Comparative Political Studies

Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe
MARCUS A. G. HARPER

The online version of this article can be found at:

Published by:
$SAGE

http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for *Comparative Political Studies* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://cps.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations: http://cps.sagepub.com/content/33/9/1191.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Nov 1, 2000

What is This?

This study tests the hypothesis that the replacement of incumbent promarket, prodemocracy governments with ex-communist parties in postcommunist East European elections was a function of the economic calculus of frustrated citizens at the ballot box. Using data from the Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer studies, this investigation adopts an individual-level approach to examine the degree to which economic assessments and unemployment influenced both proreform incumbent and ex-communist party voting intentions in Lithuania (1992), Hungary (1994), and Bulgaria (1994). The dominant impression that emerges from the logistic regression estimations predicting voting intentions is that despite strong expectations to the contrary, economic factors had at best a modest effect on party choice in these nations. These findings corroborate country-specific studies of electoral behavior in Eastern Europe that observe that the return to parliamentary power of ex-communist parties in these societies was not simply a function of economic voting.

ECONOMIC VOTING IN POSTCOMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE

MARCUS A. G. HARPER
University of California, Irvine

Between 1992 and 1994, a puzzling phenomenon manifested itself in four newly democratized states of Eastern Europe: Soviet-era communist parties—now reformed and renamed—achieved parliamentary victories in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In less than 5 years of democratic government, the citizens of these countries had become largely disillu-

sioned with the myriad parties that had arisen in opposition to communism.[1] The relatively peaceful transitions in Eastern Europe permitted the formerly monolithic communist parties to continue playing significant roles in many of these new political regimes. Following internal restructuring, these ex-communist parties, with their established material, networking, and organizational resources, presented themselves as credible democratic alternatives to the major opposition parties associated with the transition to democracy and free-market capitalism. In Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, ex-communist parties acquired sufficient votes to obtain manufactured parliamentary majorities,[2] whereas in Poland, the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) formed a coalition with two other parties to capture nearly three quarters of the seats in the Polish *Sejm*.

The behavior of voters in these four countries might be interpreted as a manifestation of nostalgia for the securities associated with the communist past: a time when street crime, unemployment, and unaffordable housing were practically nonexistent. Yet it would be misguided to suppose that electoral support for ex-communist parties signaled a desire for the return of the communist political regime. As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) explain,

> The reform Communist coalitions accepted the democratic rules of the game in how they contested the election and later in how they ruled. Also, very importantly, they were accepted as legitimate actors and rulers by the parties they defeated. In this sense there was not a *regime change* away from democracy as political scientists normally use the term. Strictly speaking, in comparative terms, the Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian elections represented a peaceful democratic alternation of power. (p. 454)[3]

The ex-communist parties of Eastern Europe have not typically promoted ideologically Communist Party platforms. Most, in fact, tend to be prodemocracy. Furthermore, among the ex-communist party elite, many

---

1. Richard Rose (1995, pp. 6-7), employing survey data from the *New Democracies Barometer III* (conducted from late November 1993 to April 1994, presents evidence substantiating the prevalence of distrust in political parties among citizens of six postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe.

2. Arend Lijphart (1994) defines a manufactured parliamentary majority as "the tendency of the electoral system to manufacture a parliamentary majority for parties that have not received majority support from the voters" (p. 57).

3. Linz and Stepan (1996), in their concluding section titled "Democracy and the Return to Communism" (pp. 454-456), fail to recognize or discuss the 1994 electoral victory of the ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party. Nonetheless, the Bulgarian election of 1994 can be accurately integrated into Linz and Stepan's assessment of the Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian elections.

have the distinction of being associated with the soft-line *nomenklatura* of the communist regime who supported liberalization policies in the late 1980s. Following electoral failures in the first postcommunist free elections,[4] many ex-communist parties have been largely successful at transforming their images. Rose (1995) explains that these parties have learned "they need to lean over backwards to pay tribute to freedom in order to reassure voters that they truly have changed their practices. Concurrently, they can emphasize continuing priority for social welfare rather than market values" (p. 12).

Following the initial democratic elections in Eastern Europe, the victorious fledgling promarket/prodemocracy parties soon discovered that the negative consequences of engaging in simultaneous economic and political restructuring could potentially prove detrimental to their bases of electoral support. Reduced standards of living and the growth of organized crime, coupled with unfulfilled expectations, resulted in the swift retreat of once-optimistic citizens from political engagement to address social and economic concerns closer to home. This withdrawal is evidenced by the precipitous decline in turnout rates for national elections across much of Eastern Europe following the founding democratic elections. Of those who remained politically involved, many opted to seek parties that promised social and financial securities or at least some way of reducing the considerable feelings of anomie experienced following the breakdown of the communist regimes. The ex-communist parties, sporting a kinder, gentler new look, welcomed these voters with open arms.

An informed explanation for the return to power of ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe may find its source in a behavior frequently observed in Western democratic elections: economic voting. Simply stated, theories of economic voting contend that the success or failure of an incumbent party is directly related to changes (real or perceived) in economic conditions prior to elections. Incumbent parties are rewarded with more votes when economic conditions have improved (or are expected to improve), whereas they are punished with fewer votes when economic conditions have deteriorated (or are expected to deteriorate). Using theories of economic voting developed in advanced democracies, the present study tests the hypothesis that the replacement of incumbent promarket/prodemocracy governments with ex-communist parties in postcommunist Eastern European elections was a function of the economic calculus of frustrated citizens at the ballot box.

---

4. The success of Bulgaria's ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in the 1990 Grand National Assembly election represents an exceptional case explained later in this article. The BSP lost political control the following year with the first regular National Assembly election.

VOTING BEHAVIOR IN
POSTCOMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE

The economic crises of the 1980s that helped bring about the downfall of the state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, coupled with the necessity after 1989 to engage simultaneously in both radical political and economic reform, generated concern among Western scholars about the sources and depth of legitimacy on which these new democratic regimes could rely. The rapid achievement of efficiency in the economic arena was recommended as a goal of primary importance because the negative consequences of market reform (unemployment, inflation, reduced standards of living), if neglected for too long, were perceived as real threats to the stability of these fledgling regimes. Concerns about the potential for a popular backlash against democracy, resulting from unfulfilled material expectations and deteriorating living conditions, were widespread.[5] Some went so far as to contend that "*perestroika* (economic and social reform) *must precede glasnost* (political freedom)," arguing "that *perestroika* is more possible without the latter, in impoverished lands" (Lipset, 1994, p. 17; see also Przeworski, 1991).

Nevertheless, despite a broad array of reform strategies—whether through "shock therapy" or gradual (and often impeded) reform—and varying degrees and periods of economic hardship across the region, despite the fact that perestroika did not precede glasnost, and finally, despite the fact that communist successor parties and personnel were (democratically) returned to power (or never left) in several of these countries, every former Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe continues to be a democracy 10 years after the collapse of the communist regimes. How, then, can we interpret and explain the return to power of the ex-communist parties through democratic elections in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria? Although some scholars have attributed the revival of the communist successor parties to factors such as legal thresholds (Moraski & Loewenberg, 1999) or previous regime types (Ishiyama, 1997), they do not explain electoral support for these parties among the mass publics of Eastern Europe.

In 1990, Ralf Dahrendorf foresaw the potential for the return of the reformed communist parties:

> I suspect that . . . in East Central Europe . . . the pendulum of normal politics will have to swing once in the liberal and once in the social direction before you feel that you have made it. The liberal direction . . . involves the jump start of

---

5. See, for example, Kornai (1992, p. 569), Zloch-Christy (1994), Åslund (1995), and Balcerowicz (1995).

economies. . . . Opposition to this process is bound to arise, and it will be about the social cost of economic growth. (pp. 71-72)

Although Dahrendorf's prediction did not manifest itself across the board in Eastern Europe, it certainly seems to fit well with the pattern observed in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Implicitly or explicitly, numerous scholars of postcommunist East European politics and political economy have interpreted the resurgence of the communist successor parties as the result—at least in part—of the economic frustrations of the electorate.[6] Among them, Krzysztof Jasiewicz (1998) notes,

> The hardships of the transition (which often reached the point of absolute pauperisation), whether caused by the ultimately successful "shock therapy" (as in Poland), or by a "shock without therapy" (as in Lithuania or Bulgaria), caused widespread popular dissatisfaction and gave a competitive advantage to political actors promising quick and easy solutions. The former communists were as eager as anyone else to make such promises. (p. 186)

Despite considerable speculation about the influence of economic conditions on the return to power of ex-communists in Eastern Europe, little empirical evidence has been assembled to support such assumptions.

The academic literature regarding postcommunist Eastern Europe is virtually devoid of systematic, comparative studies of voting behavior in general. The reasons, however, are numerous and clear. For example, considerable electoral volatility and the continuous emergence, demise, merging, and splitting of political parties and electoral unions have contributed to a situation in which the study of voting behavior in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, particularly from a comparative perspective, is difficult and complex. Furthermore, reliable and comparable cross-national data from the region (whether survey, economic, or electoral) are limited and often difficult to acquire. The result has been the publication of several country-specific studies of postcommunist East European elections.[7]

An exception, however, is Alexander Pacek's (1994) empirical cross-national study of electoral behavior in postcommunist Eastern Europe. Pacek examines the effects of economic adversity on electoral turnout and election outcomes in elections held from 1990 to 1992 in Bulgaria, the Czech and Slo-

---

6. The list is probably much longer, but, for example, see Brown (1994), Król (1994), Tworzecki (1994), Crampton (1995), Fitzmaurice (1995), Turnock (1997), and Blazyca (1998).

