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Theorizing international security regimes: a power-analytical approach

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Abstract This article seeks to develop alternative ways to conceptually grasp international prohibition/regulatory regimes. It attempts to go beyond existing, and piecemeal, analysis of regimes within the intellectual field of IR based on conventional grand/mid-range theorization. It is argued that traditional theorization of regimes fashioned as IR theory has hindered, rather than helped, to understand regimes in their complexities, vagaries, and in terms of various forces simultaneously involved. The article answers a question of how to strike a balance between theoretical eclecticism, which is believed to be vital for a comprehensive analysis of security regimes, and the need to have a uniting device to organize such research. It is for these reasons that a power-analytical approach utilizing four types of powers—productive, structural, institutional, and compulsory—is used, and its advantages for regime analysis are flagged. The value added of such an advancement lies in international security regimes being understood more plastically than through conventional lenses. Specifically, they are approached as intertwined sets of normative discourses, political structures (anarchies, hierarchies, and heterarchies), and agencies through which power operates within a given security issue area with a regulatory effect. Specific renderings of discourses and heterarchies establish channels through which sociopolitical and economic privileges get distributed; they create structural relations among actors with a possibility of their reversal or rearticulation; and they build up, challenge, and relocate walls of legal obligations.

Keywords Security regimes · Regime theory · IR theory · Power · Eclecticism · Institutionalization · Constructivism · Post-structuralism · Liberalism · Realism · Revisionism

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Introduction

This theoretical article seeks to develop alternative ways to conceptually grasp international prohibition/regulatory regimes. It attempts to go beyond existing, and piecemeal, theorization of regimes within the intellectual field of IR. It serves as an introductory piece for a series of following empirical studies. By doing so, it sets up a theoretical agenda, reflects on, and outlines perspectives for comparative research. While relying on the means of conceptual analysis rather than definitions, *international security regimes* are understood here as *sets of normative discourses, political structures* (*anarchies, hierarchies, and heterarchies*) *and agencies through which power operates within a given security issue area with a regulatory effect.* Specific renderings of discourses and heterarchies establish channels through which sociopolitical and economic privileges get distributed; they create structural relations among actors with a possibility of their reversal or rearticulation; and they build up, challenge, and relocate walls of legal obligations—all of this within a given security domain, with a systemic quality.

In IR, three "waves" of regimes theorization can be recognized and I have dealt with them in detail elsewhere (Hynek 2017). These have been neo–neo consequentialist regime theory; cognitivism; and radical constructivist/post-structuralist understanding. The first generation of regime analysis can be linked to what has been known as the theoretical convergence between neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism (Andreatta and Koenig-Archibugi 2010; Baldwin 1993; Nye 1988; Keohane 1986; Ruggie 1983). It newly emerged as a research venue linked to the complex interdependency theory (Ruggie 1983, 1975; Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1982), which attempted to balance the focus on state-centric framework and relative capabilities with the importance of international institutions (also vis-à-vis hegemons) and absolute gains. By the beginning of the 1990s, cognitivist, or knowledge-based, theories of regimes rendered the previous assumption of consequentialism and fixed, rationally determined state preferences flawed, and out of touch with empirical domain (Smith 1987). It cautiously shifted the debate of regimes from state-centrism to neo-functionally (Haas 1982), neo-institutionally (March and Olsen 1998; Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 5–8), and knowledge-oriented research, known (Hasenclever et al. 1997; the so-called Tübingen School). However, it took the third radical constructivist/post-structuralist wave to get serious about the four "cooperation areas" flagged by the Tübingen School: power of legitimacy, narrative structures, identity-related binary separations, and conditions of possibility for emergence and transformations of historical orders. Specifically, they showed how liberal and realist—but by extension also cognitivist—approaches were indeterminate, or outright mistaken, in their inability to explain the de iure existing nonuse prohibition regimes (Price 1995, 1997; Tannenwald 1999, 2007; Price and Tannenwald 1996).

