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Rising Powers Quarterly Volume 2, Issue 2, 2017, 125-147
Abstract
For the last 20 years Brazil pursued an activist foreign policy both in relation to
its own region and the wider world. Yet, in recent years, many Brazil’s initiatives
have stalled or collapsed. The argument put forward is that this inertia is largely
due to the almost total absence of Brazilian political leadership, especially in South
America. Yet, such leadership is urgently needed in the face of multiple regional
and international challenges, with the political and economic crisis serving here as
an illustrative case study. Particular attention here will also be paid to the role of
UNASUR in this crisis.
Using the conceptual framework of Complexity and Human System Dynamics
(HSD), it will be argued that Brazil cannot assume the leadership role that is needed
because its foreign policy is marked by a lack of overarching objective, muddled
foreign policy execution and a lack of clear channels through which to formulate
such a coherent policy which has the chance to achieve its strategic objectives. The
article will propose ways for Brazil to redefine its foreign policy approach and objectives
to become the dynamic leader the region needs.
Keywords
Brazil, Venezuela, Leadership, Crisis, Complexity, Human System Dynamics
Article
Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian
Foreign Policy and What it Means for the
Region
Kai Enno Lehmann
Institute of International Relations, University of São Paulo (IRI-USP)
klehmann@usp.br
Introduction
Brazil is South America’s dominant country. It is by far the biggest in terms of
territory and population, has the biggest economy in the region and sits on an
enormous pool of natural resources. Yet, for most of its history Brazil was not a
‘natural’ leader, its foreign policy being focussed principally on furthering economic
development and ensuring autonomy, especially in relation to the United
States. Its own region was often little more than an afterthought to these broader
considerations.
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Only with the arrival of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as President in 1995, followed
by President Lula, did Brazil assume a more proactive foreign policy posture.
Trying to engage across the world and to reform the international political
architecture, Brazil was also at the forefront of promoting regional cooperation in
South America for both political and economic purposes.
Little of this activism survives today and some of its achievements are crumbling.
Mired in a domestic political and economic crisis, the country has been largely
absent from the international stage. At the same time, regional cooperation has
essentially come to a halt.This is both regrettable and dangerous, bearing in mind
the multiple challenges faced within the region. Brazilian leadership is urgently
needed to navigate these challenges and could make a significant and positive
contribution to solving the various problems confronted.
This article aims to answer three questions: What factors explain this breakdown
of foreign policy activism by Brazil over the last few years? What does this breakdown
mean for both Brazil as it engages with the world and, more importantly, in
South America? What can be done to overcome this inertia?
To answer these questions, the article will use Complexity and Human Systems
Dynamics as a conceptual framework to reinterpret mainly existing scholarship,
arguing that this approach offers a set of fresh perspectives which will enable
analysts and foreign policy makers to address the problems many of them have
themselves identified. The current situation in Venezuela will serve as an illustrative
case study. Out of this case study, some original conclusions will be drawn on
the possible actions to address the problems identified. Areas for further research
will also be outlined.
Brazilian Foreign Policy in Perspective: A Brief History
Brazilian foreign policy has,historically,been marked by a great deal of continuity.
In broad terms, one can identify the following principles: First, there has been a
search for autonomy (Saraiva 2014). Fonseca (1998, p. 368) defines this concept
as ‘a desire to influence the open agenda with values that translate diplomatic
tradition and capacity to see the international order with one’s own eyes and fresh
perspectives.’
A second key theme has been the idea of using foreign policy as a tool for national
development. Lafer (2001, p. 108) describes this as ‘the objective par excellence
of [Brazilian] foreign policy, as a public policy devoted to translating domestic
necessities into external possibilities.’ In this sense ‘development [is] a means to
reduc[e] the power asymmetries that were responsible for South American vulnerability’
(ibid, p. 81), making clear the link between the need for development
and the quest for autonomy.
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Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian Foreign Policy and What it Means for the Region
A third principle is the desire to be recognized. Lima (2005, p. 6) argues that ‘this
aspiration turns into foreign policy’s very reason for [being].’She traces this desire
back to the late 19th century when Brazil joined multiple international agreements
and organizations in various policy spheres.The fear of being marginalized
manifested itself even more strongly at the start of the 20th century, when Brazil
made a point of participating in the Hague conference of 1907 and the Paris
peace conference of 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War. On both of
these occasions, the country argued strongly for the equality of states and against
the distinction between ‘great’ and ‘other’ powers (Lafer 2005, pp. 68-74).
These principles have survived as guides for Brazilian foreign policy ever since.
Yet, how these principles have been interpreted and translated into action has
changed significantly.
To get a sense of this evolution, one only has to look at the meaning of the
term ‘autonomy’ in Brazilian foreign policy. For many years, especially during the
Cold War, autonomy essentially meant the country keeping its distance from, and
therefore keeping out of, the superpower disputes of that time. Only with the end
of Brazil’s military dictatorship in 1985 and the subsequent end of the Cold War
in 1989/90 did Brazil slowly begin to adopt a posture of ‘autonomy through participation’(Fonseca
Jr. 1998, p. 374). Brazil also started to promote specific values,
such as democracy, ‘a positive attitude in relation to human rights, social justice,
search for peace [and] non-proliferation’ (ibid, p. 374). These were seen as crucial
preconditions to be able to participate fully within the international system in
a post-Cold War world which witnessed the expansion of democracy and the
supposed ‘victory’ of the liberal capitalist order at the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama
1992).
