A National Security Doctrine for Israel

Policy paper

<u>Argov Seminar</u>

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Executive Summary

The present research aims to offer a new methodology for the consolidation of a Security Doctrine for Israel.

Winograd Commission stated in 2007: "A document should be drafted which will accompany Israel's military and political strategy for future generations." Winograd, in other words, referred to a National Security Doctrine, a vision which we took upon in this research.

Since its creation, the state of Israel has always faced threats and challenges related to its security, but has never had a National Security Doctrine - a document that is intended to protect and promote the state's national security interests. Therefore, our paper offers a remedy for one of Israel's most crucial diseases: the lack of strategic planning.

The goal of this policy paper is to find the methodology, or a technique, for writing such a doctrine. In order to achieve a written doctrine, two steps must be made: (1) Choosing a methodology; (2) Implementing the methodology. Essentially this paper presents the first step and lays the foundations for the second one.

First, Our research shows that the implementation of the Incorporated Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) is an appropriate methodology in order to draft an Israeli National Security Doctrine. This is the first step toward guaranteeing that every military achievement will be used in order to gain a diplomatic goal.

Second, People in Israel are currently in the mindset of thinking of security as an army with tanks and guns. Our results show that the term 'security' is much more than that. A National Security Doctrine is a document that encompasses military, diplomatic, economic, and social policies.

In essence, this research holds a triple contribution to contemporary discussion in Israel's vital need for modern Security concepts. The first contribution is the research findings that respond to contemporary threats. Second, this research is a potential model for researching more groups, including teams of experts and laymen that could draw a bigger picture of Israel's imagery of the future. Finally, our results are the basis for actual further process. Hence, this research's uniqueness is its combination of scientific and practical elements. Our research combines the credibility which characterizes academia, and the practicality which characterizes policy papers.

To conclude, our paper creates a practical basis for a security policy which fits the model of National Resilience. Israel's late Ambassador Argov claimed thirty years ago that peace for Israel has yet to come and therefore Israel must be prepared for all scenarios.

Introduction

In January 21, 2009 Israeli Prime Minister Olmert announced the end of the Israeli military operation in Gaza, codename "Cast Lead". Although the IDF had achieved its goals in the operation, the Israeli government failed to convert it into a clear diplomatic victory (Tira, 2009). Had this notion been contained to the boundaries of academia it would have been a minor defect. But this notion spread throughout the Israeli society and has been affecting both Israel's prestige in the international arena and the Israeli public opinion. According to Dror (1989), the fact that the Israeli society has managed to sustain itself based on its army since its earlier days makes it critical to comprehend the following question: How can Israel promote its military achievements into victory in the diplomatic arena?

Clausewitz identified in the 19th century that military victory is not a goal on its own. In his famous quote: "war is a continuation of politics by other means" (1976, ch.1), he claims that war is only a means in order to achieve political goals. Harkabi (1990) adds that the purpose of contemporary war is to improve the ability to achieve political goals through a reliable agreement. Accordingly, a country which whishes to gain victory should be capable of winning a battle, but also to promote it into an agreement. Because "Total War" is not likely to happen in the world of the 21st century, most of the wars are "limited" - they tend to finish with an agreement and not total destruction (Ibid).

Whereas in ancient times the battle-field's outcomes had been shaping the change in reality, contemporary agreements and the willingness of the parties to fulfill them are the ones to determine the change in reality. So, a country whose aim is to promote its political goals through the use of force should be capable of winning its battles, but more important - to promote its military achievements into good and solid agreements.

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Many experts agree that Israel's failure of promoting its military achievements derives from its lack of strategic planning, something that makes it difficult to achieve high-quality agreements (Ben-Meir, 1987; Fox, 2008; Passig, 2008; Winograd Commission, 2008; Dror, 2009; Tira, 2009). Short-term interests have been guiding the Israeli leadership ever since its tremendous achievements in 1948. The 1948 major success proved the righteousness of the notion that Israel could reach impossible achievements without any long planning process. Furthermore, the Israeli common belief according to which the mere existence of the nation is always in danger for both its poor resources and its external enemies does not leave much room for long-term planning. This kind of processes requires many resources in order to prepare Israel to confront scenarios that may well not happen in the future. Accordingly, Israel should rely on its leadership's qualities instead of wasting vital resources over clumsy bureaucratic processes.

Under those circumstances, the Israeli leadership is exposed to "cognitive distortions" which damage its ability to identify and properly respond to national challenges (Jervis, 1997). Jervis argues that every person perceives reality according to his morals, beliefs and experience. Therefore, when this person analyzes reality he distorts data according to his personal background. In the course of this data processing period, every person drops some of the data that does not suit his personal perception, and clearly leaders are not proof of this misperception. This gap between leaders' "personal reality" and the real reality is a "cognitive distortion".

This natural process often keeps important information "hidden" from leaders in order to properly respond to reality. For example, the proud Israeli leadership could not identify the Egyptian military preparation before Yom Kippur War because of their common belief that Arab countries had understood that they have no chance to defeat Israel in conventional battle-field. As a result, the 'Agranat Commission' recommended

changing the personal nature of the Israeli decision-making process. However, more than 35 years later, there has been little change (Dror, 1989; Passig 2008).

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to comprehend **Why and How should Israel consolidate a National Security Doctrine to promote its military achievements to a level of diplomatic victory.** As Argov declared in 1982, "for Israel, defense continues to be a massive and exacting undertaking" (1983, p.57). Argov's thoughts are still relevant to the nation's sixth decade. This research's main conclusion is that Israel should have a Preferred Security Doctrine in order to promote its military achievements into a diplomatic victory. Accordingly, it comprises of four chapters:

The first chapter presents the main reason for the incompatibility between Israel's military achievements and its diplomatic ones, and points out the need in a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel. The second chapter is more of a methodological one. It offers a methodology for those who wish to consolidate a formal Security Doctrine for Israel. The third chapter reveals the implementation of the first step toward the consolidation of such document. The third chapter presents the main conclusions from our implementation experience, and suggests several steps in order to implement this policy paper. The final chapter proves the similarity between the results of our experiment and several other researches worldwide; it shows that the term National Security tends to spread toward the broader definition of National Resilience. Altogether, this research offers a fundamental discussion regarding the Israeli Security Concept, from a new perspective which is scarce in Israeli politics. This discussion starts from studying the problem and ends with an implementation of the first step of the offered solution. Also, this kind of fundamental discussion is vital for both Israeli present and future leaders for, as Ben-Gurion argued, this country's destiny will be determined by the power of its people and army (Dror, 2009).

Chapter 1: Why should Israel consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine?

The following chapter deals with the research question: **Why should Israel consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine?** Thus, it begins by presenting the problem of incompatibility between Israel's military achievements and its diplomatic goals. By leaning on the '*institutional approach*' and Israel's failure in the past it proposes a solution: a formal Security Doctrine. A further theoretical analysis points out the need for an up-bottom strategy as the best solution for the Israeli case.

The Problem

While this lack of strategic thinking hinders mainly Israeli decision makers' ability to form a policy that suits the conditions of the international arena, they are the first ones to preserve it (Ben-Meir, 1987; Fox, 2008; Passig, 2008; Dror, 2009). When Ben-Gurion established the state of Israel he avoided determining any significant bureaucratic limitation in order to increase his personal power. Hence, he was willing to share only limited power with any executive institutes regarding security or foreign policy decisions. According to Holsti (1977) this kind of decision-making process is likely to result in a decision based on short-term interest because identifying long-term interests requires a more systemized process.

Since Ben-Gurion's era, Israel's Prime Ministers have enjoyed wide maneuvering spectrum in both security and foreign affairs. Because these issues are of high importance for the average Israeli voter they preserve this status-quo (Doron, 2006). Thus, the Israeli leader will probably continue to enjoy superiority over the institutions that are in charge of evaluating the situation and planning in regard to foreign policy-making process. As a result, Israel's most crucial decisions are likely to be guided by short-term planning.

Institution vs. Agent

Therefore, any research whose aim is to improve the effectiveness of Israel's military operations, should initially understand the 'institutional environment' which surrounds Israeli decision-makers. The *New Institutionalism* is concerned with "the informal conventions of political life as well as with formal constitutions and organizational structures" (Marsh and Stoker, 2002, pp. 91). In Israel, those in charge of the use of force are mainly the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the heads of other security organizations in Israel (Harkabi, 1990; IDF site, 2009). They are all supervised by the Israeli *Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.* The political echelon determines its policy according to its National Strategy, and forms a Security Doctrine. This doctrine is used as a basis for building the military forces, including the IDF. As aforesaid, the error scope of the Israeli leader in the Israeli policy-formation is wide because of the Israeli culture which in a way admires its leaders' improvisation capabilities.

This relationship between structure and agents is not an Israeli exceptionality but a worldwide phenomena (Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Holsti, 2005). Agency refers to "individual or group abilities to affect their environment. Structure usually refers to the context and to material conditions that define the range of actions available for the actors (Marsh and Stoker, 2005, p.271). A strong structure defines a narrow range of decision-making. This 'zero-sum game'[1] between the agent and the structure is influenced by the cultural conditions of the specific society. So, it seems that in order to change the balance of power between agents and institution in Israel, we should empower the role of the structure. It could limit the range of action of the Israeli leader, thus to assist him in

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[1] Zero-sum game describes a situation in which a participant's gain or loss is exactly balanced by the loss or gain of the other participant (Game Theory).

using the IDF more "effectively - to bring about the results intended" (Oxford dictionary).

The lack in a strong decision-making institution reveals tremendous effects on Israel's ability to promote its military achievements into diplomatic victory and a clear example for that was during the second Lebanon war on 2006. The Winograd commission[2] found "grave flaws in strategic planning and strategic thinking in both political and military echelons and in the interface between them" (2008, pp.577). Hence, its recommendations focus on enhancing the role of institution within the Israeli decision-making process.

Because contemporary strategic discourse deals mainly with the vital need for superior organization which is responsible for the national intelligence in Israel - *'National Security Council'* (Dror, 1989; Arad, 2005; Winograd Commission, 2008); our research focuses on Israel's lack of fundamental documents. This lack hinders any systemized decision-making process. However, the suggested policy should correspond and be able to join a current reform in the "National Security Council Law". This reform could indeed be a significant empowerment of the institutional element in the Israeli decision-making process. The following research's aim is to offer new ideas that could be the base for a future reform in Israel's decision-making process under the National Security Council's guidance.

This research focuses on Israel's lack of "Security Doctrine" for it dwells in the core of the relations between the political echelon and the military Echelon in Israel (Harkabi, 1990; Dror, 2009). Thus, in order to limit their power our research offers a policy based on a **clear Security Document**. By doing so it implements the Winograd Committee

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[2] A committee whose purpose was to investigate the fashion of war conducting during the Second Lebanon war.

conclusion: **"a document should be drafted which will accompany Israel's military and political strategy for future generations"** (Reut Institute, 2007. pp.9).

For this purpose our research explains what a "Security Concept" is, and reveals its chief role in the decision-making process; then it focuses on the Israeli case. Accordingly, this research wishes to provide a better understanding of how Israel can improve its current Security Concept in order to translate its military achievements into a diplomatic victory.

Definition

"Security Concept" (the Israeli terminology for Security Doctrine) is the core of the security policy, an essence of its principles. It is the security "ideal" of the country which both justifies its use of force and guides its leaders by doing so (Liddell Hart, 1967; Harkabi, 1990; Teren in Amidror, 2002). In their Security Doctrines leaders not only express their understanding of reality, but also depict their vision to all of the security system. From the Security Concept derives the security policy which guides the military doctrine - the building process of the military force and its use. Hence, a Security Doctrine is vital for every country.

The Israeli case

The Israeli concept of a Security Doctrine indicates that the Israeli Security Doctrine is very vague. It is not formulated as a formal document or a list of confirmed principles (Levita, 1988; Harkabi, 1990; Passig, 2008; Tira, 2009b). However, this perception is also an 'institute' for it is "a stable, recurring pattern of behavior" (Marsh and Stoker, 2002, p. 91). Accordingly, the 'agents' are Israeli decision-makers, who today enjoy an overly wide range of action.

Nevertheless, Israeli leaders are guided by a several principles as revealed in their deeds and public announcement (Levita, 1988; Bar-Yosef, 2005; Passig, 2008; Dror 2009).

These principles have characterized Israel from Ben-Gurion days, though their influence has changed through the years. Levita (1988) was the first to unify them into one research, which gains wide experts support even today.

The first principle of the Israeli Security Concept is that Israel is constantly threatened by its neighbors who aspire to destroy it; it cannot solve conflicts by using only military means, and cannot count on any other state or force in order to protect its existence. Therefore, it must remove the battle-field from its land for it lacks geographical depth. This is a defensive doctrine whose aim is to preserve status-quo rather than shape reality. The last 35 years have shown that there is a vital need for a more suitable Security Concept for Israel (Ibid).

Experts claim that Israel's Security Concept has undergone three crises in the past 35 years (Levita, 1988; Passig, 2008; Winograd Commission, 2008; Tira, 2009). The first crisis was the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan which weakened the assumption that Israel's neighbors only seek to put an end to the Jewish state. The first Gulf War in 1991 and the contemporary Iranian nuclear plan show that Israel is indeed supported by other states (Mostly U.S.A) in order to preserve its existence. The third crisis is in the form of the last two military operations in the second Lebanon war in 2006 and in Gaza in 2008. During these last two examples, the civilian rear was attacked by hundreds of missiles from Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas from Gaza. It revealed that in modern asymmetric battle-field Israel cannot cover its lack of strategic dept by using traditional warfare methods against terror organizations (Ibid). These three crises evoked a demand for a new and more updated Security Concept.

