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Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

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A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders' support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions; however, leadership change in nondemocratic sender and nondemocratic target states is strongly related to the ending of economic sanctions.

Keywords: *coercive diplomacy; democratic leadership; nondemocratic leadership; economic sanctions; sender state; target state; policy change*

The effectiveness of international economic sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy has been debated at length with little resolution to this point (Drezner 2000; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Hass and O'Sullivan 2000; Hass 1998; Martin 1992; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Pape 1997; Tsebelis 1990). Although our understanding of the coercive success and failure of international sanctions is surprisingly limited, we know even less about how long we might expect economic sanctions to last (Drezner 1999; Dorussen and Mo 2001). A cursory glance at the data reveals that in some instances, sanctions remain in place just months before their withdrawal. In other instances, such as the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, they can remain in place for decades. A better understanding of the links between domestic political institutions and international sanction durations will tell us something about coercive diplomacy in particular and, more generally, something about the distinguishing characteristics of the policy choices that emerge from different political systems.

One reason sanctions end is that they succeed in bringing about a change in policy and/or leader in the target state. Leadership change in the target state can trigger the withdrawal of sanctions if it leads to policy changes. Sanctions that fail to bring about

AUTHORS' NOTE: Full regression results are available, along with the data, at <http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm>.

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policy concessions in the target state, however, often persist long after it is clear that they are ineffective foreign policy tools. In some cases, it takes a leadership change in the sender state to trigger the withdrawal of sanctions. For example, the turning point in Soviet-Yugoslav sanctions (1949-1954) came in March 1953 with the death of Stalin, the soviet leader. Nikita Khrushchev took power and, less than a year later, withdrew many of Stalin's restrictions on trade with Yugoslavia (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990).

Leadership turnover in the sender state, however, does not always lead to a reversal of sanctions policy. The United States has continued to sanction Cuba throughout nine U.S. presidential administrations, from Eisenhower to the current Bush administration. In the U.S./Cuba case, the withdrawal of sanctions is likely to occur following a leadership change in the target state. If Cuban president Fidel Castro goes, there can be little doubt that the U.S. president will withdraw sanctions on Cuba.

The timing of coercive diplomacy in general and the duration of sanctions in particular seem closely related to leadership change in both the target and sender states. However, the nature of this relationship is unclear. In this study, we try to untangle the relationship between leadership turnover and sanctions duration. We study how leadership change affects the choice made by sender states to terminate or continue sanctions and the choice made by target states to resist or comply with foreign demands. We argue that domestic political institutions have an important mediating effect on the influence of leadership change on sanction duration.

We argue that domestic politics in both the sender and target nation drives the application and withdrawal of sanctions (Smith 1996; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988). The distribution of the economic costs and benefits of sanctions is uneven across domestic groups and, as a result, so are the political effects of coercive diplomacy. In the sender state, we argue that the decision to impose sanctions depends on which domestic groups win representation. The duration of sanctions depends in part on the persistence of this representation. Because different leaders typically represent different interests, a leadership change in the sender state is likely to lead to a change in sanctions policy. Following the same logic, a change in leader in the target state is likely to trigger the withdrawal of sanctions. If a new leader represents different interests, a leadership change in the target state could well lead to a change in the policy that initially aggravated the sender state, causing the withdrawal of sanctions.

Leadership turnover in either the sender or target state can lead to the end of sanctions, but it does not necessarily mean that it will. It is only when the new leader draws support from different political groups that leadership change is expected to affect sanctions policy. As such, domestic political institutions have an important role in mediating the effect that leadership change has on sanction duration. This is because the nature of the domestic political institutions determines which political interests political leaders represent. Perhaps surprisingly, we argue that leadership turnover affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Our theory of sanction duration focuses on the size difference between the groups of supporters that leaders need to win over to stay in power in democratic and nondemocratic states (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

To put together a sufficiently large coalition of supporters to win an election, leaders in democratic systems often need to draw support from many of the same domestic groups on which their opposition draws. As a result, these groups receive representation even when leaders change. Autocratic leaders typically rely on significantly smaller groups of supporters. Because of this, newly installed autocrats are less beholden to the same pivotal groups as their predecessor. Thus, leadership change in nondemocratic states is more likely to alter the interests that are represented and, as a result, the call for policies that initially incurred the sanctions. We argue that a new leader in a nondemocratic sender state is more likely to withdraw sanctions than a new leader in a democratic sender state, and a new leader in a nondemocratic target state is more likely to trigger the secession of sanctions than a new leader in a democratic state. Having controlled for leadership change, political institutions are not expected to have an independent effect on the duration of sanctions.

The study is structured in three parts. In the first section, we review the literature and argue that the standard focus on the success or failure of economic sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals has limited our ability to test theories of coercive diplomacy. We argue that an examination of sanction duration offers a useful approach for extending our understanding of this frequently used coercive instrument. In the second section, we develop our theoretical predictions. We start by examining the standard war of attrition logic of sanctions between unitary actor nations and identify conditions under which sanctions are likely to be observed. We extend this approach by unpacking the internal structure of nations' political systems. In particular, we ask how political institutions moderate the impact of leadership change on sanctions policy. Domestic institutions affect which groups' preferences receive representation. When political change takes place and new leaders enter office, political institutions determine the extent to which the preferences receiving representation change. We derive hypotheses as to how leadership turnover and domestic political institutions affect the duration of sanctions. In the third section, we test these predictions on a sample of 47 sanctions episodes using hazard analysis. We conclude with remarks about the implications of this work for the study of sanctions.

