What Was the Third World?
Author(s): B. R. Tomlinson
Source: Journal of Contemporary History , Apr., 2003, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp.
307-321
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3180660
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Journal of Contemporary History Copyright ? 2003 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and
New Delhi, Vol 38(2), 307-321.
[0022-0094(200304)38:2;307-321 ;032135]
B.R. Tomlinson
What was the Third World?
The term 'Third World' was used frequently in histories of the soc
economies and cultures of many parts of the world in the second hal
twentieth century. But, although the phrase was widely used, it was neve
whether it was a clear category of analysis, or simply a convenient an
vague label for an imprecise collection of states in the second half of the
tieth century and some of the common problems that they faced. N
enthusiasts for the term provided any precision. As Peter Worsley, one o
who self-consciously began the process of passing it into academic cu
later confessed,
. . . the nature of the Third World seemed so self-evident in the 1960s that in a boo
Third World I published in 1964, I saw no need to define it any more precisely than
was the world made up of the ex-colonial, newly-independent, non-aligned countries
Like other collective descriptions of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, th
islands and Latin America - such as the 'South', the 'developing wor
the 'less-developed world' - the designation 'Third World' was more
what such places were not than what they were. That the term was often
normatively rather than analytically complicates matters further. A
topher Clapham has pointed out, 'there is no gap so wide as that be
those who seek to change the Third World and those who seek mer
understand it'.2
Those who developed a concept of the Third World around a set of
able criteria usually relied on identifying material circumstances. A
Goldthorpe put it in his influential The Sociology of the Third
Disparity and Involvement in 1975, 'if the affluent industrial countrie
modern world are grouped into those of the "West" and those of the
... then the poor countries constitute a "Third World" whose small co
over resources distinguishes them from both'.3 However, all such atte
establish a standard measurement of relative poverty that can disti
I should like to thank Professor Eileen Yeo, Department of History, University of Strathc
perceptive comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions remain my own.
1 Peter Worsely, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development (London 1984),
reference is to his book The Third World (London 1964).
2 Christopher Clapham, 'Understanding the Third World', Third World Quarter
(October 1986), 427.
3 Quoted in Marc Williams, International Economic Organizations and the Third Wor
York 1994), 3.
Journal of Contemporary History Copyright ? 2003 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oak
New Delhi, Vol 38(2), 307-321.
[0022-0094(200304)38:2;307-321 ;032135]
B.R. Tomlinson
What was the Third World?
The term 'Third World' was used frequently in histories of the soc
economies and cultures of many parts of the world in the second hal
twentieth century. But, although the phrase was widely used, it was neve
whether it was a clear category of analysis, or simply a convenient an
vague label for an imprecise collection of states in the second half of the
tieth century and some of the common problems that they faced. N
enthusiasts for the term provided any precision. As Peter Worsley, one o
who self-consciously began the process of passing it into academic cu
later confessed,
. . . the nature of the Third World seemed so self-evident in the 1960s that in a boo
Third World I published in 1964, I saw no need to define it any more precisely than
was the world made up of the ex-colonial, newly-independent, non-aligned countries
Like other collective descriptions of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, th
islands and Latin America - such as the 'South', the 'developing wor
the 'less-developed world' - the designation 'Third World' was more
what such places were not than what they were. That the term was often
normatively rather than analytically complicates matters further. A
topher Clapham has pointed out, 'there is no gap so wide as that be
those who seek to change the Third World and those who seek mer
understand it'.2
Those who developed a concept of the Third World around a set of
able criteria usually relied on identifying material circumstances. A
Goldthorpe put it in his influential The Sociology of the Third
Disparity and Involvement in 1975, 'if the affluent industrial countrie
modern world are grouped into those of the "West" and those of the
... then the poor countries constitute a "Third World" whose small co
over resources distinguishes them from both'.3 However, all such atte
establish a standard measurement of relative poverty that can disti
I should like to thank Professor Eileen Yeo, Department of History, University of Strathc
perceptive comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions remain my own.
1 Peter Worsely, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development (London 1984),
reference is to his book The Third World (London 1964).
2 Christopher Clapham, 'Understanding the Third World', Third World Quarter
(October 1986), 427.
3 Quoted in Marc Williams, International Economic Organizations and the Third Wor
York 1994), 3.
This content downloaded from
147.251.68.36 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:02:42 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
various parts of the world from each other run into considerable difficulties. It
has often been argued that the various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America (not to mention the Pacific islands and elsewhere) differ greatly in
their size, political ideologies, social structures, economic performance, cultural
backgrounds and historical experiences. These differences exist not
simply between Third World countries, but within them as well. There are rich
and poor people, empowered and disempowered citizens, to be found inside
all states and societies in the world.4
The divergent histories of different states in Asia, Africa and Latin America
in the recent past have made it harder to argue that 'Third Worldness' can be
identified unambiguously by a check-list of common material circumstances or
endogenous social or cultural characteristics. But it does not follow that the
term has no meaning. An alternative approach has stressed the importance of
the formation of a Third World consciousness, formed by common ideas, and
an awareness of a common history, in relation to the West. Thus, in some
accounts the Third World has existed because it provided an identity that was
important to those both inside and outside its borders. As John Toye pointed
out in 1987,
... the Third World is not . . . yet able to be dismissed from our minds. It is not a figment
of our imagination ready to vanish when we blink. It is a result of our collective lack of
imagination, our inability in our present difficult circumstances yet to see ourselves as
belonging to one world, and not several.5
One important characteristic of the term 'Third World' is that its academic
usage has declined strikingly in recent years. A keyword search of major
library collections reveals that at least 1805 books have been published on the
subject.6 Of these, 140 were published before 1975, 654 between 1975 and
1984, 755 between 1985 and 1994, and 169 between 1995 and 2001. By contrast
with this decline in usage, the use of the term 'globalization' (in some
senses an antonym for Third World) has increased markedly in recent years.
The first three books with globalization in their titles were published in 1988;
the first year in which more books were published on globalization than on the
Third World was 1996. Between January 1995 and March 2001 there were
358 titles on globalization, and only 162 on the Third World. The rise and fall
of academic terminology is partly a question of fashion and marketability, but
the spectacular decline in the academic use of the term Third World, with
4 Recent World Bank calculations of relative equality and inequality of the distribution of
income and consumption have shown that India, with a Gini co-efficient of 29.7, is among the top
20 least-unequal economies in the world, while Brazil (which has an economy of similar size and
with a similar history) is among the most unequal in the world, with a Gini co-efficient of 47.9.
World Bank, World Development Report 1999-2000 (Washington DC 2000), Table 5.
5 John Toye, Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development
Economics (Oxford 1987), 31.
6 The statistical data in this paragraph is based on a search of the British Library catalogue in
March 2001. A later search may modify these figures slightly, but not significantly.
various parts of the world from each other run into considerable difficulties. It
has often been argued that the various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America (not to mention the Pacific islands and elsewhere) differ greatly in
their size, political ideologies, social structures, economic performance, cultural
backgrounds and historical experiences. These differences exist not
simply between Third World countries, but within them as well. There are rich
and poor people, empowered and disempowered citizens, to be found inside
all states and societies in the world.4
The divergent histories of different states in Asia, Africa and Latin America
in the recent past have made it harder to argue that 'Third Worldness' can be
identified unambiguously by a check-list of common material circumstances or
endogenous social or cultural characteristics. But it does not follow that the
term has no meaning. An alternative approach has stressed the importance of
the formation of a Third World consciousness, formed by common ideas, and
an awareness of a common history, in relation to the West. Thus, in some
accounts the Third World has existed because it provided an identity that was
important to those both inside and outside its borders. As John Toye pointed
out in 1987,
... the Third World is not . . . yet able to be dismissed from our minds. It is not a figment
of our imagination ready to vanish when we blink. It is a result of our collective lack of
imagination, our inability in our present difficult circumstances yet to see ourselves as
belonging to one world, and not several.5
One important characteristic of the term 'Third World' is that its academic
usage has declined strikingly in recent years. A keyword search of major
library collections reveals that at least 1805 books have been published on the
subject.6 Of these, 140 were published before 1975, 654 between 1975 and
1984, 755 between 1985 and 1994, and 169 between 1995 and 2001. By contrast
with this decline in usage, the use of the term 'globalization' (in some
senses an antonym for Third World) has increased markedly in recent years.
The first three books with globalization in their titles were published in 1988;
the first year in which more books were published on globalization than on the
Third World was 1996. Between January 1995 and March 2001 there were
358 titles on globalization, and only 162 on the Third World. The rise and fall
of academic terminology is partly a question of fashion and marketability, but
the spectacular decline in the academic use of the term Third World, with
4 Recent World Bank calculations of relative equality and inequality of the distribution of
income and consumption have shown that India, with a Gini co-efficient of 29.7, is among the top
20 least-unequal economies in the world, while Brazil (which has an economy of similar size and
with a similar history) is among the most unequal in the world, with a Gini co-efficient of 47.9.
