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The Peacekeeping–Peacemaking Dilemma

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Peacekeeping has become an increasingly prominent tool for conflict management and there has been an accompanying explosion of scholarly studies on peacekeeping. Yet, such analyses typically ignore the process of getting a peace agreement itself, missing the potential impact that a peacekeeping force might have in facilitating a peace agreement between protagonists. In this paper, we explore among both enduring rivalries and civil wars whether the presence of a peacekeeping force enhances the prospects for gaining an agreement between protagonists. The academic literature suggests opposing logics: one suggesting the desirability of peacekeeping forces while the other implies that they may be counterproductive. We consider whether the presence of peacekeeping enhances or inhibits mediation and negotiation attempts. We also explore whether the success rates for international mediation and negotiation efforts in those conflicts are affected by the presence of peacekeeping forces. Our results suggest support for the pessimistic view of peacekeeping as it discourages diplomatic efforts and decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement, although the results are clearer for interstate conflict than for civil wars.

Peacekeeping has become an increasingly prominent tool used by the international community to promote conflict management and resolution. Indeed, in the history of the United Nations, over three-fourths of its peacekeeping operations have been initiated since 1988. Although such peacekeeping operations have had, or could have, a variety of missions (see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998, for a comparison), most of the operations have been put in place (1) following a cease-fire, but prior to a peace agreement (“traditional peacekeeping”), or (2) following a peace agreement between disputing parties (as a component of “peacebuilding”).

There has been an explosion of studies that have looked at the conditions associated with successful traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Yet the process of getting a peace agreement itself (“peacemaking”) is largely ignored by such analyses.¹ For studies of traditional peacekeeping, the focus is on peacekeepers’

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¹ In using the terms “peacekeeping,” “peacemaking,” and “peacebuilding,” we adopt the definitional standards articulated in Boutros-Ghali (1995). Traditional peacekeeping is distinguished from other forms of peacekeeping based on mission type and a series of other dimensions—see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall (1998).

ability to maintain a cease-fire (conflict abatement or avoidance) and not necessarily on resolving the underlying conflict (Fortna 2004). Indeed, some have even argued that considering broader conflict resolution as an explicit criterion for evaluating peacekeeping operations is inappropriate (Johansen 1994; Bratt 1996; see also Druckman and Stern 1997). For scholars of peacebuilding, a peace agreement is critical in defining the environment for peacekeepers to operate. Yet, the peace agreement is taken as a given, and its occurrence is prior to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. This obviates a concern with a reverse causal connection between the two.

What most previous studies miss is the possible impact that the deployment of a peacekeeping force might have on facilitating a peace agreement between protagonists. Specifically, we explore whether the presence of a peacekeeping force enhances the prospects for gaining a settlement between protagonists. Most studies do not address such concerns, and those few that offer some insights do so from a limited empirical basis, often from one or only a few cases. Furthermore, the academic literature seems to suggest opposing logics: one suggesting the desirability of peacekeeping forces while the other implies that they may be counterproductive.

The peacekeeping-peacemaking relationship is a critical one for policy makers. Policy makers must first decide whether to send peacekeeping forces to a conflict or whether to rely on other responses (e.g., diplomacy, traditional military intervention). A second dependent choice is the timing of any peacekeeping intervention, specifically whether to deploy forces in one of four conflict phases: prior to the outbreak of violence, during active combat, following a cease-fire, or only after a peace agreement has been signed. If peacekeeping promotes peace settlements, this suggests the desirability of early and frequent deployments of peacekeeping forces, even in the face of significant initial costs. For example, leading UN member states resisted deployment of peacekeeping forces into the Congo in 1999 until a peace agreement was in place between warring factions (and neighboring states). As a consequence, many civilians died in the interim and a comprehensive peace agreement proved elusive. When it finally came, it did not hold for very long. Peacekeepers might have promoted such a peace agreement earlier, and perhaps one that was more successfully implemented. In contrast, if peacekeeping forces stifle conflict resolution efforts, they may be little more than tourniquets that cannot be removed, with all the political and financial implications of a long-standing peacekeeping deployment. This is the standard critique of UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and on the Golan Heights. Thus, policy makers should refrain from deployment of peacekeeping operations, at least until the combatants have reached some kind of resolution to their dispute.

In order to assess the impact of peacekeeping on diplomatic success, we look at the dynamics of all enduring rivalries between states in the 1946–1996 period and all civil wars between 1946–1999. We first consider whether the presence of peacekeeping enhances or inhibits mediation and negotiation attempts. We then explore whether the success rates for international mediation and negotiation efforts in those conflicts were affected by the presence of peacekeeping forces. We consider whether rivalries and civil wars with peacekeeping had a higher incidence of peace agreements than those that had no such forces. Yet because the deployment of peacekeepers is not randomly distributed, we also look at particular rivalries and civil wars that had periods with and without peacekeeping forces in place, using a time series design. We begin with a discussion of the process of conflict management and how peacemaking can evolve from it. We then survey the empirical literature and different theoretical arguments that explicate the alleged connection between peacekeeping deployment and peace settlements.

Moving from Conflict Management to Settlement

Although peacekeeping is an important tool for conflict management in the international system, it is only one of a myriad of approaches to conflict management. Bercovitch, Diehl, and Goertz (1997), for example, distinguish between three general categories of conflict management approaches: unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral methods. Deterrence is the most common means of unilateral conflict management while negotiations are the most common form of bilateral conflict management. Mediation and peacekeeping are both multilateral forms of conflict management. Simply managing conflict, however, only represents a limited victory for peace. Without successfully settling the issues under conflict between disputants, the seeds for renewed conflict remain and the conflict is not resolved.

Although peacekeeping can help to manage conflict, by itself, it cannot settle disputes. Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) point to four general means through which disputed issues can be settled: struggle, adjudication, negotiation, and mediation. Struggle, in which disputants employ violence and other means of contention to impose their own settlement to the issues under dispute upon one another, is a common approach to the settlement of disputes. Yet, struggle involves significant costs and risks for disputants. Disputants pay the costs of violence and risk both an uncontrollable escalation of conflict and defeat. Adjudication, although relatively rare in violent international conflicts, involves the imposition of a settlement upon the disputing parties, backed by the force of law. Negotiation and mediation represent middle grounds between struggle and adjudication. Similar to struggle, both mediation and negotiation preserve the independent decision-making of disputants. Mediation and negotiation, however, by relying on dialogue and bargaining, avoid many of the costs that are endemic to struggle. Mediation and negotiation are also similar to adjudication in their reliance upon compromise as instrumental in achieving a settlement to the issues under dispute. Yet, mediation and negotiation, unlike arbitration, are activities in which either disputant may unilaterally terminate the process.

Mediation and negotiation are the most commonly used means for settling conflicts within the international system. Although Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) describe mediation and negotiation as separate means of dispute settlement, these two approaches share more commonalities than differences. Both mediation and negotiation, unlike more contentious means of dispute settlement, are built around compromise by the disputants. Jackson's (2000:324) description of negotiation as "a process by which states and other actors in the international arena exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about a point of conflict and manage their relationship" could just as easily describe mediation. Both mediation and negotiation exhibit the same give and take bargaining and each holds the possibility for the achievement of a win-win solution that is absent from struggle-based approaches. Indeed, Touval and Zartman (1989) suggest that mediation is simply a form of negotiation in which a mediator aids the disputants in finding a solution that they are unable to locate themselves. What separates mediation and negotiation from one another is the inclusion of a third party in mediation efforts. Yet, even with the addition of a third-party to the negotiation process, disputants still preserve "the right to accept or reject any suggestions made by the mediator" (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993:103).

The addition of a third party can have important consequences upon the prospects for dispute settlement. Even if both disputants desire a settlement, bilateral negotiations may fail because disputants are unable to recognize areas of commonality, lack the means of guaranteeing the agreement, or require further incentives to bridge the gaps between their proposals (see Princen 1992, for example). Mediators can be instrumental in solving what Ott (1972) terms "the bargainer's dilemma" in which disputants fear that making the concessions nec-

essary for an agreement will make them appear weak to their opponent, increasing the likelihood of exploitation. Mediators can promote settlements by allaying disputants' fears of exploitation and providing the political cover necessary for the parties to make the concessions necessary for agreement (Carnevale and Choi 2000). In this respect, third parties can play a powerful face-saving role for disputants that allows them to better "sell" an agreement to their domestic constituents. Finally, mediators can serve as settlement innovators by recognizing or creating settlements that the disputants are unable to achieve on their own. A third party, for example, can provide resources to one or both of the disputants that makes an otherwise unacceptable settlement proposal acceptable.

