq had nationalized). The shah also Ixcame one of the key guardians of US interests in the Middle Eastern oil region. In the post-war period, much of the non-communist world was opened up to US domination by tactics of this sort. This became the method of choice to Aght off the threat of communist insur gencies and revolution, entailing an ami-demixrraik: (and even more emphatically anti-populist and ami MK.iali.si/cnmmunist) strategy on the part of the US that pul the US more and more in alliance with repressive military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes (must spectacularly, of course, throughout Latin Amcr-Mi.. v :iu- ■ I.: ii Nr I 'i 1I1 '■ ■■ ■ " ■ ■ '■..■iwtu vj'an Fttmttmit Hit Man are full of the ugly and unsavoury details of hem this was alftoo often done. LS interests conscqueuth ln.iu.me mure rather than less vulnerable in the struggle against international communism. While the consent nf local ruling elites could be purchased easily enough, the need to coerce oppositional or social democratic movements (such as AUende's in Chile) associated the LS with a long history of largely covert violence against popular movements throughout much of the developing world. It was in thts context thai the surplus funds being recycled through the New York investment banks, were dispersed Throughout the world. Before 1973. most US foreign investment was of the direct sort, maiiih concerned with the exploitation of raw material resources (nil, minerals, raw materials, agricultural products) entile cultivation of specific markets (telecommunications, auto mobiles, etc.) in Europe and Latin America. The New York investment banks had always been active internationally, but after 197.1 they became esen more so, though now far more focused on lending capital to foreign governments " This required the liberalization of international credit and financial markets, and the LS government began actively to promote and support this strategy Freedom's Just Inn trier Word . , globally during the 1970s. Hungry for credit, developing countries hctc encouraged lo borrow heavily, though at rates that were advantageous to the New York bankers.1' Since the loans were designated in US dollars, however, any modest, let alone preeipit ous, rise in US interest rates could easily push s ulneraMe countries into default. The New York investment hanks would then be exposed to serious losses. The lirsi major lest case of this came in the wake of the Volckcr shock that drove Mexico into default Ln 19o2^t. The Reagan administration, which had seriously thought of withdrawing support for the IMF in its first year in office, found a way in put together the powers of the US Treasur\ and ihe IMF to resolve the difficulty bd rulling over the debt, but did so in return for iK-oliberal rcforiiis. This ireaimcnl became standard after what Slight/ refers to as a 'purge' of all Kcynesian influences from ihe IMF n 14*2 The IMF and the World Hank thereafter became centres for ihe pfi;|-ijL'.ill.'li and enforcement of 'free mark el TunJanierujIisnV and ncoliheral urtlmdow In reiorn for debt rescheduling, indebted eouniries were required to implement instiiuii-inul rtinrriiv, such as cuts in welfare expenditures, more flexible labmir m.irket laws, and privatization. Thus was 'structural adjustment' invented. Mexico was one of the first states drawn into what was going to become a growing column of ncoJiberal state apparatuses worlds idc."' What the Mesicu ease- dcilinnstTaleil, howocr, w:is. ,i key difference- between liberal unci ia :.|i':-.i--.il -.'raclicc' under the former. lender^ lake the Iiissls lh.il .irisi fmm '-'id \-\■..-xr-■:.-r dciMnr.s. while under the latter the borrowers arc forced bv state and inter national powers to take on board the cost ul dcht repay mcnl nu matter what the conscrjucni.es \<..\ ]'■•"1:1 ■ ■ :■.n J ■■■■ I brin^ol' _rhc li.iv.aj pupulatiun. if this required the surrender nt assets to 11 ir l- i;_ :i ■. • ■ 1111 ■ .11 Mrs .i" "ir;- s.ik pnnv. linn sn lit i Lies. 11 n.iny, out_, is run LMinsisteni with neolihiTal tru-or^ One eftectTas IJunT-*:ol :i)Vl I l'1. \ • '. wjtTrT^JCTIIBirTJS*5wriefs of capital 10 extract high rates of return from the rest of the world during the IQRQs and \**Hh (Figures 1.6 and 1.9}." The i est oral ion uf power In an economic elite or upper class in the US and elsewhere in the advanced capitalist eimniries drew heavily on surpluses extracted 29 Freedoms Ju*i r\nr>thjCT Word .., O-r—-,--.-,-.--,-_ 1966 198S IMF 2COS - US rulclinge atTOAd --F-or«tgn rn/dr^pi in ira united Stales. Figure IJ Eniaciing .surpluses from abroad: ratet of return on iurcipn and duoiaaHr. inTeatments In tbe US, 1960-2002 SttBTr Dumenil tfn.l LilR '•]Tie rjcnnrmiic* cf US JraperifllKm'. <-f- i i-■-1-1--,-.