Israel's two states debate Author(s): TOBY GREENE Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 91, No. 5 (September 2015), pp. 1009-1026 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24539016 Accessed: 24-02-2021 13:11 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Israel's two states debate TOBY GREENE The Israeli—Palestinian peace process is of intense interest to scholars and policy makers; and yet the internal Israeli policy debate and its impact on policy outcomes is often overlooked or read simplistically. Common misperceptions include the notions that the prime minister has executive power, that Israel is uniformly resistant to territorial compromise, and that Israeli politicians can be divided into pro-peace and anti-peace camps.1 It is impossible to understand Israeli actions, the constraints on Israeli policy-makers, and the trajectory of the conflict itself without a deeper analysis of the current Israeli debate and the impacts it has on decision-making. This article seeks to contribute to such an analysis by offering a framework for understanding the variety of policy prescriptions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proposed by Israeli policy-makers, and showing how they relate both to Israeli public opinion and to the policy-making process. In an insightful recent study of Israel's national security decision-making, Freilich includes among the country's decision-making 'pathologies' the fact that 'Israel constitutes a classic example of the "political process" or "bureaucratic politics" models of decision-making'.2 The bureaucratic politics model describes a situation in which different parts of a government system can differ substan tially about what should be done and compete to affect government decisions and actions.3 These characteristics are strongly evident in Israel, where the executive is the cabinet, and the electoral system produces coalitions with multiple parties representing conflicting wo rid-views and interests while controlling 'semiautono mous ministerial fiefdoms'.4 Decision-making, even on national security, is politi cized, and different ministers may, with full awareness, simultaneously advance policies with conflicting ends. The distribution of portfolios is tied to coalition agreements, and Israeli prime ministers have limited prerogative powers. Though See e.g. Fawaz A. Gerges, 'The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America's moment?', Interna tional Affairs 89: 2, March 2013, p. 313. Charles D. Freilich, Zion's dilemmas: how Israel makes national security policy (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), p. 36. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, 'Bureaucratic politics: a paradigm and some policy implications', in R. Tanter and R. Ullman, eds, Theory and policy in international relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 42. Freilich, Zion's dilemmas, p. 47. International Affairs 91: 5 (2015) 1009-1026 © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford 0x4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA. D 2015 The Author(s). This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Toby Greene the prime minister can at times surmount domestic obstacles and act decisively, doing so entails huge political risks.5 This article does not provide a typology for all possible solutions to the Israeli Palestinian conflict.6 It establishes a framework for understanding Israel's contem porary policy debate, drawing on statements and writings by political leaders, leading think-tanks and commentators, and on public opinion data. The internal Israeli discourse has not been entirely overlooked by specialists. Heller and Hollis's edited volume helpfully presents contrasting Israeli policy prescriptions.7 This article updates the picture and offers fresh terminology and definitions. It then outlines Israeli public opinion on the issues, before examining the four different approaches represented within the 2013-14 government, and then drawing conclu sions. First, it is worth briefly presenting the dilemma posed to Israel by control of the occupied territories, especially East Jerusalem and the West Bank (referred to by many Jews according to the biblical names of Judaea and Samaria), which relates to views deeply held by Jews in Israel and around the world. Israel's leaders have been divided over the occupied territories from the moment they came to control them in 1967, and the basic shape of the debate is familiar. To put it crudely, the left has been open to territorial compromise in return for peace agreements with Israel's neighbours or the Palestinians, on which it has placed a strategic and moral premium. The left has further considered control over a large Palestinian popula tion as a demographic threat to Israel's character as a Jewish and democratic state. The right has prioritized maintaining Israeli control of the territory, driven by a combination of security considerations and nationalist or religious ideological commitment to Jewish sovereignty over the historic 'Land of Israel'.8 The Israeli debate has always been more nuanced, fragmented and dynamic than this outline suggests, and the state's actions have been wrought with internal contradictions.9 While Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, it never extended sovereignty to other areas of the West Bank. Nonetheless, successive governments oversaw the establishment of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank, whose