American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3 August 2014
doi:10.1017/S0003055414000239 c American Political Science Association 2014
Quotas for Men: Reframing Gender Quotas as a Means of Improving
Representation for All
RAINBOW MURRAY Queen Mary University of London
G
ender quotas traditionally focus on the underrepresentation of women. Conceiving of quotas
in this way perpetuates the status of men as the norm and women as the “other.” Women are
subject to heavy scrutiny of their qualifications and competence, whereas men’s credentials go
unchallenged. This article calls for a normative shift in the problem of overrepresentation, arguing that
the quality of representation is negatively affected by having too large a group drawn from too narrow a
talent pool. Curbing overrepresentation through ceiling quotas for men offers three core benefits. First,
it promotes meritocracy by ensuring the proper scrutiny of politicians of both sexes. Second, it provides
an impetus for improving the criteria used to select and evaluate politicians. Third, neutralizing the
overly masculinized environment within parliaments might facilitate better substantive and symbolic
representation of both men and women. All citizens would benefit from these measures to increase the
quality of representation.
A
t the core of democracy is the representation
of society by an elected group of politicians.
To ensure that democracy functions optimally,
representation should be of the highest possible quality.
This entails selecting the best politicians through
meritocratic recruitment processes. Although this ideal
attracts consensus, its details—such as how to define
quality, and whether representation should be evaluated
at the individual, group, or institutional level—are
controversial. Currently, the composition of most legislatures
is dominated by wealthy, ethnic-majority men.
The ability of such legislatures to represent society in
all its diversity is contested. Further, the narrow social
composition of legislatures suggests either that certain
groups within society are less capable of representing
others or that something has gone awry in the recruitment
process.
Favoring the latter hypothesis, gender quotas have
been introduced widely as one means of correcting
imbalances in representation. The emphasis within
gender quotas typically lies with addressing women’s
underrepresentation. Gender quotas raise serious
questions about the quality of representation; advoRainbow
Murray, Queen Mary University of London
(rainbowmurray@gmail.com).
Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the Political Studies
Association (PSA) annual conference, Belfast, April 2012; at the
PSA Women and Politics specialist group conference, Bristol, February
2012; (virtually) at the American Political Science Association
annual meeting, New Orleans, August 2012; and at the University of
Bournemouth, February 2013. I am thankful to all the participants
for their valuable feedback, and especially to Alistair Clark and
Melanie Hughes for their detailed comments. The paper on which
this article is based received the APSA Women and Politics Research
Best Paper Award 2013 (Honorable Mention), and I thank Miki
Caul Kittilson (chair) and the members of the award committee
for their consideration of my paper. Peter Allen, Tim Bale, Sarah
Childs, Michael Kenny, Robin Pettitt, and Heather Savigny all gave
generous support, and I thank them all for their close reading of
the draft manuscript and their helpful insights. I am grateful to the
editors of the American Political Science Review and to each of the
five anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful and insightful
comments. This article benefited immeasurably from this feedback.
Last but not least, my thanks go to Alicia Murray-Pettitt, to whom
this article is dedicated.
cates argue that they enhance the substantive and
symbolic representation of women, whereas detractors
claim that they prioritize group representation
at the expense of meritocracy. However, insufficient
consideration is given to the limitations of the maledominated
status quo for providing high-quality representation
for both sexes. Male overrepresentation itself
compromises meritocracy and constrains the substantive
representation of men as well as women. Debates
on quotas therefore need to pay more attention to
dominant groups.
Many gender quotas are framed explicitly as quotas
for women. Even when quotas are framed in
gender-neutral language (for example, demanding that
a party list contain no fewer than 40% candidates of
either sex), rather than targeting women explicitly, the
discourse surrounding gender quotas has focused on
the underrepresentation of women (Dahlerup 2006;
Dahlerup and Friedenvall 2005).1
Because underrepresentation
is a problem that affects only women and
not men due to long-standing gender inequalities, the
use of gender-neutral language does not conceal the
fact that quotas focusing on underrepresentation are
effectively quotas for women (cf. Zimmer 1988). Even
if reducing the overrepresentation of men is a necessary
corollary of increasing women’s presence, it is never
presented as the primary goal with its own intrinsic
benefits. Rather, the justification for gender quotas focuses
on the need to increase women’s presence.
The thesis presented here is that this is a problematic
approach to gender quotas. The focus on women’s underrepresentation
has the unintended consequence of
framing men as the norm and women as the “other.”
With men’s presence already accepted as the status
quo, the burden of proof for justifying presence lies
with the outsiders wishing to enter politics (women),
rather than with those already present in excessive
numbers (men). Men are required neither to prove
their competence nor to justify their inclusion. This
1 Bjarneg˚ard (2013) does focus on male overrepresentation, but not
within the context of gender quotas.
520
American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3
is not to say that individual men are immune to all
scrutiny, but rather that the competence of men as a
category is not questioned. Women, in contrast, are
placed under close scrutiny to ascertain whether they
“deserve” a greater presence in politics. This prompts
critics of quotas to fear that “quota women” may be
inferior because of perceptions that they are less well
qualified for office, have not had to battle as hard to
enter, and/or have been selected for office only on
the basis of their sex rather than their more tangible
qualities (Bacchi 2006; Karam 1999; Zetterberg 2008).
Men have escaped the same criticisms, even though
they have long been the beneficiaries of preferential
selection based on sex.
To resolve this dilemma, I propose that we reframe
gender quotas, moving from implicit quotas for women
to explicit quotas for men. This entails a shift in emphasis
from the problem of underrepresentation to the
problem of overrepresentation. Overrepresentation of
a particular group can have a deleterious effect on the
quality of representation because of its restriction of
the talent pool to a narrow subsection of society. Expanding
the talent pool to all sectors of society would
enhance representation for everyone by achieving a
genuine (rather than spurious) meritocracy in which
only the very best will succeed.
An inevitable consequence of approaching quotas
in this way is that the number of men would need to
be reduced to their appropriate share of representation
(50%). This would, of course, also be the case for a gender
quota where the emphasis was on raising women’s
presence to 50%. However, the distinctive feature of a
focus on overrepresentation is that it shifts onto men
the onus to prove their worth and justify their coveted
place within politics. To fulfill the normative goal of the
quota (enhancing the quality of representation), the
reduction of men’s presence needs to be made on the
basis of transparent, objective criteria concerning what
constitutes a good representative. At present, selection
criteria are seldom codified and are often based on outdated
notions of the skills and qualifications required
to represent others. Thus, an essential first step is to
reappraise the qualities required of a representative.
This, in itself, could potentially transform the way that
we conceptualize representative democracy.
This article combines normative political theory
with an analysis of practical repercussions to demonstrate
the limitations of the current focus on quotas
for women. Reframing the debate is desirable both
normatively—highlighting and addressing weaknesses
in current approaches—and politically, by offering a
new way to challenge the damaging effects of overrepresentation.
A closer examination of meritocracy
further exposes flaws in the status quo. Not only are current
notions of merit discriminatory, because they are
applied unevenly to men and women and are based on
elite male norms, but they also overlook certain qualities
that are important for substantive and symbolic
representation. Although few would deny the benefit
of selecting the most meritorious candidates,2
there is
2 An exception might be advocates of random selection and sortition.
little consensus on the criteria necessary to achieve an
optimal set of representatives. Meanwhile, research on
gender quotas and representation tends to focus on
women at the expense of men and does not sufficiently
challenge existing notions of merit. Bringing together
these complementary perspectives permits a different
way of thinking about gender quotas that addresses
some of the conceptual and pragmatic difficulties presented
by existing approaches.
In the next section, I offer a more in-depth discussion
of the disadvantages of current ways of conceiving of
gender quotas, explaining why they are problematic
for women, do not apply sufficient scrutiny to men,
and operate on a flawed (and often untested) assumption
of meritocracy. I then present the thesis of quotas
for men in more detail, outlining the three core
benefits of such an approach. First, reframing gender
quotas in this way necessitates the proper scrutiny of
male as well as female politicians. Second, it opens a
debate on the true qualities required to be effective
representatives. I offer a first step toward reimagining
the criteria for what makes a “good” representative
in order to provide a more contemporary and objective
definition of meritocracy. Third, this new approach
promotes better representation of the substantive interests
of both women and men. By enhancing rather
than undermining meritocracy, quotas for men serve to
raise the quality of representation for everyone.
