Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations consists of three courts: the Court of Justice (also known as the European Court ofjustice. or ECJ); the General Court; and the European Union Civil Service Tribunal. Each serves a different purpose. Of the three, it is often the ECJ to which people refer when talking or writing about the CJEU. It consists of 28 judges, appointed by each member state. The ECJ s main role is to ensure that national and EU laws, and any international agreements entered into by the EU, 'meet the spirit of the treaties, and that EU law is equally, fairly, and consistently applied through the member states' (McCormick 2014, 91). It can only rule on matters where the EU has competence, these mainly being economic matters. It has been crucial to the idea that the EU's laws and treaties take precedence over national laws in those areas where the EU has responsibility. One of its most famous decisions, the 1979 Cassis de Dijon case, established the principle of mutual recognition: that goods produced and marketed legally in one member state may be sold without further restriction'- in all other member states. Decisions are supposed to be reached through unanimity, but votes are usually taken by simple majority Enforcement of the Courts rulings rests with the memb • | i inber 1946 at a speech at the University of Zurich he ^Htl ibout the need for a United States of Europe as a way of Nil"! In i-.; Europe, of strengthening it after the devastation of i' ! World War and Hearing unity in the face of what Hkt<< I- . miie the Cold War. Why then did the country he had HI link a year before led as one of its greatest prime ministers ■ mi i participating? and prestige Wm *.is a victor in the Second World War. It had not been H^Wlinlikr large swathes <>f the rest of Europe. It might have nsted and almost bankrupt, but as far as the British i in d they were winners. At one point, Britain had die last European holdout against Nazism. This i-i. i in Britain of its 'standing alone'. To sonic > Mil. U-. iuse it was the last holdout. But like the W~% l.iip mi tors of the Second World War - the US 11 it has tended to overlook its dependence on tin war. Hitlers Nazi Germany was defeated by i'. ■ -I tlic British Empire, the US. the USSR ♦ ' M.I .....II.'i allies. in British narrative of the Second World War II ii i \ii tor and should be treated as an equal 1 U But this was not Britain as known today Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations but Britain as the British Empire, on which Britain had drawn heavily in the war. The backbone of the British Empire was the British Indian Army, with forces from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Africa and many other parts of the Empire serving to defend Britain and, especially in the war against Japan, the Empire. Regrettably that Commonwealth and imperial contribution to Britain's power and security can be overlooked by modern debates in the UK that can assume that Britain stoodi very much on its own. Strategic lessons from the Second World War The ability to draw on the support of the Empire and, crucially, the US, meant Britain had been able to resist the Nazis and in doing so reinforce a strategic oudook that dependence on alliances with other countries in Europe would be insufficient to protect Britain's security. The collapse of France, in particular, had reinforced this. The idea then in post-1945 of committing to the rest of Europe did not sit well with British decision makers, unless it was in the form of some commitment that direcdy engaged the US in European politics, and this was found in NATO. As the first NATO Secretary General {and former British Army general) Lordlsmay quipped, NATO was 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down'. Committing to some form of arrangement to bind Britain, France and West Germany in a political and economic union would have gone against the painful lessons Britain had recendy learnt from the Second World War. As touched on further in Chapter Seven, this sense of Britain as the last holdout in Europe, and one that should always look outside of Europe for alliances that can shape the European and global order, lives on today. Europe was only one of the three circles of British power For all his lauding of a United States of Europe, Churchill himself was not wholly of the opinion that Britain should partake in any efforts at European integration. Instead he saw Britain as sat at the heart of three overlapping circles that defined its place in the world: Europe, the US, and the Bridsh Empirei llul Commonwealth. These three overlapping circles defined |li nam's internarional relations, standing and role. But these three twcrlapping circles would soon be transformed. I he Empire and Commonwealth circle started to fade away With the decolonisation of the 1950s and 1960s. British trade h»d also long been shifting