

³ After the election, the head of state (monarch or president) usually 'invites' the leader of the largest party in parliament to form a new government. Many parliamentary systems also require that the parliamentary majority formally supports the new government in a 'vote of investiture' before the new cabinet takes office.

⁴ The United States is the only presidential democracy that still preserves an Electoral College to elect the president. Under this indirect procedure, designed in the eighteenth century, votes are tallied and aggregated at the state level in order to appoint a certain number of 'electors' from each state, who then cast their votes for particular presidential candidates. Nowadays, electors pre-commit to support specific candidates and they have no autonomy once appointed. Therefore, the Electoral College is simply an intermediate source of 'noise' between the popular vote and the final selection of the US president.

⁵ Few constitutions empower the president to dissolve congress, and they do so only under very restrictive circumstances. More constitutions grant congress special powers to impeach the president, but this action requires evidence that the president has committed serious misdemeanours in office (Pérez-Liñán 2007).

⁶ Lijphart also identifies two additional traits of majoritarian democracies: a pluralist system of interest representation, and a central bank dependent on the executive (as opposed to corporatist representation and more independent central banks in consensus democracies), but these characteristics are less clearly related to the other institutional features described in the chapter.

⁷ When changes towards authoritarianism occur at a slow pace—sometimes over several years—scholars also refer to *democratic erosion* or *democratic backsliding* to describe the process (Bermeo 2016).

⁸ A fifth set of theories emphasizes the role of political culture as an explanatory factor. Those arguments are discussed in detail in Chapter 17.

⁹ Besides multilateral diffusion, international powers may in extreme circumstances impose unilateral regime change. For example, domestic political conditions changed abruptly in Western Europe with the expansion of Nazi Germany, and again after the Allies prevailed in World War II.

CHAPTER 6

Authoritarian regimes

Paul Brooker

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Reader's guide

The concept of an authoritarian regime is a residual one that throws all the non-democratic political systems in together. Apart from the fact that they are *not* democracies, these regimes have little in common and, in fact, display a bewildering diversity: from monarchies to military regimes, from clergy-dominated regimes to communist regimes, and from seeking a totalitarian control of thought through indoctrination to seeking recognition as a multiparty democracy through using **semi-competitive elections**. The chapter begins with an introduction to the historical evolution of authoritarian regimes, especially the three-phase modernization of dictatorship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Then the chapter examines the key questions of who rules an authoritarian regime, why they rule (their claim to legitimacy), and how they rule (their mechanisms of control). Finally, the conclusion discusses whether these regimes are becoming extinct or will come up with some evolutionary surprises.

Introduction

Until modern times states were normally ruled by authoritarian regimes, and most of these were hereditary *monarchies*. These monarchical authoritarian regimes were based on a traditional form of inherited personal rule that was restrained to varying degrees by traditional customs and institutions. However, the notion that rule over a state and its people could be inherited like private property—like a family business concern—would seem very primitive once democracy began to compete with the monarchies. In order to survive, let alone flourish, the authoritarian regime had to modernize by introducing a new and modern form of *dictatorship* rather than monarchy. The notion of dictatorship could be traced back to ancient Rome's invention of the post of 'Dictator', which enabled the Roman republic in an emergency to appoint someone to act as a temporary monarch-like ruler with extraordinary powers but without the ceremonial trappings of royalty (see Box: The Roman connection, in the Online Resource Centre). Since then the notion of dictatorship had acquired a broader meaning that included 'self-appointed' dictators who had taken power and did not intend to relinquish it. But the modernization of dictatorship went much further in terms of organization and legitimation during the three phases of modernization that occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Brooker 2014: 6–8).

The first phase of modernization was not very innovative organizationally, for dictatorship by a military organization or its leader had actually appeared as long ago as Julius Caesar and other politically ambitious

commanders of ancient Rome's professional army (see Box 6.1). But when General Napoleon Bonaparte pioneered first-phase modernization after his military *coup* in 1799 in post-revolutionary France, he took the innovative step of using a plebiscite, or *referendum*, to claim a form of *democratic* legitimacy for his seizure of power. Thus, the first phase in the modernization of dictatorship involved (1) rule by a military organization or its leader, and (2) 'democratic' legitimation through a plebiscite or one-candidate presidential election or by claiming that it was a temporary dictatorship aimed at democratizing or 'cleansing' the political system. During the nineteenth century, such modernized dictatorships often appeared in Latin America, but in the twentieth century they spread to other parts of what became known as the Third World. In fact, they were the most common form of authoritarian regime in the twentieth century and therefore numerically overshadowed the new form—the *ideological one-party state*—that appeared with the *second* phase of modernization of dictatorship (Brooker 2014: 30).

Second-phase modernization created the ideological one-party state by two radical innovations. First, it adopted democracy's key organization, the *political party*, but as a single-party rather than a *multiparty system* (see Chapter 13). Second, it claimed legitimacy through an *ideology* of some kind, such as communism or fascism. This new and distinctively twentieth-century form of authoritarian regime first appeared after the October 1917 socialist revolution in the former Russian Empire, which was later renamed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or 'Soviet Union'. The post-revolutionary dictatorship established by the Communist Party espoused

a Marxist–Leninist ideology that legitimated a one-party state in which the party ruled over state and society. By the 1930s a new party leader, Stalin, had established a *personal dictatorship* that was rivalled for 'totalitarian' thoroughness (see later section on totalitarianism) only by the two *fascist* ideological one-party states established by Mussolini in Fascist Italy and by Hitler in Nazi Germany. The Second World War destroyed these two fascist regimes but also led, directly or indirectly, to a huge expansion in the number of communist regimes, which were established throughout Eastern Europe, in North Korea, and, most importantly, in *China*. There were occasional additions to the number of communist regimes during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, such as Cuba and Vietnam (see Box: Revolutionary seizures of power, in the Online Resource Centre). However, these additions were numerically overshadowed by the swathe of non-communist ideological one-party states that emerged in the 1950s–70s as decolonization greatly increased the number of states in what became known as the 'Third World'.

The dissolution of the British, French, and Portuguese colonial empires in the 1950s–70s created dozens of new states in Asia and Africa and also led to a surprisingly large number of second-phase dictatorships. Some developed innovative ideologies or versions of the one-party state, notably what became known as 'African socialism' and then 'the African one-party state'.¹ And several arose from military dictatorships developing military versions of the second-phase format by claiming legitimacy through some kind of ideology and acquiring an official political party, which in these cases was subordinate in some way to the military. In addition, the *first-phase* military dictatorship found a new niche in decolonized Asia and Africa and also began a new cycle of 'popularity' in Latin America in the 1960s. So, by the mid-1970s it seemed that the authoritarian regime was dominating the globe not only numerically but also politically.