World Bank, World Development Report 1999-2000 (Washington DC 2000), Table 5.
5 John Toye, Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development
Economics (Oxford 1987), 31.
6 The statistical data in this paragraph is based on a search of the British Library catalogue in
March 2001. A later search may modify these figures slightly, but not significantly.
308308
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Tomlinson: What was the Third World?Tomlinson: What was the Third World?
only seven books with this phrase in the title appearing in the British Library
catalogue between January 2000 and March 2001, reflects a genuine rearrangement
of our mental furniture. The reasons for this, too, are worth
investigating.
Like so much of the terminology used by historians and social scientists in the
second half of the twentieth century, the notion of a Third World grew out of
the rhetoric of the Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s. The phrase had its
origins in the idea of a 'third force' or 'third way' in world affairs (distinct
from American capitalism or Soviet socialism) that was identified in the
polemical literature of the non-communist European left in the late 1940s. The
term was coined in August 1952 by the demographer and economic historian,
Alfred Sauvy, in an article in the French socialist newspaper L'Observateur,
entitled 'Trois Mondes, Une Planete', which stressed the disempowerment of
the newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa, concluding that 'the
Third World has, like the Third Estate, been ignored and despised and it too
wants to be something'.7
The first attempt to create such a third force in world affairs took place at
the Asian African Conference attended by 29 independent countries and held
in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955. The Bandung Conference is often
supposed to have represented a crucial moment in the emergence of the Third
World as a self-conscious political grouping, but the proceedings of that
meeting did not use the term. Bandung provided a useful advertisement for
the diplomatic status of formerly-colonial powers, but the conference also
revealed the extent to which the language of the Cold War had already undermined
any sense of collective identity. The attempt by the Indian and
Indonesian governments, the main instigators of the conference, to establish
'positive neutralism' between the great power blocs as the principle of a
collective approach to foreign policy was frustrated by the insistence of other
delegates - notably from Ceylon, Iraq and the Philippines - that peace could
only be established once the threat of communism had been repulsed.
Membership of collective security arrangements sponsored by the great
powers was not condemned, despite the arguments of India and China that
Asian states 'should not take any sides in the Cold War'.8
Bandung had no sequel, but the Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in
Belgrade in September 1961 created an alternative forum for negotiating the
diplomatic solidarity of countries which saw an advantage in advertising their
autonomy from the rival superpower blocs. The aims, rhetoric and membership
of the group of nations represented at the Non-Aligned Summits of the
7 Leslie Wolf-Phillips, 'Why "Third World"?: Origin, Definition and Usage', Third World
Quarterly, 9, 4 (October 1987), 1131-9 confirms Sauvy's claim to be the originator of the term.
8 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill, NC 1956), 31-2, 92-102.
only seven books with this phrase in the title appearing in the British Library
catalogue between January 2000 and March 2001, reflects a genuine rearrangement
of our mental furniture. The reasons for this, too, are worth
investigating.
Like so much of the terminology used by historians and social scientists in the
second half of the twentieth century, the notion of a Third World grew out of
the rhetoric of the Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s. The phrase had its
origins in the idea of a 'third force' or 'third way' in world affairs (distinct
from American capitalism or Soviet socialism) that was identified in the
polemical literature of the non-communist European left in the late 1940s. The
term was coined in August 1952 by the demographer and economic historian,
Alfred Sauvy, in an article in the French socialist newspaper L'Observateur,
entitled 'Trois Mondes, Une Planete', which stressed the disempowerment of
the newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa, concluding that 'the
Third World has, like the Third Estate, been ignored and despised and it too
wants to be something'.7
The first attempt to create such a third force in world affairs took place at
the Asian African Conference attended by 29 independent countries and held
in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955. The Bandung Conference is often
supposed to have represented a crucial moment in the emergence of the Third
World as a self-conscious political grouping, but the proceedings of that
meeting did not use the term. Bandung provided a useful advertisement for
the diplomatic status of formerly-colonial powers, but the conference also
revealed the extent to which the language of the Cold War had already undermined
any sense of collective identity. The attempt by the Indian and
Indonesian governments, the main instigators of the conference, to establish
'positive neutralism' between the great power blocs as the principle of a
collective approach to foreign policy was frustrated by the insistence of other
delegates - notably from Ceylon, Iraq and the Philippines - that peace could
only be established once the threat of communism had been repulsed.
Membership of collective security arrangements sponsored by the great
powers was not condemned, despite the arguments of India and China that
Asian states 'should not take any sides in the Cold War'.8
Bandung had no sequel, but the Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in
Belgrade in September 1961 created an alternative forum for negotiating the
diplomatic solidarity of countries which saw an advantage in advertising their
autonomy from the rival superpower blocs. The aims, rhetoric and membership
of the group of nations represented at the Non-Aligned Summits of the
7 Leslie Wolf-Phillips, 'Why "Third World"?: Origin, Definition and Usage', Third World
Quarterly, 9, 4 (October 1987), 1131-9 confirms Sauvy's claim to be the originator of the term.
8 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill, NC 1956), 31-2, 92-102.
309309
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Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
1960s, 1970s and 1980s broadened and expanded considerably over time.9 In
the early 1960s, the main concern was with defusing the impact of the Cold
War, as represented by the British and French invasion of Suez, and the
Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956, on states which were not part of any
power bloc. Significantly, Egypt and Yugoslavia took the initiative that led to
the Belgrade Conference, supported by India. By the middle 1960s, the main
focus was on anti-colonialism, especially as this approach to the problems
presented by Israel and South Africa provided a way of unifying the interests
of Arab and African states. From the late 1960s, and through the 1970s, the
main issues were problems of economic development, especially those arising
from heightened uncertainty in the international economy. From the Lusaka
Declaration on 'Non-Alignment and Economic Progress' in 1970 onwards,
attempts to reform the international economic system to balance the interests
of rich and poor countries moved to centre-stage. As the preamble to the
Lusaka Declaration put it,' ... the poverty of developing nations and their
economic dependence on those in affluent circumstances constitutes a structural
weakness in the present economic order'."?
It was over broad issues of economic development that the fiercest battles for
the concept of the Third World were fought. Orthodox development economists
in the 1950s and 1960s had suggested that the poverty of non-western
economies was the result of low levels of savings and investment, and that
these problems could best be resolved by increasing external influence over
them to help local elites modernize their societies (in other words, make them
more like those of the West) by providing technology and education to
increase productivity and output. The blueprints for this process were provided
by 'modernization theory', which sought to identify the 'transitional
process' that could move societies from the 'traditional' to the 'modern'.11
To many radical critics, these ideas, and the US government's development
policies that flowed from them, seemed to mask a narrow political agenda that
sought to justify the dominance of free-market capitalism as a model and
mechanism for economic, social and cultural development. One powerful
reaction to this agenda was to argue that dependence on the West had distorted
the economic and social conditions of non-western societies, leading to
9 This evolution can conveniently be traced in the 12-volume semi-official compendium, Odette
Jankowitsch, Karl P. Sauvant and Jorg Weber (eds), The Third World without Superpowers: The
Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries (New York 1978-93), although the organization
itself never used the term 'Third World' in its formal documentation.
10 'Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress', September 1970, quoted in
Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London
1978), 28.
11 As has often been pointed out, these concepts derived from the work of Talcott Parsons, and
can be traced back to Max Weber. Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackemer (eds), The
Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy ( Cambridge, MA 1961) provides a
fairly sophisticated version of this approach.
1960s, 1970s and 1980s broadened and expanded considerably over time.9 In
the early 1960s, the main concern was with defusing the impact of the Cold
War, as represented by the British and French invasion of Suez, and the
Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956, on states which were not part of any
power bloc. Significantly, Egypt and Yugoslavia took the initiative that led to
the Belgrade Conference, supported by India. By the middle 1960s, the main
focus was on anti-colonialism, especially as this approach to the problems
presented by Israel and South Africa provided a way of unifying the interests
of Arab and African states. From the late 1960s, and through the 1970s, the
main issues were problems of economic development, especially those arising
from heightened uncertainty in the international economy. From the Lusaka
Declaration on 'Non-Alignment and Economic Progress' in 1970 onwards,
attempts to reform the international economic system to balance the interests
of rich and poor countries moved to centre-stage. As the preamble to the
Lusaka Declaration put it,' ... the poverty of developing nations and their
economic dependence on those in affluent circumstances constitutes a structural
weakness in the present economic order'."?