SANCTION SUCCESS AND SANCTION DURATION

Economic sanctions are an example of coercive diplomacy designed to induce a target country to change some policy it would not otherwise (Baldwin 1985). In theory, sanctions achieve this by inflicting economic damage on the target state through the reduction of customary trade or withdrawal of financial relations by the sending state. Although most scholars take for granted the usefulness of economic sanctions, with the exception of recent work by Dorussen and Mo (2001) and Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), little scholarly analysis focuses on the duration of sanctions. Most political theorists investigate the success of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy (e.g., Baldwin 1985; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Rogers 1996; Lenway 1988; Hass and O'Sullivan 2000; Hart 2000; Hass 1998; Doxey 1987). Proponents argue that economic sanctions can be as effective as military force and are

safer and cheaper (Baldwin 1985). According to its advocates, when costs are effectively targeted at ruling elites, sanctions can achieve ambitious foreign policy goals (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990). Whether the sanctions have multilateral support also affects their effectiveness (Martin 1992; but see Drezner 1999).¹

More often than not, however, scholars conclude that sanctions simply do not work. Many argue that sanctions are rarely, if ever, effective tools of coercion (e.g., Pape 1997; Galtung 1967; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Wallenstein 1968). Klaus Knorr finds that sanctions clearly failed in 13 of the 17 cases he studies (Knorr 1977). The trade and business group USA ENGAGE (2004) argues that unilateral sanctions are largely prone to failure. Although there is a growing consensus that sanctions rarely succeed, sanctions continue to be used as a foreign policy tool making it likely that this debate will continue for some time.

One reason for the lack of consensus between policy makers and academics regarding the efficacy of economic sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy revolves around measurement issues. As Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) state, "Judgment plays an important role in assigning a single number to each element in the success equation." In their study of sanction episodes, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot attempt to minimize the subjectivity by including evaluations of other scholars. Pape (1997), however, reevaluates the same data set and comes to a very different set of conclusions about sanctions' success rate. Scholars are currently in the process of reevaluating Pape's reevaluation (Hart 2000). This suggests that some rethinking needs to be done about the reliability of the study of economic sanction outcomes. Because of these measurement issues, there is little consensus as to which variables affect the success of sanctions. Among the likely suspects are the power relationships between the two states, the economic ties binding the two states, the aims of the sender, the domestic political institutions in the target states, and the time of interaction between the states (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Dorussen and Mo 2001; Hart 2000; Wendt, 1999).

Only a small fraction of the large body of research on sanctions has looked at why some coercion attempts last for decades, but others last only a few months (Dorussen and Mo 2001; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000).² However, we think this is a useful puzzle to study for a number of reasons. Although the theoretical focus of the sanctions literature is firmly set on explaining the success of sanctions and tends to focus on politics of the target state, we study the duration of sanctions to highlight the importance of politics in both the target and the sender states.

Another, more practical, reason to study the duration of sanctions is that the dependent variable is simple to evaluate because the length of economic sanctions is more clear-cut than either the costs of sanctions or their efficacy. Measurements of sanction duration are not biased by the normative concerns that plague the measurement of sanction success. However, there are tricky specification issues in the empirical analysis of sanctions duration. Sanctions end when either the sender decides to end

1. Others argue that sanctions are often used purely for rhetorical purposes; the failure rate is misleading because many sanctions are never implemented (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990).

2. The literature on war duration, another more violent example of coercive diplomacy, is, in contrast, much better developed. See, for example, Goemans (2000) for a review.

the sanctioning policy or the target complies with demands. In other words, there are competing risks that sanctions end. When the target complies (i.e., sanctions are successful), then our ability to observe when the sender would quit is censored. Similarly, if the sender quits, then our ability to observe when the target would acquiesce is censored. We discuss different ways of dealing with this problem in the empirical section of the study.

Some scholars argue that the problem with the literature on sanction success is not measurement error but rather the weak theoretical underpinnings of the empirical literature on sanctions. Empirical work on the success of sanctions suffers from a sample selection bias that leads to misleading conclusions about the effectiveness of sanctions. Smith (1996) points out that the success of sanctions and the decision to sanction are strongly interdependent. When sanctions are likely to succeed and when there is a political willingness to impose them, no sanctions will actually be imposed because their mere threat is sufficient to force the target to change the policies in dispute. At the other extreme, if sanctions are insufficient to force concessions from the target country, then from the goal of achieving policy change, they are an ineffective tool for the sanctioner to continue to use.³ So, we should expect that the mere threat or short imposition of sanctions produces policy change or that sanctions completely fail to produce significant policy concessions from the target. Indeed, supporting Smith's contention, Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997) find empirical evidence consistent with this selection effect. They find a "real downward trend" in the likelihood that sanctions will succeed as time passes (p. 616). The longer sanctions are in place, the less likely they are to succeed (see also Hart 2000).

Scholars who study the success of sanctions as foreign policy tools face the empirical problem of sample selection bias. If the sanctions are going to work, they will not need to be applied. So why do we observe the hundreds of economic sanctions that have been imposed? Why do some states sanction for decades, long after it is clear the sanctions are insufficient to change policy in the target state? We argue that if sanctions do not work and are economically costly, they are probably imposed for some domestic political benefit. Next we systematically consider this question, starting with Smith's (1996) war-of-attrition approach to studying sanctions.

THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

To understand the duration of sanctions, it is necessary to control for the decision to sanction. Sanctions are boycotts on trading relationships with the target country. In the literature on sanctions, it is widely assumed that sanctions are used by governments to achieve international political goals, such as influencing policy in the target nation (Lenway 1988). Within this context, sanctions are a battle of wills. They last either until the sender decides to give up trying to bring about policy change or until the target

3. Smith (1996) shows that, except under certain peculiar distributional assumptions, sanctions actually occur only when sanctions are *insufficient* to force the target to alter policy *and* when the sender state prefers to send sanctions even though it knows they will fail.

acquiesces. An appropriate technique for modeling such an interaction is a “war of attrition,” in which both sides pay costs until one side decides to quit and the opponent wins the prize.

Smith (1996) uses an incomplete information version of just such a war-of-attrition approach. The sender chooses whether to sanction to get the target to give up a prize that it initially holds—its preferred policy position. The sanctions continue until either the target gives up the prize by changing policy (a case of successful sanctions) or the sender decides sanctioning is no longer worthwhile (a case of unsuccessful sanctions). By characterizing the Bayesian perfect equilibrium of the game, Smith shows that, absent some particular distributional assumptions, sanctions only occur when they are insufficient to force compliance by the target but the sender still wishes to send them, presumably for some domestic political reason.

The logic behind these results is as follows: first, suppose the sanctions are sufficiently costly that the target would rather comply with the sender’s demands than endure the sanctions indefinitely. In such a setting, because the sender knows the target will comply, it always sanctions. Knowing the sanctions will persist, the target immediately complies. Hence, sanctions are either very short or, more likely, their mere threat is sufficient to bring about the target’s compliance. Second, suppose the target would rather bare the cost of sanctions indefinitely than comply with the sender’s demands. In this setting, the target will never comply, and sanctions are useless for bringing about policy concessions. Hence, the sender state will never impose the sanction unless it gains some domestic political benefit that offsets the economic cost of the sanctions. Given this logic, Smith (1996) predicts the sanctions that we actually see represent those cases when sanctions are unlikely to work. These sanctions continue for a long time because both sides prefer their continuance.

Unfortunately, Smith’s (1996) model, although useful, assumes nations are monolithic, unchanging entities. In reality, nations are not atomistic, and their leaders choose those policies that satisfy the goals of their supporters. This has important implications for the duration of sanctions. Leadership change in either the target or the sender state can bring about a shift in sanctions policy. For instance, suppose leadership change occurs in the sender state. Although the previous leader gained some domestic benefit from imposing sanctions, the supporters of the new leader might not gain such benefits and, as such, the leader is likely to terminate sanctions. When political change brings about a shift in which interests are represented, such changes often signal the ending of sanctions.

Leadership change in the target state can have similar implications for the ending of sanctions. Suppose, for instance, that the supporters of the new leader have interests more in line with the demands of the sender than those of the predecessor’s supporters. Such a shift in leadership change is likely to end sanctions: the new leader shifts policies to those that the sender desires. Unfortunately, classifying such an event as a success or failure is fraught with danger because it often conflates success and leadership turnover. For instance, the recent removal by military force of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein led to the end of U.S. sanctions against Iraq. Although the United States achieved its policy objectives, does this fact constitute sanctions success? In our empirical section, we shall pay particular attention to this problem.

Leadership turnover in either the sender or target state can lead to the end of sanctions, but it does not necessarily mean that it will. The structure of our argument is straightforward. Leaders adopt those policies most likely to keep them in power, which are the policies that their supporters desire. As a result, changes in the leadership's coalition of supporters are liable to lead to a change in sanctions policy, be it in the target or in the sender nation. Our predictions as to when leader change causes a shift in sanctions policy reduce to an argument about which groups receive representation under different political systems. Fortunately, comparative politics scholars have made great inroads along these theoretical lines upon which we draw. We focus on differences in representation between democratic and nondemocratic political systems.

LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM

There are several ways to characterize nondemocratic leaders' political incentives (Olson 1993). We characterize both nondemocratic and democratic leaders' goals as ensuring their political survival. They do so by buying rewards for domestic interests whose support they rely on to stay in power. In democracies, elections or the breakdown of cabinet government often lead to leadership change. In autocracies, a military coup or the death of the autocrat is a typical mechanism for leadership change. In oligarchies, leadership change is frequently the result of a power struggle within the oligarchy and a shakeup in the distribution of power among political leaders.

All else equal, political leaders typically last longer in nondemocratic regimes than in democratic regimes (Bienen and Van de Walle 1991). Democratic governments have regularly held elections. Although many politicians are reelected, they are rarely in power for decades. Indeed, many democracies have term limits on political tenure. Nondemocratic regimes do not have regularly held elections, and leaders' length of time in government is highly variable. In some cases, there is rapid leadership turnover. In other cases, the leadership is in power for decades. However, if nondemocratic leaders are able to avoid a coup in the early years, the risk of turnover declines as the leader acquires political capital and consolidates his or her power.