more towards the European and ■insatlantic marketplaces. The experiences of the Suez crisis m 1956, when Britain and France, with the cooperarion of Iincl, had tried to occupy the Suez Canal, which had recently brrn nationalised by Egypt, revealed how Britain was no longer ttU" imperial power it had once been. The canal was seen as Mi .1 logically important for the Bridsh Empire, being the gateway in British territories 'east of Suez'. Bridsh, French and Israeli tliilitary efforts went smoothly. But the US under President I iM-nliower had not been informed and opposed the move as III unacceptable act of imperialism. Through pressure on the |n >uiid sterling the US caused an economic crisis for Britain that led it to quickly back down and withdraw its military forces. It mm a humiliation that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had also bed to the House of Commons fcwr the invasion. It was a painful lesson that drove France to look more towards European cooperarion and the UK towards Miiving close to the US. ure of its role in the world Nu' lading of the Empire left the two circles of Europe and the I IS, but this was not something British politicians and decision ■is were entirely comfortable with making choices over, hi l%2, Dean Acheson, a former US Secretary of State, gave i eech at the US military academy at West Point that caused imii li angst in Britain. He said: (ireat Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role apart from Europe, a role based on a special relationship with the United States, and on being head of a commonwealth which has no political strucuire, or Unity, or strength, this role is about played out. 30 31 Understanding Brexit This did not go down well in Britain. Acheson was no enemy of Britain, being a life-long Anglophile. But his speech ran up against ideas in Britain that the country was, despite the debacle of Suez, still a global power. But note what Acheson said: 'The attempt to play a separate power role apart from Europe.' Acheson was asking why. instead of accepting that Britain was a European power and so engaging fully with the rest of Europe, Britain was instead pursuing a relationship with the US and a relationship with a Commonwealth 'which has no political structure, or unity, or strength'. That his speech was received with much hostility in Britain revealed how sensitive - and disputed - was the issue of Britain's decline and place in the world. Public reaction to Acheson mirrored the private reaction inside government a few years earlier to the report. Study ofi Future Polity 1960-1970 (Cabinet Office 1959), commissioned by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to look at Britain's status in the world up to 1970. The report, which in retrospect is quite accurate in its predictions, made at the rime for such bleak reading for those who thought Britain would remain a global power that Macmillan had it classified and banished to the archives. Shifting economics Britain's relative decline (relative because it continued to grow in wealth but others overtook it by growing more quickly) had also seen a shift in its trading patterns away from the Empire and towards the markets of Western Europe. This was a slow-but painful transition that conflicted with the use of the pound sterling as a global currency used - in the sterling area - by a number of countries. But that group of states had long been declining, with Australia and Canada, for example, having long since looked more to the US than the UK. Joining the EEC in 1973 meant Britain had to cut some of the remaining imperial preferences and markets with which it had maintained close relations, such as Australia and New Zealand. No other European state had witnessed such a profound shift in its trading patterns, in part because no other European state had The history of UK-EU relations (dunks to war) maintained such a global empire and international ......is; system. In response to the growth of the EEC, Britain had in 1960 llU'inpted an alternative model for European economic relations )u the form of the EFTA. Originally consisting of seven countries k Austria. Denmark. Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland ■ ti l the UK - it was designed as an intergovernmental approach 111 encouraging trade between its members that avoided having ^tanational institutions such as the European Commis-n m and CJI'U. However, it failed to deliver the same economic gain^ ! crucially, political links the UK wanted to secure with the W»t i>t Europe. I^uibtson the Left and Right ■bifting from the Empire and Commonwealth to Europe •,.<■. felt personalis, by all healths- men aged 17—21 who i took national service - that is, conscription that sent them Mparts of what was still a worldwide empire), observable in a li r il and constitutional system that had global links (through the ii" ■ 'l common law and as the legal and constitutional centre or Il» empire) and also in terms of demographic and family links. 