Mediation and negotiation agreements can vary in terms of the degree to which they resolve all of the outstanding disputes between parties. Some agreements may be comprehensive, settling all of the issues of contention between the parties; others may be more narrowly focused upon a few areas of agreement while leaving other disputed issues unsolved. Although these partial agreements do not solve all of the issues between disputants, they do have important effects upon the parties. First, simply by reducing the number of disputed issues between the parties, partial agreements make future mediation and negotiation efforts more likely to be successful by reducing their complexity (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Hopmann 1996).² Second, previous agreements, even over a narrow range of issues, can create a momentum for a further agreement such that agreements build upon one another as the disputants increasingly trust one another and become hopeful for further settlements (Zubek et al. 1992; Regan and Stam 2000; Greig 2001, 2005). In both of these ways, mediation and negotiation efforts, even those confined to a narrow range of issues, can assist in moving disputants from the limitation of their conflict toward the settlement of the issues under conflict. We test the ability of mediation and negotiation efforts to yield these types of settlements, and how peacekeeping enhances or detracts from those abilities.

Competing Logics

Early peacekeeping studies were predominantly atheoretical and largely descriptive treatments of single peacekeeping operations. The first systematic analyses focused on the ability of peacekeeping operations to prevent the renewal of armed conflict (e.g., Diehl 1994; Bratt 1996). Peacekeeping was judged successful if the mandate was fulfilled and/or war did not re-erupt or violent conflict was held to low levels following the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Several more recent studies have looked at the "duration of peace" as measured by the time from a stoppage in fighting to the renewal of violence (Enterline and Kang 2003; Fortna 2004). Generally, much of this literature looks at how peacekeeping and other third party guarantees can help implement peace settlements (e.g., Walter 2002). Such work tends to confound simple cease-fires with formal peace settlements, however, as both are considered beginning points for measuring peace duration. At best, a peace settlement is considered as an *independent* variable in the equation. The possibility that comprehensive peace settlements, or indeed any future agreement, might follow from initial and limited cease-fires is not addressed.³

Do peacekeeping operations promote peace agreements and conflict resolution? Most prior work on peacekeeping does not address such questions (see even the

² This may, however, reduce the potential for tradeoffs across issues.

³ Other studies focus on peacebuilding success by considering whether peacekeeping forces promote desirable outcomes beyond continued conflict abatement. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) look at how peacekeeping contributes to democratization and uncontested sovereignty, as well as reduced violence, following civil wars. Again, a signed treaty is an independent, not a dependent variable.

collection by Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2000).⁴ Peacekeeping operations and treaties are either considered joint independent variables on conflict, or peacekeeping sequentially follows a peace agreement. In effect, past peacekeeping research has looked at its effectiveness in the third (cease-fire) or fourth (post-settlement) conflict phases, but has not examined how peacekeeping affects the transition between those phases. Peacekeeping essentially plays a conflict *management* role in the third phase. Yet peacekeeping's conflict *resolution* impact cannot be determined directly because the typical peacekeeping operation does not have the mandate, resources, or elements necessary to promote conflict resolution (Johansen 1994); diplomatic efforts at peace settlements are usually enterprises separate from the peacekeeping effort.⁵ Still, peacekeeping may indirectly influence peacemaking efforts by altering the environment in which those efforts occur as well as the incentives of the disputing parties to reach a settlement. Unfortunately, there are two sets of competing logics on such effects, which we label as "optimistic" and "pessimistic," and as yet little empirical evidence exists to indicate which is more accurate.

The Logics of Optimism

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1995:45) has argued that peacekeeping "expands the possibilities for . . . the making of peace." Yet, the causal connection between peacekeeping and peacemaking is not transparent in most formulations. Nevertheless, several theoretical rationales can be found in the extensive literature on the conditions for international mediation and negotiation success, even though those studies do not generally address peacekeeping operations per se.

One of the key factors thought to affect the success of mediation and negotiation attempts is the level of conflict between the disputants at the time of those efforts. Most peacekeeping operations have the limitation of armed conflict as one of their primary (or only) purposes. If they are successful in preventing the renewal of hostilities (i.e., actually keep the peace), peacekeeping operations create an environment in which the disputants are more likely to be open to diplomatic initiatives and to settle their differences. A series of studies in the conflict management literature have found that intense conflict between disputants undermines the prospects for mediation success (Kochan and Jick 1978; Brockner 1982; Kressel and Pruitt 1989; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Bercovitch 1997). By implication then, factors that lessen the intensity of that conflict contribute to peacemaking triumphs.

There are several theoretical rationales why intense conflict is deleterious to mediation and negotiation, and why a cease-fire promotes the conditions under which mediators can facilitate an agreement between the opposing sides. First, a cooling off period, evidenced by a cease-fire, can lessen hostilities and build some trust between the protagonists. In times of armed conflict, leaders and domestic audiences become habituated to the conflict. They become psychologically committed to the conflict, and some segments of the population profit politically and economically from the fighting (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004). Before diplomatic efforts can be successful, this process must be broken or interrupted, something that peacekeepers can assist with in maintaining a cease-fire.

⁴ More theoretical studies possess a much broader view of conflict resolution, going beyond concerns with whether disputants can come to agreements or resolve competing preferences, but whether reconciliation or "transformation" between or within societies occurs (e.g., Fetherston 2000). Such conceptions of conflict resolution are much grander than employed here and more tenuously connected to peacekeeping efforts. Although a valid line of inquiry, such works tell us little about the ability of peacekeeping to facilitate peace agreements. Indeed, such agreements are prerequisites for the kind of reconciliation envisioned in those conceptions.

⁵ To the extent that peacekeepers conduct conflict resolution activities, they do so on the ground and at the micro-level (e.g., at a roadblock) rather than being directly involved in negotiations aimed at resolving macro issues in a dispute (see Wall, Druckman, and Diehl 2002).

Second, intense conflict puts domestic political constraints on leaders who might otherwise be inclined to sign a peace agreement. Negotiating with the enemy may have significant political costs during active hostilities. Calls for cease-fires or pauses in bombing attacks in order to promote negotiations and diplomatic efforts are consistent with this underlying logic. Of course, this presumes that hostilities harden bargaining positions and attitudes, rather than leading to concessions by parties suffering significant costs (see the discussion of “hurting stalemates” below). Third, and from a somewhat different vantage point, active conflict leads decision makers to concentrate on those ongoing hostilities (a short-term concern), and therefore they will not place settlement issues (a longer-term concern) high on their agendas. That is, during heightened armed conflict, political and diplomatic attention will be devoted to the conduct of the fighting and at best to immediate conflict management issues such as securing a cease-fire. Fourth, that the international community has provided peacekeepers signals to the disputants the willingness of the international community to commit additional resources to any settlement that would follow such a deployment.

Traditional peacekeeping operations are most often put in place after a cease-fire has been achieved. The expectation of the optimists therefore would be that conflict settlements would be more likely after the imposition of those forces relative to other scenarios; this is essentially the assumption underlying Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's (1995) proposals. Yet, an important caveat to this expectation is that diplomacy will fail if peacekeepers do not keep the peace; that is, the positive spin-off effects of peacekeeping are predicated on cease-fires holding. We also analyze peacekeeping's effects on initiation of mediation and negotiation. The first three logics above suggest that parties would be more willing to negotiate in the presence of peacekeeping, as well as more successful in those efforts. The final logic, based on signaling international commitment, is suggestive of more frequent mediation attempts by members of the global community, including by states and international organizations. Thus, peacekeeping should be associated with more frequent mediation and negotiation attempts as well as promoting a greater success rate when they do occur.

The empirical evidence evaluating the optimist position is limited. Traditional peacekeeping is generally successful in maintaining cease-fires (Diehl 1994). Yet, in a series of case studies, Diehl (1994) does not find peacekeeping to be followed quickly or frequently by diplomatic settlements, and he rejects the notion that failure at conflict abatement is responsible for this. Sambanis (1999) accepts the argument that peacekeeping's ability to promote conflict resolution is heavily dependent on how well the operation performs its mandate, including monitoring cease-fires. Yet, he concludes much depends on how the parties and the international community react to the peacekeeping success or failure. For example, failure to maintain the cease-fire may redouble international efforts to resolve the conflict. Similarly, success in conflict abatement may change the preferences of the protagonists, build trust between them, and make them more amenable to a settlement. Both of these studies, however, are small *N* studies, and rely heavily on a single peacekeeping case, Cyprus, in an attempt to draw generalizations.

Overall, the optimistic position is based on a logic derived from studies of mediation and negotiation, with some potential applications to peacekeeping's impact on the diplomatic environment. Limited research on its predictions is not supportive of its contentions. More developed and compelling theoretical logic is perhaps found in the pessimistic position.

The Logics of Pessimism

At the other end of the spectrum are theoretical logics positing a negative effect of peacekeeping operations on peacemaking initiatives. There are two primary

positions, those based on rational choice and “hurting stalemates,” respectively. Although they differ in a number of ways, both rely on peacekeeping’s achievement of a cease-fire and both share the same pessimistic prediction that peacekeeping will make conflict resolution efforts less successful.