These strategic considerations were taken further by the governments led by Presidents
Cardoso and Lula. Both not only wanted Brazil to actively participate in
the international political system but integrate with it. This phase of ‘autonomy
through integration’ has been seen as the high point of Brazilian activism in foreign
policy, which manifested itself in a renewed push for reform of the UN
Security Council, active political engagement with the broadly defined ‘global
south’, the push for the creation of new, and the deepening of old, international
mechanisms of cooperation, such as the G20 or the BRICS grouping of developing
countries (de Almeida 2009). Brazil, then, became an active promoter of
international cooperation, regional integration and a keen advocate for profound
reform of the international political system.
This change had a significant impact on Brazil’s relationship with its own region,
South America. Here, since the early 1990s, Brazil led a series of initiatives, creating
an ‘alphabet soup’ of regional- and sub-regional organizations with a wide
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range of responsibilities across a wide array of policy areas (Glickhouse 2012).
The creation of organizations such as MERCOSUR,the Common Market of the
Southern Cone, was a reflection of Brazil’s desire to promote the region as well as
manifest its own leadership credentials (Sweig 2010; Rothkopf 2012). It was also
a reflection of an emerging consensus across the political spectrum about the kind
of economic and political model to follow, inspired by the success of, in particular,
the European Single Market.This consensus centred on a belief in free trade and
the benefits of opening Brazil up to the wider world. In the region this meant a
move away from ‘closed’ towards ‘open’ regionalism and a belief in the utility of
regionalism as a tool for advancing particular national interests. This consensus
was shared, broadly speaking, across the region and benefited greatly from the
geopolitical stability of South America (Malamud 2010).
Yet, little of this activism survives today. In fact, many commentators have argued
that Brazil is currently in headlong retreat from the international stage (Stuenkel
2014). The country has made deliberate choices, for instance, to disengage from
key international forums on security (ibid). This disengagement is also reflected
in the closing of embassies and consular representations across the globe, as well
as other cut backs at the Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty (Stuenkel 2016). As a consequence,
many of the initiatives started by Brazil in recent times lie moribond
or abandoned. For instance, MERCOSUR is essentially paralyzed, reflecting a
broader trend of the abandonment of regionalism as a foreign policy tool (Malamud
2012). With this, Brazil’s push for profound reforms of the international
political architecture has come to a halt without showing durable results (Malamud
2017).
Commentators have put forward a series of arguments to explain this situation.
Some point to the country’s internal political and economic problems as an explanation
for its passive posture (Stuenkel 2016). Others point to former President’s
Dilma’s relative lack of interest in foreign affairs, in sharp contrast to her two
immediate predecessors (Zanini 2014). Yet others, however, looking at the more
strategic level, point out that, even during its period of activism, Brazil’s foreign
policy was always hampered by what some have called ‘ambiguities’ and ‘strategic
confusion’ (Hurrel 2008; Gardini 2015).
These arguments have considerable merit in explaining current Brazilian foreign
policy inertia. In what follows I accept these arguments but interpret them
through a new and innovative conceptual framework to explain this inertia: Complexity
and Human Systems Dynamics.This framework will then be used to outline
some tentative suggestions for action to overcome the problems identified.
This is crucial since, whether it is the political and economic crisis in Venezuela,
the repercussions of the peace process in Colombia or the impact of the Trumppresidency
in the United States, the very near future is likely to present Brazil,
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Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian Foreign Policy and What it Means for the Region
and South America, with formidable challenges which will require clear policies
and effective leadership.
Foreign Policy as a Complex Adaptive System
Whilst many have acknowledged the multiple problems currently faced by Brazil,
in these debates the nature of these problems have often been defined as
complicated. As Edwards (2002, p. 17) points out, with complicated problems ‘it
is possible to work out solutions and implement them.’ Therefore, UN Security
Council reform is complicated and will require a lot of effort. Reforming the international
political architecture is complicated and will require a lot of effort and
negotiations. Dealing with the Venezuelan crisis is complicated and will require
a lot of effort.
However, as Lehmann (2012) or Geyer & Rihani (2010) have shown international
politics and, by extension, foreign policy, are not complicated but complex
issues, marked by the following characteristics:
• The presence within the system of a large number of elements
• These elements interact in a rich manner,that is,any element in the system
is influenced by, and influences, a large number of other elements
• These interactions are often non-linear
• There are feedback loops in the interaction
• The system and its elements are open to their environment
• These systems operate in a state far from equilibrium
• These systems have a history
• The elements of the system are ignorant of the behavior of the system as
a whole
In the words of Dooley (1997), this describes a Complex Adaptive System, defined
as ‘a collection of semi-autonomous agents with the freedom to act in unpredictable
ways and whose interactions over time and space generate system-wide
patterns.’ As Edwards (2002, p. 17) has observed, such systems ‘have remarkable
resilience in the face of efforts to change them.’This is partly due to the fact that
the system’s agents ‘are constantly changing, as are the relationships between and
amongst them’ (Eoyang & Holladay, 2013, p. 16-17). As a consequence, ‘uncertainty
becomes the rule’ (ibid: 17).
