Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join
the Pigou Club
N. Gregory Mankiw
Department of Economics, 223 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 2138, USA.
E-mail: ngmankiw@fas.harvard.edu
Many economists favor higher taxes on energy-related products such as gasoline, while
the general public is more skeptical. This essay, based on a talk given at the March 2008
meeting of the Eastern Economic Association, discusses various aspects of this policy
debate. It focuses, in particular, on the use of these taxes to correct for various
externalities — an idea advocated long ago by British economist Arthur Pigou.
Eastern Economic Journal (2009) 35, 14 – 23. doi:10.1057/eej.2008.43
Keywords: externalities; corrective taxes; global climate change
JEL: H23
INTRODUCTION
As an economics educator, I have always been fascinated by topics about which
there is a large gap between the beliefs of economists and those of the general public.
For example, economists are generally supportive of free trade among nations, while
the public is more skeptical. Economists oppose rent control, while much of the
public supports the policy.
In these and other cases where economists and mere muggles do not see
eye-to-eye, you should not be surprised to hear that I am quick to side with my
fellow economists. I like to think that this reaction is more than mere professional
solidarity but is, instead, a symptom of my commitment to rational thought. Unlike
most people, who spend their time thinking about their children, local sports team,
or favorite sitcom, economists have devoted much of their lives to thinking about
such things as international trade and rent control. That fact may make us boring at
cocktail parties, but it does have some offsetting benefits. It is not a stretch to believe
that more thought about an issue leads to more reliable conclusions. As a result,
I feel comfortable with conclusion that, regarding these issues, economists are right
and the general public is just ill informed.
My topic for today is a policy about which there is a particularly large gap
between economists and the public: Pigovian taxation. In particular, I want to talk
about taxes on energy-related products, such as gasoline taxes. Not long ago, the
economist Steve Levitt, coauthor of the best-seller Freakonomics, wrote on his blog,
‘‘For a long time I have felt the price of gasoline in the United States was way too
low. Pretty much all economists believe this.’’ Levitt then went on to argue for
higher taxes on gasoline. At about the same time, Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi had precisely the opposite perspective. She announced ‘‘a series of hearings to
address rising gas prices — focusing on the causes, the burdens they put on
American families and businesses, and solutions.’’
Both Levitt and Pelosi represent beliefs that are widespread among their
respective constituencies. Let us start with the economists. In a 2006 survey of
Eastern Economic Journal, 2009, 35, (14 – 23)
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Ph.D. members of the American Economic Association, 65.0 percent agreed that
‘‘the US should increase energy taxes’’ [Whaples 2006]. Similarly, the Wall Street
Journal asked business economists in 2007, ‘‘What is the most economically sound
way for the government to encourage development of alternatives to fossil fuels?’’
The poll found 54 percent advocating ‘‘taxes that raise the cost of purchasing fossil
fuels’’ [Izzo 2007]. Levitt may overstate things when he said all economists favor
higher taxes on gasoline, but he is right that a majority do.
Compare these results to a Wall Street Journal poll of the general public. The
journal found that ‘‘a majority of Americans believe it is important to reduce
the energy consumption from automobile use.’’ But how did they want to do this?
The journal reported that ‘‘79 percent of respondents said encouraging the
development and use of alternative fuels is important and 73 percent said it is
important to increase fuel efficiency standards on all vehicles. Only 5 percent of
those polled said they support creating a tax on driving’’ [Bright 2007]. In the face
of these numbers, it is no surprise that our political leaders such as Nancy Pelosi
generally avoid talk of higher energy taxes.
In a democracy, of course, economic policy is set not by economists but by the
general public. One of my favorite books of recent years is Bryan Caplan’s (2007)
treatise The Myth of the Rational Voter, subtitled Why Democracies Choose Bad
Policies. The answer Caplan offers is that voters are worse than ignorant about basic
economic principles of good policy. Ignorance, at least, would have the virtue of
being random and so perhaps would average out to zero in a large population.
Instead of being merely ignorant, voters hold onto systematically mistaken beliefs.
And politicians, whose main job is to get elected, mold those mistaken beliefs into
bad public policy. To quote Caplan, ‘‘What happens if fully rational politicians
compete for the support of irrational voters — specifically, voters with irrational
beliefs about the effects of various policies? It is a recipe for mendacity.’’
