Diplomacy in East Asia

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1

Coercive, Gunboat and Preventive Diplomacy

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2

Coercion

- Sun Tzi
  - Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.

3

History of Coercive Diplomacy

- Thucydides, writing in his Peloponnesian War, provides many examples of Athens and Sparta threatening to use their power to influence the behaviour of others.
  - In a classic example of coercion, the powerful Athenians issued demands upon the weaker Melians, and threatened that failure to comply would result in complete devastation.
- Sun Tzu, who wrote his famous *The Art of War* twenty-three hundred years ago, observed the importance of threatening punishment to influence an adversary's will

4

History of Coercive Diplomacy

- The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in his masterpiece *Leviathan,* emphasized the importance of power in creating "a fear of the consequences" and in providing "some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant

5

Limitations of Using the Force

- Nothing new !!!!
- **1928 - The Kellogg–Briand Pact** (or Pact of Paris, officially General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy)
  - international agreement in which signatory states promised not to use war to resolve **"disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them"**

6

League of Nations

- Article 10
  - The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

7

League of Nations

- Article 11
  - Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
  - It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

8

League of Nations

- Article 12
  - The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.
  - In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

9

United Nations Charter

- **CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES**
  - **Article 2**
    - All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
    - All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

10

United Nations Charter

- **CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION**
  - **Article 39**
    - The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

11

United Nations Charter

- **CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION**
  - **Article 41**
    - The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

12

United Nations Charter

- **CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION**
  - **Article 42**
    - Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

13

United Nations Charter

- **CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION**
- **Article 51**
  - Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

14

Introduction to Coercion

- If diplomacy is the art of States furthering their interests on the global stage, then "coercive diplomacy" refers to the diplomatic strategies States undertake when their interests are opposed by other States.
- While such diplomacy, in this sense, has existed as long as States have interacted, modern coercive diplomacy –practiced since World War II and even more so since the end of the Cold War –refers to an increasingly sophisticated set of non-military instruments deployed unilaterally and multilaterally to extract change in "target States"" behavior.
- **The tools of coercive diplomacy are varied but they share a core feature: the change in behavior coercers seek is furthered by threats of pain, and in many cases, the actual imposition of pain**

15

Introduction to Coercion

- Modern coercive diplomacy includes a spectrum of actions promising different sorts of pain.
- One of the oldest tools of coercion involves diplomatic consequences.
- Elements in this regard include the "strongly worded demarche,"
- the withdrawal of ambassadors, and the breaking of diplomatic relations.
- More recent additions to these diplomatic consequences include votes against targets in multilateral fora such as development banks,
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16

Introduction to Coercion

- the passage of condemning resolutions by international organizations, and the expulsion of targets from such organizations.
- A follow-on diplomatic consequence is the implicit or explicit branding of a recalcitrant state as a "pariah."
- Economic consequences are a second group of coercive measures, the most enduring version of which are broad-based, "comprehensive" sanctions against States, including trade prohibitions and arms embargoes

17

Introduction to Coercion

- A final set of tools is of more recent vintage; while it was once thought that sanctions imposed by foreign powers and international organizations could only be placed on States themselves, and not on individuals or entities within States
- since the Cold War "smart," individually-targeted prohibitions have been added to the toolbox.
- Such instruments include travel bans and financial sanctions that focus solely on noncompliant entities (persons and institutions) rather than countries as a whole.

18

Introduction to Coercion

- No matter which tool is used, the prospects of success for any instance of coercion simplifies to a common-sensical calculation:
  - if a target State assesses that the net benefits it can obtain by resisting coercion are greater than the net costs it believes will arise from complying, coercive diplomacy will fail.
  - To be successful, practitioners of coercive diplomacy must deploy tools that impact the calculus of target States by calibrating coercive measures such that the cost of resistance becomes unacceptable

19

Introduction to Coercion

- Making an assessment of the correct level and type of coercion relies on a nuanced appreciation of the **psychology, history, politics, and economics of target States**.
  - The importance of these dynamic factors means that the calculation described above rarely manifests itself. Indeed, successful examples of its application are hard to find.
  - It is noteworthy that in the case of the United States –one of the world's most fervent practitioners of coercive diplomacy –**economic sanctions, a central instrument of coercive diplomacy, were deployed prior to armed conflict in nearly two-thirds of the military engagements the U.S. waged between1950 and 2000**.
  - Coercive diplomacy evidently did not forestall military action.

20

Introduction to Coercion

- Coercive diplomacy provides the potential for significant benefits (achieving important State objectives) without the expense and risk of military engagement.
- Though some have bemoaned that policymakers have been "beguiled" by coercive diplomacy"'s promise of "big gains with minimal costs," in an era of soft budgets and war-weary citizenries the attractiveness of coercive instruments will remain.
- The potential gain from finding that elusive suite of tools that will work is too great for diplomats not to try –and continue trying–any instruments of coercive diplomacy that emerge.

21

The Concept of Punishment

- Punishment is the infliction of harm in response to a violation of a norm.
- That infliction must come from a legal order or institutional framework.
- The overriding purpose of punishment is twofold:
  - return the community to the balance that existed prior to the violation of the norm,
  - prevent such violations in the future.
- But the decision to inflict harm in order to halt that violation is a contestable practice, since the infliction of harm is 'something we regard as morally prohibited under normal circumstances' (Simmons 1995, vii)

22

The Concept of Punishment

- Deterrence is the idea that by punishing agents who violate norms future violations will be prevented.
- It is premised upon the assumption that the individual being punished may deserve the harm inflicted, but the more important social goal is the warning to others.
- Retribution is the 'idea that wrongdoers should be "paid back" for their wicked deeds' (Rachels 2002, 468).
- It differs from deterrence in not seeking to use the agent to teach a larger lesson but attempts to balance the scales within a society.
- Retribution is sometimes confused with **vengeance or revenge**; it differs in that a retributive action is not an attempt by a single agent to satisfy only his/her personal desires, but is designed to restore a balance to the community and ensure justice prevails

23

The Concept of Punishment

- Any act of punishment might include both justifications.
  - John Rawls, to be truly just, punishment should be simultaneously retributive and deterrent (Rawls 1954).
  - Rawls argues that punishments need to ensure that the right individuals are subject to penalty yet those punishments must be part of a social and political system that ensures compliance with legitimate norms.
  - **Retribution** here becomes a criterion that ensures the responsible agent is punished;
  - punishing the responsible agent avoids a situation in which any individual is subject to sanction simply in order to deter future violations, thus avoiding the dangers of corporate punishment. At the same time, punishment must be deterrent, for it reflects and reinforces the values of a society.
  - If punishment was only retributive, without this deterrent function, it would be much closer to revenge. Uses of force designed to reinforce institutions composed of clear norms that agents are expected to obey turn purely self-interested uses of forces into punishment. Linking punitive actions to legitimate institutions changes mere acts of vengeance into just punishments.

24

The Concept of Punishment

- But some theorists have suggested ways in which the international system might allow for punishment.
- Hedley Bull, for instance, argued that international society exists despite the absence of a single authority to govern it; that is, there is order in the anarchic international system.
- Labelling the international system a society implies a system of rules and norms that structure the interactions of its members. In his analysis of international society, Bull argued that the enforcement of those norms might require the use of force and that war could be 'a possible means of enforcement of international law' (Bull 1977, 188).
- While Bull hints at how force may serve such a function, he does not develop this argument at any length. To see how force might be justified in an anarchic realm as a means of punishment, two theorists of international legal thought provide further insights.

25

The Concept of Punishment

- For any military action to be considered punitive in the current international order, it must fulfil the following criteria:
- (1) it must be directed at the responsible agent (the retributive standard); and
- (2) it must be part of a legal or otherwise institutional order (the deterrent standard).
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- When uses of force conform to these two broad standards, they can be described as punishment. Such actions might also be instances of self-help, as described by Kelsen, especially in a systém lacking a sovereign authority. Yet, as long as they arise from an institutional order and are responses to violations of the norms of that order, such military actions can be conceived of as punishment.

26

Coercive Diplomacy as Punishment

- Starting with classic works by Thomas Schelling during the peak of the Cold War in the 1960s, the conceptual framework of coercive diplomacy (which incorporates elements of deterrence and compellance) has had a huge effect on both U.S. government policy and academic theorizing.
- Whether one thinks of coercive diplomacy as a rigorous theory, a conceptual framework, a foreign policy strategy, or simply a loose guide to action, its central point is straightforward:
    - one party to an international dispute can use limited force and the threat of force during heated crises to make the opponent freeze its actions, back down, and even reverse its policies.
    - This simple operational recommendation has been used in almost every crisis the United States experienced during the Cold War –vis-`a-vis the Soviet Union as well as many developing countries—and it characterized the core of U.S. actions toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the period 1991–2003.2

27

- Coercive diplomacy has failed more often than not.
- Does this rather popular method of diplomacy deserve continued use by foreign policy decision-makers around the world?
    - This question is especially pertinent in the post-9/11 world, where the U.S. government has essentially adopted both a national security strategy and a nuclear strategy heavily reliant on the idea of compelling or "dissuading" others to forego military buildups and specific aggressive actions, and if this fails, striking foes "preemptively" with precision force to prevent and defend against transnational terror threats in the 21st century

28

- coercive diplomacy constitutes a form of "demonstrative denial,"
  - in which "the coercer demonstrates to the target that the coercer can, if it so chooses, undercut the effectiveness of the target's military strategy but without actually undercutting it."
- The enemy is not stalemated, but is rather convinced that it will be stalemated at high cost to its credibility, prestige, domestic stability, economic prosperity, and military capability if it persists in its actions.
- At its heart, coercive diplomacy tries to create a dramatically heightened sense of risk—an urgent fear by the elites of the targeted state that if they do not reverse course, disaster will surely ensue.
- Robert Art argued that "Risk means escalation, and risk threatens more pain to the population or to its valuable assets. A successful risk strategy is one that causes the target to give way because it becomes convinced that the pain it will suffer from looming punishment is not worth the objectives it seeks."

29

- This strategy also offers the adversary possible rewards for compliance and holds in reserve the possibility of increasing the costs of noncompliance.
- Unlike a strategy of pure intimidation, it calls for combining positive inducements with threats, under the assumption that an adversary may prove to be more tractable if the demands and threats are paired with possible rewards for compliance.
- In fact, recent case studies have shown that "carrots" were almost always necessary to supplement the "sticks" meted out by stronger powers if the strategy was to succeed

30

- In any of its variants, the strategy offers important advantages over pure diplomacy or resort to war.
- It is more compelling than diplomacy alone, for t carries with it the explicit threat of resorting to war if compliance is not forthcoming within a specified time span.
- On the other hand, it also avoids the rapid resort to war, the consequences of which may not be calculable or controllable.
- The latter concern is especially salient when the adversary in question possesses nuclear weapons.
  - In general, as argued by Art, "it is a technique for achieving objectives 'on the cheap' and has allure because it promises big results with small costs (to the coercer)."

31

- The likely success of this strategy depends in measure on three closely related variables:
  - what exactly is demanded of the adversary;
  - how strongly disinclined the adversary is to comply with these demands
    - (although this can be affected by the offering of carrots along with sticks);
  - and the credibility and capability of the coercing state's threats and demonstrations of limited force, if physical demonstrations are used.
  - If the target state perceives that the demands being made on it are extraordinarily great and the threatened costs not sufficiently credible, the strategy is unlikely to succeed.

32

Coercive Diplomacy as Punishment

- Coercive diplomacy is the threat or use of force to coerce an opponent to undertake an action they do not wish to, and it can include a wide range of instruments, from diplomatic to military (Art and Cronin 2003).

33

Coercive Diplomacy as Punishment

- One of the earliest theorists of this new way of thinking about military force was Thomas Schelling.
- Schelling and others argued that force should be used to communicate with an opponent, making it a part of diplomacy.
- As Schelling puts it,
  - Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could for some countries in some areas, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation, and deterrence. The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence. (Schelling 1966, 34)

34

Facts of Coercive Diplomacy

- Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop and undo acts of military aggression has achieved little success.
- Of the thirty-six coercive diplomacy exchanges that have occurred between 1990 and 2008, only **five** achieved lasting success

35

Facts of Coercive Diplomacy

- Given the overwhelming military superiority of the United States, these results are confounding.
- The experience of the United States and of other strong powers suggests that qualitative measures of power seldom determine the outcome of strategies of coercive diplomacy.
- Robert Art notes, "If military superiority alone guaranteed success, then the United States should have a 100 percent success rate."

36

Facts of Coercive Diplomacy

- Why, in cases against less militarily powerful targets, has U.S. coercive diplomacy failed more often than it has succeeded?
- These results go against a long-standing principle of international relations theory, which suggests that coercive threats are more effective, on average, when they come from powerful states.
- Historical record demonstrates that the failure of asymmetric compellent threats has been a persistent feature of international crises

37

Coercive Diplomacy

- Since the end of The Cold War, coercive diplomacy has become a prominent tactic of crisis management.
- ˝The exploitation of potential force to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands is an attractive alternative to traditional military strategies in the contemporary post-Cold War international environment.
- coercive diplomacy has become a favourable approach as it provides leaders with a chance to achieve reasonable objectives, while simultaneously avoiding unwanted military escalation

38

Coercive Diplomacy

- Coercive diplomacy is understood as the threat or use of force to encourage an opponent to undertake an action they do not wish to, and can include a wide range of instruments from diplomatic (sanctions) to military operations (e.g. airstrikes or strategic bombings).

