Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women’s National Political Representation
Author(s): Sheri Kunovich and Pamela Paxton
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 111, No. 2 (September 2005), pp. 505-552
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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AJS Volume 111 Number 2 (September 2005): 505–52 505
᭧ 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/2005/11102-0004$10.00
Pathways to Power: The Role of Political
Parties in Women’s National Political
Representation1
Sheri Kunovich
Southern Methodist University
Pamela Paxton
Ohio State University
The authors extend previous research on women’s participation in
politics by examining the role of female elites in political parties in
selecting and supporting women as political candidates. They hypothesize
that political parties, in their role as gatekeepers, mediate
the relationship between country-level factors, such as women’s participation
in the labor force, and political outcomes for women. The
article focuses on three outcomes for women: the percentage of female
political party leaders, the percentage of female candidates in
a country, and the percentage of women elected. New cross-national
measures of women’s inclusion in political parties are developed
and analyzed in a cross-national, path-analytic model of women in
politics to find that (1) women’s position in party elites translates
into gains for women as candidates only under proportional representation
systems, (2) women’s position in party elites increases
the likelihood that female candidates will be elected only in nonproportional
representation systems, and (3) parties may be overly
sensitive to the perceived liability of women as candidates, when in
fact, women have success as candidates across all regions of the
world.
Women’s representation in formal politics matters both normatively and
practically. From a normative standpoint, political elites should represent
the interests of all citizens, including traditionally marginalized groups
1
As authors, we contributed equally to this article. We thank Paul von Hippel, Robert
Kunovich, Melanie Hughes, Jennifer Green, Lindsey Peterson, Katherine Meyer, Kira
Sanbonmatsu, and the AJS reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Direct correspondence to Sheri Kunovich, Department of Sociology, Southern
Methodist University, Campus Box 750192, Dallas, Texas 75275. E-mail: kunovich@smu.edu,
paxton.36@osu.edu
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American Journal of Sociology
506
such as women (Williams 1998; Phillips 1991). Practically, a lack of female
participation can result in a state that legislates in the male interest
(MacKinnon 1989; Connell 1990; Waylen 1994). In that case, society-wide
decisions in the form of legislation and the allocation of resources may
not be enacted in women’s interests. In addition, political position carries
highly visible status and prestige. While women have made remarkable
inroads into both tertiary education and traditionally male occupations,
the political sphere remains an arena in which women have not yet gained
comparably visible status. Women are highly underrepresented in national
politics, with the average percentage of women in parliaments only 15.2%
as of January 2004 (IPU 2004). To understand the overall position of
women within society it is therefore necessary to examine women’s underrepresentation
within the political structure.
The quantitative literature on women’s presence in legislatures can
generally be classified into two approaches. The first approach focuses
on national-level patterns of women’s parliamentary representation. In
this approach, country-level variables are used to explain variation in the
percentage of women in national legislatures across countries (Kenworthy
and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Matland
1998; Reynolds 1999). For example, the percentage of women in the labor
force of a country is hypothesized to represent the “supply” of women
available for public office and therefore increase numbers of women in
parliament (e.g., Paxton 1997). These studies tend to be large-N, crossnational,
statistical studies with the goal of explaining variation across
countries.
A second approach focuses instead on party-level differences in the
representation of women. This research has asked why parties differ with
respect to the number of women they nominate as candidates, where those
parties rank women on party lists, and the proportion of women they
send to parliaments (Caul 1999; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Kunovich
2003; Matland and Studlar 1996; Tremblay and Pelletier 2001; Sanbonmatsu
2002; Mateo Diez 2002; Welch and Studlar 1996). For example,
leftist parties are hypothesized to provide greater support to women’s
candidacies because they espouse egalitarian ideologies (e.g., Caul 1999;
Beckwith 1992). Similarly, parties with women in positions of power are
hypothesized to positively affect the adoption of measures favoring female
candidates (e.g., Tremblay and Pelletier 2001). Because the focus is on
very detailed information about parties, these studies tend to focus within
particular countries, or a small number of countries, across a range of
parties.
In this article, we try to advance understanding of the overall process
by which women are elected to national political office in two ways. First,
we combine the two approaches outlined above, focusing on the ways in
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Pathways to Power
507
which political parties mediate and interact with the effects of countrylevel
variables in producing political outcomes for women. Second, we
focus on multiple points of contact for women in the political system,
arguing that to understand women in the overall process of politics, it is
important to understand women’s inclusion in parties, women as candidates,
and women as elected officials.
We view the electoral process as creating two “filter” points for women.
In passing through the first filter, women must be selected by parties in
order to run for political office. In passing through the second, women
must be selected by the electorate in order to achieve political office. We
model both filters, hypothesizing that country-level and party-level factors
should influence both the number of female candidates and how well
those female candidates translate into female legislators.
Our study is cross-national in that we consider a large number of countries.
This allows us to consider the country-level variables found to be
important in so much previous research. At the same time, we include
information about the inclusion of women in the political parties of each
country. We hypothesize that, in their role as gatekeepers, political parties
mediate and interact with the effects of the country-level factors in producing
political outcomes for women. For example, some parties may
have elites who are disposed to field female candidates, regardless of
country-level pressures. Yet, it is likely that political parties are themselves
strongly influenced by country-level factors. For example, parties operating
under a proportional representation electoral system may feel pressured
to balance male and female candidates on their party lists, regardless
of their leaders’ views on women (Matland and Studlar 1996). Interaction
effects are also possible: party elites favorable to women may have an
easier time influencing the number of female candidates in proportional
representation systems compared to other systems.
Overall, our model of women in politics uses both country- and partylevel
characteristics to look at three sequential outcomes: women’s inclusion
in party elites, the percentage of female candidates fielded by the
parties of a country, and the percentage of women elected to the national
legislature. We also model the yield of female legislators from candidates
to assess whether the “return” on female candidates varies across countries.
We hypothesize that some or all of the effect of country-level variables
operates through their effect on political parties and those parties’ decisions
to field and support female candidates. To our knowledge, this is
the first empirical study to consider multiple points of contact for women
in the political system. In addition, it is the first study to consider countrylevel
and party-level influences simultaneously across a wide variety of
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American Journal of Sociology
508
countries.2
The process of election is complex and necessitates a model
that accounts for this complexity.
We complement our quantitative analyses with qualitative information
from case studies (e.g. Young 2000; Goetz and Hassim 2003) and a recently
released international survey of women in politics (IPU 2000). Case studies
provide rich detail documenting the internal operations and negotiations
within political parties. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) survey of
women in politics final report chronicles interviews with over 200 female
politicians (IPU 2000). Including illustrative qualitative information from
the case studies and the survey helps us corroborate our claims and adds
depth to our statistical findings. Overall, our findings have important
implications for policies directed at increasing the number of women in
politics.
WOMEN AS CANDIDATES, WOMEN AS ELECTED OFFICIALS
Understanding women’s participation in politics begins by acknowledging
that in no country do women make up 50% of the national legislature.
Regardless, there is a great deal of variation across countries, from less
than 5% in countries such as Egypt, to over 40% in some Scandinavian
and African countries. On average, women were 9.5% of national legislatures
worldwide in 1995, the year of this analysis.
Political parties also vary substantially in the proportion of women they
field as candidates, and, therefore, in the proportion of women they may
send to parliament. Across the 460 political parties in 76 countries used
in this analysis, women were 15% of candidates. Some parties fielded no
female candidates, while others (generally women’s parties) fielded 100%
women. Table 1 records information on the percentage of female candidates,
percentage of female members of the national legislature, and the
ratio of the two.
An initial manipulation of the numbers in table 1 reveals two important
insights:
2
In her 1997 edited volume, Norris develops a theoretical model of recruitment that
is used by others to understand the candidate selection process in a variety of individual
country studies. However, the model is not consistently tested across the studies (see
also Matland and Montgomery 2003; Norris 1996; and Rule 1981). Caul (1999) tests
the effects of party characteristics on women’s electoral outcomes, but with data for
only 12 advanced industrial nations, she is unable to include any country-level predictors
except proportional representation system. In our opinion, the lack of crossnational
research focusing on process results primarily from a lack of data rather than
a lack of interest. To our knowledge, the IPU data that we use in this article are the
first such comprehensive information on parties and candidates available cross-
nationally.
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Pathways to Power
509
1. The relationship between the percentage of female candidates
fielded by parties and the percentage of female legislators elected
is tight—the percentage of female candidates explains nearly 70%
of the variance in the percentage of females in national
legislatures.
2. For a 1% increase in the number of female candidates, there is
only a .67% increase in female legislators. Thus, the “return” on
female candidates is low.3
The first insight suggests that to understand female legislators, we must
first understand female candidates. The second insight suggests that understanding
candidates is not enough—we must also understand the factors
that enhance or inhibit the translation of female candidates into
female legislators.
The strong relationship between female candidates and female elected
officials is the result of the political process of election. In most countries,
the recruitment and selection of political elites occurs entirely within political
parties (Norris 1993; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Indeed, candidate
selection is viewed as an essential function of political parties (Bille 2001;
Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Rahat and Hazan 2001). Therefore, in order
for an individual, man or woman, to run for political office, he or she
must be selected and supported by a political party. In this way, partyspecific
decisions about fielding candidates lead to the countrywide representation
of women as candidates.
Relatively little is known about candidate selection methods because
it is a power few party elites want to share with the general membership.
As explained by Pesonen (1968, p. 348), “The nomination stage eliminates
99.96% of all the eligible people; the voters choose from only .04%.” Unlike
the primary system in the United States, candidate selection is not open
for public inspection and participation in most other nations. For example,
both the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties in Britain generate
a list of centrally approved candidates that local constituency members
use in selecting candidates (British Broadcasting Corporation News 2001).
Access to the political elite is “controlled by a series of ‘gatekeepers,’ and
the narrowest gate of all is that guarded by the candidate selectors” (Gallagher
and Marsh 1988, p. 2).
3
In fact, the return is even lower if other important variables are controlled, as shown
in table 3 below. In table 1, with the exception of four countries (the Netherlands,
Mexico, Grenada, and Seychelles), the percentage of women in the national legislature
is never more than 5% higher than the percentage of female candidates. On the other
hand, there are numerous examples where the percentage of women in the legislature
is substantially lower than the percentage of female candidates. For example, in Iceland,
women are 50% of candidates and 25% of representatives.