7. See, among others, Kitschelt, Dimitrov, and Kanev (1995) on the 1991 Bulgarian National Assembly Election; Wade, Groth, and Lavelle (1994) on the 1991 Polish Sejm election; Wade, Lavelle, and Groth (1995) on the 1993 Polish Sejm election.

vak Federated Republic, and Poland. Using aggregate district-level data, Pacek's multivariate analyses for each election reveal that unemployment rates were negatively related to incumbent party vote shares and positively associated with vote shares for the normal and extremist (left or right wing) opposition parties (Pacek, 1994, pp. 734-738). Pacek's examination of economic voting in East Central Europe is laudable, yet it also demonstrates the need for further research on the topic. His sole indicator for economic decline is change in unemployment rates. Although Pacek's analyses demonstrate strong relationships between party vote shares and this variable, the various forms of economic voting (prospective/retrospective; pocketbook/sociotropic) cannot be analyzed with Pacek's aggregate district-level data. Furthermore, although Pacek is able to account for election outcomes, his research does not address individual vote choice. The next logical step in evaluating economic voting in postcommunist Eastern Europe is to analyze how individual-level factors affect vote choice from a cross-national perspective.

Examinations of Polish elections have found some evidence for economic voting patterns, but such findings have tended to become qualified by the inclusion of relevant contextual factors. Examining Polish voting patterns in the 1991 Sejm election, Wade, Groth, and Lavelle (1994) revealed that district-level unemployment and the varied presence of the Catholic Church by district were the most important influences on party vote shares, with higher district unemployment rates tending to increase left-party vote shares. In a follow-up study analyzing the 1993 Polish election (through which the ex-communist SLD was returned to parliamentary power), the same authors find that district unemployment is no longer a statistically significant predictor of party vote shares. Furthermore, only one economic variable (district-level prices) had a significant impact on vote shares. The most compelling explanation for party vote share variation by district in the 1993 election was region: "modern, northern and western Poland [was] more receptive to the blandishments of the left, and traditionalist, southern and eastern Poland [was] relatively more resistant to them" (Wade, Lavelle, & Groth, 1995, p. 424).

Even more compelling, however, are the findings in Powers and Cox's (1997) study of voting behavior in the 1993 Polish election. Employing an individual-level analysis of a national random-sample survey of the Polish population immediately following the 1993 Sejm election, the authors find that although changes in living situations are significant predictors of vote choice, these effects are greatly attenuated (to the point of insignificance) when filtered through individual attributions of blame for the decline in living standards. Thus, the SLD is shown to have received greater electoral support from those who blamed their low standards of living on the first wave of

reformers, whereas to a lesser extent, the incumbent Democratic Union drew support from those who attributed blame for Poland's poverty to 45 years of Communist rule. This unique finding leads Powers and Cox to conclude that

> satisfaction with economic reforms has some influence on voting, but its effect is not as large as one might expect, given the prominence of market reforms and privatization. The greatly attenuated economic effects and the fact that, for many Poles, noneconomic issues are of paramount importance, suggest that *the ascendancy of post-communist parties is not so easily explained by economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents* [italics added]. (pp. 627-628)

Existing studies of individual vote choice and election outcomes in postcommunist democracies have thus tended to reveal that evaluations of the economy had some influence on the return to power of the communist successor parties. Simple economic considerations, however, have proved to be poor predictors of vote choice and election outcomes when other relevant factors are considered—especially regional variations (Wade et al., 1995) and blame attribution (Powers & Cox, 1997). However, it should be apparent to the reader by this point that Poland has received a disproportionate share of attention in these studies. This study is an attempt to begin rectifying the paucity of comparative individual-level analyses of voting behavior in the postcommunist democracies of Eastern Europe.

ECONOMIC VOTING

Researchers studying advanced industrial democracies have attempted to demonstrate that changes in economic conditions under a given government affect an individual's decision whether to vote for the ruling party again at election time. Considerable evidence has been assembled confirming the presence of economic voting among Western electorates, yet the manner in which economics affects voters remains unresolved (e.g., see Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, & Lafay, 1991). There are two general approaches to the study of economic voting: The researcher must distinguish whether the goal is to account for election outcomes (by using aggregate-level economic and election data) or to explain individual party choice (by using individual-level survey data). The present study focuses on the latter. In general, contending approaches to the study of economic voting at the individual party choice level attempt to demonstrate (a) whether individuals are pocketbook or sociotropic voters and/or (b) whether individuals vote retrospectively or prospectively.

Pocketbook voting is the notion that voting is influenced by individuals' assessments of their personal (household) financial situations. If an individual feels that his or her personal financial situation worsened under a given government, he or she will be less likely to vote for the ruling party in the next election. On the other hand, if an individual perceives that her personal financial situation improved, then she is more likely to reward the incumbent government by voting for that party in the next election. Support for the pocketbook voting thesis is demonstrated by, among others, Kiewiet (1983, chap. 4) and Markus (1988).

Sociotropic voting implies that citizens take into account larger national economic conditions when determining for which party to vote. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) argue that voters develop not wholly sophisticated impressions of the state of the economy, "and then credit or blame the incumbent accordingly" (p. 132). Sociotropic voting, then, is not necessarily some sort of altruistic calculus of the individual voter looking out for the economic needs of the entire country but instead may be based on the notion that a better national economy benefits the individual.[8] Lewis-Beck (1988), Kiewiet (1983, chap. 6), and Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) are among those who have illustrated sociotropic voting effects in their research.

In addition to the pocketbook/sociotropic influences on voting, there is also the issue of whether individuals vote based on evaluations of the past or expectations for the future. Retrospective voting implies that "votes are cast on the basis of economic performance, rather than economic policy proposals" (Lewis-Beck, 1988, p. 40). Using retrospective evaluations as the basis for studying economic voting has, until recently, been the norm. However, building on Kramer's (1971) challenge to the retrospective model, numerous scholars have examined how economic expectations for the future affect voting behavior. Although these models of prospective voting might give the average citizen more credit than is due, evidence has been assembled to show that individuals' assessments of future economic prospects influence to some degree their decision to vote for or against an incumbent party (e.g., see Kuklinski & West, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988).

Analyses of economic voting are further complicated when there is no clear-cut incumbent. Unlike presidential elections or legislative elections in two-party systems, elections in the postcommunist democracies of Eastern Europe most often involve ruling coalitions where no single party is incumbent at election time. Fortunately, this poses no new dilemma to the scholar of Western European parliamentary elections. Helmut Norpoth (1996) explains

---

8. Elsewhere, Kiewiet (1983, p. 131) is rather agnostic about the motivations behind sociotropic voting.

that in situations complicated by coalition governments and divided oppositions, voters still engage in economic voting "by keying on the major party in office" (p. 317).

The present analysis of individual vote choice in Eastern European democracies examines the effects of retrospective and prospective pocket-book and sociotropic assessments on the electoral victories of communist successor parties.[9] The application of economic voting models to fledgling democracies, such as those considered here, expands the empirical base and understanding of a behavior presumed to be universal throughout the democracies of the world. For example, concluding a review of the economic voting literature, Norpoth (1996) explains that "there are signs that the inclination to [engage in economic voting] is hard-wired into the brain of citizens in democracies" (p. 317). The economic voting model seems particularly appropriate for Eastern Europe, where economic considerations have substantial potential to affect individual vote choice. In Eastern Europe, strong party identification has been slow to develop, and party vote shares have shifted dramatically from one election to the next (see Cotta, 1996; Rose, 1995); thus, one might expect economic voting to be even more accentuated than in the West where there is greater partisan stability. Furthermore, the simultaneity of both political and economic transitions in these cases and the consequent economic hardships experienced universally throughout the region have produced conditions quite distinct from those experienced by the typical Western voter. Taken together, these differences make a comparative study of East European voting behavior an especially rich contribution to the economic voting literature in general.

This study proceeds by addressing two questions of concern: first, whether economic voting is evidenced through the punishment of proreform incumbents at election time in those East European countries where ex-communist parties were returned to parliamentary power and, second, to what extent economic adversity contributed to the victories of the ex-communist parties in opposition. In an attempt to answer these questions, I employ survey data from the Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer (CEEB) (Reif & Cunningham, 1993, 1994, 1995) studies. Of the four countries in which ex-communists garnered electoral victories, the CEEB surveys provide us with the relevant voting intention items for all but the 1993 Polish Sejm election. Thus, the present study examines proreform incumbent and ex-communist party opposition voting intentions for the following elections: Lithuania in 1992, Hungary in 1994, and Bulgaria in 1994. Table 1 presents the results

9. Unfortunately, due to a lack of relevant survey items in the data used for this study, the effects of sociotropic voting could be tested only in the 1992 Lithuanian election.

Table 1

Election Results: Incumbent Defeats and Ex-Communist Victories

	Vote (%)	Seat (%)
Lithuania, October/November 1992		
Sajudis	20.5	21.3
Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party	42.6	51.8
Hungary, May 1994		
Hungarian Democratic Forum	11.7	9.8
Hungarian Socialist Party	33.0	54.1
Bulgaria, December 1994		
Union of Democratic Forces	24.2	28.8
Bulgarian Socialist Party	43.5	52.1

Source: Nohlen and Kasapovic (1996).

of these three elections in terms of vote and seat percentages acquired by the ex-communist parties and the incumbent proreform parties.

Note that in each of these three elections, the proreform incumbent party was defeated by the ex-communist party in opposition.[10] Between 1996 and 1998, these same communist successor parties were replaced again by proreform parties. Given the economic hardships endured in each of these countries during this period and expectations derived from the economic voting literature, the recurrent alternation in government between incumbent and opposition parties may be of little surprise. The goal of the present analysis is to empirically verify whether the punishing of the proreform incumbents based on negative economic evaluations was a primary cause for the return to power of ex-communist parties. Derived from theories of economic voting and findings indicating that district unemployment rates have influenced postcommunist elections (Pacek, 1994; Wade et al., 1994), the following core hypotheses will be tested for the three elections in this study:

> *Hypothesis 1a (retrospective pocketbook voting):* Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals' positive retrospective pocketbook assessments.
> *Hypothesis 2a (prospective pocketbook voting):* Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals' positive prospective pocketbook assessments.