These critical insights are cardinal as all studied issues contained in this special issue fall into the category of security regimes (cf. Jervis 1982). To structure them further, thematics of those security regimes plays the key role (cf. Kratochwil 1993) and the issues studied in this special issue are divided into three clusters: WMD

cluster (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons), "humanitarian" cluster of weapons (antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms and light weapons), and "unconventional" security cluster (drugs and cybersecurity). The approach offered here is more than capable of analyzing variable configurations of general, specific, and unique characteristics as present in each of the regimes, and investigates them in a comparative manner. This is where existing waves of regime theorization have fallen short of the task.

On the utility of the three waves for the project

The utility of the consequentialist regime theory for this project mainly lies in highlighting structural (material) conditions and incentives for regime formation; regime evolution and maintenance; and regime compliance. With regard to regime formation, the following questions can be posed: Did the regime result from particular interests of hegemonic powers, from a different "tier" of states, or another type of actors? How precisely was the issue area specified and subsequently institutionalized? What role did "norm entrepreneurship" play in a given regime formation? Was it pursued through coercive diplomacy; What kind of reasoning drove the other states when joining the regime (following rational interest, specification of cost/benefit, coercion, bandwagoning, etc.)? As for regime evolution, one's attention is steered, inter alia, at the following questions. Did the regime evolve along the lines of great power interests, and if not, why? How has the evolutionary dynamic changed after the initial stage of formation (from power/interest driven to path-dependency or even normative persistence; did the regime become more coherent due to the substantial economy of transaction costs/information sharing procedures? Finally yet importantly, questions related to compliance relate to reasons why states complied with the regime. Has it been bargaining for profit, procedural calculations, rewards, coercion, compellence, and/or normative compliance? Have effective verification mechanisms been formed within the regime, and why? What were outcomes of non-compliant behavior, and impact on robustness of a regime? How, if at all, did the motivations among the members to comply with a given regime change over time? More recent studies drawing on this type of scholarship have further contributed by examination of interplays of international regimes (Muzaka 2011; Stokke 2003), cross-scale interactions (Young 2000), regime complexity (Gómez-Mera 2015), and ontological pluralization, especially incorporation of other types of actors (Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Arts 2000).

To make a few remarks on the utility of the cognitivist wave of regime analysis, it can be divided into three areas: actors and identities involved in regimes; regime-related processes and outcomes; and ideas through which knowledge is produced and politically used. In regard of actors and their identities, it is to study primary and secondary agents and their identities, push–pull dynamics vis-à-vis IOs and their politico-scientific justification, transnational dynamics, as well as links between ideas and national interests. Too, role conceptions/playing is important objects of examination for regime analysis, not the least because they render foreign policy

analysis relevant by virtue of bridging domestic and international environments. With respect to processes and outcomes, focus ought to be steered on cognitive and communicative mechanisms such as persuasion, coercion, forms of legitimation; network analysis related to workings of epistemic communities (and other types of actors); and thematic analysis as well as research on formation and use of narrative structures more generally. Finally, relationships between ideas and norms need to be scrutinized their specific types (principled, causal, etc.) and codification (i.e., treaty regimes, cf. Sitaraman 2009), as well as an interplay between cognitive, regulatory, and behavioral components and how those contribute to identity formation and reproduction. How do actors' identities affect their stance on norm determinacy in formation and recreation of regimes? What is the role ideas play in the best possible achievement of a desired social and political purpose as far as regimes are concerned? How is cognitional (and political) success influenced by a degree of intersubjectively shared knowledge?