It was over broad issues of economic development that the fiercest battles for
the concept of the Third World were fought. Orthodox development economists
in the 1950s and 1960s had suggested that the poverty of non-western
economies was the result of low levels of savings and investment, and that
these problems could best be resolved by increasing external influence over
them to help local elites modernize their societies (in other words, make them
more like those of the West) by providing technology and education to
increase productivity and output. The blueprints for this process were provided
by 'modernization theory', which sought to identify the 'transitional
process' that could move societies from the 'traditional' to the 'modern'.11
To many radical critics, these ideas, and the US government's development
policies that flowed from them, seemed to mask a narrow political agenda that
sought to justify the dominance of free-market capitalism as a model and
mechanism for economic, social and cultural development. One powerful
reaction to this agenda was to argue that dependence on the West had distorted
the economic and social conditions of non-western societies, leading to
9 This evolution can conveniently be traced in the 12-volume semi-official compendium, Odette
Jankowitsch, Karl P. Sauvant and Jorg Weber (eds), The Third World without Superpowers: The
Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries (New York 1978-93), although the organization
itself never used the term 'Third World' in its formal documentation.
10 'Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress', September 1970, quoted in
Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London
1978), 28.
11 As has often been pointed out, these concepts derived from the work of Talcott Parsons, and
can be traced back to Max Weber. Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackemer (eds), The
Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy ( Cambridge, MA 1961) provides a
fairly sophisticated version of this approach.
310310
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Tomlinson: What was the Third World?Tomlinson: What was the Third World?
a common process of historical change in the periphery of the world economy
brought about by 'a situation in which the economy of certain countries [and
hence their social and political structures] is conditioned by the development
and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected'.12 Such
accounts provided the foundations for a large literature on 'underdevelopment'
and 'dependency' in the 1960s and 1970s, which raised doubts as to
whether Third World countries could ever achieve satisfactory development
while they remained subject to the global reach of the advanced capitalist
economies of the West, and also suggested that their experience of exploitation
within that system might give them a common cause.'3
The dependency school was never a unified voice, and contained significant
variations of opinion about whether any development was possible within the
existing international economic system. Some arguments stressed the structural
barriers to development that followed from the division of the world
economy into 'core' and 'periphery'; other writers suggested that 'associated
dependent development' was possible given appropriate local political encouragement.
One crucial area of analysis concerned the political and social
structures of 'dependent' economies, with a key role being attributed to the
'national bourgeoisie' - the local business and political elite that had played a
role in overthrowing colonialism, and which now used alliances with international
capital to dominate the new state and suppress challenges to its
position.
An important element of the 'underdevelopment perspective' derived from
frustration with the activities of state economic planners in Third World
countries, and the links between these and the activities of regional and international
development organizations, that was felt by progressive intellectuals
and academics on the fringes (literal and ideological) of such organizations.
Out of this frustration grew a sense of common identity around the plight of
those suffering from underdevelopment both in the periphery and in some
radical opinion in core countries. This identification of a homogeneous condition
of dependency was not a necessary part of the theory of underdevelopment,
but such ideas certainly underlay many of its popular versions, and fed
into a perception of the inhabitants of Third World countries as victims rather
than agents of their history. One effect was a sudden expansion in the use of
the term 'Third World' in the late 1960s and the 1970s that has been linked to
what one enthusiast for the term described as 'the emergence of a growing
consciousness among the peoples of different Third World countries themselves
that they shared common problems and experiences in relation to other
countries'.14
12 T. Dos Santos, 'The Structure of Dependence', American Economic Review, 40 (May 1970),
231.
13 Colin Leys, 'The Rise and Fall of Dependency Theory' and 'Underdevelopment and
Dependency: Critical Notes' in his The Rise and Fall of Dependency Theory (London 1996),
3-44, 45-63 is an excellent review and sympathetic critique of the dependency school.
14 Kofi Buenor Hadjor, Dictionary of Third World Terms (London 1992), 6.
a common process of historical change in the periphery of the world economy
brought about by 'a situation in which the economy of certain countries [and
hence their social and political structures] is conditioned by the development
and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected'.12 Such
accounts provided the foundations for a large literature on 'underdevelopment'
and 'dependency' in the 1960s and 1970s, which raised doubts as to
whether Third World countries could ever achieve satisfactory development
while they remained subject to the global reach of the advanced capitalist
economies of the West, and also suggested that their experience of exploitation
within that system might give them a common cause.'3
The dependency school was never a unified voice, and contained significant
variations of opinion about whether any development was possible within the
existing international economic system. Some arguments stressed the structural
barriers to development that followed from the division of the world
economy into 'core' and 'periphery'; other writers suggested that 'associated
dependent development' was possible given appropriate local political encouragement.
One crucial area of analysis concerned the political and social
structures of 'dependent' economies, with a key role being attributed to the
'national bourgeoisie' - the local business and political elite that had played a
role in overthrowing colonialism, and which now used alliances with international
capital to dominate the new state and suppress challenges to its
position.
An important element of the 'underdevelopment perspective' derived from
frustration with the activities of state economic planners in Third World
countries, and the links between these and the activities of regional and international
development organizations, that was felt by progressive intellectuals
and academics on the fringes (literal and ideological) of such organizations.
Out of this frustration grew a sense of common identity around the plight of
those suffering from underdevelopment both in the periphery and in some
radical opinion in core countries. This identification of a homogeneous condition
of dependency was not a necessary part of the theory of underdevelopment,
but such ideas certainly underlay many of its popular versions, and fed
into a perception of the inhabitants of Third World countries as victims rather
than agents of their history. One effect was a sudden expansion in the use of
the term 'Third World' in the late 1960s and the 1970s that has been linked to
what one enthusiast for the term described as 'the emergence of a growing
consciousness among the peoples of different Third World countries themselves
that they shared common problems and experiences in relation to other
countries'.14
12 T. Dos Santos, 'The Structure of Dependence', American Economic Review, 40 (May 1970),
231.
13 Colin Leys, 'The Rise and Fall of Dependency Theory' and 'Underdevelopment and
Dependency: Critical Notes' in his The Rise and Fall of Dependency Theory (London 1996),
3-44, 45-63 is an excellent review and sympathetic critique of the dependency school.
14 Kofi Buenor Hadjor, Dictionary of Third World Terms (London 1992), 6.
31 I31 I
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Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
The 1970s was the great age of Third World rhetoric of common cause and
common action. The growing influence of dependency theory, with its argument
that the Third World existed in 'a global and political system marked
by a deep-seated and steadily increasing asymmetry and a cause-and-effect
relationship between the underdevelopment of some nations and the overdevelopment
of others',15 helped to legitimize a common agenda for changing
the structure of international relations - especially of international economic
relations - on which that asymmetry seemed to rest. In this decade, the
collective identity of most Asian, African and Latin American countries in
international relations became expressed through demands for reform in the
institutional structure of the international economy.
The lead here was taken by the Group of 77 self-declared 'developing
countries' which had been formed at the first UNCTAD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development) meeting in 1964. This grouping
included the Latin American states (which did not attend the Non-Aligned
summits of the 1960s), and drew heavily on the intellectual heritage of Latin
American economic thinking on the structural barriers to economic growth
caused by open systems of international trade. During the severe external
shocks that hit the international economy in the early 1970s - oil price
increases, food-supply crises, abrupt changes in the international monetary
regime, and a world-wide recession accompanied by inflation - the G77 led
the demand for new institutions of global economic management to remove
the structural imbalances that, as they saw it, frustrated the development of
the countries outside the OECD and Comecon.
The strength of this campaign was shown by the passing of the Charter on
the Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Declaration of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) by the sixth Special Session of the
United Nations General Assembly in 1974, convened in the immediate aftermath
of the oil crisis. At this session, the General Assembly committed itself to
a Programme of Action which sought 'to work urgently for the establishment
of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality,
common interest and co-operation between all states'.'6 The demand for the
NIEO was based on the implementation of 25 objectives dealing with international
aid and assistance, international trade, industrialization and technology
transfer, and social issues. These were to be achieved in ways which
assured the economic sovereignty of states, including their right to control the
exploitation of natural resources, with the right to nationalize them if appro-
priate.
In retrospect, we can see that the UN resolutions of 1974 concerning the
New International Economic Order marked a high point in the diplomatic
15 Ignacy Sachs, trans. Michale Fineborg, The Discovery of the Third World (Cambridge, MA
1976), ix-x.
16 Quoted in Michael Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, 4th edn (London
1989), 600.
The 1970s was the great age of Third World rhetoric of common cause and
common action. The growing influence of dependency theory, with its argument
that the Third World existed in 'a global and political system marked
by a deep-seated and steadily increasing asymmetry and a cause-and-effect
relationship between the underdevelopment of some nations and the overdevelopment
of others',15 helped to legitimize a common agenda for changing
the structure of international relations - especially of international economic
relations - on which that asymmetry seemed to rest. In this decade, the
collective identity of most Asian, African and Latin American countries in
international relations became expressed through demands for reform in the
institutional structure of the international economy.