10. Throughout this article, *incumbent party* will be used to indicate either the incumbent party (or bloc) in government or the major party in an incumbent government coalition. The one exception is my treatment of the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) as the incumbent party in 1994; as will be explained later, the UDF was not actually the incumbent party at the time of the Bulgarian parliamentary election of 1994.

Hypothesis 3a (unemployment): Individuals who are unemployed at election time tend not to be inclined to vote for the incumbent party.

Hypothesis 4a (retrospective sociotropic voting): Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals' positive retrospective sociotropic assessments. (Tested in Lithuania only.)

Hypothesis 5a (prospective sociotropic voting): Intention to vote for the incumbent party is positively related to individuals' positive prospective sociotropic assessments. (Tested in Lithuania only.)

Because ex-communist parties were victorious as opposition parties in these elections, this study seeks further to examine the extent to which these parties reaped the "rewards" of economic adversity in these societies. Thus, the above core hypotheses are inverted for the ex-communist parties in opposition, as follows:

Hypothesis 1b (retrospective pocketbook voting): Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals' positive retrospective pocketbook assessments.

Hypothesis 2b (prospective pocketbook voting): Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals' positive prospective pocketbook assessments.

Hypothesis 3b (unemployment): Individuals who are unemployed at election time tend to be more inclined to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition.

Hypothesis 4b (retrospective sociotropic voting): Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals' positive retrospective sociotropic assessments. (Tested in Lithuania only.)

Hypothesis 5b (prospective sociotropic voting): Intention to vote for the ex-communist party in opposition is negatively related to individuals' positive prospective sociotropic assessments. (Tested in Lithuania only.)

DATA AND METHODS

As mentioned in the previous section, this study employs survey data from the CEEB survey series (Reif & Cunningham, 1993, 1994, 1995). In each of the CEEB surveys used in this study, respondents were asked whether they would vote ad, if so, for which party they would vote if a general election were to be held the next day. Because the present research is interested only in individual vote choice, those cases in which the respondent indicated that he or she would not vote have been coded as missing.[11] Table 2 displays the

11. Considering Pacek's (1994, p. 732) finding that district unemployment rates tended to depress voter turnout for the elections in his study, it is reasonable to expect that economic voting may take the form of abstention by those in the worst economic situations. Although the present

Table 2
Election Dates, Survey Dates, and Number of Cases

Country	Election Date	Survey Date	Total *N*: Survey	Total With Voting Intention	
				n	%
Lithuania	October 25/November 15, 1992	November 1-11, 1992	1,000	878	(87.8)
Hungary	May 15/29, 1994	November 6-14, 1993	972	627	(64.5)
Bulgaria	December 18, 1994	November 4-11, 1994	1,045	800	(76.6)

Source: Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer Studies, 1992-1994 (Reif & Cunningham, 1993, 1994, 1995).

resultant number of cases considered for each election as well as the survey and election dates.

The CEEB survey dates for Lithuania and Bulgaria correspond fairly closely with the actual election dates. The expectation, then, is that reported voting intentions in the CEEB surveys reflect as well as possible the actual votes in the elections, especially considering that these were not intended as election surveys. The Hungarian survey, unfortunately, precedes the actual election by a little more than 6 months. Nevertheless, the unavailability of other comparable surveys forces this study to rely on this less than perfect survey as an instrument for analyzing Hungarian party preferences prior to the election of 1994.

The CEEB surveys (Reif & Cunningham, 1993, 1994, 1995) variably include relevant items useful for an analysis of economic voting. In each of the three surveys employed here, the following items have been selected to examine the retrospective and prospective pocketbook voting hypotheses:

- Retrospective pocketbook: "Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has: gotten a lot better, gotten a little better, stayed the same, gotten a little worse, gotten a lot worse"?
- Prospective pocketbook: "Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will: get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse"?

---

study deals only with individuals who expressed an intention to vote, a logical next step would be to examine the financial situations/assessments of those who chose to abstain from voting. In Table 3, I provide a comparison of percentages reporting "unemployed" among those who expressed a voting intention against those who did not express a voting intention (i.e., those excluded from this study).

In terms of retrospective pocketbook assessments, an overwhelming majority of individuals in each country responded that their household financial situation had worsened during the past year (see distributions in the appendix). However, given the economic hardships endured throughout Eastern Europe during this period, these negative assessments should be of no great surprise. Looking at prospective pocketbook assessments, it is clear that these individuals tended to be less pessimistic about their future household financial prospects. There is slightly more variation from country to country here, but in no country does a majority of respondents expect its household finances to worsen over the next year.

The next item used to test the core hypotheses is reported unemployment. Respondents were asked about their present occupation and given the option to respond "unemployed" or "temporarily not working." A concern that may arise—especially in light of Pacek's (1994) finding that districts with higher levels of unemployment tended to yield lower turnout rates—is the extent to which those who expressed no voting intention (i.e., the abstainers not included in this study) were disproportionately more likely to be unemployed than those who intended to vote. In Table 3, reported unemployment percentages are presented for both the sample that expressed an intention to vote and the sample (excluded from this study) of those who expressed no voting intention.

In the Lithuanian data, there is virtually no discrepancy in reported unemployment between the voting sample and the excluded nonvoting sample. In the Hungarian and Bulgarian samples, overall reported unemployment percentages are somewhat higher, with nonvoters being more likely to be unemployed than voters. However, the differences in reported unemployment between the voting sample and the excluded nonvoting sample are not so large as to substantially reduce the representativeness of the unemployed among voters. Yet, especially in the case of Bulgaria, the reader should bear in mind that a small portion of the unemployed are not represented in this study because they expressed no voting intention.

The last items employed for testing the core hypotheses relate to sociotropic issues. The questions from the CEEB survey are as follows:

- Retrospective sociotropic: "Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the economic situation of the country has: gotten a lot better, gotten a little better, stayed the same, gotten a little worse, gotten a lot worse"?
- Prospective sociotropic: "Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the economic situation of the country will: get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse"?

Table 3
Unemployment: Voters and Nonvoters

Percentage Reporting Unemployed	Lithuania 1992	Hungary 1993	Bulgaria 1994
Among those with voting intention	7	12	12
Among those with no voting intention (excluded cases)	7	14	17

Source: Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer Studies, 1992-1994 (Reif & Cunningham, 1993, 1994, 1995).

Of the three CEEB survey years used in this study, the sociotropic items were asked only in 1992 (Reif & Cunningham, 1993). Therefore, we are only able to test for sociotropic effects among Lithuanian voters. Here again, we find that a majority of respondents felt that the economy of the country had worsened over the past year, but when looking to the future, far less pessimism was expressed. Within the Lithuanian sample, 87% of respondents felt that the economic situation of the country had worsened over the past year, whereas fewer than half felt the economic situation of the country would worsen over the next year.

The four CEEB survey items that ask respondents to evaluate household (pocketbook) or national (sociotropic) economic conditions have been coded as to allow a five-category range of responses from 2 (*a lot better*) to –2 (*a lot worse*), with 0 (*stay(ed) the same*) in the middle. Using the occupation item in each of the CEEB surveys, a dichotomous "unemployed" variable was created, where 1 indicates the respondent reported being unemployed and 0 indicates the respondent reported any other occupation response. In a similar manner, the dependent variables are measured by dichotomous party voting intention. A 1 was assigned to the party under consideration (whether "incumbent" or "ex-Communist in opposition"), and a 0 was assigned to intention to vote for any of the other parties. The units of analysis, then, are individuals surveyed in separate CEEB studies in Lithuania (1992), Hungary (1993), and Bulgaria (1994).

Other factors, besides the economic variables described above, should be expected to influence individual vote choices. These might include strength of party identification, campaigns, issues, candidate effects, regional variations, blame attribution, and contextually relevant factors as idiosyncratic as attitudes toward the involvement of the exiled tsar in postcommunist Bulgarian politics (see Kitschelt, Dimitrov, & Kanev, 1995). The CEEB studies do not generally employ survey items that measure such factors, and this study therefore cannot account for their effects. Furthermore, the present analysis attempts to arrive at generalizable conclusions: Country-specific peculiari-

ties have thus been avoided as much as possible. Important sociodemographic items, however, were readily available in the CEEB studies and have been integrated into the models examined in this study. These include education levels, sex, age, and a dummy variable for Catholic religious self-identification (for the Lithuanian and Hungarian elections only).

In addition to these control variables, I have also included two items that gauge fundamental attitudes toward the regime transitions in general. One asks respondents about levels of satisfaction with the development of democracy in their country, and the other asks how respondents feel about the creation of a free market economy. These two variables, although not generalizable in a broader context, nonetheless have the potential to substantially affect party choice across postcommunist Eastern Europe. Those who are dissatisfied with the development of democracy in their country may be inclined to vote against proreform incumbent parties in favor of extremist and/or ex-communist parties. Similarly, those who feel that the creation of a free market economy in their country is wrong might be inclined to vote for parties, such as the ex-communists, that advocate social welfare over market values. This latter variable, in effect, would reflect a type of economic voting specific to the countries under consideration, because each of these societies has experienced simultaneous political and economic transitions. The coding and distributions for these two variables and all of the variables discussed above are presented in the appendix.