For this purpose, Israel's Minister of Defense, Shaul Mofaz, gathered 20 experts in order to consolidate a new perception which could improve Israel's capabilities to overcome its challengers in the future. They reached the conclusion that Israel's threats are changing

dramatically (Reut Institute, 2007; Passig, 2008). Whereas the old battle-field was characterized mostly in conventional war, Israel is likely to confront less conventional warfare and more non-conventional threats. For that reason, it should invest more money in order to prepare its strategic threats on the expense of its conventional threats. Those conclusions were presented in April, 2006. Three months later the second Lebanon War proved that those assumptions were wrong, according to Winograd commission (2008).

Nonetheless, Winograd commissions failed to provide the required change - a modern and suitable "Security Concept" which would enable Israel to confront the rapid change of its threats (Passig, 2008; Tira, 2009b). Both commissions' discourse concentrated on fixing Israeli failures instead of deciding their goals. Accordingly, the military level amended its defects and the political level is trying to do the same, but their efforts are barely coordinated. Subsequently, the Israeli discourse lacks in determined professional priorities and is guided mainly by public opinion (Passig, 2008). The product of these kinds of committees is usually a list of "tips" whose aim is to "prepare" the last war instead of preparing for the one in the future. The journalist Ben-Yishai (2007) described it as the following: "unfortunately, here we prefer to deal with trees without agreeing on where the forest should be and how we can protect it from pyromaniacs".

Moreover, these committees have failed to provide a compulsory policy which has a significant effect on the Israeli decision-making process. Many experts claim that because the vague Israeli process has not been changed over time, Israeli leaders continue to enjoy a wide maneuvering spectrum (Fox, 2008; Dror, 2009; Tira, 2009). So during critical crossroads, when a significant decision should be made, Israeli leaders have no organized tools on which they can rely on, except their guts and feelings. They have no "doctrinal commitment" and so they depend mostly on their own understanding. Prime

Minister Olmert reflected this analysis in his speech in saying that "a Prime Minister has to run a country, he does not need an agenda" (Reut Institute, 2007, P.3). Accordingly, it should be clear that Israel's attempts for providing a new Israeli Security Concept have failed to empower institutional elements in Israeli decision-making process.

Our research aims to implement the lessons in which these two last attempts offer: any new policy should have a **chief role in the Israeli policy formation** process and should contain **strategic elements** that could ensure a strategic planning regarding the use of the IDF by Israeli leaders. Thus, Israel could implement the main principle of any Security Doctrine- permanent learning and revision processes in order to overcome changes in the future (Harkabi, 1990).

Solution

The *Institutional Approach* reveals the difficulty of changing current institutes (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). In order to exist, an organization should be effective rather than efficient. The difference lies in the definition of these two concepts according to Oxford Dictionary: while effectiveness is "bringing about the results intended"; efficiently deals with the ratio between the benefits of the results and their costs (Pearsall, 1998). An organization must show that it is achieving the result that the society expects from it to achieve otherwise it will lose its legitimacy. For that reason, it should not be efficient for it must save resources for times when its manager will be required to show a rapid improvement. Then, the organization's manager could use its reserved resources in order to respond to public pressure (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Therefore, a rational organization is likely to invest resources in order to show immediate improvement in its performances, instead of promoting a real reform.

As mentioned before, Israeli Security Concept is an Israeli institution within the Israeli government. Its last improving attempts support the conclusion of the *Institutional*

Approach for their results deal mainly with preparing the last war in order to respond to public pressure. Furthermore, Israeli leaders do not rely on written doctrines when it comes to crucial times, as this research revealed before. Under those circumstances, **how can Israel change its Security Concept in order to translate its military achievements into diplomatic victories?**

According to Harkabi (1990) there are two approaches to consolidate a security doctrine: The *Inductive and Deductive Approaches*. Whereas the Deductive Approach mostly gives a direction and orientation to the Security Doctrine, the Inductive Approach mainly finds solutions for new problems. In the Israeli case, the first approach would start from what Israel is willing to achieve, whereas the last approach will prefer to deal with finding solutions for new challenges, such as the combination between terror organizations and weapons of mass destruction. De facto, those two approaches are not contradictory, but complete with each other. Nevertheless, in order to find new solutions for our dilemma, we wish to start our discussion regarding the Israeli "Security Doctrine" from the beginning. Thus, we follow the rule of Descartes: "The first precept was never to accept a thing as true until I knew it as such without a single doubt" (1965, Pt. 2).

According to Harkabi's distribution (1990), inductive elements are much more common in Israeli discourse. First, Israel's Security Concept **derives from its threats rather than its national aspirations**. Its guiding principles reflect the common notion that Israel is under permanent existential threat, so it has no privilege of investing its resources in order to shape a desired future. Secondly, even the committees whose purpose was to improve Israel's Security Concept concentrated mainly in finding solutions to new threats. Hence, the Israeli discourse is limited to its existing Security Concept. Accordingly, the research offers a solution whose purpose is to empower the deductive elements in Israel's Security Concept.

A Preferred Security Doctrine

According to Harkabi (1990), the Deductive Approach produces an essence of the national inspiration of the country - A *'Preferred Security Doctrine'*. It derives from the national goals and capabilities within the current world order and its trends of changing. According to Israel's perception, its main goal is merely preserving its existence. So, a current doctrine is very limited regarding other goals. Subsequently, creating a "Preferred Security Doctrine" could result in Israeli efforts which are initially directed for the same Israeli long-term interests, rather than preserving Israel's existence.

Nevertheless, the Deductive Approach contains two main weaknesses (Harkabi, 1990). First, national goals could be debatable. For example, Israel's permanent borders are an arguable issue which derives from deep gaps within the Israeli society (Dror, 2009). Secondly, a security policy must derive from a wide discussion regarding national threats and their significance in time of war and in routine (Harkabi, 1990). Therefore, every preferred Security Concept should be flexible and consistently examined. Furthermore, it should consist of both deductive and inductive elements, especially regarding national threats. Thus, it should be used as a **starting point of a discussion in the present Security Concept** and should not replace it in any kind of way (Harkabi, 1990; Passig, 2008).

This kind of Security Concept could assist Israeli leaders to confront changes in our world (Passig, 2008; Dror, 2009). Experts agree that our world is changing dramatically and in a pace that has never been seen before (Ibid). Scientific developments and the spreading of Globalization resulted in a "Global Village" which rapidly changed in new directions. For example, the rising of fundamental Islamic organizations and the spread of nuclear weapons could merge into a security threat which the world has never known

(Passig, 2008). In this kind of world Israel should have a general vision which could aid it in channeling these changes for its own purposes by considering many alternatives for every purpose. But, using the existing Security Concept, Israel is likely to pursue these changes in order to fight new threats that are consistently created. It is a dramatic strategic improvement, which is vital for Israeli policy-making process; or as Kissinger (1971) claims: In the absence of a doctrine, much energy is wasted in order to decide where we stand, more than we are going. Every occasion is departmentalized and is discussed by experts according to its specific difficulties, without noticing its affinity to the occasions.

According to Harkabi (1990), a "Preferred Security Doctrine" formation process provides a written document. It means that for the first time Israel could have a formal document which consists of its main security principles, goals, assumptions and threats. So instead of having a vague Security Concept, Israel will have a formal Security Doctrine, like other Western Governments. For example, the U.S.A has a determined pattern of a systemic security process and its desirable products: threats, interests, goals, constraints etc (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006). France also has a comprehensive doctrine which relates to many fields inside French society as threats or assets concerning National Security (Ministry of Defense of France, 1994). This kind of document is common in many developed democracies, however Israel has yet to adopt one (Defense and Trade report, 2003; Kitaoka and Tanaka, 2008; Dror, 2009).

Israeli leaders are likely to find this process helpful for it may widen their maneuvering spectrum in critical security decisions, rather than narrow them. Whereas the role of the "existing Security Doctrine" is to deal with specific solutions to national threats, this is

not under the responsibility of the "Preferred Security Doctrine". Hence, it does not significantly bind decision-makers to any given solution.

Furthermore, once leaders are bound to a formal national goal, they could have different ways to achieve it. Those alternatives could be justified by Security Doctrines that were formulated before. So, a Preferred Security Doctrine is likely to assist Israeli leaders in their decision-making process. Thus, there are not likely to oppose it. **This is the main reason why this research recommends an additional Security Doctrine, instead of trying to adjust the current one.** As aforementioned, this is a solution which failed before, and is likely to fail again because of the nature of organizations of avoiding changes, and the Israeli political culture which lacks in "doctrinal commitment" (Harkabi, 1990; Passig, 2008; Dror, 2009; Tira, 2009).

However, this research focuses on offering a methodology instead of offering a doctrine in order to enhance its effects on the institutional element in the Israeli decision-making process. As Professor Passig (2008) claims, **the product's quality is shaped mainly from the methodology which guides its creation.** While traditional Israeli methodologies failed to provide high quality products in last decades, it may be the time for a new methodology which could sustain primarily on the Deductive Approach rather than the Inductive one.

Moreover, the Israeli recoiling from obliged documents reduces the odds that any kind of offered doctrine will be accepted by politicians, especially those who wish to widen their range of action. By letting them doing so, they could influence the final product. Thus, they will have less reasons and legitimacy to oppose it.

Furthermore, as Descartes claims, a systematic doctrine could re-examine Israeli premises regarding its Security Concept and result in new notions that are not included in

contemporary discourse. This utility is highly important in a rapidly changing world which offers every organization many adaptive challenges - "is characterized by the fact that the essence of the problem and the designing of the solution requiring knowledge acquisition" (Reut Institute, 2007, p. 8). By reexamining its Security Concept, Israel will generate a process that many other Western countries have already started- reframing their Security Concept to modern battlefield, according to their national goals. France has decided to do so after the fall of the Soviet Union. French security experts came to the conclusion that the French Security Doctrine was indeed irrelevant to contemporary threats, and they drafted a new Doctrine (Ministry of Defense of France, 1994; Rieker, 2006). The US, UK, Japan and Australia underwent the same process and they all adopted new Security Doctrines according to their new national threats in the world of Post 9/11 (Defense and Trade report, 2003; National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006; Kitaoka and Tanaka, 2008; United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2009). Therefore, this research points out the need in reexamining Israeli Security Concept, and proposes a Preferred Security Doctrine as the best solution.

In addition, a successful process in this important issue could be an "anchor" for further reforms, which is essential to the Israeli policy-making process according to many experts (Harkabi, 1990; Passig, 2008; Dror, 2009; Tira, 2009). A successful experience could reduce Israeli antagonism for "doctrinal commitment" and strategic planning. So, in this case it should be clear that "the path up the hill is much more important than reaching it" (An ancient Zen phrase). It means that the process of consolidating a formal document could be even more contributing than its outcome.

Conclusion

Israel should have a Preferred Security Doctrine in order to translate its military achievements into a diplomatic victory. On the one hand, Israel needs a written Security

Doctrine (instead of a perception) in order to empower the institutional element within the Israeli decision-making process, thus to make it more systematic. On the other hand, this change should begin in adapting a "Preferred Security Doctrine" in order to respond both to the nature of any organization, and particularly to Israel's political culture. Decision-makers in Israel are the main cause to the failure of any attempt aimed at improving the decision-making process; although it may not change flaws in Israel's current Security Concept in the short-term, it could lead to dramatic changes in the Israeli decision-making in the future (Passig, 2008).

In addition, a first successful experience of creating a formal doctrine could lead to a change in the current Israeli "Security Concept", thus to adopt a common trend within Western countries throughout the world. Therefore, our research is intended to answer: **Why and how should Israel consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine**? Thus, future generations shall be able to say: "But Judah shall dwell forever and Jerusalem from generation to generation" (Joel 4:20).

Chapter 2: How should Israel consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine?

Because the first step of writing any doctrine is choosing a methodology, the following chapter offers a discussion regarding the most suitable methodology for consolidating a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel. Therefore, it gathers the three most popular methodologies of analyzing a preferred future of an organization. The methodologies were gathered from different countries and fields. Hence, this is a comparative research which is based on the methodologies' case studies, in order to find the most suitable methodology for the Israeli case in both theoretical and practical aspects. Thus, Israel could study its future imagery and shape it as its people wish.

The main purpose of 'Futures Studies' is to provide a connection between organizations' current courses of action and their goals and targets (Saul, 2001; Passig, 2008). Whereas some of the methodologies in the field propose different techniques for extrapolating current trends in the world, others focus on different perspectives in order to change the character of the decision making process as a solution-oriented process into a goal-oriented process. A Goal Oriented approach can be considered as the first step toward strategic thinking and planning (Great Britain, 2001; Passig, 2008).

Due to the fact that this chapter's aim is to find the best methodology (which could illuminate how to formulate a National Security Doctrine in Israel), this research focuses on Israel's future in the next twenty years. One the one hand, it is a long period which enables Israel to prepare for different scenarios by generating adjustment processes. On the other hand, it is not a long enough period that current trends will undergo too many changes that could find contemporary analysis irrelevant (Passig, 2008). So the "time-range" which will be examined is a 'Medium time range' of twenty years, which is the most suitable one for strategic planning in the national level, according to Passig (Ibid).

Future Studies Methodologies

a) <u>CLA: Causal Layered Analysis</u>

Future studies can be divided into four dimensions of research: empirical, interpretive, critical and "action research". Causal Layered Analysis is a futurist methodology that seeks to combine between these four dimensions while taking in account the scope of different perspectives of reality, thus through a communicative process (Inayatullah, 2004; Inayatullah, 2003; Passig, 2008; Inayatullah, 2009). However, while integrating multiple methodologies, CLA is more oriented toward the critical aspect of future studies. The main aspect of post structural critical research is that it doesn't seek to better define the future rather than to undefine it. The purpose of the theory is to analyze the future through an independent lens, free from epistemological boundaries that society, religion and culture build around our knowledge (Ibid).

