



THE END OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA: A MULTIPLE CAUSAL FACTOR EXPLANATION

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This article attempts to explain the decision by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) guerrilla movement to bring to an end the longest internal armed conflict in Latin America. It does so by analyzing changes in interparty, intraparty, and contextual factors.

INTRODUCTION

After more than five decades of internal armed conflict and numerous failed peace processes, the peace negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP)¹ successfully ended with the signing of a peace accord in August 2016.² This article identifies the factors that led FARC to seek a negotiated settlement instead of continuing the armed conflict. Unlike analyses that explain the guerillas’ decision solely on the basis of the changing military correlation of forces, this article offers a multicausal explanation that includes internal and international political factors. Considerations related to their willingness to abandon the armed struggle throughout the four-year peace process and the factors that led to the successful end of negotiations transcend the objective of the article.

A serious consideration of a negotiated solution to a seemingly intractable conflict implies a dramatic change in decision-making processes, from a routine exercise regarding the appropriate ways to pursue the war, assign resources, or neutralize the enemy’s advances, to a global reconsideration of the strategy.³ “Ripeness” theory suggests that the decision to negotiate takes place when it is clear to the parties that the armed struggle will not lead to victory and that a negotiated solution that will allow them to achieve, at least partially, some of

their objectives is more beneficial than the continuation of the armed conflict. This is said to occur when there is a confluence of objective factors related to the military correlation of forces—mutually hurting stalemate (although not necessarily with the same intensity for both parties) and inability to escalate the conflict further, imminent defeat, and subjective factors including recognition of the stalemate and perception that a negotiated solution is indeed possible.⁴

Although accepting this general outline, this analysis is guided by “readiness” theory, which abandons the necessary causation implicit in ripeness theory in favor of a “multiple causal factor model” that takes into account “environmental conditions and psychological states,” recognizes that different parties can have different motivations to end the conflict, and that variables can substitute or compensate for one another. More importantly, it offers the possibility of examining the motive of each side separately instead of focusing on “joint states of mind.”⁵ The factors most influential in the actors’ evaluation may change, as they change their opinion with regard to the possibility of success or failure or the importance of one or another concrete advantage and estimate the costs and benefits of continuing the conflict in different ways.⁶

In order to understand FARC’s motivation to engage in negotiations, this article will follow Christopher Mitchell’s analytical framework to identify changing trends in interparty, intraparty, and contextual factors.⁷

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE

Interparty Factors

The Correlation of Forces

The conflict underwent significant changes over its fifty-plus year duration. While during the 1960s and 1970s it remained rather marginal and limited to peripheral rural areas, during the 1980s it experienced a “quantitative and qualitative leap,”⁸ as a consequence of FARC’s military and political strengthening during the peace process with the Betancur administration (1982–86). During this period, FARC extended its presence to large parts of the national territory and brought the war close to important economic, administrative, and political centers, and by the end of the decade it operated in close to six hundred municipalities and exercised significant control in two hundred of them.⁹

Due to criticism by some sectors regarding the relevance of the armed struggle, in the following decade FARC distanced itself from the Communist Party of Colombia and promoted clandestine structures to strengthen its political base of support.¹⁰ In addition, it became financially and militarily autonomous as a result of its involvement in coal, oil, gold, cattle ranching, commercial agriculture, and illicit crops.¹¹ Some of its most important “fronts”¹² operated in areas of cultivation of coca and poppy, which allowed FARC to significantly increase its financial resources.