combined Jewish population now exceeds 500,000.10 The fate of these settlements, especially more isolated communities that cannot be annexed to Israel through agreed border adjustments in a future peace deal, complicates Israel's policy choices. The first intifada, which broke out at the end of 1987, was a watershed event for Israeli public opinion, significantly undermining the idea that Israel could control Yehezkel Dror, Israeli statecraft: national security challenges and responses (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 8. For an attempt at such a typology, see E. Lewin, 'In praise of the no-solution solution \ Journal of Political Science and Public Affairs 3: 141, Feb. 2015, pp. 1-8. Mark Heller and Rosemary Hollis, Israel and the Palestinians: Israeli policy options (London: Chatham House, 2005). See also Jonathan Rynhold, 'Re-conceptualizing Israeli approaches to "land for peace" and the Palestin ian question since 1967', Israel Studies 6: 2, Summer 2001, pp. 33-52. Yossi Beilin, Israel: a concise political history (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992), pp. 162-3. Mark Tessler, A history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 411-12, 465-74. http://fmep.org/resource/comprehensive-settlement-population-1972-2010/, accessed 16 July 2015. ΙΟΙΟ International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Israel's two states debate the West Bank and its large Palestinian population indefinitely, and helping prepare the political ground for the Oslo Accords.11 Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 Israeli leaders from across the spectrum have negotiated with Palestinians over a final status agreement. The details of these negotiations, and the differ ences over core issues including refugees, Jerusalem, borders and security, are not addressed here. However, it is worth noting some key developments since the Oslo Accords that have influenced the Israeli debate. Most significant has been the failure, after several attempts, to reach a final status agreement—an outcome for which each side blames the other. Having declared the bilateral negotiations a 'failure', the Palestinian Authority (PA) has pursued in recent years a strategy that President Abbas has described as 'internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political one'.12 The centrepiece of this strategy has been securing recognition for the State of Palestine in the UN and other international bodies outside the context of negotiations with Israel. This is widely interpreted in Israel as evidence of Palestinian unwillingness to make compromises, particularly relating to their demand for the 'right of return' to Israel for Palestinian refugees and their descendants. Meanwhile, Israeli settlement construction has continued and the settlement population has grown, increasing frustration towards Israel in both Washington and European capitals. The ongoing occupation has also helped fuel a small but vocal civil society movement to promote boycott, divestment and sanctions of Israel (BDS).13 Also important have been the rounds of violence. The second intifada (2000 2004), including an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings targeting buses, cafés and other public places in Israel, had a deep and lasting impact on the Israeli public. Israelis widely interpreted it as a consequence of handing the areas of the West Bank where most of the Palestinian population is concentrated over to Yasser Arafat and the PLO. The impact of the second intifada on Israeli opinion, especially on the centre-left, was all the sharper for following what Israelis saw as Palestinian rejection of generous final status proposals made by Ehud Barak at Camp David in July 2000, and bridging proposals made by Bill Clinton in December 2000.14 The belief that there is 'no partner' for peace on the Palestinian side took hold, and the centre-left Labor party has not won an election in Israel since. Israeli opinion has also been shaped by the unilateral territorial withdrawals from south Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in 2005, the latter including the evacuation of 8,000 settlers and the demolition of their homes. A majority of Israelis supported these moves, believing they would reduce the human and economic cost of occupation and, in the case of the Gaza Strip, the demographic threat to Israel's Jewish majority. What followed, however, was Hezbollah 11 Asher Arian, Security threatened: surveying Israeli opinion on peace and war (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 12 Mahmoud Abbas, 'The long overdue Palestinian state', New York Times, 16 May 2011, http://www.nytimes. com/2ou/o5/i7/opinion/i7abbas.html?_r=o, accessed 16 July 2015. 13 See Asher Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine: the two-state imperative (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2011). 