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510
TABLE 1
Percentage of Female Candidates and Women in National Legislatures
% Female % Female
Candidates Parliament Ratio Candidates Parliament Ratio
Western industrialized: Asia:
Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.9 15.5 .55 Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 5.8 1.21
Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.3 26.8 .68 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 7.2 1.71
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.1 18.0 .81 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 4.6 1.59
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.2 6.4 .33 Kiribati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 .0 .0
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.5 26.2 .88 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.1 20.1 1.00
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.9 13.9 .74 South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 3.0 1.36
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 11.1 .87 Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 9.4 .90
Monaco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0 5.6 .47 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 7.9 .92
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.5 31.3 1.22 Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 3.4 .57
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.5 24.6 .76 Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 10.8 1.27
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.8 21.0 .60 Samoa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 4.1 .84
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.4 9.5 .49 Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 2.5 .78
Scandinavia: Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 5.3 1.96
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.0 33.0 1.10 Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.3 26.0 .86
Iceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.4 25.4 .50 Latin America:
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.6 40.4 .92 Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.0 25.3 .84
511
Eastern Europe: Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.6 6.9 .42
Armenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 6.3 2.52 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 6.6 1.16
Czech Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.2 15.0 .74 Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5 7.5 .65
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.8 6.8 .25 Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 11.7 1.38
Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 13.4 1.20 Costa Rica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.6 15.8 .70
Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.0 9.0 .39 Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.8 22.8 1.00
Lithuania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.6 17.5 .85 Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 3.7 .36
Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 4.8 .42 Grenada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8 20.0 2.04
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 13.0 .99 Guyana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.7 20.0 1.20
Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 7.0 .63 Jamaica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 11.7 1.26
Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6 14.7 1.01 Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 14.2 1.60
Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.9 7.8 .34 Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.4 10.8 .41
Tajikstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 2.8 .55 Africa:
Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 3.8 .41 Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 7.2 2.18
Middle East and Northern Africa: Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.7 1.03
Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 6.6 2.75 Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 3.0 1.2
Cyprus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9 5.4 .55 Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 5.6 .78
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.0 1.00 Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.3 1.21
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.0 4.0 .40 Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.8 18.1 1.31
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 1.3 2.17 Sao Tome and Principe . . . . . . . . 9.1 7.3 .80
Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 .6 .30 Seychelles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 27.3 1.29
Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 6.7 1.12 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2 25.0 .61
Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 .7 .88 Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6 14.7 1.17
American Journal of Sociology
512
Once selected, parties are the major source of support for candidates
in their bid for public office. Parties in proportional representation systems
can support candidates by placing them in favorable list positions, while
parties in plurality-majority systems can improve a candidate’s chances
of election by providing additional financial and institutional resources
for campaigning. Previous research has documented that under proportional
representation systems women are less likely than men to be placed
in “safe” list positions or in open districts where their likelihood of electoral
success would be higher (Kunovich 2003).
The role of parties in the selection and support of candidates looms
large across single- and multiparty systems, and across full democracies,
transitional democracies, and even authoritarian regimes (Abukhalil 1997;
Gallagher and Marsh 1988). The process of candidate selection may vary
across different contexts according to how centralized the process is, how
extensive participation of party members is, and the degree to which
objective or subjective characteristics of the aspirants matter for selection
(Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Bille 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001). But it
is always parties that control the process. Even under the most tightly
controlled political system there is still competition among aspirants for
seats in the national legislature, and political parties are generally the
institutions within which the struggle occurs.
Thus, while the sentiments of the electorate and the nature of the regime
in power are obviously important in getting candidates elected, parties
play a crucial role as well. Understanding the relationship between certain
party characteristics and political outcomes for women is a major goal of
this paper.
A MODEL OF WOMEN IN POLITICS
Figure 1 presents a general theoretical model of women in politics. We
view the inclusion of women in politics as a process with three visible
sequential outcomes. Briefly, country-level factors, such as the percentage
of women in the labor force and whether a country has a proportional
representation system, directly influence all outcomes of interest: women’s
inclusion in party elites, the percentage of women fielded as candidates
across all political parties, and the percentage of women elected. Women
party elites can influence the percentage of women fielded as candidates,
and both the presence of women in elite party circles and the number of
women who run influence how many women actually attain a legislative
position. It is also important to note that country-level factors and women
party elites should also influence how well female candidates translate
into female legislators, or the “return” on female candidates. The yield of
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Pathways to Power
513
Fig. 1.—The process of women’s inclusion in politics
legislators from candidates is captured by the ratio of female legislators
to female candidates. In what follows, we explain this process in more
detail.
National-Level Explanations
Cross-national research on women in national legislatures has identified
three country-level factors that influence the percentage of women in
parliaments: structural, political, and ideological. Although the focus in
previous theoretical work has typically been on women’s national legislative
representation, the arguments are transferable to other political
outcomes of importance to women.
First, structural explanations predict that women’s educational achievements
and women’s participation in the labor force will positively affect
women’s levels of representation. Based in the observation that political
elites are pulled disproportionately from the highly educated and from
certain professions such as law (Putnam 1976), structural explanations
argue that women need human and financial capital (gained through
educational and work experience) to stand for office. It follows that the
percentage of women who are economically active and who are highly
educated should influence political outcomes for women, such as the percentage
of female candidates in a country.4
4
Empirical evidence for the impact of structural variables on women’s national legislative
participation is mixed (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 1985; Paxton
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American Journal of Sociology
514
Qualitative evidence supports the importance of structural factors. As
a respondent from Southeast Asia in the IPU survey explains, “Educated
women (tertiary level) and professionals in their mid-thirties onwards . . .
form a pool from which candidates would be selected” (IPU 2000, pp.
96–97). The importance of a growing pool of qualified candidates is one
explanation for the dramatic increases in women’s representation in several
African legislatures in recent years (Tripp 2001). Considering figure
1, at each point in the political process of election, the “supply” of available
women (those with the requisite human and financial capital) should
impact the number of women who make it through each filter.
In contrast to the “supply” of women, political explanations stress that
political systems may have different “demands” for female candidates.
Political and electoral systems either enhance or limit the ability of men,
women, and other groups in government to promote their own interests
and can be crucial factors in allowing women access in equal numbers
(Caul 1999, 2001; Matland 1998; Giele and Smock 1977; Kohn 1980).
Thus, system-level political factors, such as whether the country is a
democracy or whether it has a proportional representation electoral system,
are important in understanding the number of women in national
legislatures.
For example, it is generally accepted that the presence of a proportional
representation system, rather than a plurality-majority system (e.g., as in
the United States), aids women in gaining access to the political system
(Lovenduski and Hills 1981; Norris 1985; Rule 1987; Kenworthy and
Malami 1999; Matland 1998). Proportional representation systemsattempt
to correlate the number of seats won by a political party with the number
of votes cast for that party. In a proportional representation system, if a
party wins 30% of the votes, they receive 30% of the parliamentary seats.
In proportional representation closed-list systems, citizens vote for party
lists of candidates rather than individual candidates. If a party won 30%
of seats, legislators would be selected by moving down the party list, in
order, until all seats were filled. This type of system almost always makes
1997). Several researchers have included a measure of women’s educational attainment
to predict women’s representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moore and Shackman
1996; Paxton 1997; Rule 1981, 1987). However, with the exception of Rule (1981),
no cross-national study has found a statistically significant effect. This is most likely
because data limitations have prevented researchers from measuring women’s achievements
in particular fields such as law, which should more accurately predict the supply
of women. With the exception of our eariler work (Paxton and Kunovich 2003) and
Oakes and Almquist (1993), general measures of the share of women in the paid labor
force do not predict women’s representation. When more specific measures of relevant
occupations such as the percentage of women in professional or managerial professions
are available, the findings are significant in some studies (Kenworthy and Malami
1999) but insignificant in others (Paxton 1997).
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Pathways to Power
515
use of multimember districts, which means more than one candidate can
be elected from a particular district. In contrast, plurality-majoritysystems
like the United States ask citizens to vote for single candidates, typically
in single-member districts.5
An electoral system that uses a proportional representation closed-list
system and multimember districts offers several advantages to female
candidates (Matland 2002; Norris 1993). Since parties operating under
closed-list systems publish lists of candidates, they may feel pressure to
balance their party’s ticket across genders, leading to greater numbers of
women. As a respondent from the Pacific in the IPU study states, “There
has been recognition over the last 10 years (1988–98) that it is essential
for the credibility of any political party to be seen to be preselecting and
electing women to parliament” (IPU 2000, p. 57). In multimember districts,
balancing is used to attract voters but also to achieve equity across different
factions of the party and resolve internal party disputes through
compromise (Matland 2002; Gallagher and Marsh 1988).6
In contrast,
single-member districts result in zero-sum contests in that parties must
make a choice between male and female candidates rather than being
able to place both on the ticket.7
The extent to which institutions are democratic can also affect the
representation of women as candidates and the translation of those candidates
into legislators. Fair elections and open competition may be more
conducive to women entering politics since fewer artificial and arbitrary
constraints would act as barriers. Women can research, understand, and
possibly manipulate the rules of the game if they are clearly stated and
consistently followed (Matland 2002), suggesting that democracy can help
women. Alternatively, in nondemocratic systems women do not have to
go through the electoral process and can be placed into power (Abukhalil
5
There are a variety of variations on these two basic types of electoral systems, as
well as hybrid systems. We recommend the International Institute on Democracy and
Electoral Assistance’s Web site (http://www.idea.int/esd/systems.cfm) for a brief overview
of electoral systems.
6
Unfortunately, some of this balancing is not truly meaningful, with women placed
in hopelessly low electoral list positions (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. 254).
7
Previous statistical research has clearly demonstrated that proportional representation
systems have higher percentages of elected females. Case studies of nations with hybrid
systems provide additional compelling evidence. Within a country with both systems,
women are elected at much higher rates under the proportional representation system
than under the alternative single-position system (Henig and Henig 2001; Norris 1993,
p. 313; Rule 1987). For example, after Germany’s 1990 election, women won 28% of
the party-list seats and only 12% of the plurality-majority constituency seats. Similarly,
in Australia’s 1990 election, women won 25% of party-list seats but only 7% of the
plurality-majority districts.
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516
1997; Howell 2002). Previous research (e.g., Paxton 1997) indicates that
this second explanation may in fact be the more likely scenario.8
Quotas and legislative appointments are two political mechanisms used
in both democratic and nondemocratic nations that may increase women’s
representation. There are generally two types of quotas—those put forward
by the state to apply to all parties, and those established within a
particular party. Quotas can either be voluntary or they can be required.