If leadership change is more common in democracies than nondemocracies, and if leadership change triggers the withdrawal of sanctions, sanctions will be shorter in duration when either the sender or the target state is democratic. The shortest sanctions of all will be between democratic dyads. There is some empirical evidence that sanctions are shorter when the target state is democratic (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000). However, we argue next that the higher rate of leadership turnover in democratic states is not driving this result. Although leadership change is more common in democracies, it is less likely to be associated with the withdrawal of sanctions than in nondemocratic systems. Indeed, in the empirical analysis, we find that having controlled for leadership change, political institutions by themselves have no significant effect on the duration of sanctions.

Building on Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) approach, we argue that a key difference between democratic

and nondemocratic leaders is the size of the coalition of supporters that leaders need to retain power. In democratic systems, leaders need the support of many voters to survive in office. Autocrats rely on the support of a much smaller segment of the population. The size of the coalition of supporters required under different institutional arrangements affects the probability that leadership change leads to new interests being represented (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Leadership change in democratic systems is less likely to change which interests are represented compared with leadership change in autocratic systems. Because democratic leaders need to win the support of a much larger coalition of domestic supporters than do autocratic leaders, in democracies, there is a higher probability that the new winning coalition will include many of the previous leader's supporters. Leaders in nondemocratic states stay in power with the support of a smaller coalition of domestic supporters. The smaller size of their support base means that any overlap between the supporters of the old and new leaders is likely to be small, and as a result, the general policy preferences of new coalitions will differ from previous coalitions to a greater degree in nondemocratic states.⁴ In this framework, new leaders are more likely to represent a different set of interests from their predecessors in nondemocratic systems than in democratic systems.

A democratically elected leader who resists pressure from foreign sanctions does so with the support of a large coalition of domestic supporters. For these actors, the benefits of the leader's policy choices outweigh the costs imposed by foreign sanctions. If this were not the case, the democratic leader would have immediately acquiesced to pressure from foreign sanctions. Suppose a change in leader occurs, but the new leader draws some votes from his or her predecessor's coalition of domestic supporters. If the new leader wants to stay in office, he or she will continue resisting pressure from foreign sanctions.

In nondemocratic states, a change in leader is more likely to lead to a change in the interests the government represents. If the supporters of the new leader have interests more in line with the demands of the sanctions sender than those of the predecessor's supporters, the leader will likely acquiesce to sanctions pressure. If the new target leadership is simply more "friendly" toward the sender and hence likely to be receptive to significant future policy revisions, then the sender might end sanctions to strengthen the new target leader's domestic position.

A similar logic can be extended to the cases of democratic and nondemocratic sender states. In democratic states, new leaders follow policies similar to those of their predecessors. For a large coalition of voters, the benefits of sanctioning outweigh the domestic costs. Until this changes or the target state acquiesces, sanctions will continue. In nondemocratic states, a shift in leader is likely to lead to a change in which interests are represented. Sanctions are imposed because, for these domestic groups, the benefits associated with continuing the previous leadership's policy are probably outweighed by the costs of imposing foreign sanctions. The new leader will, as a result, revoke his or her predecessor's sanctions. We argue that in democracies, new

4. Another way of thinking about nondemocratic systems is that the leader has a clear hand in policy making as long as he or she rewards the particularistic interests of those on whose support he or she relies.

leaders follow similar policies. They continue to sanction in the case of the sender state and continue to resist pressure from sanctions in the target state. However, in nondemocratic states, a change in leader is more likely to lead to leaders giving up on sanctions or giving in to sanctions pressure.⁵

The extent to which new leaders follow new policies does vary within the set of democratic and nondemocratic systems. Some scholars argue that democracies with single-party governments experience more radical policy shifts with a change in leader than multiparty governments. However, not all scholars agree (Downs 1957; Cox 1990; Tsebelis 1999). This is a controversial topic, and there is an extensive literature comparing policy outcomes in different types of democratic systems (see, e.g., Hibbs 1977; Hofferbert and Budge 1993). Far less has been written about leadership turnover across different types of nondemocracies (but see Bunce 1981; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Olson 1993; North 1981). As in democratic systems, we might expect differences in the type of nondemocratic government (e.g., autocratic or oligarchic) to affect the degree to which policy changes with a change in leader. We argue, however, that the effect of leadership change on policy shifts is bigger across than within regime type. The United States has a unique style of democracy; nonetheless, the effect of leadership change on sanction duration is similar to that in other democratic systems. The U.S. sanctions on Cuba are a nice example of this.

In January 1959, Fidel Castro's revolutionary army defeated the Batista's incumbent government and seized power in Cuba. By 1960, Castro exhibited a strong affinity with communist states and nationalized all U.S. economic interests in Cuba. The U.S. government imposed sanctions that persist today, although the nature of the sanctions has changed over time.⁶ Since Eisenhower initiated the sanctions, there have been eight presidential administrations. Some leaders have been Democrats, others Republicans; nevertheless, sanctions have remained some of the broadest and most stringent ever recorded. In the United States, a change in leader affects which coalition of interests receives representation. However, because the incumbent leader and challengers seek to win a majority of the vote, many of the same groups of voters are important to all leaders.

The U.S. Constitution developed a presidential style of democracy that affects which domestic groups are important to all presidential candidates. The electoral col-

5. In the democratic case, the causes of leadership change are exogenous to the imposition of sanctions, but in the nondemocratic case, sanctions pressure is potentially a cause of leadership change.