— 19SJ 1060 liTtj i960 las« - Intra™ frcrri tftarwtaf 1ha woriirttjrr*8lk; r>oni» - - P'onhafdi™ctin.^it>eiii: abroacl'dHTiflst.i-^r^^s Figure 1.9 TV flow of tribute inm flit US. pnifits and capital niHirm: Ituih rlh- ilsI ol the «in Id in rclaliun ta domestic prahts .Wmr: UimrKB.il and Uv^ -Smliberai DftBaaaka Tinrirdc A Nm Ptws^1. Freedom's Just \no1 her Word .. . Irnm the re-M of ihe world ihrough international flows and structural adjustment practices. The Mffwajhlf of Chuts tVajU Bur whai uiaudy is meant here hy 'da™1? This is always a sr.ime-rtliai Nhadcnvis (siime would even say dubious) omcept, Neoliber-alization has> in any case, entailed its redefinition. This poses a problem. If neoliberaltzation has been a vehicle for the restoration of class power, then wie should be able to identify the rtass Ibrccs behind it and those that have benc-ritcd from it. Hut this is difficult J-Lii 'cLss ]N mil j -üble milij.1 l(>iijinurjtii>n In vtmir rases 'traditiimar strata have managed tri hangen to a conKisten t powier hose (often organized through family and kinship4. But in other instances neohberalization has been accompanied by a reconhgur-ation of what constitutes an upper class. Margaret Thatcher, for example, attacked some of the entrenched forms of class power in Britain. She went against tbe aristocratic tradition thai dominated Ii the military, :lie judiciary and ihe financial elite In ihe ('ill nf Tjundun and many segments of industry, and sided with the brash entrepreneurs and the nouveaux riches. She supported, and was usually supported by, this new class of entrepreneurs (such as Richard Branson, Lord Hanson, and (Jeorgc Soros). The traditional wing of her own Uonscrvativc Party was appalled. In the US, the rising power and significance of llle financiers and ihe CF.Os of large corporal ions, as well as the immense bursl nf aetiv ia> in wholly new sectors («ich as computing and the internet, media, and retailing) changed the locus of upper-cows economic power significantly. While ncohbcrali/Jtion may have been about ihe icstuf "mi-. . ..i^ p.^:^ ii h.,^ nt*[ necessarily meant the. ;-slii:at]niL of economic pc-wcr In tiie s.ciie people. BuU j.. llle einlliaslinsj cases of llie [ S and Rriuiil illustrate, class' means -liflcrcnl things in differenl plains, and in some instances (for temple in the US) it is often held to have no meaning at all. In addition there have been strong currents of differentiation in terms of class identity forma don and re-lormation in different parts of the world. In Indonesia, Malay ska, and the Philippines, for l sample, economic power became s.1 ron^ly .M Freedom's Just Another Word ... concentrated among; a few ethnic-minority Chinese, and the mode of acquisition of that economic power was quite different from that in Australia or the US (it was heavily concentrated in trading activities and entailed the cornering of markets11}. And the rise of the seven oligarchs in Russia derived from the quite unique configuration uf L:irc:un>sfanLts thai held in ihc wake nf ihe esillapse of the Soviet Union, Nevertheless, there arc some general trends that can be identified. JTte first is for the privileges of ownership and management of capitalist enterprises—traditionally separated—to fuse by paying CI'Xls {nianagcisj :u stuck Miliums i ow nc-rship titles). Stock values rather lhan [lmdui linn i lien l-si onu- i hi- guiding light of ivnnomu- activity ami, as later hi came .ipparrnt with the collapse nf i.iimp.inifs mn-h as Enron, the speculative temptations that resulted from this could become overwhelming, The second trend has been to dramatically reduce the historical gap between money capital earning dividends and interest, on the one hand, and production, manufacturing, or mcrchani capiial Looking tu gain profiis mi the other. This separatum li.nl .il ■,jrii-ns limes in (he past produced ciinflicts between financiers, producers, and merchants. In Britain, for example* government policy in the 1960s catered primarily to the requirements of the financiers in the Dry of London, often to the detriment of domestic manufacturing, and in the 1960s conflicts in the US between financiers and manufacturing LOTpiirafiims had iittcil surfaced. During ihc 1970s mut:h of this conflict c-Hher disappeared or took new forms The Urge corporations became more and more financial in their orientation* even when, as in the automobile sector, they were engaging in production. Since 1980 or so it has not been uncommon for corporations to report losses in production offset by gains from financial operations (everything from credit and insurance ippcratiuns to speculating in volatile current.v and