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This document represents the best opinion of The CNA Corporation at the time of issue.
Copyright 2007 The CNA Corporation L E T T E R O F T R A N S M I T T A L • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 3
MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD
General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.)
Chairman, Military Advisory Board
Admiral Frank “Skip” Bowman, USN (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN (Ret.)
General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.)
Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, USN (Ret.)
Admiral Donald L. “Don” Pilling, USN (Ret.)
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, USN (Ret.)
General Charles F. “Chuck” Wald, USAF (Ret.)
General Anthony C. “Tony” Zinni, USMC (Ret.)
To the reader,
During our decades of experience in the U.S. military, we have addressed many
national security challenges, from containment and deterrence of the Soviet
nuclear threat during the Cold War to terrorism and extremism in recent years.
Global climate change presents a new and very different type of national
security challenge.
Over many months and meetings, we met with some of the world’s leading
climate scientists, business leaders, and others studying climate change. We
viewed their work through the lens of our military experience as warfighters,
planners, and leaders. Our discussions have been lively, informative, and
very sobering.
Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are greater now than at any time in
the past 650,000 years, and average global temperature has continued a steady
rise. This rise presents the prospect of significant climate change, and while
uncertainty exists and debate continues regarding the science and future extent
of projected climate changes, the trends are clear.
The nature and pace of climate changes being observed today and the
consequences projected by the consensus scientific opinion are grave and pose
equally grave implications for our national security. Moving beyond the arguments
of cause and effect, it is important that the U.S. military begin planning to address
these potentially devastating effects. The consequences of climate change can affect
the organization, training, equipping, and planning of the military services. The U.S.
military has a clear obligation to determine the potential impacts of climate change
on its ability to execute its missions in support of national security objectives.
Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the
most volatile regions of the world, and it presents significant national security
challenges for the United States. Accordingly, it is appropriate to start now to
help mitigate the severity of some of these emergent challenges. The decision
to act should be made soon in order to plan prudently for the nation’s security.
The increasing risks from climate change should be addressed now because they
will almost certainly get worse if we delay.
3
G E N E R A L G O R D O N R . S U L L I V A N , U S A (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chairman, Military Advisory Board
A D M I R A L F R A N K “ S K I P ” B O W M A N , U S N (Ret.)
Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program;
Former Deputy Administrator-Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration
L I E U T E N A N T G E N E R A L L A W R E N C E P. FA R R E L L J R . , U S A F (Ret.)
Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
V I C E A D M I R A L PA U L G . G A F F N E Y I I , U S N (Ret.)
Former President, National Defense University; Former Chief of Naval Research and Commander,
Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command
G E N E R A L PA U L J . K E R N , U S A (Ret.)
Former Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command
A D M I R A L T. J O S E P H L O P E Z , U S N (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and of Allied Forces, Southern Europe
A D M I R A L D O N A L D L . “ D O N ” P I L L I N G , U S N (Ret.)
Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations
A D M I R A L J O S E P H W. P R U E H E R , U S N (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and Former U.S. Ambassador to China
V I C E A D M I R A L R I C H A R D H . T R U LY, U S N (Ret.)
Former NASA Administrator, Shuttle Astronaut and the first Commander of the Naval Space Command
G E N E R A L C H A R L E S F. “ C H U C K ” W A L D , U S A F (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
G E N E R A L A N T H O N Y C . “ T O N Y ” Z I N N I , U S M C (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
S H E R R I W. G O O D M A N
Executive Director, Military Advisory Board
The CNA Corporation
Study Team
David M. Catarious Jr.
Ronald Filadelfo
Henry Gaffney
Sean Maybee
Thomas Morehouse
THE MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD
T H E M I L I T A R Y A D V I S O R Y B O A R D • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g4 5
We are thankful to several people for their support of this effort. Rear Adm.
Richard Pittenger, USN (Ret.) of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
and Dr. Fiona Horsfall of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration provided many valuable insights into climate science and
reviewed our draft report. Dr. Robert Frosch, former assistant secretary of
the Navy for research and development and former NASA administrator,
currently at Harvard University, also reviewed our draft report and provided
suggestions for improvement regarding the science of climate change. Dr. Kent
Butts of the Army War College, Dr. Geoffrey D. Dabelko of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Franklin D. Kramer, former
assistant secretary of defense, reviewed our report and provided valuable
comments on sources of conflict and security issues related to climate change.
We thank the following persons for briefing the Military Advisory Board:
Dr. James Hansen, lead climate scientist and director, NASA Goddard
Institute for Space Studies; Dr. Anthony Janetos of the H. John Heinz III
Center for Science, Economics and the Environment; Dr. Richard Moss,
senior director, Climate and Energy, United Nations Foundation, formerly
director of the U.S. Global Change Research Program Office; Mr. Justin
Mundy, senior advisor to the Special Representative on Climate Change, UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Maj. Gen. Richard Engel, USAF (Ret.),
deputy national intelligence officer for science and technology, National
Intelligence Council; Mr. Randy Overbey, former president, Alcoa Primary
Metals Development; Mr. Kenneth Colburn, of the Center for Climate
Strategies; and Dr. Robert Socolow of Princeton University.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6
ABOUT THE REPORT 9
Voice of Experience: General Gordon Sullivan (Ret.) on Risk 10
GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 12
Voice of Experience: Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly (Ret.) on Drawing 14
His Own Conclusions
Voice of Experience: Admiral T. Joseph Lopez (Ret.) on Climate Change 17
and the Conditions for Terrorism
REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 19
Voice of Experience: General Charles F. “Chuck” Wald (Ret.) on Climate Change in Africa 21
Voice of Experience: Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II (Ret.) on Military Research 23
and Climate Science
Voice of Experience: Admiral Joseph W. Prueher (Ret.) on Climate Change in the Pacific 25
Voice of Experience: Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell Jr. (Ret.) on Climate, 26
Energy and Battlefield Readiness
Voice of Experience: General Anthony C. “Tony” Zinni (Ret.) on Climate Change, 31
Instability and Terrorism
Voice of Experience: Admiral Donald L. Pilling (Ret.) on Operational Challenges 33
of Climate Change
Voice of Experience: General Paul J. Kern (Ret.) on Weather, Logistics, 35
and the Causes of War
DIRECT IMPACTS ON MILITARY SYSTEMS, INFRASTRUCTURE, 36
AND OPERATIONS
Voice of Experience: Admiral Frank “Skip” Bowman (Ret.) on Climate Change, Energy, 41
and National Security
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 43
APPENDIX 1: BIOGRAPHIES, MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS 50
APPENDIX 2: CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE—A BRIEF OVERVIEW 56
References 61
Projected climate change will add to
tensions even in stable regions of the world.
The U.S. and Europe may experience mounting
pressure to accept large numbers of immigrant
and refugee populations as drought increases
and food production declines in Latin America
and Africa. Extreme weather events and natural
disasters, as the U.S. experienced with Hurricane
Katrina, may lead to increased missions for a
number of U.S. agencies, including state and
local governments,the Department of Homeland
Security, and our already stretched military,
including our Guard and Reserve forces.
Climate change, national security, and
energy dependence are a related set of global
challenges. As President Bush noted in his
2007 State of the Union speech, dependence
on foreign oil leaves us more vulnerable to hostile
regimes and terrorists, and clean domestic
energy alternatives help us confront the serious
challenge of global climate change. Because
the issues are linked, solutions to one affect
the other. Technologies that improve energy
efficiency also reduce carbon intensity and
carbon emissions.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD:
1. The national security consequences of
climate change should be fully integrated
into national security and national
defense strategies.
As military leaders, we know we cannot wait for
certainty. Failing to act because a warning isn’t
precise enough is unacceptable. The intelligence
community should incorporate climate
consequences into its National Intelligence
Estimate. The National Security Strategy
should directly address the threat of climate
change to our national security interests. The
National Security Strategy and National
Defense Strategy should include appropriate
guidance to military planners to assess risks to
current and future missions caused by projected
climate change.The next Quadrennial Defense
Review should examine the capabilities of the U.S.
military to respond to the consequences of climate
change,in particular,preparedness for natural
disasters from extreme weather events,pandemic
disease events,and other related missions.
2. The U.S. should commit to a stronger
national and international role to help
stabilize climate change at levels that will
avoid significant disruption to global
security and stability.
Managing the security impacts of climate
change requires two approaches: mitigating the
effects we can control and adapting to those
we cannot. The U.S. should become a more
constructive partner with the international
community to help build and execute a plan
to prevent destabilizing effects from climate
change, including setting targets for long term
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
3. The U.S. should commit to global
partnerships that help less developed
nations build the capacity and resiliency
to better manage climate impacts.
As President Bush noted in his State of the
Union speech,“Our work in the world is also
based on a timeless truth: To whom much is
given, much is required.” Climate forecasts
indicate countries least able to adapt to the
consequences of climate change are those that
will be the most affected. The U.S. government
should use its many instruments of national
influence, including its regional commanders,
to assist nations at risk build the capacity and
resiliency to better cope with the effects of
climate change. Doing so now can help avert
humanitarian disasters later.
E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 7
The purpose of this study is to examine the
national security consequences of climate
change. A dozen of the nation’s most respected
retired admirals and generals have served as a
Military Advisory Board to study how climate
change could affect our nation’s security over
the next 30 to 40 years—the time frame for
developing new military capabilities.
The specific questions addressed in this
report are:
1. What conditions are climate changes
likely to produce around the world that
would represent security risks to the
United States?
2. What are the ways in which these
conditions may affect America’s national
security interests?
3. What actions should the nation take to
address the national security consequences
of climate change?
The Military Advisory Board hopes these
findings will contribute to the call President
Bush made in his 2007 State of the Union
address to“...help us to confront the serious
challenge of global climate change” by contributing
a new voice and perspective to the issue.
FINDINGS
Projected climate change poses a serious
threat to America’s national security.
The predicted effects of climate change over
the coming decades include extreme weather
events, drought, flooding, sea level rise, retreating
glaciers, habitat shifts, and the increased spread
of life-threatening diseases. These conditions
have the potential to disrupt our way of life and
to force changes in the way we keep ourselves
safe and secure.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the national and international security
environment, climate change threatens to add
new hostile and stressing factors. On the
simplest level, it has the potential to create
sustained natural and humanitarian disasters
on a scale far beyond those we see today. The
consequences will likely foster political instability
where societal demands exceed the capacity of
governments to cope.
Climate change acts as a threat multiplier
for instability in some of the most volatile
regions of the world. Projected climate change
will seriously exacerbate already marginal living
standards in many Asian, African, and Middle
Eastern nations, causing widespread political
instability and the likelihood of failed states.
Unlike most conventional security threats
that involve a single entity acting in specific ways
and points in time, climate change has the
potential to result in multiple chronic conditions,
occurring globally within the same time frame.
Economic and environmental conditions in
already fragile areas will further erode as food
production declines, diseases increase, clean
water becomes increasingly scarce, and large
populations move in search of resources.
Weakened and failing governments, with an
already thin margin for survival, foster the
conditions for internal conflicts, extremism, and
movement toward increased authoritarianism
and radical ideologies.
The U.S. may be drawn more frequently
into these situations, either alone or with allies,
to help provide stability before conditions
worsen and are exploited by extremists. The
U.S. may also be called upon to undertake
stability and reconstruction efforts once a
conflict has begun, to avert further disaster
and reconstitute a stable environment.
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g6
A B O U T T H E R E P O R T • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 9
4. The Department of Defense should
enhance its operational capability by
accelerating the adoption of improved
business processes and innovative technologies
that result in improved U.S.
combat power through energy efficiency.
Numerous Department of Defense studies
have found that combat forces would be more
capable and less vulnerable by significantly
reducing their fuel demand. Unfortunately,
many of their recommendations have yet to be
implemented. Doing so would have the added
benefit of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
5. The Department of Defense should
conduct an assessment of the impact on
U.S. military installations worldwide of
rising sea levels, extreme weather events,
and other projected climate change
impacts over the next 30 to 40 years.
Many critical defense installations are located
on the coast, and several strategically important
ones are on low-lying Pacific islands. Sea level rise
and storm surges will threaten these facilities.
Planning and action can make these installations
more resilient. Lack of planning can compromise
them or cause them to be inundated, compromising
military readiness and capability.
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g8
To better inform U.S. policymakers and the
public about the threats to national security
from global climate change, the CNA Corporation,
a nonprofit national security analysis
organization, convened a panel of retired senior
military officers and national security experts
and conducted an assessment of the national
security implications of global climate change.
In this context, we define national security to
refer to the influence of climate change on
geo-strategic balances and world events that
could likely involve U.S. military forces or
otherwise affect U.S. strategic interests
anywhere in the world.
The Military Advisory Board consisted of
retired flag and general officers from all four
services, including service chiefs and some who
served as regional combatant commanders
(a regional combatant commander is a four-star
officer who commands all U.S. forces in a given
region of the world). The Military Advisory
Board and the study team received briefings
from the U.S. intelligence community, climate
scientists, and business and state leaders. They
also traveled to the United Kingdom to meet
with high-level government and business leaders
to learn what actions the United Kingdom is
taking to address the threat of climate change.
Members of the Military Advisory Board also
presented their own views, based on experience,
of the security effects of climate change on
various regions of the world.
This report documents the results of that
effort. We start with a discussion of the
geo-strategic implications of climate change in
the general sense—that is, how climate change
can foster instability and affect international
security. We then apply this background to
address specific regional security challenges in
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the
Americas. That is followed by a discussion of
the challenges from climate change that can
have a direct impact on military systems and
operations. We conclude with a set of findings
and recommendations related to mitigation,
adaptation, and preparation—specific actions
the U.S. government should take in response
to the challenges presented by climate change.
Appendices provide background on members
of the Military Advisory Board, and very briefly
summarize the science of climate change and
ways in which the earth’s environment may
potentially change.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
Although there is a great deal of agreement
among the world’s climate scientists regarding
the overall picture of a changing climate, there
is also some disagreement about the extent of
future changes.
Regardless of this continuing discussion, the
board’s view is quite clear: The potential consequences
of climate change are so significant that
the prudent course of action is to begin now to
assess how these changes may potentially affect
our national security, and what courses of
action, if any, our nation should take.
This approach shows how a military leader’s
perspective often differs from the perspectives
of scientists, policymakers, or the media. Military
leaders see a range of estimates and tend
not to see it as a stark disagreement, but as
evidence of varying degrees of risk. They don’t
see the range of possibilities as justification for
inaction. Risk is at the heart of their job: They
ABOUT THE REPORT
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g10
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
During the Cold War, much of America’s
defense efforts focused on preventing a
Soviet missile attack—the very definition of
a low probability/high consequence event.
Our effort to avoid such an unlikely event was a
central organizing principle for our diplomatic and
military strategies.
When asked to compare the risks of climate
change with those of the Cold War, Gen. Sullivan
said, “The Cold War was a specter, but climate
change is inevitable. If we keep on with business
as usual, we will reach a point where some of the
worst effects are inevitable.”
“If we don’t act, this looks more like a high
probability/high consequence scenario,” he added.
Gen. Sullivan shifted from risk assessment to
risk management.
“In the Cold War, there was a concerted effort
by all leadership—political and military, national
and international—to avoid a potential conflict,”
he said. “I think it was well known in military
circles that we had to do everything in our power
to create an environment where the national
command authority—the president and his
senior advisers—were not forced to make choices
regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
“The situation, for much of the Cold War,
was stable,” Gen. Sullivan continued. “And the
challenge was to keep it stable, to stop the catastrophic
event from happening. We spent billions
on that strategy.
“Climate change is exactly the opposite. We
have a catastrophic event that appears to be inevitable.
And the challenge is to stabilize things—to
stabilize carbon in the atmosphere. Back then, the
challenge was to stop a particular action. Now,
the challenge is to inspire a particular action. We
have to act if we’re to avoid the worst effects.”
Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan
enjoys a good debate. But he also knows there
are times when debate must stop and action must
begin. With respect to climate change, he says
that time has arrived.
