Contemporary cultural diplomacy in South Korea: explicit and
implicit approaches
Hyungseok Kang*
Department of Culture, Media and Creative Industries, King’s College London, London, UK
(Received 18 March 2015; accepted 6 April 2015)
This paper argues that in the case of Korea, cultural diplomacy (CD) has been
explicitly implemented in a top-down and unilateral approach by government to
enhance national prestige abroad, underpinned by the institutional legacy of a
‘developmental state’ model of governance. Yet, an implicit approach has also
emerged, associated with capacity building of the domestic cultural industries
through promoting ‘international cultural exchange’. Whilst the top-down unilateral
approach has persisted, a disarray of policy rhetoric and institutional fragmentation
surrounding CD, as well as the blurring of cultural industries
development policy with the CD agenda has led to gradual convergence of both
explicit and implicit approaches.
Keywords: cultural diplomacy; cultural policy; implicit cultural policy; Korean
Wave
Introduction
As pointed out in the introductory article of this special issue, cultural diplomacy
(CD) is inevitably underpinned by an instrumental application of culture by governmental
actors for the advancement of various national interests. In other words,
culture here is being used as a resource (Yúdice 2003): as a source of symbolic
capital (Bourdieu 1984) and soft power (Nye 2004). In this sense, Isar provided an
apt starting point to approaching CD as a process of ‘state actors engaging in
accrual of symbolic capital in the international economy of cultural prestige through
exercising cultural policy as display’ (Isar 2010). As such, CD as a form of contemporary
diplomacy involving the process of construction and representation of
national identity (Pigman 2010), requires a more nuanced examination of its
instrumentality (Nisbett 2013).
While the field has attracted a great deal of attention in the recent decade,
particularly in North America and Western Europe, critical inquiry into the role of
regional and governmental contexts in shaping contemporary CD is lacking, particularly
in Asia. The dominant post-industrial countries have been at the forefront
of deploying their national culture and values in support of their economic and foreign
policy objectives, a practice which has intensified as a result of proliferation
of ‘soft power’ discourses, and of the development of information and communication
technology (Feigenbaum 2001, Schneider 2003, Nye 2010). However, the
*Email: hyungseok.kang@kcl.ac.uk
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
International Journal of Cultural Policy, 2015
Vol. 21, No. 4, 433–447, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2015.1042473
rising economic might of East Asia and the transition to value-added production
have made CD increasingly important for Asian countries in expanding their
spheres of geopolitical and global influence. This paper examines the development
of contemporary CD in South Korea (hereafter Korea). The ways in which this has
occurred may well indicate relevant pathways for other ‘emerging’ nations.
Over the past thirty years, Korea has traversed a steep ascent to its current position
as one of the world’s largest economies through rapid export-oriented industrialization,
coupled with a peaceful transition to a liberal democracy. Yet, while
undoubtedly having become a global player in the international economy, Korea’s
standing in the global economy of prestige has remained vague and overlooked.
Foreign publics in the West, generally indifferent, continue to associate Korea with
images of poverty, instability, and the nuclear provocations of North Korea (Kim
2011b, Kinsey and Chung 2013). At the same time, since the late 1990s, neighbouring
countries began to recognize Korea with the success of its pop-culture,
known as the ‘Korean Wave’ (Hallyu) (Korea Culture and Information Service
[KOCIS] 2011). These opposing perceptions have posed both a challenge and
opportunity for the Korean government, and have reinforced the notion that CD is
integral to narrowing the ‘gap between reality and image’ (Kinsey and Chung
2013).
The recent salience of CD in Korea is reflected in a report titled Cultural Diplomacy
Manual, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) in
2010. Despite the view of CD as a peripheral activity of government even until
10 years ago, Foreign Affairs Minister Yoo Myung-hwan stated in the report that,
‘along with diplomatic efforts focused on national defense in the 1980s and the
economy and trade in the 1990s, culture will be the third pillar of diplomatic power
in the twenty-first century’ (MOFAT 2010, p. 3). Although CD has garnered significant
attention in Korea over the past decade, both in terms of policy rhetoric and
the allocation of resources directly and indirectly, the conceptual and pragmatic
framework continues to be fragmented and ambiguous (Korea Culture and Tourism
Institute [KCTI] 2004, Arts Council Korea [ARKO] 2007, 2010, Hong 2011, Kim
2012).