Yet, uncertainty does not mean permanent instability. In fact, in most cases,
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changes in the relationship between agents take place within a framework of fundamental
systemic stability. As Eoyang and Holladay (2013, p. 17) put it, interactions
‘simply change the conditions and relationships among the parts and the
whole; they do not change the system in any fundamental way.’ The interaction
between parts and the whole often sustains existing patterns as ‘parts interact to
generate emergent patterns while the patterns influence parts and their interactions.
The result is a self-generating, self-organizing reality of human systems
dynamics’ (ibid, p. 18), based on the interdependence between the parts and the
whole of the system. Self-organization here is defined as a process by which the
internal interactions between agents and conditions of a system generate systemwide
patterns (Eoyang 2001).
In such a situation change is dynamical, the result of multiple forces acting in
unpredictable ways and generating surprising outcomes which even the most
powerful actors cannot control entirely. Change, then, is only partially predictable
and characterized by what Malcolm Gladwell (2000) calls ‘tipping points’ at
which the dynamics of the system change profoundly to settle into a new pattern.
In such a situation, even if an action could be executed as planned, it would not
guarantee the ‘right’ result. As elements of a CAS are multiple and interdependent,‘one
can never do only one thing’since one action will have multiple impacts
and ‘unintended consequences abound’ (Jervis 1997). That means that the selforganization
of a Complex Adaptive System does not stop at a particular, less so
at an externally predetermined, point. Instead ‘the best you can hope to do is to
build adaptive capacity to coevolve with the system as it changes over time’(Eoyang
& Holladay 2013, p. 25).
Consequently, actions have to be constantly evaluated and adjusted depending on
particular local circumstances. Decision-making processes have to be flexible and
decentralized. They have to be able to respond and adapt to unforeseen circumstances
as agents of the system respond and adapt to any given policy.
To do so, Eoyang and Holladay (2013) developed a process they call ‘Adaptive
Action’, a ‘method for engaging in dynamical change in an ever-emerging, always
self-organizing world’.They argue that it is necessary to approach any given
problem with the aim of identifying the current state of self-organization to allow
for targeted intervention that can change the pattern of self-organization which
has given rise to, and sustains, the problem to be tackled.This process is based on
three simple questions:
What?
The ‘what’ question tries to identify the current state of the process of self-organization,
which, according to Eoyang (2001), is dependent on three conditions:
elements which hold the system together (such as shared objectives, geographical
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Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian Foreign Policy and What it Means for the Region
locations, social class etc.), differences between the agents of the system which
generate tensions that allow for change (such as different interpretations of a
particular issue, class, resources, location etc.) and channels through which these
differences can be expressed (media, assemblies, meetings etc.). Eoyang (ibid.)
calls these conditions ‘Containers’, ‘Differences’ and ‘Exchanges’. She also shows
that these conditions are interdependent and influence each other across time
and space and can serve different functions within different particular contexts.
A particular condition can serve as a container in one context but a significant
difference or an exchange in a different context.
Questions that might be asked to reveal the current state of self-organization include:
What do we see? What containers are the most relevant? What differences
exist and what impact do they have? What exchanges are strongest and what are
the weakest etc.?
So what (does it mean)?
The ‘so, what’ question tries to make sense of what has been observed. What do
the patterns we observe mean for any possibility of action? Such a question is
critical in that it generates options for action but also allows for the adaptation of
action to different circumstances across time and space. Questions might include:
So what does the current state mean to you, to me and to others? So what does
that mean for our ability to act? So what does that mean for the future development
of the system?
Now what (do we do)?
The ‘now what’question, finally, allows for the taking of action having considered
the current state of self-organization and its implications across time and space.
Questions may include: Now what will I/you/we/they do? Now what will be
communicated to others? Now what will the results and the consequences be?
These three questions allow exercising ‘[c]onscious influence over self-organizing
patterns [as it permits] seeing,understanding,and influencing the conditions that
shape change in complex adaptive systems’ (Eoyang & Holladay, 2013, p. 30).
Therefore, they allow for the identification of the conditions and patterns that
give rise to, and sustain, particular problems, as well as actions to address this
problem. As such, it will be useful to define more precisely what we mean by
conditions and patterns.
Conditions
Conditions are the elements of the social system which, individually and in interaction
with one another, determine the speed, direction, and path of a social
system as it evolves (i.e. self-organises) into the future. In other words, conditions
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and their interactions are critical to the outcome of any process of self-organiza-
tion.
Patterns
Patterns are the expression of the interaction between the three different conditions
outlined above and are understood as ‘the similarities, differences and connections
that have meaning across time and space’ (Eoyang & Holladay 2013, p.
42).