“We seem to be standing by and, frankly,
asking for perfectness in science,” Gen. Sullivan
said. “People are saying they want to be convinced,
perfectly. They want to know the climate
science projections with 100 percent certainty.
Well, we know a great deal, and even with
that, there is still uncertainty. But the trend line is
very clear.”
“We never have 100 percent certainty,” he
said. “We never have it. If you wait until you
have 100 percent certainty, something bad
is going to happen on the battlefield. That’s
something we know. You have to act with
incomplete information. You have to act based
on the trend line. You have to act on your
intuition sometimes.”
In discussing how military leaders manage risk,
Gen. Sullivan noted that significant attention
is often given to the low probability/high consequence
events. These events rarely occur
but can have devastating consequences if they
do. American families are familiar with these
calculations. Serious injury in an auto accident
is, for most families, a low probability/high
consequence event. It may be unlikely, but
we do all we can to avoid it.
GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN, USA (Ret.)
Chairman, Military Advisory Board | Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
ON RISK
“We never have 100 percent certainty. We
never have it. If you wait until you have
100 percent certainty, something bad is
going to happen on the battlefield.”
assess and manage the many risks to America’s
security. Climate change, from the Military
Advisory Board’s perspective, presents significant
risks to America’s national security. Before
explaining some of those risks, we touch on an
important scientific point.
A global average temperature increase of
1.30
F (plus or minus 0.30
F) occurred over the
twentieth century. But the temperature change
on its own is not what shapes this security
assessment. Rather, it is the impact that
temperature increases can have on natural
systems, including:
• Habitats
• Precipitation patterns
• Extreme weather events
• Ice cover
• Sea level
Throughout this report, we do not attempt
to tie our findings regarding security implications
to any one particular projection of future
temperature changes, precipitation changes, or
sea level rise whether due to ocean expansion
or ice sheet breakup. Rather, our goal is to
articulate the possible security implications
of climate change and to consider mitigating
steps the nation could take as part of an
overall national security plan.
A B O U T T H E R E P O R T • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 11
One reason human civilizations have grown
and flourished over the last five millennia is that
the world’s climate has been relatively stable.
However, when climates change significantly
or environmental conditions deteriorate to the
point that necessary resources are not available,
societies can become stressed, sometimes to the
point of collapse [1].
For those concerned about national security,
stability is a primary goal. Maintaining stability
within and among nations is often a means of
avoiding full-scale military conflicts. Conversely,
instability in key areas can threaten our security.
For these reasons, a great deal of our national
security efforts in the post-World War II era
have been focused on protecting stability where
it exists and trying to instill it where it does not.
This brings us to the connection between
climate change and national security.
As noted, climate change involves much
more than temperature increases. It can bring
with it many of the kinds of changes in natural
systems that have introduced instability among
nations throughout the centuries.
In this chapter, we consider some of the ways
climate change can be expected to introduce the
conditions for social destabilization. The sources
of tension and conflict we discuss here are
certainly not solely due to climate change; they
have been discussed by the national security
community for many years. However, climate
change can exacerbate many of them [2].
For example:
• Some nations may have impaired access
to food and water.
• Violent weather, and perhaps land loss due
to rising sea levels and increased storm surges, can
damage infrastructure and uproot large numbers
of people.
GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
• These changes, and others, may create large
number of migrants . When people cross borders
in search of resources, tensions can arise.
• Many governments, even some that look
stable today, may be unable to deal with these
new stresses. When governments are ineffective,
extremism can gain a foothold.
• While the developed world will be far better
equipped to deal with the effects of climate
change, some of the poorest regions may be
affected most. This gap can potentially provide
an avenue for extremist ideologies and create
the conditions for terrorism.
THE DESTABILIZING IMPACTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
REDUCED ACCESS TO FRESH WATER
Adequate supplies of fresh water for drinking,
irrigation, and sanitation are the most basic
prerequisite for human habitation. Changes in
rainfall, snowfall, snowmelt, and glacial melt
have significant effects on fresh water supplies,
and climate change is likely to affect all of those
things. In some areas of the Middle East,
tensions over water already exist.
Mountain glaciers are an especially threatened
source of fresh water [3]. A modest rise in
temperature of about 2° to 4°F in mountainous
G E O - S T R A T E G I C I M P L I C A T I O N S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 13
When climates change significantly or
environmental conditions deteriorate to
the point that necessary resources are not
available, societies can become stressed,
sometimes to the point of collapse.
GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
1515
regions can dramatically alter the precipitation
mix by increasing the share falling as rain while
decreasing the share falling as snow. The result
is more flooding during the rainy season, a
shrinking snow/ice mass, and less snowmelt to
feed rivers during the dry season [4]. Forty percent
of the world’s population derives at least half of its
drinking water from the summer melt of mountain
glaciers, but these glaciers are shrinking and some
could disappear within decades. Several of Asia’s
major rivers—the Indus,Ganges,Mekong,Yangtze,
and Yellow—originate in the Himalayas [4]. If the
massive snow/ice sheet in the Himalayas—the
third-largest ice sheet in the world, after those in
Antarctic and Greenland—continues to melt, it
will dramatically reduce the water supply of much
of Asia.
Most countries in the Middle East and
northern Africa are already considered water
scarce, and the International Water Resource
Management Institute projects that by 2025,
Pakistan, South Africa, and large parts of India
and China will also be water scarce [5]. To put
this in perspective: the U.S. would have to suffer
a decrease in water supply that produces an 80
percent decrease in per capita water consumption
to reach the United Nations definition of “water
scarce.” These projections do not factor in climate
change, which is expected to exacerbate water
problems in many areas.
IMPAIRED FOOD PRODUCTION
Access to vital resources, primarily food and
water, can be an additional causative factor of
conflicts, a number of which are playing out
today in Africa. Probably the best known is the
conflict in Darfur between herders and farmers.
Long periods of drought resulted in the loss of
both farmland and grazing land to the desert.
The failure of their grazing lands compelled the
nomads to migrate southward in search of water
and herding ground, and that in turn led to
conflict with the farming tribes occupying those
lands. Coupled with population growth, tribal,
ethnic, and religious differences, the competition
for land turned violent. Probably more
than any other recent conflict, Darfur provides
a case study of how existing marginal situations
can be exacerbated beyond the tipping
point by climate-related factors. It also shows
how lack of essential resources threatens not
only individuals and their communities but
also the region and the international community
at large.
Worldwide food production will be affected
by climate change in a variety of ways. Crop
ecologists estimate that for every 1.8°F rise
in temperature above historical norms, grain
production will drop 10 percent [6].
Most of the world’s growth in food demand
is occurring on the Indian subcontinent and in
sub-Saharan Africa, areas already facing food
shortages [6]. Over the coming decades, these
areas are expected to become hotter and drier [7].
HEALTH CATASTROPHES
Climate change is likely to have major implications
for human health. While some impacts, such
as reduced deaths from cold temperatures in
some areas, will be positive, the World Health
Organization estimates that the overall impact
will be negative [8].
The major concern is significant spreading
of the conditions for vector-borne diseases, such
as dengue fever and malaria, and food-borne
diseases, such as salmonellosis [8]. The decline
in available fresh water in some regions will also
have an impact, as good health and adequate
supplies of clean water are inextricably linked.
A health emergency involving large numbers of
casualties and deaths from disease can quickly
expand into a major regional or global security
In some areas of the Middle East,
tensions over water already exist.
G E O - S T R A T E G I C I M P L I C A T I O N S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r gS e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g14
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
Jim Hansen was first talking about these issues,” he
said, referring to NASA’s top climate scientist. “But
I was focused elsewhere then, and I should have
listened more closely. I didn’t become a convert until I
saw the data on my own.”
“The stresses that climate change will put on our
national security will be different than any we’ve
dealt with in the past. For one thing, unlike the
challenges that we are used to dealing with, these
will come upon us extremely slowly, but come they
will, and they will be grinding and inexorable. But
maybe more challenging is that they will affect
every nation, and all simultaneously. This is why
we need to study this issue now, so that we’ll be
prepared and not overwhelmed by the required
scope of our response when the time comes.”
When asked about his experience twenty-five
years ago in space, and how it affects him today,
Adm. Truly said, “It does change you, there’s no
doubt about it. I have images burned in my mind
that will never go away—images of the earth and
its fragility. I was a test pilot. I was an aviator.
I was not an environmentalist. But I do love
the natural environment, and seeing the earth
from space was the experience that I return
to when I think about what we know now about
the climate.”
“One of the things that struck me on my first day
in space is that there is no blue sky. It’s something
that every human lives with on Earth, but when
you’re in space, you don’t see it. It looks like there’s
nothing between you and the surface of the earth.
And out beyond that, it looks like midnight, with only
deep black and stars.”
“But when you look at the earth’s horizon, you
see an incredibly beautiful, but very, very thin line.
You can see a tiny rainbow of color. That thin line
is our atmosphere. And the real fragility of our
atmosphere is that there’s so little of it.”
Retired Vice Adm. Richard H. Truly was a space
shuttle commander and NASA administrator and
is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
When he began service as director of the
Department of Energy’s National Renewable
Energy Laboratory in 1997, he reminded his
staff that he would be confronted with a new set
of issues.
“I told them that I was unencumbered with
experience or knowledge of the energy business,
and that I would need their help,” Adm. Truly said.
“I had a pretty steep learning curve.”
One of the first issues he was asked to consider
was the extent to which fossil fuel emissions were
affecting the climate.
“I was a total agnostic,” Truly said. “I had spent
most of my life in the space and aeronautics world,
and hadn’t really wrestled with this. I was open-
minded.”
“Over the course of the next few years, I started
really paying attention to the data. When I looked
at what energy we had used over the past couple
of centuries and what was in the atmosphere
today, I knew there had to be a connection. I wasn’t
convinced by a person or any interest group—it
was the data that got me. As I looked at it on my
own, I couldn’t come to any other conclusion. Once
I got past that point, I was utterly convinced of this
connection between the burning of fossil fuels and
climate change. And I was convinced that if we
didn’t do something about this, we would be in
deep trouble.”
Adm. Truly noted an ironic twist about his path
to this conclusion. “I was NASA administrator when
“I wasn’t convinced by a person or
any interest group—it was the data
that got me.”
VICE ADMIRAL RICHARD H. TRULY, USN (Ret.)
Former NASA Administrator, Shuttle Astronaut and the first Commander of the Naval Space Command
ON DRAWING HIS OWN CONCLUSIONS
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V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
“In the military, we’ve often run into problems
associated with what we call ‘stovepipes,’ where
each branch of the service has its own way of
doing things. And we’ve learned that stovepipes
don’t work well. We have to take the same
approach with our government, to ensure that
the many agencies are working together. In those
cases where we do get involved, the task should
not automatically be the responsibility of the U.S.
military.”
He also described other layers of complexity.
Even in those cases where the U.S. may choose
to embrace such a role, the best solutions may
requireanongovernmentalcomponent.“Ifyoudon’t
include economists or far-thinking, out-of-the-box
business people in this, you’ll get shortchanged.”
He also said the U.S. “can’t imply that we’ll do this
all alone. We need to make sure we don’t give that
impression. The same forces of economics, business,
politics, diplomacy, and military and security
interests can function to build coalitions in order
to maintain stability when challenged by dramatic
climate change.”
Some Americans believe we don’t need to
worry about climate change for decades. They
say the issue isn’t as urgent as the war on terror.
Adm. Lopez, the retired top NATO commander
in Bosnia, has a different take. He sees a strong
connection between the two.
“Climate change will provide the conditions that
will extend the war on terror,” Adm. Lopez said.
“You have very real changes in natural systems
that are most likely to happen in regions
of the world that are already fertile ground
for extremism,” Adm. Lopez said. “Droughts, violent
weather, ruined agricultural lands—those are
the kinds of stresses we’ll see more of under climate
change.”
Those changes in nature will lead to changes
in society. “More poverty, more forced migrations,
higher unemployment. Those conditions are ripe
for extremists and terrorists.”
In the controversial war on terrorism, Adm.
Lopez noted, there is general agreement on
at least one thing: It’s best to stop terrorism
before it develops. “In the long term, we want to
address the underlying conditions that terrorists
seek to exploit. That’s what we’d like to do, and
it’s a consensus issue—we all want to do that.
But climate change prolongs those conditions. It
makes them worse.”
“Dealing with instability and how you mitigate
that leads to questions about the role U.S. security
forces can play,” Adm. Lopez added. “What can
we do to alleviate the problems of instability in
advance? And keep in mind this will all be under a
challenged resource situation. This is very complicated.
Of course, the military can be a catalyst for
making this happen, but it can’t do it all. This is
also about economics, politics, and diplomacy.
ADMIRAL T. JOSEPH LOPEZ, USN (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and of Allied Forces, Southern Europe
ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CONDITIONS FOR TERRORISM
“Climate change will provide the conditions
that will extend the war on terror.”
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g16
challenge that may require military support,
ranging from distribution of vaccines to
full-scale stability operations [9].
LAND LOSS AND FLOODING: DISPLACEMENT
OF MAJOR POPULATIONS
About two-thirds of the world’s population
lives near coastlines [10], where critically
important facilities and infrastructure, such as
transportation routes, industrial facilities, port
facilities, and energy production and distribution
facilities are located. A rise in sea level means
potential loss of land and displacement of large
numbers of people. Even in our own nation,
Hurricane Katrina showed the social upheaval
and tensions that can result from land loss and
displaced populations. But while the impact of
inundation from one-time occurrences such as
Hurricane Katrina is temporary, even as it is
devastating, inundation from climate change is
likely to be permanent on the scale of human
lifetimes. Rising sea levels will also make coastal
areas more vulnerable to flooding and land loss
through erosion.
Storm surges will also take a greater toll on
coastal communities and infrastructure as sea
levels rise. According to a Pacific Institute study,
a six-inch rise in the water level of San Francisco
Bay would mean a fairly routine one-in-ten-year
storm would wreak as much damage as a far
more serious“hundred-year storm” would have
caused before the sea level rise [11]. In the U.S.,
we may be able to cope with such a change, but
poorer nations would be greatly challenged.
Most of the economically important major
rivers and river deltas in the world—the Niger,
the Mekong, the Yangtze, the Ganges, the Nile,
the Rhine, and the Mississippi—are densely
populated along their banks. As sea levels rise
and storm surges increase, saline water can
contaminate groundwater, inundate river deltas
and valleys, and destroy croplands.
SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF
THESE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS
GREATER POTENTIAL FOR FAILED STATES
AND THE GROWTH OF TERRORISM
Many developing countries do not have the
government and social infrastructures in place
to cope with the types of stressors that could be
brought on by global climate change.
When a government can no longer deliver
services to its people, ensure domestic order,
and protect the nation’s borders from invasion,
conditions are ripe for turmoil, extremism and
terrorism to fill the vacuum. Lebanon’s
experience with the terrorist group Hezbollah
and the Brazilian government’s attempts to
reign in the slum gang First Capital
Command [12] are both examples of how the
central governments’ inability to provide basic
services has led to strengthening of these
extra-governmental entities.
MASS MIGRATIONS ADD TO GLOBAL TENSIONS
The reasons for mass migrations are very
complex. However, when water or food supplies
shift or when conditions otherwise deteriorate
(as from sea level rise, for example), people will
likely move to find more favorable conditions
[13]. Although climate change may force
migrations of workers due to economic
conditions, the greatest concern will be
movement of asylum seekers and refugees who
due to ecological devastation become settlers:
• By 2025,40 percent of the world’s population
will be living in countries experiencing
significant water shortages [14].
• Over the course of this century, sea level
rise could potentially cause the displacement of
tens of millions of people from low-lying areas
such as Bangladesh [15].
Migrations in themselves do not necessarily
have negative effects,although taken in the context
of global climate change a net benefit is highly
unlikely.Three types of migration patterns occur.