The evolution of CD in Korea can also be captured in the light of Ahearne’s
distinction between explicit, or nominal cultural policies, and implicit, or effective
cultural policies, that ‘work to prescribe or shape cultural attitudes and habits over
given territories’ (Ahearne 2009, p. 141). Ahearne notes that his distinction is not
intended to simply stand in for existing oppositions such as governmental/commercial,
private/public etc. but should be more dynamic in its use. In this case the
explicit/implicit distinction is suggestive in examining a complicated layering of
discontinuous policy strands associated with CD in Korea. These strands will be
taken up below.
CD may also be framed as ‘cultural policy as display’ (Williams 1984 cited in
Isar 2010), but this is not without some ambiguity regarding its location along the
explicit-implicit spectrum. McGuigan (2004) aligns the understanding of ‘display’
functions with the ‘implicit’ pole of cultural policy, as it does not always pertain to
cultural policy explicitly. On the other hand, Throsby (2009) notes that CD can be
viewed as an explicit cultural policy that is administered through the ministry of
foreign affairs, while Singh (2010, p. 12) has viewed it as ‘an explicit cultural policy
instrument’. This paper argues that in the case of Korea, CD as an explicit practice
has been implemented as a top-down and unilateral approach by government to
434 H. Kang
enhance national prestige abroad, underpinned by the institutional legacy of a ‘developmental
state’ model of governance. Yet, in conjunction, an implicit approach
has also emerged, associated with the capacity building of domestic cultural industries.
Whilst a top-down unilateral approach has persisted, a disarray of policy
rhetoric surrounding CD, and the blurring of cultural industries development policy
with CD has reflected the gradual convergence of explicit and implicit approaches.
Institutionalization of CD: from state-led modernization to globalization
Broadly speaking, CD has been institutionalized by the government as a top-down,
unilateral approach at enhancing national prestige. This was rooted in the institutional
legacy of Korea’s adoption of the ‘developmental state model’ to drive rapid industrialization.
Following the Korean War (1950–1953), Korea went through a period of
authoritarian military dictatorship under President Park Chung-hee (1961–1979).
Park prioritized economic development through state-led, export-oriented industrialization
under the banner of ‘Modernization of the Motherland’ (Minns 2001, Chu
2009, Lee and Han 2000). The developmental state model, based on strong state
intervention led by extensive regulation and macroeconomic planning, affected all
policy fields, including the arts and culture, as the ‘state became its biggest resource
provider, planner and coordinator’ (Chu 2009, Lee 2013).
The adoption of culture as an object of strict government control within an
explicit cultural policy framework meant that CD became a form of public relations
and propaganda both domestically and abroad. It served the broad political agenda
of ‘national modernization’, legitimizing the regime and redressing the impact on
the national sense of self after the Japanese colonial occupation (1910–1945), fostering
domestic cultural nationalism, and pursuing ideological warfare against North
Korea (Oh 1998, Chun 2000). Explicit cultural policy under Park adopted a deliberate
strategy of aligning national culture with traditional culture and fostering ethnic
and cultural nationalism as means to enhance national cohesion and unity (Oh
1998, Chun 2000, Yim 2002, Lee 2013). This dual agenda was reflected in two
prominent overseas manifestations sponsored by the government during this period:
‘5000 Years of Korean Art’ (1976, 1978) showcasing traditional cultural artifacts
from the collections of the National Museum of Korea, and robust promotion of
Korea Gugak Center (Traditional Performing Arts Group) tours across Asia, US
and Europe (totaling 20 tours from 1964 to 1979) (Cho 2008).
The state-led construction of national cultural identity domestically and its
representation abroad through unilateral PR initiatives were mutually reinforced
through institutional restructuring as well. In 1968, the Ministry of Culture and the
Ministry of Public Information were officially merged to establish the Ministry of
Culture and Public Information (MCPI), combining external public information and
domestic cultural development functions. This dual institutional framework
provided a basis for the government’s interventionist approach throughout the
subsequent period. Through MCPI, Park’s government exercised tight control over
the construction of national culture domestically and abroad through a unilateral
public information (gongbo) policy; it also exercised heavy regulation of information
and media flows through censorship. The scope of this censorship and regulation
included culture, arts, public opinion, media and broadcasting. In this context,
the term CD was first explicitly introduced in the Executive White Paper
(Hangjeongbaekseo) in 1964 as a subset of foreign propaganda (MOFAT 2009).
International Journal of Cultural Policy 435
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Korea went through a historic democratic
transition, with the election of President Roh Tae-woo in 1987 and the first civilian
President Kim Young-sam in 1993. This transition signified a critical juncture for
cultural policy discourses as well; notably neo-liberalization of public policies and
deregulation of the cultural sector. The government’s conception of culture shifted
from an object of state control underpinned by ideological and political propaganda
to an autonomous sector in dire need of capacity development. In turn, the MCPI
was separated into two agencies, the Ministry of Culture and the Bureau of Public
Information in 1990.