The lead here was taken by the Group of 77 self-declared 'developing
countries' which had been formed at the first UNCTAD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development) meeting in 1964. This grouping
included the Latin American states (which did not attend the Non-Aligned
summits of the 1960s), and drew heavily on the intellectual heritage of Latin
American economic thinking on the structural barriers to economic growth
caused by open systems of international trade. During the severe external
shocks that hit the international economy in the early 1970s - oil price
increases, food-supply crises, abrupt changes in the international monetary
regime, and a world-wide recession accompanied by inflation - the G77 led
the demand for new institutions of global economic management to remove
the structural imbalances that, as they saw it, frustrated the development of
the countries outside the OECD and Comecon.
The strength of this campaign was shown by the passing of the Charter on
the Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Declaration of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) by the sixth Special Session of the
United Nations General Assembly in 1974, convened in the immediate aftermath
of the oil crisis. At this session, the General Assembly committed itself to
a Programme of Action which sought 'to work urgently for the establishment
of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality,
common interest and co-operation between all states'.'6 The demand for the
NIEO was based on the implementation of 25 objectives dealing with international
aid and assistance, international trade, industrialization and technology
transfer, and social issues. These were to be achieved in ways which
assured the economic sovereignty of states, including their right to control the
exploitation of natural resources, with the right to nationalize them if appro-
priate.
In retrospect, we can see that the UN resolutions of 1974 concerning the
New International Economic Order marked a high point in the diplomatic
15 Ignacy Sachs, trans. Michale Fineborg, The Discovery of the Third World (Cambridge, MA
1976), ix-x.
16 Quoted in Michael Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, 4th edn (London
1989), 600.
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Tomlinson: What was the Third World?Tomlinson: What was the Third World?
solidarity of Third World governments engaged in a 'revolt against the West',17
and in the rhetoric associated with the international economic relations of
development. Sympathetic observers saw the NIEO programme as an inevitable
consequence of the revolution of rising expectations that had been set
off by decolonization, and that were frustrated by structural difficulties and
management problems in the international system that could be defused by
negotiation.18 But to other commentators they represented a grave threat
which put the whole basis of a liberal international order under attack from
'the armed doctrines of Bolshevism and nationalism' that had produced a new
hybrid which 'divides the world into the "northern", rich, exploiting nations
and "southern", poor, exploited nations'.19
Such apocalyptic visions of sustained economic warfare between developed
and developing countries proved to be exaggerated. The continued demand for
a direct transfer of resources from 'North' to 'South' at the United Nations
General Assembly and elsewhere, caused some acrimony, increased by the
uncertainty caused by the continued economic difficulties of many western
economies and the outbreak of the 'second Cold War' in Africa during the
1970s. Despite these pressures, little formal institutional change took place.
Although Third World countries had a numerical majority in the United
Nations General Assembly, their demand for a New International Economic
Order was opposed by the western countries that controlled the IMF and the
World Bank. However, the endemic disorder of the international economy
during the 1970s made the influence of the existing institutions of international
economic management largely ineffective - the IMF could not cope
with the strains of running an integrated world monetary system in which all
the major currencies were floating in value against each other - while the
resources available through the World Bank were much smaller, and harder to
obtain, than the funds that could be borrowed from the private international
capital market swollen by the surplus balances of the OPEC nations.
By the end of the 1970s, the ability of the Third World group at the UN to
exert pressure for change was weakening as their ability to use their chief
weapon - the threat of commodity boycotts for a range of primary products
and minerals in the manner of the OPEC manipulation of oil prices - lost
credibility. Demands for radical reform were kept up at the Havana meeting
of the Organization of Non-Aligned States, but attempts to organize global
negotiations on international co-operation through the Committee of the
Whole set up by the UN General Assembly in 1977 had reached stalemate by
1980. The report of the Independent Commission on International Development
Issues (Brandt Commission), published the same year, dealt with interstate
relations in the context of world poverty, using the phrases 'Third
17 Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt Against the West' in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The
Expansion of International Society (Oxford 1984), 217ff.
18 Ibid.
19 Elie Khedourie, 'A New International Disorder' in Bull and Watson, op. cit., 350.
solidarity of Third World governments engaged in a 'revolt against the W
and in the rhetoric associated with the international economic relatio
development. Sympathetic observers saw the NIEO programme as an i
able consequence of the revolution of rising expectations that had b
off by decolonization, and that were frustrated by structural difficult
management problems in the international system that could be defu
negotiation.18 But to other commentators they represented a grave
which put the whole basis of a liberal international order under attac
'the armed doctrines of Bolshevism and nationalism' that had produced
hybrid which 'divides the world into the "northern", rich, exploiting
and "southern", poor, exploited nations'.19
Such apocalyptic visions of sustained economic warfare between dev
and developing countries proved to be exaggerated. The continued dem
a direct transfer of resources from 'North' to 'South' at the United N
General Assembly and elsewhere, caused some acrimony, increased b
uncertainty caused by the continued economic difficulties of many w
economies and the outbreak of the 'second Cold War' in Africa durin
1970s. Despite these pressures, little formal institutional change took
Although Third World countries had a numerical majority in the Un
Nations General Assembly, their demand for a New International Ec
Order was opposed by the western countries that controlled the IMF
World Bank. However, the endemic disorder of the international eco
during the 1970s made the influence of the existing institutions of
national economic management largely ineffective - the IMF could no
with the strains of running an integrated world monetary system in whic
the major currencies were floating in value against each other - whi
resources available through the World Bank were much smaller, and ha
obtain, than the funds that could be borrowed from the private intern
capital market swollen by the surplus balances of the OPEC nations.
By the end of the 1970s, the ability of the Third World group at the
exert pressure for change was weakening as their ability to use thei
weapon - the threat of commodity boycotts for a range of primary pr
and minerals in the manner of the OPEC manipulation of oil prices credibility.
Demands for radical reform were kept up at the Havana m
of the Organization of Non-Aligned States, but attempts to organize
negotiations on international co-operation through the Committee o
Whole set up by the UN General Assembly in 1977 had reached stalem
1980. The report of the Independent Commission on International De
ment Issues (Brandt Commission), published the same year, dealt with
state relations in the context of world poverty, using the phrases 'T
17 Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt Against the West' in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (ed
Expansion of International Society (Oxford 1984), 217ff.
18 Ibid.
19 Elie Khedourie, 'A New International Disorder' in Bull and Watson, op. cit., 350.
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Joural of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Joural of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
World', 'South' and 'developing countries' interchangeably as synonymous
with 'poorer' countries where people were 'pre-occupied solely with survival
and elementary needs', and faced 'total deprivation'.20 The report itself, widely
criticized as careless in its assumptions, unrealistic in its proposals, and having
no real concern for feasibility or procedure, quickly faded into obscurity.21 The
key element in the Brandt Report, which was adopted even before the
International Commission had met, was that there was a clear mutuality of
interests between North and South that would best be served by closer economic
integration. The result was a 'North-South Summit' attended by 22
heads of state at Cancun, Mexico in 1981, but here the developed countries
maintained their objection to holding a global round of negotiations on economic
matters.
By the time of the Cancun Summit, the balance of international economic
power had tipped back firmly towards the developed nations. In the early
1980s, the Reagan administration in the USA reasserted a strong dollar's
central place in the international monetary system; as real interest and repayment
rates rose, so the boom of inward investment into developing countries
that had been fuelled by the recycling of OPEC balances became the debt
crisis that dominated relations between many developing countries and the
international system in the 1980s. The combined capital accounts of all the
developing nations, which had been in surplus by $85.7 billion in 1978-80,
moved into deficit in 1981, and showed a cumulative deficit of $54.8 billion
between 1981 and 1984, combined with a combined current account deficit
for those years of $233 billion. For the rest of the 1980s the 'debt crisis' dominated
discussions of the Third World's place in the international economic
system, with the average debt/GNP ratio running at between 24 per cent and
38 per cent for the rest of the decade. Latin American and African countries
were particularly badly hit, with the average African debt/GNP ratio exceeding
50 per cent consistently from 1986. Overall, the World Bank calculated
that the net resource flow (new lending minus debt
service) for all indebted LDCs (Less Developed Countries) went fro
tive $35.2 billion in 1981 to a negative $30.7 billion in 1987.22
The political, economic and ideological changes of the 1980s had a
cant effect in every part of the world. For developing countries,
impact was to change fundamentally the terms on which they could
international economic institutions, and with the major powers - n
20 Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A
for Survival (London 1980), 49. The term 'South' (attributed to Lord Franks) was
the early 1960s to split the globe along the latitude of the Mediterranean sea, and
poor, largely peasant, world in Africa, Asia and Latin America'. William Clark,
Adrian Moyes and Teresa Hayter, World III: A Handbook for Developing Count
1964), x.