Because the dependent variable—vote choice—is coded as dichotomous (0 for other party, 1 for incumbent or ex-communist party), logistic regression is used to examine the relationships of the independent variables to vote choice. Two models are estimated for each of the three elections under consideration: The first (Model A) contains only the three items used to gauge pocketbook voting, whereas the second (Model B) adds the sociodemographic variables and the two "regime transition" attitudinal variables to the first model. In addition, because sociotropic questions are available in the Lithuanian survey, a third model (Model C), which adds the retrospective and prospective sociotropic voting questions to Model B, is estimated for Lithuanian vote choice. To examine the overall goodness of fit of the models, I use a measure analogous to the R^2 measure frequently used in linear regression analyses. The logistic regression equivalent used here, referred to as R_L^2, is "*a proportional reduction in the absolute value of the log-likelihood* measure" that "indicates how much the inclusion of the independent variables reduces the badness-of-fit" of the model using only the constant with none of the independent variables in the equation (Menard, 1995, p. 22, emphasis in original). R_L^2 can range from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted in much the same way as R^2.

THE ELECTORAL CONTEXT

Before proceeding with the statistical analyses of voting behavior in Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, it will be useful first to provide a context for each of the elections considered.

Lithuania 1992. After nearly 50 years of forced integration into the Soviet Union, Lithuania was eager to take advantage of the Gorbachev era by quickly pressing for independence. Encouraged by the Solidarity movement in Poland, Vytautas Landsbergis led the establishment of the Lithuanian Reform Movement Sajudis in June 1988, with the objective of restoring national independence (Senn, 1990, p. 2). Along with the independence-minded members of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP), Sajudis was able to work toward the abolishment of single-party rule in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in December 1989. Three months later, in February 1990, semifree elections were held to elect a new Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Under the leadership of Algirdas Brazauskas, the LCP had renamed itself the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP) and competed against more hard-line communists and Sajudis for seats in the Supreme Soviet (Michta, 1994, p. 131).

As the only promarket/prodemocracy party running in the election, Sajudis won an astonishing victory with 49% of the popular vote and 74% of the seats in the Supreme Soviet. The LDDP came in second with 14% of the seats, followed by the hard-line Communist Party with 12% (Nohlen & Kasapovic, 1996, p. 53).

Lithuania's declaration of independence soon followed, but the Soviet Union was as yet unwilling to accept Baltic secession. After denouncements by Gorbachev and a failed military crackdown, Lithuanian independence was finalized with the failed coup attempt in the U.S.S.R. in August 1991 (Michta, 1994, p. 131). With Landsbergis as president and Sajudis dominating parliament, independent Lithuania quickly moved toward economic and political reform. In spite of expedient changes in the once centrally directed economy, Lithuania's former complete dependence on the Soviet Union contributed to a difficult economic transition. With gross domestic product (GDP) per capita plummeting and inflation soaring to phenomenal levels (as high as 1,700%) by the end of 1992, nearly 80% of Lithuanians were declared to be below the poverty line (Michta, 1994, p. 136). Severe economic decline paralleled a decline in the popularity of the Sajudis government and the Landsbergis presidency, and support for the ex-communist LDDP and its

leader Brazauskas began to rise. Divisions within the Sajudis government resulted in a call for new parliamentary elections to be held in October 1992.

The 1992 *Seimas* election was contested by a center-right coalition headed by Sajudis, a centrist coalition of five parties, and the leftist ex-communist LDDP. Leadership in the LDDP consisted largely of former communist officials: Brazauskas, for example, had been Lithuania's last communist party boss. Despite the history behind the leadership of the LDDP, its 1992 campaign was based on a social-democratic platform in opposition to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) recommendations for privatization and market pricing programs. Furthermore, the party clearly emphasized a break with its communist past (Michta, 1994, pp. 136-138). The election resulted in a manufactured parliamentary majority for the LDDP, with 43% of the popular vote and 52% of the seats in the *Seimas*. Lithuania thus became the first postcommunist country of Eastern Europe to return ex-communists to power following a promarket/prodemocracy government. Sajudis faired poorly in relation to its 1990 victory, winning 20.5% of the popular vote and only 21% of the seats in parliament.

Hungary 1994. As in Lithuania, the Hungarian communists took advantage of the opportunity to benefit from the widespread democratic upheaval in 1989. Having already built a reputation for liberal social and economic reforms during the Communist era, members of the Hungarian Communist Party distanced themselves from the bulk of the old party by founding the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) in October 1989 (Swain, 1993, p. 72). What was left of the Communist Party continued to promote reform communism in the form of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party. With the Communists largely discredited by 1989, the MSzP emerged as the strongest component of the old regime to take part in the transition process.

Opposition crystallized early in the transition period, with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), under the leadership of József Antall, paving the way for promarket/prodemocracy reform movements starting in 1987. By the time Hungary held its first free democratic elections in 1990, several parties had gained sufficient momentum to effectively compete for the popular vote. In addition to the MDF and the splinter parties of the old regime, two parties emerged representing pre–World War II Hungarian political configurations: the Independent Smallholder's Party (FKgP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP). Other strong competitors included the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a "champion of rapid bourgeois modernization, liberal political values, human rights and political freedoms," and the phenomenal Young Democrats (FIDESZ), which, with most members being

younger than age 30, was "probably the world's youngest parliamentary party" (Kéri & Levendel, 1995, p. 135).

Elections held in March and April 1990 to elect Hungary's first postcommunist National Assembly resulted in a victory for the MDF. The extremely complicated electoral formula employed had the effect of producing heavy overrepresentation for the largest party. Thus, although MDF garnered only 25% of the popular vote, it was rewarded with 42.5% of the seats in the National Assembly. The ex-communist MSzP took 11% of the votes, whereas FKgP took nearly 12%, KDNP took 6.5%, SZDSZ took 22%, and FIDESZ took 9% (Nohlen & Kasapovic, 1996, p. 128). With Antall at the helm, MDF formed the government in a conservative coalition with FKgP and KDNP and proceeded with market liberalization.

Although the economic reform program of the MDF coalition government resulted in increased foreign investment, Hungary nonetheless experienced the economic hardships associated with the transition to a market economy. Still, the hardships experienced in Hungary were mild compared with those experienced in numerous other former communist countries. Unemployment jumped from a low 1.9% in 1990 to 12.6% in 1993, whereas annual inflation rates varied between 20% and 35% (United Nations, 1995, p. 18). Nigel Swain (1993) explains that "despite its deserved reputation for economic and political stability, by the early 1990s there was in Hungary a potentially dangerous cocktail of increasing unemployment, decreasing social welfare and growing political acceptance of the vocabulary of extreme nationalism" (p. 82).

By the time of the 1994 National Assembly election, the incumbent MDF was suffering from internal divisions, with two groups splintering to form new parties. After its poor showing in 1990, the MSzP needed to make considerable headway to compete successfully in the 1994 election. Three ex-communist social democratic parties united under the MSzP in late 1993 to form a powerful left opposition to the Antall government (Michta, 1994, p. 60). Emphasizing continued democratization and market liberalization, the expanded MSzP appealed to the Hungarian electorate through its organizational strength and its appeal to the socially dislocated.

The 1994 election resulted in a clear victory for the MSzP, which took 33% of the popular vote. As with the 1990 election, the complex electoral formula resulted in the largest party being overrepresented in terms of seats: MSzP's success resulted in it capturing 54% of the seats in the National Assembly. MDF suffered serious setbacks, garnering only 12% of the popular vote, whereas its coalition partners FKgP and KDNP took 8.8% and 7%, respectively. In terms of seats, MDF was awarded fewer than 10% (Nohlen & Kasapovic, 1996, p. 128).

With the electoral victory of the MSzP in 1994, Hungary became the third postcommunist democracy to elect ex-communists to parliamentary power (after Lithuania and Poland). The MSzP formed a coalition with the classic liberal SZDSZ (which had garnered 20% of the popular vote) to demonstrate its commitment to reform. Gyula Horn, Hungary's last communist foreign minister, was appointed prime minister.

Bulgaria 1994. Bulgaria had a reputation for being the most conformist and reliable East European satellite of the Soviet Union. Under the leadership of communist premier Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria twice offered to sacrifice independence in favor of becoming the 16th republic of the U.S.S.R. (Pundeff, 1992, p. 105). Opposition to the communist regime was slow to develop in Bulgaria, and as a result, soft-line communist leaders were able to maintain a hold on the reins of power during the transition to democracy.

In 1989, when Zhivkov was removed from power, it was not by the direct intervention of democratic forces but rather by the same communist forces that had been working under him. The minister of foreign affairs, Petar Mladenov, replaced Zhivkov as the president of the republic and proceeded with a number of liberalization policies. In a move to attract popular support, the Bulgarian Communist Party was renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in April 1990.

Opposition arose in the form of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), established under the leadership of Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev in December 1989 as an umbrella organization to unite and coordinate the actions of the various reform parties and organizations that had sprung up since Zhivkov's ouster. The UDF and the BSP met in a series of roundtable discussions to work out negotiations for the transition to a democratic regime with a free market economy. Elections were subsequently scheduled to form a Grand National Assembly, which would have the primary responsibility of drafting a new democratic constitution. The opposition parties had little time or resources to organize a decent campaign, and the BSP was able to use its political experience to win a slight majority in Bulgaria's first postcommunist election. However, the Grand National Assembly was a special legislative body with a limited task, and with the ratification of a democratic constitution, new elections were scheduled to form Bulgaria's first postcommunist regular National Assembly (*Sobranie*).

Held in October 1991, this election proved favorable to the UDF, the primary opposition bloc. With only 46% of the seats in the *Sobranie*, the UDF was forced to form a coalition with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the party that emerged to represent Turkish minority interests in Bulgaria. The BSP, the ex-communist incumbent party, was still able to muster

considerable support, taking just greater than 1% fewer votes than the UDF. Although the UDF victory seemed to represent a firm break with the communist past, many Bulgarians still saw the BSP as the one political force capable of directing the country in this time of change.