As for the third "wave," i.e., radical constructivist/post-structuralist theorization of regimes—the utility is manifold. Ontologically, it goes beyond the dichotomy, or juxtaposition, of state-centered and transnational analytical frameworks (for these, cf. Lipson 2005/6). It is capable of examining regime complexes, understood as a plural mix comprising actors, networks, and artifacts: both material and ideational, and their coproductions and hybrids. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) and Foucault's (1991) analyses are vital for studying assemblages and ways in which they have been linked to state apparatuses and their rationalities, thereby creating governmentalized assemblages (Hynek 2012: 31–34; Joseph 2012; Krause 2011). This wave takes seriously ethics and culture and examines them as socially constructed, if contingent categories (Tannenwald 2013). Relevant scholarship recognizes the necessity of flexible analytical toolboxes comprehending structures as contingent, open, where seeds of resistance come from within: "Increasing interdependence among issues and issues-areas may thus produce increasing strains on regimes. In such circumstances, arguments that specific regimes order the entire system become problematic even if some issue-areas, regimes, or instruments are more significant than others. Theoretical approaches that rely on a grand unifying order become particularly suspect. 'The system' may be a fragmented, ill-coordinated thing; it may be broken-legged and limp along accordingly" (Keeley 1990: 95–96). Importantly, such an analysis also avoids siren sings of prescription and normativity, be it explicit or implicit kind (cf. Taylor 1985). Finally, collective identities are taken seriously and get scrutiny: on the one hand, their conditions of emergence, on the other, their structural and productive effects (see the next session). Last but not least, this wave attempts to expose forms (e.g., informal empires) and sources (e.g., use of knowledge) of international anarchy, hierarchy, and heterarchy (Wendt and Friedheim 1995; Crumley 1995).

The rest of the article answers the question of how to strike a balance between theoretical eclecticism, which is believed to be vital for a comprehensive and plastic analysis of security regimes, and the need to have a uniting device to organize such research. It is for these reasons that the most sophisticated existing conceptualization of *power* available, i.e., Barnett and Duvall's (2005) typology, is used as the central conceptual vocabulary, interlinking various strands of the literature to a

single analytical framework usable for this project. What is seen as notable value added to the existing literature on regimes, the framework offered will reverse the usual order of things. Rather than going from the material to ideational, as well as from rational to reflectivist, it outlines the vision where constitutive power of the discourse, the discourse in its materiality, cannot be side-lined, or made of secondary importance.

A power-analytical approach to international security regimes

No one would probably dispute that when it comes to complexities of international security regimes, robust ex post understandings, i.e., the thrust of work IR scholars do everyday (except for their dealings with piles of bureaucracy and administration), are the best way to comprehend the dynamics and cross-cutting effects (cf. Drezner 2009). Theoretical robustness often involves the necessity to combine different metatheoretical leanings, as well as relies on limited, contingent generalizations of examined phenomena, i.e., "small-t(heory)-claims" (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 275). Evolution of IR field clearly shows the rise of theoretical and analytical eclecticisms, what Reus-Smit (2013: 589) labeled "bracket metatheory thesis," thereby going beyond sweeping generalizations. However, there are still different kinds of eclecticisms. This paper in particular and the Special Issue in general shun "progressivist" theoretical eclecticism, which has usually been associated with an examination of micro-foundations and production and testing of mid-range theories (Lake 2013; Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Despite their cagey aversion to the discussion—rather than absence—of metatheoretical assumptions, research design and methods used by many of these mid-range studies have replicated problems of conventional IR theorization, just one level of theoretical ambition down.

Rather than mid-range progressivism, the type of eclecticism embraced here is what Lake (2013: 574) dubbed as "open-ended eclecticism." Arguably, not only does such open-endedness allow for unique and specific features of various issue-areas under the microscope to be considered and theorized accordingly, but it too underlines the primacy of "questions/concerns 'in the world'," thus staying away from "pathological implications" of "current textbook configuration of multiple 'isms'" (Lake 2011; cf. Krause 2002: 252–256). While regime analysis was being formulated as a mid-range project from the beginning, it has not overcome those pathologies, as was demonstrated in the previous part of the article. Simultaneously, the identified three waves of regime theorization and featured assessment of their metatheoretical leanings help to cushion what Reus-Smit (2013: 589) correctly associated with this kind of theorization, a research project not being "structured by epistemological and ontological assumptions, making it an exclusively empirical–theoretical project with distinctive ontological content."