21 Charles A. Jones, The North-South Dialogue: A Brief History (London 1983
critical view of the lack of intellectual coherence or sustained influence of the Brandt
22 Todaro, op. cit., chap. 13. The statistics quoted are based on World Bank estim
World', 'South' and 'developing countries' interchangeably as synony
with 'poorer' countries where people were 'pre-occupied solely with
and elementary needs', and faced 'total deprivation'.20 The report itself,
criticized as careless in its assumptions, unrealistic in its proposals, a
no real concern for feasibility or procedure, quickly faded into obscurit
key element in the Brandt Report, which was adopted even b
International Commission had met, was that there was a clear mu
interests between North and South that would best be served by clo
nomic integration. The result was a 'North-South Summit' attende
heads of state at Cancun, Mexico in 1981, but here the developed
maintained their objection to holding a global round of negotiation
nomic matters.
By the time of the Cancun Summit, the balance of international economic
power had tipped back firmly towards the developed nations. In the early
1980s, the Reagan administration in the USA reasserted a strong dollar's
central place in the international monetary system; as real interest and repayment
rates rose, so the boom of inward investment into developing countries
that had been fuelled by the recycling of OPEC balances became the debt
crisis that dominated relations between many developing countries and the
international system in the 1980s. The combined capital accounts of all the
developing nations, which had been in surplus by $85.7 billion in 1978-80,
moved into deficit in 1981, and showed a cumulative deficit of $54.8 billion
between 1981 and 1984, combined with a combined current account deficit
for those years of $233 billion. For the rest of the 1980s the 'debt crisis' dominated
discussions of the Third World's place in the international economic
system, with the average debt/GNP ratio running at between 24 per cent and
38 per cent for the rest of the decade. Latin American and African countries
were particularly badly hit, with the average African debt/GNP ratio exceeding
50 per cent consistently from 1986. Overall, the World Bank calculated
that the net resource flow (new lending minus debt
service) for all indebted LDCs (Less Developed Countries) went fro
tive $35.2 billion in 1981 to a negative $30.7 billion in 1987.22
The political, economic and ideological changes of the 1980s had a
cant effect in every part of the world. For developing countries,
impact was to change fundamentally the terms on which they could
international economic institutions, and with the major powers - n
20 Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A
for Survival (London 1980), 49. The term 'South' (attributed to Lord Franks) was
the early 1960s to split the globe along the latitude of the Mediterranean sea, and
poor, largely peasant, world in Africa, Asia and Latin America'. William Clark,
Adrian Moyes and Teresa Hayter, World III: A Handbook for Developing Count
1964), x.
21 Charles A. Jones, The North-South Dialogue: A Brief History (London 1983
critical view of the lack of intellectual coherence or sustained influence of the Brandt
22 Todaro, op. cit., chap. 13. The statistics quoted are based on World Bank estim
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Tomlinson: Whot was the Third World?Tomlinson: Whot was the Third World?
USA - which cemented their hold over the management of the global system.
While some countries used the new opportunities that were offered for growth
through trade in manufactured goods - notably the East Asian economies of
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, followed slightly later by
the ASEAN countries of Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand,
and by China - many others, especially in Africa, suffered severe shocks. The
decreased demand for primary produce, declining terms of trade for their
exports, rapidly rising costs of debt repayment and re-borrowing and internal
problems of agricultural productivity and natural disaster brought about
widespread economic failure in Africa, which undermined the strength, vitality
and legitimacy of many Third World states.23 The ending of the Cold War in
the late 1980s, and the removal of the possibility of Soviet support, limited
both the importance of existing African governments as allies in the geopolitical
war of position between the superpowers, and their ability to conclude
favourable bargains for outside assistance.
These changes had serious effects on the political and psychological linkages
that had bound the Third World together, since the United Nations ceased to
be a major forum for achieving reform in the structure of the global political
economy. As even its official publications admit, in the 1980s the UN lost
'development momentum', and appeared to be 'less relevant to development in
the eyes of major member countries, both developed and developing' than it
had during the campaign for the NIEO.24 The UN regained some of the initiative
in broad debates on global issues with the series of world conferences on
the environment (notably the Earth Summit held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992),
population, women, and social development that it ran in the early 1990s,
following the doctrine of 'sustainable development' that had been proposed by
the Brundtland Report (Our Common Future) in 1987. However, no major
breakthrough on these issues was achieved, with the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development concluding in 1997 that 'the overall trends for sustainable
development are worse today than they were in 1992'.25
During the 1980s, the idea of a distinctive Third World, with its own coherent
set of development issues and problems, was further undermined by changes in
the international balance of power between global development institutions.
In the absence of any UN resources or major initiatives, the task of managing
specific economic issues associated with development was now effectively
devolved to the IMF, the World Bank and the new World Trade Organization
that was founded in 1995. These agencies, especially the World Bank, adopted
23 Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline
of an Ideology (London 1986) is based on a retrospective critique of the self-serving nature of
Third World rhetoric in the light of these changes.
24 John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds), A Global Agenda, 1997-98: Issues Before the
52nd General Assembly of the United Nations (Lanham 1997), 108-9.
25 Ibid., 136.
USA - which cemented their hold over the management of the global system
While some countries used the new opportunities that were offered for growth
through trade in manufactured goods - notably the East Asian economies of
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, followed slightly later by
the ASEAN countries of Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand,
and by China - many others, especially in Africa, suffered severe shocks. The
decreased demand for primary produce, declining terms of trade for their
exports, rapidly rising costs of debt repayment and re-borrowing and internal
problems of agricultural productivity and natural disaster brought about
widespread economic failure in Africa, which undermined the strength, vitality
and legitimacy of many Third World states.23 The ending of the Cold War in
the late 1980s, and the removal of the possibility of Soviet support, limited
both the importance of existing African governments as allies in the geopolitical
war of position between the superpowers, and their ability to conclude
favourable bargains for outside assistance.
These changes had serious effects on the political and psychological linkages
that had bound the Third World together, since the United Nations ceased to
be a major forum for achieving reform in the structure of the global political
economy. As even its official publications admit, in the 1980s the UN lost
'development momentum', and appeared to be 'less relevant to development in
the eyes of major member countries, both developed and developing' than it
had during the campaign for the NIEO.24 The UN regained some of the initiative
in broad debates on global issues with the series of world conferences on
the environment (notably the Earth Summit held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992),
population, women, and social development that it ran in the early 1990s,
following the doctrine of 'sustainable development' that had been proposed by
the Brundtland Report (Our Common Future) in 1987. However, no major
breakthrough on these issues was achieved, with the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development concluding in 1997 that 'the overall trends for sustainable
development are worse today than they were in 1992'.25
During the 1980s, the idea of a distinctive Third World, with its own coherent
set of development issues and problems, was further undermined by changes in
the international balance of power between global development institutions.
In the absence of any UN resources or major initiatives, the task of managing
specific economic issues associated with development was now effectively
devolved to the IMF, the World Bank and the new World Trade Organization
that was founded in 1995. These agencies, especially the World Bank, adopted
23 Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline
of an Ideology (London 1986) is based on a retrospective critique of the self-serving nature of
Third World rhetoric in the light of these changes.
24 John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds), A Global Agenda, 1997-98: Issues Before the
52nd General Assembly of the United Nations (Lanham 1997), 108-9.
25 Ibid., 136.
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Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
a much less sympathetic attitude to the existing internal management of the
development process, applying the new principle of 'structural adjustment',
coined by the president of the World Bank, Robert Macnamara, in 1979, and
institutionalized in the introduction of 'structural adjustment lending' by the
Bank in 1980. As a result, the World Bank and other international development
agencies insisted on reforms to devalue currencies, remove government
monopolies, encourage the private sector, establish market prices, and cut
government spending as the price of further aid and assistance. The key theoretical
shift here was in the denial of any specific sub-discipline of 'development
economics', and the assumption that what has been called 'moneconomics'
could be applied universally because the potential for economic
rationality, and hence rational choice, was a constant across all societies at
every stage of development. 26
The extreme anti-statist position of this counter-revolution, derived from
the rhetoric of 'Reaganomics' in the USA, was quickly moderated, but states
were only allowed back into the development process if their institutional
capabilities for appropriately neutral macro-economic policies met approval.