futures markets). Mergers across sectors conjoined production, merchanting, real estate, and financial interests in new ways to produce diversified conglomerates. When US Steel changed its name to USX. (purchasing strong stakes in insurance) the chairman of the board, James Roderick, replied to the question 'What is X?' with the simple answer LX stands for uiimcv'" S3 Freedom's. J um Amu her Word ... All of this connected to the strong bum in activity and power within the world of finance, increasingly freed from the rcgukatory cimstrainis and harriers that had hitherto confined its field of action, financial activity could flourish as never before, eventualis everywhere. A wave of innovations occurred in financial services 10 produce not only far more sophisticared global interconnections but also new kinds of financial marke n Immiü on securitization, dctivauves.. and all manner nf futures irading. Neoliberalbration has, nieurii, in shoris i111 fmancialiratiun cjf everything. This drcp- i:nd :hc linhl til' lirunq nv it ii:fieT .Ue.ľ- >l die cOinuftn, as Well as over ihc state apparatus and, as Rangy Martin |Hiiiits nm, dailj I Tie. * It also introduced an jccc-kraiiiin vul jiiliiv into glnhal exchange relations. There was unquestionably a powder shift away from production to the wurld nf finance, Cains in manufacturing eapaciu m i lonycr necessarily meant rising per capita incomes, but concent rat ion nn financial services certainly did. For this reason, the support of financial institutions and the integrity of the financial system became the central concern of the collectivity of neo-libcr.il states (such as the group comprising the world's richest countries known as the does badly. And tor several years* particularly during the 1990s, this is exactly what happened. While the slogan was often advanced in the lQri0s thai what was good for General Motors was good foi the US, ibis had changed In the 1990s into ihe slogan thaT what is good for Wall Street is all thai Iraners, One substantial core of rising class power under ncoliberahsm lie«, therefore, with the CEOs, the key operators on corporate boards, and the leaders in the financial. Legal, and technical apparatuses that surround this inner sanctum of capitalist activity.2* The power of the actual owners <>t capital, du sh.K kholders, has, however, been ■umcwhai diminished unless [hey can gain a sufiieieiitlv lai^e voting inierest lo affect corporate policy. Sharelmlders have nn nivasiim been hilled nf mi I lions by the operations of the CEOs and their financial advisers. Speculative gains, have also made it possible to amass enormous fortunes within a 33 freedom's Jusi Another Word , .. very short period of time (examples are Warren Buftetr and George Soros), But it would be wrong to confine the notion of the upper class 10 this group alone. The opening up of entrepreneurial i ippori unities as well as new structures in trading rclaiiurci, have allowed .substantially new processes of class formation to emerge Fast fortunes were made in new sectors of (he economy such as biotechnology and information technologies (for example by Bill Gates and Paul Allen), New market relations opened up all manner of possibilities to buy cheap and sell dear, if not to actually corner markets in such a way as to build fortunes that can cither extend horizontal I v us in the case of Rupert Murdoch's sprawling global media empire) or be diversified into all manner of businesses, evtundinp baekwatds into resource extraction and production and forwards from a trading base inlo financial services, real-estate development, and retailing In this it frequently happened that a privileged relationship lo state power also played a key role. The two businessmen who were closest to Suharto in Indonesia, for example, luiih fed the Suharto family financial interests hut also fed off their connections to that stall apparatus in Income immensely rich, By 1997 one of them, tlte Saliin Group, was 'reportedly the world's largest Chincse-owned conglomerate, with $20 billion in assets and some five hundred companies'. Starting with a relatively small imesimenl company, Carlos Slim gained control over ihe newly privatized telecommunications ssstem in \U\i,n and quicklv parlayed that into a huge conglomerate empire that controls not only a huge slice of the Mexican economy but has sprawling interests in US retailing (Circuit City and Barnes and Noble) as well as throughout I jiin America * In the US, the Walton tamih has become-immensely rich as Wal-Mart has surged into a dominant position in US retailing but with integration into Chinese production lines \as well as retail stores worldwide. While there are obvious links [between these sorts