1
Parameters for Crisis
Communication
W. Timothy Coombs
Organizations frequently find themselves in situations we would define as a crisis.
Consider but a few examples: Union Carbide’s devastating chemical release in
Bhopal; Carrefour suffering from protests at its stores in China because of French
attacks on the Olympic torch relay; customers experiencing E. coli at Taco Bell;
rumors about designer Tommy Hilfiger’s racist comments; Tyco executives stealing
millions from the company; and Oxfam claiming Starbucks did not support
coffee growers by opposing the branding of certain African coffees. We must accept
that no organization is immune from a crisis anywhere in the world even if that
organization is vigilant and actively seeks to prevent crises.
The reality of crises leads to the need for preparation and readiness to respond
– crisis management. The critical component in crisis management is communication.
Over the past decade, there has been a massive increase in crisis communication
research. As the field of crisis communication develops, it is important
to develop parameters for that growth. This chapter and the Handbook of Crisis
Communication are steps towards articulating the parameters and utility of crisis
communication. The focus in this book is the research used to advance our understanding
of communication’s role in the crisis management process. To properly set
the stage for this collection, it is important to define key terms in crisis management
and overview key research on the central theme of crisis communication.
By examining these fundamental elements, the parameters of crisis communication
begin to emerge.
Key Definitions for Crisis
Because of the diversity of crisis research, it is important to present definitions of
key crisis terms early to help set boundaries. The key terms for the Handbook
include crisis, crisis management, and crisis communication. The three are inextricably
interconnected and must be considered in a progression from crisis to
18 W. Timothy Coombs
crisis management to crisis communication. By ending with crisis communication,
we begin to get a feel for the scope of this burgeoning field of inquiry.
Crisis defined
As you read this book, it will become clear there is no one, universally accepted
definition of crisis. You will also note many conceptual similarities in the
definitions even when the definitions are not exactly the same. Box 1.1 lists
commonly used crisis definitions. The list contains definitions from well-known
crisis authors as well as covering a range of disciplines, including public relations,
management, and organizational communication.
One point is worth discussing before offering the crisis definition utilized in
this chapter. Three definitions note that crises can have positive or negative outcomes.
People frequently claim that the Chinese symbol for crisis represents both
Box 1.1 Definitions of Crisis
a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization,
company, or industry, as well as publics, products, services or good name. It interrupts
normal business transactions and can sometimes threaten the existence of the
organization (Fearn-Banks 1996: 1)
is not necessarily a bad thing. It may be a radical change for good as well as bad”
(Friedman 2002: 5)
an event that affects or has the potential to affect the whole of an organization. Thus,
if something affects only a small, isolated part of an organization, it may not be a
major crisis. In order for a major crisis to occur, it must exact a major toll on human
lives, property, financial earnings, the reputation, and the general health and wellbeing
of an organization” (Mitroff & Anagnos 2001: 34–35)
turning points in organizational life” (Regester 1989: 38)
an incident that is unexpected, negative, and overwhelming” (Barton 2001: 2)
a specific, unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events
which creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s
high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer 1998: 233)
turning point for better or worse” (Fink 1986: 15)
an event that is an unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the
organization, industry, or stakeholders if handled improperly” (Coombs 1999: 2)
Parameters for Crisis Communication 19
an opportunity and a threat. Some argue that is a very idiosyncratic translation
and is overstated. Regardless, opportunity and threat are more a function of the
outcomes of crisis management rather than a defining characteristic of crisis. As
chapters 35 and 38 highlight, we can look to crises as opportunities for growth.
However, I doubt any manager would argue for the strategic creation of a crisis
to advance organizational goals as an effective form of management. Still, there
may be extreme cases where only a crisis can save the organization. On the whole,
crisis management seeks to prevent crises. Prevention protects people, property,
financial resources, and reputation assets. Inherently, crises are threats, but how
the crisis is managed determines if the outcomes are threats or opportunities. Effective
crisis management can result in stronger organizations but “management by
crisis” would take a heavy toll on stakeholders.
This chapter defines crisis as “the perception of an unpredictable event that
threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s
performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs 2007b: 2–3).
I would like to unpack the critical elements of this definition that serve to
characterize a crisis. This crisis definition was informed by discussions at the 2005
NCA Pre-Conference on Integrating Research and Outreach in Crisis and Risk
Communication. A variety of experts in the two fields were assembled and one
point on the agenda was how to define crisis and risk. A significant point in that
discussion was the perceptual nature of crises. How stakeholders view an event
has ramifications for whether or not that event becomes a crisis. The definition
attempts to honor stakeholder concerns and the role they can play in co-creating
the meaning of a crisis. Meaning is socially constructed and crises are no exception.
Thus, it was important to utilize a definition that reflects the perceptual nature
of crises. Chapter 37 does an excellent job of further arguing for the importance
of stakeholders in crisis management.
It is also important to separate crises from incidents (Coombs 2004b). Practitioners
often take issue with how loosely the term crisis is bandied about. Crisis
should be reserved for serious events that require careful attention from management.
This belief stems from the fact that the label “crisis” in an organization results in
the allocation of time, attention, and resources (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman
1980). The majority of the crisis definitions reflect the need to reserve the term
crisis for serious events. So the event has to have the potential to seriously impact
the organization. But the definition should not be viewed as limiting potential
harm only to the organization. Harming stakeholders has to rate as the most
significant “negative outcome.” The definition uses “negative outcomes” to
include any type of harm to stakeholders, including physical, financial, and psychological.
Potential is used because actions taken by crisis managers may prevent a
crisis or significantly reduce the damage one can inflict. Crisis management is
more than reaction; it can be prevention and preparation too.
Finally, the definition reinforces the role of stakeholders in the crisis through
the idea of anomalies. Crises are unusual occurrences that cannot be predicted
but are expected. True, managers should anticipate crises can occur and on any
20 W. Timothy Coombs
given day numerous organizations have crises. The analogy between crisis and earthquakes
is fitting. People in Southern California know an earthquake can and will
occur but they do not know when exactly one will happen. However, all crises
are anomalies because they violate what stakeholders expect. Consider the following
stakeholder expectations: trains should not derail, milk should not sicken children,
and tacos from restaurants should not contain e. coli. It is this anomalous dimension
of crises that draws the attention of the media and other stakeholders. Crises
are unusual negative events, so humans are drawn to them just like people on the
highway gawk at accidents.
Crisis management defined
Crisis management can be defined as “a set of factors designed to combat crises
and to lessen the actual damages inflicted” (Coombs 2007b: 5) . Moreover, crisis
management “seeks to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and
thereby protect the organization, stakeholders, and/or industry from damage”
(Coombs 1999: 4). We should think of crisis management as a process with many
parts, such as preventative measures, crisis management plans, and post-crisis
evaluations. The set of factors that constitute crisis management can be divided
into three categories: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Pre-crisis involves efforts to
prevent crises and to prepare for crisis management. Crisis is the response to an
actual event. Post-crisis are efforts to learn from the crisis event (Coombs 2007b).
These three categories reflect the phases of crisis management and are useful because
they provide a mechanism for considering the breadth of crisis communication.