In some rational choice conceptions, war and other militarized competitions are essentially information problems. War begins because there is some uncertainty about the outcome of a confrontation between disputants. Under conditions of perfect information, disputants would come to an agreement *ex ante*, and therefore not incur the costs of competition. Cetinyan (2002), for example, argues that bargaining breakdown in ethnic conflicts occurs because of the problems of information and commitments, not capability differences between the parties. Fighting provides each side with information about capabilities and resolve such that they can predict likely outcomes of future confrontations; war ends when the two sides have clear information about those outcomes (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000; see also Reiter 2003).⁶ Peacekeeping interrupts this information flow and thereby leaves some uncertainty as to which side might prevail if armed hostilities would resume. Thus, peacekeepers prevent the transmission of information necessary for the parties to settle.⁷

Rational choice theorists might predict that the introduction of peacekeeping forces limits the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts, given that uncertainty still exists about future outcomes. Thus, peacekeeping should be negatively associated with diplomatic success. Peacekeeping operations that fail in maintaining cease-fires therefore may produce positive spillover effects on mediation and negotiation efforts; fighting renews the flow of information about capabilities and resolve to the participants.

Peacekeeping should not necessarily be an absolute barrier to diplomatic settlement according to the rational choice perspective. Mediators may be able to provide necessary information to the participants, if those third parties possess such information and are regarded as credible by the disputants (Smith and Stam 2003). Thus, one might expect that the negative relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking would be more muted for mediation than for negotiation, the latter of which only involves the primary parties. Yet, even for mediation, disputants must agree that each can do better by participating in mediation than by relying upon a unilateral effort to impose a settlement upon one another (Princen 1992). To the extent to which peacekeeping limits the likelihood that this perception will develop among disputants, it will undermine settlement of the issues between them. Peacekeeping reduces the likelihood of negotiation between the disputants for the same reason it reduces the likelihood of success, because it limits information available to the disputants. This reduction would decrease the willingness of either side to initiate negotiations for fear that this would signal weakness to the opposing side. Conversely, peacekeeping could increase the likelihood of mediation between disputants. Mediation is often proposed by a third-party. As a result, accepting the proposal of a third party for mediation does not signal potential weakness that unilaterally calling for negotiations does. In addition, the presence of peacekeeping forces can provide information about the conflict and prospects for its resolution to third parties, increasing their willingness to intervene diplomatically.

Peacekeeping forces are usually put in place following a cease-fire agreed to by all major disputing parties. Might this indicate that the parties have reached a stage in the conflict at which enough information about outcomes has been gathered and

⁶ Smith and Stam (2003) explore peacekeeping and mediation from a rational choice perspective, but they do not consider how the two factors affect one another and largely conclude that peacekeeping can contribute to peace settlements as guarantors of those settlements rather than as facilitators of any agreement. At best, they argue that peacekeepers reduce the probability that one side or the other can win the next battle.

⁷ Of course, peacekeeping also prevents outright victory by one side, something also alleged to resolve the dispute (Luttwak 2001).

they are ready to settle? Although this is possible, it is unlikely in practice. Cease-fires often occur for many reasons (e.g., a chance to rearm and reorganize, for reputational purposes, or in response to domestic public opinion) that are unrelated to uncertainty about future outcomes or even a desire for settlement (Princen 1992; Richmond 1998). Furthermore, if cease-fires always indicated a willingness to settle a conflict, then they would be immediately followed by peace agreements. In fact, fighting often returns after a cease-fire and even those that do hold linger for long periods without a substantive agreement on the issues under dispute. Furthermore, if the war or rivalry had indeed run its course, then a cease-fire (by definition something temporary) would not be necessary as the parties would merely withdraw their forces and settle. From a rational choice perspective then, a cease-fire is indicative of an interrupted process of information gathering, short of the conflict's normal conclusion.

A variation of the pessimistic view, but with the same conclusion about the deleterious effects of peacekeeping, is rooted in Zartman's (1985, 2000) notion of hurting stalemate. A hurting stalemate occurs when opponents have reached an impasse in their conflict such that neither is likely to prevail or achieve their goals through force. This is related to the rational choice formulations concerning expectations about future outcomes; yet, parties have to recognize that neither side can win and this is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition for settlement. Stalemate must also be costly for the disputants. Intense conflict can be the mechanism by which some costs are imposed, with casualties and resources devoted to the conflict inducing costs upon both parties. Under these conditions, the disputants will look for a way out of their stalemate and thereby be open to attempts to settle their differences (Young 1967; Holbrooke 1998; Greig 2001). Peacekeeping operations may lessen the "ripeness" for conflict resolution by diminishing the chances for a hurting stalemate. By limiting armed conflict, peacekeeping may decrease the costs to all sides in the dispute. Thus, without ongoing costs in terms of lives or military resources, disputants may harden their bargaining positions and be resistant to diplomatic efforts. Peacekeeping might also lessen the time pressure on the disputants (Diehl 1994). Mediation studies have consistently found that deadline pressures are more likely to lead to settlements. Peacekeeping operations *de facto* have no explicit deadlines and therefore disputants may feel little need to settle, hoping for better terms of settlement later.⁸ Peacekeeping would seem to have effects mostly on the cost side of the hurting stalemate equation. A cease-fire successfully monitored by peacekeepers might at first glance seem to facilitate a stalemate; yet, this depends significantly on which side (if either) benefits from a freezing of the status quo.

The hurting stalemate model produces similar predictions to the rational choice perspective, albeit with a different underlying logic: Peacekeeping operations should be associated with diplomatic failure. Hurting stalemates would also seem to come later in a conflict (although not always), after costs accumulate, and therefore peacekeepers would appear to produce more deleterious effects when deployed early in a conflict as opposed to later. Of course, a critic might argue the opposite: Disputants involved in conflicts that persist over a sustained period of time are likely to develop significant levels of hostility toward one another that are likely to hinder conflict management efforts. The absence of time pressure and costs might also make disputants less willing to initiate negotiations. Similarly, although the international community may bear some costs associated with peacekeeping deployment, third parties may view a situation stabilized by peacekeepers as lacking

⁸ Although peacekeeping forces are typically authorized for six-month periods, renewals are regularly approved. Therefore, disputants can reasonably expect that peacekeeping operations will continue beyond each 6-month period, and therefore do not fear an imminent resumption of hostilities that might make them more open to settlement.

TABLE 1. Summary of Theoretical Expectations

<i>Logics</i>	<i>Variations</i>	<i>Peacekeeping Effects</i>	<i>Expectations</i>
Optimistic		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Promotes cooling-off period 2. Reduces leader constraint 3. Focuses attention on long-term issues 4. Signals global commitment 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mediation and negotiation more likely 2. Settlement more likely 3. Failed peacekeeping will not promote settlement
Pessimistic	Rational choice	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interrupts information flow to disputants 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Negotiation less likely, mediation more likely 2. Settlement less likely 3. Failed peacekeeping may promote settlement 4. Greater negative effect on negotiation than mediation
	Hurting stalemate	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Decreases costs to disputants 2. Lessens time pressures 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Negotiation and mediation less likely 2. Settlement less likely 3. Early peacekeeping is worse than later peacekeeping

urgency and one in which negative externalities are less likely; thus, one might also predict fewer mediation efforts.

Diehl's (1994) case studies produce findings consistent with the pessimistic view, but there are no studies to our knowledge that specifically test the propositions noted above. One problem with rational choice research is that it tends to conflate war termination with conflict resolution. The end of a war does not necessarily settle issues in dispute between states, evidenced by the continuation of rivalries and the initiation of new wars in the future. In addition, studies of ripeness and hurting stalemates have suffered from post hoc tautologies ("if there was no settlement, then the situation was not ripe . . .") that are impossible to test empirically (Kleiboer 1994).

Overall, there are theoretical logics that connect peacekeeping to peacemaking. The problem is that the logics are competing, suggesting dramatically different relationships and policy implications—see Table 1. Further complicating this is the very limited empirical evidence available to sort out such competing claims. We hope to fill that gap below.

Research Design

In testing the different views of peacekeeping and peacemaking, we must look for the confluence of peacekeeping operations with instances of diplomatic success and failure. Because they do not exist in situations of low conflict, a necessary first step is the identification of a suitable set of conflicts in which peacekeeping and peace initiatives are likely to occur. Once we establish the set of conflicts we will examine, we can then determine which of those involved the deployment of peacekeeping troops and whether diplomatic initiatives were successful, controlling for all other factors associated with peacemaking success. We consider both cases of interstate and civil conflict.