Theory

The post structural approach attempts to make problematic trends or events given to us in the futures literature, and not just to discern their class basis as in conventional neo-Marxian critical research (Inayatullah, 2004; Inayatullah, 2009). The issue is not only what are other events/trends that could have been put forth, but how an issue has been constructed as an event or trend in the first place, and the 'cost' of that particular social construction — what paradigm is privileged by the nomination of a trend or event.

According to Inayatullah (Ibid) Post Structural Methods can be divided into five major steps:

1. **Deconstruction** - breaking the components surrounding the research topic and try to understand the origins of each component.

2. **Genealogy** - trying to understand how the term under study traveled through history and which paradigms where creating following the historical evolution of the topic.

3. **Distance** - Create distance between our perspective of the alternative futures and the present causes which are the basis of these futures. This process enables other alternatives of future to emerge.

4. **Alternative pasts and futures** - understanding the relation between the valorized versions of past that forged the shape of future and future alternatives themselves.

5. **Reordering knowledge** - contextualize the different alternatives according to epistemological ideas such as civilization, religion etc. This allows us to understand how the use of a specific spectrum can influence our view of the future.

Goal

The goal of Causal Layered Analysis is to disturb present power relations by making problematic our categories and evoking other places or scenarios of the future (Inayatullah, 2004; Inayatullah, 2003; Passig, 2008; Inayatullah, 2009). Through this historical, future and civilizational distance, the present becomes less rigid; This allows the spaces of reality to loosen and the new possibilities, ideas and structures, to emerge (Slaughter, 1997). The issue is less "what is the truth" but how truth functions in particular policy settings, how truth is evoked, who evokes it, how it circulates, and who gains and loses by particular nominations of what is true, real and significant.

Process

The methodology consists of four layers (Ibid):

1) <u>The Litany</u>- this layer takes in account the quantitative trends and the obvious issues and problems concerning the research topic. The panelists, at this level, will look above the surface and analyze common knowledge, often exaggerated by the media. Other basic futurist methodologies concentrate on this layer. This layer summarizes all the different subtitles surrounding the problem. The desired product at this level will consist in an analysis and synthesis of the following subjects:

   1.1. Quantitative trends - All quantitative data available concerning the topic.

   1.2. Dilemmas - recurrent societal dilemmas concerning the topic.

   1.3. Events - historic chain of events and evolution of the topic over time.

   1.4. Issues - categorization of all the inherent sub-subjects.

2. <u>System Networks</u> - this layer includes economic, cultural, political and historical factors. Interpretation is given to the data. This layer also provides technical explanation as well as academic analysis of the data and the topic. The role of the state and other actors are taken into account. Critical approach is particularly crucial at this level since the data is to be questioned; However, the language of questioning will leave the current paradigm in which the issue is framed uncontested. The desired product consists in exploring the issue according to the following perspectives:

   2.1. Social causes - disclosure of the economical, political, cultural and historical factors and their connection to the common perception of the issue.

   2.2. Interpretation - exploration and interpretation of the quantitative data (gathered in the first layer).

   2.3. Role of the state - analysis of the state's influence, power and involvement surrounding the topic.

3. <u>Worldview</u> - this deeper layer is concerned with the worldviews and discourses surrounding each and every one of the components of the problem (from layer 1). The idea is to compare and confront the discourses in order to find the actor-invariant structures of the topic. It investigates how discourse and semantics influence our framing of the issue. Based on the varied discourses, the panelists will forge discrete alternative scenarios; for example, a scenario regarding demographic trends based on religious perspectives of population ("go forth and multiply") versus a cultural scenario focused on how women's groups imagine birth giving and child raising in modern society. Through the use of scenarios, the participants will add a horizontal perspective to the layered analysis. The reasons behind our way of presenting the litany and the variables used to understand it are questioned. The desired product consists in achieving the following stages:

3.1. Contradictive assumptions analysis

3.2. Derivation of new ways of improvement

3.3. Discussion analysis and extraction of basis for new strategies

4. <u>Mythology</u> - this layer focuses on the different beliefs and opinions concerning the research topic. At this level, we try to give an emotional perspective of the problem, revealing the deep stories, the collective archetypes and the unconscious. The desired product of this last layer consists in adding the emotional perspective to our layered analysis. The participants will thus have to explore the metaphors, the myths, the historical narrative and the unconscious opinion according to which the issue is framed, revealing the foundations of the existing paradigm.

Case study

CLA was used to explore possible futures for the United Nations as a part of the UN Millennium Project (2002-2005). The Millennium Project aims at proposing solutions to major global issues in the frame of the United Nations. The project's recommendations were presented to the UN Secretary General in 2006 (Inayatullah, 2009[3]):

"If we take the futures of the United Nations as an issue, at the litany level, of concern is news of the difficulties of the United Nations (the UN's financial problems and its failure to produce anticipated and desirable outcomes in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda).

Causes, at the second level in the UN example, include lack of supranational authority; no united military, and the perspective that the UN is only as good as its member nations. The solutions that result from this level of analysis are often those that call for more funding or more centralized power. In this case, the UN needs more money and power. Often, deeper historical reasons such as the creation of the UN by the victors of WW II are articulated as factors impeding structural change (Ibid).

At the third level, the analysis of current UN problems then shifts from the unequal structure of power between UN member states to the fact that eligibility for membership in the UN is based on acquiring national status. An NGO, an individual, a culture cannot join the General Assembly or the Security Council. Deeper social structures that are actor-invariant include center-periphery relations and the anarchic inter-state system. They are the focus at this level. The solution that emerges from this level of analysis is to rethink the values and structure behind the United Nations, to revision it. Do we need a super-ordinate authority or are market mechanisms enough to manage our global commons? One could at this level, develop a horizontal discursive dimension investigating how different paradigms or worldviews frame the problem or issue (Ibid).

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[3]The summary that follows can be found in (Inayatullah, 2009, p. 17-18)

How would a pre-modern world approach the issue of global governance (consensus, for example)? How might a post-modern one (global electronic democracy)?

At the fourth layer of myth and metaphor, in the case of the UN, some factors that could lead to an exploration of alternative metaphors and myths include issues of control versus freedom, of the role of individual and collective, of family and self, of the overall governance of evolution, of humanity's place on the Earth (Ibid). Are we meant to be separate races and nations (as ordained by the myths of the Western religions) or is a united humanity (as Hopis and others have prophesied) our destiny? At the visual level, the challenge would be to design another logo for the UN, perhaps a tree of life or a circle of beings (instead of just flags of nations as currently displayed outside the UN headquarters or the official symbol of the world in a wreath of peace)."

Graph number 1: Summary of CLA Methodology

Layer	Purpose	Desired products
1. Litany	Breaking the components surrounding the research topic (Israel's National Security) and try to understand the origins of each component.	1. Quantitative current trends 2. Future' Dilemmas 3. Future' Events 4. Future' Issues
2. System Networks	Interpretation is given to the data according to economic, cultural, political and historical factors.	1. Social causes 2. Interpretation 3. Role of the state
3. World View	To compare and confront the discourses in order to find the actor-invariant structures of the topic.	1. Contradictive assumptions analysis 2. Derivation of new ways of improvement 3. Discussion analysis and extraction of basis for new strategies
4. Mythology	Adding the emotional perspective to our layered analysis.	1. Debatable and agreeable parts of Preferred future 2. List of issues that could be published and issues that could not.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Advantages:

- Through its critical approach, Causal Layered Analysis allows us to improve our understanding of both horizontal and vertical perspectives in the process of developing scenarios and strategic mindset (Inayatullah, 2004; Inayatullah, 2003; Passig, 2008; Inayatullah, 2009; Passig, 2009).

- Causal Layered Analysis implies the involvement of different layers of society in the strategic planning process, thus reflecting the most basic ideas of democratic thinking (Ibid). For that reason it could also be a tool for justifying its outcomes after citizens' involvement in the process.

- Questioning the basic assumptions behind actual processes (why do we define "security" the way we do; how else could we define the specific terminology of the issue) allows us to develop new futures alternatives, based on different insights, into reality (Passig, 2008; Inayatullah, 2009; Passig, 2009). The questioning process permits the evolvement of preferred futures alternatives (in the research context, a "Preferred Security Doctrine" or preferred National Security Mindset).

- A separate approach of the different perspectives or layers connected to the topic enables the researchers to understand more efficiently the connection between the structure of the problem and the actual causes and consequences: how does

the structure influence reality; how does our perspective of the issue alters our perception of reality (Ibid).

Disadvantages:

- CLA is far more difficult to use in an environment where the corporate culture is strong or when there is vast hegemony on cultural perspective. CLA would possibly lead to cognitive dissonance if implemented in an empiricist arena, as the concept of worldviews and discussions would be rejected (Inayatullah, 2003).

- In order for the process to be effective, the implementers (in our case, Israeli politicians) are required to accept the concept and use of methodologies and of future and critical approaches as legitimate and effective processes toward the achievement of strategic thinking (Passig, 2009).

- As a part of preferred futures studies, the process of CLA might disclose major disagreements between the participants, surrounding basic assumptions concerning the research topic (Inayatullah, 2004; Inayatullah, 2003).

b) <u>Imen-Delphi (ID)</u>

The Imen-Delphi (ID hereinafter) procedure is a variant of the Delphi forecasting method based on experts' analysis (Passig, 1997; Passig, 2008). While the classic Delphi is meant to help decision makers to acknowledge the most probable future, the ID methodology aims at creating different optional and preferred futures and at selecting the preferable option in order for decision-makers to adopt the adequate courses of action. The ID technique involves groups of individuals, and more specifically decision-makers, who share a common interest concerning the research topic and therefore are asked to

formulate the mission statement or the long-term vision of the organization surrounding a specific issue.

Process

The procedure is divided into several rounds of discussions (Ibid):

1. <u>Preliminary round</u> - At this stage, the participants will read the data and trends surrounding the topic. Based on these sources, they will have to prepare a set of challenging questions concerning the future evolution of the issue. The desired product of the preliminary round consists in the questionnaire that will be composed of the professionals' questions and compiled by the facilitator and short stories prepared by the participants in which the challenging perspective of the issue is to be emphasized.

2. <u>First round</u> - During this round, the questionnaires will be presented to the participants. The underlying purpose of the first round is to break the assumption that the causes of the present lie in the past. The panelists need to acknowledge that the causes of the present also lie in the future, as the way people picture their future can be of dramatic influence on current actions. Several attempts will thus be made in order to convince the panelists about the importance of future projections in creating long-term thinking capacities. The desired product at this stage consists in answers to the questionnaire, responses to the short stories and new questions that the participants may raise during the process.

3. <u>Second round</u> - The purpose of the second round is to facilitate a thorough interaction that would generate specific ideas and future statements. At this stage, the facilitator will compile the answers into optional future statements and present it to the participants. The specialists will then have to answer three questions about the

statements: would it be beneficial to the organization if the specific statement was to occur, is it likely that the statement would happen in the future and how important is the statement to the future of the topic. The desired product will thus consist in the answers to the three questions concerning each statement. Through this process, the conversation will become more focused toward specific proposals for preferable futures, probable futures and important futures.

4. <u>Third round</u> - The purpose of a third round is to have the panelists take responsibility, formulate a final proposed list of future mission statements and to generate new ideas and recommendations. The facilitator is to reorganize the future statements based on their level of importance (according to the second round) and prepare a final list of future statements. The panelists will then have to answer questionnaires about the final statements. The product of this last stage consists in a list of new ideas and recommendations concerning the final future statements.

Case study: the future of local youth cultural centers (Matnas) in Israel (Passig, 2008).

In 1996, the Israeli society for local youth cultural centers started a process of redefining the mission statements of the organization in order to prepare adequately for the challenges of the digital era in the field of community centers. The members of the board participated in a one year long Imen-Delphi process in order to understand the new rational of the Matnas organization. The process helped the participants to acknowledge the profound vision that they have concerning the future of the organization. One of the main conclusions was that instead of being a supplier of educational support, the centers needed to become a core factor in all fields of Israeli society. The relationship between the centers and the direction was redefined in order to improve organizational efficiency. According to Passig (2008), the process enabled the direction to acknowledge the

underlying challenges within the organization, challenges that would have stayed unresolved otherwise, unless a crisis was to reveal it.

Graph number 2: Summary of Imen- Delphi Methodology

Imen-Delphi

| Preliminary Round: Future issues and dilemmas | ◀— | Expert's current trends |

↓

First Round: Questions regarding Future Imagery

↓

Second Round: Future 'Mission-Statements'

↓

Third Round: Iteration to create an agreement

↓

Desired Product: Insight of Future Imagery and levels of agreement upon its elements

Advantages and Disadvantages

Further investigation of case studies and other sources show that the methodology presents clear advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages:

- The use of a number of experts and persons of interests enables the methodology to maximize the collective intelligence factor (Great Britain, 2001[4]). Collective intelligence is defined as the increase of intellectual potential that can be created through group thinking processes.

- The methodology enables intellectual outsourcing, given that the Imen-Delphi can be processed almost integrally through e-mails and digital communications (Passig, 2008).

- The use of persons of interest who are actually experts in their field enables the researcher to obtain relatively high validity and credibility while also presenting the "organizational" perspective (Great Britain, 2001; Passig, 2008).

Disadvantages:

- The methodology aims at forging a future vision without challenging the primary assumptions concerning the issue. As such, it is less efficient than CLA in changing participant's perception of the underlying reasons to our current understanding of the issue (Passig, 2008).

- As a variant of the original Delphi, the methodology usually makes the participants seek for consensus, while disagreements and variety can be very important in the process of decomposing an issue (Cabinet Office, 2001).