of activities and the world of finance, the incicdibk- ability out nails lo amass large personal fortunes but to cvcrcisc a Lxintmlling power over large segments of the ecnnnmv liniters nr. these few individuals immense ecotaOfrnt pom tu influence political processes. Small wonder that the net worth of the J58 richest people in 1996 was: 'equal to ihe combined income Freedom's Just Another Word. of the poorest 45 per cent of the world's population 2,3 billion people'. Worse still, 'the world's 20(1 richest people more than doubled ihdT net worth in the four years to 1996, to more than 91 trillion The assets of the top three billionaires (were by then J more than ihe combined GNP of all least developed countries and their 600 million people.fJ1 There is, however, one further conundrum to be considered in [ this process ol radical reconfiguration »f class relations. The question arises, and has been much debated, as to whether this new class configuration should 1st- nmsulend as transnational or whether it can be still understood as something based exclusively within the parameters of the nation-state.,! My own position it this. The case thai the ruling class anywhere has ever confined its I operations and defined its loyalties to any one naiion-siate has I historically been much overstated. It never did make much sense to I speak of a distinctively US versus flritish or French or German or Korean capitalist class. The international links were always important, particularly through colonial and neocolonial activities, but also through transnational connections that go back to the nineteenth ecnturv if not before. But there has undoubtedly been a deepening as well as a widening of these transnational connections during i be phase of neolibcral glubali/jlion, and it is vital that these connect is ilies be acknowledged. This does not mean, however, that ihe leading individuals within this class do not attach themselves to specific state apparatuses lor both the advantages and the protections that this affords them. Whett they specifically attach themselves is important, but is no more stable than Trie capitalist activity thev pursue. Rupert Murdoch mas hegin in Australia then concentrate on Rrilain before finally taking up citizenship (doubtless on an accelerated schedule) in the US. He is not above or outside particular state powers, but by the same-token !*" wields considerable influence via his media interests in polities jn Britain, the LS, and Australia. All 247 of the supposedly ii.-l penJenl editors of his m-ws-pupt-rv, wurldwidr ~-11::i!■ itiPl! iIk- I s irv.isuTi of Iran U i form of shorthand, hum-ver. if s'lll nukes sense lo speak about US or British or Korean capitalist class interests because corporate interests like Murdoch s or those of Carlos Slim or the Salim group both feed 3S Freedom"* Just Another Word ., • )olf and nuTiuTt specific smii apparatuses, hach can and typically does, however, exert class power in marc than one stale simultaneously, While this disparate group of individuals embedded in the corporate, financial, trading, and developer unrlds do not necessarily conspire as a class, and while there may be frequent tensions between them, they nevertheless possess a certain accordance of interests iliut generally rccogniy.es the advantages (and now some of the dangers) to be derived from nejolibcralization. They also (Hisses*, through ..►ryani^ations like the World Fcoriomic Km urn at 1 Javos, means of exchanging ideas and of consorting and consulting with political leadets. They exercise immense influence over global affairs and possess a freedom of actii m t hat no ord inary citizen possesses. Freedom's Prospect This history of neoliberalizarion ar.il cLss inrmadM, and the proliferating acceptance of the ideas of the Vfont Pelenn Society as the ruling ideas of the time, nukes for interesting reading when placed against the background of counter-arguments laid out by Karl Polanvi in 1944 (shortly before the Mont Pclerin Society was established). In a complex society, he pointed out, I he meaning of freedom becomes as contradictory' and as fraught as its incitements to action are compelling. There arc, he noted, two kinds of freedom, one good and the other bad. Among the latter be listed 'the freedom to exploit one's fellows, or the freedom to make inordinate gains without commensurable service to the community, the freedom to keep technological ins en lions from being used lor puhlie benefit, or the freedom in profit from public calamities secret h engineered for private advantage', But, Polanvi continued, 'the market economy unden- which these freedoms throve also produced freedoms we prize highly. Freedom of