Crisis communication defined
Crisis communication can be defined broadly as the collection, processing, and
dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation. In pre-crisis,
crisis communication revolves around collecting information about crisis risks,
making decisions about how to manage potential crises, and training people who
will be involved in the crisis management process. The training includes crisis team
members, crisis spokespersons, and any individuals who will help with the
response. Crisis communication includes the collection and processing of information
for crisis team decision making along with the creation and dissemination
of crisis messages to people outside of the team (the traditional definition of
crisis communication). Post-crisis involves dissecting the crisis management effort,
communicating necessary changes to individuals, and providing follow-up crisis
messages as needed.
Crisis communication has focused on the crisis category/crisis response – what
organizations say and do after a crisis. Crisis responses are highly visible to stakeholders
and very important to the effectiveness of the crisis management effort.
For instance, improper crisis responses make the situation worse. It is by considering
the breadth of crisis management that we will stretch the boundaries of what
Parameters for Crisis Communication 21
is studied in crisis communication. All of the chapters in Part VIII, Future
Research Directions, argue for expanding the focus of crisis communication
and can be placed within the parameters of crisis management presented here.
Furthermore, a broader definition of crisis communication allows us to better draw
on the allied fields for insights on how to improve crisis communication (the focus
of chapter 2).
Crisis Management Process
Crisis communication is a field that has witnessed amazing growth in both the
professional and academic community over the past decade. The increased number
of articles and books on the subject is testament to that development. The growth
is positive because of the pressure for effective crisis communication. Crises can
create threats to public safety, environmental wellness, and organizational survival.
Crisis communication is a critical element in effective crisis management. The main
purpose of this chapter is to provide a context for this Handbook by reviewing
the history of crisis communication. However, any discussion of crisis communication
must begin by reviewing the roots of crisis management, the larger context
for crisis communication.
This section traces the origins of crisis management. From there the focus shifts
to an overview of the various “types” of crisis communication.
Crisis management: Roots of a field
In 1986 Steven Fink published the seminal work in crisis management: Crisis
Management: Planning for the Inevitable. Fink’s (1986) book began to detail the
emerging field of crisis management. Today, there exists a vast array of crisis
management books, but Fink’s remains a useful classic. Crisis management did
not appear from thin air. The roots of crisis management reside in emergency and
disaster management.
Emergency and disaster management studied ways to prevent incidents and
how to respond to/cope with incidents. We will return to the connection
between disasters and crises in the next chapter. Works in crisis management first
appeared in the International Journal of Emergencies and Disasters. Moreover,
we see strong emphasis on disaster in the publication record of the Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management. We see the split with disaster with the
phrasing “industrial crisis management” and the emergence of Industrial Crisis
Quarterly, which later became Organization & Environment. Disaster research
developed on a parallel trajectory following Quarantelli (1988) and others, while
crisis management could look to Fink (1986) and those more interested in
organizational crises. Tracing all the works that informed crisis communication
would be a monumental task. We must keep this history of crisis management
brief or risk creating a tangent.
22 W. Timothy Coombs
To fully explore crisis communication, we need to begin by reviewing the crisis
management process. To develop, a field has to have models of its process as they
help us to understand what is being done and key concepts. Examining the crisis
management process allows us to understand better the critical points where
crisis communication enters the equation. Earlier in this chapter the terms crisis
and crisis management were defined. The definition of crisis reflects a process view.
The process notion of crisis management is reflected in the field’s models. Fink
(1986) was among the first to examine crises as occurring in stages. Fink’s model
has four stages: (1) prodromal, warning signs of a crisis appear; (2) acute, a crisis
occurs; (3) chronic, recovery period that can include lingering concerns from the
crisis; and (4) crisis resolution, the organization is back to operations as normal.
Fink is proposing a model of how crises develop.
Smith (1990) developed a three step model of the crisis management process:
(1) crisis management, a crisis incubates; (2) operational crisis, a trigger event occurs
and first responders arrive; and (3) crisis of legitimization, a communicative
response is provided, media and government become interested, and organizational
learning occurs. There is a feedback loop from the crisis of legitimization
to crisis management. Smith begins to move beyond the crisis process itself by
considering crisis management efforts as well.
Mitroff (1994) offers a five stage model: (1) signal detection, seek to identify
warning signs and take preventative measures; (2) probing and prevention, active
search and reduction of risk factors; (3) damage containment, crisis occurs and
actions taken to limit its spread; (4) recovery, effort to return to normal operations;
and (5) learning, people review the crisis management effort and learn
from it. Mitroff is modeling the crisis management process more than just the crisis
process itself. In general the crisis models reflect the emergency management process
of (1) mitigation, (2) preparedness, (3) response, and (4) recovery (Principles
2003). The primary difference is that Mitroff highlights learning as a separate stage.
The crisis management process can be organized around the simple, three phase
model introduced earlier: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Pre-crisis includes
signal detection, prevention, and preparation. Crisis covers recognition of the
trigger event and response. Post-crisis considers actions after operations have returned
to normal and include providing follow-up information to stakeholders, cooperating
with investigations, and learning from the crisis event (Coombs 2007b). The
three phase model is used in this chapter to organize the discussion of crisis
communication.
General Nature of Crisis Communication Research
Crisis communication is a very applied concept. Managers will take the advice
offered in various writings to help them cope with crises. Crisis communication
is a nexus of praxis where theory and application must intersect. Grandiose ideas
or unattainable ideals are of little use. Theories and principles should help to improve
Parameters for Crisis Communication 23
crisis management rather than being academic exercises. This applied focus
originates in the belief that improved crisis management helps to protect stakeholders
and organizations. At its heart, crisis management is about making the world
a safer place. Therefore, developing theories that can be applied to helping
others has value and purpose. Too often, people only see how crisis management
benefits organizations. However, to be effective and benefit organizations, crisis
management must seek to protect and to aid stakeholders placed at risk by crises
or potential crises.
The applied nature of crisis communication is reflected in the development of
its body of knowledge. The initial crisis communication research was written by
practitioners and appeared in non-academic journals (Bergman 1994; Carney &
Jorden 1993; Loewendick 1993). Applied research seeks to use theory to solve
real-world problems. As academics embraced the need to solve crisis communication
problems, publications began to appear in academic journals. While of interest
to management researchers, the bulk of the crisis communication research
emerged from public relations and communication studies. Management research
focused more on crisis management itself and viewed crisis communication as a
variable in the process (e.g., Marcus & Goodman 1991). Researchers in public
relations and communication studies made crisis communication the focal point
of their crisis management research (e.g., Hearit 1994).
The initial practitioner research in crisis communication developed advice
through war stories and cases. War stories are a specific type of case where
practitioners would recount their crisis management efforts. These are simply descriptive
accounts of what was done sans any analytic framework. Case studies of other
organizations’ crises were analyzed to illustrate points that seemed effective.
These cases provided the foundation for the development of advice for future
crisis managers, frequently in the form of lists of “dos” and “don’ts.” As people
began to agree on the advice, a body of accepted wisdom began to form. Crisis
managers could glean recommendations from this primordial body of knowledge.