6. In June 1959, Florida Senator George Smathers proposed legislation limiting Cuba's sugar import quota to the United States. By February 1960, this legislation was in effect, reducing sugar imports from Cuba by 3 million tons, about one-half of Cuba's annual crop, and resulting in more than U.S.\$80 million of lost income (Schreiber 1973). The Eisenhower regime subsequently deepened economic sanctions. Most U.S. exports were banned by October 1960. The Kennedy administration further tightened the sanctions imposed under Eisenhower, calling on the Organization of American States (OAS) to cooperate in imposing restrictions on Cuba. Although the 1970s saw the relaxing of some restrictions, with the OAS dropping its ban in 1974 and a softening of sanctions by both Ford and Carter, significant restrictions remained (Schreiber 1973). Castro has made significant policy concessions—particularly in the past few years—nonetheless, and U.S. policy remains largely unchanged. The intensity of U.S. sanctions policy has changed over time.

lege indirectly elects the U.S. president.⁷ Presidential candidates need to win a majority of electoral college votes, not the popular vote. The more heavily populated states have a higher number of electoral college votes, and in most of these states, the candidate who carries these states wins all of the electoral votes.⁸ Although Florida is only 1 of 50 states in the United States, it has about 10% of the votes needed to win. In the highly competitive state of Florida, winning the votes of the highly organized Cuban American community has traditionally been key in determining the outcome of the election (the plurality winner takes all 27 electoral college votes). The intensity of anti-Castro feeling among the large Floridian Cuban American community has meant that harsh sanctions against Cuba have remained a part of U.S. foreign policy for more than 40 years, regardless of the party or political ideology of the sitting president or major party candidates (Purcell 1998).

The Indonesia-Malaysia sanctions episode provides a sharp contrast to the U.S.-Cuban case. In the early 1960s, Indonesia's nondemocratic regime was ruled by an oligopoly headed by President Ahmed Sukarno. In 1963, President Sukarno imposed a full trade embargo on the newly federated state of Malaysia in protest against the state's formation (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Sodhy 1988). The sanctions did not last long; a reorganization of power within the Indonesian leadership 3 years later led to the withdrawal of sanctions. In March 1966, General Suharto, commander of the army, forced Sukarno to transfer much of his executive power to him. Suharto drew support from the military—a different support base than his predecessor, Sukarno. As Indonesia's new leader, Suharto reestablished trade connections with Malaysia that very year.⁹ In the United States, leaders come and go, but sanctions policy is stable and resilient. Only in nondemocratic systems, such as Indonesia, should we expect leadership turnover in the sender state to be key to the termination of sanctions.

We are not the only scholars to explore how domestic political institutions affect sanction policy. Dorussen and Mo (2001), among the few scholars to explore the duration question, also examine domestic institutions. They do so, however, from the perspective that these institutions shape audience costs and the ability of sender nations to signal their intent (Lenway 1988; Fearon 1997; Schultz 1998; Smith 1996). They argue that democratic institutions make it costly for leaders to back down. Once a leader imposes sanctions, it is difficult for her or him to back down without concessions from the target. Although they may be right that it is hard for democrats to back down, they fail to explain why successor governments are encumbered with the same costs to backing down, given they did not impose the sanctions (McGillivray and Smith 2000; Guisinger and Smith 2002).

7. In the United States, the president typically initiates legislative action on sanctions. Congress, however, can veto presidential initiatives. Increasingly, the legislature initiates sanctions policy.

8. In theory, in a two-party race, a candidate could carry the electoral college vote with just 25% of the popular vote by winning a bare majority in the states used to build the electoral college coalition and winning none of the popular vote in the states outside the electoral college majority. A less extreme example of this took place in the 2000 election when Bush carried the electoral college vote, whereas Gore won the popular vote.

9. Barter trade resumed in June 1966, and Indonesia and Singapore officially recognized one another as states. In August 1966, Malaysia and Indonesia signed a normalization agreement, following which they reestablished trade and commercial links in March 1967.

Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) argue that sanctions are of shorter duration if the target is a democratic state because democratic leaders are more vulnerable than autocratic leaders to pressure from the domestic groups suffering from the economic effects of sanctions. They find empirical evidence to this effect. However, just being more representative does not mean that democratic states are more likely to acquiesce. Whether democratically elected leaders acquiesce to sanctions pressure depends on whether key domestic supporters believe that the costs of sanctions outweigh the benefits of retaining existing policy. Only if the costs outweigh the benefits to domestic supporters will democratic leaders give in, and then they are likely to do so quickly. However, if the benefits of keeping the existing policy are greater than the costs of sanctions to the majority of voters, leaders will resist pressure from foreign sanctions. Moreover, we argue that leadership change will be unrelated to the duration of sanctions, and the eventual withdrawal of sanctions will be brought about for an exogenous reason—perhaps leadership change in the sender state. Indeed, we find that although the duration of sanctions is shorter with democratic targets than autocratic targets, leadership change is not the mechanism that drives this.

In summary, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: Leadership change in the sender nation increases the probability that sanctions end.

Hypothesis 2: Leadership change in the target nation increases the probability that sanctions end, although such events can often be conflated with sanctions success.

Hypothesis 3: The impact of leadership change on the duration of sanctions is greater in nondemocratic rather than democratic states.