REGIONAL IMPACTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
Some migrations take place within countries,
adding to a nation’s political stress, causing
economic upheaval—positive and negative—and
distracting from other issues. As a developed
nation, the U.S. was able to absorb the displacement
of people from the Gulf Coast in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina without suffering
economic or political collapse, but not without
considerable turmoil.
Some migrations cross international borders.
Environmental degradation can fuel migrations in
less developed countries, and these migrations
can lead to international political conflict. For
example, the large migration from Bangladesh
to India in the second half of the last century
was due largely to loss of arable land, among
other environmental factors. This affected the
economy and political situation in the regions
of India that absorbed most of this population
shift and resulted in violence between natives
and migrants [16].
A third form of migration involves not only
crossing international borders but moving across
vast regions while doing so. Since the 1960s,
Europe has experienced this kind of “south to
north” migration, with an influx of immigrants
from Africa and Asia. The shift in demographics
has created racial and religious tensions in
many European countries, as evidenced in the
2005 civil unrest in France.
POTENTIAL ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS
OVER RESOURCES
To live in stability, human societies need access to
certain fundamental resources, the most
important of which are water and food. The lack,
or mismanagement, of these resources can undercut
the stability of local populations; it can affect
regions on a national or international scale.
Disputes over key resources such as water do
not automatically trigger violent outcomes, and
no recent wars have been waged solely over water
resources. In areas with a strong government and
societal cohesiveness, even tense disputes and
resource crises can be peacefully overcome. In
fact, in recent years, arguments have been made
that multinational cooperation over precious
water resources has been more an instrument of
regional peace than of war [17].
Nevertheless, resource scarcity always has the
potential to be a contributing factor to conflict
and instability in areas with weak and weakly
supported governments [19]. In addition, there
is always the potential for regional fighting to
spread to a national or international scale. Some
recent examples include: the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda that was furthered by violence over
agricultural resources; the situation in Darfur,
Sudan, which had land resources at its root and
which is increasingly spilling over into neighboring
Chad; the 1970s downfall of Ethiopian Emperor
Haile Selassie through his government’s inability
to respond to food shortages; and the 1974
Nigerian coup that resulted largely from an
insufficient response to famine [19].
Whether resource scarcity proves to be the
impetus for peaceful cooperation or an instigator
of conflict in the future remains to be seen.
Regions that are already water scarce (such as
Kuwait, Jordan, Israel, Rwanda, Somalia,Algeria,
and Kenya) may be forced to confront this choice
as climate change exacerbates their water scarcity.
The greatest concern will be movement
of asylum seekers and refugees who
due to ecological devastation become
settlers...
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S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g20
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
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Africa’s importance to U.S. national security
can no longer be ignored. Indeed, with the recent
establishment of a U.S. African Command, the
U.S. has underscored Africa’s strategic importance.
Its weak governments and the rising
presence of terrorist groups make Africa
important to the fight against terrorism.
Moreover, Africa is also of strategic value to
the U.S. as a supplier of energy; by 2015, it will
supply 25 to 40 percent of our oil, and it will
also be a supplier of strategic minerals such as
chrome, platinum, and manganese.
Reductions in soil moisture and further loss
of arable land may be the most significant of
the projected impacts of climate change in
Africa. At the same time, extreme weather
events are likely to increase. These expected
changes portend reduced supplies of potable
water and food production in key areas. Such
changes will add significantly to existing tensions
and can facilitate weakened governance,
economic collapses, massive human migrations,
and potential conflicts. In Somalia, for example,
alternating droughts and floods led to migrations
of varying size and speed and prolonged
the instability on which warlords capitalized.
AFRICA
Increased political instability in Africa
potentially adds additional security requirements
for the U.S. in a number of ways. Stability
operations, ranging from humanitarian direct
delivery of goods and the protection of relief
workers, to the establishment of a stable and
reconstructed state, can place heavy demands
on the U.S. military. While the nature of future
stability operations is a matter of speculation,
historically some stability operations have
involved significant military operations and
casualties. Political instability also makes access
to African trade and resources, on which the
U.S. is reliant for both military and civilian uses,
a riskier proposition.
UNSTABLE GOVERNMENTS AND
TERRORIST HAVENS
Africa is increasingly crucial in the ongoing
battle against civil strife, genocide, and terrorism.
Numerous African countries and regions
already suffer from varying degrees of famine
and civil strife. Darfur, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Somalia, Angola, Nigeria, Cameroon, Western
Sahara—all have been hit hard by tensions that
can be traced in part to environmental causes.
Struggles that appear to be tribal, sectarian,
or nationalist in nature are often triggered by
reduced water supplies or reductions in agricultural
productivity.
The challenges Africa will face as a result
of climate change may be massive, and could
present serious threats to even the most stable
of governments. Many African nations can
REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Such changes will add significantly
to existing tensions and can facilitate
weakened governance, economic
collapses, massive human migrations,
and potential conflicts.
VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS “That’s the situation today. Even in a time of
relative stability, there is very little civil governance,
and very little ability to serve huge
numbers of people with basics like electricity,
clean water, health care, or education.
“If you add rising coastal waters and more
extreme weather events, you then have millions
of people who could be displaced. There really
is no controlled place for them to go, no capacity
for an organized departure, and no capacity
to make new living situations. When you add in
the effects of climate change, it adds to the
existing confusion and desperation, and puts
more pressure on the Nigerian government. It
makes the possibility of conflict very real. If the
delta is flooded, or if major storms damage their
drilling capacity, you lose the primary source
of income.
“Culturally, you have a country that is split
geographically between Muslims and Christians.
If migrations occur, you put real pressure on that
country. It’s already tense and fragile. When you
exacerbate that situation with climate change
effects, it’s not hard to postulate on the dangers.”
When asked why Americans should be interested
in African security issues, retired Air Force Gen.
Chuck Wald gave a number of reasons.
“We ought to care about Africa because
we’re a good country,” Gen. Wald said. “We
have a humanitarian character; it’s one of our
great strengths, and we shouldn’t deny it. Some
may be tempted to avert their eyes, but I would
hope we instead see the very real human suffering
taking place there. We should be moved
by it, challenged by it. Even in the context of
security discussions, I think these reasons
matter, because part of our security depends on
remaining true to our values.
“There are exotic minerals found only in
Africa that have essential military and civilian
uses,” Gen. Wald continued. “We import more
oil from Africa than the Middle East—probably
a shock to a lot of people—and that share
will grow. Africa could become a major exporter
of food.
“My view is that we’ll be drawn into the politics
of Africa, to a much greater extent than in the
past. A lot of Americans today would say Africa is
an optional engagement. I don’t think that’s the
case, even today, but it certainly won’t be in the
future.”
To show how climate change can worsen
conditions that are already quite desperate, Gen.
Wald described a trip to Nigeria.
“We landed in Lagos late in the afternoon,”
Gen. Wald said. “This is a city, now, with roughly
17 million people. The best way to describe
our drive from the airport to the hotel is that
it reminded me of a ‘Mad Max’ movie. There
were massive numbers of people on the roads,
just milling around. There were huge piles of
trash. There were fires along the roadside and
in the distance—huge fires. It was just short
of anarchy.
GENERAL CHARLES F. “CHUCK” WALD, USAF (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA
“My view is that we’ll be drawn into the
politics of Africa, to a much greater extent
than we have in the past.”
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 23
best be described as failed states, and many
African regions are largely ungoverned by civil
institutions. When the conditions for failed
states increase—as they most likely will over
the coming decades—the chaos that results can
be an incubator of civil strife, genocide, and the
growth of terrorism.
LESS EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
AND POTENTIAL MIGRATIONS
More than 30 percent of the world’s refugees and
displaced persons are African.Within the last
decade, severe food shortages affected twenty-five
African countries and placed as many as 200
million people“on the verge of calamity”[20].
Expected future climate change will
exacerbate this problem. The Sahara desert is
spreading [21], and the sub-Saharan region is
expected to suffer reduced precipitation [22].
As climate changes and agricultural patterns
are disrupted, the geopolitics of the future will
increasingly be the politics of scarcity. Potential
rainfall decreases in North Africa would likely
exacerbate the problem of migration to Europe.
Reduced rainfall and increasing desertification
of the sub-Saharan region will likely also result
in migrations to Europe, as well as migrations
within the African continent.
LAND LOSS AND WEATHER
DISASTERS
Sea level rise could also result in the displacement
of large numbers of people on the
African continent, as more than 25 percent
of the African population lives within 100
kilometers (sixty-two miles) of the coast, and
six of Africa’s ten largest cities are on the coast.
Nigeria and Mozambique are particularly vulnerable
to the effects of sea level rise and storm
surges. Two cyclones in 2000 displaced 500,000
people in Mozambique and caused 950,000
people to require some form of humanitarian
assistance [23]. The Niger Delta accounts for
about 7.5 percent of Nigeria’s land area and a
population of 20 million people.
In light of the potential magnitude of the
human crisis that could result from major
weather-related natural disasters and the
magnitude of the response and recovery efforts
that would be required, stability operations
carried out by international militaries will likely
occur more frequently.
HEALTH CHALLENGES WILL
CONTINUE TO ESCALATE
Severe and widespread continental health issues
complicate an already extremely volatile environment.
Climate change will have both direct
and indirect impacts on many diseases endemic
to Africa such as malaria and dengue fever [24].
Increases in temperature can expand the latitude
and altitude ranges for malaria, and flooding
from sea level rise or severe weather events can
increase the population of malaria vectors. For
example, a temperature rise of 2°F can bring a
malaria epidemic to Kenya. Excessive flooding
is also conducive to the spread of cholera.
...the chaos that results can be an
incubator of civil strife, genocide,
and the growth of terrorism.
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g22
“Look at the Navy ocean modelers and
remote sensing experts. They worked with
scientists at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab to
unlock the secrets of El Niño, using spaceborne
altimetry data and new numerical ocean
circulation models. The mission was a military
one, but it ultimately played a role in helping us
understand more about the climate.”
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the
Soviet Union each collected data in the Arctic.
Ice thickness and sub-ice ocean conditions
affecting acoustics were critical security issues.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, many
saw that that data could be used to determine
temperature and ice condition changes over
time. The two sides collaborated on ways
to share and reconcile the data, and in 1996
released the Arctic Ocean Atlas to the
world’s scientific community. The data have
advanced understanding of climate change in
significant ways.
“I think there’s another component to
this,” said Adm. Gaffney. “Defense employees
[military and civilian] actually have a responsibility
to the nation when they have a certain
skill. They have a responsibility to share
that with the public and the nation, as long as
security is not compromised. They’ve done this in
the past. And I’d love to see them able to do this
more often in the future.”
The Department of Defense and the intelligence
community have in the past used their immense
capability for data collection and analysis to
address national and international environmental
questions. Retired Vice Adm. Paul G. Gaffney II
says we have the capacity to do this again, this
time for better understanding and monitoring of
climate change.
The DoD offers equipment, talent and, as
Adm. Gaffney put it, “Data, data, data.”
“You will find the defense and intelligence
communities have extraordinary amounts of
data, and, if done in a careful and deliberate
manner, data collected in the past and into the
future can be made available to climate scientists,”
Adm. Gaffney said. “Be it imagery, other
satellite records, data from Navy oceanographic
ships and vehicles, surface warships and submarines,
or observations collected by aircraft—you
can find ways to smooth it to protect what must
be protected if the raw data cannot be released.
If climate change is, in fact, a critical issue for
security, then the military and intelligence communities
should be specifically tasked to aggressively
find ways to make their data, talent, and
systems capabilities available to American efforts
in understanding climate change signals.
“Most of our ships are already outfitted to
collect basic atmospheric and oceanic information.
U.S. military platforms are all over the world, all
of the time; they become platforms of opportunity
to collect data for this global issue.”
Adm. Gaffney also cited staff capabilities.
“The quality of personnel from the defense
and intelligence organizations is exceptional,”
he said. “Within the DoD, we have labs that are
as good as any that exist anywhere in the world,
using whatever metrics you want—papers published,
patents, Nobel laureates.
VICE ADMIRAL PAUL G. GAFFNEY II, USN (Ret.)
Former President, National Defense University; Former Chief of Naval Research and Commander,
Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command
ON MILITARY RESEARCH AND CLIMATE SCIENCE
“The mission was a military one, but it
ultimately played a role in helping us
understand more about the climate.”
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25V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r gS e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g24
Most climate projections indicate increasing
monsoon variability, resulting in increases in
both flood and drought intensity in temperate
and tropical Asia [24]. Almost 40 percent of
Asia’s population of nearly 4 billion lives within
forty-five miles of its nearly 130,000-mile-long
coastline. Sea level rise, water availability
affecting agricultural productivity, and increased
effects of infectious disease are the primary climate
effects expected to cause problems in Asia.
SEA LEVEL RISE MAY
THREATEN MILLIONS
Some of the most vulnerable regions in the
world to sea level rise are in southern Asia,
along the coasts of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, and Burma; and Southeast Asia,
along the coasts between Thailand and Vietnam,
including Indonesia and the Philippines.
Sandy coastlines backed by densely populated,
low-lying plains make the Southeast
Asian region particularly vulnerable to inundation.
Coastal Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia
could all be threatened with flooding and the
loss of important coastal farmlands.
The location and topography of Bangladesh
make it one of the most vulnerable countries
in the world to a rise in sea level. Situated at
the northeastern region of South Asia on the
Bay of Bengal, it is about the size of Iowa with
a population of almost 150 million. It is very
flat and low lying, except in the northeast and
southeast regions, and has a coastline exceeding
300 miles. About 10 percent of Bangladesh
is within three feet of mean sea level. Over the
next century, population rise, land scarcity and
frequent flooding coupled with increased storm
surge and sea level rise could cause millions of
people to cross the border into India. Migration
across the border with India is already such a
concern that India is building a fence to keep
Bangladeshis out.
India and Pakistan have long, densely populated
and low-lying coastlines that are very vulnerable
to sea level rise and storm surge. Coastal
agriculture, infrastructure, and onshore oil
exploration are at risk. Possible increases in the
frequency and intensity of storm surges could
be disproportionately large in heavily developed
coastal areas and also in low-income rural areas,
particularly such low-lying cities such as Mumbai,
Dhaka and Karachi.
WATER STRESS AFFECTS ASIA’S
ABILITY TO FEED ITS PEOPLE
By 2050, regions dependent on glacial melting
for water may face serious consequences. Asia,
where hundreds of millions of people rely on
waters from vanishing glaciers on the Tibetan
plateau, could be among the hardest hit regions.
Climate change has the potential to exacerbate
water resource stresses in most regions of Asia
[7]. Most countries in Asia will experience
CLIMATE CHANGE CAN AFFECT IMPORTANT
U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Asia, where hundreds of millions of
people rely on waters from vanishing
glaciers on the Tibetan plateau, could
be among the hardest hit regions.
ASIA
often directed internally. They focus on keeping
internal order. There might be cases where the
U.S. military might be in a position to help deal
with the effects of climate change—with floods or
the migrations that might result from them. The
immediate goal would be to relieve suffering, not to
preserve governments. But if you’re partnering
with a nation’s army keeping domestic order, that
can be a real challenge.”
When asked about China, Adm. Prueher noted
that the European Union is working to identify
ways of cooperating with the Chinese on the
development of clean coal technologies. And he
cautioned against those in the U.S. who oppose
any kind of technology exchange with China.
“Yes, China is focused heavily on growth. Yes,
there is what I think is a quite remote possibility
of future military conflict. And, yes, it is a real challenge
to negotiate with them; one can count on
them to negotiate toward what they perceive to be
their own national interest,” he said. “Reasonable
enough. But on the issue of carbon emissions, it
doesn’thelpustosolveourproblemifChinadoesn’t
solve theirs. And that means we need to engage
them on many fronts. Issues of great importance to
our world will not get solved without U.S.-Chinese
cooperation. I happen to like dealing with the
Chinese. You may not, or you may be suspicious
of them, but we need to cooperate.
“They have 1.3 billion people, 200 million of
whom are under-employed or unemployed,” Adm.