These terms have critical implications for action. They suggest that problems of
the type currently being faced by Brazilian foreign policy-makers are, in fact, the
expression of a pattern of interdependent conditions across time and space.Therefore,
what need to change are the conditions which form these patterns.
The Decline of Brazilian Foreign Policy from a Complexity Perspective
As mentioned above, one can detect some overriding principles which have historically
guided the country in its dealings with the world. In the context of HSD
and Complexity, these principles serve as containers which bound the system. As
times changed – the end of the military dictatorship, the end of the Cold War,
the changing paradigms of international economics from the 1990s onwards, the
change of governments in Brazil etc. – so did the interpretations of these principles,as
was outlined above.Yet,the principles itself remained largely in place.This
allowed different governments to adapt foreign policy to the particular circumstances
they found themselves in. In other words, whilst the container remains in
place, different particular conditions – brought about by gateway events or other
changes – led to different interpretations of these principles which, in turn, led to
practical changes in foreign policy-making.
Presidents, as leaders, are crucial in articulating these interpretations and, therefore,serving
as exchanges for the interaction between different conditions and actors
that inhabit this system and try to shape it.In fact,they are themselves critical
conditions. In recent times, perhaps no two Brazilian leaders have taken on this
role as articulator of Brazilian foreign policy more clearly and determinedly than
Presidents Cardoso and Lula, who governed Brazil from 1995-2010. Both managed,in
their own distinct styles,to translate long-standing principles of Brazilian
foreign policy into practical policies for their respective circumstances.
In both cases,‘engagement’served as a key container for the overall foreign policy
direction. The multiple regional initiatives, the renewed push for a reform of the
international political system, the opening up of Brazil to international trade or
the enormous efforts that were made to foster cooperation with the so-called
‘global south’ are all testament to this principle (Altemani & Lessa 2008).
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Crucially, the idea that Brazil should lead these efforts was also a common denominator.
This is particularly true for efforts to foster regionalism, as shown by
attempts to further MERCOSUR or the founding of UNASUR, which was the
result of a Brazilian initiative at the start of the 2000s (Gratius & Saraiva, 2013).
Yet,Brazilian leadership extended beyond the region.The BRICS initiative or the
close engagement which Lula, in particular, sought with African countries, are
also testament to this leadership. In fact, Brazil became an active, if not always
effective, actor in both regional and international crisis diplomacy, as was the case
after the Honduran military coup of 2009 or the Iran nuclear deal pushed by
Brazil and Turkey in 2010 (Council of Foreign Relations 2010).
This is not to say that there were no differences either domestically or internationally.
Domestically, it seems clear that the emphasis by Cardoso was more on
economic development whilst, for Lula, it was more political and making Brazil
heard in the world, although these two objectives obviously overlap (Altemani
& Lessa 2008). In fact, and this will become crucial in the later discussion of the
current crisis, both used important economic actors, such as Odebrecht, Petrobras
or the national development bank BNDES, to underscore their foreign policy
objectives, giving those actors key roles in executing a variety of infrastructure
projects both in Latin America and Africa that also advanced Brazilian economic
and political interests internationally (Malamud 2017). Equally, Brazil’s push for
a greater role oftentimes met with considerable pushback, as was clearly shown in
relation to the above-mentioned cases of Honduras and Iran (Washington Post
2010).
Hence,the different emphasis by the two leaders was contained enough and could
be channelled through exchanges (or connections) that ensure the movement of
information and energy. Here, the strategy of engagement pursued by both Cardoso
and Lula was vital because it allowed for the establishment of many connections
both at regional and global level, be it through new regional organizations,
be it through the G20 grouping or the BRICS or be it through the fact that Lula,
in particular, opened a great number of Brazilian embassies across the world so
that there always were connections, and the possibility of exchange, across time
and space (Stuenkel 2014). It may be useful here to put this visually.
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Table 1: Cardoso/Lula Foreign Policy as a Coherent Process of Self-Organiza-
tion
Conditions for Self-Organization Conditions Present
Container Autonomy through integration and participation
Difference Different leadership styles
Different priorities in pursuing engagement
Exchange Presidential leadership and pronouncements
Regional and global forums
(Increasing number of) diplomatic missions
Pattern Coherent
As a consequence, Brazilian foreign policy was both coherent – here defined as
the degree to which parts of a system “fit”each other or the external environment,
and it is a necessary factor in sustainability - and effective, to the extent that several
analysts attested to the arrival of Brazil on the world stage (Rothkopf 2012).
The Economist (2009b) even proclaimed on its front page that ‘Brazil takes off ’.
Relevant to the current debate, this coherence survived several political and economic
challenges, such as high inflation confronted by Cardoso, the economic
crisis of 2008 confronted by Lula or the various regional political crises that both
confronted during their combined 16 years in power, including political instability
in Venezuela and Central America. In other words, there was enough resilience
in the system to weather these challenges.
In what follows it will be argued that the reason Brazil no longer has this resilience
in the face of unfavourable circumstances is due to a change of conditions
domestically which have meant a loss of coherence and an associated inability to
effectively influence external events.