Cases of Interstate Conflict

The analysis of interstate conflicts covers the temporal domain from 1946 to 1996 and examines the population of enduring rivalries that begin after 1945. Enduring rivalries are pairs of states that experience at least six militarized disputes over a

twenty or more year time frame (data taken from Diehl and Goertz 2000).⁹ Forty-eight rivalries occur during this period; examples include India-Pakistan and rivalries between Israel and several of its Arab neighbors. Enduring rivalries represent a suitable context to examine the impact of peacekeeping on peacemaking. Such rivalries are the most dangerous conflicts, representing over half of the full-scale interstate wars and an equal proportion of lesser conflicts in the international system (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Thus, there is great policy significance to understanding how to manage and resolve such conflicts. Furthermore, because of their significance, they also attract a disproportionate number of diplomatic initiatives by third parties (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997).

By definition, however, enduring rivalries persist despite diplomatic attempts to end them. Thus, enduring rivalries are “hard cases” for peacekeeping operations and international diplomats, even as they are vitally important to world peace. We might be accused of setting up the study so as to make a “pessimistic” conclusion. We have several responses. First, if enduring rivalries are difficult to settle, they should be so whether peacekeeping forces are in place or not. If anything, the risk is that null findings occur rather than those favoring either viewpoint. Second, expanding the set of interstate conflicts beyond enduring rivalries is unsatisfactory. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) note that peacekeeping is more likely under conditions of severe conflict. Similarly, we find that most UN peacekeeping operations in interstate conflicts are sent to enduring rivalries. We reran all our analyses looking at lesser conflicts (proto-rivalries—see Diehl and Goertz 2000). Yet, among the several hundred more rivalries examined, only two had peacekeeping operations; mediation and negotiation attempts are also less frequent. Thus, the net effect of adding these cases is an explosion of “no treatment, no effect” cases that wash out any significant results. Accordingly, we confine our analysis to enduring rivalries.

Cases of Civil Conflict

As a second line of analysis, we also examine peacekeeping within civil conflicts. The temporal domain for the civil war analysis extends from 1946 to 1999. In constructing our analysis of peacekeeping within intrastate conflicts, we use data from Regan’s (2002) intrastate conflict data set. Unlike the Correlates of War data set, which employs a more restrictive 1000 battle deaths per conflict, Regan defines a civil war as involving combat between two organized groups in which at least 200 deaths occurred. By using an aggregate count of civil war deaths, Regan’s coding of civil war includes a conflict as ongoing even in years in which the number of deaths dips below the 1000 battle-death threshold established by COW. In Regan’s data, intrastate conflict terminates when a settlement is reached between the parties and 6 months without reciprocated violence between the parties elapse.

Diplomatic Attempts and Success

In order to understand whether peacekeeping operations promote peacemaking, we need to consider attempts to make peace between the disputants. Peacekeeping operations cannot magically produce peaceful relations, but must rely on explicit supplemental efforts at diplomacy. Accordingly, we use Bercovitch’s (1999) International Conflict Management (ICM) data set to identify both interstate and intrastate mediation and negotiation attempts. Because of their significant differences, we conduct separate analyses of interstate and intrastate conflict. We also conduct separate analyses of the factors that promote successful mediation and

⁹ The Diehl and Goertz (2000) list only extends through 1992. We extended their list through 1996, using their same operational criteria for enduring rivalry and using dispute data from the latest version of the Militarized Dispute Data set, version 3.0 (<http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID302.html>) 2005, March 2.

those that promote successful negotiation, taking into account the differences between the two techniques noted above. For example, we anticipate that some characteristics of the third party and its relationship with the disputants will impact the outcome of mediation.

Because mediation attempts and negotiations are not randomly distributed in the international system, one runs the risk of a significant “selection” effect (e.g., mediation attempts may occur in conflicts in which they are most or least prone to be successful). To adjust for this bias, we estimate maximum likelihood models with controls for selection. These models are estimated in two stages. In the first stage, the models estimate the likelihood that a mediation or negotiation, respectively, will take place in any given month. The results from the first stage models are then incorporated into the second stage models that estimate the likelihood of mediation and negotiation success. This approach carries two primary benefits for our analysis. First, it provides a means of measuring and controlling for the statistical bias present in the selection of cases for mediation and negotiation. Second, and more importantly, the results from the first stage model enable us to understand the relationship between peacekeeping and the occurrence of mediation and negotiation. We recognize that there is an inherent selection effect already operating when we limit our spatial domain to enduring rivalries and civil wars. Enduring rivalries are more prone than other conflicts to attract diplomatic initiatives (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997). Similarly, civil wars represent conflicts in which the outbreak of violence has already taken place, making them different from potential conflicts in which significant hostility between two disputing parties exists but has yet to boil over into violence. Still, even within enduring rivalries and civil wars, there are variations in the competitions and conditions under which mediation and negotiation are most likely to be successful.

The unit of analysis for the selection portion of the mediation and negotiation analyses is the rivalry-month in the interstate analysis and the civil war-month in the intrastate analysis. Our analysis includes a total of 18,020 rivalry-months and 12,648 civil war-months. Because of the structure of our dependent variable and the need to control for selection bias, in months in which multiple mediations or negotiations occur, we aggregate these mediation efforts.¹⁰ This procedure yields a total of 275 mediations among 24 enduring rivalries in the interstate analysis and a total of 436 cases of mediation across 40 civil wars. We adopt a similar procedure to identify cases of negotiations in the ICM data set. Aggregating these negotiations by the month results in a data set of 325 negotiations across 28 enduring rivalries and 221 cases of negotiations within 36 civil wars. In the interstate analysis, the 275 cases of mediation comprise the units of analysis for the mediation outcome analysis and the 325 cases of rivalry negotiation are the units of analysis for the negotiation outcome analysis. In the civil war analysis, the 436 cases of mediation and the 221 cases of negotiation are, respectively, the units of analysis for the mediation and negotiation outcome analyses.

In examining the effect of peacekeeping on mediation and negotiation, we focus upon the immediate outcome of the conflict management efforts themselves. The Bercovitch (1999) ICM dataset identifies four types of mediation and negotiation outcomes: full settlement, partial settlement, cease-fires, and failures. Because peacekeeping missions, almost by definition, are oriented toward fostering and implementing a cease-fire, we argue that mediation and negotiation efforts that follow peacekeeping, in order to be considered successful, must move beyond

¹⁰ Because our analysis depends upon a selection bias control, it is necessary for us to predict which rivalry-months and which civil war-months are the most likely to attract mediation and negotiation. As a result, our unit of analysis is the rivalry-month in the interstate analysis and the civil war-month in the intrastate analysis. In months in which we aggregate multiple mediations or negotiations we include the count of the aggregated mediations or aggregated negotiations into the total mediations and total negotiations attempted variables.

cease-fires and stimulate either partial or full settlement between the disputants. If traditional peacekeeping operations here helped facilitate a cease-fire agreement, it means the operation failed to maintain the initial stability and a new cease-fire only returns the status quo at the time of initial deployment, hardly an indicator of peacemaking. To consider cease-fires otherwise would lead an analyst to code large numbers of conflict management successes in Bosnia, for example, where cease-fires were repeatedly broken and then reestablished. In this study, we are only concerned with success as defined by a peacekeeping operation's ability to promote a settlement. A peacekeeping operation may fail at this task, but nevertheless be successful along other dimensions, such as maintaining a cease-fire or improving the lives of the local population in the area of deployment.

As a first cut of the analysis, we code mediation and negotiation outcomes as full settlements, partial settlements, or failures. We estimate ordered probit selection models for mediation and negotiation in LIMDEP 8. Ordered probit models, however, rest upon the assumption that a one-unit transition is equivalent at any point in the scale of the dependent variable. In our study this means that an ordered probit model assumes that the transition from a failure to a partial agreement is equivalent to a transition from a partial agreement to a full agreement. Because we are cognizant of the possibility that peacekeeping may not necessarily affect the likelihood of transitions in the way an ordered probit model suggests, as a second cut of the analysis we estimate probit models for mediation and negotiation agreements. In the interstate analysis the dependent variable is coded "1" if a full settlement is achieved and is coded "0" otherwise. This also provides a more stringent test for the effect of peacekeeping on peacemaking: Success is measured only if peacekeeping promotes a broad settlement of issues between disputants. In the intrastate analysis, because of the rarity of full agreements, we were forced to adopt an alternative approach.¹¹ The dependent variable was coded "1" if either a full or partial agreement took place and is coded "0" otherwise. These analyses are performed in STATA 8.