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[4] For further reading see "A Futurist's Toolbox: Methodologies in Futures Work" in Great Britain, 2001.

- The process of a Delphi poll or survey can be affected by the facilitator and his actions. Unwanted interferences like this may lead to a decrease in the reliability of the research (cabinet office, 2001; Passig, 2008).

c) <u>Visioning</u>

Visioning is an integrated approach to policy-making. With overall goals in view, it helps avoid piecemeal and reactionary approaches to addressing problems. It accounts for the relationship between issues, and how one problem's solution may generate other problems or have an impact on another level of government. It is cooperative, with multi-agency involvement, frequently with joint interagency leadership.

Visioning uses participation as a source of ideas in the establishment of long-range policy (Stich, 2006; Halevi, 2010). It draws upon deeply-held feelings about overall directions of public agencies to solicit opinions about the future. After open consideration of many options, it generates a single, integrated vision for the future based on the consideration of many people with diverse viewpoints. When completed, it presents a democratically-derived consensus.

Goal

Visioning leads to a goals statement. Typically, it consists of a series of meetings focused on long-range issues. Visioning results in a long-range plan ,with a 20 or 30-year horizon, and sets a strategy for achieving the goals (Reynolds, 2001; Halevi, 2010).

Priorities and performance standards can be part of visioning. Priorities are set to distinguish essential goals. For example, in the state of Minnesota, a statewide report card was used to evaluate the current status and set up goals and milestones for the future. Performance standards allow an evaluation of progress toward goals over time.

Process

A specific time period is scheduled to develop the vision statement. The schedule incorporates sufficient time for framing issues, eliciting comments through surveys or meetings, recording statements from participants, and integrating them into draft and final documents (Reynolds, 2001).

Vision building is comprised of two challenges: The first, the ability to create inventive and diverse alternatives (the ability to dream), without screening possibilities. The second is the ability to translate the vision into an elaborate description, comprised of measurable and countable indexes (Halevi and Braslavi, 2006).

The vision is the last target one wishes to achieve. While building the vision it is necessary to define 3 parameters:

- Time - By when?
- Amount - What needs to happen? How is it measured?
- Clarity - Exact definition (avoiding vagueness). What does it mean?

Case study: General Electric

Jack Welch was Chairman and CEO of General Electric (GE) between 1981 and 2001. He grew to fame in the business world through his management success and skills during his many years at General Electric. His vision when he occupied the position of the CEO was that GE businesses had to be the best performing business in their field or else they would be sold (GE, 2010).

GE saw great growth and expansion under Mr. Welch's leadership. Through streamlining operations, acquiring new businesses, and ensuring that each business under the GE umbrella was one of the best in its field, the company was able to expand dramatically from 1981 to 2001 (Lane, 2008).

In 1980, the year before Welch became CEO, GE recorded revenues of roughly $26.8 billion; in 2000, the year before he left, they were nearly $130 billion (GE, 2010). The company went from a market value of $14 billion to one of more than $410 billion at the time of his retirement, making it the most valuable and largest company in the world, up from America's tenth largest by market capital in 1981 (Lane, 2008).

In 1999, Fortune named him the "Manager of the Century," and the Financial Times recently named him one of the three most admired business leaders in the world today (Lane, 2008). Jack Welch said: "Willingness to change is strength even if it means plunging part of the company into total confusion for a while" (GE, 2010).

Advantages and Disadvantages

Advantages:

- Visioning is extremely flexible in terms of scheduling and staff commitments. Scheduling takes weeks or months. Staff is temporarily or permanently assigned to the project. (Halevi, 2010).

- Visioning leads toward other public involvement techniques. As a policy umbrella, it can precede establishment of a civic advisory committee and guide its work in reviewing individual projects or programs. It leads to brainstorming sessions to solve individual problems (U.S Department of Transportation, 2010).

- It allows to set the stage for short-range planning activities and to set new directions in policy and when a range of potential solutions is needed.

- It is particularly effective when integration between issues is required and when a wide variety of ideas should be heard. (Reynolds, 2001).

Disadvantages:

- Time and staff requirements are significant to maintain contact with numerous community participants and carry the program forward (U.S Department of Transportation, 2010).

- The staff needs patience to deal with many diverse views and individuals, time and schedule requirements, and complex issues and interrelationships. Finally, visioning is a one-time event and therefore remains on a generalized policy level; there is a substantial risk that the resulting document will not satisfy all interest groups.

- Visioning creates paralysis by way of analysis.

- It can lead to the deceleration of the process of an organization by ignoring the current need and focusing on the long term process (Reynolds, 2001).

Visioning is of maximum use at an early point in the establishment or revision of policies or goals. Used in this way, it demonstrates openness to new ideas or concepts suggested by the public (Reynolds, 2001). For maximum effect, a visioning project should have the active support of elected officials, agency heads, and community groups.

When the vision is established there are following methodologies to transfer it to reality (see Halevi and Braslavi, 2006).

Conclusion: Our Offered Methodology

The research process of the different popular and accepted methodologies for future planning led us to the conclusion that CLA is the most suitable methodology when dealing with the preparation of a Preferred Security Doctrine for the State of Israel. Our conclusion is based on the next following reasons:

1. The major advantage of the CLA is that it primarily studies the common future imagery of the organization (in our case - the State of Israel) and offers different mission-statements toward those goals under different conditions (Passig, 2008; Inayatullah, 2009). Given that Israeli decision-makers have several strategies for meeting each goal, they will enjoy a wider range of action, so the **main obstacle** which has hindered this process in the past, their antagonism toward a doctrinal commitment, would be reduced.

2. A major advantage of the methodology lies in the variety of target audiences that is required in order to complete the different layer of CLA. This variety can help avoid conceptual barriers that prevent the political echelon from perceiving current challenges and their solutions regarding Israel's National Security. This way, Ben-Gurion's old Security Doctrine could be replaced by a more modern and suitable one.

3. CLA enables the researcher to maximize the advantages of the different methodologies available. For example, Imen-Delphi can be used as the implementation technique of the first layer while Visioning can serve as a useful tool for experts and decision-makers in the fourth layer, when they form Israel's new security concept. The idea is to keep CLA as a compass, and to use competing methodologies at every stage in order to maximize the effectiveness of the processes. In that sense, this combination between CLA and other

methodologies such as ID and Visioning was already proved successful (Ball, 2001; Terranova, 2008; Passig, 2009).

4. CLA is the most updated methodology in the field of future studies and therefore more relevant to the research topic (Inayatullah, 2009; Passig, 2009). Moreover, the methodology's popularity among experts is another justification to our choice. According to James Dator: "Causal Layered Analysis is the first major new futures theory and method since Delphi, almost forty years ago. CLA is a very sophisticated way to categorize different views of and concerns about the futures, and then to use them to help groups think about the futures far more effectively than they could by using any one of the layers alone, as most theory/methods do." (Passig, 2008, pp 445).

5. According to D. Passig (2009), the strength of CLA lies in its ability to overcome existing conceptions, enabling structural change at least from a theoretical perspective. In the case of Israel, there are obvious misconceptions or irrelevant conceptions concerning security and defense (Reut institute, 2007). In order to implement an effective security doctrine, Israeli decision-makers would be required to challenge existing assumptions and conceptions about the security of the state; CLA can provide them with the tools needed in order to succeed in this process.

6. CLA has been used successfully in several researches and projects and in various fields (Passig, 2008; Inayatullah, 2009). The availability of successful case studies will help the researcher to learn from processes and by doing so, to limit the margin of error and to improve the processes.

Following our research on the Imen-Delphi methodology, we understand that its advantages would be maximized if used as the secondary methodology for the

implementation of the first layer of CLA. On the one hand, ID is known for studying an organization's imagery, but it is less effective in breaking old images and creates new. On the other hand, the first layer, or Litany, requires in-depth thinking among participants in order to offer a comprehensive background concerning the Israeli future imagery of its National Security. Therefore, the Imen-Delphi four rounds approach suits perfectly the needs of the Litany level. It will allow the researcher to encompass all the different perspectives concerning the topic, to maximize the utility of the participants and, consequently, to effectively achieve the required products of the first layer. As aforesaid, this combination is successful when it comes to study the future imagery of an organization and when there is a need in change of perception (Ball, 2001; Terranova, 2008; Passig, 2009).

Concerning the Visioning Methodology, whose main advantages are long term planning and wide spectrum thinking, we find it more suitable as the practical tool in the implementation of the fourth layer of the CLA methodology. The fact that this specific methodology encourages focused thinking makes it less suitable for generating the process of creating a new Security Doctrine for Israel, and more suitable for the end of the process. It empowers strategic elements within the formulating process, so it could assist our politicians when they come to draft a formal document which expresses the security "vision" of Israel.

'Incorporated CLA'

Following our analysis and after taking the Passig (2008) recommendations under consideration, we have converted the CLA methodology to what we call 'Incorporated CLA': a four stage methodology to create a preferred Security concept for Israel, and one more stage to formalize it into a National Document. The Litany layer breaks Israel's preferred Security Concept by using the Imen Delphi Methodology in conducting a large

scale survey inside the Israeli society (a statistical sample). Both the 'System Network' and the 'World View' layers will be analyzed by teams of experts from different fields. As part of the 'Mythology' layer, their results will be analyzed by several groups which represent a variety of groups in Israeli society such as politicians, businessmen, diplomats, military, citizens, commanders etc. The products of the different teams will be processed by a special team of experts in the Prime Minister's Office according to the Visioning Methodology. The outcome of this four layered process is a Preferred Security Concept for Israel. To make it a fundamental document, the Prime Minister will ordain several committees whose purpose is to confirm it and to draft it as a National Security Doctrine.

According to these conclusions, the last part of this research will constitute the implementation of the first layer of the Causal Layered Analysis. Imen-Delphi will serve as the practical tool in the process. The results of this process should offer another justification to the use of CLA as the guiding methodology.

Graph number 3: Incorporated CLA (the offered methodology)

Layer	Methodology	Process
Litany	Large scale survey (using Imen-Delphi)	Breaking the **components** surrounding Israel's Preferred Security Concept.
System Networks	Groups of Experts	**Interpretation** is given to the data according to economic, cultural, political and historical factors.
World View	Groups of Experts	To compare and confront the discourses in order to find the **actor-invariant** structures of the topic.
Mythology	Quality control groups from different sectors in Israeli Society (Using Visioning)	Adding the **emotional perspective** to our layered analysis.
From Security **Concept** to Security **Doctrine**	Groups of Politicians	Voting in order to **confirm** each section of the Israeli Preferred Security Concept. Thus, determining it as a National Security Doctrine.

Chapter 3: The First Layer Implementation

After presenting the problem and offering a 'Preferred Security Doctrine' as a solution, this chapter's aim is to add experimental evidence to the theoretical argument on behalf of the CLA. Hence, this chapter reveals the implementation process of the first layer of the CLA among a single examined group: research methods and findings. The aim of examining our methodology is supporting the notion that our suggested policy is the right tool in order to form a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel, and to present products which could be an "anchor" for any professional discussion regarding Israel's Security Concept.

Research Layout

In order to provide the desirable products of the first layer (current trends, possible dilemmas and 'mission statements' for the organization), the following research merges the Imen-Delphi method with the first layer of the CLA. Thus, our research combines two of the most popular modern methodologies into one research. The purpose of this unique combination is to "erase" the common concept of security in Israel and to establish a basis for new concept which derives from organized strategic planning process.

According to Imen-Delphi's principles, our research consists of four rounds of anonymous questionnaires. In the first round, the participants were asked to formulate dilemmas and questions about Israel's security in the next twenty years. In the second round, every participant answered all dilemmas and questions that were raised by the entire group. Their answers were formed as a 'Mission Statement' for Israel. In the third round the participants ranked every statement in two different categories: (1) How much they agree with the statement; and (2) How much they find this statement important for Israel's future. In the fourth round all members re-examined their magnitude ranking,

after seeing the group's preference regarding every statement. The purpose of this round was to "encourage" an agreement within the group, for group intelligence[5] is an important element in understanding the group's future imagery. Because the method of Imen-Delphi is elaborated in the second chapter, this chapter deals mainly with the research population and the research's outcomes.

The poll's outcomes have been analyzed by quantitative tools according to Passig's (2008) method. The level of agreement was divided into four levels: (1)*Wide Agreement* - 65%+ support for one answer; (2) *Simple Agreement* - 65%+ support for the two positive answers (number 1 and 2); (3) *Clear Antagonism* - 65%+ support for the two negative answers (number 3 and 4); (4) *Disagreement* - less than 65% support for each pair of answers altogether. Each statement's magnitude for Israel's future was analyzed according to the fourth rounds results. The level of magnitude was ranked from 1 (definitely important) to 4 (definitely unimportant) and the grade of every statement was the average of the grades that were given by the group members. The lower the grade, the higher the magnitude of the statement is for Israel's future.

Research Population

After considering our research's time limitation we decided to focus on one group: a 20 person group of honors government students which were gathered under a special program for leadership and diplomacy in the Inter Disciplinary Center Herzliya. The advantages of this special leadership group convinced us that a historic process of consolidating a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel should start with them.

First, all of the participants are B.A students for Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, and so they are familiar with security theories in general and Israel's security dilemmas in

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[5] Group intelligence refers to how many individuals simultaneously converge upon the same knowledge (Passig, 2008).

particular. On the other hand, as fitting for beginning students they are not governed by common professional perceptions but rather characterized by creativity and open-mindedness. Hence, they are the "golden path" for combining professionalism and creativeness.