Between 1991 and 1994, there was a slight reduction in attacks against towns; a more significant fall in the number of assaults and attacks against installations; a sharp increase in armed contacts, terrorist actions, and kidnappings; and a reduction in the number of insurgents killed or captured.¹³ In 1994, the number of armed actions by the guerrillas equaled or surpassed the level of the three previous years. Despite partial success, the state’s efforts were not sufficiently forceful to weaken the armed groups to the point of demanding their surrender or reducing its options to negotiating or disappearing. During the last twenty days of the César Gaviria administration, the guerrillas carried out an average of 17.6 actions daily, including attacks against military garrisons, and managed to isolate some areas by hampering transportation.¹⁴

In an attempt to consolidate strategic control in some areas with the objective of combining rural war and urban insurrections, FARC created “blocks” that brought together five or more “fronts,” confronted the armed forces directly, and tried to take the war to the cities through “Bolivarian Militias.”¹⁵ By the end of the 1990s, FARC had sixty-five fronts, in addition to urban militias in various important cities, and the number of combatants was estimated at between twelve thousand and fifteen thousand.¹⁶

Another important trend was FARC’s strategy of strengthening its local power. Between 1991 and 1994, the guerrillas increased their presence at the local level, which allowed them to take an active part in regional development plans and the distribution of budgets and bureaucratic posts. They also participated in the institutional political arena by forging alliances with candidates running for mayor and governor, city councils, and provincial assemblies.

Between the mid-1990s and the first years of the 2000s, FARC reached its maximum military capacity. In actions that left a high number of military and civilian casualties and hundreds of soldiers in

captivity, it attacked military bases and police stations in various points of the national geography and even took briefly a small provincial capital. On the other hand, it intensified the kidnapping of political personalities and pressed for the resignation of candidates to local elections.¹⁷ Between 1996 and 2002, including the years of the peace process with the Pastrana administration, FARC attacks on towns averaged sixty-two per year, in comparison with an average of thirty-seven in the previous eight years, and the number of combats between 1996 and 2002 averaged about 380 per year.¹⁸

At the same time, sectors of the local elites, threatened by FARC's growing presence and capability and the relative success of Patriotic Union¹⁹ in some regions, promoted the creation of paramilitary groups. This counterinsurgent alliance was soon joined by an agrarian class linked to drug trafficking, interested in consolidating territorial control.²⁰ By 1994, the paramilitary groups operated in 317 municipalities,²¹ and by the end of the decade had significant presence in various regions, and presumably received military training from American and Israeli mercenaries.²² In an effort to build a new rural order, by 1997 the majority of them came together in the *Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) (Colombia's United Self-Defense Organization), and cooperated with the armed forces in the counterinsurgency struggle, although most of its actions targeted civilian leftists and leaders of social organizations.²³

After the failure of the peace process in 2002, FARC escalated the conflict. By the end of the year, 158 municipalities did not have police and thirty-one mayors had been forced to abandon their towns;²⁴ a year later, close to 250 mayors governed from the provincial capitals due to lack of guarantees to their security. The kidnapping of political leaders also increased.²⁵

As of 2003, the fortunes of war began to turn against FARC as a consequence of changes that began in 1999: professionalization of the army, improved intelligence gathering, adoption of a more proactive, mobile and offensive military strategy, creation of mobile brigades with airborne troops, strengthening of the marine infantry and the air force, capacity for night combat, and modernization of communications.²⁶

The government elected in 2002 set the objective of recovering control of the national territory and guaranteed a permanent presence of the state in all municipalities of the country. It rebuilt police stations destroyed by the guerrillas, created the Network of Peasant Soldiers, and increased the number of professional soldiers and mobile

brigades. By mid-2003, only 5 percent of municipalities did not have police presence.²⁷ An army offensive forced FARC's rearguard in Cundinamarca to withdraw from the area, and between 2004 and 2007 the number of combats initiated by the armed forces surpassed the number of combats initiated by the guerrillas in twenty-eight departments.²⁸ The number of attacks against towns was reduced to an average of 4.5 per year between 2003 and 2012.²⁹

On the other hand, with the objective of retaking control of the southwestern part of the country, in February 2003, 27,000 soldiers were deployed in areas of traditional FARC presence and important source of financial resources. While the United States government initially tried to keep the antinarcotics war separate from the anti-insurgency war, it later accepted that the confrontation with the guerrillas could be an unintended consequence of antinarcotics operations and finally pressed for a combination of the two wars.³⁰