WHY “QUOTAS FOR WOMEN” ARE
PROBLEMATIC
Carver (1996) reminds us that “gender is not a synonym
for women.” Yet, when we think of gender
quotas, there is an ingrained association with quotas
for women. Because men are not underrepresented,
they are not perceived to require a quota mechanism.
Quotas are usually viewed as a means of ensuring a
minimum presence of the target group (in this case,
women), rather than a means of controlling the number
of members of overrepresented groups (Dahlerup
2006; Jones 1998; Lovenduski 2005). Discourse surrounding
quotas tends to problematize the shortage of
women in politics and to present quotas as a solution,
leading to an indelible association of gender quotas
with women (Tinker 2004; Tripp and Kang 2008).
Although quotas for women are often seen as a
practical solution to women’s underrepresentation, the
causes of political gender imbalance are multiple and
complex. Much scholarship has been devoted to the
structural and systematic variables restricting women’s
access to politics. For example, Norris and Lovenduski
(1995) explore how women’s underrepresentation is a
problem both of lack of supply (qualified women do not
come forward) and lack of demand (when women do
come forward, political gatekeepers overlook them in
favor of men). Differential access to resources, including
money, education, free time, and encouragement
from others, reduces the supply of women candidates.3
3 Education is seldom a problem for women in contemporary Western
democracies, with women succeeding in education in levels that
521
Quotas for Men August 2014
Lawless and Fox (2010) highlight how women are socialized
into having lower levels of political ambition,
whereas men benefit from greater confidence and aspiration.
Demand-side factors may also present themselves
in the form of direct and/or imputed discrimination
(Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Not only will such
behavior have a direct effect on women’s presence in
politics but it may also discourage future women from
emerging as candidates. So, too, may the lack of role
models for raising young women’s aspirations. Instead,
potential female candidates are likely to be deterred by
instances of public humiliation of women politicians in
legislatures and the media (Denis 2012; Elliott 2011;
Falk 2008; Lawrence and Rose 2010; Murray 2010a).
For a wide variety of well-established reasons, therefore,
the path into office is more challenging for women
than men. The many obstacles preventing women’s
full political inclusion offer ample evidence that the
current system is not a meritocracy. Acknowledging
that women compete on an unequal playing field, the
purpose of gender quotas has been to overcome these
hurdles for women. Quotas have the potential to suppress
demand-side resistance to women candidates and
to boost supply by fostering a more welcoming, inclusive
environment.
Achieving a rapid increase in the number of women
politicians might necessitate widening the search beyond
traditional political pipelines. Although I argue
later that this widening is to be welcomed, it also gives
rise to one of the most common popular critiques of
gender quotas, namely that they favor the promotion
of inferior women candidates at the expense of more
qualified men (Celis, Krook, and Meier 2011; Dahlerup
and Freidenvall 2010; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo
2012). This fear arises from a belief, despite evidence
to the contrary (Baltrunaite et al. 2012; O’Brien 2012),
that the current system is meritocratic and that those
who make it into politics must, as evidenced by their
success, be the most worthy. Many of those already
present in politics, including some women, justify their
presence on these grounds. Indeed, the success of some
women in politics is construed as evidence that the system
is fair: If these women can penetrate the world
of politics, this proves that talent is rewarded, and
if other women were likewise meritorious, they too
would surely succeed. Examples of successful women
politicians, such as Margaret Thatcher (British prime
minister from 1979–90), are often offered as proof that
women can make it to the top as long as they are good
enough. The paucity of women in politics, on this view,
must be due to a lack of merit, and forcing underqualified
women into politics to satisfy a quota would be
detrimental to the quality of political institutions and
a threat to democracy. A woman elected via a quota
often exceed men (UNESCO 2010). There is some gender segregation
regarding topics studied, with men predominant in math and
science, whereas most women favor arts and humanities subjects. In
developing regions (notably South and West Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa), women may still not enjoy equal educational opportunities
to men, and historical differential access to education in Western
societies may have a lingering effect in older generations.
might not be the “best man for the job” but merely the
best woman and therefore might lack the experience,
appropriate background, and ability to fight for political
gains. Even if women did possess these qualities,
the association with gender quotas might undermine
their talents, leading to the suspicion that they had
not made it purely on their own merit (Krook 2006;
O’Brien 2012).
The arguments against quotas, based on meritocracy,
assume (albeit sometimes implicitly) that the significant
overrepresentation of men, over time and space,
is the correct and fair outcome. This assertion is frequently
contested by quota advocates, who sometimes
even argue that women have to be significantly more
deserving than men to overcome the many barriers to
their presence (Dahlerup 2007; Escobar-Lemmon and
Taylor-Robinson 2009; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014).
A much less commonly aired argument is that men receive
an unfair advantage in accessing political power.
If the playing field is not, in fact, level, then men may
themselves be accessing politics on the basis of their
sex rather than their more tangible qualities. As such,
they may not be the best person for the job, but merely
the best man. Hence, the threat to the quality of representation
comes not from redressing the imbalance
of the sexes, but from allowing it to persist unchecked.
One reason why the belief in an existing meritocracy
persists is because exposing its fallacy is surprisingly
complex. A pressing concern for women seeking to establish
their credentials is how to prove the existence
of merit. Men are less frequently challenged by this
dilemma: As the traditional status quo, they benefit
both from the presumption of competence and from
greater opportunity to demonstrate their worth. The
most convincing way of demonstrating competence is
by performing the required task. Because men are already
in a position to perform the task of representation
and because the criteria for success are based
on previous (male) examples, men have an inherent
advantage in showcasing their talent. Indeed, their existing
presence in politics is taken as sufficient evidence
of their ability to serve as representatives. Thus, men’s
competence is rarely called into question, and their
traits and qualifications are seldom subjected to close
scrutiny qua men. Conversely, women frequently find
themselves needing to prove their worth qua women;
they do not benefit from the same presumption of
competence and indeed may find themselves having
to disprove gendered preconceptions of inadequacy
(Dahlerup 2007; Kanter 1977; Stevens 2012).
Placing the burden of proof on women is a double
disadvantage. Not only are they less likely to have
their competence taken as a given and more likely
to be expected to justify their presence but they are
also less well placed to do so. The difficulty for “outsiders”
in demonstrating their capacity to be effective
representatives is exacerbated if the criteria for proving
merit are derived from the dominant, “insider” group
(Bacchi 1996). Getting more women into political
office via a gender quota has the benefit of giving
women an opportunity to demonstrate their competence
by performing the role (Bhavnani 2009).
522
American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3
However, the problem remains that women’s value
may be undermined by the suspicion that they owe
their presence solely to a quota rather than talent. This
enduring belief, despite research showing the contrary
(Besley et al. 2012; Murray 2010b), indicates that evidence
is necessary but not sufficient; the public debate
must be reframed.
Women may find themselves faced with a further
burden. Even if women are considered to be equally
qualified for political office, they may still face additional
expectations in order to justify expelling existing
officeholders (who may also be deemed worthy) to
make way for new entrants. Phillips (1995) argues that
the question of justice is sufficient to justify women’s
inclusion in politics, without need for further arguments.
However, for those who consider it an injustice
to remove incumbents from office through no wrongdoing
of their own, the argument for including more
women on the grounds of justice alone may not be
sufficiently persuasive, even if it cannot be refuted
outright. Instead, women may find themselves needing
to demonstrate that they are not directly equivalent
to men. Equality arguments based on women’s
equal merit, underpinned by claims for justice, have
often become subjugated in public quota debates to
arguments focusing on difference; for example, Teigen
recommends “stressing . . . the special contribution of
women” (2000, 63). It is not sufficient for women to be
interchangeable with men; they are expected to offer
something distinctive, without which the democratic
process is incomplete, thus necessitating their presence.
S´enac-Slawinski (2010) refers to this as “added value,”
with women needing to demonstrate that they meet
all the same criteria as men, while also providing additional
roles as substantive and symbolic representatives
of women. Such a strategy is essentializing and
can be problematic for female legislators, who may
feel compelled to conform to institutional norms and
avoid being associated with the narrow representation
of sectoral interests (Childs 2004; Larson 2012; Lovenduski
2005; Walsh 2012). There is no equivalent expectation
of male legislators, because the substantive and
symbolic representation of men are normally taken for
granted within male-dominated legislatures.
Scholars of gender and politics may inadvertently
contribute to these additional expectations of women,
with much work measuring possible relationships between
the descriptive and substantive representation
of women (Celis 2006; Reingold 2006; Swers 2005).
