Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method
Author(s): Arend Lijphart
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 682-693
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*
AREND LIJPHART
University of Leiden
Among the several fields or subdisciplines
into which the discipline of political science is
usually divided, comparative politics is the only
one that carries a methodological instead of a
substantive label. The term "comparative politics"
indicates the how but does not specify the
what of the analysis. The label is somewhat
misleading because both explicit methodological
concern and implicit methodological awareness
among students of comparative politics
have generally not been very high.1 Indeed, too
many students of the field have been what
Giovanni Sartori calls "unconscious thinkers"
-unaware of and not guided by the logic and
methods of empirical science, although perhaps
well versed in quantitative research techniques.
One reason for this unconscious thinking is undoubtedly
that the comparative method is such
a basic, and basically simple, approach, that a
methodology of comparative political analysis
does not really exist. As Sartori points out, the
other extreme-that of the "overconscious
thinkers," whose "standards of method and theory
are drawn from the physical paradigmatic
sciences" -is equally unsound.2 The purpose of
this paper is to contribute to "conscious thinking"
in comparative politics by focusing on
comparison as a method of political inquiry.
The paper will attempt to analyze not only the
inevitable weaknesses and limitations of the
comparative method but also its great strengths
and potentialities.
* This article is a revised version of a paper presented
to the Round Table Conference on Comparative
Politics of the International Political Science
Association, held in Turin, Italy, September 10-14,
1969. I am very grateful to David E. Apter, Donald
T. Campbell, Robert A. Dahl, Giuseppe Di Palma,
Harry Eckstein, Lewis J. Edinger, Samuel E. Finer,
Galen A. Irwin, Jean Laponce, Juan J. Linz, Stefano
Passigli, Austin Ranney, Stein Rokkan, Dankwart A.
Rustow, and Kurt Sontheimer for their comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper, which were
very helpful in the preparation of the revision.
1 The reverse applies to the relatively new field of
"political behavior": its name indicates a substantive
field of inquiry, but especially the derivative "behaviorism"
has come to stand for a general approach
or set of methods. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral
Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a
Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political
Science Review, 55 (December, 1961), pp. 763-
72.
2 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative
Politics," American Political Science Review,
64 (December, 1970), p. 1033.
In the literature of comparative politics,
a wide variety of meanings is attached to
the terms "comparison" and "comparative
method." The comparative method is defined
here as one of the basic methods-the others
being the experimental, statistical, and case
study methods-of establishing general empirical
propositions. It is, in the first place, definitely
a method, not just "a convenient term
vaguely symbolizing the focus of one's research
interests."3 Nor is it a special set of substantive
concerns in the sense of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's
definition of the comparative approach in social
research; he states that the term does not
"properly designate a specific method. .., but
rather a special focus on cross-societal, institutional,
or macrosocietal aspects of societies and
social analysis."4
Second, the comparative method is here defined
as one of the basic scientific methods, not
the scientific method. It is, therefore, narrower
in scope than what Harold D. Lasswell has in
mind when he argues that "for anyone with a
scientific approach to political phenomena the
idea of an independent comparative method
seems redundant," because the scientific approach
is "unavoidably comparative."5 Likewise,
the definition used here differs from the
very similar broad interpretation given by Gabriel
A. Almond, who also equates the comparative
with the scientific method: "It makes no
sense to speak of a comparative politics in political
science since if it is a science, it goes
without saying that it is comparative in its ap-
proach."6
"Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison:
A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of
Political Systems," World Politics, 19 (October 1966),
p. 72.
4Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Social Institutions: Comparative
Study," in David L. Sills, ed., International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York:
Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), Vol. 14, p. 423. See
also Eisenstadt, "Problems in the Comparative Analysis
of Total Societies," Transactions of the Sixth
World Congress of Sociology (Evian: International
Sociological Association, 1966), Vol. 1, esp. p. 188.
"Harold D. Lasswell, "The Future of the Comparative
Method," Comparative Politics, 1 (October,
1968), p. 3.
6 Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Political
Science," American Political Science Review,
60 (December, 1966), pp. 877-78. Almond also argues
that comparative politics is a "movement" in
political science rather than a subdiscipline. See his
682
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1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 683
Third, the comparative method is here regarded
as a method of discovering empirical relationships
among variables, not as a method of
measurement. These two kinds of methods
should be clearly distinguished. It is the latter
that Kalleberg has in mind when he discusses
the "logic of comparison." He defines the comparative
method as "a form of measurement";
comparison means "nonmetrical ordering," or
in other words, ordinal measurement.7 Similarly,
Sartori is thinking in terms of measurement
on nominal, ordinal (or comparative),
and cardinal scales when he describes the conscious
thinker as "the man that realizes the limitations
of not having a thermometer and still
manages to say a great deal simply by saying
hot and cold, warmer and cooler."8 This important
step of measuring variables is logically
prior to the step of finding relationships among
them. It is the second of these steps to which
the term "comparative method" refers in this
paper.
Finally, a clear distinction should be made
between method and technique. The comparative
method is a broad-gauge, general method, not a
narrow, specialized technique. In this vein,
Gunnar Heckscher cautiously refers to "the
method (or at least the procedure) of comparison,"9
and Walter Goldschmidt prefers the
term comparative approach, because "it lacks
the preciseness to call it a method."'0 The comparative
method may also be thought of as a
basic research strategy, in contrast with a mere
tactical aid to research. This will become clear
in the discussion that follows.
The Experimental, Statistical, and
Comparative Methods
The nature of the comparative method can
be understood best if it is compared and con"Comparative
Politics," in International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, pp. 331-36.
TKalleberg, op. cit., pp. 72-73; see also pp. 75-78.
"Sartori, op. cit., p. 1033. See also Paul F. Lazarsfeld
and Allen H. Barton, "Qualitative Measurement
in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and
Indices," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell,
eds., The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in
Scope and Method (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1951), pp. 155-92.
9Gunnar Heckscher, The Study of Comparative
Government and Politics (London: Allen and Unwin,
1957), p. 68 (italics added).
"Walter Goldschmidt, Comparative Functionalism:
An Essay in Anthropological Theory (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1966), p. 4. Oscar Lewis
argues that "there is no distinctive 'comparative method'
in anthropology," and that he therefore prefers to
discuss "comparisons in anthropology rather than the
comparative method." See his "Comparisons in Cultural
Anthropology" in William L. Thomas, Jr., ed.,
Current Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1956), p. 259.
trasted with the two other fundamental strategies
of research; these will be referred to,
following Neil J. Smelser's example, as the experimental
and the statistical methods." All
three methods (as well as certain forms of the
case study method'2) aim at scientific explanation,
which consists of two basic elements: (1)
the establishment of general empirical relationships
among two or more variables,'3 while (2)
all other variables are controlled, that is, held
constant. These two elements are inseparable:
one cannot be sure that a relationship is a true
one unless the influence of other variables is
controlled. The ceteris paribus condition is vital
to empirical generalizations.