When quotas are mandated by the state, they can result in dramatic
increases in the proportion of women elected depending on context (e.g.,
Jones 1998; Schmidt and Saunders 2004; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005;
Krook 2003, 2004a). Quotas are highly regarded by theorists and female
parliamentarians alike as a means of increasing women’s representation
in politics (IPU 2000; Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, p. 134). Previous
research has also demonstrated that when parties adopt required quotas
there is an increase in elected female representatives over time, at least
among advanced industrial nations (Caul 2001). Even when only a subset
of parties adopt quotas, diffusion effects are seen that result in other
parties’ increasing their percentage of female candidates and representatives
(Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 2001; Lovenduski 1993; McDonagh
2002).9
Legislative appointments are another strategy used by the state to increase
women’s or other groups’ overall levels of representation, especially
in countries with historic gender, ethnic, or religious inequalities. Legislative
appointments reserve a specific number of seats in the legislature
and then select individuals to fill those positions after the election. For
8
Rather than excluding nondemocratic and less democratic countries from an analysis,
we feel it is important to model explicitly how democratic processes can influence
women’s entry into politics. There is evidence that in both emerging democracies and
communist nations women aspire to hold positions in the national legislatures (Tripp
2001; Howell 2002). While the political parties within these new democracies may be
weak and/or government controlled, women’s presence in party leadership should
positively impact women’s selection as candidates and ultimate election to the national
legislature. Finally, nondemocratic governments may have extraelectoral means at their
disposal to increase or decrease the ultimate number of female legislators. Studying
women’s political outcomes in less democratic nations is further necessary because
even in an inefficient and relatively weak legislature, women’s presence provides an
opportunity for women’s voices to be heard and can be interpreted by the citizens of
the nation as symbolic support for women. Similarly, having no women in the legislature
sends a clear message as to the status of women.
9
Quotas are increasingly being used to increase women’s participation in politics. In
the late 1990s, 11 nations in Latin America passed national legislation requiring a
minimum of 20%–40% female candidates. In France a constitutional amendment in
1999 established that 50% of candidates must be women (Dahlerup 2002). At the time
of our study, however, only a small number of nations had passed federal laws mandating
national legislative quotas or systematically adopted political party quotas
(Krook 2004b).
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Pathways to Power
517
example, in Egypt, the president has the right to appoint 10 seats to the
parliament, and these are typically filled by a varying number of women
and Christians (Al-Ahram 2000). Appointments are different from quotas
because they are “extraelectoral” in that they occur outside the electoral
system. Appointments can be considered nondemocratic, in the sense that
women who gain legislative position through appointment have not been
elected.
Finally, the ratio of effective parties to all operating parties may influence
how many women participate in politics. The higher the ratio, the
more likely all parties will be elected to a meaningful number of seats.
Parties that typically win a meaningful share of seats may be unwilling
to go against the status quo and do things differently than in the past.
So, a high ratio of effective parties indicates a system with mostly comfortable,
possibly complacent, parties. In such a situation, the promotion
of women as candidates and their support in elections may not be a high
priority. In contrast, if the ratio of effective parties to all operating parties
is low, it indicates an increased presence of marginal parties, who may
be more likely to take risks on fielding and supporting women as
candidates.
Ideology constitutes the third country-level explanation for levels of
female participation in parliament. Ideas about women’s role and position
in society can enhance or constrain women’s ability to seek political power
(Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Paxton 1997; Arceneaux 2001; McCammon
et al. 2001). Ideological arguments state that, even in the presence of
favorable political systems or an adequate supply of qualified female
candidates, cultural norms can limit women’s opportunities to participate
in politics (Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2001).
Ideology is not diffuse or abstract. Ideologies and arguments against
women having the right to participate in politics have created very substantial
barriers to women’s participation for many years. For centuries,
Western political theorists such as Aristotle, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Locke
justified the exclusion of women from politics, citing their assumed nonrational
nature. “If women were to control the government, the state
would be in danger, for they do not act according to the dictates of
universality, but are influenced by accidental inclinations and opinions”
(Hegel 1977, p. 167).10
10
The same themes can be found in non-Western philosophy. There, too, women were
portrayed as inferior in reasoning and intellect. For example, Walda Heywat, an Ethiopian
teacher writing in the 17th century, cautions, “O man, remember that a woman
is weak by nature and less intelligent than man”’ (Bonevac and Phillips 1992). On
another continent and in a different century, Avicenna, an Islamic metaphysician writing
around the year 1000, states, “For in reality [woman] is not very rational and is
quick to follow passion and anger” (Avicenna 1963). Nizamu’l-Mulk Tusi, writing
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American Journal of Sociology
518
Such attitudes about women in politics persisted even after women
gained the right to participate in politics. After having gained suffrage,
women found that their ability to make rational decisions was still questioned
theoretically and empirically. For example, despite breaking ground
in explaining women’s electoral participation, Duverger (1955, p. 129)
explains sex differences in voting by a psychological female dependency
on men: “While women have, legally, ceased to be minors, they still have
the mentality of minors in many fields and, particularity in politics, they
usually accept paternalism on the part of men. The man—husband, fiance´,
lover, or myth—is the mediator between them and the political world.”
In the IPU study, female politicians cite a negative ideology more often
than any other reason as their explanation for low female participation
in politics. As a respondent from Central America states, “The patriarchal
ideology prevailing in our society is the biggest stumbling block we have
to face” (IPU 2000, p. 61). Another respondent, from Central Europe,
contrasts an ideological explanation with structural and political factors:
In spite of a long tradition of active participation in the workforce by a
vast majority of women, both women and men see motherhood and marriage
as the most important goals in a woman’s life. A common standpoint
is that “politics is a man’s business,” and that women are too emotional to
deal with affairs of the state. The reasons for this are not to be found in
education, with women in [my country] being as educated as their male
counterparts. It is simply because of the stereotyped and traditional structure
of society. (IPU 2000, p. 20)
It is likely that ideologies about women affect their representation
throughout the political process, from individual women’s decisions to
enter politics, to parties’ candidate selection, to the decisions on election
day made by the electorate. Indeed, even after women have gained office,
cultural norms can limit their effectiveness when dealing with their male
counterparts. For example, harassment of women was commonplace in
Uganda’s parliament (Tamale 1999), and in Bangladesh Islamic fundamentalists
turn their backs during speeches by female political leaders
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, p. 35).
While recent work (Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Norris and Inglehart
2001) finds that a precise measure of gender ideology has a large impact
on women in national legislatures, most earlier research relied on proxies
for ideology, such as region or religion, as cross-national information on
around the same time, warns his king not to allow women’s influence because women
are by nature inferior to men in the field of politics and administration (Nizamu’lMulk
Tusi 1977). See Giele and Smock (1977, chaps. 2–3) for further discussion of
negative historical ideologies in non-Western nations.
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Pathways to Power
519
gender ideology is sparse (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997;
Reynolds 1999). A commonly used proxy for ideology is region, with the
prevailing ideology of all non-Western regions viewed as negatively affecting
the percentage of female candidates and the willingness of the
electorate to accept female candidates. While Western industrialized
nations certainly have their own biases against women,11
women do hold
differential status across the regions of the world. Such differences are
readily apparent if we consider the measures of ideology available in the
World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2000). Regressing a range of ideological
questions (e.g., “On the whole, men make better political leaders
than women do,” “A university education is more important for a boy
than for a girl”) on five regions predicts approximately 70% of the vari-
ance.12
The Scandinavian countries demonstrate significantly more positive
gender equality views, Asia and Western industrialized countries are
at similar levels, and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other regions
demonstrate significantly more negative gender ideology views. Indeed,
in predicting women in parliaments, we (Paxton and Kunovich 2003)
moved from a model with five regional variables to a model that included
the regions plus a direct ideological question, and found that the impact
of all regions except Scandinavia could no longer be distinguished from
Western industrialized countries and that the coefficient for Scandinavia
was halved.13
Numbers of religious adherents provide other measures of ideology
because religions of the world are differentially conservative or patriarchal
11
Consider an Australian female politician’s views: “Social values that it is a women’s
role to be wives and mothers are still strong in Australia. This creates psychological
and emotional barriers to women participating in formal politics” (IPU 2000, p. 25).
12
Auxiliary analysis is available upon request.
13
Case studies indicate that attitudes about women differ by region. Scandinavia in
particular has been shown uniquely committed to women in politics (see Kelber 1994;
Karvonen and Selle 1995). In Scandinavia, there is an ideology that Hernes (1987)
describes as a “passion for equality,” with extensive commitment to abolishing poverty
and achieving social justice through political reform. Scandinavian countries have
been practicing this passion for equality in their politics for three-quarters of a century—the
first reforms concerning women took place before 1920. Heckscher (1984,
p. 172) notes, “It is no exaggeration to say that the fundamental principle of equality
between men and women is more widely accepted in Scandinavia than in most other
countries of the world; this is seen in legislation, in the apparent attitudes of the public,
and in actual practice.” Contrast the Scandinavian region to the rigid separation of
men’s and women’s spheres in Middle Eastern countries: “The men’s world has two
major manifestations: the sphere of earning a living and the public sphere of communications
including public affairs. Access of women to the former is limited and
formally none in the latter—old grandmothers being an exception” (von Nieuwenhuijze
1965, p. 71). The separation of spheres is an unequal one; in Iran, e.g., women need
permission from a husband to work, travel, or divorce.
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American Journal of Sociology
520
in their views about the place of women, both in the church hierarchy
and in society. Generally, religious beliefs can be used by those in power
to preserve patriarchal dominance (Botman 1999). And religious legacies
leave a distinct and lasting impression on contemporary values and behaviors
(Norris and Inglehart 2003).
Generally, conservative religious ideologies promote a less public role
for women. Protestant religions vary, but are generally less patriarchal
than Catholicism or Islam. Therefore, we expect the strength of adherence
to conservative religious ideologies to affect women’s performance at the
polls negatively. Countries with many Islamic adherents would be expected
to have the fewest number of women in their national legislatures,
since Islamic law is typically interpreted in a manner that constrains the
activities of women (Ahmed 1992; Glaser and Possony 1979) and results
in women’s lack of control over their own lives (Caldwell 1986, pp. 175–
76). As explained by the 2003 Nobel Laureate, Shirin Ebadi, “Many people
use Islam to justify the unequal position of women. They are wrong”
(Associated Press 2004).14
The Role of Female Elites in Political Parties
A central argument of our article is that the effects of these national-level
factors in producing outcomes for women are at least partially mediated
through women’s inclusion in political parties. As noted above, parties
play an important gatekeeping role in political systems (Caul 1999; Sanbonmatsu
2002; Kunovich 2003). Political parties make decisions about
what candidates to field and how much support to give them (e.g., through
placement on party lists). As an IPU respondent from Central America
states, “the ‘key’ is undoubtedly the political parties” (IPU 2000, p. 96).
In this article, we consider how the presence of women in the party elites
of political parties influences their selection and support of women as
candidates.15
The presence of many women in the party elite of a country should
14
Islam is not a monolithic trait: there is variation across countries and across individuals
(Abukhalil 1997). More generally, there is certainly variation in the expected
roles and place of women within regions (and even within countries, see Jejeebhoy
and Sathar 2001). Still, without more precise measures of gender ideology, the religious
and regional proxies provide some information about important ideological differences
across nations.