39

Coercive Diplomacy

- The essentials of coercive diplomacy are as old as the arts of diplomacy and warfare themselves and have been known for centuries.
- The use of force, or the threat of force as a means of bargaining, has become a necessary instrument of diplomacy and a part of the conventional wisdom of statecraft.

40

Coercive Diplomacy

- The concept of coercive diplomacy belongs to a broader category of foreign policy strategies normally labeled 'strategic coercion'.
  - An alternative to brute-force strategies, strategic coercion involves the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which they are averse.

41

Compellence

- The concept of compellence can be further divided into two similar, yet distinct concepts: blackmail and coercive diplomacy. These concepts can be distinguished according to the ways in which threats are used as an instrument of policy.
  - Blackmail strategies rely on the offensive use of coercive threats, which are intended to aggressively persuade a target to give up something of value without putting up resistance.
  - In contrast, coercive diplomacy refers to the defensive use of coercion to stop or reverse an opponent's actions.

42

Deterrence

- Alexander George and Richard Smoke describe **deterrence** as
  - persuading one's opponent that the costs or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh the benefits.
  - It involves using a coercive threat of force to maintain the status quo.
  - This concept laid the groundwork for strategic thinking throughout the Cold War, but deterrence theory, with its goal of preserving a status quo, provided little guidance on how to achieve positive policy objectives.

43

- Thomas Schelling is the best known of the early compellence theorists,
- Schelling's theory revolved around the premise that a coercer will achieve her aim if she can raise the opponent's expectation of pain to a level at which the cost he anticipates for further resistance outweighs the benefits he expects to gain.
- In essence, the coercer manipulates the adversary's sense of risk by issuing threats and, if necessary, using a measured amount of force, yet promises that she will withhold or end the pain as long as the adversary complies with her demands.

44

Deterrence and Compellence

Although deterrence and compellence both involve coercion by manipulating the adversary's calculation of costs and benefits, they differ in several crucial respects.

Deterrence is a threat intended to keep an adversary from starting something.
Compellence is a threat intended to make him do something new or cease doing something he has already begun.

45

Deterrence and Compellence

Deterrence is more often passive—conditions are set, and the initiative of acting is left to the opponent

Compellence is active with the coercer seizing the initiative and attempting to force the adversary to change his behavior.

Considering these differences, Schelling was dissatisfied with using the term "coercion" to describe his concept, because that rd applies equally to passive and active forms of pressure. Consequently, he coined the term "compellence" to differentiate the active form of coercion from its more passive counterpart, deterrence. Focusing on the coercer's power to hurt, Schelling's seminal work gave rise to the family of theories classified as *punishment*.

46

Compellence

- A second vein of compellence theory stems from the work of Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons in their 1971 book, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam.* Disturbed by America's compellence failures in the Vietnam War and generally puzzled by coercive diplomacy's inconsistent record of success, George and his co-authors

47

Compellence

- George and Simons modify their description of contextual and process variables and factor in some historical work on ultimata.
- Their use of the term "coercive diplomacy" is consistent with Schelling's definition of compellence except that it is limited to
  - "defensive uses of the strategy—that is, efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action."
  - With a strong focus on a variable called "asymmetry of motivation," George's framework and those patterned after it have come to be known as *balance of interest* theories.

48

- Robert Pape characterized the compellence problem as a strategic choice between **punishment and *denial*.**
- In a series of journal articles and a 1996 book, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War,* Pape asserts, as do most punishment theorists, that compellence results from a manipulation of the opponent's calculation of costs and benefits.
- However, whereas punishment theories focus on raising the expected costs of the opponent's resistance, Pape's theory turns instead to denying the adversary the benefits of resistance by countering his military attempts to do so.
- **Pape theorizedthat compellence only succeeds when the coercer counters the adversary's "strategy to achieve territorial objectives."** Then and only then will the opponent concede to the coercer's demands in order to "avoid futile expenditure of further resources.

49

- Carrots may be included
- The sticks can include economic sanctions as well as military force.
- While definitional precision is difficult, the key contrasts are with classical diplomacy, in which coercion is merely a remote contingency and the emphasis is on dialogue and peaceful means, and war or other uses of "brute force" to "take what you want,"
- Coercive diplomacy applies pressure in a manner and magnitude that "seeks to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping…just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary."

50

Explorations Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Most standard explorations of coercive diplomacy rely on a cost-benefit model to explain outcomes of success or failure.
- These models predict outcomes by comparing the expected costs and benefits of a particular action.
- In broad terms, coercion will be successful when the anticipated suffering associated with a threat exceeds the anticipated gains of defiance

51

Force and Diplomacy

- Jentleson and Whytock in "Who "Won" Libya: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy" (2006)
  - Focusing on Libyan policy changes, specifically in regards to international terrorism and WMD proliferation, Jentleson and Whytock explore the role of U.S. coercive diplomacy in achieving these important changes.
  - By analyzing the three phases of U.S. coercion, they identify two key sets of factors for a workable model of coercive diplomacy:
  - (1) a coercer state strategy that balances credible coercion and skilled diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility, and
  - (2) target state vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions, including the transmission belt or circuit-breaker role of elites and other key political actors. They argue that both the coercer's strategy and the target state's domestic politics and economy are essential to coercive diplomacy success or failure.

52

Force and Diplomacy

- Jentleson and Whytock argue that a coercer's strategy must meet the conditions **of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility.**

53

Force and Diplomacy

- **proportionality**, a successful strategy is one in which the scope and nature of the demand is equal to the instruments and tools used to achieve it. A coercing state can choose between three different defensive objectives:
  - (1) stopping an action,
  - (2) undoing an action, and
  - (3) a cessation of the opponent's hostile behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the adversary's government or in the nature of the regime.
- The logic of the model of coercive diplomacy suggests that the strength of an adversary's disinclination to comply is strongly related to the magnitude of the demand made.
- As such, the more a coercer demands of the target, the higher the costs of compliance are for the adversary.
- Therefore, depending on what is demanded of the target, the coercer must proportionally increase the costs of noncompliance, and the benefits of compliance, so that the ends are equal to the means.

54

Force and Diplomacy

- **Reciprocity** involves a mutually understood connection between positive inducements (carrots) and the target's concessions.
- The target must believe that they cannot achieve the benefits of inducements without reciprocation in the form of compliance.

Force and Diplomacy

- **Coercive credibility** is the final necessary component of a successful coercion strategy.
- Coercive credibility is achieved when the coercing state successfully conveys to the target the costs of noncompliance.
- The actual use of force, threats, and other coercive instruments, such as economic sanctions, must be **sufficiently credible** to raise the target's perceived costs of noncompliance.
- Perceived costs, as well as actual costs, influence an adversary's decision calculus

Force and Diplomacy

- The perceived costs are the product of the magnitude of the dangers and profits the adversary envisions for a given path and the likelihood of their occurrence.
- The second set of variables posited by Jentleson and Whytock concern the target state's domestic politics and economy.
- The motivations and interests of an adversary can help determine its potential vulnerability to coercion.
- According to this framework, if the maintenance of power is taken as the main goal of both democratic and nondemocratic regimes, sustaining coercive diplomatic pressure depends on three interrelated domestic factors.

57

Force and Diplomacy

- The first factor concerns how the target state weighs the costs of compliance versus noncompliance.
- The target state must determine whether internal political support and regime security are served by defiance, or if there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the coercing state.
  - This suggests that the stronger the domestic support a target government enjoys, the less effective coercive instruments are on the target's leadership.
  - Conversely, when there is less regime support, the same instruments and political costs are likely to have more influence.
- The second factor concerns the adversary's economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose, and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry.
  - This calculation is dependent on the strength and flexibility of the target's domestic economy and its ability to absorb or counter such costs and reduce its economic vulnerability

58

Force and Diplomacy

- The final factor is related to a problematic inherent assumption of coercion theories.
- These theories incorrectly perceive all actors as single units (e.g. as single and coherent actors).
- This assumption oversimplifies the process of state-level decision making.
- Rather than individuals, the coercer and target are actually governments.
- To resolve this issue, Jentleson and Whytock include the role of elites and other key domestic political and societal actors in their analytic framework.
- They argue that even dictatorships "usually cannot fully insulate themselves from elites within their own governments and societies."
- This means that if elite interests are threatened by compliance with the coercing state's demands, such groups, can act as buffers or "circuit breakers" by blocking the external pressures on the regime.
- Conversely, when their interests are better served by the policy changes demanded, they become "transmission belts," carrying forward the coercive pressure on the regime to comply.

59

60

Western Use Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop and undo acts of military aggression occurring across and within state borders has increased since the end of the Cold War.
- Coercive diplomacy relies on threats of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.
  - The Western powers used this strategy against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, against the Yugoslav parties, primarily the Serbs, during the Yugoslav wars between 1991 and 1995 and finally against the military regime in Haiti between 1991 and 1994.
- That the Western use of this strategy has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War is not surprising.

61

Western Use Of Coercive Diplomacy

- The principal mission of Western military forces during the Cold War, to deter a Soviet attack on the homeland, disappeared with the Soviet Union.
  - With no military threat to Western security on the horizon, the principal task now facing Western forces is that of maintaining order.
  - Rapid reaction forces are shooting up like mushrooms and Western troops are increasingly finding themselves wearing blue helmets in multinational operations, which aim to prevent, constrain, contain and end violent conflicts away from home.

62

Coercive Diplomacy Is Attractive

- Coercive diplomacy is attractive from a crisis management perspective, because it can be used to stop and/or reverse acts of military aggression with limited or, at the best of times, no use of force.
- While coercive diplomacy is a low-cost strategy when it succeeds, failure is unfortunately very costly as the coercer then faces the grim choice of backing down or executing his threat.
- What is surprising about the Western use of coercive diplomacy against military aggressors after the Cold War is that the results to date have been poor.
- Coercive diplomacy failed in the Gulf crisis where in the end it became necessary to launch a ground war to evict Iraq from Kuwait.

63

Coercive Diplomacy Is Attractive

- The result was ultimately better in Bosnia where coercive diplomacy played a major role in bringing the war to an end.
- Nevertheless, the success required major use of air power and had been preceded by years of failure.
- Coercive diplomacy was most successful in Haiti where a threat of military intervention led to the peaceful removal of the military regime and the reinstatement of the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

64

The academics background

- Thomas C. Schelling's *Arms and Influence* from 1966
- Alexander L. George et al.'s *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* in 1971.
  - surprising that only a handful of scholars have taken an interest in the strategy in recent years where the use of the strategy has increased. Researchers have primarily focused on (humanitarian) intervention, new forms of peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy.

65

Strategic Coercion

- Lawrence Freedman's term 'strategic coercion'
  - as it constitutes an umbrella concept incorporating all threat based strategies.
  - Freedman defines strategic coercion as 'the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic behaviour'.

66

Figure 2.1 Overview of existing terms concerning the use of threats

- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. *The Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice.* London, UK: Palgrave

67

Deterrence and Compellence

- The family tree of coercive strategies has **two main branches, deterrence and compellence.**
- Both are based on the same logic in the sense that they rely on threats to persuade the target to behave in a way he would prefer not to.
- They are used at different phases in a conflict and have different objectives
- **Deterrent threats are passive in nature**.
- **compellence is active in nature**

68

Deterrence and Compellence

- The objective of *deterrence* is to discourage an opponent from taking certain action in the first place from fear of the consequences.
  - Deterrence involves the communication of a threat to the opponent that pain will be inflicted if he takes a certain action. It is then up to the opponent to take the final step to start an armed confrontation.

69

Deterrence and Compellence

- **Compellence** is to initiate action, to get the opponent to do something (or stop doing something) he would prefer not to, for instance give up land or stop an attack.
- **Compellence** involves the communication of a threat and/or use of limited force to convince the opponent that the costs of non-compliance will be too high.
- **Blackmail** and coercive diplomacy are subbranches of compellence because they aim at persuading the target to do something and stop doing something respectively. Alexander L. George defines *blackmail* as the use of threats to persuade the target to do something it would have preferred not to.

70

Deterrence and Compellence

- The coercer makes the first move and issues a threat to intimidate the target to give up something of value without resistance, e.g. territory.
- Coercive diplomacy differs from blackmail in that it aims at stopping or undoing an action already initiated by the target.
- In this situation, the adversary makes the first move and the coercer then issues a threat aimed at stopping and/or undoing the action undertaken by the adversary.

71

Deterrence and Compellence

- George defines *coercive diplomacy* as the use of a threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.
- Use of threats and limited force to stop an armed attack on a third party, the situation of interest in this study, is in other words an example of coercive diplomacy.
- George has chosen the term blackmail to describe the use of threats to initiate target action because he views it as offensive and illegitimate.

72

Deterrence and Compellence

- Coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, is a defensive and hence legitimate strategy.
- While his distinction between threats used reactively to stop and undo target action (coercive diplomacy), and threats used to initiate target action is useful (blackmail), his defensive offensive label is not.

73

Self-defence

- First, attacks may legitimately be launched for defensive purposes.
  - International law has a concept called 'anticipatory self-defence' allowing states to launch a pre-emptive attack upon an enemy in situations where
  - the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.
- Secondly, George lists one objective of coercive diplomacy as cessation of the opponent's hostile behaviour through a demand for change in the composition of the adversary's government or in the nature of the regime.
  - This can hardly be called a defensive objective as it goes way beyond the restoration of the status quo ante.