The experimental method, in its simplest
form, uses two equivalent groups, one of which
(the experimental group) is exposed to a stimulus
while the other (the control group) is not.
The two groups are then compared, and any
difference can be attributed to the stimulus.
Thus one knows the relationship between two
variables-with the important assurance that
no other variables were involved, because in all
respects but one the two groups were alike.
Equivalence-that is, the condition that the
cetera are indeed paria-can be achieved by a
process of deliberate randomization. The experimental
method is the most nearly ideal method
for scientific explanation, but unfortunately it
u For the idea of discussing the comparative method
in relation to these other basic methods, I am indebted
to Neil J. Smelser's outstanding and most enlightening
article "Notes on the Methodology of
Comparative Analysis of Economic Activity," Transactions
of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology
(Evian: International Sociological Association, 1966),
Vol. 2, pp. 101-17. For other general discussions of
the comparative method, see LUo Moulin, "La Mothode
comparative en Science Politique," Revue Internationale
d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionelle, 7
(January-June, 1957), pp. 57-71; S. F. Nadel, The
Foundations of Social Anthropology (London: Cohen
and West, 1951), pp. 222-55; Maurice Duverger,
MAthodes des Sciences Sociales (3rd ed., Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), pp. 375-99;
John W. M. Whiting, "The Cross-Cultural Method,"
in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol.
1, pp. 523-31; Frank W. Moore, ed., Readings in
Cross-Cultural Methodology (New Haven, Conn.:
HRAF Press, 1961); Adam Przeworski and Henry
Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry
(New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970); and Robert T.
Holt and John E. Turner, "The Methodology of Comparative
Research," in Holt and Turner, eds., The
Methodology of Comparative Research (New York:
Free Press, 1970), pp. 1-20.
13 The case study method will be discussed below.
" Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of
Political Analysis (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press,
1965). He expresses this idea in three short sentences:
"Science seeks to establish relationships" (p. 35);
"Science . . . is empirical" (p. 37); "Science is a
generalizing activity" (p. 43).
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684 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
can only rarely be used in political science because
of practical and ethical impediments.
An alternative to the experimental method is
the statistical method. It entails the conceptual
(mathematical) manipulation of empiricially observed
data-which cannot be manipulated situationally
as in experimental design-in order
to discover controlled relationships among variables.
It handles the problem of control by
means of partial correlations. For instance,
when one wants to inquire into the relationship
between political participation and level of education
attained, one should control for the influence
of age because younger generations have
received more education than older generations.
This can be done by partialing-dividing
the sample into a number of different age
groups and looking at the correlations between
participation and education within each separate
age group. Paul F. Lazarsfeld states that
this is such a basic research procedure that it
"is applied almost automatically in empirical
research. Whenever an investigator finds himself
faced with the relationship between two
variables, he immediately starts to 'cross-tabulate,'
i.e., to consider the role of further vari-
ables."114
The statistical method can be regarded,
therefore, as an approximation of the experimental
method. As Ernest Nagel emphasizes,
"every branch of inquiry aiming at reliable general
laws concerning empirical subject matter
must employ a procedure that, if it is not
strictly controlled experimentation, has the essential
logical functions of experiment in inquiry."15
The statistical method does have these
essential logical functions, but it is not as
strong a method as experimentation because it
cannot handle the problem of control as well. It
cannot control for all other variables, merely
for the other key variables that are known or
suspected to exert influence. Strictly speaking,
14 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical
Relations as a Research Operation," in Lazarsfeld and
Morris Rosenberg, eds., The Language of Social Research:
A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 115. However,
control by means of partial correlations does not
allow for the effects of measurement error or unique
factor components; see Marilynn B. Brewer, William
D. Crano and Donald T. Campbell, "Testing a SingleFactor
Model as an Alternative to the Misuse of Partial
Correlations in Hypothesis-Testing Research, Sociometry,
33 (March, 1970), pp. 1-11. Moreover, partial
correlations do not resolve the problem of the
codiffusion of characteristics, known in anthropology
as "Galton's problem"; see Raoul Naroll, "Two Solutions
to Galton's Problem," Philosophy of Science,
28 (January, 1961), pp. 15-39, and Przeworski and
Teune, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
16 Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), pp. 452f.
even the experimental method does not handle
the problem of control perfectly, because the
investigator can never be completely sure that
his groups are actually alike in every respect.16
But experimental design provides the closest
approximation to this ideal. The statistical
method, in turn, is an approximation-not the
equivalent-of the experimental method. Conversely,
one can also argue, as Lazarsfeld does,
that the experimental method constitutes a special
form of the statistical method, but only if
one adds that it is an especially potent form.'7
The logic of the comparative method is, in
accordance with the general standard expounded
by Nagel, also the same as the logic of
the experimental method. The comparative
method resembles the statistical method in all
respects except one. The crucial difference is
that the number of cases it deals with is too
small to permit systematic control by means of
partial correlations. This problem occurs in statistical
operations, too; especially when one
wants to control simultaneously for many variables,
one quickly "runs out of cases." The comparative
method should be resorted to when the
number of cases available for analysis is so
small that cross-tabulating them further in order
to establish credible controls is not feasible.
There is, consequently, no clear dividing line
between the statistical and comparative methods;
the difference depends entirely on the
number of cases.'8 It follows that in many re-
16 For instance, if the groups are made equivalent
by means of deliberate randomization, the investigator
knows that they are alike with a very high degree of
probability, but not with absolute certainty. Moreover,
as Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., states, so-called
"forcing variables" cannot be controlled by randomization.
See his Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental
Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1964), pp. 23-26. In general, Blalock emphasizes
"the underlying similarity between the logic of
making causal inferences on the basis of experimental
and nonexperimental designs" (p. 26).
17Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical Relations
as a Research Operation," p. 119. Talcott Parsons
makes a similar statement with regard to the comparative
method: "Experiment is . . . nothing but the
comparative method where the cases to be compared
are produced to order and under controlled conditions."
See his The Structure of Social Action (2nd
ed., New York: Free Press, 1949), p. 743. Another
advantage of the experimental method is that the time
variable is controlled, which is especially important if
one seeks to establish causal relationships. In statistical
design, this control can be approximated by means of
the panel method.