15
While other features of parties, such as their organizational structures, rules, and
ideologies, have been found to be important in women’s representation in Western
and Eastern Europe (Caul 1999; Kunovich 2003), we limit our focus to only those
aspects of parties that can be measured cross-nationally at the present time. Unfortunately,
we know of no systematic cross-national measures of party organizational
structures, rules, and ideologies.
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Pathways to Power
521
increase the overall number of women fielded as candidates for at least
three reasons. First, high percentages of women in party elites may indicate
a greater supply of qualified (or perceived to be qualified) women
for the parties of a country (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Second, membership in
such positions are seen as a “necessary apprenticeship before a party
member is considered worthy of selection as a candidate” (Henig and
Henig 2001, p. 48). Finally, female party elites may themselves advocate
a greater number of female candidates (Caul 1999). As a female legislator
from Western Europe stated: “It was the women in the party who encouraged
me to get more deeply involved and to register on a list for the
elections” (IPU 2000, p. 75). Female party elites should also positively
affect the ratio of representatives to candidates since they may be able to
better support female candidates in their bids for election, influencing list
placement or party contributions to candidate war chests. Consider this
West African respondent: “Women asked me to stand in the legislative
elections and they supported my candidacy in the one-party state system”
(IPU 2000, p. 82).
Of course, women in elite positions need not act in the interests of other
women. As stated succinctly by Lovenduski (1993, p. 6), “A great dilemma
for the second wave of feminism has been whether women will change
institutions before institutions change women.” Female leaders may feel
the need to follow party rules, wish to avoid seeming to play favorites,
or simply have concerns that outweigh their gender identity. As Lovenduski
summarizes in the introduction to her edited volume on women in
parties: across the 11 cases studied, party divisions tended to outweigh
gender divisions (Lovenduski and Norris 1993).
Still, as those who study the candidate selection process argue, the
attitudes and values of the candidate selectors matter for who is selected.
Presumably, some percentage of female party elites would actively look
to promote women as candidates. Indeed, 78% of women responding to
the IPU survey believed that the presence of women had brought about
a change in their party’s priorities. And women may be better able to see
what must be done to recruit female candidates. As documented by the
Commonwealth Secretariat (1999, p. 20), in Australia, a current female
party leader made it possible for a former female party leader to return
to politics (and ultimately be elected) by promising to make all the necessary
flexible arrangements so that the she could juggle the demands of
a new baby.
For these reasons, we argue that higher average levels of women in
elite party positions (across all parties) should positively influence the
countrywide representation of women as candidates. More specifically,
we can distinguish women’s inclusion as highly visible party elites such
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American Journal of Sociology
522
as party chairperson, vice chairperson, or spokesperson, from the presence
of women in the party bureau, which is the governing body of the party.
Mediation
Figure 1 hypothesizes that the presence of women in party elites mediates
the country-level variables in producing political outcomes for women.
How would this process work? Some of the country-level effects may be
completely mediated through political parties, while others are likely to
continue to have direct effects on the percent of female candidates nationally.
Considering the categories of country-level variables, it is most
likely that the structural factors will be mediated through the parties, as
they suggest the “supply” of potential candidates that can be picked up
by these parties. In contrast, the national ideology of a country is likely
to continue to have a direct effect on outcomes down the line of sequential
outcomes. This is because, despite women’s general inclusion in the workforce
or education, parties know that women’s leadership must be ideologically
accepted by the population at large. It is an open question
whether country-level political factors will continue to have a direct effect
after the mediating party variables are included. Ultimately, we expect
that while some country-level variables may continue to have direct effects
on women in national legislatures, the direct path may not exist for others,
with all influence working through party processes.
Interaction
Rather than being influenced by their electoral system, political parties
may operate differently across proportional representation and pluralitymajority
systems. As Gallagher and Marsh (1988, p. 260) explain, “The
electoral system strongly affects the mechanics of the selection process in
every country.” Each electoral system offers different opportunities and
constraints for party elites, indicating a possible interaction effect rather
than simple mediation.16
For example, Czudnowski (1975, p. 221) argues
that when seats are assigned proportionally, using party lists, the central
party has much more influence on candidate selection.
As for a party’s selection of female candidates, party gatekeepers’ perception
of women as desirable candidates depends on their country’s
electoral system (Matland 2002). “Qualities which candidate selectors
might feel, accurately or otherwise, could be electoral liabilities in a party’s
sole candidate, like being a woman or a member of an ethnic minority,
16
We thank the AJS reviewers for asking the questions that led us to consider this
interaction effect.
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Pathways to Power
523
are needed for purposes of balance when several are being picked” (Gallagher
and Marsh 1988, p. 260). Thus, female leaders may find it easier
to get women on the ballot in proportional representation systems because
they are not fighting a zero-sum process. However, considering that ticket
balancing is often combined with “hopeless” list placement (placement on
a list below the number of seats a party can reasonably expect to win),
female leaders in proportional representation systems may be less able to
produce gains for women as elected officials.17
That is, while female elites
may be able to articulate the need for female candidates under a proportional
system, they may be less successful in getting them placed in
winnable positions on lists.
DATA AND MEASURES
All data pertaining to women’s presence in party elites, the percentage
of female candidates, and the percentage of female representatives were
collected by the IPU and made available in their 1997 publication Democracy
Still in the Making: A World Comparative Study. The IPU surveyed
national legislative bodies to obtain data for elections occurring
between August 1991 and December 1996 for all countries. In a substantial
number of countries the political parties participating in these elections
provided data about women’s participation in the party, their inclusion
as electoral candidates, and their electoral outcomes. We analyze data for
all countries where both the percentage of female candidates and the
percentage of women elected are available.
Even though not all countries provided these data, there is remarkable
regional variation. As discussed above, table 1 contains information on
the percentage of female candidates, percentage of female legislators, and
the ratio of the two for the 73 countries in our analysis. In the following
sections we describe all variables used in our analysis (for a summary of
this information, see app. table A1).
Women’s Inclusion in Political Party Elites
Within each country, the IPU surveyed political parties participating in
the election for an assortment of data. We used the party’s responses to
17
Since individual candidates are typically less important in proportional representation
systems, female elites can also not differentially support female candidates to
help them win. The exception is open-list proportional representation systems, where
voters can prioritize among the list of candidates. However, when organized listswitching
drives to improve women’s position on party lists were tried in the past
(e.g., Norway’s local elections in the 1970s), they ultimately backfired (Matland 2002).
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524
construct aggregate measures of party characteristics at the national level.
We measure our first outcome, women’s inclusion in party elites, with
two variables. The percentage of women in leadership positions is based
on the percentage of women who occupied five possible positions of power
across parties: party chairperson, party vice-chairperson, secretary general,
party spokesperson, and head of the parliamentary group. To calculate
the percentage, we pooled the parties and calculated the percentage
of women who held those positions across all of them. Women held 10%
of the positions of power on average across the countries of our sample.
Our second measure of women’s inclusion in party elites is the percentage
of female party bureau members. Generally the party bureau is
regarded as the governing body of the party and is responsible for establishing
and enforcing party rules. In a similar manner to women’s presence
in leadership positions, we pooled all parties and determined the percentage
of female party bureau members across all parties. For example,
if a country had three parties where the percentages of female party bureau
members were 30%, 15%, and 5%, this country would then be assigned
an average value of 16.7%. Women accounted for 17% of members of
the party bureau on average.
Female Candidates
Our second outcome is women’s selection as candidates. We calculated
the percentage of female candidates for the country by dividing the total
number of female candidates by the total number of candidates running
for election. On average women accounted for 15% of female candidates
with a low of less than 1% in Jordan and Yemen and a high of 50% in
Iceland.
Women in National Legislatures
Our third outcome is women’s election to the lower house of the national
legislature. We calculated the percentage of women in the national legislature
by dividing the total number of women elected by the total number
of positions in the legislature. In cross-national studies, representation
in the lower house rather than the upper house is used because in countries
with two legislative chambers, lower houses generally have more legislative
power than upper houses. On average women accounted for 12%
of representatives with a low of no women in Kiribati to a high of 40%
female representatives in Sweden.
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Pathways to Power
525
Ratio of Female Elected Officials to Female Candidates
An alternative outcome of interest is the yield of female representatives
from the female candidates. We create a ratio measured as the percentage
of female representatives elected to the lower house of the national legislature
divided by the percentage of female candidates. Values of one
indicate a one-to-one relationship between percentage of candidates and
percentage of female representatives. In our sample the yield of female
representatives ranges from values of considerably less than one (e.g., 0.3
in Morocco) to values greater than one (e.g., 1.22 in the Netherlands).
Thus, while the “return” on female candidates is very low in Morocco,
3% female elected officials for every 10% female candidates, the return
is greater than expected in the Netherlands.18
National-Level Factors
Our exogenous national-level variables are measured per previous research.
Our models include three social structural variables. As in previous
research, we include the percentage of the economically active population
who are women (women economically active) and the percentage of tertiary
students who are women in 1990 (women tertiary education; United
Nations 2000). As discussed above, these measures control for the size of
the eligible pool of women for political office.19
We also include the log
of energy use per capita in 1995 (World Bank 1999) as a measure of
industrialization. Structural arguments predict that a certain level of development
frees up time for women to pursue political careers. Although
not included in every model of women in politics, industrialization has
been found to be significant in some previous research (Paxton 1997). The
inclusion of industrialization also controls for developmental differences
across the regional variables.
A key political variable is a country’s electoral system. The variable
PRPL electoral system identifies those countries that use a proportional
representation party-list (PRPL) system to elect any seats in their national
18
Although the ratio can generally be viewed as a return on candidates, there are a
few other factors that can influence it. For example, female legislative appointments
may artificially raise a country’s ratio because women are being placed into legislative
positions without running as candidates.
19
Ideally we would like to measure the percentage of women with a tertiary degree
in 1990. However, these data are not widely available cross-nationally. Therefore,
research in the area routinely uses the percentage of women in tertiary education to
measure women’s access.
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American Journal of Sociology
526
legislatures.20
Another political variable included in our analysis is a country’s
level of democracy. Liberal democracy is measured using Bollen’s
(1998) political democracy index; a value of 100 is the maximum, indicating
a well-functioning system and regular use of democratic
procedures.21
To control for nondemocratic access to the legislature for some groups
through the use of reserved seats, we include a dichotomous measure
called appoint (United Nations 1995) to indicate whether a country appoints
members to the national legislature on the basis of gender, ethnicity,
or religious affiliation. We also control for countries where parties require
that a certain proportion of candidates be women or where national laws
mandate the increased representation of women through the use of quotas.