With the strengthening of the armed forces, the administrations of Álvaro Uribe (2002–10) and Juan Manuel Santos achieved important victories that clearly inclined the military balance in favor of the state, forcing FARC to change its strategy. The guerrillas were forced to withdraw from areas surrounding big cities, stopped confronting the army directly, and began to operate in small units; the majority of actions included the obstruction of roads, attacks against infrastructure, extortion and kidnapping, sabotage, ambushes, control of mobility corridors, and generation of resources.³¹ In a clear indication of the changing military advantage, between 2008 and 2011 the armed forces managed to kill three of the most important FARC leaders: Raúl Reyes, "Mono Jojoy," and Alfonso Cano.³²

Intraparty Factors

Mitchell argues that although conflict actors are frequently perceived as monolithic and cohesive, the decision to bring a conflict to an end is likely to produce deep cleavages within an actor, due to different perceptions with regard to the real situation in the conflict, the adversary's intentions, the possibilities to find a solution, the most beneficial course of action, and estimates as to how the end of the conflict would affect the power of some leaders or factions.³³ This makes it necessary to reach internal consensus, strengthening those sectors that tend to favor a negotiated solution. One problem is that the effectiveness of the anti-insurgency campaign may yield uneven

results, affecting more severely some factions than others, which may generate different structures of preference within an actor. If the overall situation is not clearly unfavorable, factions least affected by the enemy's offensive or in process of expansion may advocate the maintenance of the status quo.

An external observer's evaluation of the internal situation within FARC is not an easy task and must be estimated indirectly. Unlike the "dispersion of command" characteristic of many rebel groups,³⁴ FARC has many of the features that Balcells and Kalyvas³⁵ associate with "robust insurgencies," especially a highly disciplined armed organization and the centralization of authority. It is not unreasonable to argue that despite the internal debates that undoubtedly took place, its traditional hierarchical, centralized, and collective structure of authority managed to keep contradictions under control, giving the peace process at least the benefit of the doubt. This is evidenced by the fact that minority dissident factions only made public their dissatisfaction during the final stages of negotiations.

Contextual Factors

Public Opinion

Throughout the 1990s, an estimated fifty million Colombians participated in mobilizations against the war and in favor of a political solution to the conflict.³⁶ As a consequence of the above-mentioned changes, as of 2009 the armed conflict was no longer perceived by the population as the country's main problem, which diminished the momentum for these citizens' initiatives (Figure 1).

Nevertheless, as evidenced in the following table, throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the majority of public opinion supported a negotiated solution. This was the case even during the two administrations of Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010), who came to power with the promise of defeating FARC (Figure 2).

The International Context, Military Weakness, and an "Enticing Opportunity"

To military weakness must be added changes in the international political context after the end of the Cold War. Although the demise of the communist bloc undoubtedly had an impact, it did not affect




Figure 1. Perception of the armed conflict as the country’s main problem.³⁷




Figure 2. Public support for a negotiated solution.³⁸

the Colombian guerrillas as immediately or deeply as it did rebel movements elsewhere. Despite their international sympathies and alignment, the Colombian insurgents have operated rather autonomously, following strategies that respond to the internal situation, and

were not dependent on the financial support of foreign powers. Nevertheless, changes closer to home had a more direct and significant impact. During the 1980s, the Colombian guerrillas felt as “a fundamental component of a vast revolutionary struggle”³⁹ as the wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Perú were taking place. However, the end of the internal wars in Central America and the defeat of the Peruvian guerrillas brought the dream of continental revolution to an end.

As we have indicated elsewhere,⁴⁰ by itself military inferiority seldom forces automatically an actor to abandon the armed struggle. In fact, it often becomes an incentive to persist in this course of action, in the hope of reverting this situation and generating more favorable conditions for negotiations. After all, as history has repeatedly shown, the fortunes of war can turn in unexpected directions. Despite unfavorable military trends, FARC’s options were not limited to negotiating or disappearing. The capacity to wage irregular warfare does not imply the ability to openly confront the official armed forces, and the support of some sectors, local control in some areas, and resources at their disposal would probably have allowed FARC to persist in the war effort. Actors that find themselves in conditions of military inferiority or facing certain defeat can always find reasons to persist in this manner.