However, the mid-1970s also saw the beginning of a *global wave of democratization* (see Chapter 5). Although it 'missed' the Middle East, it swept through the other regions of the world in an almost sequential manner: southern Europe in the mid-1970s, Latin America and Asia in the later 1970s and the 1980s, Eastern Europe in 1989, and Africa in the early 1990s, not to mention the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union into more than a dozen new and non-communist states (Brooker 2014: 208). The global triumph of democracy seemed assured with this collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the end of the African one-party state, and the demise of most military regimes. But there now appeared a *third* phase in the modernization of dictatorship, the *democratically disguised* dictatorship, which involved (1) replacing the one-party state with a supposedly 'democratic' multiparty system and (2)

replacing ideological legitimation with a claim to democratic legitimation based on having supposedly 'competitive' multiparty elections. The third phase of modernized dictatorship further increased the already amazing diversity of authoritarian regimes in present times as well as throughout history. Such a huge variety of regimes is best categorized, described, and compared by applying the formula of who rules, why do they rule, and how do they rule.

KEY POINTS

- Until the nineteenth century most of the world's states were ruled by authoritarian regimes which were mostly hereditary monarchies.
- During the nineteenth century an important new form of authoritarian regime emerged, namely modernized dictatorship by a military organization or a military leader with some—however spurious—claim to democratic legitimacy.
- In the twentieth century there was a second phase in the modernization of dictatorship, with the emergence of the ideological one-party state, such as the communist and fascist regimes.
- In the third quarter of the twentieth century the majority of the world's states were ruled by first-phase and second-phase modernized dictatorships—including such new varieties as the African one-party state.
- The final quarter of the twentieth century saw a global wave of democratization but also saw a third phase in the modernization of dictatorship, with the appearance of democratically disguised dictatorships claiming the democratic legitimacy of having 'competitive' multiparty elections.

Who rules?

The question 'who rules?' has long been used—since the time of ancient Greece—to categorize regimes. But the three-phase modernization of authoritarianism has created a complex categorization of 'who rules?' that distinguishes between (1) the *organizational* rule of a dictatorial military or party and (2) the *personal* rule of (a) the *leader* of a dictatorial organization or (b) a *democratically disguised* dictator who is typically a 'populist presidential monarch', as will be described in the section on monarchical dictators. Furthermore, the category of personal rule has to be extended to include the pre-modernization era's typical form of personal rule, the *ruling monarchy*, because there are still some surviving examples and those in the Arab world, notably the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, are still internationally significant.



BOX 6.1 ZOOM-IN Military seizures of power

Historical background

The seizure of power by a military organization or its leader is historically the oldest way of setting up a modern form of authoritarian regime. Napoleon's 1799 coup and the later seizures of power by armies or military leaders in Latin America starkly revealed how the private ownership of public offices can occur in other ways than through ownership by a royal family. Clearly public offices could be 'stolen' by an organization or its leader that uses force to take power from an old monarchy or a young democracy.

The seizure of power

This seizure of the country's public offices is carried out by means of an actual or threatened *coup d'état*, which means literally a blow by/of the state, but in practice is an often bloodless attack by the military arm of the state against its own government.

Types of coup

- The *corporate coup*, which is carried out by the military as a corporate body and under the command of its most senior officers.
- The *factional coup*, which is carried out by only a faction of the military and often under the command of only middle-ranking officers (and so is often described as a colonels' coup).
- The *counter coup*, which is launched against a *military government* by a disaffected or ambitious faction of officers.

Practical implications

Such distinctions are important in practice as well as theory. For example, most coups are factional and most factional coups fail, so any democratic government faced with a military coup has a good chance of defeating it unless the coup happens to be one of the relatively rare cases of a corporate type of coup.

Dictatorial monarchs

Although all monarchs are clothed in the ceremonial trappings of royalty, only *ruling* monarchies exercise the same kind and/or degree of power as a dictatorship. In contrast, *reigning* monarchies are typically found in democracies, where the monarch is a hereditary but largely ceremonial head of state with constitutionally very limited powers. Of course, throughout history even *ruling* monarchies have had their power limited by traditions, religions, constitutions, or just the power of other players in the political game, as King John discovered in 1215 when his barons forced him to accept Magna Carta as written confirmation of the traditional limits on a feudal monarch's power. The absolutist monarch exercising unlimited powers in a discretionary or even arbitrary manner is very much the historical exception rather than the rule. None of the world's surviving monarchies are absolutist and some are merely reigning rather than ruling, such as the reigning monarchies to be found in several Western European democracies. The surviving *ruling* monarchies are to be found predominantly in the Arab world, and notably in the Arabian Gulf, where there are such important examples as the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.

So how have these Arab ruling monarchies managed to survive—and in such a politically unstable region? Their survival cannot be explained by the hold of tradition, as most of them originated in the nineteenth or even twentieth centuries. For example, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932 as the culmination of decades of political and military endeavours by a great Arab tribal leader, Ibn Saud. In contrast, it was British imperialism that established the Gulf emirates' monarchical rule in the nineteenth century, through treaties that recognized some prominent families as royal and ruling families (Anderson 1991). The British also created Arab monarchies in other parts of the Middle East, notably the still surviving Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, when Britain and France carved out a group of new states—including Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—from the Arab territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire after the First World War.

It is tempting to explain the survival of the Saudi and other Arab monarchies by pointing to their oil wealth. And indeed 'rentier state' theories argue that oil-rich authoritarian regimes survive by exploiting the 'rent' revenues from the oil industry. These revenues allow a regime to provide its subjects with substantial material benefits without the need for heavy taxation and therefore without the need for democratic representation: in other words, 'no representation without taxation'. But, as Herb (1999) points out, oil wealth has proved neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the survival of a ruling monarchy in the Middle East. For example, it has

not been necessary for the survival of Jordan's monarchy, and it was not sufficient to prevent the Iranian monarchy being toppled by the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Herb suggests that a better explanation for the survival of the Arab ruling monarchies is that they are often *dynastic monarchies*. Their royal families do not have to follow the rule of primogeniture (where the eldest son of the monarch automatically succeeds him) that is characteristic of the Western monarchies. The dynastic royal family can prevent an incompetent or unreliable person from succeeding to the throne, and can also remove a monarch who has become incompetent or unreliable. Furthermore, these dynastic royal families have ensured that any intra-family rivalries about succeeding to the throne have not torn the family apart and left them vulnerable to outsiders, such as military officers, seeking to dispossess the family of their power.

Another distinctive feature of these dynastic monarchies is that their royal families are very large and have an extensive presence in government, the civil service, and the military. The numerous members of these royal families not only occupy key posts in the government, but are also widely employed in the civil service and the military—in fact, there is a 'profusion' of royals in the military (Herb 1999: 35). Such an extensive presence in government and the state machinery can give the dynastic royal families the sort of control over the state that is characteristic of a ruling communist party in a second-phase modernized dictatorship.