Our final political variable is the ratio of effective parties and is based
on data from two sources. The number of effective parties comes from
Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) and is a count of the number of parties
with 10% or more of assembly seats. The total number of parties competing
comes from the data collected by the IPU (1997). We divide the
number of effective parties by the total number of competing parties to
control for the influence of marginal parties. A value of 100 indicates that
all parties typically receive at least 10% of the available seats.
As noted above, ideology has traditionally been measured with proxies
such as region and religion. In our analyses, we include six regional dichotomous
variables: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Latin
America, and Scandinavian countries. Western industrialized countries
are the omitted category.22
To measure religion, we include the percentage
of Catholics, Muslims, and Orthodox religious adherents (World Almanac
1996). Not all nations adhere to religions; instead, individuals within those
nations adhere to religions. So, using a percentage measure rather than
a dichotomous variable acknowledges variation within countries considered
predominantly “Muslim,” “Catholic,” or “Orthodox.” Also, it is reasonable
to assume that larger groups of conservative adherents are better
able to use their religious beliefs to influence women’s selection and rep-
20
While electoral systems are relatively fixed characteristics of the political environment
some countries experienced a change between their electoral system in 2003 and the
one in place when these data were collected. Therefore, we used both the Chronicle
of Parliamentary Elections and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) to identify the electoral
system. The reference category includes all other types of electoral systems, such
as first past the post, single transferable vote, and mixed systems that do not include
a PRPL system. Together, these reference category electoral systems are generally
plurality-majority systems in that candidates must individually obtain a certain percentage
of the vote (a plurality or majority) to obtain political office.
21
To get 1995 data, we used an updated version of Bollen’s (1998) data set.
22
For the exact classification, see table 1.
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Pathways to Power
527
resentation as political figures. Although regional and religious proxies
are inferior to more precise measures of ideology, our earlier work (Paxton
and Kunovich 2003) demonstrates that these are indeed good proxies for
ideology when a more precise measure is unavailable.23
Research Model and Methodology
Given the nature of the electoral process, the constituent variables have
a causal ordering that we assume is unidirectional (see fig. 1). In most
political parties, party elites and party bureau members are put in place
prior to the candidate selection process and subsequently oversee the
process. Since the selection committee is established prior to candidate
selection we are able to use cross-sectional data that documents the percentage
of women in party leadership positions at the time the candidates
were selected and ultimately elected. Thus, we estimate a recursive model
in which we hypothesize that each exogenous variable will affect all endogenous
variables and that endogenous variables occurring earlier in the
electoral process will affect endogenous variables occurring later in the
electoral process. We can therefore determine both the direct and indirect
effects of our national-level variables.24
Missing data were accounted for using multiple imputation procedures
(Allison 2002) available in the SAS statistical package.25
This procedure
allowed us to retain the full 73 cases and is the most appropriate method
23
Unfortunately, the available sample of countries constrains our ability to use the
national gender ideology measure we developed earlier (Paxton and Kunovich 2003).
24
It could be argued that the full model is nonrecursive in one important respect—
high levels of legislative participation by women could influence gender ideology
through increases in citizens’ comfort with women in politics. In our earlier work
(Paxton and Kunovich 2003, pp. 101–2), we tested this hypothesis directly with a
Hausman endogeneity test and found that the percentage of women in the legislature
does not have a reciprocal effect on gender ideology. Of course this endogeneity test
does not rule out a reciprocal effect over a longer time period. Indeed, we would expect
any effect of legislative participation to have a long-term effect on gender ideology,
much longer than the period considered here.
25
Using available data, the imputation procedure generates estimates, including a
random component, for each of the missing values. Treating imputed cases like real
data would produce artificially low SEs, so the random imputation is carried out several
times, producing multiple full data sets. The variability across these multiple imputations
is then used to adjust the SEs upward. In addition, variables not used in the
model were included in the imputation model to improve the accuracy of the imputed
values. These included date of women’s suffrage, a scale of abortion rights, and the
percentage of women in the country’s national legislature in 1980. Variables were
transformed where necessary to produce appropriate imputed values. For imputing
female party elites, the arcsine transformation is preferable to the logit or probit,
because the arcsine is defined for proportions that take values of zero (von Hippel
2003).
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American Journal of Sociology
528
when sample sizes are small. As with any small cross-national sample,
demonstrating robustness is crucial—we therefore considered whether any
outliers were influential to the results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In table 2 we provide unstandardized path coefficients and standard errors
for the model depicted in figure 1.
Country-Level Effects
Country-level ideology, politics, and structure all affect political outcomes
for women. Across the ideological factors we generally see effects of the
regional variables on women’s inclusion in parties and as candidates. Asia
and Latin America are consistently lower than the West, while Scandinavia
is generally higher. For example, net of other factors, countries in
Asia had 11% fewer women in party bureaus than did the Western industrialized
countries. Countries in Latin America had 16% fewer women
in party leadership positions than found in Western industrialized countries.
In comparison to the Western industrialized nations, Scandinavian
countries had 20% more women in party bureaus and a positive but not
significant difference with respect to women in leadership positions.
The regional ideological proxies have an impact on the percentage of
female candidates fielded by the parties of a country, even after their
indirect effects through women’s inclusion in party elites are controlled.
That is, the ideological variables continue to have a direct effect as well
as indirect effects. For example, we see that the Scandinavian countries
have almost 12% more candidates while countries in Asia and Latin
America have between 8% and 12% fewer candidates than Western industrialized
nations.
Among the religious measures of ideology, the effects of conservative
religious ideologies on the mediating party variables are also generally
negative, although substantially weaker than the regional proxies. Only
percentage Catholic has a significant effect on women in party elites. The
effect is fairly small; countries with 20% more Catholics have 2.2% fewer
women in party bureaus. The percentage Muslim and percentage Orthodox
in a country do negatively affect the percentage of female candidates,
however. Having 20% more Muslim adherents in a country results in
almost 4% fewer female candidates.26
26
Multicollinearity is an issue here. It is difficult to separate the effect of Muslim from
that of the Middle East in this sample. Reflecting this uncertainty, diagnostics suggest
that the SEs for those two variables are substantially inflated. Removing Muslim
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Pathways to Power
529
It is interesting that although the ideological proxies have an impact
on the percentage of female candidates, they do not influence the percentage
of female elected officials or the ratio of elected officials to candidates
(the “return” on candidates).27
This suggests that while parties are
reducing or increasing their numbers of female candidates in response to
their perceived acceptability as candidates, women are actually not any
more unacceptable as candidates in any region. Research on Western
industrialized countries has often shown that the public is willing to elect
women when they are nominated as candidates (Welch and Studlar 1986).
Our results indicate that this is true across a variety of regions.
In contrast to the ideological effects, the structural factors have fewer
significant effects on political outcomes for women. We do see that countries
with 10% more women attending tertiary education have 2% more
women in leadership positions. What is more surprising is that the effect
of women’s economic activity on women’s inclusion as party elites is the
opposite of what is typically hypothesized. With each single-unit increase
in women’s economic activity (measured as a percentage) there is a .31
decrease in the percentage of female party bureau members and a .45
decrease in the percentage of women in leadership positions.28
In other
words, countries with 10% more women in the labor force have 3% fewer
women in party bureaus and 5% fewer women in positions of leadership.
The negative effect of women’s labor force participation is unexpected,
but perhaps not unreasonable. Without information on the types of jobs
in which women work, it is unclear whether women are gaining politically
relevant human capital from their job or are simply working too many
hours to find the time to participate politically. This argument is supported
by two pieces of evidence. First, an examination of the relationship between
women’s economic activity and women’s presence in the party
bureau and leadership position shows that countries in Southeast Asia
and Eastern Europe are concentrated at high levels of economic activity
and low levels of inclusion. The concentration of countries in Southeast
Asia is best explained by a distinction between jobs that provide skills
and resources that can be translated into political capital versus jobs that
countries from the analysis (countries with greater than 80% Muslim adherents) is not
an option in this sample because it would leave only one country that could be classified
as Middle East—Cyprus. Still, if the Muslim countries are removed from the sample
(and Cyprus is reclassified as African), it makes no difference to the rest of the results,
except that the effect of women economically active is reduced and no longer significant.
27
In the legislator equation, Scandinavian countries continue to have a slight advantage
(4%) over other Western industrialized nations in the percentage of women that are
elected. Only the percentage of Orthodox adherents in a nation continues to negatively
affect the percentage of women elected, controlling for the other factors.
28
This effect is significant and stronger if one outlying case, Samoa, is removed from
the analysis.
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530
TABLE 2
Multiple Imputation Estimates: The Process of Women’s Inclusion in Politics
Women’s Inclusion in Party Elites Political Outcomes
Party Bureau Leadership Candidates Legislators Ratio
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Ideological factors:
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ6.01 5.81 Ϫ14.17ϩ
7.74 Ϫ1.37 4.77 1.52 3.45 .41 .35
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ10.90* 5.49 Ϫ12.38ϩ
6.61 Ϫ12.17** 4.58 Ϫ3.20 3.64 .23 .35
Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ5.92 4.68 Ϫ4.36 6.94 Ϫ6.12 4.00 Ϫ1.66 3.07 .29 .30
Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ2.36 8.20 Ϫ28.67* 12.75 Ϫ2.15 7.12 Ϫ3.60 5.71 Ϫ.08 .58
Scandinavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.74** 6.43 4.09 9.56 11.61ϩ
6.06 3.91d
4.55 Ϫ.24 .44
Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ6.85a
5.00 Ϫ16.46* 6.72 Ϫ7.88ϩ
4.23 Ϫ1.46 3.51 .18 .33
% Catholic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ.11* .05 Ϫ.06 .05 .00 .04 Ϫ.02 .03 .00 .00
% Muslim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ.10 .10 .07 .14 Ϫ.18* .08 Ϫ.07 .06 .00 .01
% Orthodox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ.02 .07 .00 .09 Ϫ.11ϩ
.06 Ϫ.07ϩ
.04 .00 .00
Structural factors:
Industrialization . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ.40 1.50 Ϫ.02 1.75 1.31 1.12 .09 .87 Ϫ.09 .09
531
Women economically
active . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ.31 b
.23 Ϫ.45 b
.28 .09 .18 Ϫ.05 .15 Ϫ.02 .01
Women in tertiary
education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 .13 .20c
.17 .07 .11 .11 .09 .01 .01
Political factors:
PRPL electoral system . . . . . . Ϫ.95 2.93 Ϫ.37 4.02 5.50* 2.40 .82 1.89 Ϫ.10 .18
Liberal democracy . . . . . . . . . . .07 .06 .02 .08 Ϫ.15** .05 Ϫ.07ϩ
.04 .00 .00
Appoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ8.24ϩ
4.31 1.36 5.44 Ϫ8.62* 3.56 Ϫ1.24 2.73 .37 .26
Quotas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.64 2.79 .56 3.21 2.97 2.22 Ϫ.84 1.71 Ϫ.13 .17
Ratio effective parties . . . . . . . .00 .05 .06 .06 Ϫ.08ϩ
.04 Ϫ.02 .03 .00 .00
Inclusion in party elites:
Party bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ϫ.03 .14 .10 .09 .02* .01
Party leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . .09 .10 Ϫ.01 .08 .01 .01
% female candidates . . . . . . . . . . .44*** .10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
R .51 .20 .64 .68 .08
Note.— .N p 73
a
If Guyana is removed, then the coefficient for Latin America is Ϫ11.0 and is significant at P ! .01. Also, the coefficient for % Catholic is Ϫ.07 and
nonsignificant.
b
If Samoa is removed, women economically active significantly (P ! .05 coefficient) affects party bureau (Ϫ.46) and leadership (Ϫ.70).
c
If Mongolia and Namibia are removed, the coefficient for women in tertiary education becomes .33 and is signficant at P ! .11.
d
Without Iceland, Scandinavia is highly significant (coefficient p 9.4), but % Orthodox is reduced in significance. In the ratio equation, Scandinavia
has a positive coefficient.