Although “shock theory,”⁴¹ which holds that actors are likely to reconsider their options as a result of a high-impact event, has some value for explaining the decision to negotiate (especially FARC’s loss of many top leaders in the years leading to negotiations and the Army’s consistent military effectiveness), an “impeding catastrophe” did not seem to be a real possibility. In fact, as argued earlier, FARC was able to adjust its strategy to survive as a classical guerrilla organization, while asserting a continued presence and influence in some areas. What the state managed to achieve, however, was the “strategic defeat” of the armed struggle.

Beyond the trends in the military correlation of forces and international isolation, there was an important political factor that motivated FARC: the prospect of becoming disconnected from the broader struggles of sectors it claimed to represent. FARC was unable to generate a strong base of support in the bulk of the population and did not manage to generate urban insurrections or to offer a political project able to bring together different social sectors, including the middle class. Despite the deficiencies of Colombian democracy, the country

did not have a “modernizing authoritarian” regime or a military dictatorship against which different sectors could come together in a wide opposition movement, conditions that, as Robert Dix⁴² pointed out, were key to guaranteeing the rebel victories in Cuba and Nicaragua. Surviving in these changed conditions ran the risk of condemning FARC to “permanent rebellion or endemic political delinquency,” where war becomes a subculture, a regular economic activity, and a policy whose objectives are its reproduction in time.⁴³

The peace process thus offered an “enticing opportunity”⁴⁴ that presented negotiations as a preferable alternative to the continuation of the war. In clear contrast to its predecessor, the Santos administration’s willingness to offer a dignified way out by negotiating points that have always been part of the rebels’ agenda and supported by broad social sectors, instead of simply demanding the surrender of weapons in exchange for plans of reintegration for rebel combatants, gave FARC the opportunity to present itself as representative of the interests of the majority of the population, advocating socioeconomic and political reforms that, although compatible with the capitalist system and liberal democracy, may have an impact on the socioeconomic and political democratization on a national scale.⁴⁵ This was essential to overcoming the perception of the counterpart’s intransigence and its reticence to consider an acceptable formula of understanding.

Previous peace processes with FARC were undertaken in the absence of the favorable conditions suggested by “ripeness” and “readiness” theories.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Colombian case is one among many cases that show that the removal of the “deep causes” of the war is not a necessary condition to bring an armed conflict to an end.⁴⁷ However, although the peace accord will not resolve the deep inequalities and exclusion that prevail in the country, it opens possibilities and provides mechanisms to begin to address them. Whether FARC has abandoned the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and adopted a “less rigid” ideology that combines nationalist and leftist ideas, as some observers argue,⁴⁸ or whether, despite being more flexible and less dogmatic, it continues to adhere to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and the defense of socialism, as others suggest,⁴⁹ is less important than showing that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, rebel organizations are not immune to changes in the context of the conflict and that their structures of preference do not remain unchanged. Empirical evidence suggests that although wars involving Marxist groups tend to last longer and be more lethal, they are more likely to

end through negotiations than in rebel victory.⁵⁰ It is thus not surprising that, when confronted with attractive alternatives as a result of lowered aspirations and recognition that maximalist objectives will not be achieved, leaders prone to resort to warmongering rhetoric may prove to be very flexible.⁵¹

As stated in the introduction, this article has concentrated on analyzing factors that led FARC to seriously consider a negotiated alternative (motivation). The other factor central to readiness theory (optimism) refers to the possibility that negotiations will produce an acceptable agreement. As such, it is more directly related to the mechanisms and strategies used in the peace process and is thus beyond the scope of this article.

NOTES

1. FARC added People's Army (EP) to its name in 1982. However, as is customary in Colombia, in this article it is simply referred to as FARC.