The first of these conditions was the change of President. Quite independently
of the economic crisis through which Brazil is passing now Dilma took over
the country in 2011 with little interest in foreign policy and, subsequently, few
international connections. Whilst hand-picked by Lula as his successor, she had,
for years, been his domestic ‘fixer’ and had far more interest in domestic affairs
(Muggah 2015).As a consequence she did little to push forward the development
of MERCOSUR or the BRICS or other initiatives. As Stuenkel (2014) pointed
out, the retreat from the international stage by Brazil predated the economic and
political crisis which ended up engulfing Dilma. A gateway event (the change of
President), therefore, led to a clear change in a key condition: the container which
had guided Brazilian foreign policy for many years.
This weakening commitment to engagement as a guiding principle of Brazilian
foreign policy occurred at a time when the differences between Brazil and
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its regional partners multiplied. In very simple terms, different regional governments
pursued increasingly divergent policies both economically and in terms of
engaging with the rest of the world. Lehmann (2013) identified three different
groupings of countries with very different priorities and policy styles. This had
significant consequences particularly for regional cooperation in South America
which, as many commentators have pointed out, relies heavily on ‘presidentialism’
as a mechanism for action (Cheibub et al. 2011). Since Presidents were no longer
coherent with regards to their foreign policy goals and approach, and with Dilma
unable and unwilling to address this divergence, regional mechanisms have essentially
fallen into a state of disrepair (Malamud & Gardini 2012).
Yet, this withering away of regional cooperation also took away one of the key
conditions to reconcile increasingly divergent priorities and styles. South American
countries have become increasingly inward-looking with many beset by their
own internal crises (as will be shown below in the case of Venezuela) or with
different political priorities as, for instance, in the case of Colombia which was
negotiating a peace deal with the FARC to end its long-standing civil war.
The economic and political crisis faced by Brazil from around 2014 onwards became
simply one more factor in explaining Brazil’s declining interest in foreign
policy, but it was in no way the starting point, nor the only factor. It was, however,
crucial in three aspects: First, it consolidated this lack of interest in foreign policy
institutionally as, in the name of austerity, cut-backs have been made to the budget
of the Foreign Ministry, Itamaratry, and several diplomatic missions across
the world have closed (Stuenkel 2016). As such, the decline of Brazil’s leadership
capacity has essentially been ‘locked in’ at institutional level for the foreseeable
future.
Second, the economic and political crisis in Brazil has sharpened the ideological
divide within the country and spilled onto the diplomatic stage, especially when
it comes to Brazil’s relationship with its own neighbourhood. This has become
particularly evident in relation to Venezuela, as will be shown below.
Third, some of the very actors that were heavily promoted by Cardoso and Lula
in their push for Brazilian insertion into the international arena are now involved
in huge corruption scandals which are illustrative of the political and economic
crisis through which Brazil is passing. Companies like Odebrecht or Petrobras
are not only facing serious financial and political difficulties at home but also
criminal investigations and reputational loss abroad. Having been key partners in
Brazilian foreign policy, these scandals therefore have a direct impact on Brazil’s
ability to project itself abroad in a very practical sense: It impedes any possibility
of the country using these companies to project itself as a benevolent benefactor
to others, especially in the sphere of financing infrastructure projects or fostering
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other aspects of south-south cooperation both in a practical or normative way.
Key players executing this strategy are sitting in jail whilst confidence and trust
in the motives of the Brazilian government have evaporated (Mares & Trinkunas
2016; Santoro 2017).
It is worth, once again, illustrating this change graphically.
Table 2: Current Brazilian Foreign Policy as a Process of Self-Organization
Conditions for Self-Organization Conditions Present
Container Presidential priorities
Austerity
Difference Divergent regional foreign policy priorities
Economic circumstances nationally and regionally
Changing and diverging economic policies
Exchange Presidentialism
Domestic audiences
(Declining number of) Diplomatic missions
Pattern Incoherent
What this demonstrates is an increasingly incoherent self-organizing process
which is constantly being amplified by self-reinforcing feedback loops. Preoccupied
with its own domestic crises Brazil has demonstrated a lack of leadership
capacity to bring these various different interests (back) together. With the erosion
of the container which used to hold the system together and the increasing
number of differences both internally and externally, the system simply cannot
cope with the tensions that are being generated. The consequence is an inability
to act effectively. What this means in practice will now be demonstrated by looking
in a little more detail at the political crisis in Venezuela and Brazil’s efforts to
lead attempts to solve it. It will show an incoherent process of self-organization
in action.
What Does it Mean? The Case of Venezuela as an Example of Incoherence in
Action
Venezuela has been on what seems like a death spiral for many years and many
observers argue that some kind of internal implosion or even conflict can no longer
be ruled out. As one Venezuelan opposition politician put it in an interview:
‘There may well be some kind of conflict’ (Interview with Venezuelan opposition
politician 2015). A Colombian journalist argued that the great danger for the region
stems from the fact that ‘we do not know what’s going on inside the country.
We do not understand it and have no influence over it’ (Interview Colombian
journalist 2014).