Furthermore, following on from the previous imperative of ‘Modernizing the
Motherland’, the government responded to the new challenge of increasing national
competitiveness in a rapidly interconnected and global market economy under the
banner of globalization (segyehwa). Gi-wook Shin (2003) aptly contextualizes the
emergence of the official segyewha agenda under President Kim Young-sam (1993–
1998) as a ‘product of policy makers’ growing recognition of globalization as a
major source of external pressure in the post-Cold War era, and as means to obtaining
a competitive edge for the nation’ (Shin 2003, p. 10). The term segyehwa came
to be loosely deployed over the following two decades to identify broader governmental
efforts in enhancing Korea’s global competitiveness in general, ranging from
the promotion of cities to traditional Korean food.1
Despite this rapidly evolving domestic and external context, the government’s
institutional approach to CD generally retained some consistency. CD as an explicit
practice persisted throughout the subsequent period as a state-led means of raising
the profile of cultural representations of Korea abroad and enhancing Korea’s status
as a ‘cultural state’2
: the explicit yet broad objectives framed under the segyehwa
agenda served as a general paradigm for Korean CD. But eventually the proliferation
of new cultural policy initiatives would lead to CD becoming increasingly
elusive.
Explicit CD and the globalization agenda
The advancement of the segyehwa agenda was coupled with an increasing emphasis
on the evolving implications of foreign perceptions of Korea. Thus CD as an explicit
practice has continued as a means to enhance the national image (Chung 1994).
In 1997, the Ministry of Culture and Sports (MCS) established the ‘Top Ten
Symbols of Korean Culture’, based on a report commissioned in 1996 entitled the
‘Korean Cultural Identity Selection and Utilization Strategy’ (MCS 1996). The
report was based on a survey targeting foreigners residing in Korea in order to
identify prominent cultural representations of Korea’s national image based on the
following criteria: ‘Representable and Distinguishable’; ‘Simplicity and Visibility’;
‘Popularity and Recognition’; ‘Friendliness’; ‘Usability for Public Relation’;
‘Familiarity’ (MCS 1996). The top ten symbols of Korean national culture
proposed by the MCS were the following:
Hanbok (traditional Korean outfit);
Hangul (Korean characters);
Kimchi and Bulgogi (traditional food);
Bulguksa and Sukgulam (Buddhist temples);
Taekwondo;
436 H. Kang
Koryeo Insam (Ginseng);
Tal Choom (Traditional Mask Dance);
Jongmyo (Royal Ancestral Shrine);
Seollak Mountain;
Korean Artists of international calibre.
These ‘Top 10 National Cultural Symbols’ were then robustly promoted through
unilateral PR activities through official overseas governmental channels: Korean
Culture and Information Service, Government Information Agency, and embassies.
Thousands of pictorial image books, publications, audio visual CDs, DVDs, and
postcards were distributed abroad through these channels to raise the profile of
Korea through these cultural symbols (MCT 2005a). Evidently, this unilateral
approach did not deviate in messaging or outcome from the previous era.
The early 2000s marked another critical juncture in explicit CD, shifting the
language surrounding self-perceptions of national cultural identity and its associated
foreign perceptions amongst policy makers. By 2001, Korea had successfully
recovered from the 1997 Asian financial crisis by paying off its debt to the International
Monetary Fund ahead of schedule. Moreover, Korea successfully co-hosted
the 2002 World Cup, and demonstrated perhaps the highest degree of national
cohesion in its modern history. In turn, policy makers determined yet again that
Korea’s national image would require a substantial update to better reflect the
recent achievements, specifically identifying the 2002 World Cup as an opportunity
to ‘upgrade the national image’ (Yoo 2008, p. 162).
In turn, a wide array of governmental agencies was established for ‘enhancing
the national image’. Most notably, a centralized agency called the National Image
Committee was established in 2002 with the Prime Minister as the chair. While private
sector advisory members were included, they were appointed by the governmental
members: the initiative was clearly driven by government. However, there
was no marked improvement of Korea’s inadequate national image abroad despite
robust institutional rhetoric.