Furthermore, the subjects of some Arab monarchies have the right to present in person their grievances and requests to the monarch—a practice that has been trumpeted as 'desert democracy' (see Herb 1999: 41–2). The rulers' democratic-like accessibility may be intended to compensate for a lack of democratic institutions but the *non-dynastic* Arab monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have gone further by establishing supposedly democratic parliamentary institutions and even sharing power with elected politicians. That both these successful monarchies lack oil but not political skill is another indication of the 'primacy of politics' in the survival of such a primal anachronistic form of authoritarian regime.

Monarchical dictators

Just as it is crucial to distinguish between monarchs who rule and those who only reign, it is crucial to distinguish between dictators who are personal rulers and those who are only *agents* of the ruling organization. For example, the president and the prime minister of communist China are more comparable in power to a ruling than a reigning monarch, but they are still merely *agents* of the communist party that they lead and that is the organizational ruler of China. (To use the language of the 'new institutionalism', there is a principal–agent relationship between the party as the organizational principal

and the public officials as its two individual agents.) In contrast, the communist party leader Mao Zedong was the *personal ruler* of China in the 1960s–70s, and in fact his power was comparable to that of an *absolutist* ruling monarch. Like the three classic totalitarian dictators described in the later section on totalitarianism, Mao had actually *reversed* the principal–agent relationship with his party and had converted this supposedly 'ruling' party into merely an agent or instrument of his personal rule.² Although relatively few personal dictators have been absolutist rulers, they have achieved varying degrees of *autonomy* from the party or military that they have led to power or have led during the organization's consolidation of power. To use the language of the 'new institutionalism', the principal–agent relationship between him and his party or military has become so weak (or even non-existent) that he is able to 'shirk' his responsibilities to this organizational principal (Brooker 2014: 31, 63–4).

An indication of this autonomy is the tendency to become monarchical rulers 'for life' and even to be succeeded in hereditary fashion by a son or brother—they have established what political scientists in the 1960s termed a *presidential monarchy* (e.g. Apter 1965). By then it was apparent that Third World personal dictators were institutionalizing their personal rule through the monarchical post and extensive powers of a president of the republic (Apter 1965: 307, 309). The presidential monarchy was becoming prevalent in Africa and would soon become prominent in other parts of the Third World, as in the case of President Suharto of Indonesia and President Hafiz Assad of Syria, and it even appeared in the communist world, with such presidential monarchies as those of Kim Il Sung in North Korea and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Although most presidential monarchies were overthrown by the global wave of democratization in the 1980s–90s, Hafiz Assad was succeeded by his son Bashir in 2000, Kim Il Sung was succeeded by his son Kim Jong Il in 1994 (who in turn was succeeded by

his son in 2012), and Fidel Castro was succeeded by his younger brother Raul in 2005 when the president retired for health reasons.

The global wave of democratization that removed most of the presidential monarchies also produced a political climate in which an unusual form of presidential monarchy has now become the standard form and should be distinguished as a separate category of personal rule—the *populist* presidential monarchy. It is a historically old form of personal dictatorship that dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century and occasionally thereafter appeared in Latin America (see Box 6.2). However, the 'mainstream' personal dictatorships of the first and second phases of modernization were much more numerous and historically momentous; it was only with the recent third-phase shift to democratically disguised dictatorship that the populist presidential monarchy came into its own. This is partly because it is so well suited to being a democratically disguised personal dictatorship, but it is also because the way in which a populist presidential monarchy is established is so well suited to the world's democratic political climate.

Since at least the 1990s it has no longer been acceptable to take power by military coup or by revolution unless these seizures of power are aimed at democratization and are quickly followed by democratic elections. But the populist presidential monarchy emerges through an *elected* president's personal **misappropriation of power**, which Latin America long ago labelled an *autogolpe* or 'self-coup' (see Box: Misappropriation of power, in the Online Resource Centre). This misappropriation has tended to occur during or soon after **democratization** and has been very rare among older democracies, but that pattern may not continue in the democratic political climate of the twenty-first century.

Like other forms of personal dictatorship, the populist presidential monarchy can be analysed in principal–agent terms, but in this case there is a reversal of the



BOX 6.2 ZOOM-IN Louis-Napoleon as a 'chip off the old block'

Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, proved himself as politically innovative as his uncle by pioneering a new type of personal dictatorship—the 'populist' presidential monarchy. Louis-Napoleon was elected president of France after the 1848 revolution and three years later followed in his late uncle's footsteps by establishing a personal dictatorship. But this was a populist rather than a military personal dictatorship and was established by misappropriating power through an *autogolpe* (self-coup) rather than by seizing power through a military coup (see Box: Misappropriation of power, in the Online Resource Centre). After his presidential *autogolpe*,

Louis-Napoleon presented the country with a new constitution to be approved by plebiscite/referendum, and during the short period that he retained the republican title of president he created the prototype of the populist form of presidential monarchy (see McMillan 1991: 43–54). This type of personal dictatorship would be much rarer than the military type pioneered by his uncle but would occasionally be found in Latin America, with the most notable case being the *autogolpe* of President Vargas of Brazil and his innovative period of populist presidential monarchy in the 1930s–40s (see Box: The Latin American connection, in the Online Resource Centre).

relationship between the *electorate* as the principal and the elected president as its agent. By reversing that relationship the president makes the electorate the instrument of his personal rule in the sense of providing him with a claim to democratic legitimacy, which he usually confirms by having himself re-elected. These new elections will be undemocratic, but the populist presidential monarch may be genuinely popular with a wide section of the people and, what is more, the third-phase cases of populist presidential monarchy are using *semi-competitive* elections rather than non-competitive one-candidate elections in order to make their re-elections appear more democratically credible (see semi-competitive and non-competitive elections in section on 'Democratic claims to legitimacy').

During the third-phase modernization of dictatorship there was also a regional shift in the prevalence of populist presidential monarchy. The Latin American tradition of *autogolpe* and populist presidential monarchy was maintained in the 1990s by Fujimori in Peru and, his opponents might say, by Chavez in Venezuela (see Box: The Latin American connection, in the Online Resource Centre). By then, however, the populist presidential monarchy was becoming more commonly found among the fifteen new states that were created by the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, especially those created in Central Asia (Brooker 2014: 237–40). Several of these countries have evolved a new and more sophisticated version based upon a more gradual or 'creeping' *autogolpe* misappropriation of power and upon a new variant of semi-competitive elections that includes puppet parties offering phony opposition to the regime (see section on 'Democratic claims to legitimacy').