The metaorganising, and conceptual, device chosen here to order regime analysis is what I term the *power-analytical approach*. It is the means to bring the previously heeded theorizations and conceptualizations in, through considerations of multiplicity of power relations. As Foucault (1980: 98) put it, power is relational rather

than substantial, it is not perfectly possessed or controlled by anybody, it is not property of anyone or anything, it passes through subjects and manifests its loci in objects, and it constitutes and actuates networks and apparatuses. The position embraced here begins with an acknowledgement of multiple types of dynamic power structures getting intertwined (with)in regimes and among them (cf. Guzzini 1993). As Allen (1998: 178) held it, "the proper alternative to power is not defeat but indifference." In particular, as the following lines show, these are political *hierarchies*, i.e., formal or informal, less or more rigid, tree-like structures, oriented vertically and unitarily, what Deleuze and Guattari described as "arborescent assemblages" (1987: 5; for an alternative conception, cf. Cooley 2005). Other systems where power is located and through which it passes are *heterarchies*—what Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 7–9) would call rhizomatic assemblages: these are forming, maintaining, and reconfiguring security regimes in a flexible and horizontal fashion, fleeing attempts of being overcoded and rendered arborescent, thus allowing for reconstitution and resistance inside of formal organizations and rigid spaces (for hierarchy–heterarchy nexus, cf. Crumley 1995).

Foucault (1982: 216–222) identified several starting questions for power-analysis: "*How is power exercised? … By what means is it exercised? … What constitutes specific nature of power? … What happens when individuals exert* (*as they say*) *power over others? … How is one to analyse the power relationship?*" Essentially, the power-analytical approach deals with an analysis of "economies of power," i.e., its various configurations (based on modalities of efficiency/effectiveness, and informed by types of power involved, see below). In the process of their excavation, a few guidelines (G1-5) were put forward by Foucault (1982: 223):

G1. *The system of differentiation* which features legal conditions, traditions of status and privilege, economic disparities, transformations in production, differences in culture and language, as well as in know-how and competence; relations of power create differentiations; and these are its conditions and results simultaneously. This guideline is particularly important for the analysis of productive power.
G2. *The types of objectives* such as "the maintenance of privileges, the accumulation of profits, the bringing into operation of statutory authority, the exercise of a function or a trade" (Ibid: 223). This guideline helps to sharpen the analysis of structural power.
G3. *The means of bringing power relations into being*—through coercion, military means, and discourses; also by means of economic differences, of control, by surveillance, with the help of archives, through informal rules, with/without technological means. Compulsory power lends itself to be analyzed through these means.
G4. *Forms of institutionalization*—can involve traditional predispositions with customs/fashions and legal systems; expressed through (sometimes very complex and elaborate) apparatuses with their loci, regulations, hierarchies, and autonomies; also feature "the distribution of all power relations in a given social ensemble" (Ibid: 223). How institutional power gets exercised can be found out with the deployment of this guideline.

G5. *The degree of rationalization*—can be understood "in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results," containing different kinds of costs—economic, e.g., putting new instruments into practice, or costs associated with reactive resistance (Ibid: 224). This principle ought to be heeded, especially when operations of institutional and compulsory power get examined.

These questions and guidelines may serve as the springboard for the following conceptual analysis of types of power. For reasons of theoretical sophistication and comprehensiveness, this article draws on the conceptualization of power offered by Barnett and Duvall (2005). Their typology takes inspiration, inter alia, from Guzzini (1993), who was the first to problematize uses of power-analysis inside IR and offered conceptual remedy. Redistribution of power understood as capabilities was enriched by the introduction of structural power and its different renderings, namely indirect institutional power, non-intentional power, and impersonal power. He proposed "that any power-analysis should necessarily include a pair or dyad of concepts of power, linking agent power and impersonal governance" (Guzzini 1993: 443). Barnett and Duvall (2005) opted for two organizing dyads in their conceptualization: first, in relation to expressions of power, one can make a difference between *interaction* and *constitution*; and second, in connection to specificity of social relations of power, *direct* and *diffused* relations can be identified (Ibid: 45–48). When put together, four types of power can be rendered: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. While utilizing Barnett and Duvall (2005), I deliberately reverse the order of types of power in the subsequent lines. Indeed, what takes theoretical and conceptual precedence in the beginning of an analysis has important consequences (cf. Reinalda and Verbeek 2004: 27–28). Due to the fact that theorization of wider normative considerations, general constitution of subjectivities, and their historical and structural conditionings are seen as especially relevant, I move from systemic to specific, and from diffused to direct. This should not be read, however, as the preference for a structuralist approach to power-analysis but rather a counterbalance, as far as the research strategy is concerned, to a conventional, state-centered regime analysis. The latter managed to tackle unit-level interactions between and among (important) states and IOs, i.e., chiefly relying on compulsory and institutional conceptions of power (Fig. 1).