18In order to highlight the special problems arising
from the availability of only a small number of cases,
the comparative method is discussed as a distinct
method. Of course, it can be argued with equal justice
that the comparative and statistical methods should be
regarded as two aspects of a single method. Many
authors use the term "comparative method" in the
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1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 685
search situations, with an intermediate number
of cases, a combination of the statistical and
comparative methods is appropriate. Where the
cases are national political systems, as they often
are in the field of comparative politics, the
number of cases is necessarily so restricted that
the comparative method has to be used.
From the vantage point of the general aims
and the alternative methods of scientific inquiry,
one can consider the comparative
method in proper perspective and answer such
questions as the following, raised by Samuel H.
Beer and by Harry Eckstein: Can comparison
be regarded as "the social scientist's equivalent
of the natural scientist's laboratory?"'9 and: "Is
the comparative method in the social sciences
. . . really an adequate substitute for experimentation
in the natural sciences, as has sometimes
been claimed?"20 The answer is that the comparative
method is not the equivalent of the experimental
method but only a very imperfect
substitute. A clear awareness of the limitations
of the comparative method is necessary but
need not be disabling, because, as we shall see,
these weaknesses can be minimized. The
"conscious thinker" in comparative politics
should realize the limitations of the comparative
method, but he should also recognize and
take advantage of its possibilities.
broad sense of the method of multivariate empirical,
but nonexperimental, analysis, i.e., including both the
comparative and statistical methods as defined in this
paper. This is how A. R. Radcliffe-Brown uses the
term when he argues that "only the comparative
method can give us general propositions." (Brown,
"The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology,"
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of
Great Britain and Ireland, 81 [1951], p. 22.) Pmile
Durkheim also follows this usage when he declares
that "comparative sociology is not a particular branch
of sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases
to be purely descriptive and aspires to account for
facts." (Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method,
translated by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller,
[8th ed., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1938], p. 139.) See
also the statements by Lasswell and Almond cited
above. Rodney Needham combines the two terms, and
speaks of "large-scale statistical comparison," i.e., the
statistical method. (Needham, "Notes on Comparative
Method and Prescriptive Alliance," Bijdragen tot
de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 118 [1962], pp. 160-
82.) On the other hand, E. E. Evans-Pritchard uses
exactly the same terminology as used by Smelser and
as adopted in this paper, when he makes a distinction
between "small-scale comparative studies" and "largescale
statistical ones." See his The Comparative Method
in Social Anthropology (London: Athlone Press,
1963), p. 22.
"'Samuel H. Beer, "The Comparative Method and
the Study of British Politics," Comparative Politics, 1
(October, 1968), p. 19.
20Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative
Politics, Past and Present," in Eckstein and David E.
Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 3.
The Comparative Method: Weaknesses
and Strengths
The principal problems facing the comparative
method can be succinctly stated as: many
variables, small number of cases. These two
problems are closely interrelated. The former is
common to virtually all social science research
regardless of the particular method applied to
it; the latter is peculiar to the comparative
method and renders the problem of handling
many variables more difficult to solve.
Before turning to a discussion of specific suggestions
for minimizing these problems, two
general comments are in order. First, if at all
possible one should generally use the statistical
(or perhaps even the experimental) method instead
of the weaker comparative method. But
often, given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy,
and financial resources, the intensive
comparative analysis of a few cases may be
more promising than a more superficial statistical
analysis of many cases. In such a situation,
the most fruitful approach would be to regard
the comparative analysis as the first stage of research,
in which hypotheses are carefully formulated,
and the statistical analysis as the second
stage, in which these hypotheses are tested
in as large a sample as possible.
In one type of comparative cross-national research,
it is logically possible and may be advantageous
to shift from the comparative to the
statistical method. Stein Rokkan distinguishes
two aims of cross-national analysis. One is the
testing of "macro hypotheses" concerning the
"interrelations of structural elements of total
systems"; here the number of cases tends to be
limited, and one has to rely on the comparative
method. The other is "micro replications," designed
"to test out in other national and cultural
settings a proposition already validated in
one setting."21 Here, too, one can use the comparative
method, but if the proposition in question
focuses on individuals as units of analysis,
one can also use the statistical method; as Merritt
and Rokkan point out, instead of the "onenation,
one-case" approach, nationality can
simply be treated as an additional variable on a
par with other individual attributes such as occupation,
age, sex, type of neighborhood, etc.22
21 Stein Rokkan, "Comparative Cross-National Research:
The Context of Current Efforts," in Richard
L. Merritt and Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The
Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 19-
20. Rokkan specifically recommends the use of "paired
comparisons" for this purpose; see his "Methods and
Models in the Comparative Study of Nation-Building,"
in Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the
Comparative Study of the Processes of Development
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), p. 52.
22Merritt and Rokkan, op. cit., p. 193.
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686 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein
make a similar distinction between truly "crossnational
studies" in which total systems are the
units of analysis, and "multi-national but crossindividual
research."23
The second general comment concerns a
dangerous but tempting fallacy in the application
of the comparative method: the fallacy of
attaching too much significance to negative
findings. The comparative method should not
lapse into what Johan Galtung calls "the traditional
quotation/ illustration methodology,
where cases are picked that are in accordance
with the hypothesis-and hypotheses are rejected
if one deviant case is found."24 All cases
should, of course, be selected systematically,
and the scientific search should be aimed at
probabilistic, not universal, generalizations.
The erroneous tendency to reject a hypothesis
on the basis of a single deviant case is rare
when the statistical method is used to analyze a
large sample, but in the comparative analysis of
a small number of cases even a single deviant
fitiding tends to loom large. One or two deviant
cases obviously constitute a much less serious
problem in a statistical analysis of very many
cases than in a comparative study of only a few
-perhaps less than ten-cases. But it is nevertheless
a mistake to reject a hypothesis "because
one can think pretty quickly of a contrary
case."25 Deviant cases weaken a probabilistic
hypothesis, but they can only invalidate it
if they turn up in sufficient numbers to make
the hypothesized relationship disappear alto-
gether.26
23 Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein,
"The Comparative Study of National Societies," Socfrzl
Science Information, 6 (October, 1967), pp. 27-
33 (italics added). See also Przeworski and Teune,
op. cit., pp. 34-43.
24He adds: "This is a very naive conception of social
science propositions; if only perfect correlations
should be permitted social science would not have
come very far." Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods
of Social Research (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967),
p. 505. The functions of deviant case analysis will be
discussed below.
25W. J. M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 52. I
have been guilty of committing this fallacy myself. In
my critique of Giovanni Sartori's proposition relating
political instability to extreme multipartism (systems
with six or more significant parties), one of my arguments
consists of the deviance of a single historical
case: the stable six-party system of the Netherlands
during the interwar years. See Arend Lijphart, "Typologies
of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political
Studies, 1 (April, 1968), pp. 32-35.