Prueher said. “They have a great deal of pride and
see themselves as a great nation. Most of what we
say to enhance environmental progress in China is
seen by them as a way to stop them from continuing
economic growth.
“Not talking to the Chinese is not an option.”
In a discussion of climate change issues in the
Pacific region, retired Adm. Joseph Prueher first
considered the issue from a singular perspective:
the impact climate change may have on the
region’s governments and their relative stability.
Using Singapore as an example, he said, “It’s
a democracy, but with a very strong leadership.
They’ve prospered, but owing to lack of space
they have many restrictions we do not have. If one
looks ahead to the effects of climate change, you
start with the understanding that Singapore, low
lying and very hot, will face more storms and more
moisture. It will face coastal impacts. Those kinds
of changes, in a crowded nation, create a whole
set of issues that affect not just the economy and
culture, but the security dynamic as well.”
Adm. Prueher then shifted the conversation to
the region’s governments in general.
“It may well be that in very crowded nations, a
stronger government is necessary in order to avoid
instability,” he said. “In Asia, one sees a whole line
of countries with governments exercising very firm
control. But when you look to the future to consider
the kinds of impacts we may see—flooding,
extreme weather events, real disruptions—you
also have to consider some steps that we in the
U.S. would think offensive. Those are steps these
governments may feel they need to take in order to
avoid chaos.”
Referencing low-lying regions where arable
land will be lost, he said, “You see mass destruction
in countries where the government is not
robust. When people can’t cope, governing structures
break down.”
Adm. Prueher noted that how a government
responds presents a new set of issues for American
political and military leaders.
“Most of our security forces are for protecting
our nation from outside, but that’s not necessarily
the case in the rest of the world,” Adm.
Prueher said. “Military personnel elsewhere are
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, USN (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and Former U.S. Ambassador to China
ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PACIFIC
substantial declines in agricultural productivity
because of higher temperatures and more variable
rainfall patterns [25]. Net cereal production in
South Asia, for example, is projected to decline
by 4 to 10 percent by the end of this century
under the most conservative climate
change projections.
But the problem isn’t just water scarcity—
too much water can also be a problem. By 2050,
snow melting in the high Himalayas and
increased precipitation across northern India
are likely to produce flooding, especially in
catchments on the western side of the Himalayas,
in northern India, Nepal, Bangladesh,
and Pakistan.
RISING SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASE
Climate change is expected to increase the
geographic range of infectious diseases such
as malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis
and increase the risk of water-borne disease.
Climate projections indicate the Asia/Pacific
region as a whole is likely to become warmer
and wetter in the coming decades, creating
conditions more conducive to disease vectors
such as mosquitoes. With the exception of east
central China and the highlands of west China,
much of the Asia/Pacific region is exposed to
malaria and dengue or has conditions suitable
for their spread. This region will continue to
be a hot spot for these diseases in the decades
ahead, with certain regions becoming more
prone to epidemics.
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
“The military should be interested in fuel
economy on the battlefield,” he said. “It’s a
readiness issue. If you can move your men and
materiel more quickly, if you have less tonnage but
the same level of protection and firepower, you’re
more efficient on the battlefield. That’s a life and
death issue.”
Gen. Farrell talked about the challenge of
focusing on long-term issues.
“Climate change is not something people
can recognize,” he said. “In geologic times, it’s
quick. But in human terms, it’s still very slow.
It’s hard to get all of us to do something about
it. And that leads me to believe we should deal
with other things that are a problem today
but that also get us to the heart of climate
change. That’s where I get to the issue of
smart energy choices.
“Focus on conservation and on energy sources
that aren’t based in carbon. Move toward a
hydrogen economy, in part because you know it will
ultimately give you efficiency and, yes, profit.
When you pursue these things, you build alliances
along the way. That’s safety. It’s a benefit we see
right now.”
He suggested another reason as well: There are
military impacts that come from our energy use.
“We’re forced to be interested in parts of the
world because of our energy consumption,” he
said. “Solving the energy problem solves a real
security problem. You get to choose your points of
engagement. It’s like one of the things your grandmother
told you. ‘Don’t go looking for trouble.
If you find trouble, you have to deal with it—but
don’t go looking for it!’ Well, when we go looking
for oil, we’re really looking for trouble.”
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Larry Farrell sees a
great deal of uncertainty about climate change
and appears willing to engage any credible
scientist in discussions of discrepancies among
climate models.
“You might say I’m from Missouri on this
issue—you have to show me,” he said. “And there
is still much uncertainty and debate on this issue.”
Despite this, Gen. Farrell sees indications that
some change is occurring.
“Clearly, there has been some warming over
the past 100 years and some climate change.
These changes have been accompanied by fairly
significant increases in the greenhouse gases carbon
dioxide and methane. If there is a connection
between warming trends and greenhouse gases,
our use of energy may be playing a part in this. If
these trends continue into the future, the changes
could well exacerbate existing social and political
instabilities and create new ones. The military
has the obligation to assess the potential military
implications of these trends.” Gen. Farrell’s preference
is to focus on solutions.
“If you advocate intelligent energy solutions,
you’ll solve this problem,” Gen. Farrell said,
before walking through a long list of reasons for a
focus on energy.
A key concern for Gen. Farrell: battlefield
readiness.
“Seventy percent of the tonnage on the battlefield
is fuel,” he said. “That’s an amazing number.
Between fuel and water, it’s almost everything we
take to the battlefield. Food and ammo are really
quite small in comparison.
“Delivering that fuel requires secure lines of
communication,” Gen. Farrell said. “If you have
bases nearby, you may be able to deliver it with
much less risk, but that’s a supply line issue.
And we see in Iraq how dangerous it can be to
transport fuel.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LAWRENCE P. FARRELL JR., USAF (Ret.)
Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
ON CLIMATE, ENERGY AND BATTLEFIELD READINESS
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g26 A S I A • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 27
THE PRIMARY STRATEGIC CONCERN
OF EUROPEANS: MASSIVE MIGRATIONS
TO EUROPE
The greater threat to Europe lies in migration
of people from across the Mediterranean,
from the Maghreb, the Middle East, and
sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental stresses and
climate change are certainly not the only factors
driving migrations to Europe. However, as more
people migrate from the Middle East because
of water shortages and loss of their already
marginal agricultural lands (as, for instance,
if the Nile Delta disappears under the rising
sea level), the social and economic stress on
European nations will rise.
It is possible that Europeans, given their
long and proximate association with the subSaharan
African countries, may undertake more
stability operations, as they have in Sierra
Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Their militaries,
and in particular their navies and coast guards,
would also have to increase their activities
in securing their borders and in intercepting
migrants moving by sea, as is now going on
through the Canary Islands.
E U R O P E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 29
Europe is getting warmer overall, northern
Europe is getting wetter, and southern Europe
is getting drier. (For the purposes of this report,
Europe includes the western part of the former
Soviet Union.)
The developed nations of Europe will likely
be able to deal with the direct climate changes
expected for that region, but some of the less
developed nations (the Balkans,for instance)
might be stressed. Europe has already experienced
extreme weather events that herald
potential climate change effects: the more than
35,000 deaths associated with the heat wave of
2003 are a reminder of the vulnerability of all
nations to climate extremes [26]. However, the
major impact on Europe from global climate
change is likely to be migrations, now from the
Maghreb (Northern Africa) and Turkey, and
increasingly, as climate conditions worsen,
from Africa.
DIRECT IMPACTS: HOTTER
TEMPERATURES AND
RISING SEAS
Most of Europe has experienced surface
air temperature increases during the twentieth
century (1.44°F on average), with the largest
increases over northwest Russia and the Iberian
Peninsula. Temperatures in Europe since 1990
THREATENED BY CLIMATE PROBLEMS
FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD
have been the warmest since records have been
kept. More heat waves across all of Europe are
likely to increase stress on human health and
could produce an increased risk of malaria and
dengue fever in southern Europe. Agricultural
zones would move north, and the Mediterranean
regions, especially in Spain, would suffer
a greater loss of productivity.
Precipitation is expected to increase in the
north but decrease in the central and eastern
Mediterranean zones and south Russia, with
acute water shortages projected in the Mediterranean
area, especially in the summer.
MITIGATION AND
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE IN EUROPE
The capacity for adaptation to these changes
is very high in most of prosperous, industrial
Europe, but less so in lesser-developed places
like the Balkans, Moldova, and the Caucasus.
With its shortages of water, the Mediterranean
area could experience considerable strain. In
northern Europe, countries may build higher
dikes, as they have done in the past, but at a
certain point that may not be sufficient, and
much port and other coastal infrastructure
would have to be moved further inland, at
great expense. Some northern migration within
Europe might be expected—the Italians already
face a large Albanian immigration, and others
may press north from the Balkans.
With its shortages of water, the
Mediterranean area could experience
considerable strain.
EUROPE
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g28
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 31
The Middle East has always been associated
with two natural resources, oil (because of its
abundance) and water (because of its scarcity).
The Persian Gulf contains more than half (57
percent) of the world’s oil reserves, and about
45 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves.
And because its production costs are among the
world’s lowest, the Persian Gulf region is likely
to remain the world’s largest oil exporter for the
foreseeable future. At the end of 2003, Persian
Gulf countries produced about 32 percent of
the world’s oil. Because of its enormous oil
endowment, the Middle East is one of the most
strategically significant regions of the world. The
security impacts of climate change on the Middle
East are greatly magnified by its historical and
current levels of international conflict, and
competition for increasingly scarce resources
may exacerbate the level of conflict. This is the
region of the world in which the U.S. is most
engaged militarily.
WATER: INCREASING STRESS ON
AN EXISTING SHORTAGE
In this region, water resources are a critical
issue; throughout history, cultures here have
flourished around particular water sources. With
the population explosion underway, water will
become even more critical. Of the countries in
the Middle East, only Egypt, Iran, and Turkey
have abundant fresh water resources. Roughly
two-thirds of the Arab world depends on sources
outside their borders for water. The most direct
effect of climate change to be felt in the Middle
East will be a reduction in precipitation. But the
change will not be uniform across the region.
The flows of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers are
likely to be reduced, leading to significant water
stress in Israel and Jordan, where water demand
already exceeds supply. Exacerbation of water
shortages in those two countries and in Oman,
Egypt, Iran, and Iraq are likely to threaten conventional
crop production, and salinization of
coastal aquifers could further threaten agriculture
in those regions.
SEA LEVEL RISE
Sea level rise combined with increased water
demand from growing populations are likely to
exacerbate saltwater intrusion into coastal fresh
water aquifers, already a considerable problem for
the Gaza Strip. Salinization of coastal aquifers
could further threaten agriculture in these regions.
Additional loss of arable land and decreases in
food security could encourage migration within
the Middle East and Africa, and from the Middle
East to Europe and elsewhere.
INFLAMING A REGION OF
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Climate change has the potential to exacerbate
tensions over water as precipitation patterns
change, declining by as much as 60 percent in
some areas. In addition, the region already suffers
from fragile governments and infrastructures,
and as a result is susceptible to natural disasters.
Overlaying this is a long history of animosity
among countries and religious groups. With most
of the world’s oil being in the Middle East and
the industrialized and industrializing nations
competing for this resource, the potential for
escalating tensions, economic disruption, and
armed conflict is great.
ABUNDANT OIL, SCARCE WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g30
MIDDLE EAST
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
Gen. Zinni referenced the inevitability of
climate change, with global temperatures sure to
increase. But he also stressed that the intensity of
those changes could be reduced if the U.S. helps
lead the way to a global reduction in carbon emissions.
He urged action now, even if the costs of
action seem high.
“We will pay for this one way or another,” he
said. “We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
today, and we’ll have to take an economic
hit of some kind. Or we will pay the price later in
military terms. And that will involve human lives.
There will be a human toll.
“There is no way out of this that does not have
real costs attached to it. That has to hit home.”
A starting point in understanding this connection
might be to “look at how climate change effects
could drive populations to migrate,” Gen. Zinni
said. “Where do these people move? And what
kinds of conflicts might result from their migration?
You see this in Africa today with the flow of
migrations. It becomes difficult for the neighboring
countries. It can be a huge burden for the host
country, and that burden becomes greater if the
international community is overwhelmed by these
occurrences.
“You may also have a population that is
traumatized by an event or a change in conditions
triggered by climate change,” Gen. Zinni
said. “If the government there is not able to
cope with the effects, and if other institutions
are unable to cope, then you can be faced with
a collapsing state. And these end up as breeding
grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for
warlords. You start to see real extremism. These
places act like Petri dishes for extremism and for
terrorist networks.”
In describing the Middle East, the former
CENTCOM commander said, “The existing
situation makes this place more susceptible to
problems. Even small changes may have a greater
impact here than they may have elsewhere. You
already have great tension over water. These
are cultures often built around a single source
of water. So any stresses on the rivers and aquifers
can be a source of conflict. If you consider
land loss, the Nile Delta region is the most fertile
ground in Egypt. Any losses there could cause a
real problem, again because the region is already
so fragile. You have mass migrations within the
region, going on for many decades now, and they
have been very destabilizing politically.”
GENERAL ANTHONY C. “TONY” ZINNI, USMC (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INSTABILITY AND TERRORISM
“It’s not hard to make the connection
between climate change and instability,
or climate change and terrorism.”
33V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r gS e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g32
Latin America includes some very poor nations
in Central America and in the Caribbean, and
their ability to cope with a changing climate
will present challenges for them and thus for
the U.S. Global climate change can lead to
greater intensity of hurricanes as sea surface
temperatures rise, with enormous implications
for the southeastern U.S., Central America, and
Caribbean nations. Loss of glaciers will strain
water supply in several areas, particularly Peru
and Venezuela. Rising sea levels will threaten all
coastal nations. Caribbean nations are especially
vulnerable in this regard, with the combination
of rising sea levels and increased hurricane
activity potentially devastating to some
island nations.
The primary security threats to the U.S. arise
from the potential demand for humanitarian aid
and a likely increase in immigration from
neighbor states. It is important to remember
that the U.S. will be dealing with its own
climate change issues at the same time.
INCREASING WATER SCARCITY
AND GLACIAL MELT
The melting of glaciers at an accelerated rate
in Venezuela and the Peruvian Andes is a
particular concern because of the direct reliance
on these glaciers for water supplies and hydroelectric
power. The Peruvian plains, northeast
Brazil, and Mexico, already subject to drought,
will find that droughts in the future will last
longer. That would lead to further land degradation
and loss of food production—a blow to
Latin America, which is particularly dependent
on food production for subsistence, and to Brazil,
whose economy is fueled by food exports.
Drought and decreased rainfall is projected
to also affect the central southern U.S. That
could have significant impact on food production
and sources of water for millions. The
High Plains (or“Ogallala”) aquifer underlies
much of the semi-arid west-central U.S. The
aquifer provides water for 27 percent of the
irrigated land in the country and supplies about
30 percent of the groundwater used for irrigation.
In fact, three of the top grain-producing
states—Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska—each
get 70 to 90 percent of their irrigation water
from the Ogallala aquifer [27]. Human-induced
stresses on this groundwater have resulted in
water-table declines greater than 100 feet in
some areas [28]. This already difficult situation
could be greatly exacerbated by a decrease
in rainfall predicted for the region. Similarly, a
recent study by the National Research Council
on the Colorado River basin (the river is the
main water source for tens of millions of people
in the Southwest) predicted substantial decreases
in river flow, based on higher population
coupled with the climate change affects [29].
STORMS AND SEA LEVEL RISE
In looking at the relationship between warmer
temperatures and storm intensity, a panel convened
by the World Meteorological Organization
concluded:“It is likely that some increase
in tropical cyclone peak wind-speed and rainfall
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
RISKS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OUR NEIGHBORS
schedules and impacts operational structures. And
that doesn’t factor in the damage that hurricanes
can do to our ports and maintenance facilities.
We spent a few billion to restore Pascagoula after
Hurricane Katrina—and we’re not done yet. But at
least that’s an impact you can see. People can get
their hands around that.”