The next evolution in the crisis communication research was case studies
analyzed by academics. Academics introduced specific theoretical frameworks or
principles for analyzing cases. The earliest example is the application of apologia
to crisis communication (e.g., Dionisopolous & Vibbert 1988; Ice 1991). The
academic case studies were more rigorous because they systematically applied specific
analytic frameworks/tools. The image repair research by Benoit (1995) and his
adherents is a perfect example. A large number of published case studies have
utilized Benoit’s image repair framework (e.g., Benoit & Brinson 1999; Benoit
& Czerwinski 1997). The academic case studies were still speculative. The qualitative
nature of the crisis communication cases meant the researchers brought their
own interpretations to the data and generalizations should not be drawn from
the results (Stacks 2002).
As chapter 3 reveals, the case study method has dominated academic crisis
communication research. I would argue that the practitioner and academic
cases both offer speculative advice. Such speculative advice opens the door for
24 W. Timothy Coombs
additional theory building and eventually to theory testing. Theory could be
developed as the cases identified potentially useful variables and potential relationships.
The authors of the cases often made predictive claims that could and should
be subject to testing. The crisis case studies provided and continue to provide the
fodder for more advanced thinking in crisis communication. Researchers need to
test the advice and observations from the case studies to see if the advice is verifiable
or not. A number of academics began calling for more theory and theory testing
in crisis communication (e.g., Dawar & Pillutla 2000; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer
1998) and researchers are beginning to meet that challenge.
However, cases are not the only source of inspiration for crisis research. Theory
development targeting crisis communication is emerging. Situational crisis communication
theory (SCCT) was developed for this specific research area. SCCT
translated attribution theory into the language of crisis communication as a base
for the theory. A series of studies have refined and tested propositions proposed
by SCCT (e.g., Coombs 2007a; Coombs & Holladay 1996, 2001). Contingency
theory was developed as a grand theory of public relations. The idea is that it
could be applied to any aspect of public relations. Researchers have begun to develop
contingency theory’s utility to explaining crisis communication and testing
propositions related to crisis communication (e.g., Cameron, Pang, & Jin 2008;
Pang, Jin, & Cameron 2004). Both theories are discussed in more detail later in
this chapter.
We are currently experiencing an impressive growth in the number of experimental
and empirical analyses of crisis communication. (Part II, Methodological
Variety, will delve into the various methods of crisis communication research in
greater detail.) This trend is ushering in a renaissance in crisis communication
research. In a sense we may have reached a plateau with current case studies.
New theories and experiments may be necessary to advance crisis communication
research to the level of evidence-based management. Evidence-based management
is inspired by evidence-based medicine. Do you want to be treated used a proven
therapy or something someone thinks might work? The “data” count as evidence
only when they have been scientifically tested and verified (Rousseau 2005). Crisis
communication would do well to move toward an evidence-based focus because
our advice has ramifications for how people practice crisis communication. We
should offer advice that is tested and proven rather than speculative. One goal
of this Handbook is to inspire additional research in crisis communication while
serving as a resource for that research.
The number and diversity of the crisis communication research studies is both
a blessing and a curse. The blessing is the variety of insights offered to the field.
The curse is the wide dispersion of the insights that makes it difficult to accumulate
and to integrate the various lessons into a useable form. Think of the number
of books and articles available on this topic. The research is scattered not only
through numerous journals but also across a variety of disciplines (Pearson & Clair
1998). It is a challenge for crisis managers to keep abreast of the latest and most
useful ideas in crisis communication. Another goal of this Handbook is to serve
Parameters for Crisis Communication 25
as a resource that represents some of the best crisis communication research from
a wide array of perspectives.
It is probably natural that crisis communication research began in the practice
and then was explored by academics. Public relations research itself followed the
pattern of practice, followed by research and theory. We can see practice ahead
of research and theory in the current online applications of crisis communication.
A practice emerges then researchers try to understand the practice and develop
ways to improve it. Ideally, theory constructing leads to theory testing. The results
of this research can then be used to guide the practice. The theoretically derived
knowledge should add value to the practice.
Crisis Communication: Overview and History
Communication is the essence of crisis management. A crisis or the threat of
crisis creates a need for information. Through communication, the information
is collected, processed into knowledge, and shared with others. Communication
is critical throughout the entire crisis management process. Each phase of the crisis
management process has its own demand for creating and sharing knowledge –
the need to collect and interpret information. Using the three phases of crisis
management we identify various “types” of crisis communication and provide a
brief historical record of the key extant research on the topic.
In addition to the three phases, it is helpful to differentiate between two basic
types of crisis communication: (1) crisis knowledge management and (2) stakeholder
reaction management (Coombs 2009). Crisis knowledge management
involves identifying sources, collecting information, analyzing information (knowledge
creation), sharing knowledge, and decision making. Crisis knowledge management
is behind the scenes. It involves the work the crisis team does to
create public responses to a crisis. Stakeholder reaction management comprises
communicative efforts (words and actions) to influence how stakeholders perceive
the crisis, the organization in crisis, and the organization’s crisis response. All of
the various crisis communication subjects covered in this section can easily fit into
either of these two categories.
Pre-crisis phase
In the pre-crisis phase, crisis communication concentrates on locating and reducing
risk. The anticipatory model of crisis management is among the limited research
in this area (Olaniran & Williams 2008). Prevention is the top priority for the
anticipatory model. The model employs vigilance during the pre-crisis phases to
aid crisis decision making and prevention. Wan and Pfau (2004) recommend using
pre-crisis messages to inoculate stakeholders about crises. Using the biological
analogy, the pre-crisis messages give stakeholders some information about a
potential crisis to help build up resistance to a negative reaction and negative media
26 W. Timothy Coombs
coverage of the crisis. The results of their study largely replicate the results of
prior reputation research. In other words, reputation building prior to a crisis is
beneficial to an organization in crisis (Coombs & Holladay 2002, 2006; Dawar
& Pillutla 2000). We shall return to the topic of prior reputation in the discussion
of crisis response.
We see some notions of prevention in González-Herrero & Pratt’s (1996) work
to integrate issues management into crisis management with the “proactive symmetrical
crisis management process” (p. 89). The idea was that crisis management
would become more proactive when fused with issues management. The proactive,
symmetrical process has four steps. Step 1 is issues management with an
emphasis on environmental scanning. Crisis managers try to find early signs of a
crisis (an issue) and take actions designed to influence the development of the issue.
Early identification permits time for analysis and strategizing. Step 2 is planning
prevention. The crisis managers take actions designed to prevent a crisis from emerging.
Scanning segues into monitoring of an issue. Crisis managers also assess the
threat posed by the issue by examining it in terms of the damage it could cause
to the organization, the degree of control over the situation, and options for an
organizational response.
Step 3 is crisis and is the usual crisis management focus on having a plan, team,
and spokesperson that are applied to the crisis. Step 4 is post-crisis where the issue
is still tracked in the media, as well as drawing interest from other stakeholders.
Crisis managers continue to communicate with stakeholders and evaluate the crisis
management effort. This perspective remains in the conceptual stage with little
research on the topic. However, there is great potential for additional research in
this approach to pre-crisis communication.