Rather than abandoning the unilateral approach altogether, the blame was
instead placed on the ‘Top ten cultural symbols’: these were said to be outdated
and ineffective in enhancing the national image (Ministry of Culture and Tourism
[MCT] 2005a). In turn, during President Roh Moo-hyun’s administration (2003–
2008), the ministry attempted to remedy the situation by broadening the national
culture symbols. As a result, a total of 100 national (minjok) culture symbols
encompassing both traditional and modern culture were established to represent the
‘national cultural DNA’ (KCTI 2006). The aim was to ‘drive modern succession of
traditional culture and establish a foundation for it to produce added value’ (MCT
2005b).
This expansion of the spectrum of representations of national culture persisted
through President Lee Myung-bak’s administration (2008–2013), largely through
recourse to the notion of ‘nation brand’. In 2008, Korea ranked 33rd in the
Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brand Index, despite having become the 15th largest
economy in the world: government officials were concerned that such a low ranking
could diminish not only the value of Korean products abroad, but the national
competitiveness of Korea in general (Joo 2011, Kinsey and Chung 2013). In
response to the persisting problem of South Korea’s image, Lee disbanded the
National Image Committee and established the Presidential Council on Nation
International Journal of Cultural Policy 437
Branding in 2008, reflecting a deeper appreciation for the economic implications of
foreign perceptions. While the explicit practice of CD continued as a unilateral,
top-down government initiative with a questionable track record of success, an
implicit approach to CD emerged through capacity building initiatives of the
Korean cultural sector.
Cultural industries development as implicit CD
In conjunction with top-down explicit approaches, an implicit approach to CD has
also emerged over the last two decades. Accrual of symbolic capital in the international
economy of cultural prestige has been implicitly sought through capacity
building of the domestic cultural sector and through promoting ‘international cultural
exchange’. Various institutional actors appropriated and reframed the policy
space of international cultural exchange. This occurred both within and outside of
governmental remit, and resulted in CD becoming more implicit.
This development was initially shaped in conjunction with the promotion of
international exchange through Korean artists and cultural organizations abroad as
an aspect of domestic cultural sector capacity building noted in the first Arts and
Culture Development Five Year Plan (1974–1978). Subsequently, in major cultural
policy plans and documents published by the government the term ‘international
cultural exchange’ has consistently appeared as an integral aspect of domestic cultural
capacity building. Annual Cultural Policy White Papers published by the
Ministry of Culture between 1993 and 2012 all contained a chapter on ‘international
exchange’. Yet the implementation and scope of ‘international exchange’
were left open to flexible interpretation by subsequent administrations. Also, in its
initial institutionalization process, the distinction between ‘international cultural
exchange’ and ‘CD’ was minimal, as both were situated under the domain of MCPI
under the Park regime. However, a divergence between ‘international cultural
exchange’ and ‘CD’ agendas began to gradually take shape through significant
shifts in cultural policy discourses underpinned by the transition to liberal
democracy in the early 1990s.
The neo-liberal turn in cultural policy in particular has shaped increasingly
instrumental framing of CD’s economic purposes. The increasing recognition of the
economic gain realized by private actors in the cultural sector led to a shift from
the government’s view on culture as a vehicle for legitimization towards culture as
a source of untapped economic potential (Cho 2005, KCTI 2005, Shim 2008, Kim
2011a, Lee 2013). As Hong (2014) suggests, the ‘cultural’ and ‘market’ agendas
have been continuously reconciled and fused within the cultural policy framework
to shape the notion of CD.
Since the mid-1990s, a ‘cultural industries’ discourse has been robustly adopted
within the cultural policy agenda (Shim 2006, 2008, Kim 2011a, Lee 2013).
Korean usage of the term ‘cultural industries’ emerged with a recommendation of
the 1994 report by the Presidential Advisory board on Science and Technology
under president Kim Young-sam (1993–1998), noting that the Hollywood movie
Jurassic Park had generated an income equivalent to exporting 1.5 million Hyundai
cars (Shim 2006, p. 32). Such a drastic comparison highlighted the importance of
developing the nascent domestic cultural sector. In turn, beginning with the
immediate establishment of the Bureau of Cultural Industries under the Ministry of
Culture in 1994, the economic potential of the cultural industries began to gain
438 H. Kang
attention and capture the imagination of policy makers. They have tended to read
Korea’s global cultural prestige through a quantitative lens, namely by means of
cultural export figures and shares in the global cultural contents market. Understandably,
for looking at market penetration figures, Korean films had only 15.9%
of the domestic film market in the mid-1990s and the combined export figure of
three major terrestrial broadcasters KBS, MBC and SBS was only US$19.7 million.
In comparison, the country imported foreign cultural contents worth approximately
US$99.5 million (Joo 2011).