Identifying Peacekeeping Operations

At each month in the database, we code whether or not a UN peacekeeping mission was ongoing. We identified the beginning and ending dates of UN peacekeeping missions from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website.¹² There are 11 peacekeeping operations that have been deployed during all or part of 10 different rivalries. Note that some rivalries had more than one peacekeeping operation deployed during its existence (e.g., UNEF I and II during parts of the Israel-Egypt rivalry) and some peacekeeping operations affect more than one rivalry simultaneously (e.g., the UNFICYP operation vis-à-vis Turkey's rivalries with Greece and Cyprus, respectively). Among the 150 civil wars in the analysis, 22 attracted UN peacekeeping forces.

Other Variables

Because other factors besides the presence of peacekeeping forces impact the likelihood and outcomes of mediation attempts and negotiations, we also include sev-

¹¹ Among the civil wars in our study there were only three cases of full agreement through negotiation and only 14 cases of full agreement through mediation.

¹² (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>) 2005, March 2. Our focus is limited to UN operations, but there are few operations conducted by other entities in the time period under study. Several such operations also are closer to military interventions (e.g., Indian intervention in Sri Lanka) or occurred after a settlement (e.g., NATO in Bosnia) and therefore do not have a traditional peacekeeping mission and are unsuitable for assessing peacemaking effects. In at least one case (the OAU mission in Chad), the organization was very weak. By focusing on UN missions, we looked at purer peacekeeping missions and those best equipped to carry out traditional peacekeeping duties, providing a basis for assessing peacemaking effects under the best peacekeeping conditions.

eral additional variables. These variables are necessary in order to test expectations derived from the different theoretical logics. Other factors are included as controls, having been identified in past research as important influences on negotiation and mediation. In general, the selection of the variables for the interstate and intrastate analyses was driven by similar theoretical logics. Because of the differences between the types of conflicts and data availability, however, there are some differences across the interstate and intrastate analyses.

One variable for the interstate analyses with potentially significant implications for our understanding of the peacekeeping effect is the presence of an ongoing militarized dispute (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) in the month under scrutiny. Such a dispute after a peacekeeping operation has been deployed may indicate that the operation has failed in its basic mission of keeping the cease-fire. Although a militarized dispute does not always indicate that the cease-fire has been broken, it does show that at least one of the disputants is threatening, displaying, or using military force, something that the peacekeeping operation was supposed to discourage. If an ongoing dispute is positively associated with diplomatic success, it suggests that conflict abatement by the peacekeepers may inhibit conflict resolution—a result consistent with the arguments of the peacekeeping pessimists. The opposite is postulated by the optimists. Thus, we test for the effect of an ongoing militarized conflict and construct an interactive term to identify situations in which peacekeeping troops are present, but fail to prevent or deter armed conflict. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent for civil wars, as there are no data available that provide point specific (in a particular month) estimates of the level of fighting.

We also assess the impact of the timing of diplomatic attempts upon the likelihood of mediation and negotiation and their success by including a variable describing the elapsed time between the beginning of conflict and the current conflict management effort. In the rivalry analysis, this variable is measured as the number of months between the beginning of the rivalry and the current conflict management attempt. In the civil war analysis, this variable is measured as the number of months between the beginning of the civil war and the current mediation or negotiation effort. In the hurting stalemate model, the expectation was that the longer conflicts persist across time, the more they generate high costs for disputants, and therefore, diplomatic efforts would be more successful. As a further test, we also created an interaction term between peacekeeping and the timing variables in order to test one of the expectations of the hurting stalemate model, that earlier peacekeeping operations were more damaging than later ones to conflict resolution efforts.

The literature on hurting stalemates and ripeness in general (Touval and Zartman 1989; Kleiboer 1994; Mitchell 1995; Zartman 2000) has pointed to several contextual factors that create a greater opportunity for successful conflict management. We include these as necessary control variables, but they also allow us to assess the hurting stalemate logic more broadly, even if these elements do not relate to peacekeeping. The key factors identified relate to the intensity, outcomes, and duration of conflict, the distribution of power between disputants, and the occurrence of political shifts as key forces that influence the prospects for mediation success. Greig (2001) found that among enduring rivals mediation is most likely to be successful as the severity of previous conflict increases and as the percentage of disputes ending in stalemate increases. As a result, we include variables in the models describing the average severity level of previous disputes and the percentage of disputes ending in stalemate. We use severity score data from Diehl and Goertz (2000) to calculate the average severity scores of previous rivalry disputes. Diehl and Goertz calculate their measure of dispute severity as a term that incorporates measures of the highest level of hostility experienced during the dispute and the total number of military fatalities in the dispute into a scale that ranges from 0 to 200. The level of previously stalemated disputes is calculated by

measuring the percentage of previous rivalry disputes that ended in stalemate. These data are calculated using the dispute outcome variable in the MID 3.0 data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).¹³ For robustness, we also include an interaction term in the intrastate analysis between the average number of casualties and the elapsed duration of the civil war; this creates a measure of the sustained costs and pain experienced by disputants in civil wars.

Relevant control variables in the literature on conflict management include features of the diplomatic efforts themselves. Mediation attempts are not independent of one another, with respect to conditioning successful outcomes. Mediation is more likely to be successful as the parties build a relationship between themselves and the mediator (Rubin 1992; Kelman 1996; Lederach 1997). We include a variable describing the number of previous mediations with the same mediator. In addition, because a mediation attempt can have a cumulative impact as part of a broader process, we include a variable counting the total number of previous mediation attempts that have occurred between the disputants. Because focused mediation efforts are often more successful, we also include a variable that describes the number of mediations taking place during an individual dispute between rivals. Similarly, because continued negotiations between disputants can help to facilitate a relationship between disputants and make them more amenable to agreement, we include a variable describing the number of previous negotiations between the disputants. Inclusion of these variables, albeit imperfectly, also serves to control for the non-independence of mediation and negotiation efforts in the lifetime of a rivalry. Data for each of these variables are taken from the Bercovitch (1999) ICM data set.

The characteristics of the mediator and the negotiators can also have an important impact upon the prospects for successful mediation (Bercovitch and Houston 1993). Negotiations conducted by state leaders themselves can signal a greater commitment to conflict management among disputants, possibly increasing the prospects for negotiation success. State leaders are much better equipped to make difficult bargaining choices than lower-level diplomats. Similarly, mediation efforts that are initiated by disputants themselves may signal an increased willingness to compromise among disputants, increasing the likelihood of successful mediation between them. As a result, we create dichotomous variables from the Bercovitch (1999) ICM data set that describe whether disputants initiate mediation and whether state leaders conduct negotiations themselves.

Although the characteristics of mediation and negotiation efforts are important, such efforts do not take place in a vacuum. The context under which conflict management takes place also plays an important role in the prospects for mediation and negotiation success. The type of issue under dispute, for example, tends to impact the prospects for reaching an agreement. Tangible issues, because of their increased divisibility, tend to be more amenable to agreements through mediation and negotiation than non-tangible issues (Brams and Taylor 1996). Similarly, as the complexity of the issues under dispute increases, the complexity of the negotiations or mediations surrounding them also increases, undermining the prospects of success. In order to control for this effect on the likelihood of successful mediation and negotiation, we included a dichotomous variable in the model that describes whether or not the issues under dispute are tangible. This variable is taken from the Bercovitch (1999) ICM data set. We also include a complexity variable in the model that describes the number of issues under dispute within the rivalry. This variable ranges from one to three and is drawn from the ICM data set. Following a similar logic, we also control for the type of conflict in the civil war analysis by creating a dichotomous variable that describes whether or not the civil war was centered on

¹³ (<http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID302.html>) 2005, March 2.

ethno-religious or ideological issues. Regan (2002) finds that ethno-religious civil wars tend to have longer durations than ideological conflicts, perhaps suggesting to third parties that they will be more resistant to conflict management efforts. Ideologically driven conflicts, by contrast, because of the role of ideology throughout the Cold War, may be more likely to actually attract mediation efforts. Using Regan's data, civil wars in which the primary issue was ethnic or religious are coded as "1" and "0" if centered around ideology.

The international conflict literature has also underscored the importance of political changes in promoting conflict management success among enduring rivals. Diehl and Goertz (2000), for example, emphasize the stasis in policies that tends to characterize enduring rivals. Because these policies become deeply entrenched among enduring rivals, they become difficult to change (Hensel 1999). Stein and Lewis (1996) and Greig (2001) each argue that regime changes can create a greater opportunity for successful conflict management as new leadership may be more open to successful conflict management initiatives. To capture this effect, we code a dichotomous variable that describes whether a polity change has taken place within at least one of the enduring rivals within the last 24 months using data from the Polity 98D data set (Gleditsch 2000). Beyond polity changes, we also anticipate that high levels of democracy will make states more receptive to mediation and negotiation and increase the chances for success. As a result, we include a variable in the model that describes the democracy score for the *least* democratic state in the rivalry (Dixon 1993).¹⁴ This variable is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score present for each state in the Polity 98D data set. Because civil wars, by definition, are often efforts to achieve this form of political change, we do not include this variable in the civil war analysis.