Over time, some of the operational issues
related to climate change would be increasingly
difficult to resolve.
“At headquarters, they would need to be much
more thoughtful about investment decisions,” he
said. “Why invest significant resources in bases
that are in low-lying regions? Why invest in bases
that may continue to be flooded? Those are tough
questions to ask, but I’d ask them.”
Retired Adm. Donald L. Pilling, former vice
chief of naval operations, highlighted one of the
reasons government agencies have been slow to
respond to the issue of climate change.
“One of the problems in talking about this
issue is that no one can give you a date by which
many of the worst effects will be occurring,”
Adm. Pilling said. “If it’s 2050, there isn’t a guy in
uniform today who will be wearing a uniform then.
The Pentagon talks about future year plans that
are six years down the road.”
Still, Adm. Pilling was able to talk about the
issue and the planning challenges it might offer.
He enumerated a list of operational impacts,
starting with the assumption that there would be
increased instances of large migrations—people
fleeing homelands that have felt the impacts of
climate changes.
“This is key because it’s easy to see how our
allies can be consumed by this,” Adm. Pilling
said. “They won’t have time to participate in
exercises at sea because all of their assets will
be focused on protecting the border and beaches.
Europe will be focused on its own borders.
There is potential for fracturing some very strong
alliances based on migrations and the lack of
control over borders.
“Open seas at the Arctic means you have
another side of this continent exposed,” he
said. “Between the Canadians and us, there are
a handful of ships oriented for the northernmost
latitudes. But there is not much flexibility or
depth there.”
He said that an increase in the frequency or
intensity of hurricanes could have a destabilizing
effect on maintenance and the stability of ships
and fleets. “It may cause you to move ships north
to avoid hurricanes. If a ship’s captain thinks he’s
in the middle of hurricane season, he’s going to go
out—get away from port. It impacts maintenance
ADMIRAL DONALD L. “DON” PILLING, USN (Ret.)
Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations
ON OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
“There is potential for fracturing some very
strong alliances based on migrations and
the lack of control over borders.”
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
35
and referenced a passage from the book Transboundary
Rivers, Sovereignty and Development
(Anthony Turton, Peter Ashton, and Eugene
Cloete, eds.), which states that “there is a vast
and growing literature that cites water as a likely
cause of wars in the twenty-first century, and the
15 international basins in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) are regularly
named as points of tension, second only to the
arid and hostile Middle East.”
He quoted from a letter written to him by
Anthony Turton, a soldier in the war over the
Okavong River basin, who wrote that “to serve
one’s country on the field of battle is truly
noble, but to serve as a peace-builder is truly
great.” Turton also wrote that in his new role
of restoring river basins, he has “found
personal peace.”
Gen. Kern also cited the late Nobel Laureate,
Dr. Rick Smalley, of Rice University, who often
lectured on the world’s top 10 problems. Smalley
listed energy, water, food, and the environment at
the top of his list.
“While the military community has not
focused on these issues, we often find ourselves
responding to a crisis created by the loss of these
staples, or by a conflict over claims to one or more
of them,” Gen. Kern said. “In my view, therefore,
military planning should view climate change as
a threat to the balance of energy access, water
supplies, and a healthy environment, and it should
require a response. Responding after the fact
with troops—after a crisis occurs—is one kind of
response. Working to delay these changes—to
accommodate a balance among these staples—
is, of course, another way.”
In 1989, Gen. Kern commanded a brigade based
at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and was preparing
to send men and materiel to Turkey in advance
of NATO training exercises. Those plans were
interrupted by Hurricane Hugo, which appeared
headed to Savannah, the port of departure for the
mission.
“We were all ready to go, but the ships
involved in transport had to be sent to Norfolk,”
Gen. Kern said. “So we broke down the
shipments that had already been assembled
for delivery. We then moved our aviation assets
out, and moved base families into shelters.
Ultimately, the hurricane hit Charleston, and did
major damage to the airbase there. That meant
one of my military battalions was deployed to
Charleston to help with the recovery there.”
“These weren’t immense challenges
for us—they were things we could handle,”
Gen. Kern said. “But the planned training
exercises—preparing us for our core military
mission—were not as good as they could have
been. It’s a very subtle thing, but there you have
it in a nutshell: Extreme weather can affect your
readiness.”
Looking ahead, Gen. Kern, now retired from
active duty, discussed wider global trends that
the military must address to achieve an optimal
state of readiness. He believes “the critical
factors for economic and security stability in the
twenty-first century are energy, water, and the
environment. These three factors need to be balanced
for people to achieve a reasonable quality
of life. When they are not in balance, people live in
poverty, suffer high death rates, or move toward
armed conflict.”
The need for water illustrates the consequences
of imbalance. “When water is scarce,
people move until they can find adequate supply,”
he said. “As climate change causes shifts in
accessibility to water, we observe large movements
of refugees and emigration.”
He said Africa offers prime examples of this,
GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, USA (Ret.)
Former Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command
ON WEATHER, LOGISTICS, AND THE CAUSES OF WAR
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
“Military planning should view climate change
as a threat to the balance of energy access,
water supplies, and a healthy environment,
and it should require a response.”
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r gS e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g34
will occur if the climate continues to warm.
Model studies and theory project a 3-5%
increase in wind-speed per degree Celsius
increase of tropical sea surface temperatures”
[30]. Warming seas and their link to storm
energy are especially worrisome for Central
American and small Caribbean island nations
that do not have the social infrastructure to
deal with natural disasters.
Flooding could increase with sea level
rises, especially in the low-lying areas of North
America—inundation models from the University
of Arizona project that a sea level rise
of three feet would cause much of Miami, Fort
Myers, a large portion of the Everglades, and all
of the Florida Keys to disappear [31].
In the past, U.S. military forces have
responded to natural disasters, and are likely to
continue doing so in the foreseeable future [32].
The military was deployed to Central America
after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and to Haiti
following the rains and mudslides of 2004. The
U.S. military was also heavily involved in the
response to Hurricane Katrina. Climate change
will likely increase calls for this type of mission
in the Americas in the future.
INCREASED MIGRATION/REFUGEE
FLOWS INTO THE U.S.
The greater problem for the U.S. may be an
increased flow of migrants northward into the
U.S. Already, a large volume of south to north
migration in the Americas is straining some
states and is the subject of national debate. The
migration is now largely driven by economics
and political instability. The rate of immigration
from Mexico to the U.S. is likely to rise because
the water situation in Mexico is already
marginal and could worsen with less rainfall
and more droughts. Increases in weather
disasters, such as hurricanes elsewhere, will also
stimulate migrations to the U.S. [32].
37
DIRECT IMPACTS ON MILITARY
SYSTEMS, INFRASTRUCTURE,
AND OPERATIONS
Climate change will stress the U.S. military by
affecting weapons systems and platforms, bases,
and military operations. It also presents opportunities
for constructive engagement.
WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND
PLATFORMS
Operating equipment in extreme environmental
conditions increases maintenance requirements—at
considerable cost—and dramatically
reduces the service life of the equipment. In
Iraq, for instance, sandstorms have delayed or
stopped operations and inflicted tremendous
damage to equipment. In the future, climate
change—whether hotter, drier, or wetter—will
add stress to our weapons systems.
A stormier northern Atlantic would have
implications for U.S. naval forces [34]. More
storms and rougher seas increase transit times,
contribute to equipment fatigue and hamper
flight operations. Each time a hurricane
approaches the U.S. East Coast, military
aircraft move inland and Navy ships leave port.
Warmer temperatures in the Middle East could
make operations there even more difficult than
they are today. A Center for Naval Analyses
study showed that the rate at which U.S.
carriers could launch aircraft was limited by
the endurance of the flight deck crew during
extremely hot weather [34].
BASES THREATENED BY RISING
SEA LEVELS
During the Cold War, the U.S. established and
maintained a large number of bases throughout
the world. U.S. bases abroad are situated to
provide a worldwide presence and maximize
our ability to move aircraft and personnel.
Climate change could compromise some of
those bases. For example, the highest point of
Diego Garcia, an atoll in the southern Indian
Ocean that serves as a major logistics hub for
U.S. and British forces in the Middle East, is
only a few feet above sea level. As sea level rises,
facilities there will be lost or will have to relocated.
Although the consequences to military
readiness are not insurmountable, the loss of
some forward bases would require longer range
lift and strike capabilities and would increase
the military’s energy needs.
Closer to home, military bases on the eastern
coast of the United States are vulnerable to
hurricanes and other extreme weather events.
In 1992, Hurricane Andrew ravaged Homestead
Air Force Base in Florida so much that it never
reopened; in 2004 Hurricane Ivan knocked
out Naval Air Station Pensacola for almost a
year. Increased storm activity or sea level rise
caused by future climate change could threaten
or destroy essential base infrastructure. If key
military bases are degraded, so, too, may be the
readiness of our forces.
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Severe weather has a direct effect on military
readiness. Ships and aircraft operations are
made more difficult; military personnel themselves
must evacuate or seek shelter. As retired
DIRECT IMPACTS ON MILITARY SYSTEMS,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND OPERATIONS
Climate change—whether hotter,
drier, or wetter—will add stress to
our weapons systems.
D I R E C T I M P A C T S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
39
Army Gen. Paul Kern explained of his time
dealing with hurricanes in the U.S. Southern
Command:“A major weather event becomes a
distraction from your ability to focus on and
execute your military mission.”
In addition, U.S. forces may be required to be
more engaged in stability operations in the future
as climate change causes more frequent weather
disasters such as hurricanes, flash floods, and
extended droughts.
THE ARCTIC: A REGION OF PARTICULAR
CONCERN
A warming Arctic holds great implications for
military operations. The highest levels of planetary
warming observed to date have occurred
in the Arctic, and projections show the high
northern latitudes warming more than any other
part of the earth over the coming century. The
Arctic, often considered to be the proverbial
“canary” in the earth climate system, is showing
clear signs of stress [33].
The U.S. Navy is concerned about the retreat
and thinning of the ice canopy and its implications
for naval operations. A 2001 Navy study
concluded that an ice-free Arctic will require an
“increased scope of naval operations” [35]. That
increased scope of operations will require the
Navy to consider weapon system effectiveness
and various other factors associated with operating
in this environment. Additionally, an Arctic
with less sea ice could bring more competition
for resources, as well as more commercial and
military activity that could further threaten an
already fragile ecosystem.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY
SUPPLIES ARE VULNERABLE TO
EXTREME WEATHER
The DoD is almost completely dependent on
electricity from the national grid to power critical
missions at fixed installations and on petroleum
to sustain combat training and operations. Both
sources of energy and their distribution systems
are susceptible to damage from extreme weather.
The national electric grid is fragile and can be
easily disrupted.Witness the Northeast Blackout
of 2003, which was caused by trees falling onto
power lines in Ohio. It affected 50 million people
in eight states and Canada, took days to restore,
and caused a financial loss in the United States
estimated to be between $4 billion and $10
billion [36]. People lost water supplies,
transportation systems, and communications
systems (including Internet and cell phones).
Factories shut down, and looting occurred.
As extreme weather events becomes more
common, so do the threats to our national
electricity supply.
One approach to securing power to DoD
installations for critical missions involves a
combination of aggressively applying energy
efficiency technologies to reduce the critical
load (more mission, less energy); deploying
renewable energy sources; and“islanding” the
installation from the national grid. Islanding
allows power generated on the installations to
flow two ways—onto the grid when there is
excess production and from the grid when the
load exceeds local generation. By pursuing these
actions to improve resiliency of mission, DoD
would become an early adopter of technologies
that would help transform the grid, reduce our
load, and expand the use of renewable energy.
For deployed systems, the DoD pays a high
price for high fuel demand. In Iraq, significant
combat forces are dedicated to moving fuel and
protecting fuel supply lines. The fuel delivery
situation on the ground in Iraq is so limited
As extreme weather events becomes
more common, so do the threats to
our national electricity supply.
D I R E C T I M P A C T S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r gS e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g38
that that the Army has established a“Power
Surety Task Force” to help commanders of
forward operating bases cut the number of fuel
convoys by using energy more efficiently. Maj.
Gen. Richard Zilmer, USMC, commander of
the multinational force in the Anbar province
of Iraq, asked for help in August 2006. His
request was for renewable energy systems.
According to Gen. Zilmer,“reducing the
military’s dependence on fuel for power generation
could reduce the number of road-bound
convoys …‘Without this solution [renewable
energy systems], personnel loss rates are likely
to continue at their current rate. Continued
casualty accumulation exhibits potential to
jeopardize mission success.…’”Along a similar
vein, Lt. Gen. James Mattis, while commanding
general of the First Marine Division during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, urged:“Unleash us
from the tether of fuel.”
Energy-efficiency technologies, energy
conservation practices and renewable energy
sources are the tools forward bases are using to
stem their fuel demand and reduce the“target
signature” of their fuel convoys.
Numerous DoD studies dating from the
2001 Defense Science Board report“More
Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel
Burden” have concluded that high fuel demand
by combat forces detracts from our combat
capability, makes our forces more vulnerable,
diverts combat assets from offense to supply
line protection, and increases operating costs.
Nowhere are these problems more evident than
in Iraq, where every day 2.4 million gallons of
fuel is moved through dangerous territory,
requiring protection by armored combat
vehicles and attack helicopters [37].
DoD planners estimate that it costs $15 to
deliver one gallon of fuel from its commercial
supplier to the forward edge of the battlefield
and about $26 to deliver a gallon of fuel from
an airborne tanker, not counting the tanker
aircraft cost. Furthermore, DoD’s procedures
for determining the types of systems it needs do
not take these fuel burden considerations into
account. DoD should require more efficient
combat systems and should include the actual
cost of delivering fuel when evaluating the
advantages of investments in efficiency [38, 39].
DoD should have an incentive to accurately
account for the cost of moving and protecting
fuel and to invest in technologies that will
provide combat power more efficiently.
Deploying technologies that make our forces
more efficient also reduces greenhouse gas
emissions. The resulting technologies would
make a significant contribution to the vision
President Bush expressed in his State of the
Union speech when he said,“America is on the
verge of technological breakthroughs that will
… help us to confront the serious challenge of
global climate change.”
Given the human and economic cost of
delivering fuel to combat forces and the almost
total dependence on the electric grid for critical
missions, DoD has strong operational economic
incentives to aggressively pursue energy efficiency
in its combat systems and its installations.
By investing at levels commensurate with its
interests, DoD would become an early adopter
of innovative technologies and could stimulate
others to follow.
ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Climate change threats also create opportunities
for constructive engagement such as stability
operations and capacity building. The U.S.
military helped deliver relief to the victims of
... reducing the military’s dependence on
fuel for power generation could reduce
the number of road-bound convoys …
41
the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami because it is
the only institution capable of rapidly delivering
personnel and materiel anywhere in the world
on relatively short notice. DoD Directive
3000.05, issued in 2006, provides the mandate
to conduct military and civilian stability
operations in peacetime as well as conflict to
maintain order in states and regions. The
Combatant Command’s Theater Security
Cooperation Program, which seeks to engage
regional states, could be easily focused on
climate change mitigation and executed in
concert with other U.S. agencies through U.S.
embassy country teams. The objective would be
to build the host nation military’s capabilities
and capacity to support civilian government
agencies. It also enhances good governance and
promotes stability, making failed states and
terrorist incursion less likely. Because many
climate change problems cross borders, it
could also promote regional communication
and cooperation.
If the frequency of natural disasters increases
with climate change, future military and political
leaders may face hard choices about where
and when to engage. Deploying troops affects
readiness elsewhere; choosing not to may affect
alliances. And providing aid in the aftermath of
a catastrophic event or natural disaster can help
retain stability in a nation or region, which in
turn could head off U.S. military engagement in
that region at a later date.
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g40
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E
that would reduce national security risks even
if this is a low probability event, given the
potential magnitude of the consequences. He
feels that as the debate over cause, effect,
and magnitude continues, we in the military
should begin now to take action to provide a
resilient defense against the effects of severe
climate change, not only within our own borders,
but also to provide resiliency to those
regions of unrest and stress that already are
threatening our national security today.