14 Jonathan Rynhold and Gerald Steinberg, 'The peace process and the Israeli elections', Israel Affairs 10: 4, Summer 2004, pp. 181-204. ΙΟΙΙ International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affair This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Toby Greene coming to control south Lebanon and Hamas coming to control the Gaza Strip (first forming a government after winning elections in 2006 and then assuming total control after violently ejecting forces loyal to President Abbas in 2007). Both groups used those territories from which Israel had disengaged as a base from which to kidnap soldiers inside Israel and launch thousands of rockets at Israeli towns and cities. Several major confrontations followed during which Israel attempted to suppress the rocket fire and degrade the armed groups.15 These developments turned the majority of Israelis against the idea of unilateral disengagement, and left them believing that the status quo in the West Bank was the safer option.1 Regional developments have also been significant. The partial collapse of the Arab state system since 2010 has highlighted the uncertain context in which Israeli policy-makers are operating.17 Most recently the United States has led the P5+1 powers to a major diplomatic agreement with Iran over its nuclear programme, while Iran remains a key supporter of Palestinian armed groups, further straining relations between Washington and Israel. With this context in mind, what follows is a typology that categorizes the policy prescriptions relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict most discussed in Israel. The drawback to any typology is that, for the sake of parsimony, it involves overlooking variations within each type and drawing artificial bound aries. However, this categorization attempts to reflect the debate more accurately than is typically the case. It proposes three categories: preservation of the status quo; proactive two-statism; and entrenchment-annexationism.18 Two variations of proactive two-statism are considered: progress via negotiated agreement (Plan A) and progress via unilateral moves (Plan B). Preservation of the status quo Many on the Israeli centre-right take the view that the conflict cannot be solved at present, and that the focus should be on conflict management. Thus in June 2014 Gideon Saar, then a Likud minister, told a conference: 'There is no evidence that any alternative is better than the status quo.'19 Those taking this view tend to regard 15 Gilead Sher, Ά proactive policy for Israel: a commentary on "Is unilateralism always bad?'", Negotiation Journal 30: 2, April 2014, pp. 157-63. 16 Jonathan Rynhold, 'Peace and security in the 2009 election', Israel Affairs 16: 1, Jan. 2010, pp. 142-64. 17 Clive Jones and Beverley Milton-Edwards, 'Missing the "devils" we knew? Israel and political Islam amid the Arab Awakening', International Affairs 89: 2, March 2013, pp. 399-415. 18 Other variations of lesser significance should be mentioned. A politically insignificant minority on the Israeli far left advocate a bi-national state. Avigdor Lieberman proposes areas of northern Israel with large Arab populations be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, but he has not articulated a practical programme, and the proposal has few other advocates. Some, e.g. Benny Morris, advocate restoring sovereignty to Jordan and Egypt, but this idea is hardly present in the mainstream discourse. See Dror, Israeli statecraft, pp. 163-4. In a more recent development Yossi Beilin, one of the Israeli architects of the two-state solution, has spoken about an Israeli-Palestinian confederation, in which two separate states will share joint functions in some areas, but this idea has yet to be fully developed or to gain wider political momentum in Israel. See Yossi Beilin, 'Confederation is the key to Mideast peace', New York Times, 14 May 2015, http://www.nytimes. com/20i5/o5/i5/opinion/yossi-beilin-a-confederation-for-peace.html?_r=o, accessed 16 July 2015. 19 Speech by Gideon Saar to Herzliya Conference, 9 June 2014, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=uHqVRPAqpHs, accessed 2 Aug. 2015. 1012 International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Israel's two states debate the root of the conflict as the failure of the Palestinians and the Arab world gener ally to accept the existence of a Jewish state.20 They argue that peace, if it can be achieved, will stem from Israel establishing deterrence, and making clear that attempts to harm Israel or impose a solution are futile. Until such time as Palestin ian or broader Arab society accepts this, the goal is to achieve the best possible economic and security situation in the circumstances. Defence Minister Moshe Ya'alon stated, for example: Ί am not looking for a solution, I am looking for a way to manage the conflict and maintain relations in a way that works for our interests.'21 Those in this category argue against the creation of a Palestinian state not in principle, but on pragmatic grounds, maintaining that the current Palestinian leadership has neither the will nor the legitimacy to make a comprehensive peace with Israel. Those advocating this approach often stress the need for a long-term change in Palestinian society in the West Bank, through economic development and improved Palestinian governance, as a prerequisite for lasting peace.22 Many in this category also stress the need for Palestinian educational reform, highlighting the negative portrayal of Israelis and Jews, glorification of violence, and rejection of Jewish national rights in Palestinian culture as a barrier to peace.23 Individuals subscribing to this approach are generally security focused, and less bothered by the demographic concerns or fear of diplomatic isolation that drive their centre-left rivals to try to change the status quo. They argue that were Israel to pull out of the West Bank, that territory would become another base for terrorism on Israel's borders. Just as Iranian-backed Hezbollah filled the vacuum on the Lebanese border and Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, so, they