Next, we test these hypotheses using a Weibull hazard model fit to a data set of 56 sanction episodes with 363 observations.

EMPIRICAL TESTS

RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE SELECTION, VARIABLES, AND DATA

The data on sanctions come from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990); we generated the control variables using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000); and the leadership data come from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).¹⁰ We discuss the sanctions data below in more detail. The dependent variable is the length of sanctions between sender nation A and target nation B. Hazard analysis estimates the probability that sanctions end at any point in time conditional on sanctions not having already ended.¹¹ We use both the parametric Weibull model and the semiparametric technique of Cox's proportionate hazard model. The results in Table 1 present the results of the Weibull models. The dif-

10. Many thanks to Randy Siverson (University of California, Davis) for sending us these data.

11. Hazard models are also referred to as survival models, duration models, or event history models. A basic introduction to such analysis is in Allison (1984). Comprehensive sources for duration analysis include Greene (1993) and Lancaster (1990). Recent applications of hazard analysis to political science include Warwick (1994), Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1994), Bennett and Stam (1996), Bennett (1998), and Goemans (2000).

TABLE 1
Weibull Estimates of International Sanctions Duration: Parameter Estimates Presented as Hazard Ratios

	Model 1: Censored		Model 2: Termination of All Sanction ("Sender's and Target's Aggregate Decision to Quit")		Model 3: Censored Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")		Model 4: Termination of All Sanctions ("Sender's and Target's Aggregate Decision to Quit")	
	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")	Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit")
Leader change A	38.9** (2.04)	20.5** (1.78)	12.2* (1.46)	10.4* (1.42)				
Leader change A* polity A	0.014** (2.18)	0.035** (1.86)	0.074* (1.37)	0.105 (1.26)				
Polity A	2.05 (0.57)	1.88 (0.53)	1.11 (0.08)	2.41 (0.72)				
Leader change B	6.31*** (2.36)	4.94*** (2.39)	4.67** (1.71)	3.46** (1.62)				
Leader change B* polity B	0.215 (1.21)	0.220* (1.44)	0.156 (1.21)	0.152 (1.50)				
Polity B	0.786 (0.28)	2.02 (1.11)	4.19* (1.43)	1.89 (0.84)				
Ratio of power capabilities	0.210 (1.25)	1.06 (0.06)	6.02 (1.03)	6.90 (1.24)				
Similarity of interests	1.01 (0.27)	0.962 (0.77)	1.01 (0.19)	0.963 (0.05)				
Dyadic age	1.50* (1.24)	1.49* (1.55)	2.11** (2.14)	2.00*** (2.45)				
Distance	2.59** (2.33)	1.65** (1.74)	3.79*** (3.02)	3.19*** (3.37)				
United States	—	—	0.124** (2.24)	0.079*** (3.07)				
Success	—	—	1.52*** (5.75)	1.30*** (7.13)				
Duration dependence parameter, <i>p</i>	1.43*** (6.04)	1.14*** (7.25)	1.36*** (5.36)	1.63*** (7.31)				
Observations	262	272	262	272				
Cases, <i>n</i>	47	47	47	47				
Log likelihood	-34.5	-50.13	-11.0	-16.8				

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. All one-tailed tests. We present our results as hazard ratios rather than the regression coefficients. Hazard ratios greater than 1.0 indicate an increased risk of failure and hence shorter durations. Z scores appear in parentheses next to the parameter estimates. Full regression results are available, along with the data, at <http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm/>.

ference between these results and those obtained using the Cox estimator are unremarkable and omitted to save space. The Weibull setup models the hazard rate at time t , the probability that sanctions terminate conditional on not already having ended, as $h(t) = p\lambda t^{p-1}$, where X represents the regressors, $\lambda = \exp(x_j \beta)$ and p is an ancillary parameter that determines whether the hazard rate increases or decreases over time.

Using such hazard approaches, we can assess whether factors such as leadership change or regime type increase or decrease the probability that sanctions end. Unfortunately, some care is needed. Sanctions end when either the sender decides to end the sanctioning policy or the target complies with demands. There are competing risks that sanctions end.¹² Suppose we focus on when the sender quits. The recent ending of sanctions against Iraq provides a useful illustration. In 2003, the United States stopped sanctioning Iraq. However, it did not do so because it chose to “quit”; rather, the motivation for the sanctions—the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime—was no longer there. Although U.S.-Iraq sanctions ended in 2003, it is clear the U.S. willingness to maintain sanctions persists should they still be required. In assessing when the sender quits, the U.S.-Iraq sanctions case shows that the United States was prepared to sanction until at least 2003. We do not know whether the United States would have sanctioned in 2004 because this became a moot point following the Second Gulf War. Cases such as these are best thought of as censored.

In general, when the target complies (i.e., when sanctions are successful), then our ability to observe when the sender would quit is censored. Similarly, if the sender quits, then our ability to observe when the target would acquiesce is censored. Unfortunately, as the contentious debate over sanctions success indicates, it is extremely difficult in many cases to ascertain which side quits. If we could make such a distinction, then a standard competing hazards approach could be used (Gordon 2002; Diermeier and Stevenson 2000).¹³ Here we adopt a compromise between lumping together all the effects into a single hazard equation and a competing hazards approach. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) provide a 16-point scale of sanctions success. Although, as already indicated, this scale is controversial, we take success ratings greater than 12 to be instances of clear success; hence, from the perspective of the sender’s decision to quit, such events are censored. In addition, we estimate the hazard model without assuming such censoring—in effect, lumping both sides’ decisions to quit into a single equation.