The admiral further believes that “our
national security is inextricably linked to our
country’s energy security.” Thoughtful national
policy is required as we debate a correct
course of future energy policy. International
participation is necessary for this global
issue. Adm. Bowman firmly believes that
“energy and economic security—key components
of our national security—must be
undergirded by alternative forms of energy
available indigenously and from countries
whose values are not at odds with our own.
As our economy and GDP have grown, so
have our energy needs. This demand for energy
strains available supplies: energy sources used
for one purpose, such as electricity generation,
are not available for other needs. Natural
gas used for electricity is not available as
feedstock for many industries that depend
on it, like the chemical industry, the fertilizer
industry, and the plastics industry. Short-term
Adm. Bowman’s more than thirty-eight years
of naval service in the nuclear submarine community
lead him to these thoughts: “Our
nuclear submarines operate in an unforgiving
environment. Our Navy has recognized
this environment and has mitigated the risk
of reactor and undersea operations through
a combination of: a) careful selection of
motivated, intelligent people whom we train
and qualify to the highest standards; b)
rigorous quality assurance of component
design and manufacturing; c) verbatim compliance
with strict rules of operation; d)
routine examination of all aspects of reactor
and submarine operations; and, e) a constant
sharing of the lessons we learn through these
processes. These components lead to a defense
in depth against a very low probability,
but high consequence event. We should begin
planning for a similar approach in dealing
with potential climate change effects on our
national security.”
Adm. Bowman notes that today, a raging
debate is underway over a potential set of
climate-induced global changes that could
have a profound impact on America’s national
security interests. Our Military Advisory Board
hasheardthearguments,somedepictingneardoomsday
scenarios of severe weather and
oceanic changes exacerbated by man-made
emissions of greenhouse gases to our environment,
others depicting a much less severe
outcome as merely one in many observed
cyclic weather patterns over time, with
virtually no man-made component.
Adm. Bowman concludes that regardless
of the probability of the occurrence, the projected
weather-driven global events could be dire
and could adversely affect our national security
and military options significantly. He therefore
argues that the prudent course is to begin
planning, as we have in submarine operations,
to develop a similar defense in depth
ADMIRAL FRANK “SKIP” BOWMAN, USN (Ret.)
Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program; Former Deputy Administrator-Naval Reactors,
National Nuclear Security Administration
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
decisions made over the past decade to build
cheap gas generation placed an unsustainable
demand on natural gas and has resulted
in hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs moving
offshore.”
Adm. Bowman warns that this interdependence
between energy policy and national
security must be viewed over the long haul as
the country addresses global climate change.
“Coal and nuclear electricity generation
remain the obvious choices for new U.S.
generation. However, to meet the concerns
over measured and measurable increases in
CO2
concentrations in our atmosphere and
their potential effect on climate, the country,
as a matter of national urgency, must develop
the technologies to capture and sequester
CO2
from coal generation. This technology
is not available today on a commercial scale,
and the lead time for its development is measured
in tens of years, not months.
Therefore, Adm. Bowman argues, we
should begin developing plans to shore
up our own defenses against the potentially
serious effects of climate, regardless of the
probability of that occurrence, while making
more resilient those countries ill-prepared today
to deal with that potential due to disease,
poor sanitation, lack of clean water, insufficient
electricity, and large coastal populations.
In doing so, these plans must recognize the
interdependency of energy and security.
“Our nuclear submarines operate in an unforgiving
environment. Our Navy has recognized this environment
and has mitigated the risk. … We should begin planning
for a similar approach in dealing with potential climate
change effects on our national security.”
V O I C E S O F E X P E R I E N C E • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g42
An increase in extreme weather can make the
most demanding of tasks even more challenging.
Increases in global temperatures will increase
the likelihood of extreme weather events,
including temperature extremes, precipitation
events, and intense tropical cyclone activity [7].
With this in mind, we ask the obvious:
How does extreme weather affect warfare?
The impacts are significant. There are
countless historical examples of how weather
events have affected the outcome of a conflict.
• Typhoons (Divine Wind) twice saved
Japan from invasion by Kublai Khan and his
Mongol horde.
• North Sea gales badly battered the Spanish
Armada in 1588 when Sir Francis Drake
defeated it, saving England from invasion.
• The severe and unpredictable Russian
winter has defeated three invading armies:
Charles XII of Sweden in 1708,
Napoleon in 1812 and Hitler in 1941.
• During the American Revolution, George
Washington would have been surrounded at
the Battle of Long Island had adverse winds not
prevented the British from landing and cutting
him off.
• Hardships from a severe drought in 1788
are thought to be the spark that caused the
French Revolution.
• Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of
Waterloo in large part because a torrential
downpour obscured visibility and delayed the
French attack.
WEATHER AND WARFARE
Though technology allows us to overcome many
obstacles, weather still poses great threats to
successful military operations on the land, sea,
or in the air.
• During World War II, Typhoon Cobra
capsized three destroyers, a dozen more ships
were seriously damaged and 793 men died. This
natural disaster, called the Navy’s worst defeat in
open seas in World War II, killed nearly a third
as many as in the attack on Pearl Harbor.
• Many know that D-Day awaited the right
weather before it began. Many don’t know that
a freak storm destroyed floating docks shortly
beforehand, almost canceling the invasion.
• During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, heavy
winds prevented Saddam Hussein from launching
Scud missiles at Israel and coalition forces.
• During the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq
war, sandstorms delayed or stopped operations
and did tremendous damage to equipment.
In March 2003, the entire invasion of Iraq
was stalled for three days because of a massive
sandstorm.
These examples are not meant to suggest
that weather changes will put the American
military at a disadvantage. They do, however,
help illustrate ways in which climate change can
add new layers of complexity to military
operations. An increase in extreme weather
can make the most demanding of tasks even
more challenging.
An increase in extreme weather can
make the most demanding of tasks even
more challenging.
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
where societal demands exceed the capacity of
governments to cope. As a result, the U.S. may
also be called upon to undertake stability and
reconstruction efforts once a conflict has begun.
Finding 3:
Projected climate change will add to tensions
even in stable regions of the world.
Developed nations, including the U.S. and
Europe, may experience increases in immigrants
and refugees as drought increases and food
production declines in Africa and Latin America.
Pandemic disease caused by the spread of
infectious diseases and extreme weather events
and natural disasters, as the U.S. experienced
with Hurricane Katrina, may lead to increased
domestic missions for U.S. military personnel—
lowering troop availability for other missions
and putting further stress on our already
stretched military, including our Guard and
Reserve forces.
Our current National Security Strategy,
released in 2002 and updated in 2006, refers
to globalization and other factors that have
changed the security landscape. It cites, among
other factors,“environmental destruction,
whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic
mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes,
earthquakes or tsunamis. Problems of this
scope may overwhelm the capacity of local
authorities to respond, and may even overtax
national militaries, requiring a larger international
response. These challenges are not
traditional national security concerns, such as
the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left
unaddressed they can threaten national security.”
In addition to acknowledging the national
security implications of extreme weather and
other environmental factors, the National
Security Strategy indicates that the U.S. may
have to intervene militarily, though it clearly
states that dealing with the effects of these
events should not be the role of the U.S.
military alone.
Despite the language in our current
National Security Strategy, there is insufficient
planning and preparation on the operational
level for future environmental impacts.
However,such planning can readily be undertaken
by the U.S.military in cooperation with the
appropriate civilian agencies,including the State
Department, the United States Agency for
International Development, and the
intelligence community.
Finding 4:
Climate change, national security, and
energy dependence are a related set of
global challenges.
As President Bush noted in his 2007 State
of the Union speech, dependence on foreign oil
leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes and
terrorists, and clean domestic energy alternatives
help us confront the serious challenge of global
climate change. Because the issues are linked,
solutions to one affect the others. Technologies
that improve energy efficiency also reduce
carbon intensity and carbon emissions.
45F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
This report is intended to advance a more rigorous
national and international dialogue on the
impacts of climate change on national security.
We undertook this analysis for the primary
purpose of presenting the problem and identifying
first-order solutions. We therefore keep this list
of findings and recommendations intentionally
brief. We hope it will stimulate further discussion
by the public and a more in-depth analysis
by those whose job it is to plan for our
national security.
FINDINGS
Finding 1:
Projected climate change poses a serious
threat to America’s national security.
Potential threats to the nation’s security
require careful study and prudent planning—
to counter and mitigate potential detrimental
outcomes. Based on the evidence presented, the
Military Advisory Board concluded that it is
appropriate to focus on the serious consequences
to our national security that are likely from
unmitigated climate change.In already-weakened
states, extreme weather events, drought, flooding,
sea level rise, retreating glaciers, and the rapid
spread of life-threatening diseases will themselves
have likely effects: increased migrations,
further weakened and failed states, expanded
ungoverned spaces, exacerbated underlying
conditions that terrorist groups seek to exploit,
and increased internal conflicts. In developed
countries, these conditions threaten to disrupt
economic trade and introduce new security
challenges, such as increased spread of infectious
disease and increased immigration.
Overall, climate change has the potential to
disrupt our way of life and force changes in how
we keep ourselves safe and secure by adding a
new hostile and stressing factor into the national
and international security environment.
Finding 2:
Climate change acts as a threat multiplier
for instability in some of the most volatile
regions of the world.
Many governments in Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East are already on edge in terms of
their ability to provide basic needs: food, water,
shelter and stability. Projected climate change
will exacerbate the problems in these regions
and add to the problems of effective governance.
Unlike most conventional security threats that
involve a single entity acting in specific ways at
different points in time, climate change has the
potential to result in multiple chronic conditions,
occurring globally within the same time
frame. Economic and environmental conditions
in these already fragile areas will further erode
as food production declines, diseases increase,
clean water becomes increasingly scarce, and
populations migrate in search of resources.
Weakened and failing governments, with an
already thin margin for survival, foster the
conditions for internal conflict, extremism, and
movement toward increased authoritarianism
and radical ideologies. The U.S. may be drawn
more frequently into these situations to help to
provide relief, rescue, and logistics, or to stabilize
conditions before conflicts arise.
Because climate change also has the potential
to create natural and humanitarian disasters on
a scale far beyond those we see today, its consequences
will likely foster political instability
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g44
from climate change. Actions fall into two main
categories: mitigating climate change to the
extent possible by setting targets for long-term
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and
adapting to those effects that cannot be mitigated.
Since this is a global problem, it requires a global
solution with multiple relevant instruments of
government contributing.
While it is beyond the scope of this study
to recommend specific solutions, the path to
mitigating the worst security consequences of
climate change involves reducing global greenhouse
gas emissions. Achieving this outcome
will also require cooperation and action by
many agencies of government.
Recommendation 3:
The U.S. should commit to global partnerships
that help less developed nations build
the capacity and resiliency to better manage
climate impacts.
Some of the nations predicted to be most affected
by climate change are those with the least capacity
to adapt or cope. This is especially true in Africa,
which is becoming an increasingly important
source of U.S. oil and gas imports.Already
suffering tension and stress resulting from weak
governance and thin margins of survival due
to food and water shortages,Africa would be
yet further challenged by climate change. The
proposal by DoD to establish a new Africa
Command reflects Africa’s emerging strategic
importance to the U.S., and with humanitarian
catastrophes already occurring, a worsening of
conditions could prompt further U.S. military
engagement.As a result, the U.S. should focus on
enhancing the capacity of weak African governments
to better cope with societal needs and to
resist the overtures of well-funded extremists to
provide schools, hospitals, health care, and food.
The U.S. should target its engagement
efforts, through regional military commanders
and other U.S. officials, toward building capacity
to mitigate destabilizing climate impacts. For example,
regional commanders have routinely used
such engagement tools as cooperation on disaster
preparedness to help other nations develop their
own ability to conduct these efforts.
Cooperative engagement has the potential
to reduce the likelihood of war fighting. As
Gen. Anthony C. (Tony) Zinni (Ret.) has said:
“When I was commander of CENTCOM, I
had two missions: engagement and war fighting:
If I do engagement well, I won’t have to do
war fighting.” The U.S. cannot do this alone;
nor should the military be the sole provider of
such cooperative efforts. But the U.S. can lead
by working in cooperation with other nations.
Such efforts promote greater regional cooperation,
confidence building and the capacity of
all elements of national influence to contribute
to making nations resilient to the impacts of
climate change.
Recommendation 4:
The Department of Defense should enhance
its operational capability by accelerating
the adoption of improved business processes
and innovative technologies that result
in improved U.S. combat power through
energy efficiency.
DoD should require more efficient combat
systems and should include the actual cost of
delivering fuel when evaluating the advantages
of investments in efficiency. Numerous DoD
studies dating from the 2001 Defense
Science Board report“More Capable
Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden”
have concluded that high fuel demand by
combat forces detracts from our combat
capability, makes our forces more vulnerable,
diverts combat assets from offense to supply
line protection, and increases operating costs.
Nowhere are these problems more evident than
47F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
Recommendation 1:
The national security consequences of climate
change should be fully integrated into national
security and national defense strategies.
As military leaders, we know we cannot wait for
certainty. Failing to act because a warning isn’t
precise is unacceptable. Numerous parts of the
U.S. government conduct analyses of various
aspects of our national security situation covering
different time frames and at varying levels of
detail. These analyses should consider the
consequences of climate change.
The intelligence community should incorporate
climate consequences into its National
Intelligence Estimate. The National Security
Strategy should directly address the threat of
climate change to our national security interests.
It also should include an assessment of the
national security risks of climate change and
direct the U.S. government to take appropriate
preventive efforts now.
The National Security Strategy and the
National Defense Strategy should include
appropriate guidance to military planners to
assess risks to current and future missions of
projected climate change, guidance for updating
defense plans based on these assessments, and
the capabilities needed to reduce future impacts.
This guidance should include appropriate revisions
to defense plans, including working with
allies and partners, to incorporate climate mitigation
strategies, capacity building, and relevant
research and development.
The next Quadrennial Defense Review
should examine the capabilities of the U.S. military
to respond to the consequences of climate
change, in particular, preparedness for natural
disasters from extreme weather events, pandemic
disease events, and other missions the
U.S. military may be asked to support both
at home and abroad. The capability of the
National Guard and Reserve to support these
missions in the U.S. deserve special attention,
as they are already stretched by current
military operations.
The U.S. should evaluate the capacity of the
military and other institutions to respond to
the consequences of climate change. All levels
of government—federal, state, and local—will
need to be involved in these efforts to provide
capacity and resiliency to respond and adapt.
Scientific agencies such as the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the United
States Geologic Survey (USGS) should also
be brought into the planning processes.
The defense and intelligence communities
should conduct research on global climate and
monitor global climate signals to understand
their national security implications. Critical
security-relevant knowledge about climate
change has come from the partnership between
environmental scientists and the defense and
intelligence communities. That partnership,
vibrant in the 1990s, should be revived.
Recommendation 2:
The U.S. should commit to a stronger
national and international role to help
stabilize climate changes at levels that
will avoid significant disruption to global
security and stability.
All agencies involved with climate science,
treaty negotiations, energy research, economic
policy, and national security should participate
in an interagency process to develop a deliberate
policy to reduce future risk to national security
RECOMMENDATIONS
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g46
APPENDICES
in Iraq, where every day 2.4 million gallons
of fuel is moved through dangerous territory,
requiring protection by armored combat
vehicles and attack helicopters.
Deploying technologies that make our forces
more efficient also reduces greenhouse gas
emissions. DoD should invest in technologies
that will provide combat power more efficiently.
The resulting technologies would make a significant
contribution to the vision President Bush
expressed in his State of the Union when he
said,“America is on the verge of technological
breakthroughs that … will help us to confront
the serious challenge of global climate change.”
Recommendation 5:
DoD should conduct an assessment of the
impact on U.S. military installations worldwide
of rising sea levels, extreme weather
events, and other possible climate change
impacts over the next 30 to 40 years.