26 t is clearly incorrect, therefore, to argue that on
logical grounds a probabilistic generalization can
never be invalidated; cf. Guenter Lewy's statement:
"To be sure, a finding of a very large number of . . .
(deviant cases would cast doubt upon the value of the
After these introductory observations, let us
turn to a discussion of specific ways and means
of minimizing the "many variables, small N"
problem of the comparative method. These
may be divided into four categories:
(1) Increase the number of cases as much as
possible. Even though in most situations it is
impossible to augment the number of cases sufficiently
to shift to the statistical method, any
enlargement of the sample, however small, improves
the chances of instituting at least some
control.27 Modern comparative politics has
made great progress in this respect as a result
of the efforts of the field's innovators to fashion
universally applicable vocabularies of basic politically
relevant concepts, notably the approaches
based on Parsonian theory and Gabriel
A. Almond's functional approach.28 Such
a restatement of variables in comparable terms
makes many previously inaccessible cases available
for comparative analysis. In addition to
extending the analysis geographically, one
should also consider the possibilities of "longitudinal"
(cross-historical) extension by including
as many historical cases as possible.29
It was the promise of discovering universal
laws through global and longitudinal comparisons
that made Edward A. Freeman enthusiastically
espouse the comparative method almost
proposition, but logically such evidence would not
compel its withdrawal. The test of the hypothesis by
way of a confrontation with empirical or historical
data remains inconclusive." Lewy, "Historical Data in
Comparative Political Analysis: A Note on Some
Problems of Theory," Comparative Politics, 1 (October,
1968), p. 109.
27Furthermore, unless one investigates all available
cases, one is faced with the problem of how representative
one's limited sample is of the universe of
cases.
28On the necessity of establishing general concepts
not tied to particular cultures, see Smelser, op. cit.,
pp. 104-09; Nadel, op. cit., pp. 237-38; Doualas
Oliver and Walter B. Miller, "Suggestions for a More
Systematic Method of Comparing Political Units,"
American Anthropologist, 57 (February, 1955), pp.
118-21; and Nico Frijda and Gustav Jahoda, "On the
Scope and Methods of Cross-Cultural Research," International
Journal of Psychology, 1 (1966), pp. 114-
16. For critiques of recent attempts at terminological
innovation in comparative politics, see Sartori, "Concept
Misformation in Comparative Politics"; Robert T.
Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., The State of Theory
in Comparative Politics (Minneapolis: Center for
Comparative Studies in Technological Development
and Social Change, 1968); Robert E. Dowse, "A
Functionalist's Logic," World Politics, 18 (July, 1966),
pp. 607-23; and Samuel E. Finer, "Almond's Concept
of 'The Political System': A Textual Critique," Government
and Opposition, 5 (Winter, 1969-70), pp.
3-21.
29 Michael Haas, "Comparative Analysis," Western
Political Quarterly, 15 (June, 1962), p. 298n. See also
Lewy, op. cit., pp. 103-10.
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1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 687
a century ago. In his Comparative Politics,
published in 1873, he called the comparative
method "the greatest intellectual achievement"
of his time, and stated that it could lead to the
formulation of "analogies . . . between the political
institutions of times and countries most
remote from one another." Comparative politics
could thus discover "a world in which
times and tongues and nations which before
seemed parted poles asunder, now find each
one its own place, its own relation to every
other."30 The field of comparative politics has
not yet achieved-and may never achieve-the
goals that Freeman set for it with such optimism.
But his words can remind us of the frequent
utility of extending comparative analyses
both geographically and historically. (The
value of this suggestion is somewhat diminished,
of course, because of the serious lack of
information concerning most political systems;
for historical cases in particular this problem is
often irremediable.)
(2) Reduce the "property-space" of the
analysis. If the sample of cases cannot be increased,
it may be possible to combine two or
more variables that express an essentially similar
underlying characteristic into a single variable.
Thus the number of cells in the matrix
representing the relationship is reduced, and
the number of cases in each cell increased correspondingly.
Factor analysis can often be a
useful technique to achieve this objective. Such
a reduction of what Lazarsfeld calls the "property-space"
increases the possibilities of further
cross-tabulation and control without increasing
the sample itself.31 It may also be advisable in
certain instances to reduce the number of
classes into which the variables are divided (for
instance, by simplifying a set of several categories
into a dichotomy), and thus to achieve the
same objective of increasing the average number
of cases per cell. The latter procedure,
however, has the disadvantage of sacrificing a
part of the information at the investigator's disposal,
and should not be used lightly.
(3) Focus the comparative analysis on
"comparable" cases. In this context, "comparable"
means: similar in a large number of important
characteristics (variables) which one
wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far
1 Edward A. Freeman, Comparative Politics (London:
Macmillan, 1873), pp. 1, 19, 302. See also
Gideon Sjoberg's argument in favor of global comparative
research: "The Comparative Method in the
Social Sciences," Philosophy of Science, 22 (April,
1955), pp. 106-17.
31 Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., pp. 172-75; Barton,
"The Concept of Property-Space in Social Research,"
in Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, op. cit., pp.
45-50.
as those variables are concerned which one
wants to relate to each other. If such comparable
cases can be found, they offer particularly
good opportunities for the application of the
comparative method because they allow the establishment
of relationships among a few variables
while many other variables are controlled.32
As Ralph Braibanti states, "the movement
from hypothesis to theory is contingent
upon analysis of the total range of political systems,"33
but it is often more practical to accord
priority to the focus on a limited number of
comparable cases and the discovery of partial
generalizations.
Whereas the first two ways of strengthening
the comparative method were mainly concerned
with the problem of "small N," this third
approach focuses on the problem of "many
variables." While the total number of variables
cannot be reduced, by using comparable cases in
which many variables are constant, one can reduce
considerably the number of operative variables
and study their relationships under controlled
conditions without the problem of running
out of cases. The focus on comparable
cases differs from the first recommendation not
only in its preoccupation with the problem of
''many variables" rather than with "small N,"
but also in the fact that as a by-product of the
search for comparable cases, the number of
cases subject to analysis will usually be
decreased. The two recommendations thus poin
in fundamentally different directions, althoug
both are compatible with the second (and also
the fourth) recommendation.
This form of the comparative method is
what John Stuart Mill described as the "method
of difference" and as the "method of concomitant
variations." The method of difference consists
of "comparing instances in which [a] phenomenon
does occur, with instances in other
respects similar in which it does not." The
12 Smelser, op. cit., p. 113. Holt and Turner refer
to this strategy as the process of "specification" (op.
cit., pp. 11-13). It is probably also what Eisenstadt
has in mind when he mentions the possibility of
constructing "special intensive comparisons of a quasiexperimental
nature" (op. cit., p. 424). See also
Erwin K. Scheuch, "Society as Context in Cross-Cultural
Comparison," Social Science Information, 6 (October,
1967), esp. pp. 20-23; Mackenzie, op. cit., p.