We corrected and dropped observations of sanctions following Pape’s (1997) arguments. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) identified 115 cases of sanctions. Pape argues that 40 of these should not be considered cases of sanctions (e.g., trade wars), or the sanctions ended for reasons unrelated to political factors at either the initiator or target state (e.g., the target state ceased to exist). Because we are focusing on the duration of economic sanctions as a function of political factors in the sending state, we dropped sanctions that ended due to military defeat and coups or by military force in the target state. There is also a growing body of evidence to suggest that international

12. See Gordon (2002) for a discussion of competing hazard models in political science.

13. Dependencies between competing hazards can be modeled using frailty models. Unfortunately, given the small sample size, such techniques are impractical here (Gordon 2002).

relations changed fundamentally after World War II (Gowa 1999). As a result, we also dropped cases including and before World War II. Our data therefore cover the years from 1948 to 1990. We begin with 60 cases; we drop 13 more due to missing data. We analyze 47 cases of international economic sanctions with 363 yearly observations. Each of the remaining incidents of sanctions has multiple observations, with a range of 2 to 31.¹⁴ An observation reflects one of two occurrences: the ending of the sanctions or the end of a calendar year. Following Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990), as well as Pape (1997), we code sanctions as bilateral, not scoring joiners but only the initiator and target states.

The variable "leader change A" is a dummy variable that codes whether any leadership change took place in a particular year in the sender nation, A. There is a corresponding variable for leadership changes in the target state, B. Using the number of instances of leadership change, rather than simply presence or absence of leadership change, yields much the same results.

Domestic political institutions are coded on the Polity III scale. Specifically, polity A is the Polity III democracy score minus the polity autocracy score for state A. Both these scores range between 0 and 10. We normalize the difference between these indices by adding 10 and dividing by 20. In our hazard models, polity A ranges between 0 and 1. Democratic states score high on this measure. Polity B is the corresponding measure for the target state.

In addition to the political variables, we include the following control variables:

1. *Ratio of power capabilities*: $\text{power A}/(\text{power A} + \text{power B})$, where power A represents the Correlates of War (COW) composite power index for nation A.
2. *Similarity of interests*: We measure the similarity of the two states' interests with Bueno de Mesquita's (1981) global tau-b measure. This is a -1 to 1 correlation of the two states' alliance portfolios.¹⁵
3. *Dyadic age*: We measure the amount of time in years that the two states have existed simultaneously in the international system. If one state drops from the system and then reappears, the age clock reverts to zero and starts anew. We use the logarithm of dyad age plus 1 year.
4. *Distance*: This variable measures the logarithm of the geographic distance between the two states' capitals in kilometers.
5. *United States*: A dummy variable coding whether the United States is the sender state.
6. *Success*: This variable measures the potency of the sanctions on the target state in terms of proportional cost relative to gross national product (GNP). It is a 1 to 16 scale.¹⁶

RESULTS

The estimates of the hazard models are shown in Table 1. Two different approaches are presented: estimates of the sender's decision to quit and the aggregate effect of both

14. The mean number of observations is 6.

15. We had missing data for roughly 5% of the cases on this variable. For these cases, we substituted the mean value for the rest of the series.

16. For details on the success scale, a product of two 1 to 4 scales, see Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990).

the sender's and target's decisions to quit. As discussed above, sanctions can end because either the sender quits or the target complies, although in many cases, it is impossible or controversial to distinguish between these outcomes. In attempting to estimate the sender's decision to quit, it is not appropriate to consider events when the target clearly complied as instances of quitting. In such a scenario, we do not know when the sender would have quit, only that she or he did not quit prior to the target's compliance. Hence, when sanctions were definitely successful (> 12 on the Hufbauer scale), the sender's decision to quit is censored. We refer to this case as the "sender's decision to quit." We also present analyses in which we do not (or more practically cannot) distinguish who quit. We refer to this case as the "sender's and target's aggregate decision to quit."

Before moving to the prominent questions of political and leadership change, we briefly describe the impact of the control variables. The relative strength of the two parties, as measured by the power ratio variable, has no significant impact on the duration of sanctions. The similarity of interests measured by Bueno de Mesquita's tau-b measure also has no significant impact on the length of sanctions. The analyses show that the longer a dyad has interacted, the shorter that sanctions are likely to be. Although this variable is statistically significant in some models, it is not in others. Furthermore, the substantive impact of this variable is small. Across all the analyses, the greater the distance between sender and target, the more likely sanctions are to end. The ancillary parameter, p , assesses the extent to which the risk of sanctions ending increases or decreases over time. The coefficient greater than 1, reported in each of the models in Table 1, indicates that the longer that sanctions last, the more likely they are to end.

Models 3 and 4 include controls for whether the United States is the sender and the level of eventual success of the sanction. Both variables have a powerful role in predicting the length of sanctions. All else equal, the United States is only about 10% as likely to end sanctions compared to other nations. As the experience of sanctions against Cuba shows, the United States is prepared to impose long-term sanctions.