Second, this special group comprises of students from a wide variety of countries such as: Canada, UK, USA, South Africa, Russia, Israel, Spain etc. Its members have also diverse backgrounds: law students, business students; some have military backgrounds, diplomatic backgrounds and some even have short experience in Israeli politics. So having this kind of a mixed group which has a common denominator in the shape of government could provide both deep understanding of current challenges and ideas for new trends that have not yet appeared.

Finally, this team is a group of future leaders whose aim is common - to promote Israel's interests in the future, whether in Israel or abroad. Given that every student in this team has high chances of being in an influential position in the future, we find it very important that they will undergo a process which aims to change their Security Concept respectively to current trends of changes in our world. Therefore, a good experience of a systemic process and a new notion regarding Israel's security concept could "find a listening ear" in the leadership of tomorrow if it fails to reach an ear in today's leadership.

Thus, our unique research population enables us to rely on present wisdom and knowledge in order to open a creative discussion regarding Israel's security issues in the next twenty years. Therefore, it could possibly be the "butterfly" which would eventually "have far-reaching ripple effects on subsequent historic events" (Glick, 1991, p.35).

Research Findings

According to the CLA method this part presents the products of the first layer: primarily, it reveals current trends as they were published by the Reut Institute (2007) and Meridor Committee (Passig, 2008). Their analysis was chosen because they are the most up to date analyses regarding current National Security trends. Secondly, it presents the 'mission statements' that were formed by the research team regarding to Israel's security obligations and dilemmas in the next twenty years; and the level of agreement among the group members regarding every statement. The 'mission statements' are ranked according to their magnitude of importance for Israel's future, according to the group analysis.

1. **Current Trends**[6]

- **"'The Resistance Network' is a new type of enemy** – The concept "Resistance Network" refers to a plurality of actors, of different types, with various aims and targets. Links among the actors are created through alliances, cooperation and network formation to carry out the struggle against Israel. For some of the actors, the objective of the struggle is the military destruction of Israel or politically abolishing Israel by denying its right to exist.

The Resistance Network's logic is political: to bring about Israel's implosion. Its objective is to bring to Israel's internal implosion similar to the collapse of South Africa and the former USSR, both which collapsed as a result of internal socio-political pressure, de-legitimization and international political and economic pressure.

The Resistance Network's military logic is secondary. This Network is conscious of Israel's military superiority. Thus it avoids, to the extent possible, direct military confrontation with Israel in which it might be defeated. At the same time, the Resistance

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[6] Retrieved from Reut Institute's research (2007) and merged with Passig's analysis (2008).

Network prevents Israel from decisive military victories or political achievements via terror and guerilla warfare.

To summarize, the Resistance Network executes an integrated, multi-pronged strategy against Israel:

a) **Preventing sustainable achievements** – Use of terror and other tools to prevent Israel from any sustainable military or political achievements, by agreement or through unilateral moves that promote an end of Israeli control over the Palestinians and guaranteeing Israel's existence;

b) **Promoting the establishment of a single** Palestinian/Arab/Islamic State instead of Israel;

c) **Denying Israel's right to exist** through Basic De-legitimization of Israel.

Hence, in the last decade, the Resistance Network has succeeded in preventing Israel from achieving neither a decisive victory on the battlefield or political achievements which would secure Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state, either via negotiations or unilateral moves.

- **Continuation of 'occupation' accelerates Israel's implosion**; the Resistance Network does not seek 'End of Occupation' – instead, it understands that the end of Israel's control over the Palestinians is an essential Israeli interest, and that continuation of Israel's control over the Palestinians will accelerate Israel's collapse from within. Therefore, the end of Israeli control over the Palestinians, and the transformation of the present conflict into a 'border conflict' through the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, are a strategic threat for the Resistance Network, as this would erode the legitimacy for continuing their struggle against Israel. This would be even more enhanced due to scenarios including the establishment of permanent borders, ending the

Israeli-Palestinian or the Israeli-Lebanese conflicts, and securing Finality of Claims between all sides.

- **IDF operational policy is irrelevant** (but is supposed to be updated following the investigation committees established following the war in Lebanon) – Following the war in Lebanon, Israel's Defense Policy and the IDF's operational policy have been rendered irrelevant. The Meridor Commission raised questions concerning the following concepts: "deterrence", "early warning", "victory", "transferring the war to the enemy's territory", and more. Furthermore, the erosion of the central governments' power in neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon and the PA, neutralizes central components of the IDF's operational policy. The investigation committees, established following the war in Lebanon, deal with the IDF's operational policy and are meant to bring about change within this component.

- **US power is declining; the pro-Israel lobby is under attack** – As a result of the failure of its democratization project and setbacks in fighting terror, the US faces strategic concerns throughout the Middle East: in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the PA. Consequently, a new discourse is arising within the US and it is reassessing its interests in the region. This may lead to a divergence between U.S and Israeli interests. Furthermore, U.S ability to act as a plausible mediator between Israel and Arab countries has considerably eroded. Erosion of the United States' stature in the region affects Israel's stature as well and the way Israel is perceived by its enemies. In addition, the pro-Israel lobby and the American Jewish community are under attack, probably of an anti-Semitic nature, questioning their loyalty towards the U.S. They are accused of placing Israel's interests before U.S interests and pressuring American decision makers in the White House and Congress. For proponents of this view, both the war in Iraq and a potential military attack on Iran are portrayed as serving Israel's interests rather than those of the U.S.

- **Emerging Iranian Hegemony** – Iran is currently seeking hegemonic power over the Middle East and becoming a global actor. To serve these objectives, Iran seeks to contain Israel's power, push the U.S out of the region, create divisions within the UN Security Council (in particular among the U.S, Russia and China), weaken the international community's tools, as well as to secure stability and calm around its borders. Iran uses the following tools: a global terrorist network, the Resistance Network, long-term strategic alliances and economic agreements (in particular with Russia and China), development of the Shiite Crescent and the global Shiite community, and development of its nuclear program and developing its military and strategic capabilities. Iran is leading its struggle against Israel on various fronts: developing its nuclear program and acquiring long-range missiles; military, political and economic support to Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance; developing a global terrorist network which threatens Jewish communities and Israelis worldwide; financial and military support to Syria including signing of a strategic defense agreement; and a policy of basic de-legitimization of Israel.

- **The most essential type of commission** – one empowered to revise the National Security Concept – has not been established – Military superiority does not mean strategic superiority. In other words, Israel may be militarily superior in every single arena, but may still be strategically inferior in the face of its enemies' strategy and capacity to unite forces (see: "The Resistance Network").

- **There is a gap between the nature of the challenge and the capacity of the Israeli government** – Facing the challenges posed by the Resistance Network calls for continuous multi-pronged cooperation in long-term planning, decision-making and implementation. However, the Israeli political system is characterized by instability, short tenures and deep rifts between legislative and executive branches. Hence, there is a gap between the nature of the challenge Israel faces and the tools it has to confront the challenge.

- **Ending control over the Palestinians is growing distant while its price is rising** – It is becoming increasingly difficult for Israel to end its control over the Palestinians, while Arab/Palestinian/Islamic forces grow stronger and work towards sustaining Israel's occupation in the West Bank. The time factor leads to a situation whereby Israel will have "to pay" more, while it "receives" less. Therefore, the chances for a direct and mutual permanent agreement are decreasing. As a consequence, the establishment of a Palestinian state will likely have to occur through unilateral processes, with the support of a third party.

- **Israel's dependency on the international community is growing** – As a consequence of the aforementioned trends, Israel's dependency on regional and international players other than the US is growing. The more it appears that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be solved via direct negotiations, the greater the tendency to internationalize the conflict. Hence, ending the war in Lebanon required establishing a security regime on Israel's northern border, cooperating with international forces, UN resolution 1701, reinforcement of UNIFIL and understandings with Russia. Similarly, the Iranian threat requires cooperation with international actors such as Russia, China, the European Union, moderate Arab states and Iran's neighboring countries.

- **Terror is an existential threat** – The danger of terror used by the Resistance Network lies not in the amount of damage or instability it causes, but rather in its ability to thwart Israel's main actions towards securing its existence. Therefore, terror is an existential challenge "(Reut Institute, 2007).

- **Increase in the weight of "supra-conventional" conflicts -** merger of non-conventional weaponry with "sub-conventional" threats involving terror and low-intensity warfare.

- **Change in the Israeli Deterrence Perception -** new challenges require innovative technological and conceptual deterrence techniques.

- **Increase in technological threats -** possible attacks on computerized national infrastructure (Passig, 2008).

2. **Mission statements**

Table Number 4: The group's Mission-Statements, according to their perceived magnitude

How important is this statement for the future of Israel (average grade*[7])? **1.** Very important **2.** Important **3.** Not so important **4.** Not important at all	**Mission-Statement** ▮ Wide Agreement ▮ Simple Agreement ▮ Disagreement ▮ Clear Antagonism	
1.10	Israel should maintain its high **education** and scientific innovation supremacy over its neighbors.	1
1.10	The field of **Education** should be perceived as the core of Israel's strategic planning.	*
1.15	Israel should gain independence over **strategic resources** such as energy and water.	3
1.15	Israel should initiate a plan for connecting the **periphery** with centers in terms of transportation, encouraging of moving to periphery and establishing security centers in the periphery.	*
1.25	Israel should create united core **education** values that are common to all sectors of society.	5
1.35	Israel should launch massive **development** programs for the south (Negev) and position it as the "new territories": "new pioneering" of the 21st century.	6
1.35	**Educational** system must teach values of democracy and rule of law from young ages.	*
1.4	Israel should increase trade (if possible) volume with **neighboring countries**, in order to increase the price of war or violence for the other side.	8
1.45	Israel must require its citizens to serve in any type of **national service** regardless of religion, sex or race.	9
1.50	Israel should be the leader in setting the world free from the **oil dependence**.	10
1.50	Israel should launch a full multi-systemic plan A.S.A.P to prepare, enlarge and build Israel preparedness for **earthquake**. Government, municipal and emergency services should be the first priority.	*
1.55	Israel should deepen its relations with the BRIC's countries through **security consulting and cooperation**.	12
1.55	Israel should reach an agreement with its **neighbors** regarding the use of nuclear weapon in the area, and emphasize in the international community that terror organization with nuclear capabilities is a REDLINE for us.	*

1.6	Israeli should charge heavy penalties for **military refusal** and any supporting calls for fraternal war.	14
1.6	In an atmosphere where technological military service is an advantage, Israel should formulate **incentives packages** for its warriors.	*
1.7	The unclear recognition of the **Holocaust** is a mean to further strengthen the de-legitimization of future existence of the state of Israel, so Israel's mission is to fight every denial attempt and to make sure that friendly countries (with Israel) have Holocaust studies in their curriculum.	16
1.7	Israel should aspire for an "inclusionist" **nationalism** model on the base of recognition in Israel as the Jewish state	*
1.75	Israeli **nationalism** should be sustained on Zionism - the love for the state of Israel, regardless of level of religion.	18
1.75	Israel should sign agreements with international bodies for the ensuring of assistance in the case of an **earthquake**, so it does not become a security threat from external or internal enemies.	*
1.85	Israel should strive for another close **strategic ally** in order to strengthen its relations with the US.	20
1.85	**Arabs** should be assimilated into the Israeli society by uniting educational systems and requiring them to perform civil service of any kind.	*
1.9	Israel should maintain its current **nuclear policy** in order to face future criticism or requests for nuclear disarmament.	22
1.9	Israel's **security alliance** is the most important alliance it has and is very important for Israel's security in all dimensions (eco, pol, and mil) and it must be preserved at all costs up until but not including giving up on its own security interests.	*
2	Israel should join an alliance that guarantees it does not stand alone against **terror** attacks, conventional or non-conventional.	24
2	Lessons should be taught on the matter of the psychological warfare of **Terror**, given the fact that the home front has become another battlefield.	*
2	Israel should force every civilian and governmental organization to have a backup plan for **electronic attacks**. The state of Israel must ensure a proper level of information security in governmental offices and banks.	*
2.05	Israel should brand itself as a "**startup country**" and deal with nanotechnology.	27
2.05	Israel should legislate a **compensation law** that will motivate private initiatives of eviction, in order to make processes easier in future scenarios.	28
2.05	Israel should **brand** its values and future aspirations among its citizens.	*
2.05	Israel should establish an institute which stands for the exchange of information and cooperation on matters of **international terror**.	*
2.1	Israel should formulate a plan for the increasing of **national pride** throughout all citizens, both on educational levels, symbols and heritage.	31
2.15	Israel should develop melting pot mechanisms and **national unity** in societal systems (outside the military).	32
2.15	Israel should formulate a plan based on transforming Israeli **Arabs** into its mediators with the Arab world (Diplomatically and Financially for the sake of fundraising abroad) by professional training and affirmative action in government offices.	*

2.2	Israel should maintain a neutral policy in regards to domestic affairs of its **neighboring countries**.	34
2.25	During elections for Knesset Israel should promote **regional elections** (regional representatives in the Knesset) in order to minimize dependency on government's control in times of peace and war.	35
2.25	Israel should formulate a code of "norm conscience" on the use of **nuclear weapons** based on the fact that it is reserved only for self defense.	*
2.3	Israel should promote equal rights and a policy for affirmative action in institutions for higher education. For when **Israeli Arabs** feel they are treated as equals, and they have the same opportunities as the Jews, they will be willing to acknowledge Israel as a Jewish state.	37
2.3	Israel should enact **social duties** as mandatory for several years until they will be voluntarily performed.	*
2.4	**Jurists** should be a central part of law enforcement and police units with judiciary capabilities should be established.	39
2.55	Israel should lead the efforts for writing the 'War on Terror' chapter in the book of **International Law**.	40
2.6	Israel should establish a **Biometric database** and legislate laws against physical crimes with malice (e.g.: murder, rape, robbery etc.)	41
2.6	**Possession of Weapons** should not be allowed at all; it will increase and escalate the forms of violence use; Individuals working in security positions should be required to deposit their weapon when not on the job at safety spots.	*
2.65	Every individual who graduates 12 years of **school** should know Hebrew and English on high levels and at least two other languages on medium levels.	43
2.7	Israel should secretly promote a **regional defense agreement** between the pragmatic regimes in the Middle East (without Israel).	44
2.7	Israel should strive toward **independence** in the security field, even with the price of temporarily economic - security losses. This will contribute to our national pride and strength.	*
2.85	**Youth movements** should serve as a tool for preparing individuals for military service in both mental and physical aspects.	46
2.9	The **Israeli army** should be a professional and efficient army in which the soldiers will have professional, well paid positions.	47
3	**Jurists** should be an integral part of every decision making unit, and train any commander or soldier during their training period	48
3.25	The **Israeli military** should been formulated on joint forces (Air, Sea and Land in each force)	49
3.3	**Israeli military** should adopt some of the characteristics of guerilla warfare in order to become more flexible, even in case of tolerable harm to democratic values, and spread this to countries fighting terror.	50
3.3	Issues of security should be dealt in a special new system of **courts** dedicated to this matter (able to negate military moves).	*
3.3	Israel should separate between the Jewish identity and the Israeli one by changing the **citizenship** to a "HEBREW" one - a new identity which is based on the connection between the land, the history, joint	*

	legacy and common future.	
3.65	Israel should train **African immigrants** (Jewish Ethiopian and illegal immigrants) and send them back as spies to form a native grid of espionage.	53

This chapter focuses on an initial implementation process of the first layer of the offered methodology - CLA. The research design reveals the limitation of its outcomes for it studies the future imagery of one specific group. More credible experiments should include more groups from different sets in Israeli society. Moreover, the trend analysis should consist of multi-institutional work, rather than an analysis of one institute. So the research's results should be treated as initial findings that do not fully represent Israeli society.