While usually being dealt with marginally at best or completely ignored at its worst, *productive power* is the crucial one for understanding the nature of regime dynamics and conditions, or their lack of. This type of power allows for the construction—or rather production (considering that their very physical makeups are at stake)—of political subjects through diffuse social relations. While productive power shares several features with other types (especially the focus on constitutive sociopolitical processes, actors' capacities, as well as their self-perception), it notably differs in relational specificity. In their analysis of power, Barnett and Duvall (Ibid: 55) therefore discussed a difference between structural power as structural constitution, i.e., "the production and reproduction of internally related positions of super- and subordination, or domination, that actors occupy" and productive power as "the constitution of all social subjects with various social

		Relational Specificity	
		Diffuse	Direct
Power works through	Social relations of constitution	PRODUCTIVE (G1) Impersonal intersubjective power (doxa, dispositif, episteme) desiring-production	STRUCTURAL (G2) Impersonal positional power (Cultural hegemony, transnational historical bloc and its maintenance)
	Interactions of specific actors	INSTITUTIONAL (G4, G5) Indirect/unintended institutional effects; lags and feedback between power base and regime	COMPULSORY (G3, G5) Possessive (power as resources and their shifts) and relational (direct control over outcomes)

Fig. 1 Types of power and analytical guidelines. (Based on Barnett and Duvall 2005: 48; Guzzini 1993; Deleuze and Guattari 1983; Foucault 1982: 223–224)

powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope." Therefore, productive power permeates systems of meaning/knowledge production and relates to general processes of signification. Following the first guideline, that is to grasp productive power through systems of differentiation, this advancement is predicated upon the constitutive role—and materiality—of the discourse. To investigate productivity of power, its differentiating capacity needs to be revealed: "Rather than analysing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of strategies. For example to find out what our society means by sanity, perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the field of insanity. And what we mean by legality in the field of illegality" (Foucault 1982: 220).

With direct implications for seeing how productive power permeates, signifies, and conditions international security regimes, the constitutive role of *ethics and culture* is seen as cardinal. Produced moral and cultural discourses (Price 1995) function as legitimizing "regimes of truth," i.e., "the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned" (Foucault 1980: 131). Thus, they play the role of "codes of intelligibility" (Weldes et al. 1999: 16), serving both as conditions of possibility and horizons of the taken for granted. It is through these that the constitutive differentiation between "the civilized" and "the uncivilized," what Price (1995: 95) called "the discipline of civilization" in relation to prohibitionary chemical weapons regime, can be enacted. Of course, those systems are ordered contingently, therefore succumbing to

numerous transformations and changes in/of intensities. How can we understand possible relationships between prohibition/regulation and productive power? What are the conditions for and effects of productive power's perpetuation/neutralization in and around security regimes? For instance, nuclear weapons being portrayed as rich man's bomb vs. chemical weapons being depicted as poor man's bomb (Ibid: 98) with different expectations and courses of action, and involvement of other three types of power mediating and moderating operations of productive power. History of arms control and humanitarian disarmament is full of these separations and differentiations (Cooper 2011; Hynek 2011) but also of their dialogical reversals (e.g., the subversion of the dual standards through a complete subversion of what was to be an integrative category of WMDs by "poor men," cf. Price 1995: 99). Contingent yet potent symbolic and legal differentiation between small arms and light weapons, antipersonnel landmines (which used to be part of the former), and cluster bombs (which had been separate but were later narratively linked to antipersonnel landmines) can partially explain different fortunes when it comes to their respective regulations and prohibitions.