74

Self-defence

- The **third** problem is related to the status quo bias that this distinction suffers from.
  - It rests on the assumption that the status quo by definition is legitimate, and that all changes to it are wrong.
  - Given the number of territorial disputes that exist around the world, few actors would subscribe to such a view.
  - **What is defensive to one actor will in most conflicts be regarded as offensive by the opponent**.
- Reactive use of threats (coercive diplomacy) as inherently more legitimate than proactive use of threats (blackmail).
    - Whether coercive diplomacy is legitimate or not must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

75

Strategies Involving Full-scale Use Of Force

- Coercive diplomacy must finally be differentiated from strategies involving full-scale use of force for either defensive or offensive purposes.
- The principal difference between coercive diplomacy, as defined by George, and strategies involving full-scale force is that the former threatens force or uses 'limited' force to persuade the opponent to comply, whereas the latter seek to impose compliance upon him.
  - Put differently, coercive diplomacy seeks to avoid escalation.
  - If limited force is used as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy, it is used as a signal intended to convince the opponent that non-compliance is too costly.
  - When coercive diplomacy is successful, the opponent complies

76

- Limited force employed as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy leaves an element of choice with the target.
- The target must choose between **complying and resisting**, meaning that coercive diplomacy requires consent to succeed.
- A strategy employing the use of fullscale force denies the target this choice.
  - Consent is not required for success as the objective is to impose compliance upon the target.
  - If a coercer has to use full-scale force to ensure compliance, then coercive diplomacy has failed because it means that the coercer's attempt to intimidate the target into complying has failed.

77

Use of Limited Force

- To decide whether use of force represents a coercive diplomacy failure, we must be able to distinguish clearly between the **use of limited and the use of full-scale force**.
  - For example, George does not make any attempt to operationalize this distinction

78

How to Decide Which Force is Used ?

- The starting point must be the objective for which force is used
  - (signaling versus imposing compliance upon the opponent) rather than the amount of force actually employed.
  - It is the former that matters in terms of deciding whether a strategy constitutes coercive diplomacy or not.
- Such a distinction cannot be based on a threshold number of troops or air strikes.
- The only solution is to base it on the element of choice that the use offeree in question leaves the target.
  - This approach makes air power and sea power part of a coercive diplomacy strategy as it by definition will leave the choice whether or not to comply to the opponent.

79

A Threat-based Strategy

- A threat-based strategy used as a pretext for war is not coercive diplomacy
  - We assume that the purpose of coercive diplomacy is to avoid war.
- The coercer is assumed to prefer target compliance to war

80

Conclusion of Coercive Diplomacy

- Summing up, coercive diplomacy is a strategy involving the use of a threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.
- The limited force as the use of ground troops in pursuit of limited objectives (they must aim at less than settling the dispute in question), and the use of air and sea power no matter the scale employed, because these actions all leave the opponent with a choice to comply or resist.
  - The use of ground troops to settle the conflict is operationalized as full-scale force because it denies the opponent such a choice by imposing compliance upon him.

81

The Theory Of Coercive Diplomacy: The State Of The Art

- Any presentation of coercive diplomacy theory must start with Schelling's discussion of compellence in Arms and Influence, published in 1966.
  - This work laid the foundation of the theory providing a systematic theoretical analysis of how states use threats and limited force to change the behaviour of other states.
  - In the book Schelling formulated a rational theory of compellence identifying **five necessary conditions for success**

82

Schelling's Five Conditions For Success

1. The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that non-compliance is too costly.
2. The threat must be perceived as credible by the adversary, that is he must be convinced that the coercer has the will and the capability to execute it in case of non-compliance.
3. The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
4. The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future.
5. The conflict must not be perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common interest in avoiding full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force.

83

Alexander George's strategy

- George was primarily interested in constructing what he termed a 'policy-relevant theory', that is a theory which can help policy makers to make more discriminating and accurate diagnosis of situations in which coercive diplomacy might be used.
- Therefore, he conceived the concept of coercive diplomacy as consisting of four components or questions that confront policy-makers trying to devise a particular strategy:
1. What to demand of the opponent?
2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand?
3. Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for non-compliance?

84

George's Variants Of Coercion

- George discusses four variants of the coercive diplomacy strategy:
  - ultimatum,
  - tacit ultimatum
  - gradual turning of the screw
  - try-and-see approach

85

George's Variants Of Coercion

- The *ultimatum* variant has three elements:
  - a demand on the opponent
  - a time limit for compliance with the demand
  - and a specific threat of punishment for non-compliance
    - which may or may not be accompanied by the promise of rewards for compliance.
- The *tacit ultimatum* variant differs from the above
  - no specific time limit for compliance is given and that the nature of the punishment for non-compliance may be left open.
  - Instead a sense of urgency/indication of the nature of the punishment contemplated is conveyed to the opponent by other means, for example by undertaking military preparations.

86

George's Variants Of Coercion

- The *gradual turning of the screw* approach
  - neither creates a sense of urgency for compliance nor signals the nature of the punishment that non-compliance will result in.
  - Instead, the demand put to the opponent is accompanied by a threat that punishment will be increased gradually if compliance is not forthcoming.
  - The first step might be to impose economic sanctions, the second step tightening of such sanctions and the third step the use of limited military force, etc.

87

George's Variants Of Coercion

- The *try-and-see* strategy is the weakest of the four.
  - Neither a time limit nor the threat of escalation is made when the demand and the threat are conveyed to the opponent.
  - In case of non-compliance, the coercer simply executes his threat and waits to see whether it has the desired effect.
  - The choice of strategy depends on the coercer's perception of the adversary's interests and his own willingness to risk escalation and ultimately war to achieve the desired objective.
  - The ultimatum approach is the most powerful, but it is also the approach most likely to backfire and result in the escalation of a crisis into full-scale war as it leaves little room for compromise and face-saving solutions. Conversely, the use of a weaker approach with a

88

George's Variants Of Coercion

- **Conclusion**
  - The **ultimatum** approach is the **most powerful**, but it is also the approach **most likely to backfire** and result in the escalation of a crisis into full-scale war as it leaves little room for compromise and face-saving solutions.
  - Conversely, the **use of a weaker approach with a lower potential** for escalation increases the risk of failure because the adversary is likely to perceive the unwillingness of the coercer to issue an ultimatum as a sign of weakness and proof that the coercer lacks the will to execute his threat.

89

George's Variants Of Coercion

- George and his associates have inductively identified **14 factors** which influence the use of the different variants of coercive diplomacy.
- They refer to **five** of them as contextual variables while the remaining **nine** are designated as conditions favouring success.

90

George's Conditions

- The five contextual variables are:
1. Global strategic environment;
2. Type of provocation;
3. Image of war;
4. Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy;
5. The isolation of the adversary.

91

George's Conditions

- The conditions favouring success are:
1. Clarity of objective;
2. Strength of motivation;
3. Asymmetry of motivation;
4. Sense of urgency;
5. Strong leadership;
6. Domestic support;
7. International support;
8. Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation;
9. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis.

92

George's Conditions

- Ideally, the two sets of variables should be used at different stages in the policy-making process.
  - The **contextual variables** should be used **initially** to decide whether coercive diplomacy is a viable strategy in a given crisis.
  - The success variables only enter the decision-making process in the second stage if analysis of the contextual variables suggests that a coercive diplomacy strategy may work.
  - The success variables are then supposed to help policy-makers in the task of conceiving an effective strategy.
  - George and Simons do not weigh the relative importance of their conditions systematically and refrain from designating any of them as necessary or sufficient for success.

93

George's Conditions

- George and Simons cautiously limit themselves to identifying four factors as 'particularly significant':
  - Asymmetry of motivation
  - Sense of urgency
  - Fear of unacceptable escalation
  - Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis.
- **Three of them relate** to the adversary's perception of the crisis underscoring their main point that success ultimately is a question of creating in the adversary's mind the belief that the cost of non-compliance will exceed any gain

94

Evaluating Schelling and George and Simon

- The main strength of Schelling's theory is its coherent and parsimonious nature. His theory is easy to use as the number of factors is manageable. From the perspective of this work, his framework is useful with respect to answering the question why coercive diplomacy succeeds or fails by calling attention to the minimum requirements for success. But parsimony is also the greatest weakness of the theory as its highly abstract nature makes it difficult to operationalize. In addition, his theory has little to offer in terms of explaining when the strategy is likely to be employed effectively or in terms of dealing with the problems raised by multilateralism. Overcoming the problem of operationalization present in Schelling's work was a principal goal that George set for himself when he began

95

Evaluating Schelling and George and Simon

- **Advantage** of George's work is the inclusion of carrots in the framework.
  - Several scholars support George's proposition that a carrot-and-stick strategy stands a greater chance of succeeding than a strategy based solely on coercion or accommodation.
  - They conclude that a bargaining strategy coupling an initial firm stand with a subsequent willingness to compromise is the most successful with respect to resolving conflicts short of war.
  - In addition, this strategy is also most likely to lead to stability in the long run.
  - Finally, George and Simons must be commended for their frankness regarding the limitations of their framework.

96

Evaluating Schelling and George and Simon

- **Weaknesses** of George and Simons
  - to the risk of misperception and miscalculation, it is odd that they fail to devote more space to suggesting ways of reducing it.
  - Another weakness stems from George and Simons's failure to address the problems raised by coalitional use of the strategy.
  - The possibility that coercive diplomacy may be employed by coalitions is incorporated into the framework, but there is precious little discussion of it.
  - George and Simons limit themselves to observing that coalitional use of coercive diplomacy is harder than unilateral use, a claim that other scholars question.

97

Evaluating Schelling and George and Simon

- A third and more serious problem concerns the operationalization of three of George and Simons' 'particularly significant' success conditions.
  - The conditions, asymmetry of motivation, the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation and urgency for compliance, can only be measured after the fact.
  - One must wait for the outcome of a crisis to determine whether they were present or not.
  - Needless to say, a framework will be much more useful to policy-makers caught in the midst of a crisis if they can determine whether its success conditions are present or not.

98

Evaluating Schelling and George and Simon

- A final problem is created by the large number of variables (14), and George and Simons' unwillingness to make a serious attempt to specify their relative importance or likely interaction.
  - they limit themselves to designating **four conditions** as 'particularly significant' and to suggesting a division between contextual variables and conditions favouring success.
  - The high number of conditions makes their framework difficult to use, and the lack of specification greatly complicates the task of assessing whether a coercive diplomacy strategy is likely to work or not in a given crisis.
  - **The division between** contextual variables and conditions favouring success is less than watertight and seems to rest on the premise that

99

Evaluating Schelling and George and Simon

- The problem created by the large number of variables and the lack of specification is to some extent a function of the inductive approach that George and Simons employ.
- They identify their variables from case studies rather than deducing them from a set of abstract theoretical statements

100

- George correctly points out, **reliance on a deductive** approach would not have solved this problem as multi-factor models are impossible to specify perfectly in the social sciences.
- George is pointing out that the complex nature of international relations demands multifactor explanations, and that it is impossible to specify the relative importance and the likely interaction among all the variables in such a model perfectly.
- The problem remains, however, that unless a reasonable degree of specification is achieved, and George and Simons do fail on this count, then a multi-factor model has limited explanatory power and policy relevance.
- **George and Simons argue that success is unlikely unless all their**

101

Conclusion of George and Simons

- Summing up, George and Simons' framework has little to offer with respect to the problems created by multilateral or coalitional use of the strategy.
  - Their framework is more helpful when it comes to explaining success and failure and to identifying the conditions under which the strategy is likely to be used effectively. Unfortunately, this help is limited by the large number of variables and the difficulty associated with operationalizing three of the most important ones.

102

IDENTIFYING THE IDEAL POLICY

- Thomas C. Schelling's and Alexander L. George's works serve as my starting point in an effort to isolate the factors that as a minimum must apply for coercive diplomacy to succeed against military aggressors.
  - The idea is to identify the **ideal policy** that will maximize the probability of success.
  - Originally, this effort started out as an attempt to identify the necessary conditions for success.
  - William E. Simons was forced to do the same and refrain from designating any of their conditions as necessary for success.
  - **They cautiously refer to nine conditions as favouring success**.

103

Ideal Policy

- The *ideal policy* maximizing the scope for coercive diplomacy success against aggressors must meet all these requirements.
- George and Simons emphasize that the key to this is to create fear of unacceptable escalation in the mind of the opponent.
  - This suggests that a threat offeree as a minimum will be required in most cases.
  - An opponent who has resorted to force has signalled a willingness to accept high costs to achieve his goals.
  - His motivation can consequently be regarded as fixed on a high level.
  - Once the opponent has used force and shed blood, a threshold has been crossed that makes it difficult to back down and compromise.
  - The room available for backing down decreases as compromises

104

Schelling's First Condition

- This suggests that a **threat offeree** as a minimum will be required in most cases.
    - An opponent who has resorted to force has signalled a willingness to accept high costs to achieve his goals.
    - His motivation can consequently be regarded as fixed on a high level.
    - Once the opponent has used force and shed blood, a threshold has been crossed that makes it difficult to back down and compromise.
    - The room available for backing down decreases as compromises acceptable prior to the outbreak of hostilities now amount to a betrayal of the soldiers who have died.
    - Threats short offeree are therefore unlikely to be sufficiently potent to induce an aggressor to comply.