However, it is time to shift attention from the various and varied examples of personal rule to the almost as diverse examples of *organizational* rule and dictatorship, which can be categorized into two basic types: *military* rule and *one-party* rule. Before doing so, though, it is important to emphasize that there is often some *overlap* with cases of *personal* dictatorship by an organization's leader because in these cases his personal rule has emerged *from* or *with* the rule of the military or party that he leads. Therefore, overlapping cases are normally described in terms of both the leader's organization and his personal rule, such as Nazi Germany being described as 'Hitler's regime' as well as 'a fascist regime' or, more fully, 'an example of the fascist subtype of one-party rule'. And this overlap is just one of the many complications involved in analysing the two different types of organizational rule: the military and the one-party.

Military rule

The *military dictatorship* is a very obvious case of rule by a 'distinctive' organization, which in this case has its own uniforms, barracks, career structure, and even legal

system. There was a time in the mid-1970s when it appeared that the military was well on the way to ruling every country in the Third World; during the previous thirty years the military had intervened in more than two-thirds of these countries and was exerting some form of rule over a third of them (Nordlinger 1977: 6). On the other hand, the military had often relinquished power to civilians by holding democratic elections, whether because it never intended to hold power for long or because it discovered that the institutional costs of holding power outweighed the benefits. Therefore it was not surprising that military rule had an average lifespan of several *years* rather than decades (Nordlinger 1977: 139). And the global wave of democratization that began in the mid-1970s not only removed most of the existing military dictatorships, but also drastically reduced the number of countries prone to military intervention in their politics.

Military intervention in politics has produced several different structural forms of military rule. As Finer (1976) pointed out, these structural forms include:

1. *open forms* of military rule, and
2. *disguised forms* of military rule, including
 - (a) civilianized rule or
 - (b) indirect rule through a civilian government.

Open military rule

Undisguised **open military rule** occurs when a military coup leads to officers appointing themselves to key positions in the country's presidential or **ministerial government** and/or forming a **junta** (council) to act as the country's *de facto* supreme government (see Box: Military juntas, in the Online Resource Centre). Two recent examples of a military junta are the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that presided over Egypt's democratization in 2011–12 and the National Council for Peace and Order established in Thailand after the 2014 military coup. Although juntas are supposed to represent the military as an organization, they have often failed to prevent the emergence of personal rule by a military leader, while some of the military dictatorships that did *not* use a junta still succeeded in remaining cases of organizational rather than personal rule.

Disguised military rule (civilianized or indirect rule)

Disguised military rule occurs when the military's rule has either been civilianized or operates indirectly through behind-the-scenes influence over a civilian government.³ The *civilianization* of a military dictatorship involves a highly publicized ending of such obvious features of military rule as a junta or a military officer holding the post of president (though often the supposed




Figure 6.1 Types of authoritarian regime

civilianization of the presidency involves no more than the military incumbent resigning or retiring from the military). Civilianization has usually included a supposed democratization through some form of elections to the legislature and/or presidency.

The military's *indirect* rule disguises its dictatorship by controlling a civilian government from behind the scenes, and even perhaps as a puppet-master pulling the strings of a puppet government. As Finer (1976: 151–7) pointed out, indirect rule can take the form of continuous control of the government or of exerting control only intermittently and over a limited range of policies, such as military budgets and national security policy. For example, after the 2013 coup that removed Egypt's democratically elected president, the military may well have shifted from limited to continuous indirect rule—exerting continuous behind-the-scenes influence upon the democratically disguised dictatorship that was established after the coup.

One-party rule

The other type of organizational dictatorship, one-party rule, has not been as common as military rule but has tended to produce longer-lasting dictatorships. They come about through a dictatorial party either seizing power through a revolution or misappropriating power after it has won key government positions through democratic elections (see Box 6.2 and Box: Misappropriation of power, in the Online Resource Centre). The party then establishes one of the three structural forms of one-party state: (1) the openly and literally *one-party* state in which all other parties are banned either in law or in practice, (2) the partly disguised and *virtually* one-party state in which the regime's official party 'leads' some form of coalition with one or more puppet parties, and (3) the disguised and *effectively* one-party state in which

all other parties are prevented from competing properly against the official party (on single-party systems, see Chapter 13).

However, a one-party state is not necessarily a case of *one-party rule*. The various structural forms of the one-party state have sometimes been established by military dictatorships, military personal dictators, and even a few ruling monarchs as merely an instrument of their rule. There are also many occasions when the party's own leader has converted his party into merely an instrument of his personal rule, but at least this personal dictatorship has emerged *from* or *with* rule by his party. Furthermore, the dictator usually continues to display some of the characteristic features of his party, especially its ideological and/or policy orientation.

The subtypes of one-party rule have usually been categorized by political scientists according to variations in this ideological/policy orientation rather than variations in the structural form of the one-party state. The two obvious ideological/policy categories are the communist and fascist subtypes, but there is also a large residual grouping that is difficult to categorize in ideological/policy terms and will be labelled simply the 'Third World' subtype because it emerged in Africa and other parts of the Third World. Of these three subtypes, the fascist, has been historically the rarest—Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were the only examples—and has been extinct since Germany was militarily defeated in 1945. In contrast, the communist and the Third World subtypes have been relatively numerous historically and the communist subtype has managed to avoid extinction.

Communist

The communist regime is historically the most important as well as the most numerous subtype. It produced

one of the twentieth century's superpowers, the now defunct Soviet Union, and seems set to produce another superpower in the twenty-first century if China maintains its rate of economic progress—and its communist one-party rule. At their numerical peak in the 1980s there were nearly two dozen regimes that espoused the basic communist ideology of Marxism–Leninism (Holmes 1986: viii). However, about a third of these regimes were actually military leaders' personal dictatorships and/or were using Marxism–Leninism only as an ideological façade and symbolic claim to legitimacy. Even amongst the core examples of communist regimes there were some cases of personal rule by the party leader, notably Fidel Castro in Cuba and Kim Il Sung in North Korea, which left less than a dozen 'true' cases of organizational rule by the communist party. And so many communist regimes collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s that now only three of these organizational dictatorships still survive—China, Vietnam, and Laos.

Third World

The 'Third World' subtype is a residual category with a diverse collection of examples. Its most significant sub-grouping are the many 'African one-party states' that emerged from the decolonization of the British and French Empires in Africa from the 1940s to the 1960s (Brooker 2014: 87, 93–4, 99). Each ruling party had won elections during the transitional period of decolonization and went on to misappropriate power after the country became independent, establishing an openly one-party state in law or in practice. But these regimes soon shifted from organizational to personal rule, with the ruling party's leader becoming a presidential monarch and, in a few such cases as Nkrumah and Nyerere, also becoming internationally prominent spokesmen about African and Third World issues. Some of the African one-party states were also replaced by military regimes and all the surviving examples were eventually removed by the wave of democratization that swept through Africa in the 1990s.