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With the country suffering the highest inflation in the world,a crime wave of unprecedented
proportions, severe shortages of food and other basic necessities and
a dysfunctional relationship between the national Congress and the Executive,
as well as tensions at street level between supporters and opponents of President
Maduro and his ‘Chavista’government that have been rising steadily for years,the
situation seems both dangerous and intractable and whose consequences are already
being felt through the region.There are both practical concerns,for instance
about the rising number of Venezuelans trying to flee the country which has a
direct impact on some of Brazil’s poorest regions (Estado de São Paulo 2017),
as well as political/strategic concerns about how to deal with Venezuela and its
governments within the various existing regional frameworks (Merke et al. 2016).
In many ways, the crisis would have been ‘made’ for Brazil to exercise its leadership.
Brazil was instrumental in setting up regional mechanisms to address precisely
this kind of crisis.UNASUR,founded by 12 member states in 2008 after an
initiative by then- Brazilian President Lula, was intended to ‘developing cooperative
mechanisms to resolve [various…] security challenges ’, ranging from drug
trafficking, extraordinary levels of violent crime, to occasional political instability
in a number of countries (Pothuraju 2012, p. 2). The idea was to provide a structure
through which common challenges could be discussed and resolved (Briceño
Ruiz 2010). Over the years, these challenges have included the question of how
to preserve the democratic order and stability in the region (Heine and Weiffen
2015).This being the case it should come as no great surprise that, as the crisis in
Venezuela got progressively worse and protracted,it was UNASUR which offered
itself as the mechanism through which some kind of mediation process between
government and opposition could be managed. This offer of mediation was first
made in 2014 (O Globo 2014).
Yet, so far at least, these mediation efforts have come to, at best, very little and
here the role played by Brazil, and its lack of leadership, is crucial. On the one
hand, there has never been unequivocal agreement between all member-states
about what the role of UNASUR should be, reflecting one of the main historic
differences between South American countries: the main purpose of regionalism.
Whilst, for some, regionalism is seen as a way to cooperate, for others it has
always been an instrument to protect against outside interference in domestic
affairs, albeit that, historically, most of this interference came from the United
States (Keller 2013). In fact, UNASUR has sometimes been seen as an organization
whose primary purpose is to underline and strengthen the autonomy
of the region vis-à-vis outside intervention. Brazil has never resolved this glaring
tension in relation to the organization (The Economist, 2009a). Nevertheless,
one can say with confidence that sovereignty in South America serves as an
enormously strong container for some countries, with obvious consequences for
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the development of regionalism. As such, commitment to a regionally-sponsored
solution to the Venezuelan crisis has never been unequivocal as it is, essentially, a
domestic problem.
At the same time Brazil’s position in relation to Venezuela has also been influenced
strongly by domestic factors. Under Lula and Dilma, the country’s posture
to Venezuela was,according to some commentators too supportive of Chavez and
his successor (Bandeira 2016). This shifted significantly when Michel Temer assumed
the presidency in 2016.The government, under the then-Foreign Minister
José Serra, began to publicly criticize Venezuela and assume a clear posture in
favour of punishing the country for breaking the democracy clause. This facilitated,
amongst other things, the suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR (El
Nacional, 2016).
Yet, in the sense of influencing the conditions which have led to and sustained
the current pattern – and therefore the crisis- in Venezuela these moves have not
significantly altered these conditions. In fact, it can be argued that, in some ways,
this change of posture has made the situation more intractable. The reasons for
this can be found in both the domestic Venezuelan situation and the regional
considerations.
In Venezuela,the changes in Brazil have merely fortified the respective containers
of the government and opposition whilst deepening the divisions between them
internally. As a result, there has been a complete breakdown of common endeavour
between supporters and opponents of the government of Nicholas Maduro,
who define each other in almost exclusively adversarial terms, as a series of interviews
the author undertook in Venezuela in 2015 made clear.1
There is, therefore,
no container around which the basis of a mutually acceptable dialogue between
the two sides can be constructed.
This being the case, the lack of knowledge and access by the rest of the region
about and to Venezuela weighs heavily. Both sides in the Venezuelan conflict see
outside actors exclusively through their own prism of being either for or against
them.The suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR,in this respect,plays into
the view held by the Venezuelan government that there is a conspiracy against the
country which sees itself surrounded by hostile forces (Carey 2015). The change
of posture by Brazil over the last year underscores this point. Almost logically,
no mediation attempt undertaken by UNASUR has been able to overcome this
debilitating difference. In other words, it has not been possible to establish a container
or an exchange within which these differences can be expressed in such a
way as to influence the incoherent pattern in a desired manner. Here, the lack of
1
These interviews were held ‘on background’ in December 2015 with actors both supportive and critical
of the current government.
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institutional capacity on the part of UNASUR weighs heavily. The organization
does not seem to have the structures and institutions necessary to act as a neutral
arbiter,nor the capacity to project itself in such a way as to be seen as such an actor
by both sides in the conflict.
