Grand Strategy
MVZ248 Week3
Definitions
Traditional idea of strategy and builds upon it in 3 ways.
Includes diplomatic, economic, informational means
Instruments of internal policies and external forces/variables
Includes periods of peacetime and wartime
Murray, et.al The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge University Press, pp.1-23
bridge University Press. pp. 1–23.
Terminology
Academia
Yale and Duke and Herzliya
Collection of plans and policies of a nation state.
Grand strategy is reconciling ends and means.
Purposeful action
What leaders think and want
Constraints and limitations (internal and external)
Thought-process
Theory
Leader’s theories about how the world works and what is role of their
nation-state
Policy and Practice
Government action and reaction in response to real (perceived) threats and
opportunities.
U.S.A = Iraq
Israel = Iran
Blending
Disciplines of history, political science, public policy, and economics
What happened and why; underlying patterns; how did it work/better; national
resources produced and protected?
Improvement of understanding in key areas
History is more relevant; Pol.Sci is more concrete, public policy is
contextualized, and economics is security-oriented.
Issues
Primary versus secondary theaters, distribution of resources, international
alliances best fit for national goals.
Grand strategy overlaps with foreign policy.
Political leadership directs grand strategy with input from military and policy
officials.
NSC/ Pentagon or Chief of General Staff (Israeli Defense Staff)
Grand strategy develops over years, perhaps multiple generations
Israel (Cabinet/politicians)
USA (Kennan) = ??
Views
Neo-isolationism
Selective engagement
US (Middle East) Israel (Sinai) (Lebanon)
Cooperative security
Primacy
(Arms)
Posen & Ross (Winter 1996-1997) “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy” International Security. 21 (3). 5-53.
Neo-Isolationism
No active participation in international politics to maintain national security.
No threats to American homeland, no need to intervene abroad
Nuclear weapons assure political sovereignty and territorial integrity of U.S.; while
proliferation prevents emergence of competing hegemon.
This follows strictly speaking a defensive realist understanding of international
politics.
Selective Engagement
Focus is on powers with significant industrial and military to prevent war.
Europe, Asia and the Middle East matter most to the United States
Europe and Asia = great powers, economic impact on IP
Middle East primary source of oil.
Prevents nuclear proliferation with strong nuclear deterrent.
At issue: differentiate necessary versus unnecessary engagement & whether
strategy represents a shift?
Collective Security (CS)
Is inspired by liberalism NOT realism in approach to IR.
CS considers nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and humanitarian crisis to be
major interests of the United States
Grand strategy involves support for international institutions, agreements, use
of force for humanitarian purposes.
Overcome security dilemma and deter interstate conflict.
However, collective action problems such as international institutions, public
opinion, limitations of arms control are ALL criticisms.
Hegemon--USA
Preponderance of power ensures peace i.e. U.S.A
Pursue hegemony and dominate international system
U.S. foreign policy focus on maintaining U.S. power and prevent other powers
from becoming serious challengers.
Only intervene when direct impact on national security occurs.
Military forces at similar levels as during Cold War
Undermines valuable multilateral institutions, the feasibility of preventing war and
imperial overstretch
Hegemon--Israel
Arms
Conventional
Nuclear
Territory
Buffer-zones by war and peace
Alliances
Arab and Western
Primacy + Selective Engagement--USA
Primacy ensures peace (US power as primacy ensures peace)
Dominate the international system; reject bipolar or multipolar world.
Foreign policy focus is on maintenance of power and prevention of competitor
Contain rivals rather than engage them.
China and Russia
Only intervene when national security (selective engagement) is directly impacted
R2P; regional conflicts
Primacy + Selective Engagement--Israel
Egypt and Jordan
Gaza
Territory under control from 1967-2005
Terrorism + buffer-zone
Lebanon
Terrorism (1982; 2006) + Buffer zone
Regional stability (1982)
Post 2010
Barry Posen advocates US abandon hegemonic strategy. Replace with restraint.
Focus on security challenges: powerful rival(s); terrorism;limiting nuclear
proliferation
Don’t shape world to U.S. values, instead advocate vital national interests
Obama administration arguably exercised this view
Large troop contingents downsized in peaceful regions (Europe)
Preserve country’s prosperity and security.
Arguments
Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth not convinced with Posen.
U.S. has no powerful rivals, no need to balance; U.S. military is prime
U.S. domination of military technology allows for trade of access. Allies agree not
to transfer key military tech. to competitors.
Brooks, Ikenberry, Wohlforth (January-February, 2013). “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement” Foreign
Affairs. 92. (1).
Arguments
Ted Carpenter argues further that major power needs to preserve its strategic
insolvency.
Overextension and national exhaustion
Off-loading security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Moral indignation rather than calculated assessment of national interest then
murky conflict involvement will occur.
Carpenter (March-April 2013). “Delusions of Indispensability” (124): 47-55.
Analysis
In Israel cycles and status quo
Overextension and national exhaustion (Intifada);(Gaza); (Oslo Accords)
Off-loading security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
(Gaza withdrawal in 2005; security fence)
Moral indignation rather than calculated assessment of national interest then
murky conflict involvement will occur.
(Terrorism -kidnapping + public outcry = Lebanon)
Criticism
Difficult to organize resources for effective grand strategy
Tendency to see actions of states as coherent and purposeful...or assume actions
and choices are more decisive.
Fallacy of coherence
Tendency of policymakers to believe they can greater influence events.
Fallacy of control
Richard Betts (2012). American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security. Columbia University Press.
Criticism
Richard Betts details skeptics critiques regarding feasibility and practicability of
strategy.
“To skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the
gap between objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be
manipulated to a specific end ”
USA in Iraq (2003-2007)
Israel in Gaza and Lebanon
Israel for Oslo Accords
Betts (Autumn 2000). “Is Strategy an Illusion”. International Security. 25 (2): 5-20