Nevertheless, this chapter holds practical magnitude for it guides those who wish to implement our offered solution - to use the CLA methodology in consolidating a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel. It offers a gradual and elaborated process to fulfill this national mission. Furthermore, the research's outcomes, credibly limited as they may be, point out significant trends that could be used as a theoretical basis for further understanding the concept of Security within Israeli society. Therefore, the next chapter presents the research's conclusions and examines its parallelism to other National Security research in Israel and abroad.

Chapter 4: Discussion

This chapter closes the fundamental discussion in Israeli security concept by presenting the research's main conclusions. Although this research credibility is very limited, its conclusions may point out the need to shift the Israeli Security Concept for something new. For that reason, the research's conclusions are examined in a comparative analysis to parallel researches in Israel and abroad in the field of National Security. Our discussion concerning the research emphasizes the next steps in order to accomplish the historic process of our time- to consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel.

Our research's findings show 53 'mission statements'. The statements are divided into three levels of importance for the future of the State of Israel: the first group comprises of those statements with an average grade of 1-2 (not including 2); the second group's average grade is 2-3; and the last group- 2-3.

1. <u>First level</u>- abstract social values (1st -23rd places): this group mainly consists of social 'mission-statements' that point out the need for enhancing joint values in Israeli society. These statements also emphasize the national responsibility of ensuring basic national economic needs in order to maintain a real independence in a free market world. According to our examined team, this group emphasizes Israel's fundamental needs regarding its ability to overcome future threats. For example: protecting the Holocaust memorial, investing in periphery, national identity and the main role of Israeli education.

2. <u>Second level</u>- the role of the state and the treatment towards Israeli Arabs (24th - 47th places): the 'mission-statements' within this group mostly deal with the government responsibility of improving Israel's status in the world, and its obligation towards Israeli Arabs. Those statements aim at improving Israel's current position, but they are secondary when it comes to Israel's capability of ensuring its existence, according to our examined team. For example: Branding

Israel, enhancing its national pride, changing its election system, preparing to both electronic war and future withdrawal from Judah and Samaria.

3. <u>Third level</u>- Military and debatable statements (48th-53rd places): these statements discuss the nature of the IDF and open debatable issues such as the balance between Israel's independence and deepening its strategic alliance with the USA. Following our examined team those issues seem less crucial for Israel's future.

Our survey's results indicate a widening trend of the concept of "National Security" within our chosen team: from National Security to National Resilience. National Security deals with ensuring the nation's existence and protection of its interests (Harkabi, 1990; Tal in Amidror, 2002). Whereas the traditional concept of National Security focuses on military threats, there is a modern discussion whether it should also include internal social threats such as socio-economic gaps, education, national identity and unity etc. Our examined team gives a clear answer: <u>Israeli National Security should include more social and economic values</u> that are considered to be under the concept of "National Resilience".

"National Resilience" is a new concept, which was created by the Institute for Policy and Strategy in the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (Arad and Alon, 2006). "National Resilience" is an expansion of the term 'National Security' to more abstract dimensions, such as: national morale, a feeling of national mission, endurance and "knowledge of a just path". This is the connection between materialistic power (classic National Security) and spiritual power. According to Arad and Alon those values are essential to the liveliness of the state when determining the nation's capability to overcome modern threats in contemporary international arena: diplomatic de-legitimization, international economic boycott, organized crime, terrorism against citizens and modern weapons that demand high level of technological knowledge and investment. Those threats are not

only military, so they require non military power (Nye, 2002; Aran and Alon, 2006; Reut Institute, 2007; Abramsky, 2009; Reut Institute, 2009). This new conception supports our examined team's results regarding a general trend in the Israeli concept of "National Security"- the rise of social and economic values.

Moreover, our examined team points out two main components in the new Israeli National Security Concept: education and economics. Three 'mission-statements' out of the first five deal with the Israeli need of high quality Education. Education is the most effective technique to promote social values (Arad and Shoshani, 2007; Bodinger, 2007; Abramsky, 2009; Reut Institute, 2009). Due to the fact that social immaterial values have enhanced their magnitude in Israeli security capability, education has a chief role in determining Israel's power in the future. Good education can ensure qualified and obedient soldiers. It could ensure a high level of technological research and development of weapons, and high quality people to operate them in battle field. Education can close social gaps and empower joint values in Israeli society. Therefore, our research's results are supported by parallel researches of three different research institutes in Israel. They all agree that education is a crucial element in Israel's capability to overcome both external and internal threats (Ibid).

In addition, our examined team finds Israel's economic power as a second crucial element in Israel's National Security. "'Economic power" refers to the market's economic situation: its infrastructure, natural and technological resources as well as for its human capital (Sadan, 2002; Amit and Fleischer, 2005; Arad and Alon, 2006; Reut Institute, 2008). Five 'mission-statements' of our examined team discuss those economic elements. Those elements are crucial for the state capability simultaneously to act independently in the global market following its interests and to preserve good relations with other countries and organizations in the international arena (Ibid). Given that Israel's biggest

enemies are undeveloped countries, its economy is one of its biggest advantages. Hence, preserving its economic superiority is indeed a crucial element in securing its existence. Furthermore, investing in infrastructure in undeveloped regions is a secondary way to close social gaps among Israelis; thus, to empower its unity and national power. The fact that all three institutes: the Institute for Policy and Strategy in the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; the National Security Studies in Haifa University; and Reut Institute, agree upon the two new security ingredients of our examined team shows that our methodology holds a great opportunity to build a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel which would be based on contemporary understanding of Israel's security needs.

Our research's results also propose an understanding of debatable and agreeable elements in Israeli National Security Concept. It shows that the most important group of 'mission-statements' enjoys a wide agreement among the group members. These results should be examined in larger scale survey which should represent most of the Israeli society. However, if this wide research shows similar results, it would indicate that those who wish to build the Israeli Security Vision should start from the agreeable issues: education as the core of Israel's strategic planning, Israel's reaction toward interior threats such as earthquake, socioeconomic gaps and improving its international prestige. Our research also reveals that the government's treatment of Israeli Arabs and the democratic price that Israel should pay for fighting terrorism and organized crime are debatable and require further discussion and understanding. A further research could strengthen these results, thus shedding a first light on contemporary Israeli concept of National Security.

Review of Global Trends

As indicated in the first chapter and due to the innovations of National Security among democratic countries, an examination of the modifications in the concept is required in order to perceive similarities with the Israeli tendency.

The following are countries that have similar characteristics to that of the state of Israel: Democracy, terrorist threats, liberal values, religious equality, public educational system and environmental awareness. Therefore we chose five countries: United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, France and the United States of America.

United Kingdom (UK)

The first National Security Strategy was meant to adapt National Security to the modern ages and focused on protecting citizens from the full range of risks that can cause harm. It showed that our understanding of National Security challenges – and our responses to them – must move beyond the concept of the security of the state and focus on the security of people, addressing the many challenges of the global world (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2009).

The updated National Security strategy outlines what progress the Government has achieved against the commitments made recently, and shows how The United Kingdom has continued to strengthen its approach through an updated National Security framework. Assessing the challenges ahead, The UK government has outlined a response to them – from terrorism and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to nuclear security, to energy security and climate change, to pandemics, to failing states and the challenges of strengthening global security through development. Thus, the British National Security contains more not "pure" military aspects (Ibid).

<u>Australia</u>

The Australian Department of Parliamentary Services stated: "the global rise of non-state threats, such as Islamist terrorism, to the forefront of security discussion, at the same time that conventional military threats to Australia fade away, brings with it questions about how the nation should think about its security requirements and whether it is still appropriate to consider such requirements solely within the context of a strictly Defense White Paper. Indeed, a broader national security approach would appear to fit well within the current 'whole of government' approach to public administration" (Tewes, 2005).

Some of the key reasons for a National Security strategy include the need for enhanced coordination, for a better understanding of National Security objectives and the place of military strategy in achieving national objectives (Defense and Trade report, 2003).

The Defense and Trade report from 2003 states that Australia's National Security objectives should encompass its 'business, leisure, diplomatic, economic, social and environment', understanding that Australian security interests are global. In addition, The National Security Doctrine takes in account possible threats on Australian infrastructure: power, water, transport systems, information communications and computing networks (Ibid). This is a wide concept of National Security which sustains on many field, rather than military power.

<u>Japan</u>

Following dramatic changes in the security environment surrounding Japan since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Japan finds itself in danger of losing its relevance within the international community. The rise of international terrorism, the decline of the American hegemony- Japan's closest ally, the rise of China as Eastern-Asia leader and the North-Korean nuclear threats found Japan's Defense strategy (Annual White paper)

irrelevant. This strategy sustains on the notion that Japan could lean only on the American power in the Pacific Ocean, and on both its economic and diplomatic relations with the world biggest super power. The roots for this strategy lie in the result of the Second World War, but they were founded as unsuitable for the contemporary multi-polar world (Kitaoka and Tanaka, 2008; Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009).

In 2009, after the fall of a traditional government in Japan, a new defense strategy was established. The new white paper was an outcome of a long re-examining of the Japanese Security perception in the last decade. It presented a comprehensive security strategy that incorporates diplomacy, economics and culture, based on a national strategy for enhancing Japan's interests (Ibid). The strategy proposed incorporated four levels of approach: the defense capability from internal and external threats, the Japan-U.S. alliance, regional security, especially against north-Korea nuclear aspirations; and international peace cooperation. This is Japan's effort to determine itself as a world leader in both economic and diplomatic aspects. Along with more cautious dependant on US military power in South-Eastern Asia. So the old Japanese conception was replaced by a new and more comprehensive one (Ibid).

<u>France</u>

Since the end of the 'Cold War' and following the restart of European integration, the concept of security and National Resilience in France has faced major emerging challenges. These challenges started a process of rethinking the basic assumptions concerning French National Security (Rieker, 2006).

New concerns in regard to immigration, economy, globalization and terror have expanded the French notion of the term "National Security" toward a more comprehensive notion, very similar to the common definition of National Resilience (Brig, 1993). The Defense White Paper (France's National Security Doctrine) states

clearly: "the major innovation compared to the previous White paper is that the security interests are appraised globally without restricting the analysis to defense issues" (Ministry of Defense of France, 1994). The French comprehensive doctrine relates to many fields inside French society as threats or assets.

<u>United States of America (USA)</u>

The core values of the American society shape the approach to any strategic field and they are: Freedom, Liberty, and Democracy. The American National Security is based on Hard Power (military), Soft Power (the ability to shape the preferences of others) and Economic Power.

The official definition of The Pentagon for National Security: "A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the conditions provided by: (a) A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; OR: (b) A favorable foreign relations position; OR: (c) A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile destructive action from within or without, overt or covert" (The Joint Chief of Staff, 1998).

In its National Security, then-President Bush (2006) claimed that the USA National Security strategy is founded upon two pillars: "The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on foundation of freedom. The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Effective multi-national efforts are essential to solve problems… America must continue to lead."

The American National Security strategy overview suggested in 2006, that "The Unites States must: Champion aspiration for human dignity; Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"); Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building infrastructure of democracy; Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; Transform America's National Security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization" (National Security strategy of the United States of America, 2006).

Secretary of State Clinton (2009) stated that the U.S.A must use what has been called 'Smart Power' - the full range of tools at the country's disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural - picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. Using 'Smart Power' diplomacy stands as the vanguard of foreign policy. Hence, The United States is basing its strategy more and more on values and less and less on military goals.

Conclusion

The world tendency of democratic countries is to question the old term of National Security, and offer a wider grasp based on the current threats and security objectives of the state. The National Security strategy, in all countries mentioned above, adapts National Security to the modern age and focuses on protecting citizens from the full range of risks that can cause harm nowadays. In some countries this is a result of some dreadful event that may have happened in their land, or to a close ally. In addition, the

globalization and the rise of terrorism offer new threats and challenges to every nation state today.