ϩ
P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
American Journal of Sociology
532
exploit women for the low cost of their labor. In fact, Matland (1998)
found that across less developed countries, women’s economic activity
negatively affected their rate of election (although his coefficient was nonsignificant).
Similarly, others have argued that the withdrawal of women
from politics in Eastern Europe was in part because of the triple burden
(work, politics, and home) they experienced under communism (Nechemias
1994; Wolchik 1993). Eight women in the IPU survey mentioned
how their careers helped prepare them for a career in politics. All eight
were professionals; four were lawyers, two were journalists, one was an
engineer, and one was an economist (IPU 2000, p. 84).
The second piece of supporting evidence is based on an auxiliary analysis
that includes the percentage of women in professional positions. These
results show that, although nonsignificant, the coefficient is positive, so
that as the percentage of women in professional positions increases, there
is an increase in the percentage of women in the party bureau and leadership
positions. Thus, a more precise measure of employment that increases
human and financial capital yields coefficients in the expected
direction.29
It is also important to note that the effects of the structural variables
are generally mediated by the party characteristics. Structural factors do
not have any effect on female candidates, elected representatives, or the
ratio of female elected officials to candidates. The fact that none of the
structural factors are significant suggests that differences in women’s participation
in other public spheres, such as the labor force and education,
do not directly explain the underrepresentation of women. Instead, these
structural factors work only indirectly, through their impact on political
parties.
Turning to the political, we find that PRPL systems do not significantly
affect women’s inclusion as party elites or their representation in the
legislature once female candidates are controlled. Instead, the effect of a
proportional representation system is exactly where we expect—on candidates.
Proportional representation list systems have 5% more female
candidates than do other systems. This finding supports the argument
that a PRPL system holds parties accountable to voters and results in the
selection of more female candidates for balance. However, a party-list
system does not improve women’s situation within the political party.
This may be because the sex composition of leadership positions and party
bureaus receive less public scrutiny.
We find that liberal democracy has a negative effect on the percentage
29
There was a great deal of missing data on women in professional occupations,
however, and given the lack of a significant effect we do not include the variable as
part of our main analyses. Auxiliary analyses are available upon request.
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Pathways to Power
533
of female candidates, controlling for other variables. This finding is not
unprecedented (Paxton 1997). The negative effect of liberal democracy
results from the fact that less democratic countries, such as Cuba, North
Korea, and Vietnam, are able to manufacture high legislative percentages
of women precisely through a lack of democratic institutions. When
women do not have to experience a competitive democratic system, they
can be placed into political positions. The well-documented decrease in
women’s national legislative participation in Eastern Europe after the
fall of communism demonstrates the sometimes surprising effect of democracy
on women in politics (Saxonberg 2000; Matland and Montgomery
2003). Indeed, in auxiliary analyses where the least democratic countries
of our sample were removed (Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Laos, North Korea,
Vietnam, and Yemen), there was no significant effect of democracy on
either candidates or legislators.
An additional result to highlight here is the negative effect of a national
policy of nonelected appointment to the national legislature on women’s
inclusion in parties and as candidates. Legislative appointments decrease
the percentage of women in the party bureau, as well as the percentage
of female candidates, without an appreciable impact on the percentage
of female legislators. Thus, country-level mechanisms to increase disadvantaged
groups such as women at the legislative level appear ultimately
to negatively impact women’s participation through their indirect effects
on the percentage of female candidates fielded by political parties.30
It
may be that party officials do not feel responsible to promote women or
other disadvantaged groups from within their own parties when the state
takes on the role of appointing such groups to the national legislature.
This finding suggests that the unintended consequence of national formal
procedures to increase the representation of traditionally underrepresented
groups might actually discourage political parties from actively supporting
these groups themselves.31
We also find that quotas at the national or party level do not result in
increases for women on any outcome, including the percentage of female
30
Without longitudinal data we are unable to definitively show that the percentage of
female candidates declines as a direct result of the use of appointments. Data for Egypt
are suggestive, however. In 1976, prior to presidential appointments, only six women
were elected. Between 1979 and 1990, anywhere from five to seven women were elected,
while 7–30 women were appointed. However, the size of the legislature increased from
392 seats in 1979 to 454 seats in 1990 so that women held a smaller proportion of
elected seats after the adoption of presidential appointments (IPU 1995, p. 113).
31
Legislative appointments are viewed as further problematic because occupants are
not held accountable, and the seats can be easily withdrawn. When seats are reserved
specifically for women, the system may give the impression that women are not fit to
contest for the general seats (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, pp. 28–35).
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American Journal of Sociology
534
candidates.32
We remain cautious in our interpretation of this lack of an
effect, however, because not all quotas are created equal. In fact while
some countries mandate 10% of candidates, others mandate 30%. If parties
tend to only meet the minimum requirements required by quota laws,
then women’s chances of being candidates in countries with a low threshold
are clearly compromised. In addition, while one party in a country
might use quotas, the other four parties operating in a system might not.
Finally, if list positions are not explicitly stated (e.g., alternation of men
and women), parties can circumvent the spirit and purpose of the quota
system by only placing women in list positions or electoral districts they
already expect to lose (Freedman 2004).33
As an IPU Central European
respondent explains, the “country list has to include 25 women. Unfortunately
they were in the second part of the list” (IPU 2000, p. 65).
Ideally, therefore, one would measure particular aspects of the quota
system and the extent of its use rather than simply relying on a dichotomous
indicator. Unfortunately, with so few countries using quotas during
this election period we were unable to follow this strategy. As information
on the number of countries and parties adopting quotas increases, researchers
will be able to tease out the effects of party versus national
quotas, differences in quota thresholds across countries, and quotas requiring
certain list placements.34
We find that as the ratio of effective parties to all parties increases,
there is a decrease in the percentage of female candidates. A 10% increase
in the ratio of successful parties results in approximately 1% fewer female
candidates. This indicates that complacent parties may feel little need to
increase numbers of women, and that innovation must come from smaller,
more marginal parties. Indeed, a respondent in the IPU survey who left
a major political party to run a slate of women as independents stated,
32
In order to determine the independent effects of national quotas and party quotas,
we measured their effects separately. In this model neither measure had a significant
effect on any of the outcomes. We attribute this to the fact that prior to 1996 few
countries had adopted these types of quotas. The political situation as of 2005, however,
is quite different.
33
Voters can circumvent quotas too—Jones and Navia (1999) find that quotas are less
effective in open-list proportional representation systems where voters can prioritize
candidates.
34
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has
recently released the “Global Database of Quotas for Women,” which provides very
detailed information on types of quotas across countries. The database cannot be used
for the current analysis, however, because the elections we analyze occurred prior to
the institution of many of the quotas recorded in the database. As the quota database
does not provide dates of implementation for all countries, we were unable to determine
whether the quotas reported there applied during the election we studied.
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Pathways to Power
535
“There were endless frustrations there. Political parties need to be totally
overhauled and reformed” (IPU 2000, p. 99).
Finally, it is worth noting that once female candidates are included in
the legislators equation, few other variables reach statistical significance.
Clearly, the percentage of women that make it to parliament is heavily
dependent on the percentage of women who run. It is also worth noting,
however, the small return for female candidates, as indicated by the
coefficient of .44. A 10% increase in female candidates yields only a
4% increase in female legislators, once other variables are controlled. As
we shall soon see, however, this yield can be influenced in certain
circumstances.
The Impact of Women in Elite Party Positions
We have argued that women’s presence in party elites will influence the
percentage of female candidates fielded in a country and how many legislators
those candidates yield. Our results demonstrate that these party
characteristics have mixed effects on female candidates and legislators
and ultimately depend on the type of electoral system being considered.
To begin, in table 2 we find that women’s inclusion among party elites,
measured both as members of the party bureau and by holding leadership
positions, does not significantly affect the percentage of female candidates
or legislators and has only modest effects on the yield of female elected
officials from these candidates (a 10% increase in the percentage of female
party elites leads to a .2 increase in the ratio, less than half an SD change).35
However, as indicated by table 3, the picture is quite different if we
consider the interaction between a PRPL electoral system and women in
party elites. In brief, the significant interaction effects suggest that female
party leaders are able to produce more female candidates in proportional
representation systems. But, female party leaders can help female candidates
get elected in plurality-majority (nonproportional representation)
systems.36
Interpreting the interaction effect in column 1 of table 3 is straightforward
since PRPL electoral system is coded as a dichotomy. The effect
35
Modeling the percentage of women in parliament without the party variables (party
bureau, party leadership, and female candidates) results in a lower R2
(.57) and findings
similar to those in previous research.
36
We considered two other interactions of female party elites with country-level political
characteristics: democracy and the ratio of effective parties to all operating
parties. Neither of the interactions was significant. In addition, we investigated possible
nonlinear interactions with democracy (e.g., an interaction between female party elites
and the most nondemocratic countries in our sample). There was no indication of a
nonlinear interaction between party elites and democracy either.