argue, there would be a similar outcome in the West Bank. They also tend to stress the regional dimension of the conflict, highlighting the growing chaos and instability around Israel, including the threat posed by the Iranian-led radical Shi'i axis and resurgent Sunni extremism in the form of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to bolster their case against risking opening up a vacuum in the West Bank.24 They tend to conclude, therefore, that the security threats posed by giving up control of the West Bank are more significant than the diplomatic threats posed by the status quo, which they claim are exaggerated. They are unperturbed by the claims of the left that time is working against Israel, arguing that the impact of settle ment growth, the demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish state and the erosion of Israel's international legitimacy are overblown. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin—Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, writes, for example, that 'real pressure on Israel to change the status quo is unlikely' and that 'attempting to manage it 20 Yosef Kuperwasser and Shalom Lipner, 'The problem is Palestinian rejectionism: why the PA must recognize a Jewish state', Foreign Affairs 90: 6, Nov.-Dec. 2011, pp. 2-9. 21 Shlomo Cesana, 'Palestinians want to destroy the Jewish state', Israel Hayom, 15 Oct. 2014, http://www.israel hayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=20759, accessed 16 July 2015. 22 e.g. Speech by Moshe Ya'alon to INSS Conference, 28 Jan. 2014, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=rj9ZRC5qiHQ, accessed 16 July 2015. 23 Kuperwasser and Lipner, 'The problem is Palestinian rejectionism'. 24 Moshe Arens, 'Israel is getting bad advice', Haaretz, 27 Aug. 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/. premium-1.543638, accessed 16 July 2015. ioi3 International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Authors). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Toby Greene [this situation] in order to minimize suffering to both sides and to minimize the diplomatic costs to Israel' is the best course.25 Those in this category also argue that it would be a mistake to offer more concessions to break the deadlock, since this would reward Palestinian intransi gence and inflate further Palestinian demands. In this context they see no need to freeze settlement construction. They tend to argue that most construction is in settlement blocks, and that it strengthens Israel's hold on strategically important areas that it can expect to keep in any future agreement. They are prepared to acquiesce in some construction even in more isolated settlements, reasoning that these can always be evacuated. The case is made, for example, by Dore Gold, president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, that 'the marginal increase in territory that might be affected by natural growth is infinitesimal'.26 Those taking this approach tend to be suspicious of US or European diplo matic interventions, regarding western leaders as either naive or driven by self interest, whether personal ambition, a desire to smooth relations with Arab and other Islamic states or—for European states—the wish to meet domestic political demands, especially from growing Muslim constituencies.27 Proactive two-statism By contrast, Israeli leaders on the centre and left believe the status quo does not represent Israel's interests. As well as making traditional arguments for the strategic benefits of peace, they see time working against Israel, and the establish ment of a separate Palestinian state as urgently required to preserve Israel's Jewish and democratic character.2 They tend to take seriously the threat of increasing international isolation posed by the continuing occupation, augmented by the Palestinian diplomatic campaign to gain unilateral recognition. They also express concerns that stalemate increases the danger of a third intifada.29 This camp can be broken down into two sub-categories. Plan A There are those, generally on the left, who still believe in the possibility of a negotiated agreement with the PA. They believe Israel can do more to promote this by building trust, especially by limiting settlement construction, and by being 25 Efraim Inbar, 'Doing almost nothing is a good option', Perspectives Paper no. 247, BESA Center, 15 May 2014, http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/almost-nothing-good-option/, accessed 16 July 2015. 26 Dore Gold, 'US policy on Israeli settlements', Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 9 June 2009, http://jcpa. org/article/u-s-policy-on-israeli-settlements/, accessed 16 July 2014. 27 Shimon Shiffer, 'Ya'alon: Kerry should win his Nobel and leave us alone', Ynetnews, 14 Jan. 2014, http://www. ynetnews.com/articles/o,7340,L-4470582,oo.html; Manfred Gerstenfeld, 'France: importing conflict from, and exporting problems to the Middle East', Jerusalem Post, 7 Jan. 2015, http://www.jpost.eom/Opinion/France Importing-conflict-from-and-exporting-problems-to-the-Middle-East-387038 (both accessed 16 July 2015). 28 See Avi Gil, 'Israel's strategic dilemmas: don't wait for the dust to settle', in Daniel C. Kurtzer, ed., Pathways to peace: America and the Arab-Israeli conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 29 e.g. 