Roles of productive power in stigmatization and tabooization politics (with its principles of contingency, hierarchy/domination through civilizational discipline, and resistance, cf. Price 1995: 89–93) help the analyst to expose how moral opprobrium articulated in and around security regimes is being linked to more general moral and cultural horizons. Moreover, productive power helps to constitute seemingly noble discourses (e.g., many international security regimes greased by narratives on humanitarianism), which in turn stimulate positive affects. Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 11–11) called them micro-political "desiring production," i.e., the investment of psychical energy into the production of what is taken as reality, and "social-production" articulated as the utilization of corporeal energy, i.e., labor. These have been neglected if very important parts of the so-called political rationalities, or governmentalities, functioning as wider discourses of rule that structure socio-political orders and, within which grid subjects are constituted (Foucault 1988: 161). What else can explain, apart from generous financing by many actors, general reasons why NGOs and civil society in general have been more and more involved in molding of many of international security regimes, from agenda setting all the way to their verification, and why they have been increasingly using humanitarian language even in agendas such as the push for nuclear disarmament (cf. Hynek and Smetana 2016)? Positive inducement—and loop—through affects is beyond any doubts linked to "ethics creep" (Slim 2013: 3).

The next type there is *structural power*. This type of power sheds light on the creation of actors' capacities. Such creation is based on mutual—and positionally oriented—constitution and occurs through direct interactions between/among actors. While structures constrain actors' options in terms of who they are and what they want, they are, simultaneously, the products of actors' direct relations. In words of Barnett and Duvall (Ibid: 52–53), this type of power "produces the very social capacities of structural, or subject, positions in direct relation to one another, and the associated interests, that underlie and dispose action … A, exists only by virtue of its relation to structural position, B. The classical examples here are master–slave and capital-labor relations." Structural asymmetry has indeed

consequences. That is, especially, different distribution of benefits, obligations, and self-awareness (including one's understanding concerning how much determined its fate is). The key concept for structural power is the notion of hegemony, especially in neo-Gramscian sense. As Cox (1987: 7) maintained, "hegemony is more than the dominance of a single world power. It means the dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and the leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful. In such an order, production in particular countries becomes connected through the mechanisms of the world economy and linked into world systems of production." Lukes (1975:24) queried about hegemony hiding itself behind the veil of false conscience and thin legitimacy as follows: "is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things?"

The importance for regime analysis can be understood in relation to the (re)production of power hierarchies. This is where the notion of cultural hegemony and neo-Marxist analysis in particular can help to reveal them (but also, cf. Wendt and Friedheim 1995). Cultural production of actors' political identities plays an important role in this regard. When it comes to direct, functionally determined power relations and capacities, sound regime analysis inquiries into the nature, extent, and direction of contestation within a given regime. Of particular importance for regime theorization is the "un-politics" of regimes, here understood as hegemonic attempts to block initiatives concerning regime proposals through exercises of structural power and reproduction of power asymmetries (Newell 2005, 2008; Crenson 1971). Strange (1994: 24–32) recognized four components of structural power relevant for theorization of regimes, namely capacity to exercise control over the sphere of security, knowledge production, finance and material production. Explicitly from a regime-theoretical perspective, Gale (1998) analyzed meso-level structures in this light and specifically strategies of contestation and recreation of normative structures, privileges, and compliance mechanisms by global civil society actors. To him, international regimes could be comprehended as "instances of institutionalized hegemony" (Ibid: 275), and with its focus on non-state actors, and their counter-hegemonic struggles, testify to the link between political heterarchies and structural power (cf. Paterson et al. 2003). What is the dominant character of such contestation, i.e., does it take place among actors who subscribe to the hegemonic discourse (and can therefore be described as "technical"); among those actors and designated "free-riders," or among the above and those who seek to more radically change, break, or break *out* of the regime and establish alternative associations based on existing, temporarily subjugated types of knowledge or on appropriation and subversive reinterpretation of existing norms? What are, on the other hand, ideational and material reasons for nominally politico-juridically independent actors to embrace norms and obligations associated with dominant actors of a given period (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Kennedy 1988)?