The Caplan thesis goes a long way toward explaining current public policy
regarding Pigovian taxation. I believe that most politicians understand the
arguments for higher taxes on gasoline and other energy products and are often
privately convinced by them. But they also know that the general public is not
convinced, and so they feign opposition. I am confident, however, that if the public
were ever to change its mind on the matter, our political leaders would quickly
follow suit.
What I would like to do here is to make the case for increased use of Pigovian
taxation. If you are a person skeptical of higher gasoline and energy taxes, you are
the person I am trying to convince. If you are someone who already agrees with me,
I hope to arm you with some arguments you can use to convince your fellow citizens.
For believers in Pigovian taxation such as myself, the primary task ahead is one of
education. To many economists, the basic argument for increased use of Pigovian
taxes is so straightforward as to be obvious. But as George Orwell once put it, ‘‘We
have now sunk to a depth where the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of
intelligent men.’’
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND CORRECTIVE TAXES
One big lesson of basic microeconomics is that under certain conditions, markets
allocate resources efficiently. I think of this as the magic of Adam Smith’s invisible
hand. In more advanced courses in economics, the efficiency of market outcomes is
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derived with extraordinary rigor, and it is called the ‘‘first fundamental theorem of
welfare economics.’’
The job of economic theorists is to prove theorems. The job of policy economists
is to figure out which theorems to apply. All theorems are based on axioms, so when
applying any theorem to the world, one has to evaluate whether the axioms assumed
by the theorem are valid. In the case of the fundamental welfare theorem, one key
axiom is the absence of externalities. If an economic transaction imposes costs or
benefits on individuals who are not part of the transaction, this theorem will not
apply, and Adam Smith’s invisible hand will fail to lead to an efficient outcome. This
is a key lesson taught in introductory economics courses.
There is, however, a simple way to remedy the market failure and restore the
optimality properties from the fundamental welfare theorem: individuals can be
charged for the external costs they impose on others (and subsidized for the external
benefits they give to others). The solution goes back to Arthur Pigou, the British
economist from the early 20th century, who was sometimes friend and sometime
nemesis to his more famous colleague John Maynard Keynes. In his honor, these
corrective measures are called Pigovian taxes.
For at least two reasons, Pigovian taxes are popular among economists. First,
they are often the least invasive way to remedy a market failure. They can restore an
efficient allocation of resources without requiring a heavy-handed government
intervention into the specific decisions made by households and firms. Second,
they raise revenue that the government can use to reduce other taxes, such as income
taxes, which distort incentives and cause deadweight losses.
CARBON EMISSIONS AND GLOBAL WARMING
The debate over global warming provides a good case study illustrating these
general points, and it makes the theoretical case for Pigovian taxes, while not new
to economists, particularly timely in the current debate over public policy. I take
it as the scientific consensus that the earth is getting warmer and that human
emissions of carbon into the atmosphere are the main cause of this trend.
I understand that some people dispute this conclusion, but I want to avoid that
debate. As an economist, I do not have a comparative advantage in evaluating
these scientific arguments. Instead, I will take the current scientific consensus,
as I understand it, as my starting point in order to focus on the possible policy
responses.
The economics here is straightforward: emitting carbon into the atmosphere
entails a negative externality. In absence of any policy, people will emit too much.
The Pigovian policy response is to impose a tax on carbon emission. This will induce
households and firms to internalize the carbon externality when deciding, for
example, how much to drive, what kind of car to buy, how much electricity to use,
what kind of electric power plant to build, and so on.
The hard part of the problem is figuring out what size tax is appropriate. The right
tax would equal the size of the external cost of carbon emission — that much is
clear. Unfortunately, there is little consensus about how large that external cost is.
One of the most prominent economists studying this topic is Yale’s Bill Nordhaus.
Nordhaus [2007] has suggested a tax of $30 per ton of carbon, increasing to about
$85 in 2050. A $30 carbon tax is fairly modest in size: it would increase the price of
gasoline by only about 8 cents per gallon.
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By contrast, the economist Nicholas Stern [2006] reached a very different
conclusion in a study prominently released by the British government. Stern
estimates the external cost of carbon emission at over $300 per ton — more than 10
times the Nordhaus number.
Part of the disagreement arises from the question of how one should discount the
distant future. To see why the discount rate matters so much, let me give you a
simple numerical example. Suppose I were to tell you that some event — it could be
global warming, or it could be a falling meteor — is going to lower permanently real
GDP by $100 billion starting one century from now. How much would you pay
today to avoid that future event? The answer depends on how you trade off dollars
today against dollars in the future, which is measured by the discount rate. At a
discount rate of 1 percent per year, you would be willing to pay $3.7 trillion today.