2. This agreement, however, was rejected by a narrow majority of 50.21 percent in a referendum held on October 2, 2016. The current agreement was approved by Congress on November 24, 2016, after incorporating some of the concerns voiced by the opponents to the initial agreement.

3. Christopher Mitchell, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 27, No. 3 (1983): 495–520.

4. William Zartman, "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation" in *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, eds. Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1986), 205–227; William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, eds. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2000), 225–250.

5. Dean Pruitt, *Wither Ripeness Theory?* (Fairfax, Virginia: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 2005).

6. Christopher Mitchell, "Cómo poner fin a guerras y conflictos: decisiones, racionalidad y trampas," *Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales* Vol. 127 (1991): 35–58.

7. Christopher Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's, 1981).

8. Eric Lair, "Transformaciones y fluidez de la guerra en Colombia: un enfoque militar," in *Violencias y estrategias colectivas en la región andina: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela*, ed. Gonzalo Sánchez and Eric Lair (Bogotá: IFEA, IEPRI, Editorial Norma, 2004), 103–143.

9. Camilo Echandía, "Expansión territorial de las guerrillas colombianas: geografía, economía y violencia," in *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*, ed.

Malcolm Deas and María V. Llorente (Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes, Editorial Norma 1999), 99–149.

10. Juan G. Ferro and Graciela Uribe, *El orden de la guerra. Las FARC-EP: Entre la organización y la política* (Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano (CEJA), 2002).

11. Alfredo Rangel, “Las FARC-EP: una Mirada actual,” in *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*, ed. Malcolm Deas and María V. Llorente (Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes, Editorial Norma), 21–51.

12. A front is normally composed of 100 combatants.

13. Ciro Carvajal, “Perspectivas de acción frente a la guerrilla colombiana” (Masters thesis, School of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 1994).

14. *Ibid.*, 45.

15. Eduardo Pizarro, *Una democracia asediada. Balance y perspectivas del conflicto armado en Colombia* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004).

16. Echandía, *Expansión territorial*, 120.

17. Camilo Echandía and Eduardo Bechara, “Conducta de la guerrilla durante el gobierno Uribe Vélez: de las lógicas de control territorial a las lógicas de control estratégico,” *Análisis Político* Vol. 57 (2006): 31–54.

18. Estimates based on Grupo de Memoria Histórica, *¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad* (Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013), and Soledad Granada, Jorge Restrepo, and Andrés Vargas, “El agotamiento de la política de seguridad: evolución y transformaciones recientes en el conflicto armado colombiano,” in *Guerra y violencia en Colombia. Herramientas e interpretaciones*, ed. Jorge Restrepo and David Aponte (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009), 27–124.

19. The Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica) was a political party created during the peace process of the Betancur administration with the objective of facilitating a FARC transition to institutional political life. In the following years more than 4,500 of its militants, 2 of its presidential candidates, 9 members of Congress, 11 mayors, 14 members of provincial assemblies, and 145 city council members were systematically murdered. In just one municipality, El Castillo, 4 Patriotic Union mayors were assassinated.

20. Alejandro Reyes, “Paramilitares en Colombia: contexto, aliados y consecuencias,” *Análisis Político* Vol. 12 (1991): 35–43.

21. Fernando Cubides, “Los paramilitares y su estrategia,” in *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*, eds. Malcolm Deas and María V. Llorente (Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes, Editorial Norma, 1999), 151–199.

22. Comisión Andina de Juristas Seccional Colombiana, *Nordeste antioqueño y Magdalena Medio* (Bogotá: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1993).

23. Mauricio Romero, “Democratización política y contra reforma paramilitar en Colombia,” in *Violencias y estrategias colectivas en la región andina: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela*, ed. Gonzalo Sánchez and Eric Lair (Bogotá: IFEA, IEPRI, Editorial Norma, 2004), 332–357.

24. Camilo Echandía, “El fin de la invulnerabilidad de las FARC. El estado actual del conflicto armado en Colombia,” *Nueva Sociedad* Vol. 217 (1998): 4–13.