Although recent scholarship has sought to disassociate
descriptive and substantive representation, arguing
that women’s bodies are neither a guaranteed nor
an exclusive conduit for feminist minds (Celis et al.
2008; Childs 2006; Childs and Webb 2012), there is
still solid evidence that women do need women representatives
(Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski 2010).
Consequently, women representatives find themselves
faced with a triple whammy: They are expected to be
as good as men on traditional male-oriented criteria,
while also providing added value, yet may still be perceived
as inferior to their male colleagues and have
their competence constantly questioned.
In contrast, men benefit from their position as the
dominant group by being able to set the rules of
the game, with themselves as the established players.
Scrutiny of political credentials tends to focus on the
challengers to the status quo (women), rather than on
its upholders (men). Phillips challenges the presumption
that men automatically belong in office, arguing
instead that we should
turn the argument around, and ask by what “natural” superiority
of talent or experience men could claim a right
to dominate assemblies? The burden of proof then shifts
to the men, who would have to establish either some genetic
distinction which makes them better at understanding
problems and taking decisions, or some more socially
derived advantage which enhances their political skills.
Neither of these looks particularly persuasive; the first has
never been successfully established, and the second is no
justification if it depends on structures of discrimination.
(Phillips 1995, 65)
If men do not enjoy a “natural superiority of talent,”
it is unsafe to assume that a legislature comprised
disproportionately of men provides the ideal balance
for good representation. We cannot automatically infer
that men are present in these proportions because they
were the best representatives available. Baltrunaite
et al. (2012) find that feminizing legislatures through
quotas leads to an increase in the quality of both male
and female politicians, a finding supported by Besley
et al. (2012) and J´ulio and Tavares (2010), suggesting
that the composition of legislatures pre-quotas was
suboptimal.
Problems in male-dominated legislatures include
corruption, with politicians in various countries accused
of bribery, clientelism, fiddling expenses, and
abusing power (Bale and Caramani 2010; Bjarneg˚ard
2013; Caramani, Deegan-Krause, and Murray 2011).
These scandals parallel similar problems in other sectors
such as banking and finance, where the maledominated
culture and exclusion of female talent contributed
to the recent economic crisis (Pr¨ugl 2012) and
board homogeneity is associated with lower value for
corporate firms (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003).
My argument is not that it is a gender imbalance
per se that might create problems,4
but rather that
male-dominated legislatures comprise a skewed sample
drawn from a subsection of the population, resulting
in an increased risk of selecting inferior politicians.
The exclusion of alternative perspectives and cultures
may also permit bad practices to persist unchecked.
Furthermore, the inadequacies of male-dominated
legislatures for addressing the substantive interests of
women are well documented (Childs and Withey 2006;
Lovenduski 2005; Swers 1998). Although women do
not monopolize the capacity to act as substantive representatives
for women, they mobilize more frequently
than men on issues of importance to women, and they
bring perspectives to policy debates that are otherwise
4 Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) did find
some evidence that women are less involved in corrupt practices than
men, although these findings have been contested (Bjarneg˚ard 2013;
Sung 2003).
523
Quotas for Men August 2014
lacking (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Mansbridge
1999; Sapiro 1981; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Legislatures
dominated by male elites also pose problems for symbolic
representation, because they may lead to a sense
of political alienation among members of excluded
groups (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012).
The narrowness of politicians’ backgrounds may further
undermine the legitimacy of political institutions
(Dovi 2007). Studies indicate a loss of citizen engagement
with institutions perceived as too remote from
their daily lives (Karp and Banducci 2008). Verba,
Burns, and Schlozman (1997) found that greater gender
balance in politics was mirrored in more genderbalanced
levels of political knowledge within the general
population; similarly, a better gender balance of
political candidates increases women’s political engagement
and participation (Atkeson 2003; Norris,
Lovenduski, and Campbell 2004). However, if people
do not recognize themselves within the institutions
purporting to represent them, they may disengage altogether
from the political process (Henn, Weinstein, and
Hodgkinson 2007; O’Toole, Marsh, and Jones 2003).
Legislatures that are unrepresentative in areas such
as gender, race, and class have contributed to democratic
malaise, evidenced by declining levels of voter
turnout, public disenchantment with politics, and a
desire for change and political renewal (Baldez 2004,
2006; Saward 2010).
Yet, public disillusionment with politics tends to be
linked to gender only through the substantive and symbolic
representation of women, whereby legislatures
are criticized for neglecting women’s interests and perspectives
and for not providing a mirror of society.
There is far less debate about whether imbalanced
legislatures are failing everyone, across the full range
of policy areas and representative acts, as a result of
limiting political recruitment to a subsection of society.
In other words, the competence of male legislators
is seldom questioned even when the effectiveness of
male-dominated legislatures as a whole is seen to be
undermined.
QUOTAS FOR MEN
A central tenet of this article is that the overrepresentation
of any group is unfortunate, not only because of the
corresponding deficit of another group but also in and
of itself. Selecting too many people from a restricted
talent pool is intrinsically problematic because it compromises
the quality of representation for everybody.
Solving this problem requires a solution that focuses
on restricting overrepresentation, rather than redressing
underrepresentation. It necessitates a reconceptualization
of quotas, whereby instead of serving as a
target for an underrepresented group, they operate as
a ceiling for an overrepresented group. A quota for
men would indicate the maximum percentage of men
who could be present in a legislature; for example, 60%
or even 50%. Although many existing gender quotas
are framed in gender-neutral language that includes
ceilings as well as floors (for example Spain, whose
“parity” quota stipulates a minimum of 40% and maximum
of 60% of either sex), a quota for men is distinct
from a gender quota, because it emphasizes the problem
of overrepresentation. Indeed, although the focus
here is on quotas for men in order to highlight the
normative shift away from quotas for women, a similar
quota could be applied to any overrepresented group.
The key distinctive feature is the normative reasoning
underpinning the quota. The central concern lies not
with gender equality, nor fairness, valid and important
though these undoubtedly are. Instead, the emphasis is
on enhancing the quality of representation for all.
If we accept Phillips’ claim that men do not enjoy a
“natural superiority of talent” and assume instead that
most attributes are distributed fairly randomly across
the population, it follows that approximately half of
the best possible legislators will be men and approximately
half will be women. If we restrict the talent
pool of legislators only to men, we lose half of the
best people for the job. If we restrict the pool further,
focusing on men from elite, privileged, ethnic-majority
backgrounds (as is the case in most polities), we remove
from contention the majority of the top candidates.
Instead of selecting the best candidates for the job,
we can select only the best candidates from within the
restricted talent pool. Inevitably, this results in a less
competitive process, with a larger sample being drawn
from a narrow subset of the population. This sample
may still include the best candidates from within the
subset, but it will also include candidates who would not
be selected if faced with full and fair competition from
the wider population. Thus, if competition is restricted
to members of a narrow group, the outcome will be
the selection of suboptimal candidates who would not
have been competitive if operating within a genuine
meritocracy. By having too many candidates from one
restricted group and too few from other groups, there
is an inefficient use of the overall available talent of
the population. The consequence is an inferior quality
of representation, which is undesirable for all citizens,
both male and female.
It could be argued that the effects on quality of restricting
the talent pool are marginal when the number
of elected politicians is considered within the context
of the overall population size. Even if the candidates
selected are suboptimal, it might still be possible to find
a sufficient number of strong candidates from within
the restricted talent pool of men. However, this claim
is not persuasive, because it is not the case that all
members of the population are viable contenders for
elected office. The “ladder of recruitment,” introduced
by Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 16), illustrates the
filtering process present in most democracies by which
the total pool of eligible citizens is reduced to a much
smaller pool of potential candidates. This process is
mediated by political parties, which play a key role in
political recruitment and candidate selection, but the
filtering principle also holds when the role of parties is
less dominant. Even if aspirant candidates emerged in
an equal distribution from all sectors of society, the
total number of individuals possessing the qualities
and motivation to succeed in electoral politics would
524
American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3
be relatively low. Although the “natural superiority of
talent” is not restricted to a particular social category
such as men, all citizens do not possess in equal measure
an aptitude for politics, any more than artistic or
athletic talent is universal. If only a limited number of
individuals possess political talents, it is important to
include as many of those individuals as possible in the
recruitment process to ensure that political institutions
receive the best talent available. Within an already restricted
pool of those possessing a flair for politics, the
difference in quality created by excluding at least half
of potential candidates is likely to be significant.