An updated cultural policy plan called the New Cultural Policy was published
by President Kim Dae-jung’s administration (1998–2003) in 1997, proposing to
take an ‘industrial and scientific’ approach to culture, and its importance in ‘internationalizing’
the national cultural image by expanding exports of cultural products
(MCS 1997). Yet early on, the notion of ‘internationalization of national
culture’ was deemed vague, while the foundation for implicit CD was reflected in
the newly passed Basic Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion (1999). The law
stipulated the government’s responsibility to support and promote cultural industries
development. Furthermore, the interventionist approach was reinforced through
combining segyehwa and cultural industries development rhetoric. ‘International
cultural exchange’ was applied as segyehwa in practice, and was adopted as an
aspect of the strategic development of the sector to be facilitated and catalyzed by
the government. Article 20 (International exchange and foreign market entrance
support section) of the above legislation contained the following clause: ‘1 Government
may support co-production with foreign entities, marketing and public relations
abroad through broadcast and internet, foreign investment, international film
market participation, etc. to promote export competitiveness and increase share in
the international market of cultural industries.’ Furthermore, Article 31 noted that
the government would support ‘entering overseas market, distribution vitality and
marketing for the development of cultural industries’. ‘International Exchange’
became a term that implicitly sought support for fostering cultural industries’ economic
interests abroad, as an inherent capacity building mechanism.
Subsequently, further legislation and institutions were established for developing
specific segments of the cultural sector, including film, music, publishing, broadcasting,
and more, all including ‘international exchange’ to be promoted by the
government. The KCTI’s 2007 Report, Research for Institutional Establishment for
International Cultural Exchange Promotion, noted 22 different laws under the remit
of the MCT that were passed by the government up to the mid-2000s. These all
supported sector and content specific development, incorporating articles or clauses
broadly promoting ‘international exchange’ and ‘international cooperation’ as part
of the sector development strategy (KCTI 2007).
The governmental approach shifted to more decentralized CD activity in
recognition of the increasingly private sector driven exchange of cultural contents
(MCT 2001). During the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008),
whose campaign platform emphasized principles of ‘participation’, ‘autonomy’ and
‘decentralization’, an attempt was made to move towards the democratization of
culture (Lee 2012). Roh’s administration proposed a revised and updated cultural
policy framework titled Creative Korea (2004), emphasizing the need for a longterm
plan to foster the creative capacity of the entire society (MCT 2004b). The
‘new cultural policy vision’ proposed by the Ministry of Culture under Roh noted
that while the governmental budget for culture had reached 1% of the total
International Journal of Cultural Policy 439
expenditure during the previous administration, the overt focus had been on the
‘cultural industries’ rather than on the welfare of citizens (MCT 2004a). Despite
the rhetoric however, this did not diminish the role of the cultural contents
industries development agenda.
Roh noted in his inaugural speech in 2003 that the contents industry would
become one of the core driving engines of Korea’s economy (MCT 2004a). In
2005, MCT published Culture Strong Nation (C-Korea) 2010 (MCT 2005a),
proposing the goal of becoming a ‘top 5 cultural content nation’ by 2010 along
with US, Japan, UK and France by developing a domestic cultural market size of
90 trillion KRW (approximately 85 billion USD), and reaching six billion USD in
cultural export revenue (MCT 2005a, p. 19). The means included ‘fostering global
cultural industries market; innovating cultural contents distribution structure; copyright
industry establishment; and internationalization of Korean Wave to enhance
the national brand’ (MCT 2005a). By this point, not only had the term cultural
industries shifted to contents industries, the framework of international exchange
had also shifted to broader capacity building of the domestic environment to provide
robust support of production, distribution and marketing of creative contents
abroad.
The adoption of cultural industries development as a national agenda blurred
the line between economically oriented international exchange capacity building of
the domestic cultural sector and more explicit modes of CD. The government’s
explicit agenda to establish Korea as a ‘Contents Strong Nation’ reflected a robust
neo-liberal adaptation of a ‘cultural state’. However, this delineation was not clear,
since the government took an ambivalent position towards the Korean Wave.