At a discount rate of 5 percent per year, the answer is a mere $15 billion. Plausible
changes in the rate of discount can easily change the answer by more than 100-fold.
This simple numerical example goes to the heart of a difficult problem: the issue of
global warming involves taking costly actions today to avoid adverse outcomes that
will occur far in the future. Economists have not yet figured out the best way to
calibrate that tradeoff.
So while Nordhaus and Stern would probably agree that a carbon tax is the right
policy for dealing with the problem, they would have trouble reaching agreement
about its size. But that is, at least, the right debate to be having. Discussing the size
of a carbon tax, rather than alternatives to it, would be a big step forward compared
to where the public discussion is right now.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CARBON TAX
But let me now take a look at the alternatives. The case for a carbon tax looks even
stronger after examining the other options on the table.
Let us start with CAFE standards. CAFE here is not a cute French bistro, but
rather Corporate Average Fuel Economy. In essence, lawmakers in both political
parties want to require carmakers to increase the fuel efficiency of the cars they sell.
It is easy to see why passing the buck to auto companies has a lot of popular appeal.
Increased fuel efficiency, however, is not free. Like a tax, the cost of complying
with more stringent regulation will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
car prices. But, unlike a tax, the government will not raise any revenue that it can use
to reduce other taxes to compensate for these higher prices. (And do not expect
savings on gas to compensate consumers in a meaningful way: any privately costeffective
increases in fuel efficiency would already have been made. The whole
purpose of CAFE standards is to require increased efficiency beyond what is
privately optimal.)
More important, enhancing fuel efficiency by itself is not the best way to reduce
energy consumption. Fuel use depends not only on the efficiency of the car fleet but
also on the daily decisions that people make — how far from work they choose to
live and how often they carpool or use public transportation.
A carbon tax would provide incentives for people to use less fuel in a multitude of
ways. By contrast, merely having more efficient cars encourages more driving.
Increased driving offsets some of the direct carbon benefit of more having more
efficient cars. It also exacerbates other problems, such as accidents and road
congestion.
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Another popular proposal to limit carbon emissions is a cap-and-trade system,
under which carbon emissions are limited and allowances are bought and sold in the
marketplace. The effect of such a system depends on how the carbon allowances are
allocated. If the government auctions them off, the price of a carbon allowance is
effectively a carbon tax. I should note that both Barack Obama and John McCain
have at times endorsed auctioning permits under a cap-and-trade system, although
neither has made it a prominent part of his campaign, no doubt heeding the sound
advice of political advisers.
Unfortunately, the history of cap-and-trade systems for other pollutants suggests
that the carbon allowances would probably not be auctioned. Instead, they would
be handed out to power companies and other carbon emitters, which would then be
free to use them or sell them at market prices. In this case, the prices of energy
products would rise as they would under a carbon tax, but the government would
collect no revenue to reduce other taxes and compensate consumers.
The problem with such cap-and-trade programs is that they, in essence, give the
revenue from a Pigovian tax lump sum to a regulated entity. Why should an electric
utility, for example, be given a valuable resource simply because it has for years
polluted the environment? That does not strike me as equitable. A new firm entering
the market should not have to pay for something that an incumbent gets for free.
And the fact that the incumbent has for years been taking a valuable resource from
the rest of society is no reason to think it deserves a free ride in the future. On equity
grounds, one could just as easily argue that the incumbents should compensate
society for their past misdeeds.
Cap-and-trade systems are also relatively inefficient for three reasons. First, if
pollution rights are allocated based on historical emissions, the prospect of a capand-trade
system encourages utilities to pollute more before the system is put into
effect in order to ‘‘earn’’ pollution rights. Second, unless pollution rights are fully
auctioned, they waste the opportunity to use the Pigovian tax revenue to reduce
distortionary taxes on labor and capital. Third, if the demand for carbon emissions
fluctuates from year to year because of, for example, the business cycle, the price of a
pollution permit and thus the marginal cost of abatement would fluctuate over time.
Because global warming depends only on the sum of carbon emissions over time,
the cost-minimizing path is to smooth the price of emissions and to allow the
quantity to fluctuate. That efficient dynamic path is more easily achieved with a
Pigovian tax on carbon emissions.