Latin America produced three notable examples of one-party rule: the Party of Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) in Mexico from the 1940s to the 1990s, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in Bolivia in the 1950s, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s—the most ideologically leftist of these three revolutionary regimes. They preferred a disguised rather than openly one-party form of rule and they were also less vulnerable than other Third World cases to being converted into personal dictatorships. In fact the Mexican PRI developed the unique system of installing temporary presidential monarchs, with each president being allowed a degree of personal rule but only for a single six-year term of office.

KEY POINTS

- A ruling monarch is a personal ruler, but a merely reigning monarch is typically a democracy's constitutional head of state.
- Dictatorship by an organization, such as the military or a party, is often transformed into personal rule by the organization's leader.
- Dictatorship can result from a military or revolutionary seizure of power or from a misappropriation of power by an elected party or an elected president through an *autogolpe* (self-coup).

Why do they rule?

Authoritarian regimes do not claim that 'might is right' or that those they rule should be obedient solely out of fear of the punishments inflicted for disobedience. Even the most tyrannical and brutal of regimes will claim to exercise a *legitimate authority* that gives it a right to rule and gives its subjects a *duty*—a moral obligation—to obey. When authoritarian regimes ask themselves the rhetorical question 'why do we rule?' they have an answer ready, no matter how spurious or self-serving, that proclaims their right to rule and therefore the duty of the ruled to obey. For example, authoritarian regimes typically make some claim to *legal* legitimacy by claiming a legal justification and basis for their rule. In fact, apart from 'emergency' or 'temporary' versions of military rule through a junta and martial law, authoritarian regimes typically have some sort of constitution, legislature, and judiciary that can provide an impressive formal claim to legal legitimacy even if the substance or practice falls far short of being 'the rule of law'. In addition to this claim to legal legitimacy, there will be (1) a claim to religious or ideological legitimacy and/or (2) some claim to democratic legitimacy. So the ruled can have no cause for complaint, according to the regime, if their obedience is also enforced by fear and through an authoritarian regime's various control mechanisms (see the section on 'How do they rule?').

Religious and ideological claims to legitimacy

Religion

Religious claims to legitimate authority have historically been the most common but are now relatively rare and found only in the Middle East and the Vatican City. Religious claims to legitimacy have been associated with monarchies for more than a thousand years, perhaps

most famously with the European monarchs' coronation anointing and their claims to rule by 'the grace of God' or 'the divine right of kings'. And religion is still used by contemporary ruling monarchies to bolster their legitimacy, as in the case of the Saudi monarchy's alliance with the Islamic Wahhabi movement (Anderson 1991).

However, religious claims to legitimacy re-emerged in a new guise with the 1979 revolution in Iran that established a self-proclaimed Islamic Republic (Brooker 1997: chapter 9). The new constitution included several religious elements, and also a new public office had been designed for the religious and political leader of the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. This unique public office not only included religious as well as political responsibilities, but also constitutionally 'outranked' the president and therefore is often described in the West as the post of 'supreme leader' rather than 'spiritual leader'. After Khomeini's death in 1989 it was conferred on another politically active member of the Shiite clergy, Ayatollah Khamenei, in what appears to be another lifetime appointment.

Ideology

During the twentieth century, claims to legitimacy based on religion were largely 'replaced' by claims based on ideology. These ideologies ranged from the communists' systematic and comprehensive Marxism–Leninism to the grievances and aspirations of Latin American populism (see Box: The Latin American connection, in the Online Resource Centre). But all ideologies are similar to religion in holding certain things to be sacred, even if ideologies are more concerned with 'this worldly' than 'other worldly' matters and with ideas, goals, and principles rather than rituals and symbols. An ideology usually lacks the social presence and influence of such long-established religions as Christianity or Islam, which also have a network of churches or mosques staffed by professional clergy who are expert in maintaining and propagating the religion. So if an ideology is to be as effective as these religions in providing a basis for an authoritarian regime's legitimacy, it will have to be given a similar social presence and influence by 'its' regime—through use of mass media, the education system, and mass-mobilizing organizations, such as the regime's official party, youth movement, and labour unions.

This investment of time and energy may be acceptable to an ideologically driven dictatorship, such as Hitler's Nazi regime, that already has a usable ideology and political party. But a dictatorship that is not ideologically driven may well balk at the cost of this investment (and also perhaps at the possibility of having to take ideological matters into account in its policy-making). It may well prefer instead to avoid ideological claims to legitimacy, as many military regimes have

done, or to adopt a merely token ideology that provides a symbolic claim to legitimacy. Therefore the ideological diversity of authoritarian regimes includes not only the content of their ideologies, but also the fact that many of these ideologies are not taken seriously and that many military regimes have never bothered with even a token ideology.

Another source of diversity is that ideological claims to legitimate authority take different (but often overlapping) *forms*. There have been ideological claims to legitimacy in:

- the personal sense of leaders claiming a prophetic legitimacy as ideologists;
- the organizational sense of parties or militaries claiming an ideological right to rule;
- the visionary or programmatic sense of a regime claiming that the goals and principles enshrined in its ideology give it a right to rule.

The communist ideology has been the most widely used ideological claim to legitimacy, with its core of Marxism–Leninism providing both a Leninist organizational form and a Marxist visionary form (see Box 6.3 on the visionary form). Its organizational form of claim to legitimacy is based on Lenin's theory of the communist party as the vanguard party of the proletariat (working class) that leads the proletariat not only *to* revolution but also *after* a revolution, when the post-revolutionary regime is seeking to achieve Marx's visionary goal of a classless, communist society. All the many communist regimes that arose during the twentieth century adopted this ideological justification of one-party rule as part of their commitment to Marxism–Leninism. The communist regime in China may well abandon Mao Zedong's ideological additions to Marxism–Leninism, and may even abandon the visionary, Marxist component of the ideology, but would the regime ever abandon the Leninist legitimation of one-party rule?

There has been no equivalent of Leninism among the rare attempts to justify *military* rule ideologically. The leader of the 1952 military coup against Egypt's monarchy, Colonel Nasser, claimed in somewhat Leninist fashion that the Egyptian military was acting as the temporary and transitional 'vanguard of the revolution'.⁴ But Nasser's ideological justification of military rule was not adopted by coup-makers in other countries, except by the Nasser-emulating Colonel Gadhafi when he overthrew Libya's monarchy in 1969. An even less influential military equivalent of Leninism was the Indonesian military's 'dual function' ideology of the 1960s–90s, which claimed that the army had a permanent political–social as well as military function. Armies have, in fact, tended to be wary of any ideology and have preferred to express an ideological commitment only to introducing or restoring democracy.