Still more, there is *institutional power*. While its operations through specific interactions among actors are what it shares with the next in the line, i.e., compulsory power, its relational quality is diffuse, or indirect. As Barnett and Duvall (2005: 51) maintained in this context, “the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constraints the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others.” Thus, where it differs from compulsory power is particularly in the mediatory, international-institutional locus of power workings. Therefore, A and B do not enter into direct interaction here as temporal, bureaucratic and/or social distance kicks in. Indeed, temporal and bureaucratic distances require the use of historical institutionalist and rational-choice institutionalist accounts. Forms of institutionalization and degrees of rationalization, i.e., Foucault’ fourth and fifth guidelines, highlight significance of institutional power and its particular workings. As Hanrieder (2015) showed, complex political, legal, and bureaucratic relations between states and IOs account for design of IOs often being “circumscribed by path-dependent power dynamics,” leading to rationally explicable inertia and preferences for certain type of policy/norm diffusion (Ibid: 215). Here, an analysis of institutional programs, themselves derived from wider political rationalities effectuated by productive power, should be stressed as one of their most important functions is its regulatory function: “practices of bureaucratic hierarchism and proceduralism spread from state institutions into ‘non-state’ realms … This dispersal of the … regulation and government throughout society also illustrates the governmentalization of society” (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 17).

When it comes to relevance for regime analysis, operations of power such as decisional rules (either hegemonically or collectively established), formal/informal lines of responsibility and its division, configurations of linear path dependence—or on the other hand shifts through critical junctures, as well as diffused reciprocity, are being investigated. With theoretical and empirical focus on international regulatory regimes, manipulation of power configuration through collective institutional entrepreneurship becomes crucial for understanding the fashion in which institutional power operates on/through those regimes (Wijen and Ansari 2007). As the authors put it, there is “agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation” (Ibid: 1079). How has an established regime subsequently evolved, in relation to original hegemonic interests and calculations? Also, importantly for regime analysis, it is a question of durability, intensity, and evolutionary trajectories related to the formation/application of institutional rules. As Barnett and Duvall (Ibid: 52) argued, while “institutions … are established to help actors achieve mutually acceptable, even Pareto-superior, outcomes also create ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ to the extent that the ability to use the institution and accordingly, collective rewards—material and normative—are unevenly distributed into the future and beyond the intentions of the creators.” Therefore, an integral part of analyzing the institutional power is focus on

indirect (and often unintended) consequences, such as institutional effects of particular agenda setting, facilitating/mediating conditions, forms of interdependence, as well as nesting and/or path-dependency pathologies (cf. Clegg et al. 2006; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore 1993). Indeed, such an analysis also needs to consider the institutional mediation form the position of the subaltern, or weak actors. Sometimes, and perhaps surprisingly, it may be linked, in terms of indirect effects, to the institutional limits of hegemonic power (consider the subversive discourse of the weak states on chemical weapons enabled by the previously established Western legal and political connection between those weapons and hegemonic possession of nuclear weapons).

Finally, there is *compulsory power*. It is based on a series of unit-based interactions through which actors get into relations with each other directly. As Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48) maintain, "compulsory power exists in the direct control of one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another." It is here where Dahl's (1957: 202–3) classical definition of power, defined as the ability A to get B to do what B what B otherwise would not do, applies. In this context, one can think about one's direct influence over other actors exercised through practices and discourses. Both material and ideational resources are thus being utilized and put into workings. The important feature, which goes beyond Dahl's formulation and is noted by Barnett and Duvall (Ibid: 50), is the possibility of compulsory power operating in an unintentional fashion. It is for this reason that "compulsory power is best understood from the perspective of the recipient, not the deliverer, of the direct action" (Ibid: 50). Indeed, this does not square readily with existing IR scholarship which has—both generally and in regime analysis, traditionally focused on deliverers, especially wielding of compulsory power by dominant states in the system.