Of course, cap-and-trade systems are better than heavy-handed regulatory
systems. But they are not as desirable, in my view, as Pigovian taxes coupled with
reductions in other taxes.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
The international dimension of the problem also suggests the superiority of a carbon
tax over cap-and-trade. Any long-term approach to global climate change will have
to deal with the emerging economies of China and India. By some reports, China is
now the world’s leading emitter of carbon, in large part simply because it has so
many people. The failure of the Kyoto treaty to include these emerging economies is
one reason why, in 1997, the United States Senate passed a resolution rejecting the
Kyoto approach by a vote of 95 to 0.
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Agreement on a truly global cap-and-trade system, however, is hard to imagine.
Think about how the allowances would be allocated between, say, China and the
United States. China is unlikely to be persuaded to accept fewer carbon allowances
per person than the United States. Using a historical baseline to allocate allowances,
as is often proposed, would reward the United States for having been a leading cause
of the problem. China is never going to agree to that.
But allocating carbon allowances based on population alone would create a
system in which the United States, with its higher standard of living, would buy
allowances from China. American voters are not going to embrace a system of
higher energy prices, coupled with a large transfer of national income to the Chinese.
Such a system would amount to a massive foreign aid program to one of the world’s
most rapidly growing economies.
A global carbon tax would be much easier to negotiate. All governments
require revenue for public purposes. The world’s nations could agree to use a
carbon tax as one instrument to raise some of that revenue. No money needs to
change hands across national borders. Each government could keep the revenue
from its tax and use it to finance spending or whatever form of tax relief it
considered best.
RELATED EXTERNALITIES
So far, I have been talking about global climate change and the case for a carbon
tax. I know that some people are skeptical about global warming, and if you are,
I am certainly not enough of a scientist to convince you otherwise. I will leave that
job to Al Gore. But the case for higher Pigovian taxes is based on more than the
conclusion of that particular debate.
Let me focus on the activity of driving — an activity that takes a sizeable fraction
of the average American’s waking hours. This activity has a large number of external
costs. One of them is carbon emissions, as I have been discussing. Another is local
pollution, such as smog.
A third external cost is congestion. Every time I am stuck in traffic, I wish my
fellow motorists would drive less, perhaps by living closer to where they work or
by taking public transport. And they might well be thinking the same about me. In
essence, each of us is imposing external costs on everyone else.
A fourth external cost is accidents and the higher insurance rates we all pay. That
is, when I choose to drive, I make it more likely that I will be in an accident. That is,
of course, an internal cost that I fully take into account when deciding whether to
take my car out of the garage. But, in addition, when I drive, I make it more likely
that you will be in an accident. That is an external cost, which from an economic
standpoint is equivalent to pollution. The numbers here are staggering. According
to the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, there are more than
30 million traffic accidents a year. It estimates that the annual dollar cost of
accidents, including property damage and personal injury, amounts to more than
$400 billion a year.
There is a large literature that tries to put numbers on each of these external costs
of driving. An article published in the Journal of Economic Literature in June 2007
summarized many studies and concluded that the optimal Pigovian tax on gasoline
was $2.10 per gallon [Parry et al. 2007]. That is well above the current level of
taxation in the United States, which is about 40 cents a gallon.
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Such a huge increase in the gasoline tax may seem unrealistic to you, but
international experience suggests that it is in fact a plausible public policy. Other
nations, such as Japan and Ireland, have gas taxes at about the $2 level suggested in
the study. And other nations, such as Germany and England, have gas taxes
about $3 a gallon. The United States is very much an outlier in how little we tax
gasoline.
Let us look a little deeper at that $2.10 figure. Only about 6 cents of that amount
came from the external effects associated with global warming. Most of it came from
the more mundane externalities. The largest, making up half of the total external
cost, was from congestion. The second largest was from accidents. So even if God
came down today and told us that global warming was a complete hoax, the case for
a much higher Pigovian tax on gasoline would survive, for the simple reason that
every time you get in your car and drive, you inconvenience other drivers with
increased road congestion and you put them at increased risk of being in a traffic
accident.
I should note that a gasoline tax is an imperfect instrument for dealing with
externalities such as congestion. One problem is that some roads are more congested
than others, and congestion varies by time of day. An ideal Pigovian tax to deal with
congestion externalities would adjust the tax to driving conditions. That is not as
crazy as it sounds. The city of London has instituted a fee for driving in the most
congested part of the city. The idea was pushed by Mayor Ken Livingstone.
Livingstone is so left-leaning politically that he has been nicknamed ‘‘Red Ken.’’