The Korean Wave and the convergence of explicit and implicit CD
Since the mid-2000s, the Korean Wave (Hallyu) has been explicitly adopted by the
government as a national success story, reinforcing both the government’s neoliberal
economic agenda and domestic cultural nationalism (Shim 2006, Chua and
Iwabuchi 2008, Kim 2011a, Lee 2013). As a fortuitous extension of the segyehwa
and cultural industries development agendas, the Korean Wave has become a point
of convergence for explicit and implicit CD. While economic returns and the
unprecedented exposure of Korean cultural contents abroad were robustly
propagated by the government,3
the symbolic underpinnings of the cultural ‘texts’
(Hesmondhalgh 2013) that proliferated were not critically examined. This is unsurprising,
as the government has consistently perpetuated a one-dimensional enhancement
of the national image through mere exposure abroad, yet has relied on
cultural export figures as a tangible indicator of national prestige. The proliferation
of popular cultural contents under the remit of Hallyu fulfilled both of these
objectives, although the position of the government became increasingly more
ambiguous.
Despite the government’s robust strategic intervention in the development of
domestic cultural industries, it is difficult to draw a linear correlation between the
overseas success of the Korean Wave phenomenon and domestic cultural industries
policy. There are other internal and external contextual factors underpinning the
Korean Wave, such as the globalizing forces influencing Korea’s deregulation of
cultural production throughout the 1990s, the hybridization of Korean popular culture,
and the trans-nationalization of the media industries in Asia (Jin 2006, Shim
440 H. Kang
2006, Chua and Iwabuchi 2008, Kim 2011a, Lee 2013). The bulk of the governmental
budget for cultural industries development was allocated for infrastructural
establishment in areas such as ‘culture technology’ and associated human resources,
rather than on the promotion of the Korean Wave abroad (Hong 2014). Moreover,
the Korean Wave was adopted as an explicit cultural policy paradigm only in
response to the massive success of dramas such as Winter Sonata in Japan and
Daejangeum in the Middle East in the early 2000s (KOCIS 2011, Lee 2013),
despite the earlier popularity of the drama What is Love, that actually launched the
term (KOCIS 2011).
Given the increasing recognition of private sector driven transnational flows of
cultural contents, the governmental approach shifted to more decentralized CD
activity. Since the early 2000s, many non-governmental cultural organizations have
been established in order to decentralize the cultural sector, in spite of attempts to
achieve comprehensive capacity building of the cultural contents sector through an
existing centralized body, the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). In 2003,
an agency primarily focused on explicit promotion of the Korean Wave was established,
the Korea Foundation for Cultural Industries Exchange (KOFICE). Unlike
KOCCA, a centralized governmental agency directly under the remit of the
Ministry of Culture, KOFICE is an autonomous non-governmental, non-profit
foundation registered under the Ministry of Culture.4
Its aim as expressed in its
mission statement is to foster ‘mutual understanding between Korea and other
countries through various international exchange programs of cultural industries,
and establishing cooperative foundation through acting as a channel for private sector
cooperation’ (kofice.or.kr). Along with this broader agenda, it has also adopted
as an explicit objective the sustainable expansion of internationalization of the
Korean Wave. In recognition of the two most popular formats of pop culture content,
the two most high profile initiatives of KOFICE were hosting the annual ‘Asia
Song Festival’, an Asian pop music festival held in Korea since 2004 featuring
artists from Asian countries,5
and the ‘Asian Drama Conference’, a forum for
writers and producers of TV dramas in Asia.
The emergence of agencies such as KOFICE reflected the gradual shift to
decentralized approaches to international cultural exchange. There has been a
proliferation of governmental and private cultural organizations over the past two
decades, underpinned by the increasing dynamism of the cultural sector.6
Many of
them directly and indirectly, as well as explicitly and implicitly, follow interests that
overlap with the government’s articulated agenda. Yet, as much of the financial
resources remained under governmental control, and the distinction between
national, governmental and private interests remained vague, the term ‘International
cultural exchange’ begun to be appropriated profusely by the non-governmental
sector. Most organizations have adopted the term ‘international exchange’ or segyehwa
to articulate their organizational agenda, reinforcing their legitimacy. Hallyu
discourses became integral to the non-governmental sector in the decentralizing
process, mutually reinforcing both organizational interests and the national agenda.
This decentralized effort was also a response to adverse reactions to the government’s
explicit promotion of Korean Wave abroad (Jang and Paik 2012). As the
Korean Wave was adopted increasingly to support a nationalist agenda within
popular media and policy discourses, it began to also be perceived in some of the
neighbouring countries as Korean ‘cultural imperialism’. This was especially
evidenced through a backlash against the Korean Wave in Japan, as anti-Korean
International Journal of Cultural Policy 441
sentiments – termed yuk-hallyu – began to grow. An anti-Korean comic book
entitled ‘Hating the Korean Wave’ (Kenkanryu) released in 2005 became the number
one bestseller on Amazon Japan (Liscutin 2009). The overt success of Korean
popular culture in Japan was seen as threatening to Japanese culture, as well as
eroding the domestic cultural market share. In response, the MCT began to explore
a non-economic framing for the continued proliferation of the Korean Wave externally.