Because we anticipate that the occurrence of mediation and negotiation will be more likely to take place when they are most likely to be successful, the contextual variables described above are also included in the selection models for mediation and negotiation. Beyond these factors, however, we also control for other factors that the literature has suggested influence the likelihood that mediation and negotiation will take place. Previous war between enduring rivals seems to make them more likely to engage in mediation, perhaps out of a fear that such a war will recur unless steps toward conflict management are taken, and we include a variable reflecting this. We also include a control variable in the selection models that describes whether or not a major power is involved in the rivalry. Because major powers are less likely to be influenced by the bargaining incentives that mediators often bring to the table and are more likely to seek to maintain their freedom of action in their foreign policies than smaller powers, we expect that mediation and negotiation will be less likely to take place among enduring rivalries containing a major power. Finally, we include a measure of the level of ethnic homogeneity of the society in the selection equation of the civil war analysis. These data are taken from Regan (2002) and measure the percentage of the nation's population in the largest ethnic group. Regan finds some evidence to suggest that high levels of ethnic fractionalization may make civil conflicts last longer. If this result is true, it is possible to envision two distinct effects of high levels of ethnic fractionalization upon the occurrence of conflict management. First, ethnic fractionalization may dissuade third parties from intervening because of the difficulty of reaching a settlement in such an intractable conflict. Yet, the danger posed by conflicts with high levels of

¹⁴ For robustness, we also tested other ways of measuring democracy among enduring rivals by calculating the joint democracy score of the dyad and by creating a dichotomous joint democracy variable. Neither variable substantively changed the results of the analysis. We believe that using the smallest democracy score within the dyad makes the most sense theoretically because it does not allow a high score for one state to outweigh a low score for another state as a joint score does, and it does not require an arbitrary threshold like a dichotomous variable does. As a result, we report the results with the smallest democracy variable.

fractionalization may also push the parties to engage in conflict management in order to avoid an extended conflict.

Empirical Results

In gauging the impact of peacekeeping on peacemaking, we must ascertain first whether peacekeeping deployment affects the likelihood that mediation and negotiation will be attempted. Then, we can assess peacekeeping's impact on the success of those efforts.

The Impact of Peacekeeping on Diplomatic Initiatives

The bottom half of Table 2 lists the results of the ordered probit models with selection controls for enduring rivalries. For both mediation and negotiation, the

TABLE 2. Ordered Probit Model with Selection—Enduring Rivalries

	<i>Mediation</i>		<i>Negotiation</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>
<i>Outcome</i>				
Ongoing militarized dispute	0.425***	0.155	0.018	0.085
Number of previous rivalry negotiations	-0.024	0.018	-0.008	0.016
Lowest rival democracy score	0.022	0.016	-0.026	0.02
Average rivalry dispute severity	-0.008**	0.003	0.004	0.007
Percentage of previous disputes ending in stalemate	-0.015***	0.003	0.002	0.007
Elapsed rivalry time (in months)	-0.004***	0.001	0.0001	0.002
Recent polity change (within 24 months)	-0.184	0.163	0.479**	0.203
Number of previous rivalry mediations	0.043***	0.009	-0.001	0.015
Tangible issue under dispute	0.596***	0.186	0.073	0.139
Disputant initiated conflict mgmt	0.244	0.216	0.112	0.214
Level of complexity of negotiations	-0.117	0.114	-0.236**	0.13
Negotiations conducted by state leaders			0.37**	0.202
Number of previous mediations (current dispute)	-0.054	0.048		
Number of mediations by same mediator	0.079**	0.045		
Ongoing peacekeeping	-0.339*	0.195	-0.107	0.374
<i>Selection</i>				
Previous rivalry war	0.896***	0.095	0.154***	0.039
Ongoing militarized dispute	0.687***	0.054	-0.132***	0.038
Lowest rival democracy score	0.002***	0.0002	0.003	0.005
Average rivalry dispute severity	-0.014***	0.001	-0.011***	0.001
Percentage of previous disputes ending in stalemate	-0.01***	0.001	-0.011***	0.001
Rivalry contains major power	-0.0004	0.015	-0.0003	0.015
Elapsed rivalry time (in months)	-0.005***	0.0002	-0.004***	0.0002
Recent polity change (within 24 months)	-0.114**	0.052	-0.236***	0.054
Number of previous rivalry mediations	0.053***	0.003	0.02***	0.003
Number of previous rivalry negotiations	-0.013***	0.004	0.035***	0.001
Ongoing peacekeeping	-0.531***	0.084	-0.296***	0.095
ρ	0.827***	0.114	-0.243	0.555
<i>N</i>	18,020		18,020	
Uncensored observations	274		324	
Log-likelihood	-1645.091		-2062.083	
Chi-square	10.630		.207	
Prob > chi-square	0.001		.649	

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$; two-tailed test.

selection models largely perform as the conflict management literature, and that focusing on hurting stalemates in particular, suggests. Factors such as high levels of previous dispute severity, frequently stalemated disputes, or a long rivalry duration that engenders intense hostility between disputants, all dampen the occurrence of both mediation and negotiation. Factors that signal a more focused danger to the rivals, such as a previous war or a currently ongoing militarized dispute, however, both significantly increase the likelihood that mediation and negotiation will take place. In this respect, the perception of a conflict precipice among enduring rivalries pushes them toward conflict management while the hostility created by previous conflicts drives them away from conflict management. This is broadly consistent with the pessimistic logic in which it is the most conflictual events that drive disputants toward mediation and negotiation.

Although a well-specified selection model is important statistically for subsequent analysis of peacemaking success, we are also concerned with the substantive impact of peacekeeping on the initiation of mediation and negotiation. The presence of peacekeeping forces provides the sharpest reduction in the likelihood that mediation or negotiation will take place of any of the variables in the model. This is consistent with the pessimistic position, especially the hurting stalemate variation.

The pessimistic logic also suggests that the presence of an ongoing militarized dispute may have desirable peacemaking consequences. That such disputes are positively associated with mediation occurrence, although the opposite is true for negotiation,¹⁵ suggests at least in part that the international community is more likely to respond to crisis situations than those that have been pacified. Yet, an ongoing militarized dispute may have occurred when peacekeeping forces were not present. To identify situations in which a peacekeeping force failed to keep the peace, we reran the analysis with an interaction term (peacekeeping*ongoing dispute) to capture the conflict abatement failure of that force. Although the other terms remain largely the same, the interaction term is significant and *negative* (for *both* mediation and negotiation) indicating that peacekeeping failure depresses conflict management efforts. When a new dispute breaks out, third parties and the disputants themselves apparently become soured on conflict resolution efforts and are less willing to entertain new peace initiatives.

The results are considerably less dramatic for civil wars, as evidenced by the bottom portion of Table 3. The coefficient for the peacekeeping variable is positive with respect to mediation and negative with respect to negotiations; yet, neither is statistically significant, although both are close to the standard .05 level. The average casualties variable captures the overall intensity of a civil war. As this intensity mounts, negotiation and mediation become *less* likely. Yet, this relationship does not tell the full story, the notion of “hurting stalemate” involves elements of both costs and time—participants must pay high costs, which accumulate over time and there needs to be recognition that an easy victory is not imminent. This is better captured by our interaction term of casualties and elapsed time for the civil war (average casualties*elapsed time). When a hurting stalemate is present, consistent with the pessimistic argument described above, both the international community and the warring parties are more open to peace initiatives.

Although the initial results on diplomatic initiatives are somewhat different for enduring rivalries and civil wars, there is one strong similarity. We reran the analyses with an interaction term of peacekeeping and casualties to again capture situations in which peacekeepers were ineffective in their primary mission of

¹⁵ We are uncertain why the coefficient is negative for negotiations here, and positive in the selection model in Table 4, which focuses on full agreement.