In an uneasy coalition with the MRF after the 1991 *Sobranie* election, the UDF proceeded with market reforms and attempts to construct a democratic Bulgarian society. However, the coalition government collapsed in October 1992. By December of that year, a government of experts was formed, which was expected to function until the constitutionally scheduled election of 1995. Yet after barely surviving a vote of no confidence in May 1994, it became obvious that the government of experts would not survive much longer. The parties began preparing for an early election.

Based on recommendations by the IMF and the World Bank, the UDF coalition government had pursued an economic austerity program to move the country from state socialism to a market economy (Michta, 1994, p. 97). Bulgaria's prior dependence on the Soviet Union left the country struggling to seek out foreign investment and trade. Adherence to U.N. sanctions against Serbia proved to be a detriment to the Bulgarian economy. Unemployment reached 16% in 1993, and consumer prices inflated by nearly 340% in 1991 (United Nations, 1995, p. 18). Among the hardest hit by the economic crisis was Bulgaria's disproportionately large population of pensioners, who according to the 1992 census, made up approximately 24.5% of the total population (Gotovska-Popova, 1993, p. 46). Pension payments failed to keep up with spiraling inflation, forcing many pensioners to seek alternative sources of income. Apparent apathy among young voters (Meininger & Radoeva, 1996) and the emigration of highly educated professionals (Nikolaev, 1993) contributed to a situation in which the disproportionately large elderly segment of the Bulgarian electorate could have a significant impact on election outcomes.

Elections to form Bulgaria's second postcommunist *Sobranie* were held on December 18, 1994, a year prior to the scheduled expiration of the 1991 assembly's term. The ex-communist BSP ran its campaign on "a nostalgia for rosier times when people could rely on affordable milk, bread, and even water" (Perlez, 1994, p. 16)—referring to the emergency rationing of water in Sofia two weeks prior to the 1994 election. The BSP had made efforts to change its image to more closely resemble a social democratic party and focused public attention on its fundamental role in the establishment of a democratic society in Bulgaria (Engelbrekt, 1993, p. 37).

With more parties competing (more than 50) and fewer voters casting their ballots than in the previous two elections, the BSP won its second postcommunist majority (43.5% of votes, 52.1% of seats). The UDF fared

poorly, taking only 24% of the popular vote, whereas its former coalition partner, the MRF, dropped from 7.5% in 1991 to 5.4% in 1994 (Nohlen & Kasapovic, 1996, p. 139). Again, there is some complication in treating the UDF as the incumbent party in 1994: The UDF/MRF coalition of 1991 survived less than a year before being replaced by a government of experts. However, because the UDF led the introduction of the economic austerity program in 1992, it is plausible that the Bulgarian voters would nonetheless associate the UDF as the last elected government whose policies resulted in the economic crisis.

PREDICTING VOTING BEHAVIOR

Logistic regression results for incumbents. At this point, we can now proceed to examine the extent to which the five core hypotheses derived from theories of economic voting help explain incumbent party vote intentions in the three elections described above. Let us begin by first examining the effects of the two pocketbook voting items and unemployment alone, then continue by looking at the performance of these items when taking into account the sociodemographic variables and the regime transition attitudinal variables. Finally, the Lithuanian data are examined in a third model that incorporates the two sociotropic voting items. Again, I remind the reader that the sociotropic items were not asked of the Hungarian (in 1993) and Bulgarian (in 1994) respondents, so that Hypotheses 4 and 5 can be tested only for Lithuania (in 1992). The results of the logistic regression estimations for incumbent party vote intentions are presented in Table 4.

The columns labeled Model A in Table 4 present the unstandardized logistic regression coefficients for the two pocketbook items and unemployment alone. The pocketbook indicators perform differently in each election. With the exception of the retrospective pocketbook item in Bulgaria, each pocketbook coefficient is in the predicted positive direction; but in terms of statistical significance, there is considerable variance among the three countries. Lithuanians appear to have engaged in both retrospective and prospective pocketbook voting to some extent: Those whose personal household financial situations improved over the past year and those who expected their personal household financial situations to improve over the next year tended to be more inclined to favor the incumbent Sajudis over other parties. However, in Hungary we find that although they are in the predicted positive direction, neither of the pocketbook items is a statistically significant predictor of intentions to vote for the incumbent MDF. Finally, in the case of the Bulgarian UDF, only the prospective pocketbook item is statistically significant. The

Table 4

Logit Results for Incumbent Party Voting Intentions

Variable[a]	Sajudis (Lithuania 1992)						MDF (Hungary 1993)				UDF (Bulgaria 1994)			
	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model A		Model B		Model A		Model B	
Retrospective pocketbook	.262***	(.10)	.257**	(.10)	.142	(.11)	.262	(.22)	.066	(.24)	−.133	(.11)	−.421***	(.13)
Prospective pocketbook	.200**	(.10)	.174*	(.10)	.073	(.12)	.107	(.19)	.006	(.21)	.327***	(.10)	.281***	(.10)
Unemployed	−.597	(.42)	−.490	(.44)	−.412	(.44)	−.756	(.75)	.092	(.81)	−.215	(.33)	−.304	(.36)
Retrospective sociotropic	—		—		.264***	(.12)	—		—		—		—	
Prospective sociotropic	—		—		.150	(.11)	—		—		—		—	
Education	—		.055	(.13)	.065	(.13)	—		.286	(.20)	—		.171	(.14)
Female	—		.445**	(.19)	.439**	(.19)	—		−.145	(.42)	—		−.158	(.21)
Age	—		.014**	(.01)	.015**	(.01)	—		.040***	(.01)	—		−.005	(.01)
Catholic	—		.969***	(.25)	.860***	(.26)	—		.307	(.41)	—		—	
Free market	—		.291**	(.14)	.289**	(.14)	—		.078	(.25)	—		.543***	(.12)
Democracy satisfaction	—		.274***	(.09)	.236**	(.09)	—		.786***	(.17)	—		.421***	(.14)
Constant	−1.03***	(.11)	−3.05***	(.60)	−2.74***	(.62)	−2.60***	(.24)	−5.24***	(.98)	−1.64***	(.15)	−1.57**	(.63)
R_L^2	0.03		0.09		0.10		0.02		0.17		0.02		0.08	
n	770		770		730		582		582		719		719	

Note: MDF = Hungarian Democratic Forum. UDF = Union of Democratic Forces. Entries are unstandardized logit coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Dashes indicate items not employed for model.

a. Definition of variables: Dependent = dichotomous for incumbent party voting intention (1) and other voting intention (0). For independent, see the appendix.

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

mixed bag of results for the pocketbook items indicates that even though substantial economic hardship had been endured in each of these countries prior to the elections under consideration, it would be misguided to generalize that the three incumbent parties were all punished based on the personal economic considerations of voters. Other factors likely played a role in shaping individual voting preferences from one country to the next.

The third economic voting item in Model A is unemployment. Although the direction of the coefficients is in the predicted negative direction for all three elections—that the unemployed would be disinclined to vote for the incumbent party—the unemployment item performs poorly overall in statistical terms. Thus, Hypothesis 3a is not well supported by these findings.

Turning now to the columns labeled Model B in Table 4, the sociodemographic and regime transition attitudinal variables are added to the initial three economic voting items. The addition of these variables has little overall effect on the statistical significance of the pocketbook and unemployment coefficients. Sajudis continues to be favored by those who felt their personal household financial situations had improved over the past year or would improve over the next year (supporting Hypotheses 1a and 2a). For the MDF, the pocketbook voting items still fail tests of statistical significance. Finally, in the case of the UDF, we find an odd mixture where negative retrospective pocketbook assessments are statistically significant predictors of UDF voting intentions (contrary to Hypothesis 1a), yet positive prospective pocketbook assessments continue to be associated with UDF voting intentions (supporting Hypothesis 2a). This incongruity for the case of the UDF may find its explanation in the fact that there was no real incumbent party at the time of the Bulgarian election of 1994: Those who felt their pocketbooks had fared well over the previous year would not be expected to attribute their good fortune to a UDF government, whereas those who expected their household financial situations to improve over the next year may certainly have believed that the greatest assurance of that prosperity would result from the program of the UDF. The unemployed dummy variable is not statistically significant in any of the Model B estimations.

The control variables introduced in Model B produce predictably mixed results. Education is not a statistically significant predictor of incumbent party voting intention in any of the three countries, whereas age is statistically significant in each case except for the Bulgarian UDF. Gender and religion are shown to be significant determinants of party preference only in Lithuania, with females and Catholics tending to favor the incumbent Sajudis.

Most interesting, however, is the performance of the two regime transition attitudinal variables. With the exception of the MDF model, favorable atti-

tudes toward the free market have a statistically significant impact on incumbent party vote intentions. The coefficients are positive for the three incumbent parties (although, again, not statistically significant in the case of the MDF), all of which are promarket parties that had arisen to challenge the pre-1989 state socialist order. In a sense, the fact that those who feel the creation of a market economy is "right" would be inclined to vote for these parties reflects a type of sociotropic economic voting. Although the national economy is not assessed in terms of its performance, the conviction among these voters that a market economy is—or will be—good for their country and that promarket forces should therefore remain in power certainly reflects a sociotropic orientation toward party preferences. The situation is similar in terms of satisfaction with the development of democracy. Sajudis, the MDF, and the UDF could all draw on the support of those who are satisfied with the development of democracy in their country, whereas the dissatisfied were disinclined to vote for these parties. In each country, the democracy satisfaction variable is statistically significant. Although attitudes toward the creation of a market economy reflect an economic sociotropic orientation, attitudes reflecting levels of satisfaction with the development of democracy provide us with a measure of political sociotropic orientations. That is, one's interpretation of the unfolding of political developments since the transition provides a yardstick by which to measure the performance of the political parties in power.