This critique of existing state structures extended to their socio-economic base,
and the domestic forces that dependency theory had identified as the 'national
bourgeoisie' were now identified with the equally derogatory label of 'rentseekers'
- privileged groups in a symbiotic relationship to the state who were
rewarded by access to scarce factors of production such as capital, education
and import licenses, without any competition for their productive use.2 The
political accompaniment of rational choice economics and structural adjustment
was the propaganda of democratization exemplified by the imposition of
'political conditionality' - a concern for human rights, democracy and 'good
governance' - by aid donors on recipient countries. While western governments
were not always able to enforce these conditions, they did represent an
ambitious project for reordering Third World states, that some critics argued
amounted to a process of 'recolonization' and the 'reassertion of Occidental
hegemony in matters of development'.28
As the coherence of the materialist concept of the Third World dissolved in
the 1980s, an alternative approach to identifying a distinctive and (partially)
unified Third World experience and voice emerged in the growing body of
literature concerned with post-colonial theory and history. Here the lines of
debate over the meaning and validity of a common Third World identity have
followed similar lines to that in the discussions of political economy already
26 See Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival
(Cambridge 1996), 169ff.
27 Anne 0. Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic
Review, 64, 2 (June 1974), 291-303 is a classic exposition of this view.
28 Clapham, Africa and the International System, op. cit., 186; David Slater, 'Trajectories of
Development Theory: Capitalism, Socialism and Beyond' in R.J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor and
Michael J. Watts (eds), Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late
Twentieth Century (Oxford 1995), 70.
a much less sympathetic attitude to the existing internal management of the
development process, applying the new principle of 'structural adjustment',
coined by the president of the World Bank, Robert Macnamara, in 1979, and
institutionalized in the introduction of 'structural adjustment lending' by the
Bank in 1980. As a result, the World Bank and other international development
agencies insisted on reforms to devalue currencies, remove government
monopolies, encourage the private sector, establish market prices, and cut
government spending as the price of further aid and assistance. The key theoretical
shift here was in the denial of any specific sub-discipline of 'development
economics', and the assumption that what has been called 'moneconomics'
could be applied universally because the potential for economic
rationality, and hence rational choice, was a constant across all societies at
every stage of development. 26
The extreme anti-statist position of this counter-revolution, derived from
the rhetoric of 'Reaganomics' in the USA, was quickly moderated, but states
were only allowed back into the development process if their institutional
capabilities for appropriately neutral macro-economic policies met approval.
This critique of existing state structures extended to their socio-economic base,
and the domestic forces that dependency theory had identified as the 'national
bourgeoisie' were now identified with the equally derogatory label of 'rentseekers'
- privileged groups in a symbiotic relationship to the state who were
rewarded by access to scarce factors of production such as capital, education
and import licenses, without any competition for their productive use.2 The
political accompaniment of rational choice economics and structural adjustment
was the propaganda of democratization exemplified by the imposition of
'political conditionality' - a concern for human rights, democracy and 'good
governance' - by aid donors on recipient countries. While western governments
were not always able to enforce these conditions, they did represent an
ambitious project for reordering Third World states, that some critics argued
amounted to a process of 'recolonization' and the 'reassertion of Occidental
hegemony in matters of development'.28
As the coherence of the materialist concept of the Third World dissolved in
the 1980s, an alternative approach to identifying a distinctive and (partially)
unified Third World experience and voice emerged in the growing body of
literature concerned with post-colonial theory and history. Here the lines of
debate over the meaning and validity of a common Third World identity have
followed similar lines to that in the discussions of political economy already
26 See Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival
(Cambridge 1996), 169ff.
27 Anne 0. Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic
Review, 64, 2 (June 1974), 291-303 is a classic exposition of this view.
28 Clapham, Africa and the International System, op. cit., 186; David Slater, 'Trajectories of
Development Theory: Capitalism, Socialism and Beyond' in R.J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor and
Michael J. Watts (eds), Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World in the Late
Twentieth Century (Oxford 1995), 70.
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Tomlinson: What was the Third World?Tomlinson: What was the Third World?
outlined - especially in terms of how many worlds there are, and the homogeneity
or heterodoxy of post-colonial struggles and responses to the West.29
The attempt to identify a coherent and distinct Third World experience has
come under attack from those who are concerned to stress the 'multiplicity of
margins' - the proliferation of many distinct voices in African, Asian and
Latin American cultures that must be given equal privilege - and also by
those who prefer to stress a 'one-world' model based on the importance of
identities forged by class divisions and class solidarities across cultures.
The equivalent to the political economy concept of dependency that underlay
cultural studies approaches to this problem were the notions of 'hybridity'
and 'strategic essentialism' that were proposed as the basis for both identifying
and justifying a unified response to the West. The notion of 'hybridity' emphasizes
the complementarities which exist between the different aspects of the
post-colonial cultural formation across national boundaries and tries to build
upon them. Such an attempt makes possible the adoption of the principle of
'strategic essentialism' as an 'intermediate' model of post-colonial identity
which 'allows a conception of essentialism as - at the very least - a stage
which must be passed through in the process of cultural decolonization' that
offers 'advantages ... for a coherent politics of resistance' and possibility for
'solidarity among different kinds of "margin"'. Despite continued political
problems in attempting to combine on the basis of common differences, this
approach provides 'the possibility of alliances in a "war of position" in a way
that cultural particularism is reluctant to do'.30 While acknowledging that
cultural nationalism proved effective in helping to end the era of formal
colonialism, and can provide the basis for opposition to dominant global
orders based on an alliance of nation states, such approaches echo dependency
critiques in attacking the character of many of the regimes set up after decolonization.
Thus, according to Moore-Gilbert, colonial and post-colonial
systems of control were maintained through the cultural production of complicit
'mimic men' and the creation of 'the national bourgeoisie ... to which
control was relinquished at the beginning of the (neo-)colonial period'.31
These ideas (or at least the rhetoric derived from them) helped to form the
basis of radical responses to the impact of structural adjustment and political
conditionality on Third World societies which called for the 'empowerment of
the people' to achieve 'human-centred development'.32 One result was renewed
29 This account is largely based on Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices,
Policies (London 1997) and his 'Postcolonialism: Between Nationalitarianism and Globalization?
A Response to Simon During', Postcolonial Studies 1, 2 (April 1998), 49-65.
30 Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory, op. cit., 191-2, 198-9, 202.
31 Ibid., 195.
32 The Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa argued in 1990, 'The
foundation for self-reliant and internally self-sustaining processes of development is people's
participation .... Authentic, self-reliant processes of development inevitably result in the transformation
of the people who bring about the change.' Quoted in Richard Sandbrook, The Politics
of Africa's Economic Recovery (Cambridge 1993), 138.
outlined - especially in terms of how many worlds there are, and the homogeneity
or heterodoxy of post-colonial struggles and responses to the West.29
The attempt to identify a coherent and distinct Third World experience has
come under attack from those who are concerned to stress the 'multiplicity of
margins' - the proliferation of many distinct voices in African, Asian and
Latin American cultures that must be given equal privilege - and also by
those who prefer to stress a 'one-world' model based on the importance of
identities forged by class divisions and class solidarities across cultures.
The equivalent to the political economy concept of dependency that underlay
cultural studies approaches to this problem were the notions of 'hybridity'
and 'strategic essentialism' that were proposed as the basis for both identifying
and justifying a unified response to the West. The notion of 'hybridity' emphasizes
the complementarities which exist between the different aspects of the
post-colonial cultural formation across national boundaries and tries to build
upon them. Such an attempt makes possible the adoption of the principle of
'strategic essentialism' as an 'intermediate' model of post-colonial identity
which 'allows a conception of essentialism as - at the very least - a stage
which must be passed through in the process of cultural decolonization' that
offers 'advantages ... for a coherent politics of resistance' and possibility for
'solidarity among different kinds of "margin"'. Despite continued political
problems in attempting to combine on the basis of common differences, this
approach provides 'the possibility of alliances in a "war of position" in a way
that cultural particularism is reluctant to do'.30 While acknowledging that
cultural nationalism proved effective in helping to end the era of formal
colonialism, and can provide the basis for opposition to dominant global
orders based on an alliance of nation states, such approaches echo dependency
critiques in attacking the character of many of the regimes set up after decolonization.
Thus, according to Moore-Gilbert, colonial and post-colonial
systems of control were maintained through the cultural production of complicit
'mimic men' and the creation of 'the national bourgeoisie ... to which
control was relinquished at the beginning of the (neo-)colonial period'.31
These ideas (or at least the rhetoric derived from them) helped to form the
basis of radical responses to the impact of structural adjustment and political
conditionality on Third World societies which called for the 'empowerment of
the people' to achieve 'human-centred development'.32 One result was renewed
29 This account is largely based on Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices,
Policies (London 1997) and his 'Postcolonialism: Between Nationalitarianism and Globalization?
A Response to Simon During', Postcolonial Studies 1, 2 (April 1998), 49-65.
30 Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory, op. cit., 191-2, 198-9, 202.
31 Ibid., 195.
32 The Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa argued in 1990, 'The
foundation for self-reliant and internally self-sustaining processes of development is people's
participation .... Authentic, self-reliant processes of development inevitably result in the transformation
of the people who bring about the change.' Quoted in Richard Sandbrook, The Politics
of Africa's Economic Recovery (Cambridge 1993), 138.