1 Ins personal, and especially family connection, remained clear in and long after Britain joined the EU. In 2006 the IPPR think tank (Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006) looked into where Dillons lived overseas for more than six months. Their work iled three large concentrations: the rest of Europe, North i tea, and Australia and New Zealand. Large numbers were tlio t< i be found in South Africa, South Asia (especially India and I'll isian) and the Caribbean. IfBritons resident in Ireland (with 11 the UK shares a common travel area) and Spain (home ton then estimated 761,000 Britons) are removed from the I iiiopean calculation then Europe's share shrinks considerably. I lie distribution reflects demographic links that connect Britain MUl what some term the 'Anglo-sphere'of the English-speaking iiI.I That world is not only defined by links with what in the ■Ht was called the 'White'Commonwealth Can ida, Australia Bill New Zealand - but, thanks to immigration to the UK also ■ -i is it to countries in Africa. Asia and the Caribbean. This ol cultural, demographic, political, economic and historical Itnl help explain why Oxford historian - and a committed 1 ipean and liberal - Timothy Garton-Ash (2001) concluded 34 Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations that '[t]he answer to the question "Is Britain European?" has to be "yes, but not only"'. Late realisation What delayed Britain's membership then was a combination of | strategic oudooks, historical experiences, a different pqlitical and legal setup, economic, demographic and cultural links beyond! Europe and an unwillingness to accept that relative decline meant j Britain needed to think more about Europe than the wider world. The realisation that this could not be sustained and that Britain was also missing out on being able to shape what was fast emerging as the key organisation in European politics eventually | moved UK decision makers towards applying for membership. Britain might have been doing well, and its people in the 1950$] had, as then Prime Minister Harold Macinillan put it, 'never had it so good'. But the sense of global decline was palpable and by I the 1970s the country was labelled - both at home and abroad! - as the 'sick man of Europe' thanks to a series of economic! booms and busts. This contrasted with the steadier growth the! members of the EEC had experienced, which only added to a I sense among UK decision makers of Britain's decline. Repeated attempts at membership Membership of the EEC became an economic, political and strategic concern for the UK, with the first attempt at membership made in 1961. It was eventually rejected in 1963 by France's President de Gaulle. For de Gaulle, Britain was not sufficiently European. The French rejection, along with another in 1967, did not represent the positions of the rest of the EEC, afl| ot whom supported British membership. It might also have been less about how European Britain was and more about how de Gaulle feared Britain challenging French leadership in the EEC. Nevertheless, that de Gaulle argued Britain was not European enough was telling. Britain's late applications and their rejection meant that when Britain finally joined in 1973 — as a result of de Gaulle leaving office m 1969 - it arrived late, frustrated by delays at getting in, and found an organisation already established to: 36 ma way that was more in fitting with politics elsewhere i ri>pe than the style found in Westminster and also designed fcpecially in its budget) to meet their needs, not Britain's. tin two-faced European Hik up any book about Britain's membership of the EU and Ail) soon read about how that relationship has rarely been Kill. Brexit has taken this to new heights. Look more closely #I \i>u will soon see that the relationship has afro been more i naive and positive than might first appear. Even opinion (tt'lling has shown support for UK membership fluctuating iiu.mdy, albeit with support for withdrawal never falling 1 25 per cent (Ipsos Mori 2016). Britain has therefore often seen as a two-faced European, sometimes also described ■} 'Janus faced' after the two-faced Roman god. A ijihk) example of this two-faced approach can he found peech Margaret Thatcher gave in 1988 at the College ff Europe in Bruges, a speech that has become known as the Mr ii|;es Speech' (Menon and Salter 2016). This speech is widely Interpreted as an attack on the European project. One line in i i.ii is often quoted: 'We have not successfully rolled back iM'iuiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed 41 < I uropean level.'This was in reaction to attempts, as she saw ^Hy some in the EEC to push forward integrated economic m i.i! policies that would be underpinned by unnecessary nl iimns that would stifle business and competitiveness. This 11 li< ii with what had become known as Thatcherism, which, ........r other things, emphasised deregulation and the power narkets. |Such ideas were also found in the US in the ■ in ut 'Keagonomics', named after President Ronald Reagan. 