In turn, initiatives such as the ‘Cultural Partnership Initiative’ of the MCT
aimed at providing opportunities for fellows from Asia, Latin American and
African countries were established, with significantly less emphasis on a nationalist
agenda.7
However, explicit promotion of the Korean Wave began to be also adopted in
the non-cultural realm as well. The previous section argued that from a cultural
policy perspective, CD was an implicit practice within the broader international cultural
exchange policy that sought more holistic capacity building of the domestic
cultural sector. As efforts to depoliticize culture persisted during the transition to
liberal democracy, the term CD was not used within the cultural policy framework.
Up until the mid-2000s, CD was an implicit function of international cultural
exchange promoted by the Ministry of Culture, even though the Ministry of Culture
deliberately avoided using the term CD because of its perceived political undertone.
In contrast, the term had been widely used within the foreign policy framework,
albeit loosely associated with other terms such as cultural public relations or
cultural cooperation. Foreign Policy White Papers from 1992 to 2008 have used
the term CD and cultural public relations interchangeably, but their combined scope
was narrowly limited to bilateral cultural treaties or to activities of the non-governmental
Korea Foundation, (funded however through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs). Thus there was no clear institutional differentiation between CD and
international cultural exchange, although the two would begin to diverge in the
mid-2000s with Korea’s adoption of the soft power discourse.
Rise of the soft power discourse
In the mid-2000s, the concept of soft power emerged as a keyword within foreign
policy circles, leading to a reconfiguration of the scope of CD. The Foreign Policy
White Paper of 2010 noted that ‘with the increasing importance of soft power, and
culture as a key element of national competitiveness, CD has become a new pillar
of diplomatic power’ (MOFAT 2011, p. 204). This explicit adoption of the soft
power discourse was reinforced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ first designated
CD document in 2010, entitled Cultural Diplomacy Manual, as already mentioned,
which noted that in the twenty-first century, soft power has become equally important,
and ‘culture’ has become a third pillar of diplomatic power (MOFAT 2010).
Yet the practical framework adopted by MOFAT did not become any clearer.
This was partly because Korea had to reimagine the applications and pursuit of
soft power relevant to its own context. As Lee (2009) argues, Nye’s concept of soft
power was more relevant to the hegemonic leadership oriented approach of the US,
but did not give practical insights to lesser powers like Korea. Lee further explains
that
the enthusiasm for Korea’s popular culture produced by the Korean Wave naturally
led to a mass consumption of symbols and ideas relating to Korea, thereby leading to
442 H. Kang
the formation of specific images, perceptions, and opinions about Korea; thus Korean
wave can be a crucial soft resource that can potentially develop Korea’s soft power.
(Lee 2009, p. 130)
Jang and Paik (2012) argued that ‘Korean wave has positive impact and potential that
would promote Korea’s CD as a part of soft power approach’. An anecdotal illustration
further suggested that negative impressions of South Korea by Taiwan after the
break-up of diplomatic relations in 1992 have been transformed positively through
increased cross-cultural ties created by the Korean Wave (Jang and Paik 2012).
Furthermore, the perceived effectiveness of the Korean Wave as a soft power
resource has reinforced the role of the MOFAT. A fundamental shift of the conceptual
framework within the MOFAT began to take shape under Lee Myung-bak’s
administration. In 2010, MOFAT and its arm’s length agency, the Korea Foundation,
co-hosted the ‘Korean Public Diplomacy Forum’. ‘Public Diplomacy’ was
proposed as the ‘third pillar of diplomacy along with the political and economic’.
This shift in terminology occurred in the context of transferring much of the public
relations and international cultural exchange capacity to the Ministry of Culture.
Moreover, public relations rhetoric was minimized and ‘two-way communication’,
‘soft power’, and ‘nation brand’ became the dominant terms.
Since the Korean Public Diplomacy Forum in 2010, there have been significant
conceptual shifts regarding CD within the foreign policy framework. CD has
become a sub-category of public diplomacy. The notion of ‘culture’ based public
diplomacy has been framed as (1) bilateral diplomatic relations celebration and cultural
event promotion, (2) two-way cultural exchange support, (3) conferences
hosted by the Culture Ministry, (4) NE Asia Cultural Cooperation (Korea-China-Japan
Culture Shuttle Initiative), and (5) the expansion of Hallyu. MOFAT indicated
that they would continually make efforts in developing new discourses of public
diplomacy, meaning that the term is constantly evolving (or left flexible for interpretation
and appropriation by the government). Moreover, this forum announced
that the Korea Foundation had become the official organization in charge of public
diplomacy (MOFAT 2011), perpetuating an explicit CD policy.