105

Schelling's Second Condition

- The coercer must have the capability to destroy the adversary's military strategy or deny him his objectives *quickly with little cost.*
    - **A cheap threat is more credible than a costly one,** and issuing threats of force are cheaper for the coercer if he can win quickly with little cost than if it will take him a prolonged war to win.
    - A threat to fight a prolonged war will only be credible if the coercer's vital interests are directly threatened.
    - This proposition finds support in the deterrence.
    - To maximize credibility, a threat of quick defeat backed by the required capability is not sufficient, however.
    - A deadline for compliance must accompany it.
    - An actor being asked to stop and/or undo an act of aggression can

106

Schelling's Second Condition

- consequently include a deadline for compliance as the second condition in the *ideal policy*.
  - Apart from reducing the risk of misperception and miscalculation, a deadline also serves to reduce the scope for delaying tactics and counter-coercion.

107

Schelling's Third Condition

- As Schelling's **third condition** stipulates
  - deadlines must, of course, give the opponent sufficient time to comply.

108

Schelling's Fourth Condition

- Schelling's fourth condition are **Assurance** against new demands must be included in the *ideal policy* to meet.
  - The opponent's incentive to comply will be significantly reduced if he fears that compliance will merely result in new demands.
  - George and Simons make the same point when they stress clear terms of settlement as a **'particularly significant'** condition

109

Schelling's Fifth Condition Ideal Policy

- **Use of carrots** is the fourth and last ingredient in the *ideal policy*.
  - Carrots should be used as sweeteners or face-savers to help an opponent fearing the coercer's threat to comply with a minimum of humiliation.
  - By increasing the opponent's incentive to comply carrots help to prevent zero-sum situations (**Schelling's fifth condition**), and they also serve to give assurances against future demands more credibility.
  - Carrots contribute to success in two of the three cases in which they are employed whereas coercive diplomacy fails in the four cases where carrots are not employed.

110

Summary of Ideal Policy

- Summing up, the *ideal policy* comprises:
1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, backed by the necessary capability;
2. A deadline for compliance;
3. An assurance to the adversary against future demands;
4. An offer of carrots for compliance.

111

No-peace And No-war

- In a system of states, the use of force generally discriminates between peace and war.
  - Yet, international politics often takes place in a gray region involving **no-peace and no-war**, wherein the threat of violence more than its mere application
- The critical variable for an understanding of interstate relations and crises.
- Most conflicts are, in fact, reciprocal bargaining situations wherein the desired outcome hinges on the participants' skillful exploitation of potential force

112

Detterence and Compellence

- two best-known types of threat
  - one intended to dissuade an adversary from doing something (deterrence)
  - and the other intended to persuade an adversary to do something (compellence).

113

Approaches to the Study of Deterrence and Compellence

- Walter Petersen (1986) in his assessment of some hypothesized dissimilarities between deterrence and compellence.
  - Common key propositions stemming from deterrence theory hold that
  1. Compellent threats are more likely to result in violent conflict
  2. It is easier to compel than to deter
  3. Compellence is a reckless activity
  4. The targets of compellent threats have a bargaining advantage over the initiators.

114

Approaches to the Study of Deterrence and Compellence

- Petersen's findings suggest that the first statement is true if compellent threats are issued under specific structural conditions
- The second proposition is limited
- The third and the fourth ones are invalid.

115

Successfulness of Threats

- For a threat to be successful, the target must be convinced that the issuer really means to carry it out.
  - **Democratic** governments, however, are at every turn susceptible to criticism from domestic oppositions, which can raise doubts about their willingness and ability to act.
  - **Autocratic** governments, on the other hand, can more easily conceal or suppress their internal divisions.
    - Wright concludes, "in the game of power diplomacy, democracies pitted against autocracies are at a disadvantage" (1965, p. 842).

116

- The effects of domestic institutions on international crises:
1. Ashared preference for a peaceful bargain does not ensure that such a bargain will be found.
   - Under conditions of asymmetric information, peaceful outcomes that both sides prefer to war may not be realized.
2. Overcoming information asymmetries is complicated by the fact that actors have conflicting interests in a crisis and so have incentives to misrepresent their preferences in order to get the best possible deal.
   - Acrucial determinant of crisis behavior and outcomes is the ability of states to signal information credibly, given a strategic environment which encourages deception, concealment, and bluff.

117

3. While states' power and interests influence the outcomes of crises, their effect is mediated by information and beliefs.
   - The nature of strategic interaction under uncertainty means states' preferences over war and peace need not influence the likelihood of war and peace in a predictable or straightforward manner.

118

Information and signaling

Fig. 2.1 Crisis bargaining model

119

- In Figure 2.1. There are two states, a challenger and a target.
- The interaction begins with the challenger's decision either to accept the status quo allocation of the good or to issue a challenge – that is, to threaten the target with force unless it concedes to a change in the status quo.
- If the challenger chooses to maintain the status quo, the game ends.
- If the challenger issues a threat, the target faces a choice between conceding to the challenger's demand or resisting.
- In the event the target concedes, the game ends peacefully with some or all of the good being reallocated to the challenger.
- If the target resists, the challenger must then decide either to stand firm and follow through on its threat or to back down.

120

Characteristics Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Three elements characterise coercive diplomacy:
  - 1) a demand;
  - 2) a threat;
  - and 3) time pressure
- First, a specific demand has to be formulated vis-a`-vis the opponent.
  - The objective of the demand is to **stop or reverse an action** that the opponent has started.
  - As this demand is supplemented with a threat, the demand has to be understood as a requirement.
  - The success or failure of coercive diplomacy depends on whether the demand will be executed.

121

Characteristics Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Second, the demand has to be **supported by a threat**. '
  - If you do not agree with this demand, I will punish you by doing X or Y'.
  - As Alexander George has pointed out: 'the general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand'.
  - Most of the time the threat has to be made explicit.
  - The latter can be further supported by action. Organising military exercises near the coast of the opponent, as the US Navy has done near the coast of North Korea and Taiwan, may help to convince the opponent that the threat is real.

122

Characteristics Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Third, it is not sufficient to have a demand combined with a threat.
    - Coercive diplomacy also requires some kind of time pressure.
    - Peter Jakobsen states that: 'Opponents will simply not perceive a threat of force as credible unless it is accompanied by a deadline for compliance'.

123

Factors That Determine The Success Rate Of Coercive Diplomacy

- coercive diplomacy looks like an efficient approach to persuade opponents and to prevent war.
- In reality, many factors have to be present in order to make coercive diplomacy succeed. Ten factors, which may be clustered around five basic questions, can be distinguished. In addition, positive incentives—'carrots'—may help to persuade the opponent

124

Factors That Determine The Success Rate Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Is the demand legitimate?
  - Here a distinction can be made between the underlying objective and the specific demand.
- First, is the underlying objective legitimate?
- If **public opinion in the threatening state(s) believes that the final goal is not legitimate,** then it will be hard for decision makers in the threatening state to maintain this policy of coercive diplomacy for long, especially in democratic states.
- **If public opinion in the threatened state does not find the underlying objective legitimate**, it will support its government in resisting the external pressure. The result of the latter will be that the threatened government will become more self-confident and even

125

Factors That Determine The Success Rate Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Does the opponent believe that there will be more demands turning up in the future?
  - If the opponent believes that more demands will turn up in the future, he will not be eager to give in in the first place.
  - The threatening state should make clear right from the beginning what the overall goals are and what the definitive solution will look like.
  - Is the threat credible? The credibility of the threat is a major factor that determines the success rate of coercive diplomacy.

126

Factors That Determine The Success Rate Of Coercive Diplomacy

- The credibility of a threat depends in its turn on four factors:
  - Is the threat proportional to the demand?
  - If the threat is not in proportion to the demand, than it will not be perceived as credible.
  - The threat may either be too big or too small.
  - It should be proportional to the specific demand, the underlying objective and the available means.
  - Where military action is threatened, Jakobsen recommends never excluding the use of ground troops.
  - Does public opinion support the threat and its potential consequences? Sanctions, for instance, may also hurt the economy of the threatening state, which may prevent the use of coercive

127

Factors That Determine The Success Rate Of Coercive Diplomacy

- Is the time pressure credible?
  - The demand may be legitimate and the threat credible, but if the time pressure is too tight or, in contrast, not tight enough, the odds are that the threatened state will not give in.
  - Which actor is most motivated to win the negotiation game?
  - Which actor is most motivated in absolute terms? Motivation basically depends on the size of the national interests involved. If there are vital interests at stake, the odds are that the country will be extremely motivated to win the game. Which actor is most motivated in relative terms?
  - Even if there are substantial interests involved for both states, it is likely that one of them is more motivated than the other in relative

128

Coercive Diplomacy vs. Non-Coercive Diplomacy

- The existing theories of military coercion is divided into two camps. On the one hand, the classical theory of coercion, or the so-called balance of power theory, predicts a monotonically increasing effect of power on the likelihood of using force. In the anarchical structure of international relations, there is no central authority that prevents states from using force as a means to achieve goals; since the effectiveness of violence increases with power, states' incentive to use force should increase as they become stronger via-`a-vis other states (Wright 1942; Morgenthau 1948; Claude 1962; Mearsheimer 1990).

129

- On the other hand, the neoclassical theory of military coercion, or the so-called preponderance of power theory, does not predict a positive association between power and the use of force; instead, it predicts a monotonically increasing effect of power on the likelihood of the threat to use force. A very strong state need not actually use force in order to achieve goals because a mere threat to use force, which is less costly than using force, may be enough to alter the behavior of a weaker state. Hence, states' incentive to actually use force may not increase monotonically with power, but their likelihood of threatening other states with the use of force should increase as they become more powerful relative to other states (Organski 1968; Blainey 1988; Morrow 1989; Fearon 1994; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and Zorick 1997).

130

- The neoclassical theory is more sophisticated than the classical one in that it considers the possibility of different tools — the use of force and the threat to use force — to achieve a diplomatic goal. However, it is still incomplete as it only focuses on the choice between different coercive measures, paying little attention to the possibility that a non-coercive instrument may be used as a substitute for coercive ones.

131

- In international relations, states often attempt to influence other states through the provision of benefits, rather than through the threat or use of force (Baldwin 1971; Knorr 1973; Morrow 1991; Lake 1996; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Palmer and Morgan 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). In contrast to coercive diplomacy, whose effectiveness is based on the power to hurt, the logic of non-coercive diplomacy hinges on the power to reward. The more benefits a state can provide, the more likely it is to be able to buy a policy of another state in non-coercive diplomacy. Even if a state has an enough ability to use force or threaten to use force, this does not necessarily imply that it would actually employ such a coercive measure; a state uses force or threatens to use force only when doing so is more beneficial

132

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Though varied, successful instances of coercive diplomacy have shared five characteristics.
  - First, the goals of the coercive exercise have been clearly stated and realistic.
  - Second, the target State believed that the threat of punishment was credible.
  - Third, the target State had limited ability to mitigate pain caused by the coercive tools.
  - Fourth, the coercive strategies included credible inducements for compliance.
  - Fifth, both the diplomatic objective and the coercive tools employed enjoyed widespread international support.

133

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Traditional coercive tools –
  - diplomatic consequences,
  - limitations on international travel,
  - and broad and targeted sanctions –can all be deployed in line with these criteria. Referral to the ICC has a much more uncertain relationship with these criteria.

134

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Clarity and Reasonableness of the Objective
  - A clearly-articulated objective is a basic ingredient for coercive diplomacy as it allows the coercer to calibrate its efforts and the target to accurately weigh the costs and benefits of compliance and resistance.

135

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Credibility of Threatened Punishment
  - Whether a coercive instrument threatens the onset or exacerbation of pain, a coercers" ability to productively threaten is largely based on whether the target views the threat as genuine. In this regard, an ICC referral is distinct from the traditional tools of coercive diplomacy.There is no doubt that the Security Council"s demand to institute travel bans, arms embargoes, or asset freezes has teeth. Hundreds of entities (individuals, organizations, and States) have been sanctioned under such programs by the UN, with provisions against malefactors implemented globally by Member States. And, the pain of being targeted is real. Sanctioned countries have been significantly deprived,32sanctioned organizations have been bankrupted,33and

136

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Ability of Target to Mitigate Pain
  - Long the Achilles" Heel of coercive diplomacy, the ability for a target to mitigate pain caused by coercive tools can render even the most forceful instruments ineffective. Such mitigation has been seen in many of the traditional coercive tools such as economic sanctions. Targets have undermined prohibitions through various means, ranging from the diversion of sanctioned goods to sophisticated legal chicanery, including the establishment of fronts, the re-namingof sanctioned entities, and the use of third countries tore-export goods.

137

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Presence and Credibility of Inducements
  - Coercive strategies have been much more effective when coupled with credible inducements. At aminimum, such inducements include the removal of punishments; at best they include the promise of real benefits. Such enticements can allow face-saving by the coerced and make compliance more agreeable.

138

The Makings of Successful Coercive Diplomacy

- Degree of International Support
  - The power of coercive diplomacy is depleted if a target is able to exploit weaknesses in the coercive net. To this end, it has become critical for the effectiveness of most coercive tools that they be implemented multilaterally to ensure that the prohibition imposed by one jurisdiction is not overcome by an absent prohibition elsewhere.