The application of a “ceiling” quota would help address
this problem by restricting the number of candidates
selected from one subsection of the talent pool,
thus opening up the selection process to rival groups
and making selection more genuinely competitive and
meritocratic. Hence, a quota for men would restrict
the numbers of men to help ensure that only the best
candidates survive the selection process. Although the
focus here is on men, the theory has potential application
for the overrepresentation of other categories,
such as ethnicity and class. The present problem of
male overrepresentation is exacerbated by the fact that
these men tend disproportionately to be from ethnicmajority
and privileged economic backgrounds.
A quota is not sufficient, in itself, to guarantee a genuine
meritocracy; weaker men might still triumph over
more talented male rivals due to other anticompetitive
aspects of the selection process such as patronage.
There is also a risk that minority men might be forced
out of politics to preserve places for majority men; such
a move would run counter to the goals of the quota.
Hence, an emphasis on merit is essential to avoid the
replacement of one form of elite with another.
Meritocracy can be advanced through challenging
the status quo, opening a debate about quality, and
making better use of available resources of talent. For
the problem of (un)fair competition to be resolved, it
first must be recognized. The political priority accorded
to quotas for women has masked the many problems
caused by overrepresentation; however, the absence
of public debate on overrepresentation does not mean
that no such debate is necessary. The parallel issue of
underrepresentation was also long absent from public
discourse until campaigns for quotas for women highlighted
the democratic deficits caused by excluding certain
groups from power. A focus on overrepresentation
is now needed to highlight the lack of meritocracy underpinning
current imbalances and to initiate a debate
on how to improve the quality of representation. Quotas
for men would raise public awareness of a problem
that is too frequently ignored or denied, often by those
with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.
Publicly highlighting the detrimental consequences of
unfair competition would also help open up alternative
talent pools, thus increasing the chances of selecting the
best candidates for the job.
It is important to note that the argument in favor of
quotas for men is not an attack on male representatives.
For democracy to thrive, the presence of men is essential.
Rather, the emphasis lies with achieving a more
fully competitive process and enhancing the quality
of representation for all. Nonetheless, these goals do
necessitate a significant reduction in the number of
male politicians. (The extent of the reduction required
varies both in terms of the degree of overrepresentation
and the level at which the ceiling is set.) Although,
from a normative perspective, a 50% quota for men
would be ideal (thus ensuring that the number of men
elected is proportionate to the wider population), a
case could be made for a little flexibility to account
for natural fluctuations of talent within the population.
(An overly generous ceiling, however, might present
the same problems as a quota for women that is set too
low, by providing a margin within which reform can be
resisted.)
Determining which men to remove from office introduces
both normative and practical dilemmas. Ideally,
such decisions should lie with voters. In practice, candidate
(re)selection decisions frequently lie with political
parties. Forcing parties to deselect incumbents is
arguably a restriction of the freedom both of parties
to select their preferred candidate and of voters to
elect their candidate of choice (Rehfeld 2010). However,
these dilemmas are equally raised when seeking
to implement quotas for women (Hazan and Rahat
2010; Murray 2010c). Parties implementing quotas
have been obliged to modify their recruitment practices
and free up seats for women candidates (Krook
2009). The difference here is that parties would have an
explicit mandate to focus on quality when evaluating
male candidates, rather than targeting men who were
out of favor with the party for other reasons. Meanwhile,
voter choice has always been restricted to the
candidates preselected by political parties; voters who
wished to vote for a more diverse range of candidates
have been unable to do so. Although quotas for men
would not automatically increase voter choice, they
would encourage parties to use more meritocratic selection
procedures and hence to put forward the highest
caliber candidates on their tickets, thus having a
fairly neutral effect on voter freedom and a positive
effect on the quality of representation. A focus on
meritocracy in selection procedures would still operate
alongside other imperatives for parties when selecting
candidates, such as the need to balance internal factions,
but should complement rather than contradict
these other priorities.
Given the practical difficulties for parties of forcing
incumbents out of office, pragmatists might argue for
reducing the number of male politicians in stages rather
than enforcing an immediate cull. This approach might
be defended on the grounds of fairness to existing
male legislators, continuity, and conserving experience.
However, Mexico does not permit legislators to serve
two consecutive terms, indicating the potential for complete
political renewal within a single election. Because
slow implementation of a quota for men would result
in an ongoing suboptimal set of legislators, it is difficult
to defend on any grounds other than facilitating
implementation.
For the central goal of enhancing quality to be fulfilled,
it is not sufficient for the quota to be met in
525
Quotas for Men August 2014
numerical terms; in addition, the selection process must
be transformed, such that those who withdraw are the
weaker politicians, while those retained and newly recruited
represent the best that society has to offer. The
first step toward improving the quality of a legislature
is therefore to assess the merit of those already present,
to determine in a fair and transparent way which politicians
should continue and which should step down.
Thus, quotas for men necessitate careful scrutiny of
men’s qualifications and job performance. This ideal
is easily stated but less easily achieved, because the
traditional standards against which men might be measured
are not necessarily the best ones for determining
which legislators are most fit to serve as democratic
representatives. Therefore, to ensure optimal quality,
we require a reappraisal of the qualities needed to be
an effective representative.
RETHINKING THE CRITERIA FOR BEING A
GOOD REPRESENTATIVE
Identifying appropriate criteria for being a good representative
presents multiple challenges. Normatively,
it is difficult to isolate the key qualities required of
a good representative without inadvertently drawing
on (male-dominated) precedents. Empirically, it is difficult
to apply abstract concepts of merit to specific
individuals, especially when considering prospective as
well as current politicians. This section considers how
existing studies have grappled with these issues, before
proposing paths for future research.
Many theoretical works on representation focus on
relatively abstract criteria for determining good representatives,
such as integrity, sound judgment, or rational
decision making. For example, there is debate about
the extent to which representatives should be delegates,
enacting the stated preferences of constituents,
or trustees, following their own judgments (Eulau et al.
1959). Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work extends
the debate, illuminating the different requirements of
representative democracy. She highlights how representatives
may stand and act for their constituents,
and introduces the notions of descriptive, substantive,
and symbolic representation. These definitions are instructive
when assessing the capacity both of individual
representatives and of institutions such as legislatures
to serve the needs of representative democracy.
Mansbridge (2003) builds on Piktin’s definitions. She
introduces concepts such as anticipatory, gyroscopic,
and surrogate representation. Anticipatory representation
assumes that citizens base their votes on the
future promises made by candidates, in opposition to
promissory representation, which evaluates promises
kept since the previous election; Przeworski, Stokes,
and Manin (1999) discuss similar concepts in the form
of mandate and accountability views of elections. Gyroscopic
representatives look within themselves to their
own beliefs to inform their judgments, and representatives
who share beliefs and experiences with their
constituents might be best placed to perform this type
of representation. Surrogate representation accounts
for scenarios whereby citizens feel most represented
by politicians from beyond their own constituency, thus
highlighting the importance of diversity across the legislature
as a whole. Rehfeld (2009) and Saward (2010)
present a more nuanced discussion of these concepts
and demonstrate their applicability to representation
beyond the electoral context.
Although these studies are important for understanding
the relationship between representative and
constituent, they are less instructive about the specific
qualities that best qualify individuals to serve as representatives
(Rehfeld 2010). Dovi (2007) offers an important
advance by developing several key criteria for
measuring a “good representative.” These include the
virtues of fair-mindedness, critical trust building, and
good gatekeeping. Dovi’s criteria are unbiased, but are
more useful for judging retrospectively the attributes of
those already in office than for identifying the potential
of candidates not yet elected. Although these criteria
might therefore help identify male representatives who
need to be deselected to implement a quota for men,
they do not overcome the problem faced by women
and other out-groups of proving their credentials prior
to election. It is unsatisfactory to remove men from
office using criteria that cannot guarantee that the representatives
replacing them will be any better qualified.
However, Dovi also argues that democratic representation
requires the legitimacy of institutions, and this is
undermined by the exclusion of marginalized groups;
hence, the quality of representation must be considered
both at an individual and a collective level.
These important theoretical advances concerning
democratic norms of representation need to be integrated
into candidate selection procedures, both when
considering new candidates and deciding whether to
reselect candidates. Current criteria deployed by political
parties to recruit candidates include availability
of resources, such as the time and money necessary to
run a successful campaign; charisma; eloquence and the
ability to defend an argument in public; media appeal;
ability to work a crowd; intelligence; and networks. Parties
may also place a premium on party loyalty, sometimes
favoring a compliant candidate over one willing
to defend constituents’ interests. Murray (2010c) found
that these attributes were cited more frequently than
professional background or educational attainment as
being essential criteria for selection (see also Hazan
and Rahat 2010).