1 \\v speech was therefore interpreted in Britain as Thatcher ■ I. i. ii.ling an Anglo-American (sometimes referred to as 'Anglo- m i economic order against a more corporatist, Keynesian ' interventionist European one. This was used by her press ei.it \ to feed a domestic message that Thatcher was standing "I lot Britain, arguing that it was a place apart from the rest ot itn III , and that it was being held back by it. These arguments lluve only grown among Eurosceptics since 1988. 37 Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations There is, however, another side to the speech that looks at how it shaped the EEC and later the EU. British outlooks on the speech assume it was greeted with hostility across Europe, Yet Thatcherism and Reagonomics were part of a wider series of changes in the political economy of the West that also swept across much of Europe. The speech offered a perspective that aligned with frustrations found elsewhere in the EEC. As. explored below. Britain, and Thatcher especially, had pushed for the creation of the single market to encourage competition across-Europe, something other member states had also embraced. Look back on the ideas Thatcher set out in v ntinl renegotiation did secure some changes, with 'Sn-uctural i ii 111 lent Funds' being created to pay for projects in some of I Ill's poorest regions, which included a number of areas ■ In- 11K. Overall, however, the situation remained much as it Ii ill I ii luv. with the renegotiation sold to the British people as till exercise in UK diplomacy at securing concessions. 39 Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations The eventual referendum, held on 5 June 1975, saw 67 per cent of Britain that voted do so to remain in the EEC (on a turnout of 63.9 per cent). This provided Labour with only a short reprieve from its tensions over EEC membership. In the hope of maintaining cabinet unity, Harold Wilson had allowed ministers to campaign on differing sides. The divisions this helped bring to the surface added to pressures, not least from Labours move towards a more Left-wing agenda, which led in the early 1980s to a group of pro-European Labour MPs splitting away to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP). By the 1983 general election Labour was campaigning for withdrawal from the EEC. A transactional approach to membership Labour's renegotiation and referendum were only the beginning of a history of demands for special treatment from the EU. Tellingly, Labour ministers viewed the UK-EEC relationship as a 'business arrangement'(Wall 2012, 516). Despite this, the 1975 renegotiation had not substantially reduced the amount the UK paid to the EEC. Relations were therefore again strained when in the early 1980s Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher! pushed the EEC to restructure its budget so that the UK would not have to pay as much in. The 'rebate' which she secured for the UK's contributions followed fraught negotiations in which Thatcher famously declared that she wanted 'my money back'.] To the rest of the EEC, especially other net contributors, this was evidence of Britain pursuing a purely national as opposed to' collective approach to European integration. The rebate, and the way it was secured, has caused a degree of resentment ever since.) Britain has secured many opt-outs Throughout its membership. Britain has been able to secure opt-l outs and exclusions from common EU policies, most famously! from the European single currency and Schengen. It was alstfl able to negotiate an opt-out from some areas of cooperation in justice and home affairs and later from the 'Charter ol Fundamental Rights', which was an attempt by the EU to create! a bill of rights for itself. British officials often resisted the use pi b word 'federal' to refer to anything within the EU because it ■Tried connotations of a 'federal Europe', which in Britain had ■fume associated with centralisation of power in Brussels and ■t emergence of a United States of Europe. The rest of the EU «*. i.