151; Fred Eggan, "Social Arithopology and the
Method of Controlled Comparison," American Anthropologist,
56 (October, 1954), pp. 743-63; and Erwin
Ackerknecht, "On the Comparative Method in Anthropology,"
in Robert F. Spencer, ed., Method and
Perspective in Anthropology (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 117-25.
33Ralph Braibanti, "Comparative Political Analytics
Reconsidered," Journal of Politics, 30 (February,
1968), p. 36.
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688 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
method of concomitant variations is a more sophisticated
version of the method of difference:
instead of observing merely the presence or absence
of the operative variables, it observes and
measures the quantitative variations of the operative
variables and relates these to each other.
As in the case of the method of difference, all
other factors must be kept constant; in Mill's
words, "that we may be warranted in inferring
causation from concomitance of variations, the
concomitance itself must be proved by the
Method of Difference."34
Mill's method of concomitant variations is
often claimed to be the first systematic formulation
of the modern comparative method.35 It
should be pointed out, however, that Mill himself
thought that the methods of difference and
of concomitant variations could not be applied
in the social sciences because sufficiently similar
cases could not be found. He stated that
their application in political science was "completely
out of the question" and branded any
attempt to do so as a "gross misconception of
the mode of investigation proper to political
phenomena."36 Durkheim agreed with Mill's
negative judgment: "The absolute elimination
of adventitious elements is an ideal which cannot
really be attained; . . . one can never be
even approximately certain that two societies
agree or differ in all respects save one."37
These objections are founded on a too exacting
scientific standard-what Sartori calls "overconscious
thinking." It is important to remember,
however, that in looking for comparable
cases, this standard should be approximated as
closely as possible.
The area approach appears to lend itself
quite well to this way of applying the comparative
method because of the cluster of characteristics
that areas tend to have in common and
that can, therefore be used as controls.38 But
opinions on the utility of the area approach
' John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (8th ed.,
London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1872),
Book III, chapter 8.
35 Nadel, op. cit., pp. 222-23; Kenneth E. Bock,
"The Comparative Method of Anthropology" Comparative
Studies in Society and History, 8 (April,
1966), p. 272.
86Mill, op. cit., Book VI, chapter 7; see also Book
III, chapter 10.
" Durkheim, op. cit., pp. 129-30. But he hailed the
method of concomitant variations, which he evidently
interpreted to mean a combination of the statistical
and comparative methods, as "the instrument par
excellence of sociological research" (p. 132). See
also Francois Bourricaud, "Science Politique et Sociologie:
Reflexions d'un Sociologue," Revue Francqise
de Science Politique, 8 (June, 1958), pp. 251-63.
" If the area approach is often preferable to research
efforts with a global range in order to maximize
comparability, the era approach may be preferable to
longitudinal analysis for the same reason. Cf. the
differ sharply: Gunnar Heckscher states that
"area studies are of the very essence of comparative
government," and points out that "the
number of variables, while frequently still very
large, is at least reduced in the case of a happy
choice of area."39 Roy C. Macridis and Richard
Cox also argue that if areas are characterized
by political as well as non-political uniformities,
"the area concept will be of great value,
since certain political processes will be compared
between units within the area against a
common background of similar trait configuration";
they cite Latin America as an example of
an area offering the prospect of "fruitful intraarea
comparison."40 On the other hand, Dankwart
A. Rustow declares in a recent article that
area study is "almost obsolete," and he shows
little faith in it as a setting for "manageable
comparative study." He argues that "mere geographic
proximity does not necessarily furnish
the best basis of comparison," and furthermore
that "comparability is a quality that is not inherent
in any given set of objects; rather it is a
quality imparted to them by the observer's perspective."''4
This is a compelling argument that
should be carefully considered.
It is not true that areas reflect merely geographic
proximity; they tend to be similar in
many other basic respects. By means of an inductive
process-a factor analysis of 54 social
and cultural variables on 82 countries-Bruce
M. Russett discovered socio-culturally similar
groupings of countries, which correspond closely
to areas or regions of the world as usually defollowing
statement by C. E. Black: "There is much
greater value in comparing contemporary events and
institutions than those that are widely separated in
time. The comparison of societies or smaller groups
that are concerned with reasonably similar problems
is more likely to lead to satisfactory conclusions than
comparisons between societies existing many centuries
apart." Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A
Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper
and Row, 1966), p. 39.
'9 Heckscher, op. cit., p. 88.
40 Roy C. Macridis and Richard Cox, "Research in
Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review,
47 (September, 1953), p. 654. See also John
D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study
of Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics 28 (February,
1966), pp. 57-80.
41 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative
Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory,"
Comparative Politics, 1 (October, 1968), pp. 45-47.
Area study may also be criticized on the ground that,
in the words of Dell G. Hitchner and Carol Levine,
in Comparative Government and Politics (New York:
Dodd, Mead, 1967): "Its very method of delimitation
puts emphasis on what may be particular to a limited
group of states, as opposed to the universal generalizations
which fully comparative study must seek"
(pp. 7-8). This argument has been answered above
in terms of the need for partial generalizations as a
first step. See also Braibanti, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
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1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 689
fined.42 Comparability is indeed not inherent in
any given area, but it is more likely within an
area than in a randomly selected set of countries.
It seems unwise, therefore, to give up the
area approach in comparative politics. But two
important provisos should be attached to this
conclusion. First, the area approach can contribute
to comparative politics if it is an aid to
the comparative method, not if it becomes an
end in itself. Otherwise, area study may indeed
become "a form of imprisonment."43 It is
against this danger that the thrust of Rustow's
argument is directed. Second, the area approach
should not be used indiscriminately, but
only where it offers the possibility of establishing
crucial controls. In this respect, some of the
smaller areas may offer more advantages than
the larger ones-Scandinavia, for example,
which has barely been exploited in this manner,
or the Anglo-American countries, which have
received greater comparative attention (but
which do not constitute an area in the literal
sense) .44
An alternative way of maximizing comparability
is to analyze a single country diachronically.
Such comparison of the same unit at different
times generally offers a better solution to
the control problem than comparison of two or
more different but similar units (e.g., within the
same area) at the same time, although the control
can never be perfect; the same country is
not really the same at different times. A good
example of diachronic comparative analysis is
Charles E. Frye's study of the empirical relationships
among the party system, the interest
group system, and political stability in Germany
under the Weimar and Bonn Republics.
Frye argues that "for the study of these relationships,
Weimar and Bonn make a particu-
42 Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions,"
in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International
Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York:
Free Press, 1968), pp. 317-52. See also Russett, International
Regions and the International System
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).