139

140

- Coercive diplomacy or "forceful persuasion" is the "attempt to get a target, a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a nonstate actor-to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force".[1] This term also refers to "diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military force to achieve political objectives".[2] Coercive diplomacy "is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary".[3]

141

- Coercive diplomacy can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."[4]

142

- As distinguished from deterrence theory, which is a strategy aimed at adversaries to dissuade them from undertaking an action not yet started, coercive diplomacy entails efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.[5] Its central task is "to create in the opponent the expectation of costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing".[6] Coercive diplomacy attempts to have force be a much more "flexible, refined psychological instrument of policy in contrast to the 'quick, decisive' military strategy, which uses force as a blunt instrument".[5]

143

- The term 'coercive diplomacy' falls under the theory of coercion as a foreign policy tool

144

- The Dynamics of Coercion-American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercive diplomacy as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force".[7] Joseph Nye emphasizes that coercive diplomacy depends upon the credibility and the cost of the threat.[8] "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce acceptance and it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in

145

- A strategy commonly associated with coercion theory and coercive diplomacy is the concept of deterrence, or "the maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack".[9] The term deterrence is differentiated from coercive diplomacy. In his influential work, Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling puts forth a general concept of coercion theory as it emerges beyond deterrence. According to Schelling, deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping an adversary from acting. It is only a threat. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer." Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence".[3]

146

- 'Compellence', in contrast to 'deterrence', shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt".[3] When differentiating between deterrence and compellence, deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it; in contrast, compellence "requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts" as in deterrence. "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction."[3] Alexander L. George, a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at Stanford University, was a pioneer in

147

Framework

- According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken. Third, it may persuade an adversary to make "fundamental changes in its government".[11] When constructing a coercive diplomacy strategy, policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand".[6]

148

- The first variant of the 'coercive diplomacy' strategy is the classic 'ultimatum'. An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: "a demand on the opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable".[6]
- The second variant of coercive diplomacy, 'Tacit ultimatum', is similar to 'ultimatum' except that it doesn't set forth an explicit time limit.
- The third variant of coercive diplomacy, the 'Try-and-See', addresses strictly the first component of the 'ultimatum' variant, "a demand on the opponent". There is no time limit set, no sense of urgency conveyed, instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single

149

Requirements for success

- mong the numerous theories on coercive diplomacy, Peter Viggo Jakobsen's (1998) ideal policy succinctly identifies the four key conditions the coercer must meet to maximize the chance of success to stop or undo acts of aggression:
- A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
- A deadline for compliance.
- An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
- An offer of inducements for compliance.
- The first requirement in Jakobsen's 'ideal policy' is to make the threat so great that non-compliance will be too costly for the resisting actors [12] The second requirement demands that after maximizing the

150

151

Coercive Diplomacy:
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War

- 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, in which China unsuccessfully attempted to compel Vietnam into abandoning its recent invasion of Cambodia.
- This conflict qualifies as a case of coercive diplomacy under George's definition because:
1. One party tried to force another party to stop and reverse an action;
2. It was a "limited" military action (i.e., not aimed at the adversary's total surrender);
3. There was no zero-sum conflict between the two combatants (i.e., fighting over a common border).

152

Coercive Diplomacy:
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War

- Chinese efforts to apply coercive diplomacy to Vietnam, despite an overwhelming superiority in numbers and material
- Failed to achieve Beijing's two primary objectives:
  - withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia
  - and restoration of the status quo antebellum

153

Coercive Diplomacy:
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War

- **First**, Chinese fears of provoking a Soviet response caused them to avoid actions that signaled future escalation to large-scale warfare and occupation, reducing the credibility of Chinese threats.
- **Second**, the strategic pauses that marked Chinese statements before and during the invasion relieved the diplomatic pressure on Hanoi and allowed the latter to regroup its forces.

154

Coercive Diplomacy:
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War

- **Third**, movements of Chinese forces and threats of force intended to signal Beijing's limited objectives were lost amongst other diplomatic "noise" about Vietnamese border incursions and "self-defense counterattacks."
- **Finally**, Beijing did not select diplomatic positions and military moves that provided Vietnam with a face-saving exit, thus backing Vietnam into a corner from which it ostensibly had no choice but to resist Chinese coercion.

155

George And Simons's Model Of Coercive Diplomacy

- The central logic of George and Simons's model is that pressure, correctly applied, can force an adversary to comply with one's demands.
- Success itself depends on a number of factors, including the magnitude of the demand, matching the strategy to the situation, and effectively implementing that strategy

156

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- The historical relationship of China and Vietnam, generally marked by mutual distrust and enmity
- For nearly one thousand years China claimed a sphere of influence in the northern Tonkin region of modern Vietnam, and the latter imported many elements of China's cultural and political system.
- After its independence in the **tenth** century, Vietnam continued to maintain a **"tributary"** relationship with its large northern neighbor and the Vietnamese ruling elite drew legitimacy from the Chinese Confucian/imperial system.
- During the colonial period, both countries suffered at the hands of the imperialist powers, and their nascent communist parties were closely linked in the struggle for independence.

157

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- The 1954 Geneva Conference marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration in cooperation between the two revolutionary parties, as a newly unified and powerful China sought to reassert its traditional sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.
- This growing split was exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet rift of the late 1950s, in which Vietnam quickly became a pawn in a struggle for influence between two increasingly hostile would-be benefactors.
- In the end, the Soviet Union's offer of material assistance for Vietnam's war against the United States proved more valuable than China's empty-handed moral exhortation of "self-reliance," pushing Ho's regime into the "revisionist/social imperialist" camp of the USSR

158

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- China's rapprochement with the United States in 1972 came as a great shock to the Vietnamese government, which perceived the Nixon visit as an act of betrayal
- As William Duiker argues, "Vietnamese leaders [after 1972] had apparently become convinced that China's Vietnam policy was rooted in a desire to maintain the division of Vietnam in order to facilitate postwar domination of Southeast Asia. "
- This ostensible change in policy contrasted sharply with Vietnam's world view, which still saw global politics.
- China, on the other hand, had come to perceive a much more complicated global balance of power, with China as a vertex of an increasingly Quid strategic triangle with the Soviet Union and the

159

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- Vietnam's relationship with the Soviet Union
- Burton concludes that the real cause of the March 1979 border war was Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in Christmas 1978 an act that greatly provoked the Chinese and drove them to employ a much more aggressive diplomatic strategy.
- He contends that the strategic imperatives of China and Vietnam in Indochina and the entanglements of the Sino-Soviet split combined to make Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia a flashpoint between the two countries.
- This conclusion is verified by a number of factors, including the fact that Chinese troop movements began only after Vietnam's military campaign was underway

160

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- In 1954 at Geneva, China had sought to weaken Vietnam's regional control over Indochina by refusing to permit Cambodia and Laos to attend the conference as full members

161

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- In the late 1960s, China heavily supported Cambodia's neutral leader, Prince Sihanouk, who had turned a blind eye to Vietnamese excursions in his country's eastern provinces.
- After Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk in 1971, China granted the latter asylum in Beijing, while simultaneously stepping up aid to the anti-Lon Nol Khmer Rouge, whose Maoist inclinations had long since soured their relations with the Soviet-oriented communists in Vietnam.
- The Chinese continued to aid the Khmer Rouge after their victory over Lon Nol's forces in 1975, and they encouraged their new Maoist allies to resist Vietnamese attempts at hegemonism in the region.
- These agitations increased in intensity throughout the mid-1970s, as Pol Pot's regime escalated its aggressive and often unpredictable

162

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- At first, China and Vietnam held back from direct confrontation over Cambodia.
- After Beijing signed a military aid pact with Pol Pot in September 1977, however, the latter evidently felt he had the unconditional support of the Chinese regime and intensified the skirmishes on the border with Vietnam.
- Talks between China and Vietnam in November 1977 did not defuse the crisis, but instead drove the Chinese to demand that the Vietnamese completely withdraw their troops from eastern Cambodia.
- By the spring of 1978, escalating rhetoric across the border ignited a massive refugee crisis, as thousands of ethnic Chinese streamed into southern China.

163

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- On February 17, 1979, China invaded Vietnam with a force of more than 100,000 men and 190,000 in reserve, pitted against 60,000 to 80,000 regular Vietnamese troops and similar numbers of local militia forces.
- Despite some Western reportage to the contrary, it appears that the Chinese military assault was never meant to be a full-scale invasion.
- When one considers the size of the Chinese army and its choice of tactics in the conflict, it is easy to see the difference.

164

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- At the time of the conflict, China's army totaled more than 4 million men in uniform, including twenty-nine divisions of main and local force troops stationed in the two military regions bordering Vietnam.
- If they had been so inclined, the Chinese could have thrown a much larger force at the Vietnamese, completely overwhelming their border defense.
- Also, the visible Chinese strategy was congruent not with conquering, but with signaling.
- If the Chinese had intended to capture Hanoi, they would not have attacked at many places along the border as they did, but instead would have chosen one or two key entry points and driven hard to the capital, as dictated by contemporary military strategy.
- Deng himself confirmed the limited nature of the attack on February

165

Historical Background Of Sino-Vietnam

- In addition, **Deng announced a few days later that Chinese forces had no intention of capturing Hanoi**.
- Both of these signals were undoubtedly aimed at Moscow, which had signed a mutual defense treaty (some would say military alliance) with Vietnam only the year before.

166

CHINA 'S POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

- China's tangible attempts at coercive diplomacy began after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978.
- China's principal objective was to convince the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia (in essence, restore the status quo antebellum)
  - or what George would consider a classic Type B strategy.
  - More specifically, it resembled the variant of coercive diplomacy described by the authors as the **"try and see approach,"** because the Chinese did not link their demand to a time limit;
  - thus, **they did not create a strong sense of urgency.**
  - Instead, they carried out a limited military action and then waited to see if it was sufficient to persuade the Vietnamese to retreat from

167

Objectives and Unclear Terms of Compliance

- Beijing's communication of this desire, however, was often lost in mixed signals.
- In November of 1978 at a Bangkok press conference, Deng Xiaoping discussed the measures that China would take in dealing with Vietnam's regional hegemonism and stated that the scale of their efforts would depend on the level of Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia.
- Two days after the fall of Phnom Penh on January 7, an article by a "commentator" in *People's Daily* warned that "the capture of Phnom Penh by Vietnam does not mean the end but the beginning of war.'
  - At the end of January, Deng Xiaoping made a well-publicized trip to the United States, where he spoke publicly of the need to punish the

168

Objectives and Unclear Terms of Compliance

- The common thread running through these statements is that China's main concern was Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.
- In tone and timing, these messages were strikingly reminiscent of Chinese strategies before entry into the Korean War in 1950 and their border clashes with India in 1959 and 1962.
- Despite these precedents, however, the Chinese objective was not clear to the Vietnamese, since the warnings about Cambodia were issued among other, equally strident notes dealing with ancillary issues such as border incursions and refugees.
  - Beginning in the summer of 1978, China began issuing stern notes to Hanoi concerning "unscrupulous provocations,, along their common border. On November 7, 1978, the Chinese Foreign Ministry strongly

169

Objectives and Unclear Terms of Compliance

- This warning was repeated again in notes issued on December 24.
- Finally, on January 18, February 12, and February 16, Beijing issued its strongest protests against Vietnamese border incursions and hinted at impending hostilities.
- Even on the day of the Chinese invasion, February 17, Beijing's official explanation declared that the Chinese were "forced to rise in self-defensive counter-attack" because of Vietnam's "incessant armed provocations and hostile activities" along their border.
- Additionally, they announced that the "objective" of their punitive attack was to secure a "peaceful and stable border. "
- The official statement did not mention Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia at all, nor did it establish conditions for Chinese retreat.

170

Objectives and Unclear Terms of Compliance

- Herbert Yee has argued that China's note gave the Vietnamese a chance to withdraw troops from Cambodia without losing face and denied the Soviets an excuse to intervene on Hanoi's behalf.
- It could also be asserted that labeling the assault a "counterattack" also helped bolster domestic support and morale in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, since it was understandably difficult to explain to the populace why China's former "fraternal socialist brother" was now a military adversary.
- Even if these assertions are true, however, signal ambiguity on this scale is not conducive to the success of coercive diplomacy, especially given the magnitude of the objective Beijing sought from Hanoi.

171

Objectives and Unclear Terms of Compliance

- The statement gave the Vietnamese no clear indication of China's intentions, nor did it clearly establish the terms of compliance.
- Even the later statement made in the UN Security Council by China's representative Chen Chu that China "will retreat only after meting out punishment" did not explicitly set out any terms of compliance.
- For coercive diplomacy to have been successful, the Chinese should have carefully communicated their precise desires to Hanoi, as well as interim and unilateral acts of good faith the Vietnamese government could have undertaken to express their willingness to comply with the demands (full retreat of 100,000 men cannot happen overnight).