At the same time, in assuming such an uncompromising position, the Brazilian
government has exacerbated different perceptions of the crisis throughout the
region. As mentioned above, there is now a regional problem of refugees from
Venezuela in which Brazil is involved in a practical sense. However, other countries,
such as Colombia feel the impact of the crisis on a much larger scale with
tensions between the two countries running extremely high,leading to the closure
of the shared border and serious problems in border communities in relation to
the smuggling of goods and the attempts by Venezuelans to acquire basic necessities
across the border in much larger numbers than has been the case in Brazil
(The Guardian 2016). As such, any escalation of the rhetoric is seen with great
concern by Colombia since the fall-out from it will be felt much more immediately
by that country.
Taking these factors together one can see an extremely incoherent process of selforganization
which it is worth visualizing for clarity.
Table 3: Response to the Crisis in Venezuela as a Process of Self-Organization
Conditions for Self-Organization Conditions Present
Container Pro-government
Pro-opposition
Impact on ‘my’ (neighbouring) country
Difference Objectives of any political action
Differences in impact
Problem definition
Preferred forum for problem resolution
Exchange Respective national media
Respective government pronouncements
(Weakening) regional institutions
Bi-lateral meetings with government or opposition
Pattern Incoherent
What one has,then,is a process where multiple,and often contradictory,containers
are not strong enough to hold the multiple and, recently, increasing differences
that inhabit the system. These differences can be found across all levels of
the system, from the local to the national to the regional.This in turn means that
actions cannot be scaled across the system as a whole, making it highly unlikely,
at best, that any actions could be effective. Brazil actively contributes to this inco-
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herence by assuming such an uncompromising position in relation to Venezuela
at the same time as it has essentially abdicated as a serious foreign policy actor
in virtually all other questions. That means that, on the one hand, it is not seen
as a ‘neutral’ actor in which both sides in the Venezuelan crisis have a minimum
of confidence whilst not being able and willing to invest time and effort to make
UNASUR into a central forum for the resolution of this, and this type, of conflict.The
result is ineffective diplomacy and drift.There is no consensus about the
role UNASUR could, or should, play in addressing the crisis, nor, consequently,
about what to do to make the organization an effective actor in this respect. Brazil
provides no leadership in order to address this question nor does there seem to
be any particular demand on the part of many other countries that Brazil assume
such a role.
As a consequence, there are also no effective exchanges through which the differences
indicated above could be aired in such a way as to allow for change in a
reasonably coherent and effective manner.The incoherence of the process of selforganization
therefore becomes self-sustaining.
The question, then, is what can be done.
Now What?
Acting in self-organizing Complex Adaptive Systems is, in principle, straightforward.
All one has to do is to change the conditions which give rise to the pattern
which gives rise to and sustain the problem one is seeking to address. Therefore,
for Brazil, the problem is not that it cannot lead, just as in Venezuela the problem
is not that government and opposition do not trust each other and, therefore,
cannot work together. The problem is the conditions which give rise to this lack
of leadership or mistrust.
Therefore, the key is to identify the conditions that can be changed and over
which Brazil,in our case,would have influence.This last bit is crucial since it makes
absolutely no sense to try and influence conditions that are beyond the capacity
of any particular actor.This being the case, the first thing Brazil can do is looking
at itself. As the above has shown, the country itself currently suffers from an extremely
incoherent foreign policy process fuelled, but not started, by an economic
and political crisis which makes long-term strategic planning extremely difficult.
Therefore, some key questions Brazil should ask itself in its foreign policy debate
are: What conditions cause the incoherence in our foreign policy? What are our
foreign policy priorities? How might different actors interpret these priorities?
What does this mean for foreign policy action? What common ground can we
find between different actors in terms of priorities and actions?
A debate on such questions is critical since it can strengthen the containers
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around which foreign policy is made whilst allowing the tensions generated by
the differences identified to be used constructively. In order to do this, however,
one practical action that could be taken is to increase the exchanges through
which these differences can be aired.It would,in this respect,be useful if the space
given over to foreign policy in the media, in Congress and other forums – political
and in civil society - was to be increased. Here the current economic crisis
might actually be helpful in the sense that it would allow a return to a historic
principle of Brazilian foreign policy: that of development. Whilst there would be
disagreements on the exact ways and means through which development could
be furthered through foreign policy, the principle that foreign policy should be
used to improve the living standards for the population at large would surely be
uncontroversial, if not particularly ambitious.
Only having resolved the basic principles of Brazilian foreign policy going forward,
can Brazil hope to leave behind its foreign policy inertia since it will then
be possible to once again engage with the outside world with a clear objective to
pursue.This, in consequence, would also enable the country to once again engage
constructively in the region,be it through MERCOSUR,UNASUR or bilaterally
and assume a leadership role. Here also, the key is the critical questions that need
to be asked: What are the priorities that all member states can agree on? What are
the principle issues to be tackled at regional level for Brazil and for others? How
would Brazil,and how would others,define the most important challenges for the
region? What common ground can be established? What instruments could and
should be used to address these common challenges?
Such questions are particularly important in the light of the current political and
economic crisis in Brazil since it is these crises which have significantly altered
the conditions within which Brazil can act. In simple terms, as shown above,
many of the actors that were key partners of the government to promote and
execute Brazilian foreign engagement during the Cardoso and Lula years are not
only no longer available (since they are in jail or investigated criminally) but have
seriously undercut the normative aspect of the approach followed by Cardoso and
Lula. As a consequence, not only is Brazil not offering leadership, there is also
very little demand for it on the part of other countries.