Of particular need is more research on crisis sensing or the location of warning
signs. Research from communication networks and knowledge management
should be applied to understand how organizations develop systems for locating
and tracking potential crisis risks. Part of crisis sensing would be efforts to
monitor the media and that includes the Internet. In crisis sensing, the practice
outpaces the theory (Coombs 2007b). Companies offer computer systems for
tracking data relevant to crisis managers, especially Internet-based data. However,
we lack much theory and research to inform the use of these systems. The crisis
sensing development reflects the evolution of crisis communication in general. First,
practitioners report on their practices and then academics study and critique
the actions to determine the most effective way of executing the tasks. Again, a
pattern of theory trying to make sense of the practice emerges.
Preparation has received a fair amount of communicative attention through
training. Concern for crisis communication is reflected in spokesperson training
and team decision making skills. Media relations was a key element of early printed
research on crisis communication (e.g., Barton 2001). Practitioner and academic
research has done an excellent job of identifying what spokespersons should and
should not do during a crisis. We have the perfect blend of practice and theory
informing one another. The starting point was the published conventional
Parameters for Crisis Communication 27
wisdom of practitioners. Later, research found data that support this wisdom. For
instance, spokespersons are told to avoid saying “no comment.” Research established
that when people hear “no comment” they think the organization is guilty
and hiding something (Guth 1995). Research in other areas of communication
validated many of the accepted practices. The deception research supports the
advice that a spokesperson must have solid eye contact, few vocal fillers, and few
nervous adaptors because people use those three cues to assess deception (Feeley
& de Turck 1995). Thus the spokesperson advice on delivery is a sound recommendation
to avoid looking deceptive.
Part of preparation includes exercises designed to improve the crisis management
skills of the crisis teams. Crisis teams are decision making units. They
must make a series of decisions about how the organization should respond to
the crisis. Decision making is a function of what is sometimes called situational
awareness. Situational awareness occurs when the crisis team feels it has enough
information to make a decision. Communication provides the knowledge the crisis
team requires to create situational awareness and to make decisions. Exercises should
include training and practice in the communicative skills that facilitate situational
awareness (Kolfschoten & Appelman 2006).
Finally, risk communication is under-utilized in the pre-crisis phase. The
extended parallel process model (EPPM) can be used to explain the positive effect
of exercises and related risk information on community members. Kim Witte’s
(Witte, Meyer, & Martell 2001) EPPM provides a way to understand how
people will respond to risk messages. Fear can motivate people to action if a threat
is perceived to be relevant to people and significant. For people living near a facility
with hazardous materials, the threat can be perceived as relevant and significant.
When people believe a threat is real, they then make efficacy assessments. If people
are to follow the advice given in a risk message, they must believe that the proposed
action will work (response efficacy) and that they can enact the proposed
action (self-efficacy). If people do not believe the response will work and/or do
not think they can execute the response, they ignore the risk and messages
associated with it. Exercises help community members understand that the organization’s
emergency plan can work. Community members learn how the plan
affects them, how they can be a part of the plan, and the general efficacy of the
crisis plan.
In emergencies, people have two basic options: stay or leave. Staying is known
as shelter-in-place. People stay inside and close any openings that would allow
outside air into the building such as doors, windows, and air conditioning.
Leaving is known as evacuation. People leave using designated routes and are encouraged
to take “go bags” with them. Go bags contain essential items such as medicine,
water, and some food. By participating in exercises community members can learn
that they can enact the actions required in the emergency plan – they can take
the steps necessary to evacuate or to shelter-in-place.
Crisis communication has done little to integrate the relevance of risk communication
to crisis preparation. One notable exception is a study by Heath and
28 W. Timothy Coombs
Palenchar (2000). They found that knowledge of emergency warning systems
increased concern over risks while still increasing acceptance for the organization.
It seems that knowing about the emergency warning kept community members
vigilant rather than lulling them into a false sense of security. Vigilance is preferable
to complacency in a crisis and proper crisis communication during preparation
can set the foundation for a more effective crisis response. Heath, Lee, and
Ni (2009) extend this finding by demonstrating the value of pre-crisis communication
and perceptions of efficacy. When pre-crisis messages are from people
similar to the audience in race/ethnicity, gender, and age, or are sensitive to
their concerns, the people are more likely to comply with the message. Moreover,
message sensitivity is positively correlated with self-efficacy and some forms of
response efficacy. Another exception is an article by Williams and Olaniran
(1998) that recommends crisis managers factor perceptions of risk into their
explanation of risks to stakeholders.
Crisis response phase
The crisis response phase is the most heavily researched aspect of crisis communication.
The reason is that how and what an organization communicates during
a crisis has a significant effect on the outcomes of the crisis, including the number
of injuries and the amount of reputational damage sustained by the organization.
We shall provide a cursory review by highlighting key research trends in the crisis
communication as crisis response.
Tactical advice The early research was tactical in nature, a type of “how to”
instruction. This would include the proper form for spokespersons to use when
meeting the media. Four accepted pieces of wisdom emerged from the tactical
research and later were supported by theory and research in crisis communication
and related areas of communication. We have already noted avoiding “no comment.”
The other three are be quick, be accurate, and be consistent. Practitioners
emphasized a quick response, usually within the first hour (Barton 2001). The
Internet has only increased the need for speed. A failure to respond lets others
provide the information that will frame how the crisis will be perceived by stakeholders.
Silence is too passive and allows others to control the crisis (Brummett
1980). Moreover, research has proven the value of bad news coming from the
organization itself. When an organization is the information source about a crisis
occurring, there is less reputational damage than if the news media are the first
to deliver the information. This effect has been called “stealing thunder” (Arpan
& Pompper 2003; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen 2005) and provides proof that
organizations must discuss the crisis and not remain silent.
Accuracy builds credibility while inaccuracy erodes it. Furthermore, misinformation
can place stakeholders at risk. For instance, releasing the wrong batch
number for a frozen food recall results in people still consuming the dangerous
food. Inaccuracy can penalize both the organization in crisis and its stakeholders.
Parameters for Crisis Communication 29
Being consistent is another way to build credibility. Inconsistencies create confusion
and make crisis managers appear to be incompetent. Consistency is often called
speaking with one voice. However, people often confuse speaking with one voice
with having just one spokesperson during the crisis (Coombs 2007b). Most organizations
use multiple spokespersons during a crisis. Different spokespeople may
be needed to cover various areas of expertise, or a crisis may extend over days
making it impossible for one person to be the sole voice for the organization.
Spokespersons must be kept informed of the same information to help insure
consistency (Carney & Jorden 1993).
Strategic advice The bulk of the academic research in crisis communication focuses
on the strategic use of crisis responses. Strategic crisis communication research
seeks to understand how crisis communication can be used to achieve specific outcomes
and have the desired effect on stakeholders. The emphasis in on how various
crisis response strategies are used to pursue various organizational objectives.
Sturges (1994) provides a useful framework for categorizing crisis responses by
strategic focus. Sturges’ three strategic foci are (1) instructing information, how
to cope physically with the crisis; (2) adjusting information, how to cope
psychologically with the crisis; and (3) reputation repair, attempts to ameliorate
the damage a crisis inflicts on an organization. Clearly, the three are related, as
instructing and adjusting information will influence reputation repair. It is surprising
how researchers frequently overlook instructing and adjusting information.
Instructing information, according to Sturges (1994), is the first priority in a
crisis. Yes, public safety should be the preeminent concern in a crisis. Oddly, instructing
information is taken for granted in most crisis communication research.