13George I. Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin
America," American Political Science Review, 53
(March, 1959), p. 126. See also Sigmund Neumann,
"The Comparative Study of Politics," Comparative
Studies in Society and History, 1 (January, 1959),
pp. 107-10; and I. Schapera, "Some Comments on
the Comparative Method in Social Anthropology,"
American Anthropologist, 55 (August, 1953), pp.
353-361, esp. p. 360.
"See Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Value Patterns
of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis,"
American Sociological Review, 28 (August, 1963),
pp. 515-31; Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The
Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1963); Leslie Lipson, "Party Systems in the
United Kingdom and the Older Commonwealth:
Causes, Resemblances, and Variations," Political Studies,
7 (February, 1959), pp. 12-31.
larly good case [strictly speaking, two cases]
because there are more constants and relatively
fewer variables than in many cross-national
studies. Yet the differences could hardly be
sharper."145
Unless the national political system itself
constitutes the unit of analysis, comparability
can also be enhanced by focusing on intranation
instead of internation comparisons. The
reason is again the same: comparative intranation
analysis can take advantage of the many
similar national characteristics serving as controls.46
Smelser illustrates the utility of this
strategy with the example of a hypothetical research
project on industrialization in Germany
and Italy: "For many purposes it would be
more fruitful to compare northern Italy with
southern Italy, and the Ruhr with Bavaria, than
it would be to compare Germany as a whole
with Italy as a whole. These two countries
differ not only in level of industrialization, but
also in cultural traditions, type of governmental
structure, and so on." The advantage of intraunit
comparison is that inter-unit differences
can be held constant. "Then, having located
what appear to be operative factors in the intra-unit
comparisons, it is possible to move to
the inter-unit comparisons to see if the same
differences hold in the large."47
As Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel
point out, a particularly promising approach
may be the combination of intranation and internation
comparisons: "The comparison of
those sectors of two societies that have a
greater number of characteristics in common
while differing on some crucial ones may be
more fruitful than overall national comparisons."48
An illustrative example of this approach
in the political realm is suggested by
Raoul Naroll: "If one wishes to test theories
about the difference between the cabinet and
I Charles E. Frye, "Parties and Pressure Groups in
Weimar and Bonn," World Politics, 17 (July, 1965),
pp. 635-55. (The quotation is from page 637.) The
postwar division of Germany also offers the opportunity
of analyzing the effects of democratic versus
totalitarian development against a similar cultural
and historical background. See Ralf Dahrendorf,
"The New Germanies: Restoration, Revolution, Reconstruction,"
Encounter, 22 (April, 1964), pp. 50-
58. See also Sylvia L. Thrupp, "Diachronic Methods
in Comparative Politics," in Holt and Turner, eds.,
The Methodology of Comparative Research, pp.
343-58.
46Heckscher, p. 69; Heinz Eulau, "Comparative
Political Analysis: A Methodological Note," Midwest
Journal of Political Science, 6 (November, 1962), pp.
397-407. Rokkan, too, warns against the "wholenation"
bias of comparative research ("Methods and
Models," p. 49).
47 Smelser, op. cit., p. 115.
" Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "WithinThis
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690 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
the presidential systems of government . . . one
is better advised to compare Manitoba and
North Dakota than to compare Great Britain
and the United States, since with respect to all
other variables Manitoba and North Dakota
are very much alike, while Great Britain and
the United States have many other differen-
ces."49
(4) Focus the comparative analysis on the
"key" variables. Finally, the problem of "many
variables" may be alleviated not only by some
of the specific approaches suggested above but
also by a general commitment to theoretical
parsimony. Comparative analysis must avoid
the danger of being overwhelmed by large
numbers of variables and, as a result, losing the
possibility of discovering controlled relationships,
and it must therefore judiciously restrict
itself to the really key variables, omitting those
of only marginal importance. The nature of the
comparative method and its special limitations
constitute a strong argument against what Lasswell
and Braibanti call "configurative" or "contextual"
analysis: "the identification and interpretation
of factors in the whole social order
which appear to affect whatever political functions
and their institutional manifestations have
been identified and listed for comparison"
(Braibanti's definition).50 Lasswell argues that
the comparative method as usually applied has
been insufficiently configurative, and calls for
the exploration of more variables: the entire
context-past, present, and future-"must be
continually scanned."51
Scanning all variables is not the same as including
all variables, of course, as long as one
is on one's guard against an unrealistic and
eventually self-defeating perfectionism. Comparative
politics should avoid the trap into
which the decision-making approach to the
study of international politics fell, of specifying
and calling for the analysis of an exhaustive list
of all variables that have any possible influence
on the decision-making process.52 Parsimony
Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight
Spains," in Merritt and Rokkan, op. cit., p. 268.
49Naroll, "Scientific Comparative Politics and International
Relations," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches
to Comparative and International Politics
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966),
pp. 336-37.
" Braibanti, op. cit., p. 49. In this context, "configurative"
analysis is not synonymous with the traditional
single-country approach, as in Eckstein's definition
of the term: "the analysis of particular political
systems, treated either explicitly or implicitly as unique
entities" ("A Perspective on Comparative Politics,"
p. 11).
"I Lasswell, op. cit., p. 6.
'3 See Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton
suggests that Joseph LaPalombara's call for a
"segmented approach" aiming at the formulation
of middle-range propositions concerning
partial systems makes a great deal of sense.53
Similarly, Eckstein's urgent call for greater
manageability of the field should be carefully
heeded: "The most obvious need in the field at
present is simplification-and simplification on a
rather grand scale-for human intelligence and
scientific method can scarcely cope with the
large numbers of variables, the heaps of concepts,
and the mountains of data that seem at
present to be required, and indeed to exist, in
the field."54
It is no accident that the most fruitful applications
of the comparative method have been in
anthropological research. In primitive societies,
the number of variables is not as bewilderingly
large as in more advanced societies. All relevant
factors can therefore be more easily surveyed
and analyzed. In this respect, anthropology
can be said to provide "almost a laboratory
for the quasi-experimental approach to social
phenomena."55 Political science lacks this advantage,
but can approximate it by focusing attention
on the key variables in comparative
studies.
A final comment is in order about the relationship
of comparative politics as a substantive
field and comparison as a method. The two are
clearly not coterminous. In comparative politics,
other methods can often also be employed,
and the comparative method is also applicable
in other fields and disciplines. A particularly instructive
example is James N. Rosenau's study
of the relative influence of individual variables
(personal policy beliefs and "personalizing tendencies")
and role variables (party role and
committee role) on the behavior of United
States senators during two similar periods: the
"Acheson era," 1949-1952, and the "Dulles
era," 1953-1956. Rosenau argues that these
two eras were characterized by a generally similar
international environment and that the two
secretaries of state conducted similar foreign
Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).
sJoseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications
in Comparative Politics," Comparative
Politics, 1 (October, 1968), pp. 60-77. As an example
he cites Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in
Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1966), esp. chapters 11-13. See also LaPalombara,
"Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative
Politics: An Anti-Scholastic View," in Holt and Turner,
eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research,
pp. 123-49.
54Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics,"
p. 30.
5 Nadel, op. cit., p. 228.
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1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 691
policies and also resembled each other in personal
qualities. He terms the method that he
uses in his analysis the method of "quantitative
historical comparison." One of its basic characteristics
is the testing of hypotheses by comparing
two eras (cases) that are "essentially comparable
. . . in all respects except for the . . .
variables being examined." The method is
called "quantitative" because the variables are
operationally defined in quantitative terms, and
"historical" because the two cases compared
are historical eras.56 The method is, therefore, a
special form of the comparative method. It illustrates
one of very many ways in which an
imaginative investigator can devise fruitful applications
of the comparative method.57
The Comparative Method and the
Case Study Method
The discussion of the comparative method is
not complete without a consideration of the
case study method. The statistical method can
be applied to many cases, the comparative
method to relatively few (but at least two)
cases, and the case study method to one case.
But the case study method can and should be
closely connected with the comparative method
(and sometimes also with the statistical
method); certain types of case studies can even
be considered implicit parts of the comparative
method.
The great advantage of the case study is that
by focusing on a single case, that case can be
intensively examined even when the research
resources at the investigator's disposal are relatively
limited. The scientific status of the case
study method is somewhat ambiguous, however,
because science is a generalizing activity.
A single case can constitute neither the basis
for a valid generalization nor the ground for
disproving an established generalization.
Indirectly, however, case studies can make
"James N. Rosenau, "Private Preferences and Political
Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individual
and Role Variables in the Behavior of U.S.
Senators," in Singer, ed., Quantitative International
Politics, pp. 17-50, esp. p. 19. Rosenau adds that if
"the findings are not so clear as to confirm or negate
the hypotheses unmistakably, then of course the
analyst moves on to a third comparable period" (p.
19). If such a third or even more periods can be
found-which seems unlikely in the case of Rosenau's
particular research problem-they should be included
regardless of the outcome of the analysis of the first
two eras (if the available resources permit it, of
course).
57 See also the proposed use of "multiple comparison
groups," as an approximation of the experimental
method, by Barney G. Glazer and Anselm L. Strauss,
"Discovery of Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy
Underlying Qualitative Research," American Behavioral
Scientist, 8 (February, 1965), pp. 5-12.
an important contribution to the establishment
of general propositions and thus to theorybuilding
in political science. Six types of case
studies may be distinguished. These are ideal
types, and any particular study of a single case
may fit more than one of the following catego-
ries:
(1) Atheoretical case studies;
(2) Interpretative case studies;
(3) Hypothesis-generating case studies;
(4) Theory-confirming case studies;
(5) Theory-infirming case studies;
(6) Deviant case studies.
Cases may be selected for analysis because
of an interest in the case per se or because of
an interest in theory-building. The first two
types of cases belong to the former category.
Theoretical case studies are the traditional single-country
or single-case analyses. They are
entirely descriptive and move in a theoretical
vacuum: they are neither guided by established
or hypothesized generalizations nor motivated
by a desire to formulate general hypotheses.
Therefore, the direct theoretical value of these
case studies is nil, but this does not mean that
they are altogether useless. As LaPalombara
emphasizes, the development of comparative
politics is hampered by an appalling lack of information
about almost all of the world's political
systems.58 Purely descriptive case studies do
have great utility as basic data-gathering operations,
and can thus contribute indirectly to theory-building.
It can even be claimed that "the
cumulative effect of such studies will lead to
fruitful generalization," but only if it is recognized
that this depends on a theoretically oriented
secondary analysis of the data collected
in atheoretical case studies.59
As indicated earlier, the atheoretical case
study and the other types of case studies are
ideal types. An actual instance of an atheoretical
case study probably does not exist, because
almost any analysis of a single case is guided by
at least some vague theoretical notions and
some anecdotal knowledge of other cases, and
usually results in some vague hypotheses or
conclusions that have a wider applicability.
Such actual case studies fit the first type to a
large extent, but they also fit one or more of
the other types (particularly the third, fourth,
and fifth types) at least to some extent.
' LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications,"
pp. 60-65.
59 See Michael Curtis, Comparative Government and
Politics: An Introductory Essay in Political Science
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 7. See also
Macridis, The Study of Compardttve Government
(New York: Random House, 1955).
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692 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
Interpretative case studies resemble atheoretical
case studies in one respect: they, too, are
selected for analysis because of an interest in
the case rather than an interest in the formulation
of general theory. They differ, however, in
that they make explicit use of established theoretical
propositions. In these studies, a generalization
is applied to a specific case with the aim
of throwing light on the case rather than of improving
the generalization in any way. Hence
they are studies in "applied science." Since they
do not aim to contribute to empirical generalizations,
their value in terms of theory-building
is nil. On the other hand, it is precisely the purpose
of empirical theory to make such interpretative
case studies possible.60 Because of the
still very limited degree of theoretical development
in political science, such case studies are
rare. One interesting example is Michael C.
Hudson's imaginative and insightful case study
of Lebanon in the light of existing development
theories, in which he discovers a serious discrepancy
between the country's socioeconomic
and political development.,"
The remaining four types of case studies are
all selected for the purpose of theory-building.
Hy)pothesis-generating case studies start out
with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses,
and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses
to be tested subsequently among a
larger number of cases. Their objective is to develop
theoretical generalizations in areas where
no theory exists yet. Such case studies are of
great theoretical value. They may be particularly
valuable if the case selected for analysis
provides what Naroll calls a sort of "crucial experiment"
in which certain variables of interest
happen to be present in a special way.62
Theory-confirming and theory-infirming case
studies are analyses of single cases within the
framework of established generalizations. Prior
knowledge of the case is limited to a single
d0 As Przeworski and Teune state: "The main role
of a theory is to provide explanations of specific
events. These explanations consist of inferring, with a
high degree of probability, statements about particular
events from general statements concerning classes of
events" (p. 86).
'Michael C. Hudson, "A Case of Political Underdevelopment,"
Journal of Politics, 29 (November
1967), pp. 821-37. See also Beer, "The Comparative
Method and the Study of British Politics," pp. 19-36.