The relationship between pop culture success and national image is not necessarily
rooted in empirical evidence. However, with the increasing recognition of
soft power as a key foreign policy paradigm, with culture perceived as its fundamental
resource, the Korean Wave has gone from being an economic to a diplomatic
resource linked explicitly to CD. This had led to tensions between the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, with both attempting to
bring CD under its domain. In 2011, the congressional Culture Sports and Tourism
committee submitted a newly revised ‘International Cultural Exchange Promotion
Law’, and the Foreign Affairs and Trade committee submitted the ‘Cultural Diplomacy
Promotion Special Law’ (Kim 2012, p. 228). This inter-ministry tension
shows the extent to which the institutional fragmentation and conceptual ambiguity
surrounding CD in its explicit and implicit approaches have reached a tipping point.
It is necessary to renegotiate a coherent policy paradigm.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that since South Korea’s transition to liberal democracy in
the early 1990s, the deregulation and liberalization of the cultural sector and its
International Journal of Cultural Policy 443
growing transnational dynamism throughout the following two decades have shaped
the institutional development surrounding CD in both explicit and implicit ways.
CD as an explicit practice has persisted largely as a top-down and unilateral
approach by governmental actors to enhancing national prestige abroad, underpinned
by the institutional legacy of a ‘developmental state’ model of governance.
CD has also been shaped implicitly, associated with capacity building of the
domestic cultural industries through promoting ‘international cultural exchange’.
Economically oriented cultural industries development policy that measured
national prestige through a quantitative approach of market figures was absorbed
into the broader CD paradigm. Thus while a top-down unilateral approach has persisted
in general, a disarray of policy rhetoric surrounding CD has also led to
greater institutional fragmentation and has highlighted the government’s ambivalent
role. There has thus been a gradual convergence of both explicit and implicit
approaches.
The Korean Wave has been appropriated domestically to boost cultural nationalism
as well as legitimize governmental efforts in developing the domestic cultural
industries. Yet in response to some of the negative ramifications of the dominance
of the Korean Wave in neighbouring countries, less emphasis has been placed on
an explicit cultural export agenda, leading to a depoliticized and decentralized
approach to facilitating international cultural exchange. The Korean Wave’s domestic
appropriation as a national success story has allowed CD to come into its own
as an explicit foreign policy orientation. In particular, as the Korean Wave has been
folded into the soft power foreign policy agenda, a further gap between foreign
policy and cultural policy has been perpetuated.
Despite this fragmented institutional approach to explicit CD, the government
policy will most likely remain primarily unilateral, aimed at the enhancement of
national prestige underpinned by the institutional legacy of the ‘developmental
state’ model. However, the rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic implications
of this unilateral approach, as exemplified by the success of the Korean Wave, will
most likely lead to a further proliferation of decentralised initiatives carried out by
a multitude of actors, drawing on expanding government and private sector
resources.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. See ‘Hansik Segyehwa’ campaign (www.hansik.org).
2. Kim (1994) suggests Korea’s constitutional adoption of ‘culture state’ is adopted from
the German notion of Kulturstaat doctrine, but appropriated as an instrumental rhetoric
of cultural policy in Korea.
3. The Korean Economic Research Center noted 3 billion US dollars as the profit generated
from the value-added businesses deriving from Yon-sama (the male actor in Winter
Sonata), and tourism revenue alone reaching 84 million KRW resulting from popularity
of locations that appeared in the drama, such as Nami-seom Island and Yongpyeong Ski
resort, 3 trillion KRW in DVD sales in Japan, and running royalties for KBS reaching
more than 100 million dollars (Cho 2005, KOCIS 2011).
444 H. Kang
4. While it received part of its funding for its programs from the Ministry of Culture as it
sought public interests in the cultural realm, it was not under direct control of the
Ministry.
5. Asia Song Festival have featured pop artists from Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan,
Phillipines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore to date (www.
asiasongfestival.com).
6. A list of non-governmental organizations registered under MCST can be found at http://
www.mcst.go.kr/web/s_data/corporation/corpList.jsp.
7. Cultural Partnership Initiative (www.culturefriends.or.kr).
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