As part of prudent planning, DoD should
assess the impact of rising sea levels, extreme
weather events, drought, and other climate
impacts on its infrastructure so its installations
and facilities can be made more resilient.
Numerous military bases, both in the U.S.
and overseas, will be affected by rising sea levels
and increased storm intensity. Since World
War II, the number of overseas bases has diminished,
and since the Base Realignment and
Closure process began the number of stateside
bases has also declined. This makes those that
remain more critical for training and readiness,
and many of them are susceptible to the effects
of climate change. For example, the British
Indian Ocean Territory island of Diego Garcia,
an atoll in the southern Indian Ocean, is a major
logistics hub for U.S. and British forces in the
Middle East. It is also only a few feet above sea
level at its highest point. The consequences
of the losing places like Diego Garcia are not
insurmountable, but are significant and would
require advance military planning. The Kwajalein
is a low-lying atoll, critical for space
operations and missile tests. Guam is the U.S.
gateway to Asia and could be moderately or
severely affected by rising sea levels. Loss of
some forward bases would require us to have
longer range lift and strike capabilities and
possibly increase our military’s energy needs.
Military bases on the eastern coast of the
U.S. are vulnerable to hurricanes and other
extreme weather events. In 1992, Hurricane
Andrew virtually destroyed Homestead Air
Force Base in Florida. In 2004 Hurricane Ivan
knocked out Naval Air Station Pensacola for
almost a year. Most U.S. Navy and Coast Guard
bases are located on the coast, as are most U.S.
Marine Corps locations. The Army and Air
Force also operate bases in low-lying or coastal
areas. One meter of sea level rise would inundate
much of Norfolk,Virginia, the major East Coast
hub for the U.S. Navy.As key installations are
degraded, so is the readiness of our forces.
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g48
A P P E N D I X 1 • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 51S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g50
V I C E A D M I R A L PA U L G . G A F F N E Y I I , U S N (Ret.)
Former President, National Defense University; Former Chief of Naval Research and Commander,
Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command
Admiral Gaffney has been the Naval Research Laboratory commander and worked in a number of other science and oceanography
administration assignments. He served as the 10th president of the National Defense University, and before that as chief of naval research.
He also was the senior uniformed oceanography specialist in the Navy, having served as commander of the Navy Meteorology and Oceanography
Command from 1994 to 1997. He was appointed by President George W. Bush to the Ocean Policy Commission and served
during its full tenure from 2001 to 2004. He served in Japan, Vietnam, Spain, and Indonesia, and traveled extensively in official capacities.
He has been recognized with a number of military decorations; the Naval War College’s J. William Middendorf Prize for Strategic
Research, the Outstanding Public Service Award from the Virginia Research and Technology Consortium, and the Potomac Institute’s
Navigator Award. He has served on several boards of higher education and was a member of the Ocean Studies Board of the National
Re-search Council from 2003 to 2005. He has been selected to be a public trustee for the New Jersey Consortium and chaired the
Governor’s Commission to Protect and Enhance New Jersey’s Military Bases.
He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1968 and has a master’s degree in mechanical engineering (ocean) from Catholic
University and a master’s of business administration from Jacksonville University.
Admiral Gaffney is currently the president of Monmouth University in West Long Branch, New Jersey.
G E N E R A L PA U L J . K E R N , U S A (Ret.)
Former Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command
General Kern was commanding general, Army Materiel Command from 2001 to 2004, and senior adviser for Army Research, Development,
and Acquisition from 1997 to 2001.
General Kern had three combat tours. Two were in Vietnam as a platoon leader and troop commander. His third was as commander
of the Second Brigade of the 24th Infantry in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Second Brigade played a pivotal role in the historic attack
on the Jalibah Airfield, which allowed the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division to secure key objectives deep inside of Iraq. He also served as the
assistant division commander of the division after its redeployment to Fort Stewart, Georgia.
General Kern’s assignments included senior military assistant to Secretary of Defense William Perry. During that period, he accompanied
Secretary Perry to more than 70 countries, meeting numerous heads of state, foreign ministers, and international defense leaders.
He participated in U.S. operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Zaire, and the Balkans, and helped promote military relations in Central and Eastern
Europe, South America, China, and the Middle East.
General Kern received the Defense and Army Distinguished Service Medals, Silver Star, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of
Merit, two Bronze Star Medals for valor, three Bronze Star Medals for service in combat, and three Purple Hearts. He has been awarded
the Society of Automotive Engineers Teeter Award, the Alumni Society Medal from the University of Michigan, and the German Cross of
Honor of the Federal Armed Forces (Gold).
A native of West Orange, New Jersey, General Kern was commissioned as an armor lieutenant following graduation from West Point
in 1967. He holds master’s degrees in both civil and mechanical engineering from the University of Michigan, and he was a Senior Security
Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
He is an adviser to Battelle Memorial Institute and holds the Chair of the Class of 1950 for Advanced Technology at the United States
Military Academy.
General Kern is a member of the Cohen Group, which provides strategic advice and guidance to corporate clients.
A D M I R A L F R A N K “ S K I P ” B O W M A N , U S N (Ret.)
Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program;
Former Deputy Administrator-Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration
Admiral Skip Bowman was director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Naval Sea Systems Command. Prior assignments include deputy
administrator for naval reactors in the Naval Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; chief of naval personnel; and director
for Political-Military Affairs and deputy director of naval operations on the Joint Staff.
He was commissioned following graduation in 1966 from Duke University. In 1973, he completed a dual master’s program in nuclear
engineering and naval architecture/marine engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was elected to the Society of
Sigma Xi. Admiral Bowman has been awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters from Duke University.
In 2005, Admiral Bowman was named president and CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute. NEI is the policy organization for the
commercial nuclear power industry. In 2006, Admiral Bowman was made an Honorary Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order
of the British Empire in recognition of his commitment in support of the Royal Navy submarines program.
L I E U T E N A N T G E N E R A L L A W R E N C E P. FA R R E L L J R . , U S A F (Ret.)
Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force
Prior to his retirement from the Air Force in 1998, General Farrell served as the deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, Headquarters
U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He was responsible for planning, programming and manpower activities within the corporate Air Force
and for integrating the Air Force’s future plans and requirements to support national security objectives and military strategy.
Previous positions include vice commander, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and deputy director,
Defense Logistics Agency, Arlington, Virginia. He also served as deputy chief of staff for plans and programs at Headquarters U.S. Air Force
in Europe. A command pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours, he flew 196 missions in Southeast Asia and commanded the 401st Tactical
Fighter Wing, Torrejon Air Base, Spain. He was also the system program manager for the F-4 and F-16 weapons systems with the Air
Force Logistics Command, Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
General Farrell is a graduate of the Air Force Academy with a bachelor’s degree in engineering and an MBA from Auburn University.
Other education includes the National War College and the Harvard Program for Executives in National Security.
General Farrell became the president and CEO of the National Defense Industrial Association in September 2001.
APPENDIX 1:
BIOGRAPHIES, MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS
A P P E N D I X 1 • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 53S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g52
A D M I R A L J O S E P H W. P R U E H E R , U S N (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and Former U.S. Ambassador to China
Admiral Prueher completed thirty-five years in the United States Navy in 1999. His last command was commander-in-chief of the U.S.
Pacific Command (CINCPAC); the largest military command in the world, spanning over half the earth’s surface and including more than
300,000 people. Admiral Prueher also served as ambassador to China from 1999 to 2001. He served two presidents and was responsible
for directing, coordinating, and managing the activities of all United States executive branch activities in China.
From 1989 through 1995, Admiral Prueher served as commandant at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis; commander of Carrier
Battle Group ONE based in San Diego; commander of the U.S. Mediterranean Sixth Fleet and of NATO Striking Forces based in Italy; and as
vice chief of naval operations in the Pentagon.
Admiral Prueher graduated from Montgomery Bell Academy in Nashville, Tennessee, and then graduated with distinction in 1964
from the U.S. Naval Academy, later receiving a master’s degree in international relations from George Washington University. He is also a
graduate of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. In addition to co-authoring the Performance Testing manual used by naval
test pilots for many years, he has published numerous articles on leadership, military readiness, and Pacific region security issues. Admiral
Prueher has received multiple military awards for combat flying as well as naval and Joint Service. The governments of Singapore, Thailand,
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia have decorated him.
Admiral Prueher is a consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies and senior adviser on the Preventive
Defense Project. He is on the board of trustees of the Nature Conservancy of Virginia.
G E N E R A L G O R D O N R . S U L L I V A N , U S A (Ret.)
Chairman, Military Advisory Board
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
General Sullivan was the 32nd chief of staff—the senior general officer in the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the chief
of staff of the Army, he created the vision and led the team that helped transition the Army from its Cold War posture.
His professional military education includes the U.S. Army Armor School Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General
Staff College, and the Army War College. During his Army career, General Sullivan also served as vice chief of staff in 1990 to 1991; deputy
chief of staff for operations and plans in 1989 to 1990; commanding general, First Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas, in
1988 to 1989; deputy commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1987 to 1988; and
assistant commandant, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, from 1983 to 1985. His overseas assignments included four tours in
Europe, two in Vietnam and one in Korea. He served as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in the administration of President
George H.W. Bush.
General Sullivan was commissioned a second lieutenant of armor and awarded a bachelor of arts degree in history from Norwich
University in 1959. He holds a master’s degree in political science from the University of New Hampshire.
General Sullivan is the president and chief operating officer of the Association of the United States Army, headquartered in Arlington,
Virginia. He assumed his current position in 1998 after serving as president of Coleman Federal in Washington, D.C.
A D M I R A L T. J O S E P H L O P E Z , U S N (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and of Allied Forces, Southern Europe
Admiral Lopez’s naval career included tours as commander-in-chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and commander-in-chief, Allied Forces,
Southern Europe from 1996 to 1998. He commanded all U.S. and Allied Bosnia Peace Keeping Forces in 1996; he served as deputy chief
of naval operations for resources, warfare requirements and assessments in 1994 to 1996,; commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in 1992 to
1993; and senior military assistant to the secretary of defense in 1990 to 1992.
Admiral Lopez was awarded numerous medals and honors, including two Defense Distinguished Service Medals, two Navy Distinguished
Service Medals, three Legion of Merits, the Bronze Star (Combat V), three Navy Commendation Medals (Combat V) and the
Combat Action Ribbon. He is one of just two flag officers in the history of the U.S. Navy to achieve four-star rank after direct commission
from enlisted service.
He holds a bachelor’s degree (cum laude) in international relations and a master’s degree in management. He has been awarded an
honorary doctorate degree in humanities from West Virginia Institute of Technology and an honorary degree in information technology from
Potomac State College of West Virginia University.
Admiral Lopez is president of Information Manufacturing Corporation (IMC), an information technology service integrator with major
offices in Manassas, Virginia, and Rocket Center, West Virginia.
A D M I R A L D O N A L D L . “ D O N ” P I L L I N G , U S N (Ret.)
Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Pilling assumed duties as the 30th vice chief of naval operations, the Navy’s chief operating officer and second-ranking officer, from
November 1997 until his retirement from active service in October 2000.
Ashore, he was assigned to a variety of defense resources and planning billets. In his earlier career, he served four years in program
analysis and evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As a more senior officer, he served as a Federal Executive Fellow at the
Brookings Institution in 1985-86. A member of the National Security Council staff from 1989 until 1992, Admiral Pilling was selected to flag
rank in 1989 while serving there. From 1993 to 1995, he was the director for programming on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations,
and later served as the Navy’s chief financial officer from 1996 to 1997.
Admiral Pilling also commanded a warship; a destroyer squadron; a cruiser destroyer group; a carrier battle group; the U.S. Sixth
Fleet; and NATO’s Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe.
Admiral Pilling has a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy and a doctorate in mathematics from the University
of Cambridge.
He served as vice president for strategic planning at Battelle Memorial Institute and became president and CEO of LMI, a nonprofit research
organization, in 2002.
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G E N E R A L A N T H O N Y C . “ T O N Y ” Z I N N I , U S M C (Ret.)
Former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
General Zinni’s joint assignments included command of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military assets
and operations in the Middle East, Central Asia and East Africa.
General Zinni’s joint assignments also include command of a joint task force and he has also had several joint and combined staff
billets at task force and unified command levels. He has made deployments to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Western Pacific,
Northern Europe, and Korea. He has held numerous command and staff assignments that include platoon, company, battalion, regimental,
Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Marine expeditionary force command. His staff assignments included service in operations, training, special
operations, counter-terrorism and manpower billets. He has also been a tactics and operations instructor at several Marine Corps schools
and was selected as a fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group.
General Zinni joined the Marine Corps in 1961 and was commissioned an infantry second lieutenant in 1965. General Zinni holds a
bachelor’s degree in economics from Villanova University, a master’s in international relations from Salvae Regina College, a master’s in
management and supervision from Central Michigan University, and honorary doctorates from William and Mary College and the Maine
Maritime Academy.
He has worked with the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the
Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. He is on the International Council at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and
Justice. He is also a Distinguished Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
He has also been appointed as a member of the Virginia Commission on Military Bases.
General Zinni has co-authored, with Tom Clancy, a New York Times bestseller on his career entitled Battle Ready. His book, The
Battle For Peace: A Frontline Vision Of America’s Power And Purpose, was published in 2006.
V I C E A D M I R A L R I C H A R D H . T R U LY, U S N (Ret.)
Former NASA Administrator, Shuttle Astronaut and the first Commander of the Naval Space Command
Admiral Truly served as NASA’s eighth administrator from 1989 to 1992, and his career in aviation and space programs of the U.S. Navy
and NASA spanned 35 years. He retired as a vice admiral after a Navy career of more than thirty years. As a naval aviator, test pilot and
astronaut, he logged over 7,500 hours and made over 300 carrier-arrested landings, day and night.
Admiral Truly was the first commander of Naval Space Command from 1983 to 1986 and became the first naval component
commander of U.S. Space Command upon its formation in 1984. While still on active duty following the Challenger accident, he was called
back to NASA as associate administrator for space flight in 1986 and led the accident investigation. He spearheaded the painstaking
rebuilding of the space shuttle, including winning approval of President Reagan and the Congress for building of Endeavor to replace the
lost Challenger. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential Citizen’s Medal.
Truly’s astronaut career included work in the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, and NASA’s Apollo, Skylab, ApolloSoyuz
and space shuttle programs. He piloted the 747/Enterprise approach and landing tests in 1977, and lifted off in November 1981
as pilot aboard Columbia, the first shuttle to be reflown into space, establishing a world circular orbit altitude record. He commanded
Challenger in August-September 1983, the first night launch/landing mission of the space shuttle program.
He served as vice president of the Georgia Institute of Technology and director of the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) from
1992 to 1997. Admiral Truly retired in January 2005 as director of the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL).
Truly is a member of the National Academy of Engineering. He has previously served on the board of visitors to the U.S. Naval
Academy, the Defense Policy Board, the Army Science Board, and the Naval Studies Board. He is a member of the National Research
Council Space Studies Board, a trustee of Regis University and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, and a member of
the advisory committee to the Colorado School of Mines Board of Trustees.
G E N E R A L C H A R L E S F. “ C H U C K ” W A L D , U S A F (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
From 2001 to 2002 General Wald was deputy chief of staff for air and space operations at the Pentagon, and from December 2002 until
his retirement in 2006 General Wald was deputy commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. USEUCOM is
responsible for all U.S. forces operating across 91 countries in Europe, Africa, Russia, parts of Asia and the Middle East, and most of the
Atlantic Ocean.
General Wald commanded the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base, Italy, where on Aug. 30, 1995, he led one of the wing’s initial
strike packages against the ammunition depot at Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in one of the first NATO combat operations. General Wald
commanded the Ninth Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, where he led the development
of the Afghanistan air campaign for Operation Enduring Freedom, including the idea of embedding tactical air control parties in
ground special operations forces. He has combat time as an O-2A forward air controller in Vietnam and as an F-16 pilot flying over Bosnia.