Yet, many empirical studies of candidate quality still
focus on income and education rather than the character
traits driving candidate selection (Baltrunaite et al.
2012; Besley et al. 2012; Galasso and Nannicini 2011;
J´ulio and Tavares 2010; Kotakorpi and Poutvara 2011).
Representatives often follow a particular (usually elite)
path involving specific educational qualifications from
selective establishments (such as Ivy League universities),
certain careers (such as business and law), and
certain springboard positions (such as coveted, usually
male-dominated positions within local or party
politics). Even allowing for some variation depending
on the nature of the selectorate and electoral system,
the current criteria for successful entry into politics
526
American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3
are rather narrow. They focus on privilege and insider
knowledge, without emphasizing the need to share and
understand citizens’ concerns. Traditional notions of a
good representative do not best reflect the needs of
contemporary societies in all their diversity.
It is also difficult to evaluate merit conclusively using
the existing criteria, so claims of women’s inferiority
cannot easily be disproved. Studies attempting
to compare men’s and women’s preparedness for office
have produced mixed results (Black and Erickson
2000; Curtin 2008; Escobar-Lemmon and TaylorRobinson
2009; Saint-Germain 1993). Verge (2011)
and Franceschet and Piscopo (2012) found that women
tend to have higher levels of education than men, supporting
the hypothesis that the bar is raised higher for
women. In contrast, O’Brien (2012) found little difference
between the sexes, and Murray (2010b) found
that women have slightly different professional backgrounds
and less prior political experience on average
than men. But the main limitation of all these studies
is that the means of judging “merit” are somewhat arbitrary,
given the understandable focus on objective,
measurable criteria such as education, profession, and
prior political experience. Such measures cannot gauge
many of the more subjective criteria that also influence
a candidate’s chances of success. The challenge of
identifying criteria that are objective, measurable, and
meaningful makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions
regarding the relative merit of male and female
candidates.
The criteria for judging candidate quality may also
contain an inherent male bias. The measure of a good
candidate often stems from an evaluation of what came
before, using prior examples of successful candidates as
models for future aspirants. If the status quo is predominantly
male, there is a risk that selectors will (perhaps
inadvertently) favor qualities more commonly found
in men. Norris and Lovenduski recognize this problem,
arguing that “if selectors base their assumptions
about suitable applicants on their image of established
MPs this may produce a systematic bias in favor of
maintaining the status quo” (1995, 127). Taylor concurs,
stating that “one way discrimination is perpetuated is
by the dominance of elite white men over. . .the idea of
what counts as merit” (1991, 233, emphasis in original).
Bacchi (1996) argues that, though ill defined, these criteria
often go unquestioned. Franceschet, Krook, and
Piscopo (2012, 11) further note that “assessing female
politicians’ backgrounds and preparations according to
norms established by men’s longstanding participation
risks ignoring or discounting the types of qualifications
women do bring to politics, such as extensive backgrounds
in grassroots or community organizing.” Traditional
definitions of “qualification” and “competence”
therefore may exclude criteria that are important for
performing the role of a democratic representative.
Furthermore, discriminatory societal attitudes may
color our judgment when assessing “outsider” groups
as prospective representatives. When definitions of
merit are applied to groups other than elite men,
stereotypes about the competence of women and other
outsiders may inhibit people’s perceptions of these
outsiders as meritorious (Kanter 1977). Young (2000)
argues that structural discrimination has led both to an
underestimation of the capacities of out-groups such
as women and ethnic minorities, and the use of criteria
based on elite male norms that are harder for others
to meet. Women may therefore find themselves being
judged unfavorably against criteria that men are assumed
more naturally to possess.
However, these problems should not undermine efforts
to generate unbiased criteria for evaluating election
candidates—on the contrary, the presence of underlying
biases only reinforces the need to develop objective
criteria rather than relying on subjective judgments.
As Dovi (2007, 14) argues, “to remain silent
about the proper criteria for choosing representatives
is to ignore the fact that democratic citizens will not
always bring proper standards to bear in evaluating
their representatives. Contemporary political theory
should not be afraid to challenge the judgments of
democratic citizens by offering guidelines for assessing
individual representatives.” Developing criteria that
are appropriate, objective, unbiased, and measurable
is an immense undertaking that is beyond the scope of
this article. The key aims here are to highlight the need
for further research in this area and to suggest some
steps forward.
When considering which traits and backgrounds
might best qualify an individual for electoral office, one
option is to consider the core functions of a representative,
thereby ensuring that the qualities demanded
correspond to the needs of the role. This approach
refocuses criteria away from subjective impressions
based on the status quo and toward the objective requirements
of representation. Representatives serve a
symbolic role as the embodiment of democracy, speaking
for those who are not themselves present. They
have a discursive and deliberative function, enabling
the voicing of different perspectives to ensure that all
views are taken into account when policies are debated.
They make decisions about policies, validating policy
outcomes. Finally, they act as conduits of information,
relaying ideas from constituents to fellow decision
makers and then explaining and defending decisions
made to their constituents. Although the exact nature
of these roles might vary depending on the strength of
political parties and the relationship between legislatures
and executives, these four core roles are common
to all representatives.
The successful performance of these roles depends
both on the quality of the individual representatives
and on their collective capacity to represent society.
To be accepted as symbols of democracy, representatives
must be of the people. If the collective body
of representatives looks too different from the society
that it purports to represent, there is a risk that
excluded groups will no longer perceive the representative
process to be legitimate. Thus, connectedness
between representatives and represented is necessary
to promote symbolic representation. To fulfill a deliberative
function, representatives must be aware of
the diverse needs of their constituents and be able to
articulate these effectively. Just as no representative
527
Quotas for Men August 2014
can embody full descriptive representation as an individual,
neither can any individual defend all viewpoints
simultaneously. In both cases, diversity at the aggregate
level is essential for promoting substantive representation
and ensuring that no identity or viewpoint is systematically
excluded (Mansbridge 1999). Making decisions
requires sound judgment, and conveying information
to and from citizens requires excellent communication
and interpersonal skills. Thus, both collective
diversity and individual talent are essential to enable
institutions to represent citizens effectively. Quotas for
men would help enhance both of these dimensions of
good representation.
Focusing on the core functions of a representative
also reveals that some of the measures used to evaluate
the ideal candidate may be superfluous. For example,
the case for favoring prestigious careers in commerce
or law is not persuasive. Nor is personal ambition
necessarily an advantage in this context. Representatives
are expected to defend the interests of their
constituents and to promote the common good; if they
instead prioritize their own advancement, they may be
seen to be violating the principles of representative
democracy. Furthermore, the importance of including
a cross-section of society is clear if the symbolic and
deliberative elements of representation are to be performed
effectively. Lived experience of common concerns,
authenticity, and empathy for the needs of others
are all qualities that would serve a representative very
well. However, these traditionally feminine qualities
have been undervalued in assessing the fitness of individuals
to represent others. Concepts of candidate
merit need to be degendered, such that politicians—
both current and prospective—are evaluated on the
skills actually needed to represent others, rather than
on (gendered) societal expectations.
For example, when selecting election candidates, parties
might favor someone who can participate regularly
in campaigning activities and look unfavorably on a
candidate who already has multiple demands on his or
her time. Because women are more frequently charged
with domestic responsibilities, including caring for children
and elderly relatives, they may (be perceived to)
have less availability for political campaigning. However,
another way of viewing the same situation is that
women in this position show skill in managing time
and juggling competing priorities. Their desire to engage
in politics despite other demands on their time
could be viewed as evidence of their commitment and
motivation.
Similarly, a man involved in corporate networks
might be viewed more positively than a woman involved
in childcare networks. Yet the woman might
have been resourceful and adept in finding creative
solutions to complex caring arrangements, as well as
in working collaboratively with others and harmonizing
many different schedules. These are not negligible
qualities from a political perspective, and they are also
skills that reflect the daily reality of many parents.
Thus, a female candidate in this situation might be
more closely attuned to the policy needs and personal
experiences of many citizens—arguably, qualities that
would benefit any policy maker. Yet such skills tend to
be overlooked by selectorates in favor of more “traditional,”
prestigious demonstrations of competence, as
evidenced by the types of candidate selected and prior
research on candidate selection preferences (Krook
2006; Niven 1998; Norris and Lovenduski 1995).