< .1. >:;g w ith many of these opt-outs, but not without unease. I In ic was therefore a sense of exasperation when, as explored \u lied on above, Britain's demands for special treatment Mini from a domestic political debate that rarely embraced ■fthipr.m integration and was often deeply divided over it. As uli the issue of Britain's relations with the EU has caused l. ins for successive prime ministers and shaped their hips. Divisions within Labour over Europe weakened I 11 mid Wilson and James Callaghan; Margaret Thatchers i|i .i' ul ill was in part because of divisions with her cabinet over nil"" altitude to the idea of a single European currency; it ' . .m\e of bitter splits and divisions within John Major's . mucin; it caused tensions between the pro-European Blair note wary Cordon Brown; the vote for Brexit brought Understanding Brexit down David Cameron; and the problems of implementing Brexit have defined Theresa May's troubled premiership. No wonder then that British leaders have appeared weary of dealing with EU matters and confronting some of the causes that can make the relationship with the EU a troubled one. Euroscepticism has defined public and media debate Public opinion on UK membership has been erratic but support for leaving has never gone below 25 per cent (I psos Mori 2016); The British public has therefore never been consistently positive about UK membership. This has not been helped by a media which has moved from supporting membership, albeit with a long-running suspicion of motivations from elsewhere on the continent, to one which has been largely negative, alarmist and sensationalist about its claims of the effect Brussels and the EU has on everyday life in the UK (Daddow 2012). This media and public suspicion has rarely been met by A strong pro-European message from leading politicians. Tons Blair, one of Britain's most pro-European prime ministers, was once described as an 'anri-anri-European' (Donnelley 2005| because he was willing to attack Eurosceptics but rarely willing to go beyond this by actively making a pro-European case to the British people. Like many prime ministers, when Blair did speak positively of Europe he did so when speaking elsewherj in Europe. Pro-European campaign groups have often been weak in comparison to the better-resourced and -organised] Eurosceptic ones. The result has been a political culture inj which UK politicians have been willing to take credit for any positive developments in the EU, but on the whole were mord inclined to attack it to score easy political points and blame for unpopular tilings they might have done anyway. There has also been a strong temptation to blame the EU for the UK?[ own problems. In 2013, Boris Johnson, then Mayor of London argued that one of the benefits of leaving the EU would be that 'we would have to recognize that most of our problems are nod caused by Brussels' (Johnson 2013). 42 The history of UK-EU relations ^H/'i has been willing to say no not just been in political debate where'relations have been ^Hpi-d. Britain has also appeared to be awkward because ;i has ^Bl more willing than others in the EU to voice concerns, ilili |>Kiposals and. ultimately, say no or veto a deal. It has Hv*i Ix'en said that other member states were prepared to hide 111 mJ that willingness and so allow the UK to play the 'bad Hm' id European integration. As a large state Britain could H| be easily ignored. Part of this willingness also stems from Mm mi's nujoritarian and more confrontational political system, ii id earlier. Compromises are publicly avoided, instead i mng in the UK system in more private networks within i "'tween government and Parliament (Russell and Gover - has too often looked to the US ins commitment to a 'special relationship' with the US In |'< d dilemmas when Europe and the US have moved in ■ directions. When faced with such a dilemma Britain lw* "ii' ii been willing to side with the US, as happened under I Hair over his decision to back the US over the 2003 Iraq Bkf, This might, as noted earlier, be in order to ensure the US mis committed to Europe, but this has also brought with it i> i ii-..ih)iis that the UK is an American 'Trojan Horse'intended in Ii i mine any EU efforts that do not align with those of the \)k I oi example, efforts to create EU cooperation in foreign, • H \ and defence matters have long been weakened by UK . ■ | -1 - - ■ mi 'ii. which stems from a concern that such efforts would 111 mie NATO and the US commitment to Europe. ■ v.trd because of its size in is not the only member state to have joined after the l>\ i w is founded {19 other member states joined after Britain ii 1973), faced difficulties in joining/countries in Eastern I .....(i tor example, complained that their accession was a nl ifly difficult one), feel distant from the core (countries 43 Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations such as Bulgaria and the Baltic states worry about this), be anl island with an insular outlook (Malta, Cyprus. Ireland), struggle with the EU's policies, budget or treaties (the citizens of France the Netherlands, and Ireland have each rejected EU treaties ir referendums), have links with the US (Atlanticism is a nornj in European politics), seen large numbers of immigrants anc asylum seekers (southern European states have been confronted with a far bigger refugee crisis in recent years), or seen a rise ii Eurosceptic parties (the leaders of France's Front National have twice - in 2002 and 2017 - made it to the second round of the French presidential election). What lias made Britain