The success variable strongly influences the ending of sanctions. However, this is not surprising. The success of sanctions is an *ex post* evaluation and, in many cases, is equivalent to the end of sanctions. In models 1 and 3, we censor those termination events when sanctions ended with clear success. Although the inclusion of the success variable improves the model fit, it does not substantively alter the impact of the political and leadership variables. It is these variables that are of most interest here.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERSHIP CHANGE

The variable "leader change A" is coded 1 if leadership turnover occurs in the sender state in a particular yearly observation and 0 otherwise. The statistically significant hazard ratio of 38 reported in model 1 means that for an autocratic sender state, the likelihood of quitting sanctions is 38 times greater if leader change occurs. Leadership

change appears to have an enormous impact on the duration of sanctions. However, this interpretation applies only to autocratic states. The variable “leader change A* polity A” is the product of the leadership change dummy and the institutional arrangements in nation A. When the sender state is fully autocratic, and hence polity A = 0, then this variable has no impact on the duration of sanctions. For such a state, only the “leader change A” variable is relevant in assessing the impact of leadership change. However, when the sender state is democratic, then the impact of leadership change depends on both terms. The coefficient on the interaction term in model 1 is 0.014. For a fully democratic state (polity A = 1), the impact of leadership change on the decision to quit sanctioning is negligible. This pattern is repeated throughout the other models in Table 1, although the magnitude of the effect differs somewhat. Consistent with our expectations, leadership turnover reduces the duration of sanctions in autocratic, but not democratic, senders.

Leadership change in target states also drastically affects the probability of sanctions ending. The variable “leader change B” is coded 1 if leadership change occurs in the target state and 0 otherwise. Across the four models presented in Table 1, the proportionate hazard on this variable is around 4, meaning that leadership change in the target state makes sanctions four times more likely to end when the target is autocratic. This result should not surprise us. In many cases, the implicit goal of sanctions is regime change.

When the target is democratic, the impact of leadership change is negligible. The variable “leader change B* polity B” is the product of any leadership change and the target’s regime type. When the target is democratic (polity B = 1), then the net effect of leadership change is the product of the proportionate hazards (equivalently, the sum of the coefficients). The net effect of leadership change in democracies is 0. As our theoretical arguments predict, to put together a sufficiently large coalition of supporters, leaders in democratic systems often need to draw support from many of the same domestic groups. Therefore, the interests of these groups receive representation even when leaders change. Autocratic leaders rely on smaller groups of supporters. As such, they are less beholden to the same pivotal groups as their predecessor, and so leadership change alters the interests that are represented and hence the calls for policies that incur sanctions.

Having controlled for leadership change, political institutions by themselves have no significant effect on the duration of sanctions. The variables polity A and polity B code the regime type of sender. Neither of these variables alters the length of sanctions directly. As argued earlier, there are competing influences determining how institutions affect sanctions. Although the impact of leadership change is greater in autocratic systems, leadership turnover is more common in democracies. The results suggest that neither effect dominates the other, so taken together, regime type does not alter the length of sanctions.

The results also show that leadership turnover often ends sanctions in autocratic nations, with the effect being much less in democracies. Leadership change is relevant in both senders and targets. It is worth returning to the distinction between models 1 and 3 and models 2 and 4 to consider the relevance of these results. In models 1 and 3,

we focus on instances when the sender quits sanctioning by censoring those events that end in success (e.g., when the target complied). Despite that the focus of these analyses is on the sender, leadership change in the target has a significant impact on the sender's decision to quit sanctions. Several factors contribute to this result. First, an implicit, if not explicit, reason for sanctions is regime change. Hence, although the sanctions might not be a coercive success, once a major reason for the sanctions has disappeared, the sender quits. Second, if the new target leadership is friendlier toward the sender and hence likely to be receptive to significant future policy revisions, then the sender might end sanctions to strengthen the new target leader's domestic position. Even in the sender's decision, leadership change in the target has significant impact on the decision to maintain sanctions.

Models 2 and 4 make no attempt to distinguish how sanctions end. As such, they represent the aggregate effect of both the sender's and the target's decision to quit. The analyses produce very similar results to those in models 1 and 3. Leadership change in autocratic states often leads to the termination of sanctions because new autocratic leaders often shift their support base relative to their predecessors, which leads to different interests receiving representation. In democratic systems, the requirement to form a large coalition of supporters often forces both incumbents and challengers to seek the support of the same domestic groups. Because satisfying the goals of these key domestic groups is essential for political success, leadership change has less impact on sanctions policy. Whether from the perspective of the sender's decision to quit or the aggregate of both the sender's and target's decisions, the impact of leadership change in both the sender and target on the length of sanctions depends on the institutional context in which leaders serve. In democracies, leadership change has little impact on the cessation of sanctions. In contrast, leadership change in autocratic states is likely to bring about the end of sanctions.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, we developed a model linking leadership change and domestic political institutions to the duration of economic sanctions. Domestic political institutions play an important role in mediating the effect that leadership change has on sanctions because institutions determine which political interests political leaders represent. We focus on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders' support coalitions. We argue that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic systems. A change in nondemocratic leadership is more likely to trigger the withdrawal of sanctions than a change in democratic leadership—in either the sender or the target state. We fit a hazard model to a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Our findings strongly support our predictions. Leadership change in democratic sender states and democratic target states is unrelated to the duration in sanctions. However, leadership change in both nondemocratic target and sender states is a strong predictor of sanction duration.

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