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TABLE 3
Multiple Imputation Estimates, Interaction between Electoral System and
Women in Party Elites
Political Outcomes
Candidates Ratio Legislators
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Ideological factors:
Africa ............... Ϫ2.49 4.78 .42 .35 1.85 3.34
Asia ................. Ϫ14.51** 4.60 .31 .37 Ϫ2.39 3.66
Eastern Europe .... Ϫ6.00 3.82 .29 .29 Ϫ1.29 2.88
Middle East ........ Ϫ1.76 6.84 Ϫ.24 .62 Ϫ4.13 5.72
Scandinavia ........ Ϫ2.04 7.22 .38 .55 7.16 5.35
Latin America ..... Ϫ10.19* 3.99 .33 .35 Ϫ.94 3.42
% Catholic ......... .00 .04 .00 .00 Ϫ.01 .03
% Muslim .......... Ϫ.23** .08 .00 .01 .05 .06
% Orthodox ........ Ϫ.11* .05 .00 .00 Ϫ.07ϩ
.04
Structural factors:
Industrialization ... .86 1.08 Ϫ.05 .09 .23 .83
Women economically
active ......
.01 .17 Ϫ.01 .01 Ϫ.07 .15
Women in tertiary
education ........
.07 .10 .01 .01 .12 .08
Political factors:
PRPL electoral system
...............
Ϫ5.86 4.37 .45 .36 Ϫ1.40 3.25
Liberal democracy
.............
Ϫ.15** .05 .00 .00 Ϫ.07ϩ
.04
Appoint ............. Ϫ9.55** 3.34 .41 .26 Ϫ.94 2.62
Quotas .............. 2.56 2.13 Ϫ.11 .18 Ϫ.88 1.58
Ratio effective parties
................
Ϫ.10* .04 .00 .00 Ϫ.01 .03
Inclusion in party
elites:
Party bureau ....... Ϫ.23 .18 .04** .01 .11 .13
Party leadership ... .09 .13 .00 .01 Ϫ.04 .12
Interactions:
Party bureau #
PRPL .............
.53* .23 Ϫ.04* .02 .03 .18
Party leadership #
PRPL .............
.23 .21 .01 .02 .16 .17
% female
candidates .......
.49*** .11
R2
...................... .68 .13 0.72
Note.—The interaction effect of party bureau # PRPL on female candidates is stronger if Guyana
is removed.
ϩ
P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
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Pathways to Power
537
of a 1% increase in female party bureau members results in a .3 increase
in female candidates in PRPL systems but a .2 decrease in(Ϫ.23 ϩ .53[1])
female candidates in other systems. Looking at a larger(Ϫ.23 ϩ .53[0])
increase, we see that a 10% increase in female party bureau members
results in 3% more female candidates in PRPL systems but 2% fewer
candidates in other systems.37
These results are exactly what we would expect, considering what we
know about differences between proportional representation and plurality-majority
systems. As noted in the discussion above, candidate selectors
in PRPL systems feel pressure to balance their party’s list for both external
reasons (voters) and internal reasons (factional peace). Thus, it should be
relatively easy for female party elites in PRPL systems to convince the
party to field female candidates. In contrast, plurality-majority candidate
selection is a messy, zero-sum process, where the inclusion of a woman
necessarily indicates the exclusion of a man (Matland 2002). Our results
suggest that under such competitive circumstances, having women in
some positions of leadership may actually result in a trade-off for women
as candidates.
In contrast, turning to the yield of legislators from female candidates
(see the ratio column of table 3), we see something quite different. Increases
in female party bureau members do not increase the ratio of legislators
from female candidates in PRPL systems . Instead, for(.04 ϩ Ϫ.04 [1] p 0)
this outcome, nonproportional representation systems show a positive effect
of women in leadership positions . A 10% in-(.04 ϩ Ϫ.04 [0] p .04)
crease in female party bureau members in a non-PRPL system lead to a
.4 increase in the ratio of elected women to candidates. The standard
deviation for ratio is .53, so this is a relatively large effect size.
These results suggest that female leaders in PRPL systems are less able
than their counterparts in plurality-majority systems to increase the electability
of their female candidates. Again, this is reasonable given differences
across the electoral systems. In PRPL systems, candidates appear
on lists, and voters typically vote for the party (and its list), rather than
for individual candidates. So, female leaders in PRPL systems are relatively
unable to influence the fate of any one candidate relative to the
others by giving them more financial support. As one Central European
respondent noted in the IPU survey, “Once a woman is on a party list,
or a party candidate, she has the same material and financial support as
her male colleagues” (IPU 2000, p. 89). Instead, what matters is placement
37
The effect of female elites in proportional representation systems is even stronger if
Guyana is removed from the sample. A 10% increase in female party bureau members
leads to a 7% increase in female candidates in that case. The effect of female party
bureau members in plurality-majority systems remains the same, Ϫ.18.
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American Journal of Sociology
538
on the party list. And, as previous quantitative and qualitative research
has shown, women tend to be placed lower on party lists (e.g., Kunovich
2003). Our results suggest that while female leaders can articulate the
need for female candidates, they are less able to place those candidates
in winnable positions. As a West African IPU respondent complained,
“Women actively participate in the same way as men, but they don’t
manage to move upwards, always holding subordinated positions in political
organizations and on electoral lists” (IPU 2000, p. 60).
Contrast this to the situation of female leaders in plurality-majority
systems. Once the battle for who will be a candidate is over, each party
has the incentive to support their candidate fully, whether male or female.
And, female party leaders are in a position to provide additional support
to their female candidates in the form of campaign money or better institutional
resources for campaigning. In the United States organizations
such as Emily’s List raise money and provide additional training and
institutional support for female candidates in their bid for office. These
types of organizations have also been crucial to women’s success in several
African nations (Tripp 2001). Female party leaders can tap into these
external resources to help women gain a legislative seat once they are
nominated as a candidate.
An important question remains: Why do we see these interaction effects
for women in party bureau positions but not for women in leadership
positions such as party chairperson or party spokesperson? The answer
is likely because of critical mass (Dahlerup 1988; Staudt 1996; Jaquette
1997; Kanter 1977; but see Studlar and McAllister 2002). It is important
to remember that, generally, women’s representation in elite positions is
low.38
When women are only a small part of the leadership, their impact
is also likely to be small. IPU respondents from Central and West Africa,
Southern Europe, and South America all commented that because
38
Even before women had suffrage and the right to stand for national office, women
played some roles in the success and failures of political parties (Ostrogorski 1902,
chap. 6). But after gaining suffrage and the right to stand for office, women continued
to be primarily relegated to informal roles within political parties. Women’s level of
involvement in party politics has been steadily increasing. By 1990, women comprised
40%–50% of party members in several Western European nations (Henig and Henig
2001). Despite these high levels of participation in the lower ranks, the proportion of
women among party executives and key committee members is substantially lower
(Norris and Lovenduski 1993). “So far, very few women are leaders of political organizations.
Usually they simply join political parties created and led by men” (West
African respondant; IPU 2000, p. 55). This occurs not just in countries where women
are new to the political arena. As a female legislator from a Nordic country stated in
the IPU’s survey of female legislators, “We have the highest women’s representation
in the world (43%) but men still dominate as party leaders and in the most ‘heavy’
positions” (2000, p. 19).
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Pathways to Power
539
women’s participation in parties and party elites was minimal, female
members were unable to change the party culture or increase support for
female candidates (IPU 2000, pp. 59–61). When women make up only a
small portion of the party, they are, according to an East African respondent,
vulnerable: “The few who are determined to confront the male
politicians within the party end up being called all sorts of names—
insolent, would-be men, etc.—and they are often ignored and pushed to
one side” (IPU 2000, p. 56). Active discrimination on the part of male
leaders may also occur: a legislator from East Africa claims that “even
though I am a member of the executive committee of the party I am often
kept out of important decisions and even meetings” (IPU 2000, p. 20).39
With critical mass in mind, it is worth noting that the average percentage
of women in leadership positions in parties is 10%, while the
average percentage in the party bureau is 17%. More telling, the median
percentage of women in party bureaus is 14% compared to only 5%
women in leadership positions. Indeed, in 30% of the countries we examined,
there are no women in leadership positions. On average, women
in party bureaus may be better approaching levels that produce results:
“The central committee of the RCD has included 21.3% women. The
change is tangible. In meetings, when a woman speaks in favor of a
proposal which concerns women, the applause is louder and more sustained,
at least from her female colleagues. They can have a decisive
influence during debates and on decisions. A significant percentage can
sway a vote” (North African respondent; IPU 2000, p. 68). When women
in leadership positions approach these numbers on a more regular basis,
we may begin to see more positive results for women.40
39
Further, without a critical mass of women for support, women may be unwilling to
support other women (Sawer 2002). An IPU respondent from Southern Europe states
“if . . . the number of women politicians is small as in the case of my country, politics
may change women because, in order to survive politically, women may copy the men
in their methods and behavior” (IPU 2000, p. 23). This statement echoes Lovenduski’s
(1993) warning that institutions can change women before women change institutions.
Especially in highly visible positions, women may need to be cognizant of sanctions
for being seen to act in the interests of women. Relating the experience of Labour MPs
in Great Britain, Childs (2002, p. 151) explains, “The most common perception is that
women who seek to act for women act only for women. This results in a tension
between a woman MP’s parliamentary career and acting for women. If an MP desires
promotion, she cannot afford to be regarded as acting for women too often or too
forcefully.”
40
It is important to note that some of the women interviewed by the IPU felt strongly
that the quality of female leaders was as important as numbers: “Just one courageous
woman can be a vehicle for profound change where 30% may be of little effect” (Pacific
respondent; IPU 2000, p. 68). Still most of the respondents appeared to feel that vehicles
to increase percentages, such as internal party quotas, could only produce positive
benefits.
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American Journal of Sociology
540
CONCLUSION
In order for women to be elected to Parliament, the political
parties have the responsibility of trusting in women, encouraging
them, and putting them forward in constituencies where
they can be certain of electoral success. (Central African respondent;
IPU 2000, p. 97)
Despite advances in women’s levels of education and participation in the
paid economy over the last 20 years (Clark, Ramsbey, and Adler 1991;
Jacobs 1996), women have made little significant progress with respect
to their representation in national politics. In the United States, women
account for 46% of the paid labor force and 55% of tertiary students
(United Nations 2000). However, their representation in Congress and the
Senate remains 13% and 14%, respectively. The situation is similar in
other nations. Currently 182 countries allow women to stand for office.
Yet women make up fewer than 20% of elected representatives in the
great majority of these countries (IPU 2004). Women’s low rate of participation
at the highest levels of politics remains an enduring problem
in gender stratification (Paxton and Kunovich 2003).
In this article, we have attempted to expand our understanding of the
problem of women’s political representation by thinking of politics as a
process with several important stages for women. First, women must be
selected as candidates, and second, female candidates must be elected. In
most countries, political parties are the primary means by which individuals
are selected and supported in their bids for the public office. Thus,
our primary focus is on women’s inclusion in political parties and how
that impacts both the selection and support of female candidates. We
argue that features of political parties mediate and interact with countrylevel
factors, such as a country’s electoral system, in influencing women’s
political outcomes.