172

1979 - China – Vietnam –
No Way Out: Asymmetry of Motivation

- According to George and Simons's criteria for asymmetry of motivation, China did not possess an advantage in the conflict with Vietnam.
  - First, Beijing's motivation was weakened by the fact that it could not view the issue in life-or-death terms, primarily because it did not involve a zero-sum dilemma between itself and Vietnam (despite propaganda to the contrary, they were fighting over disputed territory not on their border but on that of a third party).
  - On the other hand, Beijing seemed to perceive (**incorrectly**) that the Vietnamese would be easy to coerce.
    - Statements by Chinese leaders reveal their deep confidence in the striking power of the People's Liberation Army and the expected

173

1979 - China – Vietnam –
No Way Out: Asymmetry of Motivation

- Although an argument could be sustained that Vietnam's costly war in Cambodia reduced their ability to fight a war on two fronts, the brimming confidence of China's military leadership had little basis in fact.
  - China had fought in a number of conflicts since Korea, including some skirmishes against the Russians, but they had not carried out a full-scale military operation against a competent foe in over thirty years.
  - The optimism of China's leaders ignored the seemingly obvious fact that Vietnam had just finished waging a victorious thirtyfive- year guerrilla war against some of the world's most advanced technology.
  - Vietnam, on the other hand, had no shortage of motivation in the

174

1979 - China – Vietnam –
No Way Out: Asymmetry of Motivation

- First, their sunk costs (investment in men and material) involved in the Cambodian operation made it nearly impossible for the Vietnamese to withdraw quickly, and effectively bolstered their resistance to Chinese coercion.
- In addition, Vietnam's leaders had reasons to assume that China lacked the will to fight.
  - First of all, they were confident that China would act cautiously, lest Beijing elicit a militant response from Moscow.
  - They may have also assumed that the elderly Chinese leadership was preoccupied with the country's nascent modernization drive, given the enormous attention it was receiving in the Chinese domestic press around the time of the Cambodian invasion.

175

1979 - China – Vietnam –
No Way Out: Asymmetry of Motivation

- Instead, China made demands that went far beyond what was "essential" to their interests, requiring Vietnam to make an expensive retreat from Cambodia, which would have resulted in an unacceptable loss of face and reputation in the world community.
- Furthermore, Beijing never publicly offered Hanoi any economic or political incentive to withdraw from Cambodia peacefully, nor did they signal what mid-level steps Hanoi could take to show their desire for peaceful crisis resolution.
- They didn't even offer a flexible timetable for withdrawal, which would seem reasonable given the magnitude of the demand.
- All of these mistakes and omissions prevented China from enjoying a favorable asymmetry of motivation, or at the very least, reducing

176

1979 - China – Vietnam – Unacceptability of Chinese Escalation

- Looming over the crisis between Vietnam and China was the specter of the Soviet Union, which had signed a mutual defense treaty with Hanoi shortly before the invasion of Cambodia.
- It was clearly not in China's interests to have its heavily armed northern neighbor join the conflict, for nearly forty-three Soviet motorized rifle divisions were poised in a high state of readiness on the Chinese order, not to mention the Soviet Union's overwhelming nuclear superiority.

177

1979 - China – Vietnam – Unacceptability of Chinese Escalation

- To prevent this escalation, Beijing took a number of crucial steps.
  - First, as Yee has argued, the phrasing of the note to Vietnam on February 17 was carefully crafted so as not to **"give Moscow an otherwise similar excuse to intervene on Hanoi's behalf.** "
    - By mentioning only trivial border issues, the Chinese made it clear that they had no intention of full-scale war against Vietnam.
    - If, on the other hand, China had declared its intent to invade and occupy the nation of Vietnam, the USSR would have been compelled to enter the crisis, probably attacking China proper.
  - Second, the Chinese action remained relatively "limited" in scope. As noted earlier, only 100,000 troops were used in the invasion (out of a total force of 4.3 million) and the tactics used were not those

178

1979 - China – Vietnam –
Unacceptability of Chinese Escalation

- Near the Sino-Soviet border in the weeks preceding its attack on Vietnam, placed the entire Northern Front military region on maximum alert, and began discussing contingency plans for evacuating foreigners from Beijing.
- A third important element in China's strategy to keep the Soviet Union out of the war was their subtle application of the "U.S. card."
  - On January 1, 1979, one week after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the United States and China concluded the process of diplomatic normalization.
  - At a banquet following the signing of the agreements, **Hua Guofeng** was frank about the value of improved Sino-U.S. ties: I believe that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United

179

Conclusion

- The Chinese invasion of Vietnam was a stunning failure.
- While achieving a number of tactical objectives, the main strategic objective of compelling the Vietnamese to withdraw forces from Cambodia was thwarted by the resilience of the Vietnamese militia and the ineffectiveness of the People's Liberation Army.
  - After a month of fighting, the Chinese army limped back across the border, leaving Vietnam to occupy Cambodia for an additional twelve years.
  - Pro-Beijing elements within the Hanoi government who favored retreat from Cambodia, such as party veteran Hoang Van Hoan, were either arrested or forced to defect to China.
  - Back at home, Deng Xiaoping trumpeted the invasion as a success to

180

The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy

- "Operation Parakram," the Indian coercive response to the December 2001 terrorist attacks on its parliament in New Delhi.

181

An Overview Of The Enduring India-pakistan Rivalry

- Bilateral confrontation between Pakistan and India currently encompasses almost every known indicator of conflict in international relations.
- There is an ever-present (and growing) nuclear weapons and missile standoff; a slow-motion arms race between huge conventional arsenals; a history that encompasses four conventional wars (in 1947–48, 1965, 1971, and 1999);
- Number of paramilitary clashes in disputed areas; severe difficulties with indigenous minority groups who are sometimes funded, equipped, and supported by one rival against the other; and contested domestic identities and weak government legitimacy among ethno-religious groups in outlying provinces.

182

An Overview Of The Enduring India-pakistan Rivalry

- Moreover, all of these various strains of confrontation are now increasingly focused in the "low-intensity" paramilitary campaign between contending groups in the disputed province of Kashmir, which has been dubbed the world's most likely "nuclear flashpoint."

183

An Overview Of The Enduring India-pakistan Rivalry

- In recent years, an average of three hundred Indian citizens per month has been killed in paramilitary and terrorist attacks.
- This constant background of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and state repression also has a "strategic" state-to-state dimension:
- Pakistan has been involved in the training, equipping, and housing of anti-India Muslim guerrilla groups in its own section of Kashmir, and Pakistan routinely inserts these forces (under cover of mortar and artillery attacks) into India's territory.
- Moreover, each side increasingly resorts to coercive "nuclear diplomacy" during conventional mobilizations as well as peacetime.
- India declared that it has not ruled out a conventional battle underneath the "nuclear umbrella," signaling a potential resolve to hit suspected terrorist camps in Pakistani Kashmir with modern fighter-bombers or Special Forces if Pakistan does not stop all incursions.
- Pakistan, meanwhile, denied support for low intensity warfare in Indian Kashmir, and it stated forcefully in addresses to both the United Nations and Indian authorities that it reserved the right to use nuclear first-strikes against New Delhi if India dare cross the "red line" and upset the status quo by resorting to conventional air strikes to gain an edge in the Kashmir dispute.

184

An Overview Of The Enduring India-Pakistan Rivalry

- With the United States now cooperating heavily with Pakistani intelligence and military agencies to fight the remnants of Al-Queda in both Afghanistan and in poorly policed, outlying areas of Pakistan,
- Musharraf is threatened more than ever before by domestic discontent—as evidenced by two major terrorist strikes on his Presidential motorcade within a three week period in late 2003.
- Many experts now predict that if Pakistan does not reform its educational, financial, justice, and political systems to rid them of corruption, repression, and religious extremism, Pakistan could become a "failed state" in ten to twenty years, like Afghanistan.

185

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- On 19 December 2001 six individuals believed to be members of the Lashkari-Taiba attacked the Indian parliament building in New Delhi after easily penetrating a lax security cordon.
- The exchange left dead all six attackers and eight members of the security forces
- This assault was the most brazen in a series of attacks against India carried out by the Lashkar-i-Taiba and another Pakistan-based group, the Jaish-e-Mohammad Earlier these groups had confined their acts of terror and mayhem to the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
- In the months after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, these and other groups undertook a series

186

The Indo-pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- Vicious and increasingly bold acts of terror against non-military targets in Indian-controlled Kashmir and beyond, such as an attack on the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature on 1 October 2001 **which killed twenty-six people**.
- Within a day after the attack on the Indian national parliament, Indian officials linked the attackers to the Lashkar-i-Taiba.
- They also contended that the group had acted at Pakistan's behest.
- In an attempt to induce Pakistan to stop these insurgent groups from carrying out similar attacks, Indian officials asserted a series of demands and simultaneously began a significant military mobilization.

187

The Indo-pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- The demands made of Pakistan were quite explicit:
  - ban the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Lashkar-i-Taiba,
    - the two groups implicated in the attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature and the national parliament,
  - Extradite **twenty** individuals whom India accused of having carried out terrorist attacks on its soil
  - Put an end to the infiltration of insurgents into Kashmir.

188

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- Consonant with the tenets of coercive theory,
  - **Indian decision-makers were highly motivated to induce Pakistan to change its behavior.**
  - They were also clear in terms of what they sought to accomplish and conveyed these goals in unequivocal terms to their Pakistani counterparts.
  - They enjoyed considerable domestic support in pursuit of these goals and also possessed the requisite conventional military capabilities to impose significant costs on Pakistan.
  - What followed India's adoption of the coercive diplomacy script was six months of each side ratcheting up tensions via a series of bellicose statements and continued military mobilizations.
  - At one point, special forces, heavy tanks, artillery, and fighter-bombers that could strike offensively along several fronts at any moment comprised roughly five hundred thousand troops deployed on each side of the fragile borderline

189

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- Consonant with the tenets of coercive theory,
  - In fervent efforts to keep the crisis from exploding into all-out conventional and nuclear warfare on the subcontinent—and to protect its new objectives in the war against Al-Qaeda and their surrogates in **Afghanistan—the United States intervened diplomatically with both India and Pakistan.**
  - India welcomed this U.S. intervention, hoping it would brand Pakistan as a "terror-supporting state" and apply its own form of drastic pressures.

190

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- The First Phase of the Crisis In the aftermath of the attack on the parliament building Indian decisionmakers acted eagerly.
- They had three distinct audiences
  - Pakistani military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf
  - Indian public, especially the "attentive public."
  - The global community in general and the United States in particular.

191

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- The immediate task at hand for the Indian political leadership was to demonstrate a seriousness of purpose in pressing Pakistan to end its support for terrorism in India.
- The messages that the Indian leadership wanted to convey to these audiences had important overlapping features but also had important differences.
- The leadership wanted to discourage Pakistan from supporting various Pakistan-based and insurgent groups from carrying out further attacks with the threat of a possible war; it was keen on reassuring the Indian public that sufficient steps were being taken to deter future attacks; and it sought to **induce the United States to pressure Pakistan** to end its support of insurgents.
- The Indian leadership was prepared to manipulate America's fear of a possible nuclear war to bring about American pressure on Pakistan.
  - In pursuit of these ends, the Indian government issued a stern warning to Pakistan on 18 December 2001 making clear that its patience was rapidly diminishing.
  - Rising domestic pressures within parliament for tough action against Pakistan necessitated such a public stance.

192

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- Despite India's seemingly unyielding position, Pakistani decision-makers denied any complicity in the attacks.
- The United States, however, took a more serious view of the attacks and on 20 December froze the assets of the Lashkar-i-Taiba, the group Indian authorities blamed for the parliament attack.
- India, displeased with Musharraf's response, recalled its ambassador from Pakistan.
- Simultaneously, India suspended bus and train services to Pakistan and indicated that it was sharing information about Pakistan's complicity in the attack with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, among other countries.
- Shortly thereafter, India's exercise in coercive diplomacy was put into motion.

193

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- Having made a series of explicit demands on Pakistan, India now launched military maneuvers to demonstrate its willingness and ability to coerce Pakistan.
- India mobilized its army, moved key military formations to forward deployments, and permitted its air force to carry out repeated sorties near the border. Pakistan, in response, cancelled all leave for its army personnel and asserted that its medium-range missiles were on alert.

194

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- A retired Indian general aptly summed up the Indian strategy:
  - Soon India will go on an extended diplomatic offensive, the kind Indira Gandhi launched on the eve of the 1971 war.
  - The manifestation of outrage, high-octane political rhetoric, diplomatic forays and the threat of war are all part of coercive diplomacy, which will sooner than later force the US to put breaks on Pakistan.
  - **It was Madeleine Albright who told [Indian foreign minister] Jaswant Singh that diplomacy works better when backed by force.**
  - Double standards aside, the last thing the US wants at this time is a war either by design or accident between nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan while its own war with Afghanistan is still being fought.

195

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- India's acute sense of anger and frustration with Pakistan, the United States announced that Pakistan had rounded up some fifty individuals connected with the Lashkar-i-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed.
- Despite this assurance from President George W. Bush, India continued its troop buildup along the Indo-Pakistani border, bringing seven new divisions into attack positions.
- India continued these deployments on the grounds that Pakistan failed to demonstrate sufficient sincerity and resolve in cracking down on the militants operating from within its territory.
- Faced with significant American diplomatic and Indian military pressure, Pakistani authorities arrested Jaish-e-Mohammed founder Maulana Masood Azhar and Lashkar-i-Taiba leader Hafiz Mohammed Saeed in quick succession.
- India's reactions to these arrests varied from muted to dismissive. Indian authorities took advantage of this opening to formally hand over the list of twenty accused terrorists it wanted Pakistan to arrest and turn over to India.
- Although Pakistan continued its crackdown against the two militant groups, it refused to extradite these individuals to India. Indian intelligence sources continued to insist that General Musharraf had done little to dismantle terrorist training camps in such places as Barakot, Bhimber, Kotli, Chilas, Astor,

196

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- India's decision to maintain sustained military pressure on Pakistan was evident in a forceful statement from General Padmanabhan, the chief of staff of the Indian Army.
- At a 11 January 2002 New Delhi stated that **any country that was "mad enough" to initiate a nuclear strike against India would be "punished severely."**
- Against this backdrop of rising tensions General Musharraf gave an important speech on Pakistani national television on 12 January 2002.
    - In this speech he promised to prevent Pakistani territory from being used to carry out acts of terror against India or other foreign countries.
    - He also categorically refused, however, to end Pakistan's support for the Kashmiri cause, stating, "Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir."
- The next step in their strategy of forceful persuasion was the testing of a new missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead within a range of four hundred miles. Not surprisingly, the former chief of staff of the Indian Army, General Ved Prakash Malik, openly stated on this occasion that "the message is part of thestrategy, call it coercive diplomacy, or whatever."