TABLE 3. Ordered Probit Model with Selection—Civil Wars

	<i>Mediation</i>		<i>Negotiation</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>
<i>Outcome</i>				
Average casualties*elapsed time	- 0.001	0.001	0.0002	0.001
Average casualties per month	0.004	0.004	- 0.001	0.004
Elapsed time	0.256***	0.097	- 0.283**	0.14
Tangible issue	- 0.411**	0.175	0.043	0.217
Disputant initiated conflict management	0.544***	0.159	- 0.261	0.172
Issue complexity	- 0.081	0.133	- 0.369	0.123
Mediation by state leader	0.113	0.183		
Negotiations conducted by state leaders			- 0.24	0.213
Number of previous negotiations	0.003	0.017	0.083**	0.02
Number of previous mediations	- 0.023***	0.007	- 0.0004***	0.008
Previous mediations by same mediator	0.025	0.046		
Peacekeeping	0.218	0.216	- 0.048	0.333
Previous agreement	0.021	0.131	0.2	0.177
Ethno-religious conflict	0.317**	0.161	- 0.364	0.21
<i>Selection</i>				
Average casualties*elapsed time	0.002***	.0002	0.002***	.0002
Average casualties per month	- 0.011***	0.001	- 0.007***	0.001
Elapsed time	- 0.382***	0.025	- 0.457***	0.034
Number of previous mediations	0.01***	0.003	- 0.002***	0.003
Number of previous negotiations	0.001	0.007	0.102***	0.009
Peacekeeping	0.122	0.084	- 0.293	0.11
Number of previous agreements	0.118***	0.016	- 0.054**	0.018
Ethnic homogeneity	- 0.005***	0.001	- 0.009***	0.001
Ethno-religious conflict	- 0.182***	0.053	- 0.244*	0.072
ρ	- 0.552		0.663	
<i>N</i>	12,648		12,648	
Uncensored observations	436		221	
Log-likelihood	- 1962.155		- 1212.197	
Chi-square	3.882		0.603	
Prob > chi-square	0.048		0.437	

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$; two-tailed test.

supervising cease-fires. As with enduring rivalries, when peacekeeping failed to keep the peace, both mediation and negotiation were less likely to occur. In this respect, rather than just impacting the level of hostility and conflict between disputants, peacekeeping, when it fails, also appears to undermine the willingness of both disputants and potential third parties to participate in mediation and negotiation. This suggests that failed peacekeeping is worse for the diplomatic process than letting the conflict continue—with no cease-fire and no peacekeepers. None of the theoretical approaches anticipate these results well. The optimist position would anticipate negative effects from ongoing conflicts in general, but does not seem to distinguish between violent conflict happening in the presence of peacekeepers and that occurring in its absence. Similarly, the two pessimistic logics do not include expectations for why ongoing violence should limit peacemaking initiatives, much less why this should be evident when peacekeeping fails.

The results on diplomatic initiation are more consistent with pessimistic views than optimistic ones, albeit the results are stronger on enduring rivalries than civil wars. The hurting stalemate model is better than the rational choice model in anticipating decreased efforts at negotiation *and* mediation, but failed peacekeeping has a negative effect on all diplomatic attempts, something none of the models

expected. This result underscores the interconnectedness of different conflict management tools and highlights the importance of studying the effect that one type of conflict management effort exerts upon another, a focus that remains rare within the existing conflict management literature.

The Impact of Peacekeeping on Peacemaking Success

Although peacekeeping may reduce the likelihood of mediation and negotiation in some circumstances, it is still possible that peacekeeping forces will promote the achievement of an agreement between the parties when such conflict management efforts do occur. Our findings, however, are not consistent with this optimistic expectation. Across the ordered probit models of mediation and negotiation success in the top halves of Tables 2 and 3, peacekeeping operations are at best weakly related to the prospects for successful conflict management. In fact, the only statistically significant term (peacekeeping's effect on mediation success among enduring rivalries) is negative, indicating the peacekeepers on the ground inhibit diplomatic success. Furthermore, an ongoing militarized dispute is associated with mediation success in enduring rivalries, again suggesting that not limiting the pressure of imminent conflict may have positive diplomatic benefits. Still, in subsequent analyses, the interaction term of peacekeeping and ongoing dispute had a negative impact, suggesting once again that failing to keep the peace has deleterious effects beyond the loss of life involved in the violence and overcomes any benefits (costs or information) from the ongoing fighting. Peacekeeping had little or no systematic effect on mediation or negotiation success in civil wars. The interaction term for peacekeeping and casualties was also not significant.

Although peacekeeping does not increase the likelihood that a mediation or negotiation effort will move from a failure to a partial agreement or from partial agreement to full agreement, we remained open to the possibility that peacekeeping would be positively related to the achievement of the most decisive type of agreement, a full settlement over the issues under mediation or negotiation. As a result, we estimated a probit model with selection in order to estimate the impact of peacekeeping upon the likelihood of a full settlement between rivals. Similarly, we estimated a probit model with selection that describes the likelihood of a full or partial agreement among civil war disputants. The results from these analyses are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.

As was the case in the ordered probit selection models, peacekeeping reduced the likelihood that either mediation or negotiation would take place among enduring rivals. The peacekeeping coefficients in the mediation and negotiation outcome models were negative, as they were in the ordered probit analysis. The peacekeeping term in the mediation model approached nominal significance and the term in the negotiation model was statistically significant. Peacekeeping had *a larger negative effect on the likelihood of a full agreement through negotiation than any other variable*. The presence of peacekeeping forces made a full agreement less likely than even an increase in the complexity of the issues under negotiation. These results are consistent with the pessimistic view generally, and the differential effect, with a stronger impact on negotiation than mediation, fits with the predictions of the rational choice approach specifically. Although peacekeeping may have little impact in producing partial settlements, it has a negative influence in promoting broader conflict resolution. Indeed some of the most prominent mediation successes (e.g., the Beagle Channel agreement between Chile and Argentina) took place in the absence of peacekeeping forces. Unlike earlier results, however, the presence of an ongoing militarized dispute did not influence the prospects for full settlement. Yet, earlier peacekeeping did have a negative effect on diplomatic success, but only for negotiations; the former is consistent with the hurting stalemate

TABLE 4. Full Settlement Probit Model with Selection Control—Enduring Rivalries

	<i>Mediation</i>		<i>Negotiation</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>
<i>Outcome</i>				
Ongoing militarized dispute	0.033	0.305	- 0.278	0.275
Number of previous rivalry negotiations	- 0.034	0.037	0.023	0.016
Lowest rival democracy score	0.046	0.032	- 0.059	0.036
Average rivalry dispute severity	- 0.011	0.007	- 0.007	0.007
Percentage of disputes ending in stalemate	- 0.008	0.007	- 0.019**	0.009
Elapsed rivalry time (in months)	- 0.006***	0.002	- 0.010***	0.003
Recent polity change (within 24 months)	0.169	0.334	0.456*	0.271
Number of previous rivalry mediations	0.064***	0.016	0.069***	0.023
Disputant initiated conflict mgmt	0.512	0.372	0.240	0.223
Number of mediations by same mediator	0.020	0.097		
Issue complexity	- 0.553**	0.259	- 0.476**	0.220
Tangible issue	1.299**	0.521	0.168	0.306
Number of previous mediations (this dispute)	- 0.033	0.109		
Rank of mediator	- 0.104*	0.062		
Negotiations conducted by state leaders			- 0.139	0.303
Ongoing peacekeeping	- 0.704*	0.420	- 1.553**	0.673
Constant	0.142		0.420	1.432
<i>Selection</i>				
Previous rivalry war	0.246**	0.100	0.203***	0.079
Ongoing militarized dispute	0.664***	0.061	0.223***	0.060
Lowest rival democracy score	0.039***	0.005	0.003	0.006
Average rivalry dispute severity	0.002**	0.001	0.003***	0.001
Percentage of disputes ending in stalemate	- 0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001
Rivalry contains a major power	- 0.255***	0.093	0.256***	0.064
Elapsed rivalry time (in months)	- 0.001***	0.0003	- 0.0003	0.0002
Recent polity change (within 24 months)	0.178***	0.059	0.137**	0.056
Number of previous rivalry mediations	0.036***	0.003	0.007**	0.003
Number of previous rivalry negotiations	- 0.019***	0.004	0.023***	0.002
Ongoing peacekeeping	- 0.300***	0.095	- 0.200*	0.108
Constant	- 2.363***	0.137	- 2.862	0.132
ρ	0.834***	0.241	0.999***	0.0001
<i>N</i>	18,020		18,020	
Uncensored observations	274		324	
Log likelihood	- 1145.755		- 1360.916	
Wald chi-square	341.28		29.43	
Prob > chi-square	0		0.0057	

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$; two-tailed test.

logic, although having the effect confined to negotiation is in line with rational choice predictions.

Once again, the results for civil wars are considerably weaker. Peacekeeping had no general impact on mediation or negotiation success. High casualties were associated with negotiation success, but not with mediation success. The pessimistic predictions are again supported, especially those in the rational choice camp. Subsequent analyses with the peacekeeping*casualty interaction term showed that it promoted mediation success, perhaps by making the mediators try harder to achieve an agreement, but the breakdown of order and the renewal of severe violence made the parties alone less willing to come to an agreement. Again, this belies the optimistic expectations and suggests that the failure of peacekeeping to limit armed conflict may have some diplomatic payoffs.