Clearly, much more research is required into what
constitutes “merit” and which qualities would best enable
representatives to perform their function at the
individual and collective level. The absence of fully
reconceptualized criteria for determining the quality
of legislators does not mean that it is too early to be
talking about quotas for men. The process of redefining
politics is iterative; quotas for men help stimulate
debate on how best to achieve a meritocracy, which in
turn will assist the process of refining our concepts of
merit.
IMPROVING MEN’S SUBSTANTIVE AND
SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION
In addition to encouraging greater scrutiny of male
politicians and providing an impetus for rethinking
candidate selection criteria, a third benefit of reframing
gender quotas is to advance a neglected area of
representation, namely the substantive and symbolic
representation of men. Prior debate has focused almost
exclusively on women, with research considering
linkages between the descriptive, substantive, and
symbolic representation of women. The three types of
representation are usually considered mutually reinforcing,
although it is acknowledged that descriptive
representation may not be sufficient to ensure substantive
or symbolic representation, especially where
male-dominated political cultures remain entrenched
(Crowley 2004; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012;
Hawkesworth 2003). One of the central arguments supporting
quotas for women is therefore that they might
facilitate (even if they cannot guarantee) an increase in
the substantive representation of women. Women have
recognized interests, although their definition is widely
contested (Diamond and Hartsock 1981; Dovi 2002;
Sapiro 1981). Male legislators can serve as critical actors
for women (Childs and Krook 2009), but the presence
of women is also necessary to ensure that women’s
perspectives are fully articulated and defended, especially
on issues that remain uncrystallized (Mansbridge
1999).
In contrast, the substantive representation of men attracts
little public or scholarly attention. Because men
are the dominant group, it is taken as a given that their
interests will be understood and defended adequately
by legislators. Men’s descriptive overrepresentation
has triggered complacency concerning their substantive
and symbolic representation. Men’s interests have
not been subjected to the same intense scrutiny and debate
and are less clearly defined. Yet, just as “women’s
interests” are heterogeneous, men also have diverse,
gender-specific interests that may not always be represented
adequately by a male-dominated legislature.
Bacchi (1996) and Collinson and Hearn (2005) caution
528
American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3
that men should not be viewed as a homogeneous category
and that important differentiations among men
should not be overlooked. In one of the few studies to
focus explicitly on men’s interests, Pease (2002) makes
the case that, as with women, men’s interests are not
universal and are not always best served by patriarchy
or the status quo. Dovi (2007, 35) recognizes that descriptive
representatives of historically disadvantaged
groups may overlook the interests of certain subgroups;
the same may be true for subgroups of historically advantaged
groups. More attention therefore needs to be
paid to the diversity of male interests, recognizing that
not all of these interests will be served by the status
quo.
Similarly, although men may not feel excluded as
a category from democratic institutions, subgroups
of men may remain symbolically underrepresented.
LeBlanc (2009) highlights how many Japanese men
are unable to access politics despite the heavy male
domination of politics in Japan. LeBlanc argues that
gendered expectations constrain not only women but
also men, resulting in obligatory performances of masculinity
that serve to exclude most men. More generally,
the exclusion from politics of many men who do
not conform to the gendered, racial, and class norms of
most legislatures may explain why dissatisfaction with
democratic institutions is prevalent among men as well
as women (Anderson and Guillory 1997).
Predominantly male legislatures can create environments
that engender a particular kind of masculinity
based on aggression, confidence, virility, and power
(Grey 2002). Testosterone-fuelled debates on the floor
may be combined with raucous jeers, shouting down
opponents, and trading insults, plus an emphasis on
masculine pursuits in more informal arenas, such as
smoking rooms and a culture of heavy drinking (Htun
2005). Research on masculinities and organizational
culture indicates that male-dominated environments
can be intimidating for men as well as women, with
men compelled to perform a certain type of masculinity
in order to conform to the dominant culture, even
when this does not come naturally (Collinson 1988;
Collinson and Hearn 2005; Kanter 1977). Increasing
the presence of women may help improve the behavior
of male legislators and foster a working environment
that is more respectful.5
Women may have more scope
than men to disrupt and transform traditional patterns
of masculinity within politics.
LeBlanc claims that “if men, because they are men,
find it difficult to practice certain kinds of important
politics, then a political world in which few women participate
is gravely distorted—not only because women’s
voices are missing but also because gender expectations
repress men’s ability to speak for the full diversity of
political needs men have” (2009, 43, emphasis in original).
Curbing the numbers of men might therefore produce
a more pleasant and productive legislative culture
for both sexes.
5 Author’s interviews with members of the French National Assembly,
Paris, January–June 2011.
Correcting an overly masculinized culture may also
enhance the substantive representation of men’s interests.
All policy areas are potentially gendered (Daly
2005; Walby 2005), and men’s interests are already embedded
within policy processes and outcomes. However,
there are policy areas where men have distinctly
gendered interests that require policy intervention.
These include health care, where men’s needs differ
considerably from women; education, where attainment
by boys has fallen behind girls in many subjects
and countries; and paternity, where men have particular
interests as fathers. Essentialist views on what men
want andneedmaythriveunchallenged, evenwhenthis
is to the detriment of some men (Kenny 2011; Messner
and Solomon 2007). This is particularly the case when
men have needs that contradict the dominant model of
masculinity.
If the culture becomes more inclusive and the requirement
to perform masculinity is removed, the legislative
space is then more open to discussion of sensitive
issues that might otherwise create embarrassment
for men. For example, an aggressively masculine legislature
might ridicule a man seeking to discuss the needs
of fathers who wish to be primary or equal caregivers
for their children. Consequently, important policies facilitating
the role of fathers, such as paternity leave,
flexible working conditions, and career breaks, might
be sidelined in favor of focusing on the needs of mothers.
Failure to pay sufficient attention to such issues
can be detrimental to all of society. Policies obliging
women to be the primary caregivers result in heavier
caring burdens and damaged careers, while fathers and
children are deprived of time together unless fathers
exit the labor market.
In another example, mental health problems are frequently
perceived as taboo, and an overly masculinized
political culture might struggle to discuss the emotional
needs of men. Yet we know that these needs are very
real: Men are four times more likely than women to
commit suicide, in part due to difficulty with discussing
problems and admitting when they need help (Murphy
1998). Providing counseling and support for men and
training public servants such as teachers, health care
professionals, and social workers to encourage males
to express emotions are all fundamental to improving
men’s health. Cultural taboos preventing the frank
discussion of such issues might more easily be shattered
within a more gender-balanced legislature. Indeed,
women might even become critical actors for men
on such issues. Men have benefited from substantive
representation by women on potentially embarrassing
issues such as testicular cancer (May 2004). Men may
therefore have an “enlightened self-interest” in supporting
quotas for men (Pease 2002, 166).
Although a better gender balance may be necessary
to enhance the substantive representation of men, ingrained
structural gender inequality and power imbalances
are difficult to overturn even as women’s
numbers increase (Bauer and Britton 2006; Childs and
Krook 2008). An advantage of reframing gender quotas
as quotas for men is that this challenges existing
norms, which in turn can help degender institutions.
529
Quotas for Men August 2014
CONCLUSION
This article argues for a new way of approaching gender
quotas. Reconceptualizing them as quotas for men
alters the parameters of the debate on quotas: The
frames of reference shift from the problem of female
underrepresentation to that of male overrepresentation.
Although both problems exist in perfect tandem
and are equally important, the former is privileged in
debates on quotas at the expense of the latter. An
undesirable consequence of placing the emphasis on
women is that women are framed as the “other” or the
“outsider group” against a dominant male norm. As
a result, pressure is placed on women to justify their
presence in politics through questioning women’s qualifications,
attributes, and fitness to govern. Women may
find themselves expected to provide “added value” and
risk being perceived as inferior candidates who were
selected only on the basis of sex rather than merit.
However, the hurdles currently facing women candidates
mean that the reverse is actually true: Men are
the beneficiaries of preferential sex selection, whereas
women have to be exceptional to overcome social,
structural, and political barriers to office.
Quotas for men offer three major benefits. The first
is that shifting the focus from a minimum presence of
women to a maximum presence of men also shifts the
burden of proving competence from women to men.