In Model C for Lithuania, the inclusion of the two sociotropic variables has little impact on the effects of the sociodemographic and regime transition attitudinal variables. However, of the five economic voting items, only the retrospective sociotropic variable is statistically significant and in the predicted direction. That is, those who felt that the economy of the country had gotten better over the previous year were inclined to support the incumbent Sajudis (supporting Hypothesis 4a). As is typical of studies of economic voting, the sociotropic items, when included, tend to outperform the pocketbook items. In this case, both pocketbook coefficients are reduced to statistical insignificance in Model C, whereas unemployment and the prospective sociotropic measure, although in the predicted direction, are also not statistically significant.

Overall, how well do these models predicting incumbent party voting intentions perform? To what extent can we argue that these three incumbent parties, all of which lost the elections under consideration, were punished as a result of the economic calculus of the electorate? If we look at the goodness of fit of the models as measured by R_L^2, it is apparent that in no election do these models have a high degree of explanatory power. The R_L^2 for Model A in each of the three estimations is so small (ranging from .02 to .03) that one

could confidently contend that the pocketbook assessment and unemployment variables considered here had virtually no effect on incumbent party voting intentions. And although the inclusion of the sociodemographic variables and the compelling regime transition attitudinal variables in Model B invariably results in an increased goodness of fit, the models still do not explain a great deal of the variance in incumbent party voting intentions. Model B is strongest for predicting incumbent party voting intentions in Hungary ($R_L^2 = .17$), but with none of the three economic voting items producing statistical significance, it is abundantly clear that these variables are not driving the model. In Model C for Lithuania, the inclusion of retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic assessments results in very little overall increase in the goodness of fit: Whereas Model B for Lithuania produced an R_L^2 of .09, the R_L^2 for Model C is only .10. The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that although economic assessments may be statistically significant predictors of incumbent party vote choice, they do not function in the same manner across cases or appear to have a great deal of substantive significance in any case.

Logistic regression results for ex-communists in opposition. Our focus now shifts to vote determinants for ex-communist parties in opposition. It should be noted again that each of these parties was awarded a manufactured majority in their respective parliaments following the elections considered here. After the poor showing of the logistic models estimated for incumbent party voting intentions, we now examine the extent to which ex-communist parties in opposition reaped the alleged rewards of economic adversity in these countries. As stated earlier, the initial core hypotheses employed for the incumbent parties are inverted for the ex-communist parties in opposition.

Again, I first examine the effects of the pocketbook voting and unemployment items alone, then continue by evaluating the performance of these items when taking into account the sociodemographic variables and the regime transition attitudinal variables. Finally, a third model is tested for Lithuania, where the two sociotropic assessments of the economy are included. The results of the logistic regression estimations for ex-communist party in opposition vote intentions are presented in Table 5.

Starting with Model A (the two pocketbook voting items and unemployment alone), we find that with the exception of "unemployed" coefficients in the Lithuanian and Bulgarian models, all of the economic voting coefficients are in the hypothesized directions. In terms of statistical significance, however, there is again a mixture of results from one election to the next. Both of the pocketbook coefficients, retrospective and prospective, are negative and statistically significant for the Lithuanian and Hungarian ex-communists,

Table 5

Logit Results for Ex-Communist Party Voting Intentions

Variable[a]	LDDP (Lithuania 1992)						MSzP (Hungary 1993)				BSP (Bulgaria 1994)			
	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model A		Model B		Model A		Model B	
Retrospective pocketbook	−.261**	(.10)	−.187*	(0.11)	−.219*	(.12)	−.309**	(.13)	−.196	(.14)	−.071	(.09)	.206**	(.10)
Prospective pocketbook	−.249***	(.09)	−.160	(.10)	−.093	(.12)	−.183*	(0.11)	−.122	(.11)	−.248***	(.08)	−.195**	(.08)
Unemployed	−.121	(.36)	.013	(.37)	.151	(.38)	.025	(.32)	.263	(.35)	−.410	(.27)	−.061	(.30)
Retrospective sociotropic	—		—		−.165	(.14)	—		—		—		—	
Prospective sociotropic	—		—		−.075	(.10)	—		—		—		—	
Education	—		.145	(.13)	.072	(.13)	—		.222**	(.11)	—		.068	(.11)
Female	—		.133	(.18)	.215	(.19)	—		−.224	(.22)	—		−.005	(.17)
Age	—		.010	(.01)	.009	(.01)	—		.016**	(.01)	—		.025***	(.01)
Catholic	—		−.563***	(.20)	−.507**	(.20)	—		−.373*	(.23)	—		—	
Free market	—		−.167	(.11)	−.144	(.12)	—		−.317**	(.13)	—		−.299***	(.10)
Democracy satisfaction	—		−.307***	(.09)	−.293***	(.09)	—		−.262**	(.11)	—		−.714***	(.15)
Constant	−1.51***	(.13)	−1.89***	(.57)	−1.99***	(.61)	−1.85***	(.18)	−2.76***	(.51)	−.858***	(.12)	−3.08***	(.57)
R_L^2	0.03		0.06		0.07		0.02		0.06		0.02		0.09	
n	770		770		730		582		582		719		719	

Note: LDDP = Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. MSzP = Hungarian Socialist Party. BSP = Bulgarian Socialist Party. Entries are unstandardized logit coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses.

a. Definition of variables: Dependent = dichotomous for ex-communist party voting intention (1) and other voting intention (0); for independent, see the appendix. Dashes indicate item not employed for model.

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

thus supporting Hypotheses 1b and 2b. That is, those who felt that their personal finances had gotten worse over the past year (under the proreform Sajudis and MDF governments) and those who expected their personal finances to worsen over the next year tended to favor the ex-communist LDDP (Lithuania) and MSzP (Hungary) over other parties. In the case of the BSP (Bulgaria), only the prospective pocketbook hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) is supported: The statistically significant negative coefficient indicates that those who expected their personal finances to worsen over the next year tended to be inclined to vote for the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In none of these three cases, however, is "unemployed" statistically related to ex-communist party in opposition voting intentions.

When the control variables are added to the initial model, Model B provides mixed evidence for the impact of economic assessments on intentions to vote for the ex-communist parties in opposition. Negative retrospective pocketbook assessments continue to be a statistically significant predictor of LDDP voting intention, whereas the prospective pocketbook item is no longer significant. The introduction of controls into the equation for the ex-communist MSzP reduces all of the economic items to statistical insignificance—not unlike the findings for the incumbent MDF. Furthermore, similar to the findings for the UDF (Bulgaria), both of the pocketbook items are statistically significant for the model predicting vote intentions for the BSP. In contrast to the UDF, however, the retrospective pocketbook assessments are positively related to BSP vote intention (contrary to Hypothesis 1b), whereas prospective pocketbook assessments are in the hypothesized negative direction. As with Model A, and with Model B for the incumbent parties, the unemployment item in Model B for the ex-communist parties in opposition is not statistically significant in any case. Clearly, Hypotheses 3a and 3b are not supported by these findings.

The control variables introduced in Model B provide some interesting insights. The "Catholic" variable reveals a negative, statistically significant relationship to ex-communist party vote intentions for both the LDDP and the MSzP. Obviously, Catholics were disinclined to vote for either of these ex-communist parties in opposition. Age is positively related to MSzP vote intentions, as it was for incumbent MDF vote intentions, indicating that younger Hungarian voters were not particularly inclined to favor either the incumbent or the ex-communist opposition party.[12] Age is also positively related to intentions to vote for the BSP, confirming evidence that the Bulgar-

12. This could be indicative of younger Hungarians' continued support for the Young Democrats (FIDESZ). It should be noted, however, that the popularity of FIDESZ had declined since

ian Socialist Party victory was due in part to its appeal to the disgruntled elderly population. Higher levels of education are positively associated with intentions to vote for the MSzP, but education is statistically insignificant in the other two countries.

Even more compelling, however, are the coefficients for the two regime transition attitudinal variables. The "free market" coefficients are negative in all three countries and statistically significant for the MSzP and the BSP. In both Hungary and Bulgaria, those who felt that the establishment of a free market economy in their country was wrong tended to favor the ex-communist parties in opposition. Furthermore, for all three ex-communist parties, the "democracy satisfaction" coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Thus, voters who felt dissatisfied with the development of democracy in their countries were inclined to vote for the ex-communist parties in opposition. If we pair these findings with those in the previous section, the following general picture emerges: Incumbent proreform parties tended to draw support from those who believe that the establishment of a free market economy is right and those who are satisfied with the development of democracy; ex-communist parties in opposition tended to draw support from those who feel the establishment of a free market economy is wrong and those who are dissatisfied with the development of democracy. A longitudinal, broader cross-sectional analysis of the association between these two regime transition attitudinal variables and support for major proreform versus ex-communist parties, both as incumbents and in opposition, appears to present a promising avenue for further research on the topic of party identification in postcommunist Eastern Europe. Again, we find that it is not necessarily assessments of the economy or personal finances that are driving the models but more fundamental sociotropic issues about the development of the new regimes.

In the Lithuanian Model C, the inclusion of the two sociotropic voting items has practically no impact on intentions to vote for the ex-communist LDDP. Neither coefficient is statistically significant, although both are in the predicted negative direction. Hypotheses 4b and 5b are thus not supported by these findings. Furthermore, the statistical significance and direction of all of the variables from Model B remain unchanged when the two sociotropic voting items are included.