197

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- One important alternative was
    - a series of air strikes against insurgent training camps in Pakistan controlled Kashmir
    - A second wave of helicopter-borne commandos would then attack these camps. Shortly thereafter, helicopter gunships would ferry these troops back to Indian territory.
    - Senior army commanders cautioned against the implementation of this strategy fearing Pakistan would retaliate in a series of armored counter-thrusts in Punjab and Rajasthan at a time of its choosing, probably at night.
    - Since Indian forces were without night-vision equipment they would be acutely vulnerable to any such well-orchestrated Pakistani attacks.
- A second option discussed was resort to full-scale war.
    - Much of the Indian army was in its peacetime stations, ammunition and other logistics had not been appropriately stocked, and hospitals in forward bases had not been adequately prepared to deal with substantial casualties.

198

The Indo-Pak Crisis Of 2001–2002

- The Second Phase of the Crisis The seasonal lull in insurgency and terrorism proved to be short-lived
- On 14 May 2002 a set of suicide bombers launched an attack on an Indian army base in Kaluchak, near Jammu, killing thirty-three individuals
  - The timing of this attack was significant as Christina Rocca, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, arrived in New Delhi to discuss the state of Indo-Pakistani relations.
  - On 21 May terrorists shot and killed Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent Kashmiri separatist leader who had expressed some willingness to enter into talks with the Indian government.
  - The United States reacted with alacrity to the prime minister's truculent words. Secretary of State Colin Powell promptly called on General Musharraf to reiterate the importance of reining in the terrorists who were again striking at will in Kashmir.
  - Simultaneously, other state department representatives urged Indian authorities to eschew military options and seek a diplomatic resolution to the escalating crisis

199

TABLE 1 The India-Pakistan Confrontation, 2001–2002

Indices of Violence	January 2001	January 2002	February 2001	February 2002	March 2001	March 2002	April 2001	April 2002	May 2001	May 2002	June 2001	June 2002	Total 2001	Total 2002
Violent Incidents	249	241	210	168	236	263	320	208	342	290	296	239	1653	1409
Attacks on Security Personnel	135	132	118	79	116	138	169	102	164	165	182	121	884	737
Attacks on Civilians	59	54	47	49	63	58	74	55	79	67	52	67	374	350
Security Personnel Killed	23	35	42	12	48	43	55	37	33	40	49	28	250	195
Civilians Killed	76	67	74	51	60	82	80	74	96	98	59	84	445	456
Terrorists Killed	81	166	92	110	90	163	99	109	157	162	223	109	742	819
Infiltration	149	33	104	60	115	132	94	141	179	202	263	30	904	598
Exfiltration	25	2	46	2	10	6	9	13	54	—	40	63	184	86

Source: Compiled by Praveen Swami; data from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Used with permission.

200

The Ambiguous Results of Operation Parakram

- Not until October 2002 would India finally pull back the bulk of its forces from their deployments along the Indo-Pakistani border.
- Indian spokespersons publicly justified the demobilization on the grounds that the purposes of the general mobilization had been served.
- They contended that the international community had recognized Pakistan's involvement with terrorism so India could now afford to return its military units to their peacetime stations.
  - According to Ashley Tellis: The 2001–2002 crisis ended ambiguously from an Indian perspective. Of course, the "hammer and anvil" strategy of Indian military pressure and U.S. diplomatic intervention produced many gains for India. These included forcing Pakistan to acknowledge complicity in Kashmiri terrorism and promise a change in course, securing U.S. acknowledgement of Kashmir as a case of terrorism rather than simply insurgency, and strengthening the international perception of Pakistan as a "near rogue" country that exports terrorism, proliferation, and instability. But these gains notwithstanding, India did not secure the one thing its military mobilization was intended to achieve: conclusive termination of Pakistan's involvement in terrorism directed against India. On this score, General Musharraf [the military and political leader of Pakistan] adopted a tactically brilliant strategy of modulating Pakistan's involvement in terrorism depending on the intensity of international (primarily U.S.) pressure at any given moment—but never quite abandoning terrorism as an instrument of state policy despite his own growing recognition that it was a wasted asset in the post-9/11 environment.

201

The Ambiguous Results of Operation Parakram

- the Indian strategy violated two of the key tenets of the successful pursuit of coercive diplomacy.
  - **First**, the demands made on the adversary far exceeded any willingness and motivation to comply
  - **Second**, the coercing power had few, if any, rewards to proffer for the adversary's compliance.
  - Furthermore, India's threats to escalate the conflict militarily were not really credible.
    - Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons not only emboldened the country to embark on the 1999 Kargil invasion, but also persuaded India to limit its response to the area of infiltration during that crisis.
    - In turn, India's unwillingness to expand the scope and dimensions of the Kargil conflict had convinced some Pakistani decision-makers that their country's overt acquisition of nuclear weapons had effectively neutralized India's conventional military superiority.

202

The Ambiguous Results of Operation Parakram

- The Indian inability to credibly threaten escalatory action against Pakistan thus violated a **third** principle of a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy:
  - threats to escalate and initiate military strikes must be sufficiently strong and credible.
  - If India chose to resort to a large-scale conventional attack against Pakistan, the achievement of either controllable or calculable consequences from Indian strikes remained unclear.
  - Pakistani decisionmakers, if they felt that their country was in mortal danger from an Indian attack, could always threaten use of nuclear weapons, thereby preventing India from limiting the conflict's scope or intensity.
  - As an Indian diplomat stated at the peak of the crisis, "The idea that Pakistan will cooperate in a conflict and comply with India's wishes to fight a limited war is ridiculous. It will be naturally in their interest to keep any conflagration as unlimited as possible."

203

The Ambiguous Results of Operation Parakram

- Indian preventive border mobilizations as sign of a possible blitzkrieg rather than as preventive, prudent, defensive measures to back up limited strikes in Azad Kashmir.
- Without nuclear weapons in place, India could always back up its attempts at compellance and coercion with actual conventional escalations as deemed necessary throughout the crisis:
  - India could credibly threaten, and possibly carry out, a full escalation to conventional war. Successful coercion and compellance is, in the end, based on the credible threat of unlimited conventional war, not limited conventional options.

204

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- Non-democratic regimes have more possibilities in deceiving the enemy than democratic regimes.
- Due to their closeness, these non-democratic states are better at the ability to conceal military and political shortcomings and are therefore more accessible and successful in perplexing the opponent.
  - According to Wright "in the game of power diplomacy, democracies pitted against autocracies are at a disadvantage".
- As a result of the events in the international environment, North Korea's leadership realized that they need a mechanism which will enable survival of the regime and at the same time allow the existence of economic assistance from other actors.
- For this reason, the use of force or threats of use of force has become a part of the strategies that DPRK applies to achieve its political goals.
  - This style of politics has been widely used since the foundation of the regime after the Korean War.
  - The strategy subsides for a moment and comes to the forefront only after Kim Il-sung's position has been consolidated.

205

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- This leads us to the belief that based on the actions of the DPRK since its foundation the North Korea's policy of coercion **has five factors that characterize it.**
  - First, there is the notion that domestic political factors have not been the mainstay of coercion.
  - The second characteristic is the use of intimidation as the main instrument for militant-diplomatic action.
  - Another important component, which affects the use of Coercive Diplomacy by the DPRK is a wide knowledge of legal factors and their use, so they are in favor of the North Korean regime.
  - An indispensable element is a moment of surprise which has always been an important part of North Korea's strategy.
  - Fifth factor, is the assertion that coercive policy is being implemented, even though the development of the international environment and the view of the DPRK are positive

206

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- Therefore, we can assume it does not matter whether the environment is hostile or favorable when the application of Coercive Diplomacy is put into the action and this environment does not determine the outcome of this act.
- During the development of the DPRK's Coercive Diplomacy the goals changed considerably.
- In the 1990s, North Korea began to focus more on securing the survival of the regime and obtaining economical and food aid.
- Furthermore, the use of force (or military action) has always been in line with the DPRK's political objectives.
- The change can be found in the choice of goals and intensity.
- Similarly as with the other actors that are using Coercive Diplomacy, not all DPRK actions are successful.
- In comparison, some are very well implemented but others are unsuccessful and sometimes counterproductive. It is also possible to say that the initial success of the Coercive Diplomacy does not have to have a long-term positive development; on the contrary, it may become a failure in the longer-term perspective. Here we can mention an example from 1998 incident when Taepodong missile test accelerated the US and Japan missile defense development.

207

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- In its beginnings, the Coercive Diplomacy was a costly policy for the DPRK.
  - A large part of the country's financial and material resources had been invested into the development of the nuclear and missile capacities.
  - Due to the pressure and threats, from the international actors began to modernize their military technology which in time has manifested itself in the fact that North Korean regime was designated as a state possessing an obsolete military technology.
- Nowadays, another view on this topic emerged and it states that the DPRK's most important instrument of Coercive Diplomacy is not a nuclear program, but a simple rule "*people who are irritated pay attention*".
  - Pyongyang has, due to its statements which are often exaggerated and sometimes designed to confuse the international environment, unlimited possibilities in confusing and tribulation of other actors. By using this tactic the DPRK will force international players to negotiate and possibly to meet the requirements of the North Korean regime.

208

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- The DPRK realizes that alliances and friendly agreements are very tempting but may not prevail.
- That is why it is better for the isolated country that works based on a dictatorial regime and cult of personality to keep other players of the international environment in uncertainty.
  - We must realize that isolation is not only for domestic purposes (keeping the population under control and out of the reach of enemies) but also for distorting the events in the state for the international environment in such a way that North Korea's actions are less predictable.

209

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- **The Coercive Diplomacy After the Succession of Kim Jong-un**
- Since the succession of Kim Jong-un, many actions that have been implemented have the character of the Coercive Diplomacy.
- One example is visible during the August 2015, which was a period of higher tensions for the Korean Peninsula then ever before.
  - The Supreme Leader of North Korea continues to use nuclear Coercive Diplomacy as one of the main drivers of coercion.
  - Strong statements (an example can be pointed out in a part of the 2017 New Year speech when Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea is in the final stages of the intercontinental ballistic missile testing), provocative actions, such as missile tests, nuclear tests, and other threats are real manifestations of Coercive Diplomacy of the DPRK.

210

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- The target state of the Coercive Diplomacy is mostly the US, which are in this position mainly due to two principles.
  - The first concerns the US commitment to the removal of nuclear weapons from the DPRK nuclear program.
    - The point is that the US refuses to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power and negotiations on improving relations are conditional on taking significant steps to stop and eliminate the North Korean nuclear and missile program.
  - The second principle concerns the US preference for negotiating with the DPRK in the framework of Six-Party Talks, maintaining friendly relations with Japan and South Korea, and endeavors to improve relations with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation

211

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- **North Korea's Coercive Diplomacy Tools**
- During its existence, North Korea has used the coercion instruments many times.
- The most used tool is the Korean People's Army, nuclear and missile programs, the withdrawal from international treaties or negotiations, and provocative statements. In this article, the authors focus only on the role of the Army, Nuclear and Missile programs as tools of the Coercive Diplomacy under the rule of Kim Jong-un.
  - The DPRK has over one million active military personnel and another six to seven million active reserves. It is a well-known fact that around seventy percent of the Army and half of the naval and aviation forces are concentrated in the area within a hundred kilometers of the demilitarized zone. Most North Korean military equipment is associated with ground forces (such as tanks and artillery), but North Korea also has an air force and navy with several submarines. American helicopters Hughes MD-500 were also added to the equipment of the DPRK. After learning from the US operation in Iraq, the regime purchased the system of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). The weapons of the Army also include one of the largest supplies of chemical and biological weapons, where the estimated quantity of these weapons is between 2,500 – 5,000 tons. It is assumed that DPRK can produce around 4,500 tons of other stocks per year if needed. North Korea's chemical weapons include, for example, the Paralytic Agent VX, Sarin, Mustard gas or Phosgene. The biological weapons that the DPRK allegedly has available to use include for example plague, cholera, anthrax, and smallpox.

212

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- **North Korea's Coercive Diplomacy Tools**
  - The artillery is located along the demilitarized zone is a significant threat to South Korea. It is the largest artillery capacity in the world that includes 13,000 systems and 2,300 rocket launchers, where some of the missiles can be deployed with chemical weapons warheads. There are estimates, that since 2001, the North has been able to shoot about 500,000 artillery shells per hour and hit Seoul. This fact puts Seoul in an unfavorable position similar to a prisoner of war, which will feel the changes of tensions at the peninsula among the first, and for this reason (and many others) pre-emptive attacks on the DPRK are excluded. However, even though that the numbers of the North Korean army are great, the technology is obsolete, and the level of

213

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- The most used tool of North Korea's Coercive Diplomacy are nuclear and ballistic programs.
  - Pyongyang considers the development of nuclear weapons as an existential necessity to guarantee survival of the regime.
  - This idea derives from American interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The tendency to base the defense and survival of the regime on the nuclear weapons can be seen also in official statements about the nuclear program, where these weapons are dubbed as "*an all-powerful sword*" or "*invincible power*".
  - The nuclear program of North Korea is also one of the concerns of the United States. Korea is enhancing the nuclear capacities and upgrading the technology with the main aim to keep United States away from the region.
- From the point of view of the DPRK's position in the international environment, this is a rational decision for the regime.
  - North Korea is aware that the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war is a situation that today's international environment is trying to prevent by all possible means. Therefore, these weapons put North Korea in a position where it is not so vulnerable.
  - The nuclear program of North Korea and with the aim of production of the nuclear weapon is currently one of the biggest concerns of the international environment. However, it is necessary to take in consideration that ballistic missiles are not the only possible way to deliver a nuclear bomb.