The general has served as a T-37 instructor pilot and F-15 flight commander. Other duties include chief of the U.S. Air Force Combat
Terrorism Center, support group commander, operations group commander, and special assistant to the chief of staff for National Defense
Review. He was also the director of strategic planning and policy at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and served on the Joint Staff as the vice
director for strategic plans and policy.
General Wald is a command pilot with more than 3,600 flying hours, including more than 430 combat hours over Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos, Iraq, and Bosnia. The general earned his commission through the Air Force ROTC program in 1971.
Currently, General Wald serves as president of Wald and Associates, an international management consulting and strategic planning
firm, and is an adjunct lecturer at the Atlantic Council. He is also a member of the Bipartisan Policy Center, National Commission on Energy
Policy, and the Securing America’s Future Energy Commission.
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Thus, the current atmosphere is significantly
different from its preindustrial state in a way that is
compatible with increased heating.
AVERAGE GLOBAL TEMPERATURES HAVE
ALREADY BEGUN TO RISE
Average global surface temperature is the most
fundamental measure of climate change, and there
is no dispute that the earth’s average temperature
has been increasing over the last century (albeit not
uniformly), with an acceleration in warming over the
last 50 years. Over the last century, the average
surface temperature around the world has increased
by 1.3°F ± 0.3°F [7]. Temperatures since the 1950s
were “likely the highest [of any 50-year period] in at
least the past 1,300 years” [7]. Of the hottest twelve
years on record since temperatures began to be
measured in the 1850s, eleven have occurred in the
last twelve years [7].
The burning of fossil fuels (such as oil, natural
gas, and coal) is the main source of the rise in atmospheric
CO2
over the last two and a half centuries;
deforestation and other changes in land use are
responsible for a portion of the increase as well.
Human activities have also been responsible for
a portion of the rise in other heat-trapping greenhouse
gases, such as methane, which has risen
148 percent since preindustrial times, and nitrous
oxide, which has risen 18 percent during the same
period. Currently, half of the annual methane emitted
is from activities such as burning fossil fuel and
agricultural processes; [41] humans are responsible
for about a third of nitrous oxide emissions, mainly
from agriculture.
There is no known natural forcing that can
account for the severity of the recent warming. For
example, while claims are made that variation in the
intensity of the sun is responsible, the variation in
solar radiation’s effect on the climate is estimated to
be less than 5 percent as strong as that of humaninduced
greenhouse gases [7].
MORE THAN TEMPERATURE
RISE: OBSERVED IMPACTS ON
EARTH’S NATURAL SYSTEMS
A 1.3°F increase in average global surface temperature
over the last century may seem like an insignificant
change, but in fact it has had a marked impact
on many of the earth’s natural systems.
PRECIPITATION PATTERNS HAVE CHANGED
A change in the temperature of the atmosphere has
a great impact on pre-cipitation patterns. As an air
mass warms, it is able to hold more water vapor,
so a warmer atmosphere can absorb more surface
moisture and produce drier ground conditions. However,
this increase in atmospheric content will also
lead to more severe heavy rain events, when this
higher water-content atmosphere drops its moisture.
Changes in precipitation amounts have been
detected over large portions of the world. Annual
precipitation has increased 5 to 10 percent over the
past century across eastern North America, northern
Europe, and northern and central Asia [7, 41]. The
Mediterranean region experienced drying [7]. The
tropics have witnessed a slightly lower increase,
of 2 to 3 percent, and most of sub-Saharan Africa
has shown a decrease in precipitation of 30 to
50 percent [42].
The Northern Hemisphere subtropics experienced
a decrease in precipitation of approximately
2 percent [41]. Some of the most noticeable drying
occurred in the Sahel and portions of southern
Asia [7]. No significant change was detected in
rainfall patterns across wide areas in the Southern
Hemisphere; however, precipitation was noticeably
decreased in southern Africa [41].
EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS ARE
MORE FREQUENT
Since 1950, cold days and nights and frost days
have become less frequent, while hot days and nights
and heat waves have become more frequent [7].
There is a vast amount of scientific literature on the
subject of climate change, and a complete discussion
on the current state of the world climate and
its deviation from climatological norms could fill
volumes. In this appendix we discuss the consensus
of the science community on climate change, effects
observed thus far, and projections about what may
happen in the future.
We have drawn information from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
peer-reviewed scientific literature, and data, reports,
and briefings from various respected sources,
including the National Academy of Sciences,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Air and Space Administration, and the United
Kingdom’s Hadley Centre for Climate Change
CURRENT CONSENSUS
The IPCC’s latest assessment report affirmed
the following:
• While natural forces have influenced the earth’s
climate (and always will), human-induced changes in
levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases are playing
an increasingly dominant role.
• After considering the influences of the known
causes of climate change—natural- and human-induced—the
significant increase in the average global
temperatures over the last half century can be
attributed to human activities with a certainty of
more than 90 percent [7].
• Those temperature increases have already
affected various natural systems in many global
regions.
• Future changes to the climate are inevitable.
CHANGING GLOBAL
TEMPERATURES
INCREASED CARBON MEANS INCREASED
TEMPERATURES
Throughout its history, the earth has experienced
oscillations between warm and cool periods. These
shifts in climate have been attributed to a variety of
factors, known as “climate forcings,” that include
orbital variations, solar fluctuations, landmass distribution,
volcanic activity, and the atmosphere’s
concentration of greenhouse gases, such as carbon
dioxide, methane, and water vapor. The changes we
see today are occurring at a more rapid rate than is
explainable by known natural cycles [15].
Throughout the earth’s past, temperature and
greenhouse gas concentration have been closely
linked through the planet’s natural greenhouse effect;
i.e. greenhouse gases trap heat in the atmosphere
and thereby warm the earth. Throughout Earth’s
previous four glacial and warming cycles, atmospheric
CO2
concentration, and temperature show a high
degree of correlation. Other greenhouse gases,
such as methane, also show a similar relationship
with temperature.
The recent and rapid rise in atmospheric CO2
levels is of concern to climate scientists and policymakers.
CO2
concentrations never exceeded 300
parts per million by volume (ppmv) during previous
large swings in climate conditions, but the CO2
concentration now is about 380 ppmv [41], representing
a 35 percent increase since the onset of the
industrial revolution in the mid-eighteenth century.
CO2
levels are likely at their highest levels in the last
20 million years, and “the current rate of increase
is unprecedented during at least the last 20,000
years” [41].
APPENDIX 2:
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE—A BRIEF OVERVIEW
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OCEAN SALINITY HAS CHANGED
Oceanographers have observed dramatic changes
in salinity levels in the oceans. Oceans in the midand
high latitudes have shown evidence of freshening,
while those in tropical regions have increased in
salinity [7].
Increases in ocean acidity have also been
observed since preindustrial times. Increased
atmospheric CO2
is absorbed in the ocean where
it combines with water to form carbonic acid, a mild
acid. Most people are familiar with acid rain; this is
its ocean equivalent. Forecasts project the increase
in acidity over the coming century to be three times
as great as the increase over the last 250 years
[7]. Higher acidity could have a major impact on
ocean life by preventing the formation of shells and
skeletons of some very numerous and important zooplankton
[48]. Coral reefs are particularly vulnerable.
FUTURE SCENARIOS: A CHOICE
FOR HUMANS
To help illustrate the changes in climate that may
occur, the IPCC developed a set of more than three
dozen scenarios that describe different paths along
which the world may evolve over the next century
[49]. These paths are divided into six overarching
categories distinguished by the assumptions made
for factors such as economic growth, interactions
among nations, population growth, and technological
advances.
The scenarios were used as inputs to drive
various climate models. The IPCC’s 2007 report
documents a range of climate change outcomes for
the next century for each of the six categories used.
According to the IPCC report, when considering the
climate model results for each scenario, the average
temperature projected in years 2090 to 2099 is
expected to exceed the average temperature
observed from 1980 to 1999 by 2.0° to 11.5°F.
Sea levels are projected to rise between seven
and twenty-three inches. This projection does not
include the effect of potential changes in ice flow
dynamics of large, land-based glaciers that may
further contribute to the rise in sea level. To put this
in perspective, recall that over the last century, the
temperature increased about 1.3°F, and the sea level
increased seven inches.
Because most of the inter-model studies assessed
by the IPCC focus on three specific scenario
categories, the IPCC’s 2007 report necessarily
focuses mostly on the same three. The “low”
scenario (i.e., the one that results in the lowest
temperature increase) describes a future in which
population levels come under control, the global
economy moves away from a manufacturing focus,
and nations work together on improvements in
environmental sustainability and developing clean
technologies. The “medium” scenario describes a
future where the assumptions regarding population
and economic growth are similar to those made
in the low scenario. Moreover, in the “medium”
scenario the IPCC assumes the development of
efficient technologies, and the production of energy
from a variety of sources other than fossil fuels. The
“high” scenario is the same as the “middle” scenario
except energy production remains heavily focused
on fossil fuel sources.
Each of the IPCC scenarios lead to different
projections for temperature change; however, they
all project significant global warming, with the most
intense warming occurring in the Arctic and the high
northern latitudes.
Some of the areas hardest hit by temperature
increases will also very likely experience significantly
less rainfall by the end of the century. Domestically,
the southwestern portion of the United States will
very likely experience the worst combination of these
factors. Decreasing precipitation and markedly
increasing temperatures will also stress northern
and southern Africa and the Middle East.
While the earth’s natural systems will continue
to experience greater stress due to future climate
changes, so will some key human systems [24]:
• Coastal populations: Increases in flooding
and inundation from rising seas and more intense
storms will affect coastal populations across the
world, particularly those in Bangladesh and low-lying
island nations.
• Agriculture: Temperature increases of a few
degrees and increases in atmospheric CO2
levels
Global patterns of both heavy precipitation
events and intense droughts have changed over
recent decades. The increase in heavy precipitation
events is consistent with the general increase in
temperatures and the commensurate increase in
atmospheric water vapor content. Droughts have
become more intense, particularly in the tropics and
subtropics, because of higher temperatures, more
frequent heat waves, and changes in precipitation
patterns [7].
The combination of increasing atmospheric
temperatures and increased sea surface temperatures
can increase the energy of tropical storms [43].
Preliminary observations since 1970 suggest that
this effect has been observed in the North Atlantic
and perhaps other regions as well [7].
ICE AND SNOW COVER IS DISAPPEARING
Glacial ice and snow cover are disappearing in many
regions around the world. The Arctic region, in
particular, is one of the areas being affected most by
rising temperatures. As a result of temperatures that
have increased at nearly twice the global average
rate, Arctic sea ice is thinning and shrinking in
extent, glaciers are melting throughout the region,
and the snow season has shortened. Alaskan glaciers
have retreated at a rapid pace; in fact, the
amount of glacial mass lost in Alaska alone represents
half of the estimated worldwide total [44].
There will be little to no sea ice in the Arctic’s
summers toward the end of this century [7]. Glaciers
in other regions, such as high-altitude glaciers in
tropical areas, are also melting at an increasing rate [7].
Increased melting of the Greenland ice sheet
is one of the most worrisome Earth responses observed
thus far. Data from NASA’s Goddard Space
Flight Center show that the seasonal melt area over
Greenland has trended upward at 7 percent per year
over the last twenty-five years, and the ice shelf
surrounding Greenland has thinned by 230 feet over
the last five years [15]. Recent satellite data analyzed
by NASA have shown that from 2003 through 2005,
Greenland annually lost three times more ice through
melting than it gained through snowfall [45].
Antarctica’s ice cover has also responded to the
increasing temperature, but in different ways. West
Antarctica has lost ice mass, while the ice sheet in
East Antarctica has thickened. The thickening has
been explained as being due to increased snow fall
(as a result of warming temperatures that lead to
more water vapor in the atmosphere) [46] as well
as a slowing of glaciers for reasons unrelated to
climate [45].
The melting of ice cover is an important positive
feedback that reinforces heating, because of ice’s
contribution to the reflectivity of the earth. As ice
melts, it exposes either land or water, depending on
its location. Because land and water both reflect less
solar radiation than ice, they reinforce rising temperatures,
which in turn melts more ice. Once such
loops begin, predicting their stopping point
is difficult.
OCEANS ARE WARMING
The oceans have an enormous capacity to hold
heat; because of their volume and heat capacity
they require extremely large inputs of heat to change
their temperatures. Nevertheless, the global mean
sea surface temperature increased 0.9°F globally in
the twentieth century [47], and the IPCC stated that
“global ocean heat content has increased significantly
since the late 1950s” [41].
SEA LEVELS ARE RISING
Ocean temperature is important to sea level rise
because as temperatures increase, water expands,
causing sea levels to rise. Because of the thermal
inertia of the oceans, once sea level begins to rise
because of thermal ex-pansion, it will continue to do
so for centuries regardless of any mitigative actions.
Sea levels are also raised by the melting of landbased
ice and snow because of the direct transfer
of water into the sea. Sea-based ice, however, does
not raise sea levels as it melts.
From 1961 through 2003, global mean sea level
has risen about three inches, with nearly half of that
increase occurring between 1993 and 2003 [7]. Over
the entirety of the twentieth century, sea levels have
risen nearly seven inches. The IPCC concluded that
this rise was caused by thermal expansion of the
ocean as well as melting of mountain glaciers and
snow cover [7].
S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g60 S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g
REFERENCES
may help agricultural productivity in mid- and high
latitudes but will surely hurt agriculture in the tropics
and subtropics, where crops already exist at the
top of their temperature range; higher increases in
temperature, as well as heat waves, changes in precipitation,
and increased pests, will hurt agricultural
productivity across much of the globe.
• Water resources: Five billion people are
expected to live in water-stressed countries by 2025
even without factoring in climate change. Expected
changes in climate will exacerbate water-stress in
some areas (including most of Asia, southern Africa,
and the Mediterranean), while alleviating it in others
(such as the United Kingdom). Areas that depend on
tropical mountain glaciers for water (such as Lima,
Peru), will face a precarious situation as the glaciers
continue to melt and eventually disappear.
Developing nations with little capacity to manage
water will be among the hardest hit.
• Health: Rising temperatures and heat waves
will increase the number of heat-related deaths in
summer months. This increase will be partially offset
by decreases in cold-related winter deaths. The
reach of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria
and dengue fever, is expected to spread. Increasing
frequency of floods will harm human health by its
direct impact on populations as well as by facilitating
the spread of disease to affected areas. Vital health
infrastructure can be damaged, making minor and
treatable injuries become life-threatening.
A WILD CARD: ABRUPT
CLIMATE CHANGE
For many years it was believed that climate changes
have been gradual—that the earth gradually cycles
between glacial periods and warm interglacial periods.
We now know this is not always the case [50].
Abrupt climate changes present the most worrisome
scenario for human societies because of the
inherent difficulties in adapting to sudden changes.
Abrupt sea level rise is particularly worrisome. The
great ice sheets along the edges of Greenland and
the West Antarctic are vulnerable to sudden breakup:
as the edges of the sheet thaw and meltwater seeps
to the ice-ground boundary, the meltwater will act as
a lubricant and facilitate a slippage into the sea. This
physical phenomenon is an example of a positive
feedback mechanism that, once started, is difficult
to reverse [15]. Melting of these ice sheets would be
catastrophic. The Greenland Ice Sheet could raise
sea levels by twenty-three feet over a millennium
[7]; the West Antarctic Ice Sheet would have a more
immediate impact, raising sea levels more than three
feet per century for five centuries [41]. The probability
of a collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet
before 2100 is estimated to be between 5 and 10
percent [7].
None of these abrupt climate changes are
projected by the climate models driven by the IPCC’s
2007 future scenarios. However, if temperature
increases were at the high end of the ranges projected
by the models, abrupt climate changes such
as those discussed above are more likely to occur.
Such abrupt climate changes could make future
adaptation extremely difficult, even for the most
developed countries.
R E F E R E N C E S • S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g 63S e c u r i t y A n d C l i m a t e . c n a . o r g62
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