In light of the compatibility of the initial outcomes of our offered methodology with researches in Israel and abroad one can infer that the results of the survey indeed strengthen certain claims. Most importantly: the claim that the proposed methodology is an important guiding tool when formulating a Security Doctrine in Israel, while referring to existing trends on the one hand and encouraging the value of creativity on the other. It indeed manages to overcome conceptual barriers and results in a better understanding of the concept of "National Security" in Israel of the 21st century. These outcomes could serve as the basis for further research whose purpose is replacing the irrelevant security concept of Ben-Gurion. Moreover, discussions in the code of "norm conscience" on the use of nuclear weapons; the legal limits of possession of weapon; adopting a Guerilla style warfare; and our role in protecting the memory of the Holocaust; all these shed light on a unique mission that perhaps Israel should take upon itself in the emergence of new threats. These ideas are examples of creative discussions that our offered methodology has initiated. It gives a first estimation about both potential credibility and innovation that our methodology holds. Therefore, the results of our survey establish the foundations for the Implementation of our offered methodology - the 'Incorporated CLA'.

<u>Conclusion</u>

Our research is meant to offer a proper methodology that will help Israeli decision makers achieve complete victory in the future. As such, it emphasizes two new notions: (1) the need for a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel in order to gain future victory; (2) this victory is likely to be related to a variety of aspects in addition to military ones. Thus, this victory concerns more elements of National Resilience than National Security elements. These two conclusions are a result of both theoretical analysis of the Israeli case and the world review of other countries.

The first chapter shows that **Israel should have a Preferred Security Doctrine**. On the one hand, Israel needs a written Security Doctrine (instead of a concept) in order to empower the institutional element within the Israeli decision-making process. Thus, the solution-oriented Israeli concept which has resulted in the irrelevant Security Concept (Reut Institute, 2007), could be replaced by a goal-oriented one whose purpose is to promote Israel's interests rather than merely protecting it.

On the other hand, this change should begin by adapting a Preferred Security Doctrine in order to respond both to the nature of any organization, and particularly to Israel's political culture. A Preferred Security Doctrine would be the security "ideal" which would both set goals for improved reality after the war, and offer different strategies toward those goals under different battle conditions. Given that Israeli decision-makers have several strategies for meeting each goal, they will enjoy a wider range of action. Thus, our political echelon will adopt a security doctrine for the **main obstacle** which has hindered this process in the past, their antagonism toward a doctrinal commitment, and this obstacle would therefore be reduced (Passig, 2008; Dror, 2009; Tira, 2009).

The Second chapter compares the most popular methodologies for studying Preferred Futures and formulating future planning documents, in order to present **how Israel should consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine**. Our research led us to the conclusion that "Incorporated CLA" is the most suitable methodology because it offers the best solution for the stumbling-blocks that have prevented Israel from formulating a formal National Security document: (1) it enables us to use all three most modern and popular methods for the same purpose: for the first time drafting a formal Security Doctrine for Israel; (2) the CLA starts by setting the future imagery of Israel's Security concept, so it ensures that the Security Doctrine will be Goal Oriented. Thus, for the first time in its history, all of Israel's strategies would be coordinated; (3) Given that Israeli decision-makers have several strategies for meeting each goal, they would enjoy a wider range of action, thus making the **main obstacle** which has hindered this process in the past, their antagonism toward a doctrinal commitment, considerably smaller.

The Third chapter deals with examining the implementation process of the first layer of the 'Incorporated CLA'. The research design reveals the limitations of its outcomes for it studies the future imagery of one specific group. More credible experiments should include more groups from different groups in Israeli society. Nevertheless, the research outcomes' credibility, limited as they may be, point out a significant widening trend that could shed light on the change in the concept of security within Israeli society: from National Security to National Resilience.

The Fourth chapter shows that this trend of the enhancement of the role of the social elements in facing future external and internal threats is compatible to other researches in Israel and abroad. This is evidence that the Incorporated CLA may lead both to the understanding of current trends in Israel and to creativity in seeking solutions for its

national threats. Those outcomes could be the basis for further research whose purpose is replacing Ben-Gurion's irrelevant Security Concept.

In conclusion, this research holds a triple contribution to contemporary discussions in Israel's vital need for modern Security concepts. The first contribution is the research findings. By using the Imen-Delphi method we gathered 53 missions that should be taken under consideration in any serious planning processes of new Israeli security concept. Whereas some of them respond to contemporary threats, others shed a light on new missions that should be discussed in the connection of future dilemmas and threats.

This research could also be a model for researching more groups, including teams of experts and teams of laymen that could draw a bigger picture of Israel's imagery of the future. Comparing our results with those of other groups could deepen and widen the crucial discussion regarding Israel's new National Security Concept.

Finally, our research has the potential to fulfill its purpose: to act as the first step of implementing the CLA method in order to consolidate a Preferred Security Doctrine for Israel. Accordingly, our results should be the basis for further process, according to the CLA's principles, as they are presented in the second chapter. **This process should be promoted by the Prime Minister's Offic**e which is in charge of the cooperation between the military level (which has the experts and should therefore be responsible for the second layer) and the political level (which should use the third and the fourth layer in order to create a formal document). Rephrasing the Israeli concept of security in a formal document is the mission which our team undertook in the beginning of this research. But if there is nothing that can awake a professional discussion in one of our most crucial fields, then the leadership of tomorrow could rely on this research in order to do so.

This research's uniqueness is in its combination of scientific and political elements. Our research combines the credibility which characterizes academia, and the practicality which characterizes policy papers. By relying on modern and reliable methodology this research provides credible initial products that provide a first understanding of current trends in the National Security arena. And by focusing on finding a solution which is based on experiment it proves its relevance to Israeli reality beyond any theoretical work, and creates a practical basis for a security policy.

Therefore, our work is a modern research which does not focus on the past but on the future by being Goal-Oriented instead of supporting the common perception of Solution-Orientation. Thus, it establishes a basis for strategic planning in Israel. Altogether it offers a remedy for one of Israel's most crucial diseases: The Lack of Strategic Planning.

The main product of this research is a methodology for a Preferred Security Doctrine forming process. An implementation of the offered methodology is the first step toward guaranteeing that every military achievement will be used in order to gain a diplomatic goal. Thus, we could ensure that the Israeli army would gain victory in any battle-field in the future. This is our mission, for as Ambassador Argov claimed thirty years ago, peace for Israel has yet to come. This is our only way to ensure that every Hebrew mother shall know that her children are entrusted in the hands of leaders that ensure the Security of The State of Israel and its citizens.

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Appendix

Appendix A: full table of our survey's results

How important is this statement for the future of Israel (average grade*[8])? 1. Very important 2. Important 3. Not so important 4. Not important at all	The degree of agreement among the survey members: 1. Definitely yes 2. Maybe yes 3. Maybe no 4. Definitely no				Mission-Statement	
	4	3	2	1	Wide Agreement — Simple Agreement — Disagreement — Clear Antagonism	
1.10	0	0	5	95	Israel should maintain its high **education** and scientific innovation supremacy over its neighbors.	1
1.10	0	5	20	75	The field of **Education** should be perceived as the core of Israel's strategic planning.	*
1.15	0	0	20	80	Israel should gain independence over **strategic resources** such as energy and water.	3
1.15	0	10	10	80	Israel should initiate a plan for connecting the **periphery** with centers in terms of transportation, encouraging of moving to periphery and establishing security centers in the periphery.	*
1.25	0	5	25	70	Israel should create united core **education** values that are common to all sectors of society.	5
1.35	0	0	25	75	Israel should launch massive **development** programs for the south (Negev) and position it as the "new territories": "new pioneering" of the 21st century.	6
1.35	5	5	15	75	**Educational** system must teach values of democracy and rule of law from young ages.	*
1.4	0	5	20	75	Israel should increase trade (if possible) volume with **neighboring countries**, in order to increase the price of war or violence for the other side.	8
1.45	0	0	45	55	Israel must require its citizens to serve in any type of **national service** regardless of religion, sex or race.	9
1.50	0	0	35	65	Israel should be the leader in setting the world free from the **oil dependence**.	10
1.50	5	0	35	60	Israel should launch a full multi-systemic plan A.S.A.P to prepare, enlarge and build Israel preparedness for **earthquake**. Government, municipal and emergency services should be the first priority.	*
1.55	0	20	50	30	Israel should deepen its relations with the BRIC's countries through **security consulting and cooperation**.	12
1.55	30	15	20	35	Israel should reach an agreement with its **neighbors** regarding the use of nuclear weapon in the area, and emphasize in the international community that terror organization with nuclear capabilities is a REDLINE for us.	*
1.6	0	30	10	60	Israeli should charge heavy penalties for **military refusal** and any supporting calls for fraternal war.	14
1.6	10	15	20	55	In an atmosphere where technological military service is an advantage, Israel should formulate **incentives packages** for its	*

					warriors.	
1.7	0	20	35	45	The unclear recognition of the **Holocaust** is a mean to further strengthen the de-legitimization of future existence of the state of Israel, so Israel's mission is to fight every denial attempt and to make sure that friendly countries (with Israel) have Holocaust studies in their curriculum.	16
1.7	10	20	45	25	Israel should aspire for an "inclusionist" **nationalism** model on the base of recognition in Israel as the Jewish state	*
1.75	0	10	5	85	Israeli **nationalism** should be sustained on Zionism - the love for the state of Israel, regardless of level of religion.	18
1.75	5	10	50	35	Israel should sign agreements with international bodies for the ensuring of assistance in the case of an **earthquake**, so it does not become a security threat from external or internal enemies.	*
1.85	5	15	60	20	Israel should strive for another close **strategic ally** in order to strengthen its relations with the US.	20
1.85	10	15	35	40	**Arabs** should be assimilated into the Israeli society by uniting educational systems and requiring them to perform civil service of any kind.	*
1.9	10	10	40	40	Israel should maintain its current **nuclear policy** in order to face future criticism or requests for nuclear disarmament.	22
1.9	5	25	35	35	Israel's **security alliance** is the most important alliance it has and is very important for Israel's security in all dimensions (eco, pol, and mil) and it must be preserved at all costs up until but not including giving up on its own security interests.	*
2	5	10	65	20	Israel should join an alliance that guarantees it does not stand alone against **terror** attacks, conventional or non-conventional.	24
2	15	20	45	20	Lessons should be taught on the matter of the psychological warfare of **Terror**, given the fact that the home front has become another battlefield.	*
2	5	25	15	55	Israel should force every civilian and governmental organization to have a backup plan for **electronic attacks**. The state of Israel must ensure a proper level of information security in governmental offices and banks.	*
2.05	5	15	40	40	Israel should brand itself as a "**startup country**" and deal with nanotechnology.	27
2.05	5	20	40	35	Israel should legislate a **compensation law** that will motivate private initiatives of eviction, in order to make processes easier in future scenarios.	28
2.05	10	25	30	35	Israel should **brand** its values and future aspirations among its citizens.	*
2.05	10	15	60	15	Israel should establish an institute which stands for the exchange of information and cooperation on matters of **international terror**.	*
2.1	10	15	30	45	Israel should formulate a plan for the increasing of **national pride** throughout all citizens, both on educational levels, symbols and heritage.	31
2.15	10	5	50	35	Israel should develop melting pot mechanisms and **national unity** in societal systems (outside the military).	32
2.15	10	25	50	15	Israel should formulate a plan based on transforming Israeli **Arabs** into its mediators with the Arab world (Diplomatically and Financially for the sake of fundraising abroad) by professional training and affirmative action in government offices.	*
2.2	10	20	30	40	Israel should maintain a neutral policy in regards to domestic affairs of its **neighboring countries**.	34
2.25	15	15	50	20	During elections for Knesset Israel should promote **regional**	35

					elections (regional representatives in the Knesset) in order to minimize dependency on government's control in times of peace and war.	
2.25	0	30	30	40	Israel should formulate a code of "norm conscience" on the use of **nuclear weapons** based on the fact that it is reserved only for self defense.	*
2.3	20	25	25	30	Israel should promote equal rights and a policy for affirmative action in institutions for higher education. For when **Israeli Arabs** feel they are treated as equals, and they have the same opportunities as the Jews, they will be willing to acknowledge Israel as a Jewish state.	37
2.3	20	35	35	10	Israel should enact **social duties** as mandatory for several years until they will be voluntarily performed.	*
2.4	25	10	55	10	**Jurists** should be a central part of law enforcement and police units with judiciary capabilities should be established.	39
2.55	10	25	40	25	Israel should lead the efforts for writing the 'War on Terror' chapter in the book of **International Law**.	40
2.6	15	10	30	45	Israel should establish a **Biometric database** and legislate laws against physical crimes with malice (e.g.: murder, rape, robbery etc.)	41
2.6	25	15	35	25	**Possession of Weapons** should not be allowed at all; it will increase and escalate the forms of violence use; Individuals working in security positions should be required to deposit their weapon when not on the job at safety spots.	*
2.65	5	40	30	25	Every individual who graduates 12 years of **school** should know Hebrew and English on high levels and at least two other languages on medium levels.	43
2.7	0	40	45	15	Israel should secretly promote a **regional defense agreement** between the pragmatic regimes in the Middle East (without Israel).	44
2.7	30	40	25	5	Israel should strive toward **independence** in the security field, even with the price of temporarily economic - security losses. This will contribute to our national pride and strength.	*
2.85	40	25	25	10	**Youth movements** should serve as a tool for preparing individuals for military service in both mental and physical aspects.	46
2.9	35	25	30	10	The **Israeli army** should be a professional and efficient army in which the soldiers will have professional, well paid positions.	47
3	10	35	35	20	**Jurists** should be an integral part of every decision making unit, and train any commander or soldier during their training period	48
3.25	25	50	20	5	The **Israeli military** should been formulated on joint forces (Air, Sea and Land in each force)	49
3.3	25	25	45	5	**Israeli military** should adopt some of the characteristics of guerilla warfare in order to become more flexible, even in case of tolerable harm to democratic values, and spread this to countries fighting terror.	50
3.3	60	20	15	5	Issues of security should be dealt in a special new system of **courts** dedicated to this matter (able to negate military moves).	*
3.3	50	25	20	5	Israel should separate between the Jewish identity and the Israeli one by changing the **citizenship** to a "HEBREW" one - a new identity which is based on the connection between the land, the history, joint legacy and common future.	*
3.65	55	30	15	0	Israel should train **African immigrants** (Jewish Ethiopian and illegal immigrants) and send them back as spies to form a native grid of espionage.	53

שאלה: מדוע דוקטרינת הביטחון הנוכחית אינה מעוגנת במסמך סדיר?