214

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- The nuclear program of North Korea is a threat to the stability of international environment due to the threat of exporting the technology and know-how of the nuclear and ballistic programs to other rogue states or non-state actors such as terrorist groups in exchange for natural resources or western currency.
- The DPRK uses nuclear fuel-extracted plutonium from the Yongbyong reactor as a base material for the production of its nuclear warheads. It is estimated that North Korea owns between 24 – 42 kilograms of plutonium, which is usable for nuclear weapons production, which, according to the estimates is enough to produce three to eight nuclear bombs.
- There are also speculations that North Korea has highly enriched uranium but there are no reports of its quantity. Although the DPRK has conducted five nuclear tests, nuclear power states refuse to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state claiming this declaration would strengthen the status of the Kim Jong-un regime in the international environment. As North Korea's nuclear program evolves and modernizes, chances of the possibility of voluntary suspension of the program are fading

215

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- The missile program of the DPRK is a very significant project that has many purposes.
  - It serves to protect the regime and as a way to gain foreign currencies. North Korea is one of the largest horizontal proliferation states of ballistic missiles (selling ballistic missiles to other states or non-state actors). There are also claims, that the DPRK is the best choice for buying ballistic missiles if the state does not belong among the US allies. North Korea is estimated to be able to produce over a hundred Scud missiles per year with a flight range between 300 - 400 kilometers.
- North Korea has in its arsenal short-range and mid-range missiles, as well as long-range missiles. The successful tests of the short-range and mid-range missiles were mostly carried out with a high flight trajectory to avoid interference with the neighboring countries. These missiles are capable of hitting Seoul and Tokyo.
- There is also a theory that DPRK has carried out more than 600 Scud rocket launches, around 200 Nodong missiles (Rodong) and less than 50 Musudan and Taepodong missile tests. These trials were launched by North Korea on the basis that it is not a signatory state of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Hague Ballistic Missile Proliferation Code.

216

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- North Korea is actively developing its existing missile types to increase their potential.
- In 2015, a photo of Kim Jong-un was published in front of an alleged miniaturized implosion nuclear bomb, which is, according to the DPRK, capable of reaching targets in the United States. Since the accession of Kim Jong-un to power, the missile program is constantly modernized and in 2015 a report has been published that DPRK has successfully tested a shield for the so-called "*re-entry vehicle*" and another success is a series of testing of solid fuels for rocket propulsion.
- When the DPRK began to test the missile system more intensively in 2016, it also modernized its infrastructure.
- This development was mainly focused on the Sohae station, which was built for satellite deployment, which was officially completed in 2011 and expanded in 2013. The reconstruction allows launch of rockets up to 50 meters long, and two new warehouses for a purpose of doubling the fuel and oxidizing agents supplies. An important addition was also underground railroad structures for the missile preparations that make it harder to spot the preparation process for the launch. With these modifications, Sohae station became the center for the development of long-range missiles and in February 2016, the Unha 3 rocket was launched and carried the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite on a low orbit. In the 2017 New Year Speech, Kim Jong-un mentions the idea that DPRK is in the final stages of preparations for a test shot of an intercontinental missile.

217

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- Another part of the missile program is a development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A new kind of submarine was identified in 2014 at the Sinpu Shipyard - this type of submarine had command towers from which a ballistic missile or a guided cruise with low trajectory could be launched.

218

The North Korea and Coercive Diplomacy

- **Case Studies: Implementations of Coercive Diplomacy by North Korea**
- The empirical events that will be analyzed as the cases are:
  - detonation of a landmine in the DMZ, which occurred in 2015
  - launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine from 2016
  - New version of the ballistic missile from 2017.
- These specific events were selected based on three criteria.
  - The first criteria is the timeframe: the situation had to take place after the accession of Kim Jong-un to power in the DPRK.
  - The second condition is the use of threats or limited demonstration of force.
  - The last condition is the nature of the event: the event had to correspond to the theoretical framework of a Coercive Diplomacy, not deterrence.

219

The Detonation of a Landmine in the Demilitarized Zone

- On August 4, 2015, two South Korean army soldiers were on their patrol at the DMZ and were seriously wounded by a landmine explosion. South Korea had accused the DPRK of purposeful placement of this mine and, as a reaction to this incident, launched a cross-border loudspeaker broadcast that was targeted against the northern regime.
- The reaction of the DPRK was of a sharper nature, but it could have been expected due to the joint training exercise of the US Army and ROK Army at that time, so the regime has felt threatened, and the launch of South Korean "*propaganda*" had only increased its hostility. Kim Jong-un's first step during that time started the escalation of the situation; North Korea's leader declared a "*semi-state of war*" on August 20 and set an ultimatum for South Korea to end its broadcasts against DPRK.
- If the ultimatum were not to be abided, DPRK would opt for retaliation in form of military intervention to south. On the same day, an artillery fire exchange took place in the DMZ, which, according to the South, was started by DPRK and started a gradual increase of tension on peninsula, which lasted for three days. Other actions undertaken by DPRK included: putting the army in a state of emergency, doubling artillery equipment and military equipment at the border, sending about fifty submarines and ten large hovercrafts to the waters around the sea border.

220

The Detonation of a Landmine in the Demilitarized Zone

- South Korea has also undertaken strategic steps, notably by announcing increased military readiness and negotiating with the US on moving the US B-52 Stratofortress bomber to a base in the ROK. United States also considered sending a nuclear submarine, which was anchored at a naval base in Japan.
- Just two hours before the expiration of Kim Jong-un's ultimatum, DPRK offered to negotiate in the Joint Security Area (JSA).
- These meetings were realized in a form of talks of senior officials from both countries and at that time were most likely the most significant meetings since 2007 when Roh Moo-hyun met Kin Jong-un. North Korea's chief negotiator was general Hwang Pyong-so (North Korean Army General Bureau Director), and South Korea's negotiator was presidential (Park Geun-hye) adviser for national security Kim Kwan-jin.
- The agreement was reached on August 24, when both sides signed a document that stopped state of alertness and stipulated that talks to establish better relations would be implemented as soon as possible. In addition, North Korea expressed regret over the events that have occurred in connection with the landmine explosion on the southern side of the demarcation line, and guaranteed the end of "semi-war state". South Korea has promised to stop cross-border broadcasting by the midnight of the following day. Finally, both states promised to carry out a meeting of separated families.
- During this crisis, Korean Peninsula came close to the military conflict and for the first time in five years, there was an artillery exchange between the two Koreas. Through this situation, we can easily determine that Kim Jong-un understands principle of using the coercion. Goals that DPRK wanted to achieve were clearly identified, and the ultimatum and the penalty that would follow if the requirements were not met were set out too. The threat of power and the demonstration of power were sufficient enough, to force South Korea to take the threats of the northern neighbor seriously. In this case, the reward for both states was retention of stability in the region.

221

The Test Firing of a Ballistic Missile from a Submarine

- Launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine on the east coast of the state in August 2016. According to the experts, it was a KN-11 missile (also called as Pukkuksong-1 / Bukgeuksong-1 / Polaris-1).
- The flight trajectory of this ballistic missile was about 500 km long and landed in the Sea of Japan, into the area of Air Defense Identification Zone.
- This action took place two days after a joint military exercise of South Korea and the United States (Ulchi Freedom Guardian), and the same day as the meeting of South Korean, Chinese and Japanese Foreign Ministers in Tokyo.
  - Therefore, it can be said that the DPRK took this action as a punitive (retaliation) threat against joint military exercise of two armies near the state borders and as a training for a possible plan of invasion to the northern part of the peninsula and thus as a security threat to the survival of the regime.
  - Before the start of these training maneuvers, in August 2016, North Korea warned South Korea that their actions (regular military exercises) are pushing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a war, and that if the DPRK officials were to come to a judgement that steps were being taken to attack the state, North Korea would respond with a preemptive nuclear attack. North Korea often engages in coercive policy with the use of its missile program, before or during US and ROK military exercises. This year the defection of the North Korean diplomat from the diplomatic mission of the DPRK in London also contributed to this tense situation.

222

The Test Firing of a Ballistic Missile from a Submarine

- This event also highlights advances in the development of ballistic missiles designed to launch from submarines, which attracted attention of the US and the ROK, as THAAD defense system that the US Army intends to place in South Korea might not be sufficient for these missiles. Due to the fact, that that launched submarine missile with an underwater trajectory near Seoul would be hard to identify for the THAAD system.
- Through this example, we can observe the fact that DPRK perceives the regular military exercises of the South Korean and United States armies as a major security threat, and the actions that are being carried out during these exercises are seen as potential training of the invasion to the territory of North Korea.
- In this case, the threat was very clearly made by DPRK by a statement of a possible **preemptive nuclear** intervention, if the steps of the participants of the military training maneuvers suggested the possibility of attacking the northern part of peninsula. The ballistic missile launch was a demonstration of force that could be used in case of unacceptable development of the situation.
- In this particular use of Coercive Diplomacy, however, we do not find several classic elements of Coercive Diplomacy, such as a time limit for ending actions or positive stimuli. None of these factors, however, are a mandatory element for engaging in coercion, even if their use is recommended by theoreticians to ensure the success of this strategy.

223

The Test Launch of a New Version of the Ballistic Missile

- The third example is the unconventional use of North Korea's Coercive Diplomacy in a way typical for this regime; the use of Coercive Diplomacy as a preventive diplomacy tool. DPRK, with preventive force demonstrations, especially nuclear explosions and missile tests, is trying to discourage the international environment from intervening against the regime. This limited demonstration of the use of force should serve as a threat and demonstration of military technology that would be used if the state and hence the regime were in danger.
- One of the specific cases of this use of Coercive Diplomacy is a launching of a new type of mid-to-long distance missile in February 2017. It was a very important test because the missile was a modified version of the KN-11 ballistic missile that was fired from a submarine in 2016. This new enhanced KN-11 is a missile with a longer range and is mainly driven by solid fuel. Another improvement is the "*cold shot*" system. The DPRK described this missile as a "*new kind of strategic weapon capable of carrying a nuclear warhead*".
- This missile was launched from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with a lofted trajectory, the height of its flight is estimated at 575 km and the flight length about 500 km and the landing point was the East Sea near Japan. Soon it was identified that the Panghyon Air Base in the northwest of the state is the launch site, but it was later proven that the launch took place at the Iha-ri facility.

224

The Test Launch of a New Version of the Ballistic Missile

- This launch demonstrates significant advances in DPRK missile program. The transition from liquid rocket fuels to solid ones means a greater operational efficiency of the missile arsenal of the North Korean regime, as well as an increase of the chances of successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment that would be able to hit targets in the USA. After this test, North Korea has proved that it has gradually acquired all the skills needed to build a powerful missile program and has a realistic chance to build a functioning ICBM. However, in a way, this test helped to test response of the USA and Japan on a demonstration of power. This test was conducted during the days when the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, attended a summit in the USA and met with President Donald Trump. The condemnation of this test was very fast for both states, but the fruition of the statement took about 48 hours.
- In this case, it is important to distinguish this mode of Coercive Diplomacy from the policy of deterrence that DPRK uses when it needs food aid.
- In this case, North Korea also **uses limited force provocations to disrupt the status quo on the Korean** Peninsula and to force the neighboring actors to pay a compensation to maintain peace in the region. Consequently, based on the analyses, this case cannot be labeled as a Coercive Diplomacy, because in this case, DPRK did not interfere with the attitude/action/event that has already taken place but the first step here is made by North Korea using its limited conventional force to secure the region's attention and threaten its stability and thus its prosperity. This situation forces the neighboring states to negotiate with Kim Jong-un's regime to find a solution that will not escalate the situation and return it back to the status quo.

225

The Test Launch of a New Version of the Ballistic Missile

- As part of DPRK's Coercive Diplomacy, which is in this country's case a part of preventive diplomacy, the regime regularly and repeatedly responds to the presence of the US military forces, the regime of sanctions, and the regular military exercises of the US and ROK armies. In a contrast, deterrence is intended only to obtain food, material or financial assistance. The conduct of Coercive Diplomacy (and deterrence) is a legitimate step for North Korea and its implementation is rational (from the regime's view). Of course, misinformation about the attitudes of other states is also an issue, but this is a factor that exists even in democratic states.
- The problem, however, remains in the fact that even rational actors can make dangerous decisions if they are exposed to a high pressure or pushed into a corner. In these cases, the decisions are fierce, but that does not mean that these actors lose their ability to think. In these situations when actors are forced to protect their primary interest, the desperate action becomes entirely rational. The theory of this situation deals with "*prospect theory*", which is based on a very simple idea which says that the worse the situation is, the more risk are people willing to undertake.

226