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Joural of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Joural of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
attention to local social movements, now often seen as 'cultural struggles over
material conditions and over practices and meanings of everyday life', that
targeted local state structures as well as global economic institutions.33 Such
movements - which often found expression in opposition to large-scale
development projects such as the building of dams, commercial logging and
the extension of pastoral agriculture that seem to threaten local communities,
and mobilized action around civil rights, gender issues and environmental
issues, expressed in terms of quality of life or access to economic resources
for social reproduction - led to the formation or reassertion of identities and
solidarities based on religion, kinship, neighbourhood, and local social and
cultural networks.
The decline and fall of assimilationist ideology in the USA, and its replacement
by ideologies of internal cultural distinctiveness, with many citizens
choosing to identify with particular groupings that saw themselves in competitive
opposition to previous systems of dominance, also shaped the context
in which such issues were studied. Those seeking to escape from perceived
oppression by the political, social, economic and ideological hegemony of the
state within their countries, and from the influence of powerful states or interests
within the international system, often identified the coalescence of forces
represented by imperialism, colonialism, neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism
as the key factor in securing and maintaining the dominance they were contesting.
Thus the notion of a Third World lived on, in some post-colonial historiography
at any rate, not as a compendium of quintessential characteristics,
but as the voice of 'subordinated subjects' which has now 'penetrated the inner
sanctum of the first world in the process of being "third-worlded" - arousing,
inciting, and affiliating with the subordinated others in the first world',
such as socialists, radicals, feminists and ethnic minorities.34
The sense of common circumstances or identity central to a concept of the
Third World over the last 40 years of the twentieth century was based around
three key issues of perception: differences between the Third and other worlds,
the consciousness of such differences, and inter-connectedness - the extent to
which difference and consciousness were the result of the dependence of events
in one part of the world on actions in another. All these issues - the causes of
difference, the validity of common consciousness, and the extent of dependence
- have been disputed in the specialist literature, and in the polemical
debates about the nature of the Third World that have taken place inside and
33 Paul Routledge, 'Resisting and Reshaping the Modern: Social Movements and the
Development Process' in Johnston, Taylor and Watts, op. cit., 273.
34 Gyan Prakash, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from
Indian Historiography', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32 (1990), 384, 403; for a
similar argument, see Chandra Tapande Mohanty, 'Introduction: Cartographies of Struggle' in
Chandra Tapande Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres (eds), Third World Women and the
Politics of Feminism (Bloomington, IN 1991), 7.
attention to local social movements, now often seen as 'cultural struggles over
material conditions and over practices and meanings of everyday life', that
targeted local state structures as well as global economic institutions.33 Such
movements - which often found expression in opposition to large-scale
development projects such as the building of dams, commercial logging and
the extension of pastoral agriculture that seem to threaten local communities,
and mobilized action around civil rights, gender issues and environmental
issues, expressed in terms of quality of life or access to economic resources
for social reproduction - led to the formation or reassertion of identities and
solidarities based on religion, kinship, neighbourhood, and local social and
cultural networks.
The decline and fall of assimilationist ideology in the USA, and its replacement
by ideologies of internal cultural distinctiveness, with many citizens
choosing to identify with particular groupings that saw themselves in competitive
opposition to previous systems of dominance, also shaped the context
in which such issues were studied. Those seeking to escape from perceived
oppression by the political, social, economic and ideological hegemony of the
state within their countries, and from the influence of powerful states or interests
within the international system, often identified the coalescence of forces
represented by imperialism, colonialism, neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism
as the key factor in securing and maintaining the dominance they were contesting.
Thus the notion of a Third World lived on, in some post-colonial historiography
at any rate, not as a compendium of quintessential characteristics,
but as the voice of 'subordinated subjects' which has now 'penetrated the inner
sanctum of the first world in the process of being "third-worlded" - arousing,
inciting, and affiliating with the subordinated others in the first world',
such as socialists, radicals, feminists and ethnic minorities.34
The sense of common circumstances or identity central to a concept of the
Third World over the last 40 years of the twentieth century was based around
three key issues of perception: differences between the Third and other worlds,
the consciousness of such differences, and inter-connectedness - the extent to
which difference and consciousness were the result of the dependence of events
in one part of the world on actions in another. All these issues - the causes of
difference, the validity of common consciousness, and the extent of dependence
- have been disputed in the specialist literature, and in the polemical
debates about the nature of the Third World that have taken place inside and
33 Paul Routledge, 'Resisting and Reshaping the Modern: Social Movements and the
Development Process' in Johnston, Taylor and Watts, op. cit., 273.
34 Gyan Prakash, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from
Indian Historiography', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32 (1990), 384, 403; for a
similar argument, see Chandra Tapande Mohanty, 'Introduction: Cartographies of Struggle' in
Chandra Tapande Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres (eds), Third World Women and the
Politics of Feminism (Bloomington, IN 1991), 7.
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Tomlinson: What was the Third World?Tomlinson: What was the Third World?
outside academic circles. This contestation over the use of the term 'Third
World' goes to the heart of many ways of thinking about the modern world,
its past, present and future. It can best be seen as a marker for these battlegrounds
of interpretation, rather than as a banner for one of the sides taking
part in the fight itself.
The paired opposites of modernization and dependency theory, and rational
choice and post-colonialism, have dominated analyses of the Third World.
One clear contrast between these broad approaches has been the differing
weighting they have placed on material and cultural approaches, although
modernization and dependency theories were both concerned, to some extent,
with cultural issues (over entrepreneurship on the one hand and 'peasant
studies' on the other, for example), and some strands of post-colonial criticism
have paid some attention to material matters (in the continued campaign over
international debt). However, the most obvious distinction between them
has concerned their treatment of public institutions, especially the state.
Modernization model-builders and dependency theorists attacked the existing
state-structures of many developing countries, but both saw an important role
for a reformed state and other public institutions in bringing about economic
growth and social change. Those who base their analysis on rational choice
theory or post-colonial perspectives, on the other hand, are equally critical of
any public institutions, above the very local, as barriers to the proper expression
of individual or community autonomy and choice. For them, almost any
form of state is part of the problem, not of the solution.35
At the end of the twentieth century, the nature of states and the international
state system created by the Cold War world, that once seemed to
represent the climax of an evolutionary process of nationalism and nationbuilding,
looked much more contingent and historically specific. Increased
mobility of capital, people and ideas caused serious problems for conventional
political and social institutions. The ability of existing states to provide
material and psychological satisfaction for their citizens was widely called into
question.36 How can we write the history of the modern world as a whole
without a narrative of the inevitable rise of states and nations, or the creation
of a global alliance of those who think themselves oppressed? Some accounts
of the contemporary world and its recent history have suggested that there is a
simple division across space and culture between the empowered and the disempowered,37
while Edward Said has advocated a position of 'reconciliatory'
post-colonialism, seeking to provide 'a reconsidered or revised notion of how
35 On these issues, see John Martinussen, Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing
Theories of Development (London 1997) and J. Schuurman, 'Paradigms Lost, Paradigms
Regained? Development Studies in the Twenty-first century', Third World Quarterly, 21, 1
(February 2000), 7-20.
36 Andrew Levine (ed.), The State and its Critics: Volume 1 (Aldershot 1992). Part IV is a convenient
collection that focuses on 'state imperfections' from public choice and 'new Right' per-
spectives.
37 See John Friedman, Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development (Oxford 1992).
outside academic circles. This contestation over the use of the term 'Third
World' goes to the heart of many ways of thinking about the modern world,
its past, present and future. It can best be seen as a marker for these battlegrounds
of interpretation, rather than as a banner for one of the sides taking
part in the fight itself.
The paired opposites of modernization and dependency theory, and rational
choice and post-colonialism, have dominated analyses of the Third World.
One clear contrast between these broad approaches has been the differing
weighting they have placed on material and cultural approaches, although
modernization and dependency theories were both concerned, to some extent,
with cultural issues (over entrepreneurship on the one hand and 'peasant
studies' on the other, for example), and some strands of post-colonial criticism
have paid some attention to material matters (in the continued campaign over
international debt). However, the most obvious distinction between them
has concerned their treatment of public institutions, especially the state.