Previously, the myth of meritocracy has allowed men to
benefit from a presumption of competence, with their
qualifications for office largely evading scrutiny. The
long-term male domination of politics also means that
both men and women are held to standards based on
male norms. Quotas for men challenge the notion that
the constant overrepresentation of men is the product
of meritocracy, and reduce the stigma of being a “quota
woman.”
The main purpose of quotas for men is to increase
the quality of representation for everybody. This would
be achieved by controlling the numbers of politicians
drawn from oversubscribed subsets of the population
and expanding the talent pool to ensure that the full
range of talent is utilized. Opening up political recruitment
into a fully competitive process would promote
a truer meritocracy and a more thriving democracy.
However, achieving this goal would require a means
for judging merit. It is highly questionable whether the
criteria by which we currently evaluate politicians are
the optimal measures for identifying the best possible
representatives. Updating these criteria to reflect
the needs of contemporary representative democracy
would potentially transform our understanding of what
it means to represent. Reducing the emphasis on traditional
privilege, and refocusing it on the ability to
understand and articulate the needs of ordinary citizens,
offers the second advantage of quotas for men:
to improve the representative process for all while enabling
women to compete on more equal terms with
men.
In addition to calling for a renewed debate on the
criteria for assessing representatives, this article indicates
the need for a new research agenda exploring the
substantive representation of men. This is an important
but neglected topic of research due to the erroneous
assumption that men’s interests are fully catered for
within existing male-dominated politics. An important
step in overcoming the pernicious effects of patriarchy
is recognizing that its effects are detrimental to men as
well as women, and mobilizing both sexes to seek the
benefits that come from a more gender-equal society.
The final benefit of quotas for men is that they offer a
significant advance toward this goal.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Christopher, and Christine Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions
and Satisfaction with Democracy.” American Political
Science Review 91(1): 66–81.
Atkeson, Lonna Rae. 2003. “Not All Cues Are Created Equal: The
Conditional Impact of Female Candidates on Political Engagement.”
Journal of Politics 65(4): 1040–61.
Bacchi, Carol. 1996. The Politics of Affirmative Action. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Bacchi, Carol. 2006. “Arguing for and against Quotas: Theoretical
Issues.” In Women, Quotas and Politics, ed. Drude Dahlerup. London:
Routledge, 32–52.
Baldez, Lisa. 2004. “Elected Bodies: Gender Quota Laws for Legislative
Candidates in Mexico.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29
(May): 231–58.
Baldez, Lisa. 2006. “The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws.”
Politics & Gender 2(1): 102–09.
Bale, Tim, and Daniele Caramani. 2010. “Political Data in 2009.”
European Journal of Political Research 49 (7–8): 855–67.
Baltrunaite, Audinga, Piero Bello, Alessandra Casarico, and Paola
Profeta. 2012. “Gender Quotas and the Quality of Politicians.”
Mimeo, Bocconi University.
Bauer, Gretchen, and Hannah E. Britton, eds. 2006. Women in
African Parliaments. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Besley, Timothy, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne.
2012. “Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man.”
Mimeo, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. “Do Electoral Quotas Work after They
Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India.”
American Political Science Review 103(1): 23–35.
Bjarneg˚ard, Elin. 2013. Gender, Informal Institutions and Political
Recruitment. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Black, Jerome H., and Lynda Erickson. 2000. “Similarity, Compensation,
or Difference? A Comparison of Female and Male OfficeSeekers.”
Women & Politics 21(4): 1–38.
Campbell, Rosie, Sarah Childs, and Joni Lovenduski. 2010. “Do
Women Need Women Representatives?” British Journal of Political
Science 40(1): 171–94.
Caramani, Daniele, Kevin Deegan-Krause, and Rainbow Murray.
2011. “Political Data in 2010.” European Journal of Political Research
50 (7–8): 869–87.
Carter, David, Betty Simkins and W. Gary Simpson. 2003. “Corporate
Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value.” Financial
Review 38(1): 33–53.
Carver, Terrell. 1996. Gender Is Not a Synonym for Women. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner.
Celis, Karen. 2006. “Substantive Representation of Women: The
Representation of Women’s Interests and the Impact of Descriptive
Representation in the Belgian Parliament (1900–1979).” Journal
of Women, Politics & Policy 28(2): 85–114.
Celis, Karen, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, and Mona L. Krook.
2008. “Rethinking Women’s Substantive Representation.” Representation
44(2): 99–110.
Celis, Karen, Mona Lena Krook, and Petra Meier. 2011. “The Rise
of Gender Quota Laws: Expanding the Spectrum of Determinants
for Electoral Reform.” West European Politics 34(3): 514–30.
Childs, Sarah. 2004. New Labour’s Women MPs. New York: Rout-
ledge.
Childs, Sarah. 2006. “The House Turned Upside Down? The Difference
Labour’s Women MPs Made.” In Representing Women
530
American Political Science Review Vol. 108, No. 3
in Parliament, eds. Marian Sawer, Manon Tremblay, and Linda
Trimble. Oxford: Routledge, 152–67.
Childs, Sarah, and Mona L. Krook. 2008. “Critical Mass Theory and
Women’s Political Representation.” Political Studies 56(3): 725–
36.
Childs, Sarah, and Mona L. Krook. 2009. “Analyzing Women’s Substantive
Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical Actors.”
Government and Opposition 44(2): 125–45.
Childs, Sarah, and Paul Webb. 2012. Sex, Gender and the Conservative
Party. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Childs, Sarah, and Julie Withey. 2006. “The Substantive Representation
of Women: The Case of the Reduction of VAT on Sanitary
Products.” Parliamentary Affairs 59(1): 10–23.
Collinson, David. L. 1988. “‘Engineering Humour’: Masculinity, Joking
and Conflict in Shop-floor Relations.” Organization Studies
9(2): 181–99.
Collinson, David L., and Jeff Hearn. 2005. “Men and Masculinities in
Work, Organizations, and Management.” In Handbook of Studies
on Men and Masculinities, eds. Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn, and
Robert W. Connell. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Crowley, Jocelyn Elise. 2004. “When Tokens Matter.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 29(1): 109–36.
Curtin, Jennifer. 2008. “Comparing Pathways to Power: Women
and Political Leadership in New Zealand and Australia.” In
Public Leadership: Perspectives and Practices, eds. Paul ‘t Hurt
and John Uhr. Canberra: Australia National University Press,
265–74.
Dahlerup, Drude. 2006. “Introduction.” In Women, Quotas and Politics,
ed. Drude Dahlerup. London: Routledge, 3–31.
Dahlerup, Drude. 2007. “Electoral Gender Quotas: Between Equality
of Opportunity and Equality of Result.” Representation 43(2):
73–92.
Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. 2005. “Quotas as a ‘Fast
Track’ to Equal Representation for Women.” International Feminist
Journal of Politics 7(1): 26–48.
Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. 2010. “Judging Gender
Quotas: Predictions and Results.” Policy and Politics 38(3): 407–
25.
Daly, Mary. 2005. “Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and Practice.”
Social Politics 12(3): 433–50.
Denis, Daphnee. 2012. “Sun Rises, French Female Minister Gets
Heckled, Sun Sets.” Slate, July 19. http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_
factor/2012/07/19/cecile_duflot_and_the_floral_dress_just_
another_day_in_the_french_parliment.html. Accessed August 18,
2013.
Diamond, Irene, and Nancy Hartsock. 1981. “Beyond Interests in
Politics.” American Political Science Review 75(3): 717–21.
Dollar, David, Sandra Fisman, and Roberta Gatti. 2001. “Are
Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex? Corruption and Women in Government.”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46:
423–29.
Dovi, Suzanne. 2002. “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will
Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?” American Political Science
Review 96(4): 729–43.
Dovi, Suzanne. 2007. The Good Representative. Malden, MA: Black-
well.
Elliott, Cath. 2011. “Cameron’s ‘Calm Down, Dear’ Is a Classic Sexist
Put-down.” The Guardian, April 27.
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. 2009.
“Getting to the Top: Career Paths of Women in Latin American
Cabinets.” Political Research Quarterly 62(4): 685–99.
Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C.
Ferguson. 1959. “The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical
Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke.” American
Political Science Review 53(3): 742–56.
Falk, Erika. 2008. Women for President: Media Bias in Eight Campaigns.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, eds.
2012. The Impact of Quotas on Women’s Descriptive, Substantive,
and Symbolic Representation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2008. “Gender Quotas
and Women’s Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina.”