תשובה: הניסיונות האחרונים (תפיסת ההפעלה מאפריל 2006, דוח וועדת מרידור) לא היו טובים: הן מתודולוגית (קרי, היעדר תיחום של המסמך, היעדר הסדרה מלאה של רובד מסוים, ובמקום זאת קובץ אקלקטי של אנקדוטות) והן בהיבט התוכן. יתרה מזו, בישראל אין נטייה טבעית להסדרת תחומים באמצעות מסמכים.

שאלה: האם העקרונות הנוכחיים של הדוקטרינה עדיין משפיעים על התווית המדיניות בפועל?

תשובה: לא ממש. ראו את הספר שלי על סוריה – אם טרם ראיתם אותו. הטענה שם היא הפוכה, שהמדיניות היא לא יותר מתחושות הבטן של המנהיג.

שאלה: מה הן נקודות החולשה של הדוקטרינה הנוכחית?

תשובה: אין דוקטרינה כתובה בתוקף.

שאלה: מה ניתן לעשות על מנת לוודא שהדוקטרינה (העקרונות) הכתובה שתותצע אכן תמומש בפועל?

תשובה: אולי כמה עשורים של חינוך. כאמור, בישראל אין נטייה לקדש מסמכים דוקטרינריים בשום עת ובשום נושא.

שאלה: באיזו צורה תוכל דוקטרינה לשנות באופן חיובי את תהליך קבלת ההחלטות של הדרג המדיני, ואת הממשק שלו עם הדרג הצבאי?

תשובה: הרבה מאוד. היום החלטות מתקבלות אינטואיטיבית, וללא מסד "ידע" (מילה בעייתית). לרוב הדיון מתחיל מאפס, וממציא את הגלגל מחדש. לכן גם נעשות הרבה מאוד טעויות.

שאלה: האם, לדעתך, מסמכי יסוד של ארצות-הברית יוכלו לשמש מקור מתאים להשוואה, למרות ההבדל במעמדן ובעצמתן של שתי המדינות?

תשובה: מבחינת התוכן בשום פנים ואופן לא. אין שום מקום להשוואה בין מעצמת העל היחידה ובין מדינה קטנה. מבחינת מתודולוגיה: סוגי המסמכים הקיימים, דרך עבודת המטה, דרך השימוש בבסיס ידע מסוכם מראש, וכיוצ"ב כן אבל מסויג. מסויג – כי יש שונות בנסיבות המחייבת שונות דוקטרינרית. למשל, הדרג הראשון המפקד על כל הכוחות המזוינים האמריקאים הוא הנשיא. הרמטכ"ל אינו ממש מפקד, והוא בונה כוח ולא כל כך מפעיל כוח (הוא יועץ הנשיא להפעלת כוח). המפקד של מפקד הפיקוד המרחבי הוא הנשיא. המבנה הישראלי יותר מתאים לישראל והוא מחייב שינוי מתודולוגי ביחס לארה"ב. דוגמא נוספת, מפקד הפיקוד המרחבי האמריקאי הוא למעשה רמטכ"ל הפיקוד, והרמטכ"ל רק "ספק" כוחות עבורו. לכן, האמריקאים מאוד מחזקים את הרובד הזירתי. בישראל, ובצדק, הרמטכ"ל הוא מפעיל הכוח העליון והוא לרוב (ובצדק) מפקד זירת המערכה בפועל גם אם אינו מוגדר ככזה (למשל, הפיקוד עוסק רק בחזית ואילו הרמטכ"ל מנהל את הלחימה האסטרטגית בעומק – שהיא ממד חשוב מאוד של הלחימה), והפיקוד המרחבי הוא כמעט דרג טקטי-על.

<u>שאלה</u>: האם קיימות מתודולוגיות נוספות שיכולות להוות בסיס לתהליך עיצוב תפיסת ביטחון רצויה בישראל (נוסף על ה-CLA)?

<u>תשובה</u>: יש הרבה ... אחת נוספת ואפשרית היא שיטת אימן דלפי שאני פיתחתי. אפשר לראות את הרציונאל וההליך שלה במספר פרסומים שלי באתר וגם בפרק בספר צופן העתיד בו אני מתאר את ההליך שעשיתי עם החברה למתנסים.

<u>שאלה</u>: מהן חסרונותיה של מתודולוגיית ה-CLA בהקשר של תהליך קבלת ההחלטות בישראל?

<u>תשובה</u>: החיסרון הגדול שאני רואה בעתיד הוא שהפוליטיקאים יתקשו לקבל את מסקנותיה משום שהם יהיו רק חלק קטן בהליך. והפוליטיקאי הישראלי עדיין לא בשל להבין שעבודת מטה שנעשית בעזרת מתודולוגיה ברורה ושקופה מחייבת אותו להיות נאמן לתוצאותיה.

<u>שאלה</u>: כיצד, לדעתך, תוכל תפיסת ביטחון רצויה באמת להשפיע על תהליך קבלת ההחלטות בישראל, בכלל, ועל תפיסת הביטחון המצויה, בפרט?

<u>תשובה</u>: אני מאמין שזה יוסיף ערך מוסף לתפיסת הביטחון המצויה בכך שהיא תיתן קונטקסט רחב יותר לפעולות המדיניות ויחברו טוב יותר את המטרות הצבאיות עם המטרות המדיניות. נקודה זו היא אחת מנקודות התורפה הגדולות של מקבלי ההחלטות הישראליים.

<u>שאלה</u>: אלו מתודולוגיות יכולות להתאים ליישום השכבה הראשונה של ה- CLA במסגרת מוסד אקדמאי (המסתמך בעיקר על סטודנטים ומרצים)?

<u>תשובה</u>: את השלב הראשוני הזה ניתן לערוך בשתי שכבות. האחת, סקירת ספרות וניתוח תוכן של מאגר גדול של מאמרים ביטחוניים וזיהוי כל הסוגיות שנשאלו עד כה בנושאי ביטחון אך בעיקר זיהוי הנושאים שלא נשאלו. השכבה השניה יכולה להיות חשיפת הרשימה שמתקבלת בפני קהלים שדעותיהם הפוליטיות הן קיצוניות משמאל ומימין ולבקש מהם לאור הרשימה לנסות ולהעלות סוגיות שלא מופיעות בה ולא נדונו עד היום, לעניות דעתם, בשיח הביטחוני הישראלי.

<u>שאלה</u>: האם לדעתך קיים דמיון בין תכנון אסטרטגי בעולם העסקי ובין תכנון אסטרטגי בעולם הביטחוני?

<u>תשובה</u>: כן. הסיבה שקיים דמיון בין כל תכנון אסטרטגי בכל הקשור להגדרה ברורה של יעדים, ובזכות כך לאפשר הפרדה ברורה בין מטרות שרוצים להשיג לדרכי הפעולה שרוצים להשיג באמצעותם. כמו כן נובע הדמיון מכך שבשני המקרים יש צורך במשאבים, יש מגבלה של משאבים וקיימת חוסר וודאות.

<u>שאלה</u>: מהי מטרתו של תהליך עיצוב חזון ארגוני?

<u>תשובה</u>: מטרתו של תהליך עיצוב חזון ארגוני הינה: יצירת תשתית תומכת קבלת החלטות המאפשרת התמודדות יעילה ומועילה יותר עם תהליכי קבלת ההחלטות וחוסר הוודאות עימם יש להתמודד לאורכו של הפרוייקט. התהליך מבטיח הקטנה משמעותית של מרכיב השרירותיות בכל הקשור לתהליכי קבלת ההחלטות, תקשורת פנים ארגונית טובה יותר עקב תיאום ציפיות טוב יותר, ולבסוף התרומה בכך שמאפשר בחינה של החלטות ומהלכים בדיעבד, תוך זיהוי הטעויות והנחות יסוד שגויות בשלבים מוקדמים יותר בתהליך ועל ידי כך הפחתת העלות של כל טעות. על כן, הפחתת הסיכון של כל החלטה.

<u>שאלה</u>: האם תהליך עיצוב חזון ארגוני הינו שכיח בעולם עסקים? מדוע?

<u>תשובה</u>: מניסיוננו התהליך אינו שכיח, וזאת לרוב משום שמדובר בתהליך מתודולוגי שאינו נלמד לרוב במסגרת תהליכי ההכשרה המקובלים. בנוסף על כן, גם כאשר נלמד אינו מיושם לרוב, משום שמחייב עבודת תכנון שאינה נתפסת לרוב כפעולות פיריונית, ודחופה מספיק לעומת תחושת הדחיפות והבהילות של המטלות היומיומיות המעסיקות את המנהלים. מדובר בסוג של מעגל עוני: אין לי זמן לעצור ולתכנן משום שלא תכננתי מלכתחילה. סיבה נוספת לכך שהארגון אינו שכיח נובעת מהקצב המהיר שבו פועל העולם ומהדחף לעמוד ביעדים של מחר בבוקר (זה המעגל העוני). כמו כן, קצב המסחרר של השינוי של העולם, מתפס כסיבה לחוסר הכדאיות להשקיע זמן רב מידי בתכנון ארוך טווח. זוהי כמובן טעות תפיסתית משום שלרוב היעדים האסטרטגים אינם בהכרח משתנים ביחס לשינוי העולמי, כי עם דרכי הפעולה הנדרשות להשיג אותם. אמירה זו נכונה על אחת כמה וכמה במגזר הציבורי.

שאלה: מהם השלבים הקיימים בתהליך עיצוב חזון ארגוני? אנא פרט ככל שניתן, תוך התייחסות לתוצרים הרצויים של כל שלב.

תשובה: השלבים לעיצוב חזון ארגוני מצוינים במאמר Project Management Overview שכתבנו גור ברסלבי ואני בשנת 2006. מאמר זה מרכז את העקרונות על-פיהם אנחנו מנחים ארגונים ציבוריים ופרטיים בארץ ובעולם.

שאלה: אני לא מכיר את כלל השיטות, אך אני מאמין שתיאום ציפיות וקביעת יעדים נכונה בתחילת פרויקט היא אחד מהדברים המשמעותיים שמבטיחים ניהול רציונאלי ועקבי והימנעות מהקצאה לא נכונה של משאבים וזיהוי מאוחר של טעויות. נסמך על ניסיון שלנו (חברת דיבייט) והגישה רציונאלית של קבלת החלטות (על פי הרברט סיימון, 1978), והתחום של קבלת החלטות בתנאי אי ודאות.

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שאלה: מהם חסרונותיה של שיטת עיצוב חזון לעומת שיטות אחרות בעולם העסקים?

תשובה: החסרונות של השיטה הן: 1. בהאטת קצב צבירת התאוצה של ארגון בשלבים המוקדמים שלו. 2. אנאליזה עודפת מובילה לשיתוק (paralysis by way of analysis). 3. ניהול לא נכון של התהליך יכול להביא לפגיעה משמעותית בעבודת צוות בשלבים המוקדמים עקב אי ההסכמה ביעדים שחלקם עשויים להיות רחוקים מידי בשביל להצדיק פירוק שיתוף פעולה.

שאלה: אנא פרט על מקרה בוחן אחד של עיצוב חזון ארגוני (פרטי המקרה, תוצאותיו הכלליות, מסקנות ולקחים ממקרה זה)- תוכל לבחור את חברת "דיבייט" כמקרה בוחן או כל חברה אחרת שפועלת לפי תהליך זהה.

תשובה: אני ממליץ לחקור את ג'נראל אלקרטיק (ג'ק וולש, המנכ"ל בין 1981-2001) או מקדונלדס – במקרים שלהם ניתן לראות חזון וקווים מנחים.

<u>שאלה</u>: אילו צעדים ראשונים צריך הארגון לבצע על-מנת לממש את החזון אשר עיצב (מדובר על מעבר מתהליך עיצוב החזון לתהליך מימושו).

<u>תשובה</u>: השלבים הראשונים שיש לבצע על מנת להתחיל את מימוש החזון הם: איתור של צווארי הבקבוק המיידיים העומדים בדרכו של המיזם באותה נקודת זמן והקצאה נכונה של המשאבים הזמינים לצורך ניטרול צווארי בקבוק אלה. התועלת בשיטה זו הינה במיקוד שהיא מעודדת באופן הקצאת המשאבים מתבסס על היותם מוגבלים. לאחר איתור צווארי הבקבוק יש לאתר מכפילי הכוח בהם נכון להשקיע את המשאבים המוגבלים על מנת להתגבר ביעילות על צווארי הבקבוק לצורך עמידה באבן הדרך הבאה.

<u>שאלה</u>: כיצד, לדעתך, יכול תהליך של עיצוב חזון ביטחוני לשפר את הישגה הצבאיים של מדינת ישראל בעתיד?

<u>תשובה</u>: יעילות בהקצאת משאבים, שימור ידע, עקביות הכרחית בארגון בו קיימת תחלופה קבועה של מקבלי החלטות.

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