TABLE 5. Partial and Full Settlement Probit Model with Selection Control—Civil Wars

	<i>Mediation</i>		<i>Negotiation</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>
<i>Outcome</i>				
Average casualties per month	0.003	0.003	0.003***	0.001
Elapsed time	0.208***	0.073	- 0.156***	0.06
Average casualties*elapsed time	- 0.001	0.001	- 0.001	.0004
Tangible issue	- 0.332**	0.153	0.109	0.104
Disputant initiated conflict management	0.426***	0.154	- 0.123	0.085
Issue complexity	- 0.122	0.102	- 0.032	0.103
Mediation by state leader	0.227*	0.14		
Negotiations conducted by state leaders			- 0.086	0.098
Number of previous negotiations	0.016	0.015	0.075***	0.015
Number of previous mediations	- 0.028***	0.006	- 0.002	0.005
Previous mediations by same mediator	0.026	0.038		
Peacekeeping	0.179	0.187	0.02	0.208
Previous agreement	- 0.041	0.111	0.037	0.072
Ethno-religious conflict	0.202	0.133	- 0.056	0.217
Constant	0.817	0.436	- 2.198***	0.275
<i>Selection</i>				
Average casualties per month	- 0.006***	0.001	- 0.001	0.001
Elapsed time	- 0.193***	0.029	- 0.212***	0.035
Average casualties*elapsed time	0.001***	.0002	0.0003*	.0002
Number of previous mediations	0.007**	0.003	- 0.007**	0.003
Number of previous negotiations	- 0.005	0.006	0.105***	0.008
Peacekeeping	0.202**	0.086	- 0.162	0.17
Number of previous agreements	0.114***	0.017	- 0.117**	0.046
Ethnic homogeneity	0.006***	0.001	0.005***	0.002
Ethno-religious conflict	- 0.04	0.051	- 0.046	0.137
Constant	- 1.54	0.139	- 2.013	0.165
ρ	- 0.771		1	
<i>N</i>	12,648		12,648	
Uncensored observations	436		221	
Log-likelihood	- 1851.766		- 1105.905	
Chi-square	74.89		99.27	
Prob > chi-square	0.000		0.000	

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$; two-tailed test.

Conclusions

The results of the analysis cast a rather dim light on the ability of peacekeeping forces to assist the conflict resolution process. In enduring rivalries, the presence of peacekeeping forces reduced the occurrence of mediation and negotiation attempts as well as reduced the prospects for their success when they do take place, at least with respect to achieving a broad peace agreement. The effects with respect to civil wars were not as harmful, but neither did peacekeeping have the kind of positive impacts it was designed to have.¹⁶ There was virtually no support throughout any of the analyses for the optimistic view that peacekeeping promotes peacemaking.

¹⁶ Peacekeeping forces may contribute to conflict resolution within civil conflicts if the intervention occurs before civil war breaks out. Because our intrastate analysis focused only upon civil wars, the weaker findings observed for peacekeeping may be because once civil war has begun, it has already spiraled beyond a level at which the presence of peacekeeping forces might encourage agreement among the parties. In this respect, once a civil war breaks out between the parties, it may be too late for peacekeeping to do anything more than seek to separate combatants and limit the conflict between them. This logic suggests that a vital element for intrastate peacekeeping missions to promote resolution may be early warning that is sufficient to permit intervention before open civil war breaks out.

The pessimistic view was supported in most of the analyses. The hurting stalemate and rational choice models were confirmed in that they predicted fewer settlements in the presence of peacekeeping. The results tended in support of the hurting stalemate model in that costs were an important influence in diplomatic initiatives and successful outcomes. The rational choice logic was prescient in anticipating stronger negative effects on negotiation success than mediation success. The results are perhaps not strong enough to privilege one model over the other. Yet, it may be that a combined model might provide the best explanation. This might be accomplished by factoring in the cost elements of the hurting stalemate model into the rational choice approach. The stalemate element is certainly consistent with the rational choice notion of information about future outcomes, and the cost elements permit states to opt out of civil wars and rivalry, which are admittedly expensive ways to gain additional information.

Although a hybrid model is promising, a remaining empirical puzzle comes from the finding that when peacekeepers failed to keep the peace (i.e., peacekeeping forces on the ground did not prevent severe violence), third parties and disputants alike made fewer efforts at peacemaking. Having a peacekeeping operation that fails to keep the peace is worse than continuing the fighting with no peacekeeping deployment. If anything, this is consistent with a strongly pessimistic view of peacekeeping and peacemaking, although it does not fit with either of the pessimist logics discussed in the study. Such a finding, however, deserves closer examination and better explanation.

Our findings suggest that policy makers confronted with an ongoing conflict face a difficult dilemma. On one hand, there are powerful political, strategic, and moral reasons for deploying a peacekeeping force in conflicts marked by mounting bloodshed. Cases of genocide or recurring warfare may be so extreme that they demand peacekeeping forces in order to separate the combatants and prevent the renewal of fighting. Indeed, the prospect of peacekeeping deployment may be the only way to get the protagonists to agree to a cease-fire in the first place. Once deployed, peacekeeping forces may be the best mechanism for stabilizing the situation. Yet, the intervention of peacekeepers may not only represent a temporary solution to the fighting, but may also hinder conflict management efforts aimed at resolving the issues in enduring rivalries that created the conflict in the first place. This paradox works to create situations such as that of Cyprus in which peacekeepers are deployed for decades, but little movement toward agreement or settlement occurs. Nevertheless, this is not to diminish the positive effects that flow from ending bloodshed and allowing the local population to live as normal lives as possible. If peacekeepers fail to keep the peace effectively, however, as has been the case in southern Lebanon and in the Congo, then conflict resolution efforts by third parties or the disputants themselves may dry up. In those cases, not only has conflict resolution been negatively impacted, but also, there is not even the benefit of saving lives and promoting stability in the area, the primary purpose of most peacekeeping deployments.

The other horn of the dilemma is present if decision makers decide to defer the deployment of peacekeeping forces until after a peace agreement. In one sense, it may be advantageous in the long-term for conflict to continue to occur unabated without the intervention of peacekeepers in order to allow the conflict to progress to a stage in which the disputants become more amenable to settlement (see Luttwak 2001, for example). Yet, such a hands-off approach is likely to be unpalatable in the most extreme cases of conflict and may carry the risk of conflict expansion, effectively compelling third parties to intervene militarily. Furthermore, decision makers may wait for a peace agreement that never comes, as there is no guarantee that the conditions for ending an enduring rivalry or civil war will ever be manifest, at least not for many years. At minimum, the results of this study suggest the need for third parties to be judicious in their use of peacekeeping,

balancing the immediate need to limit conflict with the long-term goal of producing a settlement.

Although our results provide a bleak outlook on the relationship between peacekeeping and mediation/negotiation success, there remain other areas in the scholarly literature that suggest ways in which peacekeeping operations enhance efforts at conflict resolution. It may be that the *prospect* of peacekeeping, rather than the actual presence of peacekeeping forces, promotes mediation and negotiation success. Disputants may be willing to commit to an agreement if they know that peacekeepers will be there afterward to guarantee the settlement (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004). By acting as guarantors of agreements, peacekeepers may serve to lessen the possibility of renewed fighting when disputes over the implementation of agreements arise. In addition, the prospect of peacekeeping may positively influence the content of agreements reached. Protagonists may be more willing to commit to more detailed settlement provisions and those which address a broader range of disputed issues if some guarantees, facilitated by peacekeepers, exist such that provisions will be implemented with full compliance. Peacekeepers may also promote the durability of agreements by making disputants feel less exposed to the consequences of unilateral defection by the other side. In this sense, by making disputants feel more secure, peacekeepers can provide a powerful solution to the security dilemma often faced by enduring rivals and civil war combatants even after an agreement is reached between them. In this vein, peacekeepers may be able to reduce the tendency of disputants to build up their arms or lessen the degree to which they feel that they must strike first in the event of renewed conflict. In each of these ways, peacekeeping forces may be able to exert a positive long-term effect upon conflictual relationships, beyond simply encouraging cease-fires.

All peacekeeping efforts are not created equal, and it is possible that certain forms of peacekeeping may have different effects on peacemaking. We focused on UN peacekeeping actions in general, with a particular emphasis on cease-fire monitoring. In the last decade, however, peacekeeping has involved increasingly complex operations, with multiple tasks and missions. Many of these roles involve post-settlement activities, such as election monitoring and nation-building, and therefore are not relevant to our concerns here. A cursory examination of pre-settlement missions, however, does not suggest a revision of our conclusions about the negative effects of peacekeeping on peacemaking. For example, humanitarian assistance may save thousands of lives (as in Somalia), but at the same time mitigate the costs of the conflict to the participants and the negative externalities (e.g., refugee flows) to neighboring states, such that diplomatic initiatives are less frequent and there is less incentive for warring parties to reach an agreement. It is also not clear whether many of the new roles for peacekeepers are sufficiently impartial or capable of being efficiently carried out in conjunction with traditional missions such that any positive spin-off effects for peacekeeping would be present anyway (Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998).

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