Livingstone says, however, that he got the idea of congestion pricing from the
renowned free-market economist Milton Friedman. New York mayor Michael
Bloomberg has recently proposed a similar plan for his city.
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE
There is one argument that you sometimes hear for higher gasoline taxes that
I should probably comment on — that it would help us achieve the goal of ‘‘energy
independence.’’ Politicians from both political parties often proclaim the importance
of energy independence as a policy goal, and such proclamations win easy applause
from crowds. But they often leave economists scratching their heads.
Without doubt, it would be great if we could wave a magic wand and costlessly
reduce the need for imported energy. And, indeed, calls for energy independence are
usually followed by magic-wand-like claims about what conservation or technological
advance is likely to produce. But if we do not have a magic wand, and I do not
think we do, what does it mean to call for energy independence? Another word for
‘‘independence’’ is ‘‘autarky.’’ If free trade is in general good for a nation, the same
set of arguments should apply to energy products.
A related, and perhaps more coherent, argument is that we need to reduce our use
of foreign oil for reasons of national security. Many prominent policymakers,
including former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan, former Secretary of State George
Schultz, and former national security adviser Tony Lake have called for increased
taxes on gasoline on national security grounds. Maybe there is a good Pigovian
argument related to national security, but as it involves the complicated dynamics of
world politics, this argument is hard for an economist to evaluate. But I should note
that even if a higher gasoline tax reduced our consumption of oil, we could not
decouple our economy from turmoil in the Middle East. The price of oil is set in a
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world market, and that is true regardless of how much or how little we use. It is hard
is escape the fact that American consumers are going to be subject to price volatility
arising in other parts of the world.
THE QUESTION OF INCIDENCE
Let me turn to another reason why the United States might consider a higher tax on
oil, beyond the Pigovian arguments I have been making so far. Another, completely
unrelated argument involves the basic theory of tax incidence.
So far, I have presumed that the burden of these taxes would be fully borne by
consumers. That would be true if the United States were a small country. If this were
the case, the world price of oil would not depend on our tax policies.
But the United States is a big oil consumer — in fact, we use almost a quarter of
the world’s production. As a result, we have substantial market power. Our tax
policies can have a significant impact on the world price of oil. This means that, in
the long run, part of a US gasoline tax gets paid by the producers of oil, not the
consumers. This is an example of what economists call the optimal tariff argument.
Many years ago, the economist Ted Bergstrom [1982] did some calculations trying
to estimate optimal tax policy if oil-consuming nations wanted to transfer more
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) profits to themselves.
According to Bergstrom, if each nation pursued a policy on its own (so we get what
game theorists call the Nash equilibrium), gas taxes in Europe should be somewhat
lower, and gas taxes in the United States should be much higher. If, however, the
United States, Europe, and Japan all coordinated their policies, so we could reach a
cooperative equilibrium, we should all tax oil at a rate of 100–200 percent. That
would amount to several dollars a gallon of gasoline, compared to about 40 cents now.
This is, without doubt, a sizeable tax hike. I should point out that prices at the
pump would rise by much less than the amount of the tax increase, because reduced
consumption would lower world oil prices. That indeed is the point of the policy: to
collect some revenue from OPEC.
As long as I am speaking about incidence and OPEC, let me note a couple of
arguments that one hears about this topic. Sometimes, when the world price of oil
rises, as it has done recently, commentators say that this is a good thing. They claim,
in essence, the price increase is equivalent to the optimal Pigovian tax. This
argument is, in my view, more wrong than right. An increase in world oil prices is
like a tax on oil, where the revenue from the tax is handed over to world suppliers
of oil. I would be a lot less supportive of a Pigovian tax on gasoline if the
Congress were going to hand the tax revenue over to the Saudis. I am eager for this
tax only if the revenue is to be used to reduce other taxes, either contemporaneously or
in the future.
Another argument you sometimes hear when the world price of oil rises is that
Congress should protect consumers from these shocks by suspending gas taxes until
world oil prices return to normal. This is a poor idea for a couple of reasons. First,
the tax is already too low, for the reasons I have been describing. Second, think
about how this policy response would affect the incentives facing OPEC. Lowering
the gas tax as the world price rises reduces the response of US oil consumption to
higher world prices. In other words, it makes the effective demand curve less elastic.
With a less elastic demand curve, OPEC would have even more market power than it
already has, and it would jack up the price even higher.