'Former Shin Bet chief: Palestinian "despair" threatens third intifada', Haaretz, 9 Jan. 2013, http://www. haaretz.com/news/israeli-elections-2013/israeli-elections-news-features/former-shin-bet-chief-palestinian despair-threatens-third-intifada.premium-1.492779, accessed 16 July 2015. ioi4 International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Israel's two states debate flexible on final status issues, for example by accepting pre-1967 lines as a basis for a territorial agreement. Former Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Tzipi Livni is the most promi nent representative of this position, which is also held by much of the centre left Labor and left-wing Meretz parties, and advocated by Shimon Peres.30 It should be noted that even among these Plan A supporters there is a consensus on maintaining settlement blocks in a land-swap deal, ensuring that any solution for Palestinian refugees preserves Israel's Jewish character, and ensuring adequate security arrangements. Plan A supporters argue that the benefits of advancing through negotiations (in contrast to unilateral moves) would include improved relations with Palestinian moderates, and their empowerment against Hamas. They also point to the prospect of transformed relations with moderate Arab states, enabling greater cooperation against Iran and violent Sunni Islamist groups. They frequently highlight the Arab Peace Initiative as offering hope for peace with the wider Arab world, if a deal were to be made with the Palestinians.31 Advocates of Plan A further argue that a more constructive approach would improve relations with the United States and Europe, thereby strengthening Israel's legitimacy in military confrontations with armed groups, while fending off attempts to impose a solution. Livni said in October 2013 : 'When there is no peace process, there is no legitimacy to act in order to keep Israel's security. So stalemate is against Israel's security needs.'32 Plan A advocates are fully aware of the practical difficulties of implementing a deal immediately. They can hardly ignore the fact that the PA has lost control of the Gaza Strip. For this reason they have at times spoken of a 'shelf agreement' which would establish a shared vision for final status, showing both Israelis and Palestin ians that a deal is possible, while acknowledging that full implementation might be delayed.33 They are also aware of the heavy shadow cast by the repeated failure of final status negotiations and the very poor state of relations between leaders of Israel and the PA. This leads to their repeated focus on the need to rebuild relations with moderate Palestinians through confidence-building measures. Plan A support ers often assert the need to freeze settlement construction, either throughout the West Bank or at least in outlying settlement blocks beyond the security barrier, in areas Israel cannot hope to keep in a negotiated solution.34 The point of this, they argue, is not only to help build confidence among Palestinian partners, but also to stop the creation of facts on the ground which may diminish the feasibility of securing a negotiated separation in the future. 30 See e.g. Itamar Sharon, 'Livni attacks Ya'alon over Abbas comments: grumbhng is easy', Times of Israel, 16 March 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/livni-attacks-Ya'alon-grumbhng-is-easy/, accessed 16 July 2015. 31 Nechama Duek, Έχ-generals, police chiefs tell PM: resume peace talks', Ynetnews, 2 Nov. 2014, http://www. ynetnews.com/articles/o,7340,L-4586854,oo.html, accessed 16 July 2015. 32 Ari Soffer, 'Tzipi Livni: negotiations with the PA are in Israel's interests', Israel National News, 23 Oct. 2013, http://www.israelnationalnews.eom/News/News.aspx/173141#.VLjlxkeUeSo, accessed 16 July 2015. 33 Amira Schiff, 'The "Annapolis process": a chronology of failure', Israel Affairs 19: 4, Jan. 2013, pp. 660-78. 34 See e.g. speech by Isaac Herzog to 15th Herzliya Conference, 7 June 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=-itooFQHBWY, accessed 2 Aug. 2015; speech by Zahava Galon to 15th Herzliya Conference, 7 June 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=talvETFiGTs, accessed 2 Aug. 2015. lois International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Authors). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Toby Greene In the context of the very low expectation of progress through bilateral talks with the Palestinians, Plan A supporters also increasingly call for an Israeli initia tive to respond favourably to the Arab Peace Initiative. They hope the involve ment of moderate Arab states may help give the Palestinians support in making difficult concessions, while also giving greater incentives for the Israeli public to countenance concessions on their side. They also argue that the regional strategic interests shared by Israel and Sunni Arab states—including the threats from both Iran and Sunni extremism typified by ISIS—create an opportune moment to try to engage the wider Arab world.35 Other steps typically advocated by Plan A supporters include enhancing cooperation with the PA on the economy and security in the West Bank and on reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip, and taking steps to rebuild relations with the US administration around a shared agenda to advance the peace process. A variation on the attempt to reach a final status agreement in one go, if this proves impossible, is an attempt to reach a partial or interim agreement. This can be labelled 'Plan Α-minus'. The goal is to seek a consensual step towards final status without requiring agreement on