BOX 6.3 ZOOM-IN Communist ideological vision and Chinese economic practice

Communist ideology

The communist ideology has provided the most widely used *visionary* or programmatic form of legitimacy. It views rapid economic growth as a sacred goal because this will produce the material abundance required for the envisioned shift to a fully communist, classless society.

Stalin's influence

In the late 1920s Stalin initiated an economic Five Year Plan in the Soviet Union that also produced a new economic doctrine for orthodox communists to believe in. This Stalinist economic doctrine declared that a state-planned and largely state-owned economy was needed to progress through the transitional 'socialism' stage that would eventually lead to full communism. During this socialist stage the urban economy of industry and commerce would be owned as well as planned by the state, while agriculture would be state-planned but owned by huge 'collective' farms that would each be owned and worked cooperatively by thousands of peasants.

The new pragmatism

In the 1980s the post-Mao Chinese communist regime introduced a pragmatic reinterpretation of the communist

economic approach. The new economic doctrine, 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics', argued that capitalist economic methods were a more effective way of attaining the rapid economic growth required in the transitional socialist stage of progressing towards full communism. In fact the regime had already begun to shift to an increasingly market economy with an increasing amount of private enterprise and private ownership (except of land, which could only be leased). Furthermore, the economic emphasis had shifted from the Stalinist focus on heavy industry towards first agriculture and then increasingly the consumer and export sectors of the economy.

A long transition to full communism?

The notion of a specifically 'Chinese way' was supplemented in 1987 with the new theory of a 'primary' stage of socialism. The main medium-term goal was to raise living standards and develop productive forces—through capitalist methods. And later it was suggested that China would remain in this primary capitalist-like stage of socialism for a hundred years!

'Democratic' claims to legitimacy

Since the time of Napoleon Bonaparte's plebiscites most dictatorships have claimed a form of democratic legitimacy. Sometimes it has taken the ideological form of claiming to be a special or superior type of democracy, as with a communist regime's claim to be a 'proletarian democracy' and an African one-party state's claim to be an 'African democracy'. Even the Fascist and Nazi regimes claimed to be, respectively, an 'authoritative democracy' and a 'German democracy'.

But always the claim to democratic legitimacy has also or instead taken an institutional form. There has been a claim either to be *using democratic institutions*, such as an elected parliament or presidency, or to be *preparing to introduce/reintroduce them*. The latter case typically arises after the military has seized power from what it claims to be an undemocratic, corrupt, or incompetent government. Usually the military then quickly reassures international and domestic audiences that military rule is only temporary and is preparing the way for the (re)-introduction of democracy. But it may take a long time to 'deliver' on its promises, as in the case of the Burmese military waiting until 2011 to dissolve the military junta that had ruled since the 1988 'democratizing' coup.

In contrast, the claim to be *using democratic institutions* is based on the 'delivery' of an elected parliament

and/or president, but they have been elected *undemocratically*. For example, a parliament may be elected in the plebiscitary manner pioneered by the first phase of modernization, whereby voters are given the 'choice' of either approving or rejecting the official candidate or list of candidates (if **proportional representation** elections) that is the *only* candidate or list appearing on the ballot paper. An early example of a second-phase dictatorship electing a legislature in this plebiscitary manner arose in 1938 in Nazi Germany—five years after it had become literally and legally a one-party state. Hitler held new elections to the Reichstag (parliament) that appeared to use a proportional representation list system (see Chapter 10), but with just the *one* list of candidates to approve or reject. And it was not a Nazi *party* list, but instead 'the list of the Fuehrer [Leader]', i.e. Hitler's personal list of candidates that he wanted elected to the Reichstag. Thanks to vote-rigging and other undemocratic methods, the election result was a more than 99 per cent vote in favour of the list. 'Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry congratulated itself. "Such an almost 100 per cent election result is at the same time a badge of honour for all election propagandists" it concluded' (Kershaw 2001: 82).

Although such elections have been termed one-list or one-candidate elections, a broader and better description is 'non-competitive' elections. They were taken to a higher level of sophistication by the communist regimes

established in Eastern Europe and Asia after the Second World War. These virtually one-party states included one or more puppet parties in a communist-dominated combined or coalitional list of candidates that would produce a 'multiparty' election and legislature while retaining the simplicity of a non-competitive election. China's communist regime differed from the other virtual one-party states in using indirect elections to its NPC legislature but it also had no fewer than *eight* puppet parties, with a total membership in recent years of more than 700,000, and has officially described its system as 'multiparty cooperation' rather than a one-party state (Saich 2015).

However, even when including puppet parties, non-competitive elections cannot match the sophistication of the *semi-competitive* election, which was invented long ago in Latin America and has become the standard method of the third phase of modernization and its democratically disguised dictatorships. Semi-competitive elections provide a more credible claim to democratic legitimacy than any non-competitive election because they allow some electoral competition between parties, even if the official party or candidate cannot lose—if necessary, the regime will resort to vote-rigging or even annulling the election in some manner. The third-phase modernization has already produced new variants of semi-competitive elections, notably adding puppet parties or candidates to provide phony competition and 'opposition' to the government or regime. This variant emerged in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia as early as the 1990s, and more sophisticated mixtures of phony and genuine competition or opposition soon appeared in Azerbaijan and Belarus in the 2000s (Brooker 2014: 237–40).

Electoral and Competitive Authoritarianism

A democratically disguised dictatorship using semi-competitive elections can also be described as an example of 'electoral' authoritarianism, whose distinguishing feature is that an authoritarian regime presides over 'unfree' electoral competition (see Schedler 2006). However, the concept of electoral authoritarianism has been applied so broadly that it may include some of the many *hybrid* regimes that are to be found in the grey area between authoritarianism and democracy (Brooker 2014: 36–7). A recent large-scale study of a hybrid category labelled 'competitive authoritarianism' used a sample of more than thirty cases and acknowledged that it was covering a broad range of hybridity that extended 'from "soft" near-democratic cases' at one extreme 'to "hard," or near-full authoritarian cases' at the other extreme, such as Putin's Russia in the mid-2000s (Levitsky and Way 2010: 34). The near-full-authoritarian extreme is often difficult to distinguish from electoral authoritarianism, even if the latter is narrowly defined as referring to a fully



BOX 6.4 ZOOM-IN Classifying 'electoral' and 'competitive' authoritarian regimes

This is a list of nine countries, drawn from three different regions of the world, which experienced either electoral or competitive authoritarianism in 2010–20: eastern Africa's Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania; southeast Asia's Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore; and the former Soviet Union's Belarus, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Which of the nine cases should be classified as electoral authoritarian regimes and which should be classified as competitive-authoritarian hybrids of authoritarianism and democracy?

authoritarian regime—to a democratically disguised dictatorship or ruling monarchy. The most useful basis for distinguishing this electoral authoritarianism from any competitive-authoritarian hybrid regime is that the latter's 'competitive' elections are not merely a façade and in fact 'opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power' or at least 'democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to compete for power' (Levitsky and Way 2010: 7). But even the experts agreed that there were borderline cases. For example, Levitsky and Way acknowledged that Azerbaijan and Singapore 'arguably could be included' in the category of competitive-authoritarian hybrid even though these cases were 'insufficiently competitive' for their book to classify them as hybrids rather than fully authoritarian regimes (2010: 34). Another way of illustrating the classification problem is to list some contemporary examples of electoral and competitive authoritarianism and ask which should be classified as electoral and which as competitive (see Box 6.4).