Although there is some research examining how people respond to emergency
information (e.g., Heath & Palenchar 2005) and the need for instructing information
(Gibson 1997), we have only begun to scratch the surface. If an organization
fails to provide instructing information, the stakeholders and organizations
will suffer even more. Safety is a binding force in a crisis. Organizations must
protect stakeholders to protect themselves. A lack of regard for stakeholder safety
will intensify the damage a crisis inflicts on an organization. In essence, a failure
to protect the safety of stakeholders will breed a second crisis. Not only has the
organization had a problem, but it did not seem to care about its stakeholders.
Adjusting information includes the need to express sympathy and to explain
what the organization is doing to prevent a repeat of the crisis. Efforts to prevent
a repeat of the crisis are also known as corrective action. Adjusting information
has been studied as reputation repair rather than adjusting information.
Researchers have treated expression of sympathy and corrective action as reputation
repair strategies and studied them as part of that research. We do know there
is great value to the organization and stakeholders when management expresses
concern for victims and explains what actions are being taken to prevent a recurrence
of the crisis (Cohen 1999; Fuchs-Burnett 2002; Patel & Reinsch 2003;
Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider 1998). The research justifies Sturges’ (1994) belief that
30 W. Timothy Coombs
adjusting information is an essential part of crisis communication and is second
in importance to instructing information.
Of the strategic research, the vast majority emphasizes reputation repair in one
way or another. Because an entire book could be devoted to reviewing this research,
I provide just a sample of the major works. This section reviews the various research
streams in crisis reputation repair. The review divides the research by research
methods. Following Stacks (2002), three categories of research methods are used:
(1) informal, (2) transition, and (3) formal. Informal research methods are subjective,
provide little control over variables, and are not systematic in the collection
and interpretation of the data. The results provide an in-depth understanding of
the phenomenon but do not permit generalization or prediction. Content analysis
is the transition method between formal and informal research. The method is
informal but data can be randomly sampled and counted. Content analysis can
answer questions of fact. Lastly, formal research involves the controlled, objective,
and systematic collection of data. Generalizations and predictions can be made
from formal research.
Informal Crisis communication research and reputation The informal crisis communication
research related to reputation repair utilizes the case study methods.
The researchers are heavily influenced by rhetoric in both theory and method.
Rhetorical theories are used as analytic tools to dissect and to interpret cases and
to generate insights into crisis communication. Three schools of thought dominate
the informal research: (1) corporate apologia; (2) image restoration; and (3) renewal.
Corporate apologia Apologia is a rhetorical concept that explores the use of communication
for self-defense. A person’s character is called into question when she
or he is accused of engaging in an action that involves wrongdoing. When one’s
character is attacked, one of four communication strategies can be used to defend
one’s character. Those four strategies are denial (person was not involved in any
wrongdoing), bolstering (remind people of the good things the person had done),
differentiation (remove the action from its negative context), and transcendence
(place the action in a new, broader context that is more favorable) (Ware and
Linkugel 1973). Dionisopolous and Vibbert (1988) presented the first published
piece that explained how apologia could be adapted and applied to corporate
communication. Crises, for instance, could be viewed as wrongdoing and
create the need for “corporate apologia.” The “corporation” speaks to defend its
reputation.
Ice (1991), Hobbs (1995), and Ihlen (2002) are among the researchers to apply
corporate apologia to specific crisis communication cases. Keith Hearit (1994, 1995a,
1995b, 2001, 2006) is most responsible for forging corporate apologia’s place
within crisis communication. For Hearit, a crisis is a threat to an organization’s
social legitimacy (the consistency between organizational values and stakeholder
values). A crisis violates stakeholder expectations of how an organization should
operate, thus calling its social legitimacy into question. Corporate apologia is used
Parameters for Crisis Communication 31
to restore social legitimacy. Social legitimacy is a form of reputation, making corporate
apologia a form of reputation defense.
Hearit integrated a number of other rhetorical ideas, such as dissociation, into
a communicative framework for analyzing crisis cases. A dissociation splits a
single idea into two parts. Crisis managers use dissociations in the hopes of reducing
the threat a crisis poses to reputation (Hearit 1995b, 2006). For instance,
one dissociation is individual-group. This dissociation argues that a person or group
within the organization is responsible for the crisis, not the entire organization.
The organization is not bad, just a few people inside the organization acted
inappropriately. If stakeholders accept this dissociation, blame and responsibility
for the crisis are deflected away from the organization as a whole to these isolated
individuals within the organization.
Image restoration theory/image repair theory The most prolific framework for
informal crisis communication research is image restoration theory, developed by
William Benoit (1995, 2005). The name of the theory has evolved over the years.
As late as 2005 the framework was known as image restoration theory (IRT).
However, in 2008, Benoit and Pang refer to the framework as the theory of image
repair discourse or image repair theory. The abbreviation and core concepts of
the theory remain the same, so it will be referred to simply as IRT.
IRT begins with an attack that threatens a reputation (what Benoit terms image).
An attack has two components: (1) an offensive act and (2) an accusation of responsibility
for the act. The offensive act can be a threat to a reputation. It becomes
a threat when an individual or organization is accused of being responsible for
the offensive act. If there is no offensive act or no accusations of responsibility
for the act, there is no reputational threat (Benoit 1995a; Benoit & Pang 2008).
IRT was “crafted to understand the communication options available for those,
whether organizations or persons, who face threats to their reputations” (Benoit
2005: 407). IRT was not developed specifically for crisis communication, but is
applicable because a crisis is a reputation threat.
IRT uses communication to defend reputations. IRT holds that corporate
communication is goal-directed and a positive organizational reputation is one of
the central goals of this communication (Benoit 1995). Drawing from rhetorical
and interpersonal communication (account giving), IRT offers a list of potential
crisis response strategies (image restoration strategies). Table 1.1 lists and defines
the IRT strategies. IRT has been applied to a vast array of crises, including corporations
(Benoit 1995; Benoit & Brinson 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski 1997),
celebrities (Benoit 1997), and politics (Benoit & McHale 1999). The primary
communicative recommendations to emerge from IRT have been an emphasis on
apology and accepting responsibility for crises (Benoit & Pang 2008).
Rhetoric of renewal The most recent informal line of crisis communication research
is the rhetoric of renewal. What separates the rhetoric of renewal from corporate
apologia and IRT is its emphasis on a positive view of the organization’s future
32 W. Timothy Coombs
rather than dwelling on the present and discussions of responsibility. The focus
is on helping victims. The idea is that an organization finds a new direction and
purpose – it grows – from a crisis (Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow 2007). The crisis
communication strategies emphasize the future and how things will be better
for the organization and its stakeholders. The rhetoric of renewal is an extension
of adjusting information and is consistent with a number of IRT strategies
as well.
The rhetoric of renewal is limited in its applicability. Because certain conditions
must exist for the rhetoric of renewal to be viable, it is not an option in every
crisis situation. Researchers have established four criteria necessary for the use of
renewal: (1) the organization has a strong pre-crisis ethical standard; (2) the
constituency-organization pre-crisis relationships are strong and favorable; (3) the
organization can focus on life beyond the crisis rather than seeking to escape blame;
and (4) the organization desires to engage in effective crisis communication. Events
that occur before and during the crisis determine whether or not an effective
crisis response can include the rhetoric of renewal. The rhetoric of renewal
emphasizes the value and nature of a positive crisis communication – an emphasis
on the future and recovery.