When it comes to significance of compulsory power for theorization of regimes, three points are highlighted in particular. First, great power politics and diplomacy needs to be examined. Specifically, that is to focus on how, and for what reasons, great powers form and maintain international regimes. Systemically, hegemony and its specific manifestations need to be studied. Can we identify a specific hegemon in a given regime? What has been the nature of legitimization of regime formation? How has it been accepted internationally? In terms of mechanisms of power, can we recognize coercion, peer-pressure, normative compliance, bandwagoning, bribing, etc. in this context? What has been their specific configuration, both in terms of spatiality and temporality? What have been directly produced unintended consequences, especially in light of resistance and subversion from other actors, and their coalitions? Second, the role of IOs needs to be studied when it comes to compulsory power and regime analysis. When it comes to this type of power operation, especially the use of their specific targeting needs to be systematized. What have been ways in which IOs have put into use their sources of authority? What kinds of authority, and/or their configuration (e.g., expert, moral, delegated, political/legal), have been deployed to alter behavior of specific actors? What have been the specific mechanisms and technologies of power (e.g., teaching, persuasion, and sanctions) used for this alteration? Last but not least, the compulsory power of non-state actors needs to be scrutinized. When it comes to regime analysis, especially the role of

NGOs and broader transnational advocacy networks has been well documented (Risse et al. 2013; Arts 2000; Price 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 1995). What have been their sources of compulsory power (e.g., moral authority, field knowledge and recognized history of practice, informal/formal standing and/or status)? What specific technologies and mechanisms of power did they utilize to alter other actors' interests and identities (e.g., naming, shaming, tabooization, whistle-blowing)? However, while those actors are usually perceived positively, their possible blocking and/or disruptive potential needs to be factored in, too (e.g., actors representing business/legal interests which clash with international prohibitive/regulatory attempts, and targeting directly other actors; actors physically fighting against such attempts and their proponents).

Conclusion

Theorization of regimes—and that includes international security regimes—is not dead, albeit significant theoretical criticism has been swirling around theoretical grounds from the very start. Judged by the number of regime analysis publications in academic journals and books, theorization of regimes has seen its peak, with more recent contributions having focused on refinements and new venues of limited ambition, such as regimes interplay, complexity. Therefore, theorization of regimes has had many features of an explicit, progressive scientific research program—to invoke Lakatos' (1970) understanding of scientific work—for much of it life. The move from neorealism and hegemonic stability theory to neoliberal institutionalist regime theory, and from there to theorization of cognitivism and stronger incorporation of the role of ideas and norms, can be understood as "progressive problem shifts," both theoretically and empirically. That is, however, within an image of the IR field remaining intact when it comes to the nature of its general paradigm (Kuhn's "normal science") and "disciplinary" standards. As was shown, the development in and around the field of IR experienced two trends which coincided with the existence and refinement of normal-scientific regimes theorization.

The trends—i.e., the opening the disciplinary boundaries (since the Third Great Debate) and the rise of theoretical and analytical eclecticism, which are still visible and even stronger today, have synergistically—and irreversibly—worked to change the IR landscape. For some, this has been for the better, for others, the perception has not been so positive, as the special issue of EJIR on the end of IR theory showed (Dunne et al. 2013; Reus-Smit 2013; Lake 2013). Be as it may, it could be argued that the development of regime-theoretical research program has displayed signs of what Lakatos would have called "negative heuristics," i.e., certain propositions of a research program that are non-revisable. Here, it was regime theorization based on "ism" of one sort or another, just with a more limited range, state-centralism, and marginalization of insights from radical constructivism and post-structuralism. For these reasons, this article, and the entire special issue, embrace a cautiously open-ended, eclectic position that puts into the center the discussion conceptualization of power, its exercises, multiplicities, as well as general outline of relevance for

theorization of international security regimes. From Lakatosian "hard-core" research programmatic perspective, this looks as an example of epistemological pluralism, but for reasons driven by plastic understanding of workings of those regimes vis-à-vis operations of power. Including productive power, for many reasons the most underdeveloped one when it comes to normal science of regime theorization, which cannot be ignored for the sake of its constitutive effects.

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