We find that women’s inclusion in parties is important in helping
women to become candidates and elected officials, but that the ways in
which female elites can make a difference varies across electoral systems.
Put briefly, female party leaders are able to increase numbers of female
candidates in proportional representation systems. But female party leaders
can help female candidates get elected in plurality-majority (nonPRPL)
systems. This finding has important implications for the ways in
which women can use their growing presence in leadership positions to
the benefit of other women. Female leaders need to recognize the electoral
constraints under which they operate and work to overcome those constraints.
At the same time, female leaders can work to exploit the opportunities
their electoral system may provide.
While the state or various parties may wish to redress historic ineThis
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Pathways to Power
541
qualities by instituting quotas, we do not see an effect of quotas in this
analysis. However, we believe that this finding is likely the result of the
constraints of our data. With better measures of quotas, especially those
accounting for quotas of different types, we expect that, like other studies,
we would find positive impacts for women’s political outcomes, at least
under certain types of quotas. On a related note, we see that complacent
parties do not feel pressure to field women—without marginal parties
challenging the more complacent, established parties, women’s representation
as candidates is reduced.
Finally, we find evidence for the importance of ideological proxies,
which corresponds to much previous research (e.g., Paxton 1997; Paxton
and Kunovich 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2001). However, it is interesting
that while we find ideology influences the gender composition of party
elites in a country and the percentage of women candidates, we do not
find that ideology influences how well women fare at the polls. This
suggests that parties may be overly sensitive to the perceived liability of
women as candidates, when in fact, women have equal success as candidates
across all regions of the world.
Overall, our results stress the importance of parties for women’s political
representation. Even if parties do not actively discriminate against
women, political parties are the gatekeepers that can limit women’s access
to national legislatures. Through the candidate selection process, political
parties limit the choices available to voters. By differentially supporting
candidates, parties also influence the election process. Since the percentage
of female candidates largely determines the percentage of women elected,
it is clear that parties must rise to the challenge by recruiting and supporting
female candidates.
While forces outside an individual party’s control, such as the electoral
system under which it must operate, have an effect on women’s representation
as candidates and how well female candidates do at the polls,
parties could do more to increase women’s achieving elected office. First,
our results indicate that parties should not assume that the electorate will
not accept female candidates. Second, when the state acts to appoint
women or other traditionally marginalized groups to the legislature, political
parties should not assume this means they have no personal responsibility
to increase their own selection of these groups as candidates.
Finally, parties should remove any barriers to women’s full participation
as political elites. Without the internal barriers mentioned by the respondents
in the IPU’s survey of elected officials, women might be better able
to translate their numbers in party bureaus or other positions of power
into increased gains for women.
What role do female elites within parties play in changing or perpetuating
female underrepresentation? Echoing Sanbonmatsu’s (2002) conThis
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American Journal of Sociology
542
clusions about women in the United States, we could say that there is no
single path for women to elected office. Female leaders need to consider
the constraints of their electoral system and plan strategies to increase
women’s representation as candidates and legislators accordingly. In
PRPL systems, female elites should remember that stressing a balanced
party list will not translate into more female legislators unless they also
press for better list positions. The situation may be more difficult in plurality-majority
systems. There, female party elites must fight the perception
of electoral contests as zero-sum outcomes to ensure better representation
of women as candidates.41
Our study demonstrated the utility of developing measures that allow
cross-national researchers to investigate the entire process of women’s
inclusion in politics. However, our study remains limited by its focus on
only one cross-section of elections. Longitudinal data would be better able
to address how the positive impact of female party leaders and party
bureau members might evolve over time as women’s representation in
these positions increases and their influence strengthens. Longitudinal
analyses could also more rigorously test the propositions outlined here by
examining changes in parties, leadership, and electoral rules on the proportion
of women in office over time. Finally, longitudinal data would be
able to test whether women’s political fate is tied to the fate of certain
political parties, and whether the ideological composition of the national
legislature (percentage of seats held by socially liberal vs. conservative
parties) influences women’s electoral outcomes.
While the countries in our sample are representative of national leg-
41
While the focus of this article is the number of women selected as political candidates,
and how many of those are elected, we acknowledge that diversity among women
selected and elected is also of paramount importance. It is likely that the women who
run for, and are elected to, political office are not typical of women in their country.
An important challenge facing female political leaders is the ability to represent the
interest of a wide variety of women while maintaining good standing with constituents
and party leaders. In fact, women’s parliamentary caucuses have been formed in a
substantial number of countries in order to provide an institutional structure within
which representatives from competing parties can pool resources in order to focus on
issues of concern for women and children. In a recent address, Edna Madzongwe, the
Deputy Speaker of the Zimbabwe Parliament and head of the Women’s Caucus, referenced
this challenge faced by female representatives: “Women parliamentarianshave
a dual representative role in that, apart from representing constituencies, you also
represent women who constitute 55% of our population. As such you should remain
focused on the challenging task before you of representing the largest but marginalized
group in our society. You are therefore expected to spearhead change in societal attitudes
by virtue of your being in Parliament by ensuring that legislation passed by
the House is gender sensitive” (see archive of speeches from public figures in Zimbabwe,
http://www.kubatana.net). Even as women begin to comprise 30% of national legislatures,
it may take considerably more time before women have the authority and
resources to represent the diversity of interests among women.
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Pathways to Power
543
islatures worldwide, the range of variables we could consider was constrained
by available data. For example, party ideology is an important
variable, as theory and some research have demonstrated that left parties
are more likely to field female candidates. But data, especially for nonWestern
countries, are not currently available. Similarly, we would ideally
have also considered women’s presence in professional careers such as
law, the strength of any feminist movement, and the percentage of voters
who are women. It is critical that future research collect and include these
variables in quantitative studies.42
Finally, it is important to remember that candidate nomination procedures
vary cross-nationally in ways not considered here (Gallagher and
Marsh 1988, p. 237). For example, in some countries like the United States,
party leaders have much less influence in the candidate selection process.
Candidate selection also depends on the level of centralization of decision
making and the level of party bureaucracy (Matland 2002). Thus, researchers
need to collect additional measures of the candidate selection
process, such as party centralization and the institutionalization of rules,
in order to further understand this process. Proportional representation
systems are hypothesized to be beneficial for women for a variety of
reasons, including larger district magnitudes and the publication of lists.
Further research could consider which specific features of PRPL systems
facilitate the ability of female party leaders to promote female candidates.
For example, in closed-list systems, a voter cannot change the order of
the list of candidates provided by the party. In an open-list system, voters
can. Extrapolating from our results, among PRPL systems, female party
elites should have more influence on the return of female candidates in
open-list systems as they have more of a chance to influence voters by
spending money or organizing list switching. As a South American IPU
respondent explained, “I was the last person on the list, but a campaign
helped me to be elected with preferential votes of more women voters”
(IPU 2000, p. 89).43
Ultimately, this article demonstrates that the characteristics of parties
mediate and interact with more general country-level factors in producing
outcomes for women. The interaction we find here between electoral system
and female party leaders provides a tantalizing glimpse of how we
may ultimately understand the relationship between political structures
at the national and party level in providing both opportunities and constraints
for women to increase their numbers. While it is challenging to
obtain the appropriate data to study this process cross-nationally, it is
42
The IPU should be recognized for collecting party-level data for a range of countries.
We hope that, in the future, such data sets will be less rare.
43
Organized list-switching drives can backfire (Matland 2002).
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American Journal of Sociology
544
clear from these results that the candidate selection process needs to become
part of the standard model.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Description and Data Sources
TABLE A1
Variables
Variable Definition Source Range Average
Dependent variables:
% women in leadership
positions
Calculated by averaging the percentage of
women occupying positions of power for five
distinct positions across the parties for each
country
IPU 1997 0–43 10
% female party bureau
members
Calculated by averaging the percentage of female
members across the parties for each
country
IPU 1997 0–50 17
% female candidates Calculated by dividing the total no. of female
candidates by the total no. of candidates running
for election in each country and multiplying
by 100
IPU 1997 .6–50 14.7
% women in the national
legislature
Calculated by dividing the total no. of female
elected representatives by the total no. of
seats in the lower house for elections held between
August 1991 and December 1996 (#
100)
IPU 1997 0–40 11.8
546
Ratio (ratio of female
elected officials to female
candidates)
Calculated by dividing the percentage of female
representatives by the percentage of female
candidates in each country. Countries with a
value of 0 have no elected representatives;
values ! 1 indicate fewer representatives
were elected than the percentage of candidates
would have suggested; a value p 1 indicates
a one-to-one relationship; values 1 1
indicate more women were elected than expected
by the percentage of candidates.
IPU 1997 0.0–2.75 .95
Structural factors:
Women economically
active
Percentage of women who are in the paid labor
force
United Nations 2000 9.21–54.00 37.94
Women tertiary
education
Percentage of tertiary students who are female United Nations 2000 13.02–65.11 43.82
Industrialization Log of energy use per capita in 1995 United Nations 2000 2.77–8.99 7.04
Political factors:
PRPL electoral system Identifies those countries that use a proportional
representation party-list system to elect all or
some seats in their national legislatures (20).
From the Chronicle of Parliamentary
Elections (IPU
1985–2002) and Derbyshire
and Derbyshire (1996).
Liberal democracy Bollen’s political democracy index Bollen 1998 0–100 72.63
Appoint Identifies those countries that appoint seats to
their national legislature on the basis of sex,
race, ethnicity, or minority status (6)
United Nations 1995
Quota Identifies those countires that have a federal
law mandating the use of a quota system to
insure a minumum level of representation for
female candidates or that some political parties
operating in the system have a voluntary
quota (28)
IPU 1997
547
Ratio of effective parties The no. of effective parties (parties with 10% or
more of assembly seats) divided by the total
no. of parties (# 100).
Derbyshire and Derbyshire
1996 (effective parties);
IPU 1997 (N of parties
competing)
6.25–100 49.99
Ideological factors:
Region Seven region dummy variables: Africa (10),
Asia and the Pacific (14), Eastern Europe
(13), Middle East and Northern Africa (8),
Scandinavia (3), and Latin America (13). The
baseline region is Western industrialized
nations (12).
% Catholic Percentage of the population that is Catholic World Almanac 1996 0–99 31.82
% Muslim Percentage of the population that is Muslim World Almanac 1996 0–99 7.63
% Orthodox Percentage of the population that is Orthodox World Almanac 1996 0–100 16.71
American Journal of Sociology
548
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