Politics & Gender 4(3): 393–426.
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2012. “Gender Quotas
and Political Backgrounds.” In The Impact of Quotas, eds. Susan
Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. New
York: Oxford University Press, 43–56.
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2014. “Sustaining Gendered
Practices? Power, Parties, and Elite Political Networks in
Argentina.” Comparative Political Studies 47(1): 85–110.
Galasso, Vincenzo, and Tommaso Nannicini, 2011. “Competing on
Good Politicians.” American Political Science Review 105(1): 79–
99.
Grey, Sandra. 2002. “Does Size Matter? Critical Mass and
New Zealand’s Women MPs.” Parliamentary Affairs 55(1):
19–29.
Hawkesworth, Mary. 2003. “Congressional Enactments of RaceGender:
Towards a Theory of Raced-Gendered Institutions.”
American Political Science Review 97(4): 529–50.
Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. 2010. Democracy within
Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein, and Sarah Hodgkinson. 2007. “Social
Capital and Political Participation: Understanding the Dynamics
of Young People’s Political Disengagement in Contemporary
Britain.” Social Policy and Society 6(4): 467–79.
Htun, Mala N. 2005. “Why Women, But Not Blacks or Indians,
Got Quotas in Politics in Latin America.” Paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago.
Jones, Mark. 1998. “Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election
of Women.” Comparative Political Studies 31(1): 3–21.
J´ulio, Paolo, and Jos´e Tavares. 2010. “The Good, the Bad and the
Different: Can Gender Quotas Raise the Quality of Politicians?”
Mimeo, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. Men and Women of the Corporation.
New York: Basic Books.
Karam, Azza. 1999. “Beijing +5: Women’s Political Participation.”
Paper presented at the UNDP Meeting on Women and Political
Participation, New Delhi, India.
Karp, Jeffrey A., and Susan A. Banducci. 2008. “When Politics Is
Not Just a Man’s Game: Women’s Representation and Political
Engagement.” Electoral Studies 27: 105–15.
Kenny, Michael (2011). “The Political Theory of Recognition: The
Case of the ‘White Working Class.’” British Journal of Politics and
International Relations 14(1): 19–38.
Kotakorpi, Kaisa, and Panu Poutvaara. 2011. “Pay for Politicians and
Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Public
Economics 95(7–8): 877–85.
Krook, Mona Lena. 2006. “Gender Quotas, Norms, and Politics.”
Politics & Gender 2(1): 110–18.
Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender
and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Larson, Anna. 2012. “Collective Identities, Institutions, Security, and
State Building in Afghanistan.” In The Impact of Quotas, eds.
Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo.
New York: Oxford University Press, 136–55.
Lawless, Jennifer, and Richard L. Fox. 2010. It Still Takes a Candidate:
Why Women Don’t Run for Office. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lawrence, Regina, and Melody Rose. 2010. Hillary Clinton’s Race
for the White House. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
LeBlanc, Robin. 2009. The Art of the Gut: Manhood, Power, and
Ethics in Japanese Politics. Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
Lovenduski, Joni. 2005. Feminizing Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and
Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes.’” Journal of Politics
61(3): 628–57.
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American
Political Science Review 97(4): 515–28.
May, Theresa. 2004. “Women in the House: The Continuing Challenge.”
Parliamentary Affairs 57(4): 844–51.
Messner, Michael A., and Nancy M. Solomon. 2007. “Social Justice
and Men’s Interests.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 31(2):
162–78.
Murphy, George E. 1998. “Why Women Are Less Likely than
Men to Commit Suicide.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 39(4):
165–75.
531
Quotas for Men August 2014
Murray, Rainbow, ed. 2010a. Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A
Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Murray, Rainbow. 2010b. “Second among Unequals: A Study of
Whether France’s ‘Quota Women’ Are up to the Job.” Politics &
Gender 6(1): 93–118.
Murray, Rainbow. 2010c. Parties, Gender Quotas and Candidate Selection
in France. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Niven, David. 1998. “Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape
of Bias.” Women & Politics 19 (2): 57–80.
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender,
Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Norris, Pippa, Joni Lovenduski, and Rosie Campbell. 2004. Gender
and Political Participation: The Activism Gap. London: Electoral
Commission.
O’Brien, Diana Z. 2012. “Quotas and Qualifications in Uganda.” In
The Impact of Quotas, eds. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook,
and Jennifer M. Piscopo. New York: Oxford University Press, 57–
71.
O’Toole, Therese, David Marsh, and Su Jones. 2003. “Political Literacy
Cuts Both Ways: The Politics of Non-participation among
Young People.” Political Quarterly 74(3): 349–60.
Pease, Bob. 2002. “(Re)Constructing Men’s Interests.” Men and
Masculinities 5(2): 165–77.
Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Pr¨ugl, Elisabeth. 2012. “’If Lehman Brothers Had Been Lehman
Sisters. . .’: Gender and Myth in the Aftermath of the Financial
Crisis.” International Political Sociology 6(1): 21–35.
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. 1999.
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2009. “Representation Rethought: On Trustees,
Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation
and Democracy.” American Political Science Review 103(2):
214–30.
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2010. “On Quotas and Qualifications for Office.”
In Political Representation, eds. Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, Elisabeth
Jean Wood, and Alexander Kirshner. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 236–68.
Reingold, Beth. 2006. “Women as Office Holders: Linking Descriptive
and Substantive Representation.” Paper presented at the “Political
Women and American Democracy” conference, University
of Notre Dame.
Saint-Germain, Michelle A. 1993. “Paths to Power of Women Legislators
in Costa Rica and Nicaragua.” Women’s Studies International
Forum 16(2): 119–38.
Sapiro, Virginia. 1981. “When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem
of Political Representation of Women.” American Political
Science Review 75(3): 701–16.
Saward, Michael. 2010. The Representative Claim. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie. 2010. Political Power and Women’s Representation
in Latin America. New York: Oxford University
Press.
S´enac-Slawinski, R´ejane. 2010. “De la parit´e `a la diversit´e : entre
Deuxi`eme sexe et discrimination seconde.” Modern and Contemporary
France 18 (4): 431–44.
Stevens, Anne. 2012. “Comparing and Assessing Gender Effects
in Political Leadership.” In Comparative Political Leadership, ed.
Ludger Helms. Basingstoke: Palgrave 207–26.
Sung, Hung-En. 2003. “Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and
Corruption Revisited.” Social Forces 82(2): 703–23.
Swamy, Anand, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, and Omas Azfar. 2001.
“Gender and Corruption.” Journal of Developmental Economics
64(1): 25–55.
Swers, Michele L. 1998. “Are Women More Likely to Vote for
Women’s Issue Bills than Their Male Counterparts?” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 23(3): 435–48.
Swers, Michele L. 2005. “Connecting Descriptive and Substantive
Representation: An Analysis of Sex Differences in
Co-sponsorship Activity.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(3):
407–33.
Taylor, Bron R. 1991. Affirmative Action at Work. Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press.
Teigen, Mari. 2000. “The Affirmative Action Controversy.” NORA—
Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies 8(2): 63–77.
Tinker, Irene. 2004. “Quotas for Women in Elected Legislatures: Do
They Really Empower Women?” Women’s Studies International
Forum 27: 531–46.
Tripp, Aili Mari, and Alice Kang. 2008. “The Global Impact of Quotas:
On the Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation.”
Comparative Political Studies 41(3): 338–61.
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2010. Global Education Digest
2010: Comparing Education Statistics Across the World. http://
www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/GED_2010_EN.pdf.
Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1997.
“Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement.”
Journal of Politics 59(4): 1051–72.
Verge, Tania. 2011. “Quotas’ Effects on Political Recruitment, Candidates’
Profiles, and Routes to Political Office.” Paper presented
at the European Conference on Gender and Politics, Budapest,
Hungary.
Walby, Sylvia. 2005. “Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions
in Theory and Practice.” Social Politics 12(3): 321–43.
Walsh, Denise. 2012. “Party Centralization and Debate Conditions
in South Africa.” In The Impact of Quotas, eds. Susan Franceschet,
Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. New York: Oxford
University Press, 119–35.
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Zetterberg, Par. 2008. “The Downside of Gender Quotas? Institutional
Constraints on Women in Mexican State Legislatures.”
Parliamentary Affairs 61(3): 442–60.
Zimmer, Lynn. 1988. “Tokenism and Women in the Workplace:
The Limits of Gender-Neutral Theory.” Social Problems 35(1):
64–77.
532