Despite the various statistically significant findings for ex-communist parties in opposition voting intentions, the models as a whole are weak in

---

the previous election. In 1994, many younger voters also supported the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) (Gazsó & Stumpf, 1995, pp. 25-26).

terms of goodness of fit. Did the ex-communist parties in opposition reap the electoral rewards of economic hardships in these countries? By many accounts of the issues surrounding these elections, including my own in the present study, we would expect a resounding affirmative answer. Yet if we look at the R_L^2 for each of the models in which only the economic voting items are included (Model A), there is clear cause for skepticism. Paralleling the weak goodness-of-fit measures for the incumbent proreform party models, the R_L^2 in Model A for the ex-communist parties in opposition is a mere .03 for the LDDP and .02 for both the MSzP and the BSP. Certainly, at least in terms of the core economic indicators tested here, economic voting did not play a very large part in the return to power of ex-communist parties in Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Even when adding the sociodemographic variables and the regime transition attitudinal variables, the models still perform poorly overall: R_L^2 in Model B is .06 for LDDP and MSzP and .09 for BSP. As with the model for the incumbent MDF, Model B for the MSzP indicates that pocketbook assessments and unemployment played virtually no part in the intention to vote for this ex-communist party. Model C for LDDP, where the two sociotropic voting items are included, shows little increase in overall explanatory power from Model B, with R_L^2 increasing to only .07. Again, it appears that overall, economic perceptions played some part in ex-communist party vote choice in some cases, but their effects vary from election to election and they do not appear to have had a major substantive impact on ex-communist party in opposition voting intentions.

DISCUSSION

Earlier I stated that this study sought to answer the following two questions: (a) To what extent is economic voting evidenced through the punishment of incumbents at election time in postcommunist East European societies, and (b) in terms of electoral support, to what extent have ex-communist parties in opposition reaped the rewards of economic adversity in these societies? Given the extent of economic distress and the high levels of electoral volatility from one election to the next, the economic voting thesis was expected to provide a strong explanation for the defeat of proreform incumbent parties and the return to parliamentary power of the ex-communists in these postcommunist democracies.

Yet reflecting on the findings from the empirical tests of five theoretically based economic voting hypotheses, the dominant impression is that despite strong expectations to the contrary, economic factors had at best a modest effect on party preference in these societies. In most of the models estimated

here, economic voting was apparent to some degree, albeit appearing in various forms from party to party. When controlling for the effects of sociodemographic variables and the two regime transition attitudinal variables, however, the effects of the economic voting items tended to be reduced in terms of statistical significance. Indeed, in the controlled models for the Hungarian election, neither of the pocketbook assessment coefficients is a statistically significant predictor of vote choice for either the incumbent MDF or the ex-communist MSzP in opposition.

Furthermore, in none of the models estimated in this study did unemployment reveal a statistically significant relationship to voting intention for either the incumbent or ex-communist opposition parties. This contradiction to Pacek's (1994) study showing that district-level unemployment rates were related to party vote shares deserves more attention. Whereas Pacek examined economic voting in Eastern Europe in terms of party vote shares, the present analysis has focused on economic voting at the individual level in terms of party preference. A plausible explanation for the differences between my findings and Pacek's is that the unemployed themselves do not tend to be inclined to vote for or against the incumbent or ex-communist opposition parties, but rather, high unemployment rates in a district are associated by that district population in general with poor performance on the part of the incumbent party. Thus, the relationship between higher district unemployment rates and lower incumbent party vote shares may have little or nothing to do with the unemployed themselves but instead might be explained as the district population engaging in a form of retrospective sociotropic voting.

Two of the three CEEB surveys employed in this study, Hungary 1993 and Bulgaria 1994, did not include the relevant survey items to gauge individuals' sociotropic economic assessments. It was therefore impossible to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 (retrospective and prospective sociotropic voting) in terms of intention to vote for the incumbents or ex-communists in these countries. Yet for the models predicting voting intention for the Lithuanian incumbent and ex-communist parties, the relevant sociotropic survey items were available, and I was able to test the sociotropic voting thesis. However, in neither model did the inclusion of the sociotropic voting items increase the overall goodness of fit by any substantial amount. Evidence from studies of economic voting in advanced democracies indicate that "when both measures are included in a vote equation, the sociotropic side usually beats the pocketbook" (Norpoth, 1996, p. 313). At least partially, this appears to be the case in the Sajudis model, where the inclusion of the retrospective and prospective sociotropic items reduces the pocketbook coefficients to statistical insignificance. Furthermore, in the same model, the retrospective sociotropic coefficient is the only one of the five core economic variables that is statistically

significant. Yet in the model predicting voting intention for the ex-communist LDDP, neither of the sociotropic economic assessments are statistically significant, and of the five core economic variables, only the retrospective pocketbook coefficient is statistically significant (as in Model B for the LDDP).

It may be argued that the unavailability of the sociotropic items resulted in an underspecification of the models estimated for Hungary and Bulgaria. This is certainly a plausibility I am willing to accept, but I have considerable doubt that the inclusion of the same sociotropic items in these models would have improved the overall goodness of fit of the models, nor would it likely have changed the overall findings in this research. If we can make any imputation from the Lithuanian models for both Sajudis and the LDDP, as we move from Model B (excluding the sociotropic items) to Model C (including the sociotropic items), the goodness of fit for these estimations does not improve so much as to reverse the finding that the effects of economic voting, whether pocketbook or sociotropic, were at best weak.[13]

The assertion by Powers and Cox (1997) that the return of the communist successor parties is not so easily explained by "economic dissatisfaction and punishment of incumbents" (p. 628) is clearly supported by the findings in the present cross-national study of economic voting and the return to parliamentary power of the ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the evidence from the models estimated here indicates that economic assessments were at best only part of the equation predicting voting intentions. In addition to erratic effects by the economic voting items and the socio- demographic variables, the two regime transition attitudinal variables—attitudes toward the establishment of a free market economy and satisfaction with the development of democracy—were consistently statistically significant predictors of voting intentions. Those who felt that the establishment of a free

13. We are thus still left with a puzzle: District-level unemployment is related to party vote shares (Pacek, 1994), yet at an individual level, neither unemployment nor pocketbook or sociotropic economic assessments explain much by way of party preferences. The Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer (CEEB) surveys include a region variable, but these regions do not necessarily correspond with actual electoral districts. It is therefore impossible using these surveys to reliably examine the data by region and compare them to electoral district-level party vote shares and unemployment rates. A useful avenue of research would be to extend Pacek's aggregate party vote share analysis to the elections considered in the present research by examining the relationship between electoral district party vote shares and district-level unemployment rates. However, even if such an analysis were undertaken, it would not be at the level of individual party preferences, and we would still not know whether it was the unemployed or other individuals who tended to support one party over another. What is most needed are reliable and cross-nationally comparable survey data for this region consisting of useful questions for studying electoral behavior that can be isolated at the level of the electoral district.

market economy was wrong and those who were dissatisfied with the development of democracy tended to favor the ex-communist parties in opposition. These perceptions of the transition process itself are shown here to have consistent impacts on vote choice. Indeed, it is possible to interpret each as a form of sociotropic assessment: politically sociotropic for the democracy satisfaction indicator and economically sociotropic for the free market indicator. However, despite their consistent statistically significant performance in the models estimated here, these regime transition attitudinal variables are nonetheless not so consequential as to produce models with any satisfactory degree of explanatory power.

In postcommunist societies, most people have experienced severe economic hardship as the path to an uncertain future continues to be ill-defined and debated. Certainly, simple economic considerations, such as those included here to gauge pocketbook and sociotropic assessments, will play a role in people's party preferences, but the role is rendered weak and unclear by a strongly felt sense of anomie and insecurity. Marcin Król (1994), discussing the return of the ex-communists in the 1993 Polish Sejm election, shares this perspective:

> It is not nostalgia or an ideological dream but a brute fact that for considerable numbers of people life has become more difficult. The ex-communists have not been shy about exploiting this situation. People may accept the free market and democracy in principle, but they cannot help missing the sweet sense of security that was once theirs. (p. 91)

So, to use Norpoth's (1996) phrasing, is the inclination to engage in economic voting "hard-wired into the brain of citizens" (p. 317) in Eastern Europe? The findings here indicate that simple economic perceptions explain only a very small part of citizen party preferences in these postcommunist societies. In the early 1990s, East Europeans may have had doubts about both incumbents and the ex-communist opposition parties. There appeared no certain course of improvement and no single outlet for the dissatisfied and the economically displaced. Some may have felt that they were suffering from the legacy of state socialism, whereas others might have thought they were suffering from ill-conceived marketization.

The alternation of parliamentary power between proreform and ex-communist parties continues in these countries: Ex-communist incumbent parties fared quite poorly and were replaced in elections subsequent to those examined in this study. Certainly there remain considerable need and opportunity for further investigations of voting behavior in postcommunist societies, especially in a comparative context. Such studies might eventually show that

once democracy is consolidated in these societies and the memories of the communist era and the transition period fade, electorates in East European democracies will more closely follow the patterns of economic voting observed in established Western democracies.