Modernization model-builders and dependency theorists attacked the existing
state-structures of many developing countries, but both saw an important role
for a reformed state and other public institutions in bringing about economic
growth and social change. Those who base their analysis on rational choice
theory or post-colonial perspectives, on the other hand, are equally critical of
any public institutions, above the very local, as barriers to the proper expression
of individual or community autonomy and choice. For them, almost any
form of state is part of the problem, not of the solution.35
At the end of the twentieth century, the nature of states and the international
state system created by the Cold War world, that once seemed to
represent the climax of an evolutionary process of nationalism and nationbuilding,
looked much more contingent and historically specific. Increased
mobility of capital, people and ideas caused serious problems for conventional
political and social institutions. The ability of existing states to provide
material and psychological satisfaction for their citizens was widely called into
question.36 How can we write the history of the modern world as a whole
without a narrative of the inevitable rise of states and nations, or the creation
of a global alliance of those who think themselves oppressed? Some accounts
of the contemporary world and its recent history have suggested that there is a
simple division across space and culture between the empowered and the disempowered,37
while Edward Said has advocated a position of 'reconciliatory'
post-colonialism, seeking to provide 'a reconsidered or revised notion of how
35 On these issues, see John Martinussen, Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing
Theories of Development (London 1997) and J. Schuurman, 'Paradigms Lost, Paradigms
Regained? Development Studies in the Twenty-first century', Third World Quarterly, 21, 1
(February 2000), 7-20.
36 Andrew Levine (ed.), The State and its Critics: Volume 1 (Aldershot 1992). Part IV is a convenient
collection that focuses on 'state imperfections' from public choice and 'new Right' per-
spectives.
37 See John Friedman, Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development (Oxford 1992).
319319
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Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2Journal of Contemporary History Vol 38 No 2
a post-imperial intellectual attitude might expand the overlapping community
between metropolitan and formerly colonized societies'.38 Others have
attempted to find, 'against the grand narrative of history itself, the cultural
resources to negotiate the terms through which people, living in different,
contextually defined, communities, can co-exist peacefully, productively and
creatively within large political units'.39 Such arguments beg crucial questions
about the constructed meaning of 'community',40 but they make it harder to
conceive of coherent states inhabiting separate worlds, distinct from each
other and yet cohesive in themselves, and this has dealt a further blow to the
idea of the Third World.
In the late twentieth century, the world was confronted with the new problematic
of globalization. Many responses to this phenomenon (which is, again,
better seen as a label for a set of contested issues, rather than as an objective
set of characteristics in its own right) have stressed the historical connections
between it and earlier globalizing forces of the recent past.41 For historians, the
concept of globalization can, perhaps, best be seen as an heuristic device or
ideal type that maps the integration and interaction of economic, social and
cultural processes from the local or regional to the world level. These processes,
based around the cultures and commodities of consumption, can be
traced back to at least the seventeenth century, but they have not progressed in
a linear or continuous way since then.42 The notion of the Third World, in
both its material and cultural manifestations, grew out of the specific form of
global interaction that resulted from the rise of nation states in Europe, and
the expansion of their power through international trade and imperial rule.
The phenomenon of imperialism was characterized by unequal relations of
political, social, economic and cultural power exercised across communities
not bound together by a common sense of identity. While these power relations
were unequal, the more powerful did not always successfully dominate
the less powerful consistently over time, and there were significant shiftings of
power both between and within the communities of the colonizers and the
38 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London 1993), 19-20.
39 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories
(Princeton, NJ 1993), 237-8. On the Indian case Viayek Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern Studies
and the Postcolonial (London 2000) reprints a number of key essays, and also contains a useful
short introduction.
40 For a sceptical survey of the post-colonial historiography that has developed these ideas, see
D.A. Washbrook, 'Orients and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of
the British Empire' in Robin E. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume V:
Historiography (Oxford 1999), 596-611.
41 See Jorge Larrain, Ideology and Cultural Identity Modernity and the Third World Presence
(Cambridge 1994); Jan Aarte Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke 2000);
F.J. Lechner and J. Boli (eds), The Globalization Reader (London 2000); A.G. Hopkins (ed.),
Globalization in World History (London 2001), especially Hopkins, 'The History of Globalization
- and the Globalization of History?', 11-46.
42 C.A. Bayly, "'Archaic" and "Modern" Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena,
c.1750-1850' in Hopkins, Globalization in World History, op. cit., 47-73, is a stimulating introduction
to this approach.
a post-imperial intellectual attitude might expand the overlapping community
between metropolitan and formerly colonized societies'.38 Others have
attempted to find, 'against the grand narrative of history itself, the cultural
resources to negotiate the terms through which people, living in different,
contextually defined, communities, can co-exist peacefully, productively and
creatively within large political units'.39 Such arguments beg crucial questions
about the constructed meaning of 'community',40 but they make it harder to
conceive of coherent states inhabiting separate worlds, distinct from each
other and yet cohesive in themselves, and this has dealt a further blow to the
idea of the Third World.
In the late twentieth century, the world was confronted with the new problematic
of globalization. Many responses to this phenomenon (which is, again,
better seen as a label for a set of contested issues, rather than as an objective
set of characteristics in its own right) have stressed the historical connections
between it and earlier globalizing forces of the recent past.41 For historians, the
concept of globalization can, perhaps, best be seen as an heuristic device or
ideal type that maps the integration and interaction of economic, social and
cultural processes from the local or regional to the world level. These processes,
based around the cultures and commodities of consumption, can be
traced back to at least the seventeenth century, but they have not progressed in
a linear or continuous way since then.42 The notion of the Third World, in
both its material and cultural manifestations, grew out of the specific form of
global interaction that resulted from the rise of nation states in Europe, and
the expansion of their power through international trade and imperial rule.
The phenomenon of imperialism was characterized by unequal relations of
political, social, economic and cultural power exercised across communities
not bound together by a common sense of identity. While these power relations
were unequal, the more powerful did not always successfully dominate
the less powerful consistently over time, and there were significant shiftings of
power both between and within the communities of the colonizers and the
38 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London 1993), 19-20.
39 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories
(Princeton, NJ 1993), 237-8. On the Indian case Viayek Chaturvedi, Mapping Subaltern Studies
and the Postcolonial (London 2000) reprints a number of key essays, and also contains a useful
short introduction.
40 For a sceptical survey of the post-colonial historiography that has developed these ideas, see
D.A. Washbrook, 'Orients and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of
the British Empire' in Robin E. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume V:
Historiography (Oxford 1999), 596-611.
41 See Jorge Larrain, Ideology and Cultural Identity Modernity and the Third World Presence
(Cambridge 1994); Jan Aarte Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke 2000);
F.J. Lechner and J. Boli (eds), The Globalization Reader (London 2000); A.G. Hopkins (ed.),
Globalization in World History (London 2001), especially Hopkins, 'The History of Globalization
- and the Globalization of History?', 11-46.
42 C.A. Bayly, "'Archaic" and "Modern" Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena,
c.1750-1850' in Hopkins, Globalization in World History, op. cit., 47-73, is a stimulating introduction
to this approach.
320320
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Tomlinson: What was the Third World?Tomlinson: What was the Third World?
colonized. One consequence of this was that the European empires, which had
seemed so dominant in 1900, came to an end in the third quarter of the
twentieth century. The history of imperialism has been immensely important
in shaping our view of the modern world, both from the top down and from
the bottom Up,43 but the phenomenon was also historically specific, and represents
only one stage in the process of understanding the interaction between
the local and the global. To write the history of the 'Rest', as well as of the
West, we need now to move on, and to construct new narratives of global
history that go beyond the models of coherent and distinct communities,
nations and states, arranged into hierarchies of material achievement and cultural
power, and underpinned by universal institutional ideals of participatory
democracy and free markets, that dominated thinking about international and
local systems in the world for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Only then will the ghost of the Third World be laid to rest, and the contested
nature of its history be properly understood.
B.R. Tomlinson
is Professor of Economic History at the School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London. He is the author of The
Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942 (London 1976),
The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947 (London 1979), and
The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970 (Cambridge 1993). He
is currently researching business networks in Asian trade in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
43 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony' in Frederick
Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World
(Berkeley, CA 1997) provides a treatment of these issues sympathetic to both political economy
and cultural studies approaches.
colonized. One consequence of this was that the European empires, which had
seemed so dominant in 1900, came to an end in the third quarter of the
twentieth century. The history of imperialism has been immensely important
in shaping our view of the modern world, both from the top down and from
the bottom Up,43 but the phenomenon was also historically specific, and represents
only one stage in the process of understanding the interaction between
the local and the global. To write the history of the 'Rest', as well as of the
West, we need now to move on, and to construct new narratives of global
history that go beyond the models of coherent and distinct communities,
nations and states, arranged into hierarchies of material achievement and cultural
power, and underpinned by universal institutional ideals of participatory
democracy and free markets, that dominated thinking about international and
local systems in the world for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Only then will the ghost of the Third World be laid to rest, and the contested
nature of its history be properly understood.
B.R. Tomlinson
is Professor of Economic History at the School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London. He is the author of The
Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942 (London 1976),
The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947 (London 1979), and
The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970 (Cambridge 1993). He
is currently researching business networks in Asian trade in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
43 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony' in Frederick
Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World
(Berkeley, CA 1997) provides a treatment of these issues sympathetic to both political economy
and cultural studies approaches.
321321
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