While the rhetoric of renewal uses case studies, it has been innovative in the
use of what can be called first-person case studies. The researchers talk with the
people involved in the crisis to get the crisis managers’ insights into the communicative
process (e.g., Ulmer 2001). Corporate apologia and IRT rely on what
Table 1.1 IRT crisis response strategies
Denial
• Simple Denial: did not do it
• Shift the Blame: blame some one or thing other than the organization
Evading responsibility
• Provocation: response to some one else’s actions
• Defeasibility: lack of information about or control over the situation
• Accidental: did not mean for it to happen
• Good intentions: actor meant well
Reducing offensiveness
• Bolstering: remind of the actor’s positive qualities
• Minimize offensiveness of the act: claim little damage from the crisis
• Differentiation: compare act to similar ones
• Transcendence: place act in a different context
• Attack Accuser: challenge those who say there is a crisis
• Compensation: offer money or goods
• Corrective Action: restore situation to pre-act status and/or promise change and prevent
a repeat of the act
• Mortification: ask for forgiveness; admit guilt and express regret
Parameters for Crisis Communication 33
can be called third-person case studies. Third party data are limited to news reports
and public statements from the organization. There is no contact and insights
from the people managing the crisis. While both case study approaches are subjective,
the first-person cases offer some unique insights into how crisis managers
view the process. This approach can yield valuable insights into the decision
making process of crisis managers.
Transition crisis communication research: Content analysis The content analysis
studies share an analysis of actual messages related to crisis communication.
Researchers try to illuminate how crisis response strategies are used by crisis
managers. The data include media reports, messages from the organization, and
messages from social media (Internet postings). Though varied, all the studies
provide insights into how crisis communication strategies have been used and, in
some cases, the effects of those strategies on the crisis situation.
Allen and Caillouet published two studies that examined the crisis messages
from one organization (Allen & Caillouet 1994; Caillouet & Allen 1996). They
grounded their analysis in the impression management literature and used this
literature as the source of crisis response strategies that they termed impression
management strategies. Their assumptions and strategies are similar to those found
in corporate apologia and IRT. Like corporate advocacy, legitimacy was the focal
point. A crisis threatens legitimacy (the view that an organization has the right
to operate) and communication can be used to restore legitimacy. They argued
that the crisis response strategies were impression management efforts – attempts
to influence how stakeholders perceive the organization. In other words, crisis
response strategies are used to shape reputations. The data included interviews
with employees, official statements, and government testimony by employees. Their
work was the first systematic examination of how crisis response strategies were
being used by the organization.
Huang (2006) examined four different political crises involving allegations of
extramarital affairs. The fours cases represented different types of the same basic
crisis. The media coverage was coded to evaluate what crisis response strategies
were used by the politicians and the effect of the response on the tenor of the
media coverage (positive or negative treatment of the politician). The idea is that
the different crises would require different responses to be effective. The predictions
were based on Bradford and Garrett’s (1995) model for responding to charges
of unethical behavior.
Huang’s (2006) analysis found that the situation did influence the effectiveness
of the crisis response strategies. Simply stated, some crisis response strategies are
more effective in particular situations. Huang’s data also presented the opportunity
for the study of cultural influence, as the crises and media coverage were from
China. Her results noted that culture could help to explain the utility of the
transcendence crisis response strategy and the wide use of the bolstering crisis
response strategy. Huang (2006) provides a much needed extension of crisis
communication research beyond its Western roots.
34 W. Timothy Coombs
Holladay (2009) used content analysis to examine how effective crisis managers
were at getting their side of the story out via the news media. She examined crises
that involved chemical accidents and the immediate news coverage of those
accidents. Her results found that organizational messages were not appearing in
the news coverage. In fact, the news stories rarely used an organizational member
as a source for this story. The problem could be a failure to provide information
to the news media in a timely fashion and/or the news media ignoring crisis
response efforts from organizations. Whatever the case, organizations are failing
to have their side of the story represented in the news media. The results are problematic
for crisis managers because getting out “your side” of the story has long
been a central recommendation for crisis communication (Lerbinger 1997;
Ogrizek & Guillery 1999). The study yielded insights into how poor crisis managers
were at becoming part of the crisis news coverage.
Stephens and Malone (Stephens & Malone 2009; Stephens, Malone, & Bailey
2005) extended crisis response strategies to include technical translation. They
not only examined the crisis response strategies identified in earlier research, but
also examined how technical information was explained in crisis responses – what
they term technical translation. The technical translations could be direct (no explanation),
elucidating, quasi-scientific, and transformational. Press releases, media
coverage, websites, and blogs were used as data for their analyses. Their research
has extended crisis response strategies beyond their traditional focus with the
inclusion of technical translation. Technical information is often a vital concern
given the technical nature of many crises.
Taylor and her colleagues (Caldiero, Taylor, & Ungureanu 2009; Perry,
Taylor, & Doerfel 2003: Taylor & Perry 2005) have been the strongest force
pushing for the inclusion of the Internet in crisis communication. This line of
research examines whether or not and how organizations use their websites for
crisis communication. Perry et al. (2003) established the method of reviewing
corporate websites for crisis information within the first 24 hours after a news
story appeared about the crisis. The Internet-based information was coded
into traditional or new media tactics. Traditional tactics include news releases,
transcripts of news conferences, fact sheets, memos/letters, and question-andanswer
materials. New media tactics include two-way interactive communication,
use of links, real-time monitoring, and video and audio effects. This initial
study noted a trend of increasing use of the Internet for crisis responses across
time.
Taylor and Perry (2005) refined the new media tactics and used a new label,
innovative media tactics. The innovative media tactics include dialogic communication,
connecting links, real-time monitoring, multimedia effects, and online
chat. The same method was used for examining websites within 24 hours of a
crisis news story appearing. The websites were coded for the use of traditional
and innovative media tactics. The research revealed a heavy reliance on traditional
media tactics. Caldiero et al. (2009) applied the analysis of crisis messages on the
Internet to fraud cases. The focus was on the news releases presented during a
Parameters for Crisis Communication 35
fraud crisis and their effect on media coverage. They found that quotations and
background information from the news releases were appearing in news stories.
The Internet-based news releases were acting as an information subsidy and allowing
the organization to tell its side of the story.
Choi and Lin (2009) examined online bulletin board comments during a crisis.
They content analyzed comments on two online parent communities in 2007
during a series of four toy recalls by Mattel. The recalls centered on lead paint
from toys made in China, but included a concern with loose magnets, too. The
comments about Mattel were coded for perceived responsibility for the crisis,
perceived reputation, emotion, and behaviors. The emotions included anger,
fear, surprise, disgust, contempt, alert, shame, worry, confusion, sympathy, and
relief. The coded behaviors were return the product to Mattel, boycott Mattel
products, contact Mattel, boycott made-in-China products, and take children to
the doctor. Their results found that anger and alert had a significant negative
relationship to reputation.