different and awkward has been the combination of these with its size. As one of the largest member states its votes, budget contributions, and positions matter more than those of many other member states. Whatever the cause of the UK's awkward behaviour, ones triggered it cannot be easily ignored. A quiet European There are six counterpoints that show how Britain has been a more positive and constructive player in European integration than it is often credited with. Popularity vs effectiveness It would be a mistake to confuse popularity with effectiveness You can be deeply unpopular (or at least have a public appearance ot being so) or be seen as awkward, but still be effective and constructive at getting your way. There is little doubt that deeply divisive political differences exist in the UK about membership ot the EU and that these have caused tensions with the rest of the EU, but that does not always affect what Britain gets done ir Brussels. Britain is widely judged to have been one of the mosl effective players in getting what it wants: more opt-outs and exclusions than any other member state, a substantial rebate on the budget, renegotiation of its relationship in 1975 and again ii 2016 (something no other member state has ever secured) and, as discussed in detail further below, success in shaping a largi number of policy areas to British aims. Jm had to assert itself to be taken seriously til H 'in \ abrasiveness in the earlier phases of its membership was ■.■it had to overcome an unwillingness to take seriously its ii>n as a new member state, which is a common problem I \ ill new member states. Britain challenged the accepted ■ I the EU, one which had been shaped around the needs 'i .me and Germany. One of the strongest backers of Britain's I ■ i ship had been the European Commission, whose leaders ■ I Britain would act as a counter-balance to French efforts lii Ii id the EU. There was therefore an unwillingness on both flil. .in. omo to terms with the UK as an EU member state. ^■nt/c/sm is the norm in the EU M*uiu ism has long been a strong norm within European ^Bfcv In siding with the US Britain has not always been alone. .. Hi it.mi decided to support the US over the 2003 Iraq War ^Bp hacked by a large number of governments in other EU ..In i states (although, arguably, perhaps not their publics), division led US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to H| ni Old Europe and New Europe', with 'New Europe' uling large numbers of new member states from central and i ii I mope. Like Britain, and indeed most other EU states, id, Ii i\v looked first and foremost to the US for their defence nut to the EU. It was also for this reason that soldiers from mi uid a large number of other EU states fought in the war i nist.in. It was to show their countries' commitments to fit* Allure of the Atlantic alliance and the security it brings to ill-- FU and Europe. ' tun won on many policy areas • In i i . mute example of Britain shaping the EU, and one made ll>. m Britain, is the role Britain played in creating the ■ ■ ,le Market and the advancement of economic reforms I mope. That even some British Eurosceptics have-been ......i he UK retaining access to the single market highlights liii.i itiiu h some in Britain feel the country invested in the 44 45 Understanding Brexit The history of UK-EU relations project. As noted earlier, Margaret Thatchers extolling of th free market in her Bruges Speech was in line with the trend i the EU's political economy. Feelings that the EU had become servant of Anglo-Saxon free-market economics were so stron in France that they played a part in France's 2005 referendu rejection of the European constitution. Other areas where Brita has been a strong advocate of the EU's work are as diverse aj climate change through to animal rights. Any complaints that Britain has been and can be outvoted id the EU ignores that a Westminster-style zero-sum mentality q win/lose is not how the consensus system of the EU (or of mai other EU member states) works. It also ignores that the UK h been closer to most final EU policy outcomes than most othe: EU governments (Hix 2015b). That Britain has over the past fe years found itself somewhat at odds with EU decisions reflects in no small part a disengagement by the UK government, bu| thanks to the consensus system Britain was on the winning sid 87 per cent of the time (Hix and Hagemann 2015). Has been a good enforcer ofEU laws Britain has not only been good at shaping EU policy, it has alsa been good at implementing EU law. Part of Britain's difficulties with the EU may stem from the fact that it is too often a go^j European when it comes to EU law, the enforcement of whicl has provoked a long litany of complaints in the media. Tn European Commission can take a member state to the CJEli for failure to fulfil its EU legal obligations. As Figure 2.2 shows states such as Italy, Greece and Spain have typically had the wors records. The UK's record has long been a good one and durinj the period 2012-16 equalled that of Germany, the two havin the best records of any of the large member states. The EU's design reflects British aims Britain's budget rebate might be seen as one of Britain's moi awkward and destructive contributions because it enshrines; transactional approach to the EU of juste retour. This ignore that the EU has long faced, and will continue to face, awkwal 46 ripitlands from its member states for juste retour. The UK has Hvn one of the strongest backers of reforming a budget that .....