KEY POINTS

- Authoritarian regimes claim that they have *legitimate* authority, i.e. a *right* to rule.
- Dictatorships claim to be a form of democracy or to be preparing the way for democracy.
- Holding elections is a sign of shrewd dictatorship rather than real democracy if these elections are non-competitive or semi-competitive.

How do they rule?

This section describes how authoritarian regimes have used various mechanisms to exert *control* over state and society. It also describes the most extreme way in which dictatorships have ruled—what political scientists have

termed *totalitarianism*. Few authoritarian regimes have attempted to be so extreme, but the very concept of a 'totalitarian' regime has led political scientists to develop a concept of 'authoritarianism' that describes the less extreme and standard way of authoritarian rule.

Totalitarianism and authoritarianism

Totalitarianism

The term 'totalitarian' was first popularized in the 1920s–30s, when Mussolini described the fascist state as totalitarian. The term was adopted by political scientists after the Second World War, but they gave it a wider application which included Hitler's Nazi regime and also Stalin's communist regime in the Soviet Union. Occasionally, it was also applied to the new communist regimes that had emerged in China, North Korea, and Eastern Europe. Unlike previous types of dictatorship, totalitarianism sought to transform human nature by indoctrinating people with an official ideology and by establishing 'total' control over state and society—a control imposed by the regime's party and other organizations, especially the fearsome secret police.

The early theorists of totalitarianism paid special attention to the role of ideologically inspired *leadership* by the Hitler or Stalin leader figure who prophetically interprets and is driven by the ideology (see Box 6.5). But this and other aspects of the concept of totalitarianism had to be reappraised after Stalin's death in 1953 because the post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union criticized Stalin's personal rule and reined in the secret police. What is more, by the 1960s historical research was beginning to show that the three classic totalitarian dictatorships had failed to achieve a total control of actions, let alone thought, and that the concept of totalitarianism could only be applied to the aspirations or goals of these regimes rather than their actual 'achievements'. In fact, it seems that a few later dictatorships, such as the communist regime in North Korea, have been better examples of totalitarianism.

Authoritarianism

The difference between the totalitarian way of ruling and the authoritarian regimes' standard way was highlighted by a sophisticated concept of authoritarianism developed by Linz in the 1960s (Linz 1970). He described four

defining elements or features of authoritarianism that delineated something that was more than monarchy but less extreme than totalitarianism:

- the presence of some limited political pluralism;
- the absence of an ideology that is elaborate and/or used to guide the regime;
- the absence of intensive or extensive political mobilization;
- a predictably limited rather than arbitrary or discretionary leadership by a small group or an individual.

These four features have been present in the great majority of dictatorships, regardless of whether the dictatorship was personal, military, or one-party. In fact, Linz suggested that even totalitarian regimes might eventually develop into something that looked more like an authoritarian regime. He later coined the term 'post-totalitarian' to describe this development and to provide more differentiation and categorization within the very broadly applicable concept of authoritarianism (Linz and Stepan 1996). Later, he also coined the term 'modern sultanism' to describe absolutist personal dictators who not only lacked the ideological motivation and legitimation of totalitarian leaders but also used *greed* as well as fear to motivate key subordinates (see Chehabi and Linz (1998) for an extension of the concept of sultanist dictatorship to mean a tendency that appears in different varieties of regime, to varying degrees, and in different stages of a personal dictator's career).

Exercising control

Both totalitarianism and authoritarianism deploy a range of control mechanisms to ensure that the regime will be obeyed even if its claims to legitimacy are not effective. The control is exercised by monitoring and enforcing political loyalty as well as by implementation of the regime's policies.

The most effective control mechanism is a force of competent political or 'secret' police. Depending upon the regime and its circumstances, the political police's methods (1) of information-gathering range from using torture and informers to merely electronic surveillance and (2) of punishment range from execution or 'disappearance' to merely ending a person's career prospects. Totalitarianism is more likely than authoritarianism to involve extreme methods of political policing, but any dictatorship may use them in a peak period of repression. In these periods of extreme repression the political police may be so concerned with *potential* as well as *actual* disloyalty or disobedience that even politically reliable sectors of the population are 'terrorized' by the repression's scope and apparent arbitrariness.

A military regime has some distinctive control mechanisms, notably the junta and the declaration of martial law. The latter bestows policing and judicial powers upon the military, which can then use its soldiers to police and control society at street and village level. The junta can be used to control the military regime's presidential or ministerial government and counterbalance the civilian influence upon and *within* the government, especially that of the civilians used to fill technical posts such as minister of finance. A few military regimes have further extended their control over the state by appointing military officers to important positions in the civil service and regional or local government. And one of the reasons why the military have occasionally adopted a military version of the one-party state is in order to use a political party as a means of extending control over state and society.⁵

One-party rule's distinctive control mechanisms have been based on using a political party to control state and society. The communist regimes have led the way since 1917 in seeking strong and extensive party control of the state from the top downwards. The party's Politburo or Standing Committee of the Politburo (in the case of China) is the equivalent of a junta and acts as the country's *de facto* government, with its decisions being passed on to the state's legal government—the council of ministers—for implementation. The party also uses its extensive membership in the civil service and the military to ensure that these policies are carried out. Party members monitor policy implementation as well as political loyalty, while party officials may actually provide 'guidance' to civil servants about how to implement party policy—indeed, regional and district party leaders have often been the *de facto* governors of their areas. Considering that even a generation ago the Chinese regime had some 600,000 party officials and administrators, the extent and range of this party control mechanism is very impressive (Hamrin 1992: 96). On the other hand, the fascist and Third World cases of one-party rule have seldom adopted the communist practice of strong and extensive party control; for example, a party committee has not often acted as a junta-like *de facto* government of the country. This may be at least partly because of their tendency to be transformed into personal dictatorships by their party's leader, who is unlikely to favour institutions that represent 'collective leadership' and organizational rule by the party.