82 Naroll, "Scientific Comparative Politics and International
Relations," p. 336. An example of such
a case study is my analysis of the determinants of
Dutch colonialism in West Irian. In most cases, both
objective (especially economic) and subjective factors
can be discerned, but the case of West Irian is unique
because of the complete absence of objective Dutch
interests in the colony. See Lijphart, The Trauma of
Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
variable or to none of the variables that the
proposition relates. The case study is a test of
the proposition, which may turn out to be confirmed
or infirmed by it. If the case study is of
the theory-confirming type, it strengthens the
proposition in question. But, assuming that the
proposition is solidly based on a large number
of cases, the demonstration that one more case
fits does not strengthen it a great deal. Likewise,
theory-infirming case studies merely
weaken the generalizations marginally. The
theoretical value of both types of case studies is
enhanced, however, if the cases are, or turn out
to be, extreme on one of the variables: such
studies can also be labeled "crucial experiments"
or crucial tests of the propositions.
Deviant case analyses are studies of single
cases that are known to deviate from established
generalizations. They are selected in order
to reveal why the cases are deviant-that
is, to uncover relevant additional variables that
were not considered previously, or to refine the
(operational) definitions of some or all of the
variables.63 In this way, deviant case studies
can have great theoretical value. They weaken
the original proposition, but suggest a modified
proposition that may be stronger. The validity
of the proposition in its modified form must be
established by further comparative analysis.64
Of the six types of case studies, the hypothesis-generating
and the deviant case studies have
the greatest value in terms of their contribution
to theory. Each of these two types, however,
has quite different functions in respect to theory-building:
The hypothesis-generating case
study serves to generate new hypotheses, while
the deviant case study refines and sharpens existing
hypotheses. The deviant case study-as
"3 See Patricia L. Kendall and Katherine M. Wolf,
"The Analysis of Deviant Cases in Communications
Research," in Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton, eds.,
Communications Research: 1948-49 (New York: Harper,
1949), pp. 152-57; Sjoberg, op. cit., pp. 114-15;
and Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism
and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968), chapter 10.
" This process of refining generalizations through
deviant case analysis is what Robert M. Marsh calls
"specification." See his article "The Bearing of Comparative
Analysis on Sociological Theory," Social
Forces, 43 (December, 1964), pp. 191-96. Specification
should therefore definitely not be regarded as
"the garbage bin" of comparative research; see Conrad
Phillip Kottak, "Towards a Comparative Science of
Society," Comparative Studies in Society and History,
12 (January, 1970), p. 102. See also Milton M. Gordon,
"Sociological Law and the Deviant Case," Sociometry,
10 (August, 1947), pp. 250-58; and Andre
J. F. Kobben, "The Logic of Cross-Cultural Analysis:
Why Exceptions?", in Rokkan, ed., Comparative Research
Across Cultures and Nations (Paris: Mouton,
1968), pp. 17-53.
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1971 Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method 693
well as the theory-confirming and theory-infirming
case studies-are implicitly comparative
analyses. They focus on a particular case
which is singled out for analysis from a relatively
large number of cases and which is analyzed
within the theoretical and empirical context
of this set of cases. The deviant case may
be likened to the "experimental group" with the
remainder of the cases constituting the "control
group." Just as the analytical power of the
comparative method increases the closer it approximates
the statistical and experimental
methods, so the analytical power of the case
study method increases the more it approximates
the comparative method in the form of
deviant case analysis. Such case analysis requires,
of course, that the position of the deviant
case on the variables under consideration,
and consequently also its position relative to
the other cases, are clearly defined.
The different types of cases and their unequal
potential contributions to theory-building
should be kept in mind in selecting and analyzing
a single case. Some of the shortcomings in
Eckstein's otherwise insightful and thoughtprovoking
case study of Norway may serve as
instructive examples.65 Eckstein argues that the
Norwegian case deviates from David B. Truman's
proposition concerning "overlapping
memberships,"60 because Norway is a stable democracy
in spite of the country's deep and nonoverlapping
geographic, economic, and cultural
cleavages. But he fails to place the case of
Norway in relation to other cases. In fact, although
he describes Norway's divisions as "astonishingly
great, sharp, and persistent," he explicitly
rules out any comparison with the
cleavages in other countries. This exclusion seriously
weakens the case study. Furthermore,
instead of trying to refine Truman's proposition
with the help of the deviant findings, Eckstein
simply drops it. In terms of the sixfold typology
of case studies discussed above, his analysis of
the Norwegian case is only a theory-infirming
one and is not made into a deviant case study.
From then on, the case study becomes a theI
Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy:
A Study of Norway (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1966), esp. pp. 60-77, 177-201. Part of
the critique which follows is included in my review
of this book in the Journal of Modern History, 41
(March, 1969), pp. 83-87.
6 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process:
Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York:
Knopf, 1951).
ory-confirming one. Eckstein finds that the
Norwegian case strikingly bears out his own
"congruence" theory, which states that governments
tend to be stable if there is considerable
resemblance (congruence) between governmental
authority patterns and the authority patterns
in society.67 He demonstrates persuasivel
that both governmental and social patterns of
authority are strongly democratic in Norway
and thus highly congruent. The problem here is
not that the Norwegian facts do not fit the theory,
but that they fit the theory too perfectly.
The perfect fit strengthens the theory marginally,
but does not contribute to its refinement.
The theory does not hold that complete congruence
of authority patterns is required for stable
democracy. In his original statement of the
congruence theory, Eckstein himself points out
the necessity of further work on the important
questions of how much disparity can be tolerated
and how degrees of congruence and disparity
can be measured.68 Because the Norwegian
case turns out to be a perfect theory-confirming
one, it cannot be used to refine the theory
in any of these respects. Therefore, Eckstein
was unlucky in his selection of this case as
far as the development of his congruence theory
is concerned, and he fails to take fUll advantage
of the case study method in analyzing
the case in terms of Truman's theory of overlapping
memberships.
* * *
The comparative method and the case study
method have major drawbacks. But precisely
because of the inevitable limitations of these
methods, it is the challenging task of the investigator
in the field of comparative politics to
apply these methods in such a way as to minimize
their weaknesses and to capitalize on their
inherent strengths. Thus, they can be highly
useful instruments in scientific political inquiry.
In one respect, it is not altogether correct to call
the Norwegian case study a theory-confirming study.
Because the congruence theory has a rather narrow
empirical basis, consisting chiefly of only two cases
(Britain and Germany), it is a hypothesis rather than
an established theory. The case study of Norway is,
of course, not a hypothesis-generating study either.
Perhaps it should be called a "hypothesis-strengthening"
case study or, as Eckstein himself suggests, a
"plausibility probe" (oral comment at the IPSA
Round Table Conference in Turin, September 1969).
6sEckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy, Research
Monograph No. 10 (Princeton, N.J.: Center
of International Studies, 1961).
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