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DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS
While I am on the topic of who pays, let me try to dispel a common fear about
higher Pigovian taxes, such as taxes on carbon or gasoline — that they will fall
disproportionately on the poor. Certainly, a gasoline tax would, by itself, raise the
tax burden on anyone who drives a car. And a carbon tax would, in addition, raise
the tax burden on anyone who uses electricity produced with fossil fuels, which
includes just about everybody. Some might fear these taxes would be particularly
hard on those at the bottom of the economic ladder.
Yet that is not necessarily the case. A 1991 study by Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) economist James Poterba called ‘‘Is the Gasoline Tax
Regressive?’’ concluded that ‘‘low-expenditure households devote a smaller share
of their budget to gasoline than do their counterparts in the middle of the
expenditure distribution.’’ The poor are far more likely than higher-income
households to ride the bus or subway to work.
Moreover, if Congress were to use a hike in Pigovian taxes to pay for a cut in
other taxes, there is nothing to stop it from cutting tax rates on lower incomes more
than on higher incomes. Gilbert Metcalf, an economist at Tufts, has shown how
revenue from a carbon tax could be used to reduce payroll taxes in a way that would
leave the distribution of total tax burden approximately unchanged. He proposes a
tax of $15 per metric ton of carbon dioxide, together with a rebate of the federal
payroll tax on the first $3,660 of earnings for each worker. (Note that $15 per ton of
carbon dioxide is equivalent to $55 per ton of carbon.)
So while it makes sense to think through the distributional impact of higher
gasoline or carbon taxes, concern about the income distribution need not be a
reason to avoid these taxes. The economists in the Treasury Department are fully
capable of designing a package of tax hikes and tax cuts that together internalize
externalities and leave the overall distribution of the tax burden approximately
unchanged.
NOT A WACKY IDEA
In my introduction, I mentioned Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi as an example
of a political leader expressing concern about high gas prices. Perhaps, to be fair,
I should have pointed out that political opposition to higher gas taxes is bipartisan,
and if anything, is perhaps a bit stronger among Republicans than Democrats. Bill
Clinton did propose a BTU tax in 1993, but the plan died in Congress. The political
fallout from that wise but ill-fated attempt may be one reason why so many elected
leaders are now reluctant to try again.
When I was chairman of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, I once
raised the topic of an increased gasoline tax as I sat in the oval office in the midst of
a discussion of reforming CAFE standards. The President made pretty clear that he
thought higher gasoline taxes were a wacky idea. And, in fact, during the 2004
campaign, the Bush team ran a television ad criticizing John Kerry for once favoring
a 50-cent increase in the gas tax. ‘‘Some people have wacky ideas,’’ the voiceover
said.
As judged on purely political terms, higher Pigovian taxes are a wacky idea. I have
yet to see a major candidate for President endorse the concept. In 2004, John Kerry
denied being in favor of high gas taxes. His campaign said that it was Bush adviser
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Greg Mankiw who in fact favored high gas taxes. That retort was correct — I had
written in favor of higher gasoline taxes several times. But it was not particularly
effective: few voters had any idea who Greg Mankiw was.
As judged by the standard principles of economics, however, rather than by
the standards of politics, higher Pigovian taxes are not wacky but eminently sensible.
My goal here has been to convince you of that view. Only you can judge if I have
succeeded. If so, and if we together can convince enough other voters, the political
dynamic will undoubtedly change. We can hope that in future elections the gap
between the advice of the economic advisers and the advice of the political
consultants will become a lot smaller.
References
Bergstrom, Theodore C. 1982. On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax. American Economic
Review, 72(1): 194–201.
Bright, Beckey. 2007. Many Americans are Trimming Travel, But Few Car Pool to Cut Fuel Use. Wall
Street Journal, July 7, 2007.
Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Izzo, Phil. 2007. Is It time for a New Tax on Energy? Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2007.
Metcalf, Gilbert E. 2007. A Green Employment Tax Swap: Using a Carbon Tax to Finance Payroll Tax
Relief, Policy Brief. The Brookings Institution and the World Resources Institute.
Nordhaus, William. 2007. Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change. Science, 317:
201–202.
Parry, Ian W.H., Margaret Walls, and Winston Harrington. 2007. Automobile Externalities and Policies.
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(2): 373–399.
Poterba, James M. 1991. Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive? Tax Policy and the Economy, 5: 145–164.
Stern, Nicholas. 2006. The Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whaples, Robert. 2006. Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes! The Economists’ Voice, 3(9).
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