As a whole, the content analysis research demonstrates how crisis communication
is being used. This research provides a clearer picture of how crisis managers
are or are not using recommendations from the research. Moreover, there is an
exploration of the effects of using or ignoring crisis communication advice on
crisis management efforts. This exploration includes a critical examination of accepted
crisis communication wisdom such as telling the organization’s side of the story.
For fraud crises, online news releases did present the organization’s side of the
story. However, for chemical accidents, the news stories rarely included the organization’s
voice. We also see important questions being raised, including the role of
culture, the Internet, and emotion in crisis communication.
Formal research Formal research shares the desire to describe and to understand
a topic with informal and transition research. But formal research goes further in
a quest for prediction and control (Stacks 2002). Formal crisis communication
research is designed to establish relationships between variables and to develop
the predictive ability of crisis communication theory. Another significant difference
with formal research in crisis communication is the shift in focus from sender
to audience. As Lee (2004) noted, there was a need for crisis communication research
to take this turn toward the audience. The informal and transition research examine
the messages the crisis managers (senders) create and seek to infer effects on
the audience. The formal crisis communication research is more audience-oriented.
The emphasis is on how the receivers/audience react to crisis events and crisis
response strategies.
The best comparison of the sender and audience-oriented perspectives is the way
formal crisis communication research studies the crisis response strategies – what
crisis managers say and do after a crisis occurs. This section begins with survey
research examining audience perceptions of crisis response strategies. The focus
then shifts to studies examining the effects of crises and crisis response strategies
on the audience.
36 W. Timothy Coombs
Crisis response strategies An important outcome of the informal and transition
crisis communication research was the creation of lists of crisis response strategies.
These crisis response strategies are used in formal, transition, and informal
crisis research projects. The research generally has a sender orientation because
the concern is with defining the crisis response strategies that the crisis manager
(sender) might use. The formal research shifts focus by examining how receivers
react to the crisis response messages.
Coombs (2006) had respondents (receivers) rate a list of ten crisis response
strategies for its emphasis on protecting the victims in the crisis (accommodative)
and the organization’s perceived acceptance of responsibility for the crisis.
Table 1.2 presents a list of the crisis response strategies used in the study. A
cluster analysis found the ten strategies grouped into three clusters: deny, diminish,
and deal. The deny cluster seeks to prevent any association of the crisis with
the organization. The diminish cluster tries to reduce the amount of organizational
responsibility and/or the severity of the crisis. The deal crisis takes actions
to help the victims in some way and is perceived as accepting responsibility
for the crisis. Surveys were used to determine how receivers perceived the crisis
response strategies.
Huang, Lin, and Su (2005) asked public relations professionals in Taiwan
to evaluate crisis response strategies. The methods included the collection and
analysis of survey data about the various strategies. The data were used to create
groupings of strategies. Five groupings appeared: concession, justification, excuse,
diversion, and denial (refer to table 1.2 for details on the groupings). The groupings
reflected the accommodative-defensive continuum (protecting victims verses
self-interests) found in the Western crisis communication writings. A second continuum
fit as well, specification to ambiguity – the amount of detail in the response.
Table 1.2 Crisis response strategies in the SCCT cluster analysis study
1 Denial: management claims there is no crisis.
2 Scapegoat: management blames some outside entity for the crisis.
3 Attack the Accuser: management confronts the group or person claiming that something
is wrong.
4 Excuse: management attempts to minimize crisis responsibility by claiming lack of
control over the event or lack of intent to do harm.
5 Justification: management attempts to minimize the perceived damage caused by the
crisis.
6 Ingratiation: management praises other stakeholders and/or reminds people of past
good works by the organization.
7 Concern: management expresses concern for victims.
8 Compassion: management offers money or other gifts to victims.
9 Regret: management indicates they feel badly about the crisis.
10 Apology: management accepts full responsibility for the crisis and asks stakeholders
for forgiveness.
Parameters for Crisis Communication 37
Huang et al. (2005) argue that the specification-ambiguity continuum reflects
Chinese cultural values. While the sample was composed of potential crisis managers,
the research sought to organize the crisis response strategies by how people
perceived the strategies.
Audience effects crisis communication research The audience effects crisis communication
research seeks to understand (1) how stakeholders perceive and react
to crises and (2) how crisis response strategies affect those perceptions and
reactions. The audience effects crisis communication research is dominated by two
perspectives: (1) attribution theory and (2) contingency theory.
Attribution theory overview Attribution theory is a social-psychological theory
that attempts to explain how people make sense of events. The idea is that when
an event happens, especially a negative event, people try to determine why the
event occurred. People will make attributions of responsibility for events based
on limited evidence. The general attribution is that responsibility lies with the
person involved in the event (internal) or environmental factors (external). For
instance, a car skids off the road and hits a tree. The cause might be driver error
(internal) or ice on the road (external).
According to Bernard Weiner (1986), one of the main proponents of attribution
theory (AT), attributions of internal or external responsibility shape affective
and behavioral responses to the person involved in the event. It is logical to extend
AT to crisis communication. Stakeholders will make attributions of crisis responsibility
– was it the organization or environmental factors? The need to understand
the factors that shape people’s attributions and reactions to crises is what
makes AT approaches audience-oriented. Those attributions will shape affect and
behaviors directed toward the organization in crisis (Coombs 1995, 2007a). The
AT-based crisis research is audience-centered because it attempts to understand how
various factors in the crisis situation shape the crisis attributions stakeholders
might make about the crisis.
Early applications of AT to crises can be found in the marketing literature and
help to inform situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). SCCT is rooted
in AT and efforts to translate its ideas into crisis communication (Hazleton 2006).
This section begins with a discussion of the early application of AT to crisis through
marketing research, and then moves to a discussion of SCCT.
Early attribution theory applied to crisis through marketing Mowen and his
colleagues (Jolly & Mowen 1985; Mowen 1979, 1980; Mowen, Jolly, & Nickell
1981) applied AT to product recalls from a marketing perspective. Their focus
was on factors that influenced how people perceived the recalling organization.
Their factors included speed of the response, if the response was considered socially
responsible, and prior recalls. Prior recalls did intensify negative perceptions of
the recalling organization. This result is consistent with AT, especially Kelley’s
(1971) work with the consistency principle. Past recalls establish a pattern of
38 W. Timothy Coombs
behavior by an organization – the organization consistently has problems with its
products – that intensifies the negative perceptions about the recall.
The perception of the recall as socially responsible has the clearest application
to communication. An organization would want people to think its response to
the recall was socially responsible. The perception of social responsibility in the
response is facilitated by a fast response and the government commenting that
the response was socially responsible (Jolly & Mowen 1985; Mowen et al. 1981).
Crisis managers would want a quick response and to find third parties ready to
endorse the response as socially responsible. This pioneering research, however,
was limited to product recall responses which would be related predominantly to
product harm crises.
Later research extended AT to product tampering (Stockmyer 1996), accidents
(Jorgensen 1996), and unethical behavior (Bradford & Garrett 1995). Stockmyer
(1996) found that the emotion generated by a product tampering crisis influenced
purchase intentions. Jorgensen (1996) established the link between internal crises
and attributions of crisis responsibility and that a full apology reduced negative
emotions for a severe accident crisis. Bradford and Garrett (1995) demonstrated
that the nature of the unethical situation (the degree of responsibility) helped to
determine which crisis response strategies would be most effective – the nature
of the crisis situation influences the effectiveness of the response. This early research
was conducted in marketing where communication was one variable among
many. Communication researchers made crisis response strategies the variable as
they explored the links to AT and crisis communication in more depth.