all issues at once. Those advocating this approach hope that while Israel may not have a partner for a comprehensive deal, it may have a partner for a partial agreement. Yossi Beilin, among others, has proposed the immediate creation of a Palestinian state in parts of the West Bank, alongside a schedule for reaching a permanent agreement.36 The most immediate objection to this approach is that the Palestinians have consistently rejected interim proposals, arguing that a 'provisional' Palestinian state will become permanent, and the remaining Palestinian demands will be buried.37 However, the most substantial challenge to Plan A inside Israel is the repeated failure of all final status talks, widely blamed in Israel on Palestinian intransigence. Plan Β Plan Β supporters agree that Israel's interest lies in breaking the status quo and advancing towards a two-state reality. However, like the status quo adherents, they attribute the failure to reach an agreement to inherent gaps between the parties which currently cannot be bridged. Individuals in this camp include supporters of the peace process disillusioned by what they perceive as Palestinian intransigence in the face of reasonable Israeli offers.38 Plan Β supporters conclude, in the words of Amos Yadlin, director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Speech by Tzipi Livni to 15th Herzliya Conference, 8 June 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=XPyo6T_Q-Os, accessed 2 Aug. 2015. Yossi Beilin, 'Why Kerry failed at peace', Politico, 14 May 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/ story/20i4/o5/why-kerry-failed-at-peace-io6596.html#ixzz3lBjXyagd, accessed 16 July 2015. Herb Keinon and Khaled Abu Toameh, 'Abbas denies considering interim peace agreement', Jerusalem Post, 29 Oct. 2013, http ://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/PA-refutes-report-saying-Abbas-has-softened his-stance-on-peace-talks-330089, accessed 16 July 2015. e.g. Shlomo Avineri, 'Don't expect Abbas to sign anything', Haaretz, 18 Feb. 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/ opinion/.premium-1.574759, accessed 15 July 2015; Ari Shavit, 'Waiting for the Palestinian Godot', Haaretz, 24 April 2014, http://www.haaretz.eom/opinion/.premium-1.574759, accessed 16 April 2015. ιοι6 International Affairs 91: 5, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This content downloaded from 147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:11:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Israel's two states debate that: 'The gaps between our minimum and the Palestinian minimum were too great.' In particular, they judge that Israel cannot make further concessions on security arrangements in the Jordan Valley or on the Palestinian demand for the 'right of return'.39 Plan Β supporters also believe that the Palestinian side will not make major compromises because it has its own 'Plan B' alternative to a negotiated agreement, including unilateral diplomatic moves. As long as the PA can strengthen the Pales tinian diplomatic position and the isolation of Israel through unilateral moves, they will have no reason to compromise.40 Plan Β advocates feel their case has been proved by Abu Mazen's refusal to agree to a framework document produced by US Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014 and continuation of unilateral measures in international institutions. Like status quo adherents, Plan Β advocates think the conflict has to be managed; but their approach to managing it is radically different, in that they propose unilateral Israeli measures to change the status quo. Currently, according to Plan Β advocates, settlement growth and declining public confidence on both sides are making a two-state solution harder to achieve; they propose to reverse these trends by moving proactively towards separation. While Plan Β proponents invariably accept that negotiated steps would be preferable, they argue that Israel should not wait for the Palestinians, and should take independent steps to advance a two-state reality if necessary. This approach originated on the left following the collapse of final status negoti ations in 2001.4I However, it came to the fore after being taken up by pragmatists in the Likud led by Ariel Sharon. It was Sharon who drove through the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and four small West Bank settlements in 2005, before splitting from Likud to form the centrist Kadima party with the intention of continuing the process in the West Bank.42 Recent years have seen renewed interest in unilateral separation, which has seen its credibility boosted by the endorsement of INSS, Israel's leading strategic think tank. Supporters of various versions of Plan Β can be found across the centre-left parties, but Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid has gone furthest of the party leaders in publicly backing it, doing so in a policy speech in June 2014.43 Overshadowing Plan B, however, is the precedent of the 2005 disengagement. This move was done without coordination with the Palestinians, and ultimately involved forcibly removing some settlers who ignored evacuation orders. Plan Β advocates stress they would avoid some of the adverse results of 2005, including the rise to power of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and associated escalation in rocket 39 Presentation by Amos Yadlin to INSS conference, 29 June 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbX5j 0vMRLI&index=3&list=PLCap