APPENDIX
Coding and Distribution of Variables

Variable (variable name)		Coding	Lithuania 1992	Hungary 1993	Bulgaria 1994
1 Proreform party voting intention	0	Other party, blank, don't know	78.7	94.6	83.5
	1	Proreform party	21.3 (Sajudis)	5.4 (MDF)	16.5 (UDF)
		Valid *n*	878	627	800
2 Ex-communist party voting intention	0	Other party, blank, don't know	76.3	81.2	68.1
	1	Ex-communist party	23.7 (LDDP)	18.8 (MSzP)	31.9 (BSP)
		Valid *n*	878	627	800
3 How did the respondent's household financial situation change in the last 12 months? (retrospective pocketbook)	−2	Got a lot worse	25.5	29.1	39.4
	−1	Got a little worse	44.4	38.7	30.8
	0	Stayed the same	19.3	24.5	22.3
	1	Got a little better	9.2	7.4	6.7
	2	Got a lot better	1.6	0.3	0.8
		Valid *n*	874	625	789
4 How will the respondent's household financial situation change in the next 12 months? (prospective pocketbook)	−2	Get a lot worse	12.8	18.4	21.7
	−1	Get a little worse	30.7	31.0	18.8
	0	Stay the same	33.1	29.2	31.3
	1	Get a little better	22.0	19.2	26.3
	2	Get a lot better	1.4	2.2	1.8
		Valid *n*	773	583	722
5 How did the economic situation of the country change in the last 12 months? (retrospective sociotropic)	−2	Got a lot worse	44.6	—	—
	−1	Got a little worse	42.8	—	—
	0	Stayed the same	8.7	—	—
	1	Got a little better	3.2	—	—
	2	Got a lot better	0.6	—	—
		Valid *n*	869	—	—
6 How will the economic situation of the country change in the next 12 months? (prospective sociotropic)	−2	Get a lot worse	14.8	—	—
	−1	Get a little worse	30.5	—	—
	0	Stay the same	24.5	—	—
	1	Get a little better	28.9	—	—
	2	Get a lot better	1.4	—	—
		Valid *n*	800	—	—
7 Unemployment (unemployed)	0	Other occupation response	93.3	88.4	88.4
	1	Unemployed	6.7	11.6	11.6
		Valid *n*	878	627	800

(continued)

APPENDIX Continued

Variable (variable name)		Coding	Lithuania 1992	Hungary 1993	Bulgaria 1994
8 Education level (education)	1	Elementary	9.9	53.1	13.8
	2	Secondary, not complete	14.5	16.9	29.1
	3	Secondary, graduated	63.3	21.4	41.8
	4	Higher education	12.3	8.6	15.4
		Valid n	878	627	800
9 Sex (female)	0	Male	45.0	48.5	47.8
	1	Female	55.0	51.5	52.3
		Valid n	878	627	800
10 Age (age)		Respondent's age			
		Valid n	878	627	800
11 Catholic (Catholic)[a]	0	Other religion response	27.3	53.9	—
	1	Catholic	72.7	46.1	—
		Valid n	878	627	—
12 Is the creation of a free market economy right or wrong? (free market)	−1	Wrong	17.9	24.6	44.4
	0	Don't know	14.5	25.4	16.6
	1	Right	67.7	50.1	39.0
		Valid n	878	627	800
13 Respondent's satisfaction with the development of democracy (democracy satisfaction)	−2	Not at all satisfied	4.4	27.3	48.8
	−1	Not very satisfied	39.2	45.1	44.0
	0	Don't know	7.1	3.7	3.6
	1	Fairly satisfied	45.0	21.1	3.3
	2	Very satisfied	4.3	2.9	0.4
		Valid n	878	627	800

Source: Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer Studies (1992-1994).

Note: MDF = Hungarian Democratic Forum. UDF = Union of Democratic Forces. LDDP = Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. MSzP = Hungarian Socialist Party. BSP = Bulgarian Socialist Party. Frequencies are based only on those respondents who reported some indication to vote. Those who did not express an indication to vote are not included in this study and have therefore been coded as missing. Unless otherwise indicated, "don't know," "refused," and "NA" response categories have been coded as missing. Both sociotropic items (retrospective and prospective) were unavailable for Hungary and Bulgaria.

a. This item was either not available or was not coded for Bulgaria. Because Catholicism plays virtually no role in Bulgarian society, this variable is not relevant for the Bulgarian set.

REFERENCES

Åslund, A. (1995). The case for radical reform. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Economic reform and democracy* (pp. 74-85). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Balcerowicz, L. (1995). Understanding postcommunist transitions. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *Economic reform and democracy* (pp. 86-100). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Blazyca, G. (1998). The politics of economic transformation. In S. White, J. Batt, & P. G. Lewis (Eds.), *Developments in Central and East European politics 2* (pp. 191-215). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Brown, J. F. (1994). *Hopes and shadows: Eastern Europe after communism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Cotta, M. (1996). Structuring the new party systems after the dictatorship. In G. Pridham & T. Vanhanen (Eds.), *Democratization in Eastern Europe* (pp. 99-127). New York: Routledge.

Crampton, R. J. (1995). The Bulgarian elections of December 1994. *Electoral Studies*, *14*(2), 236-240.

Dahrendorf, R. (1990). *Reflections on the revolution in Europe*. New York: Random House.

Engelbrekt, K. (1993, May 21). Bulgaria's communists: Coming or going? *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, pp. 37-41.

Fitzmaurice, J. (1995). The Hungarian election of May 1994. *Electoral Studies*, *14*(1), 77-80.

Gazsó, F., & Stumpf, I. (1995). Parties and voters after two elections. In *Hungarian parliamentary election 1994* (pp. 18-41) (Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Budapest: Hungarian Center for Electoral Research.

Gotovska-Popova, T. (1993, June 25). Bulgaria's troubled social security system. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, pp. 43-47.

Ishiyama, J. T. (1997). The sickle or the rose? Previous regime types and the evolution of the ex-communist parties in post-communist politics. *Comparative Political Studies*, *30*(3), 299-330.

Jasiewicz, K. (1998). Elections and voting behavior. In S. White, J. Batt, & P. G. Lewis (Eds.), *Developments in Central and East European politics 2* (pp. 166-187). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Kéri, L., & Levendel, Á. (1995). The first three years of a multi-party system in Hungary. In G. Wightman (Ed.), *Party formation in East-Central Europe* (pp. 134-153). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar.

Kiewiet, D. R. (1983). *Macroeconomics and micropolitics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, D. R., Adams, G. S., & Gronke, P. W. (1989). Economics and politics in the 1984 American presidential election. *American Journal of Political Science*, *33*, 491-515.

Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981). Sociotropic politics: The American case. *British Journal of Political Science*, *11*, 129-141.

Kitschelt, H., Dimitrov, D., & Kanev, A. (1995). The structuring of the vote in post-communist party systems: The Bulgarian example. *European Journal of Political Research*, *27*, 143-160.

Kornai, J. (1992). *The socialist system: The political economy of communism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-term fluctuations in US voting behavior: 1896-1964. *American Political Science Review*, *65*, 131-143.

Król, M. (1994). Poland's longing for paternalism. *Journal of Democracy*, *5*(1), 85-95.

Kuklinski, J. H., & West, D. M. (1981). Economic expectations and voting behavior in United States Senate and House elections. *American Political Science Review*, *75*, 436-447.

Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1988). *Economics and elections: The major western democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lijphart, A. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1994). The social requisites of democracy revisited. *American Sociological Review*, *59*, 1-22.

Markus, G. (1988). The impact of personal and national economic conditions on the presidential vote: A pooled cross-sectional analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, *32*, 137-154.

Meininger, T. A., & Radoeva, D. (1996). Civil society: The current situation and problems. In I. Zloch-Christy (Ed.), *Bulgaria in a time of change* (pp. 45-73). Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.

Menard, S. (1995). *Applied logistic regression analysis* (Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences No. 07-106). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Michta, A. A. (1994). *The government and politics of postcommunist Europe*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Moraski, B., & Loewenberg, G. (1999). The effect of legal thresholds on the revival of former communist parties in East-Central Europe. *Journal of Politics*, *61*(1), 151-170.

Nikolaev, R. (1993, January 7). Bulgaria's 1992 census: Results, problems, and implications. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, pp. 58-62.

Nohlen, D., & Kasapovic, M. (1996). *Wahlsysteme und systemwechsel in Osteuropa* [Electoral systems and system change in Eastern Europe]. Opladen, Germany: Leske und Budrich.

Norpoth, H. (1996). The economy. In L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, & P. Norris (Eds.), *Comparing democracies: Elections and voting in global perspective* (pp. 299-318). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Norpoth, H., Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Lafay, J. (1991). *Economics and politics: The calculus of support*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Pacek, A. C. (1994). Macroeconomic conditions and electoral politics in East Central Europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, *38*, 723-744.

Perlez, J. (1994, December 18). Ex-communists in Bulgaria are poised for return to power. *The New York Times*, p. 16 (International).

Powers, D. V., & Cox, J. H. (1997). Echoes from the past: The relationship between satisfaction with economic reforms and voting behavior in Poland. *American Political Science Review*, *91*, 617-634.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pundeff, M. (1992). Bulgaria. In J. Held (Ed.), *The Columbia history of Eastern Europe in the twentieth century*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Reif, K., & Cunningham, G. (1993). *Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 3*: Political disintegration, October-November 1992 [Computer file] (Conducted by GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research, Brussels, ICPSR version) (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Prod.). Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Reif, K., & Cunningham, G. (1994). *Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 4*: Political and economic change, November 1993 [Computer file] (Conducted by GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research, Brussels, ICPSR version) (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Prod.). Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Reif, K., & Cunningham, G. (1995). *Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 5*: European Union, November 1994 [Computer file] (Conducted by GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research, Brussels, ICPSR version) (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Prod.). Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Rose, R. (1995). *Mobilizing demobilized voters in post communist societies* (No. 246). Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy.

Senn, A. E. (1990). *Lithuania awakening*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Swain, N. (1993). Hungary. In S. White, J. Batt, & P. G. Lewis (Eds.), *Developments in East European politics* (pp. 66-82). London: Macmillan.

Turnock, D. (1997). *The East European economy in context: Communism and transition*. London: Routledge.

Tworzecki, H. (1994). The Polish parliamentary elections of 1993. *Electoral Studies*, *13*(2), 180-185.

United Nations. (1995). *World economic and social survey 1995* (Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis). New York: Author.

Wade, L. L., Groth, A. J., & Lavelle, P. (1994). Estimating participation and party voting in Poland: The 1991 parliamentary elections. *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, *8*, 94-121.

Wade, L. L., Lavelle, P., & Groth, A. J. (1995). Searching for voting patterns in post-communist Poland's Sejm elections. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *28*(4), 411-425.

Zloch-Christy, I. (1994). *Eastern Europe in a time of change: Economic and political dimensions*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Marcus A. G. Harper is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. His research focuses on political culture and political behavior in postcommunist Eastern Europe. He has recently returned from a year of dissertation research as a Fulbright fellow in Bulgaria.