25. Pizarro, *Una democracia asediada*.

26. Echandía and Bechara, Conducta de la guerrilla; Pizarro, *Una democracia asediada*.
27. Pizarro, *Una democracia asediada*.
28. Echandía, El fin de la invulnerabilidad.
29. Estimates based on Grupo de Memoria Histórica, *¡Basta Ya!*
30. William LeoGrande and Kenneth Sharpe, "Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia's New Violencia," *World Policy Journal* Vol. 17, No. 3 (2000): 1–11.
31. Echandía and Bechara, Conducta de la guerrilla.
32. Two more important leaders died in those years. The legendary "Tirofijo," founder and top commander of the organization, died of natural causes, and Iván Ríos, a member of the FARC Secretariat, was killed by one of his personal guards.
33. Christopher Mitchell, *Evitando daños: reflexiones sobre la 'situación de madurez' de un conflicto* (Vizcaya: Gernika-Gogoratuz, 1996).
34. Jane Holl, "When War Doesn't Work: Understanding the Relationship Between the Battlefield and the Negotiating Table," in *Stopping the Killing. How Civil Wars End*, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 269–291.
35. Laia Balcells and Stathis Kalyvas, "Did Marxism Make a Difference? Marxist Rebellions and National Liberation Movements" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2, 2010).
36. A. Villarraga, *Biblioteca de la Paz* (Bogotá: Fundación Cultura Democrática, 2013).
37. Author's own elaboration based on Miguel García, Juan Rodríguez-Raga, Mitchell Seligson, and Elizabeth Zeichmeister, *Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia y las Américas, 2014. Dilemas de la democracia y desconfianza institucional en el marco del proceso de paz*. (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Observatorio de la Democracia, Centro nacional de consultoría, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, 2014).
38. Author's own elaboration based on Miguel García, Jorge Montalvo, and Mitchell Seligson, *Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia, 2015. Actitudes democráticas en zonas de consolidación territorial* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Observatorio de la Democracia, Centro nacional de consultoría, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, 2015).
39. Daniel Pécaut, "Las FARC: fuentes de su longevidad y de la conservación de su cohesión," *Análisis Político* Vol. 21, No. 63 (2008): 22–50.
40. Pedro Valenzuela, "Consideraciones sobre el proceso de paz con el ELN," in *¿Por qué negociar con el ELN?*, ed. Víctor de Currea (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2014), 167–182.
41. Shock theory argues that actors are likely to reconsider their options as a result of a high-impact event. Less relevant for explaining the Colombian case is New Leaders theory, which argues that a change in leadership facilitates negotiations, as new leaders are not responsible for previous policies or are not viewed with as much suspicion by the adversary. Although new leaders came to occupy commanding positions within FARC, they were already part of the top leadership

in its collective structure of authority. The same applies to the government side: President Santos was the Minister of Defense during the Uribe administration, and as such responsible for some of the most decisive military actions against FARC and for the deaths of the FARC leaders mentioned earlier.

42. Robert Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," *Polity* Vol. 16, No. 3 (1984): 423–446.

43. Hernando Valencia, *La justicia de las armas* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1993), 101–102.

44. Mitchell, *Evitando daños*, 6.

45. Pedro Valenzuela, "Out of the Darkness? The Hopes for Peace in Colombia," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Stockholm: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27–36.

46. One important reason for the failure of the peace process with the Pastrana administration (1998–2002) was that it took place at a moment of FARC's military ascendance and increased territorial influence, which led many observers, and probably many FARC leaders, to view a rebel victory as a possibility. Without the change in the military balance in favor of the state, it would probably not have seriously considered engaging in negotiations in terms acceptable to the adversary.

47. Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

48. Román Ortiz, "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol. 25 (2002): 127–143.

49. Ferro and Uribe, *El orden de la guerra*, 121–125.

50. Balcells and Kalyvas, "Did Marxism Make a Difference?"

51. Jeffrey Dixon, "Intervention, Capabilities, Costs, and the Outcome of Civil Wars" (PhD diss., Rice University, 2001).