KEY POINTS

- Totalitarianism seeks total control, including control of thought, but is a historically rare way of dictatorship.
- Authoritarian regimes use various control mechanisms, such as the political or secret police, which monitor and enforce obedience.



BOX 6.5 ZOOM-IN Fascist totalitarian leaders

Fascist Italy

Origins

In 1922 Mussolini led the militaristic, radically rightist Fascist party in an attempted 'revolutionary' coup, the March on Rome, which led to the king of Italy appointing Mussolini as his constitutionally legitimate prime minister.

Consolidation

Mussolini took several years to convert what remained of Italy's democracy into a one-party state. He also converted the post of prime minister into the more powerful post of 'Chief of the Government' and reversed the principal-agent relationship between himself and the Fascist party, which was relegated to the subordinate role of assisting the new 'Fascist State'.

Personal rule

By the 1930s Mussolini was clearly the personal dictator as well as *Duce* (leader) of Italy. For example, his personal propaganda cult had become so prominent that *mussolinismo* seemed to overshadow Fascist ideology and such ideologically inspired innovations as the 'Corporative State' economic policy. But Mussolini never replaced the king as head of state, and was sacked by him in 1943 when the Allies invaded Italy and seemed certain to win the war.

Nazi Germany

Origins

The fascist Nazi party came to power in Germany after a series of increasingly successful *election* performances in the early 1930s, when the country was suffering from the social and economic effects of the Great Depression.

Consolidation

As the Nazis had become the largest party in parliament, the president appointed Hitler to the post of head of government in early 1933. Hitler took only a few months to take over the parliament's legislative powers and establish a one-party state.

Personal rule

Hitler's personal rule became absolutist in 1934 under his new legal title of *Führer* (leader), which combined the powers of head of state and government. This was accompanied by a personal oath of allegiance from all members of the military as well as from civil servants, police, and even the judiciary. Like Mussolini, he had the power to take his country into an ideologically driven, unwinnable war which would bring an end to his regime.

Conclusion

The safest way to draw conclusions about the past and future of authoritarian regimes is to present two differing perspectives: (1) the extinction interpretation and (2) the evolution interpretation. The *extinction* interpretation would argue that authoritarian regimes are political dinosaurs in a world whose political climate clearly favours democracy. It would back up this argument by citing such large-scale theories as Fukuyama's 'end of history' claim that liberal democracy was the end of humanity's ideological evolution and its final form of government (Fukuyama 1992: xi). An older and larger-scale theory is Weber's early-twentieth-century interpretation of modern history as the tendency towards formal rationalization and its emphasis on rules-and-numbers calculability; the *economy* will be rationalized through the development and spread of market capitalism, *administration* will be rationalized through the development and spread of bureaucracy, and therefore, by implication, *politics* will be rationalized through the development and spread of representative *democracy* (Brooker 2014: 221).

The *evolution interpretation* uses the biological analogy to emphasize the proven ability of authoritarian regimes to adapt to change in their political environment. After all, they are now engaged in a *third* phase of modernization that may well be as successful as the nineteenth-century first phase and twentieth-century second phase. Furthermore, the third-phase modernization has adapted to the democratic political climate by evolving democratically disguised dictatorships that use democratically credible semi-competitive elections. And this evolution interpretation becomes very plausible if the biological analogy is used to argue that competitive-authoritarian *hybrid* regimes should be classified as part of 'modern authoritarianism'. Then the recent history of authoritarian regimes can be interpreted as a very successful adaptation to the democratizing change in the political climate that was explained by Fukuyama and predicted by Weber. In other words, there has been what Polanyi described long ago as a 'double movement' (2001[1944]: 136–8), which in the present case meant a global movement away from the outdated forms of authoritarian regime and then a global movement towards the more modern democratized forms of authoritarianism.



Questions

Knowledge based

1. What is the difference (a) between a reigning and a ruling monarch, (b) between a ruling monarch and a dictator, and (c) between personal rule and rule by an organization?
2. Who rules in authoritarian regimes and how do they legitimize their rule?
3. What is the difference between totalitarianism and authoritarianism?
4. In what ways do elections in authoritarian regimes differ from elections in democracies?
5. What control methods are used by authoritarian regimes?

Critical thinking

1. Why have authoritarian regimes been much more diverse than democracies?
2. Why have there been so few totalitarian regimes?
3. Can an authoritarian regime win much popular support? If so, how?
4. Are authoritarian regimes likely to be less successful in the twenty-first century than they were in the previous century?
5. Why have authoritarian regimes been allocated only one chapter in this book?



Further reading

- Brooker, P. (2014) *Non-Democratic Regimes* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Finer, S. E. (1988) *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview).
- Herb, M. (1999) *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democratic Prospects in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).

- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010) *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Saich, T. (2015) *Governance and Politics of China* (4th edn) (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Schedler, A. (2006) (ed.) *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner).



Web links

<http://www.freedomhouse.org>

Website of Freedom House with assessments of global trends in democracy that also highlight cases of dictatorship.

<http://www.amnesty.org>

Website of the worldwide movement Amnesty International that campaigns for human rights and, therefore, also highlights cases of repression.

<http://www.hrw.org>

Website of Human Rights Watch that seeks to protect human rights around the world and, therefore, also highlights cases of repression.

<http://www.wmd.org>

Website of World Movement for Democracy that seeks to promote and advance democracy and, therefore, to help challenge dictatorships and democratize semi-authoritarian systems.



online
resource
centre

For additional material and resources, please visit the Online Resource Centre at:

<http://www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/caramani4e/>



Endnotes

¹ Innovative ideologies or structures had already appeared in Turkey and Mexico in the 1930s, with visionary military dictators seeking to Westernize the former and to civilianize the latter's military-dominated politics into democratically disguised one-party rule.

² Reversing the principal-agent relationship is not sufficient, though, to produce absolutist personal rule if the dictator's party or military is a relatively weak institution. For example, Mussolini's fascist party was too weak to control or counterbalance Italy's military and reigning monarch.

³ Civilianization and indirect rule have also been favourite strategies of military *personal* rulers in the Middle East and Latin America, respectively.

⁴ The military's temporary vanguard role was converted into a civilianized presidential monarchy for Nasser, who was succeeded by his deputy, ex-Colonel Sadat, who was in turn succeeded by his own deputy, ex-General Mubarak, who continued to rule Egypt as a third-generation civilianized presidential monarchy until overthrown in the 2011 Arab Spring.

⁵ The military's control mechanisms can be exploited by a military leader establishing and maintaining a *personal* dictatorship. Two particularly useful mechanisms are (1) the official party in the military version of a one-party state and (2) the appointment of officers to positions in the civil service and other civilian posts.