From this perspective, then, the most important thing is to change the conditions
that lead to, and sustain, the current dysfunctional pattern. That means, above
all, asking different types of questions to see where and how the conditions can
be identified and influenced. This, in turn, will have significant implications for
practical foreign policy action.
In relation to the case study of Venezuela, such a reconceptualization has critical
consequences. First of all, approaching the country with questions, rather than
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Kai Enno Lehmann
answers (‘Maduro must go’, for instance), might allow for more meaningful engagement.
Approaching the country with the aim of focussing, for example, on
the economy and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe (‘What can be done to
avoid a humanitarian catastrophe?’,as one example) is far more neutral and might
enable the construction of a consensus than to ‘take sides’.It would also be critical,
in this respect, to take any dialogue out of a setting (a geographical or political
container) that may be construed as being biased. In this sense, recent attempts
by the Catholic Church to broker a dialogue might be more promising in the
medium-term.Asking the type of questions indicated above will also focus minds
on what or who can realistically be changed. Since Maduro has given no indication
that he will change his approach in any significant way,for instance,but since
it is known that there are divisions within the government on how to handle the
crisis, focus on these divisions in any action and concentrate on those actors that
have shown willingness, albeit slight, to adapt and engage (Caselli 2013). In practical
actions, focus on changing the conditions on the ground by helping, as far as
possible, the population regardless of political beliefs in order to demonstrate the
benefits of engagement. In other words, take the action out of the political arena
where the pattern which sustains the political and social division in the country is
so entrenched. Due to its influence, size and resources, Brazil could play a critical
role in managing and developing these efforts.
A second, related, approach could be to focus on improving the institutional capacity
of UNASUR to develop and deliver such practical humanitarian policies.
Key questions would include what needs to be done to allow UNASUR to become
an effective humanitarian actor to address the consequences of the Venezuelan
crisis? Whilst such a focus would represent a significant departure for
UNASUR politically, it would, at the same time, narrow in on something that
member-states may more easily be able to agree on and, as a consequence, give
new vitality to the group, especially if it were to be successful in alleviating the
most dire consequences of the current humanitarian crisis. Such success, in turn,
would change the dynamic within the group and build up its political capital.
In other words, the conditions within which it is acting would change, allowing
for a change of pattern and therefore open up the possibility of change. From a
Brazilian point of view, it would also be a focus which could command consensus
domestically.
Whilst the outcome of such changes would be uncertain, such a focus would, at
the very least, signal change and a willingness to engage that may bring about a
tipping point at which the system changes dramatically. It seems that worse than
the current state is hardly possible.
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Can Brazil Lead? The Breakdown of Brazilian Foreign Policy and What it Means for the Region
Conclusion
In answering the question in the title of this article – Can Brazil lead? – the
conclusion has to be that, at this moment in time, the country is unable to lead,
at least in any effective and coherent sense. Yet, the purpose of this article was
to show that this inability to lead is not the result of particular events like the
economic crisis.Rather,Brazil’s retreat from the international stage,and its subsequent
inability to lead its own region, is the consequence of an incoherent pattern
of conditions to which the economic crisis contributed but did not start. Using
Complexity and Human System Dynamics, it was argued that the key to reassuming
a leadership position and, as a result, be able to deal with important issues
right on the country’s doorstep, such as Venezuela, is to ask the right question to
identify the conditions that form and sustain the pattern of incoherence which
marks Brazilian foreign policy at the moment. That requires action both at the
national, as well as the regional level.The actions proposed, like the broadening of
the exchanges or a thorough debate about what should be the Brazilian foreign
policy container, are obviously only sketched out very briefly here. How these
ideas can be put into practice and be scaled across a giant system like the Brazilian
foreign policy establishment, and those actors linked to it, will require a lot more
work and research.
Yet, I hope to have shown that such work is urgent since the absence of Brazilian
leadership has done nothing to stabilize the region or give it a greater and
more coherent voice in the world. Even in a Complex Adaptive System, which is
marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, leadership is a crucial element. The
question is, therefore, not if one needs leadership but what one is leading for and
towards.That is the question Brazil has to answer urgently.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the referees for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article. Any errors and omissions are, of course, mine.
I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from
the ‘Europe and Global Challenges Fund’ which allowed this research to be con-
ducted.
Bio
Kai Enno Lehmann is Professor at the Institute of International Relations of the
University of São Paulo (IRI-USP) in Brasil, having previously held positions at
the Pontifica Universidade Católica, Rio e Janeiro (PUC-Rio) and the University
of Liverpool in England, from which he holds a PhD in International Relations.
Dr Lehmann’s research focusses regionalism in Latin America, as well as the ap-
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Kai Enno Lehmann
plication of Complexity Theory to international politics broadly defined.
He is a non-resident research Associate at the German Institute of Global and
Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, Germany. Between 2013 and 2016, he lead
the Latin American case studies of a large research project investigating the role
of the EU in conflicts outside its immediate neighbourhood.
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