conscience; freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, freedom of assodai ion, freedom to choose one's own fob1. While we may 'cherish these freedoms lor their own sale', -and, surely, mam of us still do— they were 10 a large extent 'by-products of the same economy that was also responsible for the evil freedoms'. '' Polanyi's answer to this duality makes strange reading given the current hegemony of nemiberal thinking: Freedom's Just Another Word . . . The passing i>l | the | market economy can become like lie jinnim; of jji era of unprecedented freedom, juridical and actual freedom can he nude-wider and more general thin ever before; regulation and control can achieve freedom nut unly fur the tew, but for ill. Freedom not as an appurtenance of pro lU-p:, tainted at the source, but as a prescriptive right emending far beyond the narrow confines of the political sphere into the intimate organization nf siniciy itself Thus will uld freedoms ami civic rights be added to (he fund of new freedoms generated ho the lemiri- and security that industrial society offer* to all Such a society can afford to be both just and Unfortunately, Polanvi noted, the passage to such a future is blocked by the 'mural obstacle' of libctal uropianism (and umru than once he cites Hayek as an exemplar of that tradition): Planning and cnntrnl are being attacked as a denial of freedom. Free enterprise and přisáté ownership are declared tu be essentials od freedom No society built on other fouudaiiuns is said tu deserve in be called free. ITic freedinn lllal regulation creates is denounced at unlreedmnL the justice, liberty and welfare it offers are decried as a camouflage || ilavery." The idea of freedom "thus degenerates into a mere advocacy of free enterprise', which means 'the fullness of freedom iin Those whose income, leisure and security need no enhancing, and a mere pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain atlempt to make use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the owners of property'. Hut if, as is always the case, 'no society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function1, then the only way this liberal Utopian vision could be sustained is by force, violence, and authoritarianism. Liberal or neoliberal utopianksm is doomed, in Polanyi's view; to be frustrated by authoritarianism, or even outright fascism.1* The good freedoms arc lost, the bad ones take over. Polanyi's diagnosis appears peculiarly appropriate to our con-temporal condition It provides a powerful vantage point from which in understand what President bush intends when he asserts that 'as the greatest power on earth we |the US) have an obligation to help the spread of freedom'. It helps explain why neoliberalisrn 37 Freedom's Just Another Word , has turned «i authoritarian, forceful, and anti-democratic at the very moment when "huniaiv.tv hulu\ in r.\ haiuU r he ■ .ppm t..ui:v to offer freedom's triumph over all its age-old foes'.'' It males us focus on how so mam corporations have profiteered from withholding the benefits of their technologies (such as AIDS drugs) from the public sphere, as well as from the calamities of war (as in ihe case of Halliburton), famine, and environmental disaster. It raises the worry as to whether or not many of these calamities nr near calamities (arms races and the need to ci uifront both real and imagined enemies) have been secretly engineered for corporate advantage. And it males it all too clear whv those of wealth and power so avidlv support certain conceptions of rights and freedoms while seeking to pefiuade us of their universality and goodness^ Thirty years of neolibcral freedoms have, after all, not only restored power to a narrowly defined capitalist class. They have also produced immense concentrations of corporate power in energy, the media, pharmaceuticals, transportation, and even retailing (for example Wal-Mart). The freedom of the market that Hush proclaims as the high point of human aspiration turns out ro be nothing more than the convenient means to spread corporate monopoly power and tjx-a Cola everywhere without constraint With disproportionate influence over the media and the political process this class (with Rupert Murdoch and Fox News in the lead) has both the inc<:ott\e and the power to persuade us that we arc all better off under a neolibcral regime of freedoms For the elite, living comfortably in their gilded ghettos, the world must indeed seem a better place. As Polanyi might have put it, neolibcr alism confers rights and Irccdnrns on those 'whose incomcVleisure and security need no enhancing1, leaving a pittance for the rest of us. How is it, then, that 'the rest of us' have so easily acquired in this state of affairs?