<■ i.ivoured juste retour for French agriculture, among others. Britain's strong support for EU enlargement, along with that BlNATO, has brought about an EU th it stretc hes a< ross mosi ij I 'in ipe H(inr 2.2: Judgements concerning failure of a member state to fulfil its TSfitions (2012-16) I I III.. • l 5 i 3 .« -- II ..11 ..1 1 I I I I I I 1 a t * 1 e ElfIIIII f I - 5 J f x ! 1 a I i 1 * B » c i c 2 a « 5 *• £ s III mil cl Justice of the European Union (2017). ii i for widening the EU was also premised on the idea iU prevent the deepening of the EU because it would iWther integration more difficult. This has meant finding within the EU has become increasingly difficult, piiihlems for the EU when trying to manage problems hi. ia in the Eurozone. This can. to some extent, be I • hi Id nam. Ai ilu ...ins- time, most of the problems within the Eurozone hi i'.kited to the UK's behaviour. Nor can the need • ii i balanced relationship between the nine non-Eurozone Nil Mid. i. ii| the i-.U and the 19 within the Eurozone. This was ^^Bly iibniit relations with the UK, although because of its 1 K was again at the forefront of tensions. 47 Understanding Brexit Conclusion How then can it be explained that a country that on the mxM hand has often succeeded in getting what it wants from the EUI has at the same time been home to such a divisive debate abou Europe? There are three groups of reasons. Historical legacies UK-EU relations have been defined by a mix t>f Britain imperial hubris, strategic lessons from the Second World Wa economic links with global markets that dramatically shifted, lafi membership of an EU set up to serve other member states, anc contrasting political and constitutional norms that have cause* misunderstandings and tensions. Finding a role Being a member of the EU has never, despite what Deal Acheson hoped, been the primary role Britain sought to play it the world. Membership of the EU has not been seen as importan to Britain's identity, sovereignty, or social and economic futur as itjhas in many other EU member states. A constraining public debate Despite a referendum in 1975, the British public has rarely bea engaged in detailed discussion about the EU. British politician have wanted to avoid raising the topic, in pan because of thi tensions it confronts Britain with over the roles it wants to pla1 in the world and also because it has become an increasingly toxji subject. It should not be forgotten that across Europe the pa< decades have seen a move from what has been called a 'permisshl consensus' about European integration, in which Europe* publics were content to allow integration, to a 'constrainiq dissensus'where publics have become more divided and unlikel to sanction integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Britis politics has shown this very clearly. ■ The history of UK-EU relations hn ii'er readings ■ 1 i Bickerton. The European Union: A Citizens Guide (Penguin, Bid). Provides a penetrating analysis of the complex and 'WNixiue ways in which the EU works. < li.....pher Booker and Richard North. Tin Great Deception: Bfii the European Union Survive? (Continuum, .211115 V Gives a I. [•urosceptic take on Britain's relationship with the EU HI tli< origins and history of European integration. thv Garton-Ash, 'Is Britain European?' International Affairs, ' '11 hnuary 2< H) 1. Looks at many of the questions surrounding in . identity. •'. (ieddes. Britain and the European Union (Macmillan, HI l| A good introductory textbook on UK-EU relations. n < -corge. An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European .....tin)' (OUP, 1998). One of the best accounts of Britain's • ill- m iwkward relationship with European integration. HBrl Kcnealy, John Peterson and Richard Corbett, Tlie ('««« ( nion: how docs it work? (OUP, 2015). A comprehensive ■ ■■••view of how the EU works, which combines theoretical Hntit with detailed descriptions of the EUs institutions and hndcr and Simon Usherwood, 77ie European Union: A N\W Introduction (OUP, 2013). A quick and accessible way 1 1 1 mil the EU, its institutions, its development and the 1 '»!■ 111 it shape it. Siiiuns, Britain's Europe: A Tiiousand Years of Conflict and ^^Hpfcw (Allen Lane, 2016). Simms's history shows Britain 11 "it, England's) struggle to shape Europe.