Situational crisis communication theory Coombs and his colleagues began the
development of SCCT in 1995. The premise was very simple: crises are negative
events, stakeholders will make attributions about crisis responsibility, and those
attributions will affect how stakeholders interact with the organization in crisis
(Coombs 1995; Coombs & Holladay 1996; Schwarz 2008). SCCT is audience
oriented because it seeks to illuminate how people perceive crises, their reactions
to crisis response strategies, and audience reactions to the organization in crisis.
The nature of the crisis situation shapes audience perceptions and attributions.
Hence, efforts to understand how people perceive crisis situations are audience
centered. The idea is to understand how people make attributions about crises
and the effects of those attributions on their attitudes and behavioral intentions.
The core of SCCT is crisis responsibility. Attributions of crisis responsibility have
a significant effect on how people perceive the reputation of an organization in
crisis and their affective and behavioral responses to that organization following
a crisis. A crisis is a threat to an organization’s reputation (Barton 2001; Dowling
2002). Reputation matters because it is an important intangible resource for an
organization (Davies, Chun, da Silva, & Roper 2003; Fombrun & van Riel 2004).
Moreover, crises can generate negative affect and behavioral intentions toward an
organization. Crisis responsibility is a major factor in determining the threat posed
by a crisis. The initial SCCT research sought to identify the factors that shape
Parameters for Crisis Communication 39
crisis responsibility and the threat posed by a crisis (Coombs 1995; Coombs &
Holladay 1996, 2001, 2002).
SCCT proposes a two step process for assessing the crisis threat. The initial
step is to determine the frame stakeholders are using to categorize the process.
SCCT works from a grouping of three crisis types: victim (low crisis responsibility/
threat), accident (minimal crisis responsibility/threat), and intentional (strong
crisis responsibility/threat). The three categories represent increasing levels of
attributions of crisis responsibility and threat posed by a crisis. Determining the
crisis type/frame establishes the base threat presented by the crisis. The second step
is to determine if any of the two intensifying factors exist. The intensifying factors
alter attributions of crisis responsibility and intensify the threat from the crisis.
Currently, two intensifying factors have been documented: (1) crisis history and
(2) prior reputation. Crisis history is whether or not an organization has had
similar crises in the past. A history of crises increases the threat from a crisis. As
noted earlier, past crises help to establish a pattern of “bad behavior” by an organization.
Hence, stakeholders attribute greater crisis responsibility when past crises
exist (Coombs 2004b). Prior reputation is how well or poorly an organization has
treated stakeholders in the past – the general state of its relationship with stakeholders.
Organizations with negative prior reputations are attributed greater crisis
responsibility for the same crisis than an organization that is unknown or has a
positive prior reputation (Coombs & Holladay 2002, 2007). By increasing attributions
of crisis responsibility, the intensifiers increase the threat from a crisis. Only one
of the intensifiers needs to be present to alter the threat a crisis poses. Figure 1.1
illustrates the key variables and relationships in SCCT.
SCCT has not limited itself just to reputation as a crisis communication outcome.
Other crisis outcomes include affect and behavioral intentions. Along
with Jorgensen (1996), McDonald and Härtel (Härtel, McColl-Kennedy, &
McDonald 1998; McDonald & Härtel 2000) conducted some of the initial research
into anger and crisis. This is consistent with Weiner’s (2006) view of attributions
of responsibility leading to specific affect. Coombs and Holladay (2005) examined
a number of crisis types for their ability to generate sympathy, anger, and
schadenfreude (taking joy in the pain of others). The most compelling result was
the link between anger and crisis responsibility. Not surprisingly, anger increases
with attributions of crisis responsibility.
Affect also has been linked to behavioral intentions (Jorgensen 1996). The
behavioral intentions include purchase intension and negative word-of-mouth.
Negative word-of-mouth is particularly problematic because the effects could outlast
memories of the crisis. Messages posted online, for instance, can remain for
years, while people’s memory of a crisis fades after a few months. Coombs and
Holladay (2007) posited the negative communication dynamic. The idea is that
anger from a crisis leads to an increased proclivity towards negative word-of-mouth
as well as reduced purchase intention. The data supported the existence of the
negative communication dynamic and provided more insight into the role of affect
in crisis communication. Anger is the motivator that moves people to action. In
40 W. Timothy Coombs
the case of the negative communication dynamic, that action is relaying negative
messages to others about the organization in crisis.
Crisis managers utilize the threat level to determine the appropriate crisis
response (Coombs 2007c). SCCT argues that every crisis response should begin
with instructing and adjusting information, two concepts discussed earlier in the
chapter. Instructing information tells stakeholders how to protect themselves from
a crisis. Examples include information on what product to return in a recall or
how to evacuate an area during an industrial accident. Adjusting information helps
stakeholders to cope psychologically with a crisis. Expression of concern or sympathy,
basic information on the crisis event, and any corrective actions to prevent
a repeat of the crisis would qualify as adjusting information (Coombs 2007b; Sturges
1994). Once adjusting and instructing information are provided, crisis managers
can attempt reputation repair efforts.
SCCT divides the crisis response strategies into three primary strategies (deny,
diminish, rebuild) and one supplemental strategy (reinforcing). Deny strategies
attempt to prove the organization had no responsibility for the crisis. Either the
crisis did not happen or someone else was responsible for the event. Diminish
strategies seek to minimize the organization’s crisis responsibility and/or reduce
the perceived seriousness of the crisis. Rebuild strategies are very accommodative
Crisis
Crisis
Response
Strategies
Crisis
Responsibility
Organizational
Reputation
Behavioral
Intentions
Prior Relationship/
Reputation
Crisis History
Affect
Figure 1.1 Model for the situational crisis communication theory variables
Parameters for Crisis Communication 41
and seek to improve perceptions of the organization through compensation
and/or apologies. Reinforcing strategies try to add positive information about the
organization by praising others (ingratiation) and/or reminding people of past
good works by the organization (bolstering). Reinforcing strategies would seem
odd if used alone and are opportunity strategies (Coombs 2006). Rather than
being a primary strategy, they are best used to support the three primary strategies.
Reinforcing strategies are opportunities because they can only be used when
an organization has past good works and/or reasons to thank others.
The rationale and definitions of the crisis response grouping were provided in
the earlier discussion of crisis response strategies and formal research. The three
primary strategies vary in focus from trying to protect the organization to helping
the crisis victims – the level of accommodation. Crisis managers select the
reputation repair crisis response strategies based upon the threat presented by the
crisis. As the crisis threat increases, crisis managers should use progressively more
accommodative crisis response strategies.
The victim crisis types can be managed using instructing and adjusting information.
An accident crisis can add justification and/or excuse to the instructing
and adjusting information. An intentional crisis or accident crisis with an intensify
factor warrants an apology and/or compensation added to the instructing
and adjusting information (Coombs 2007a). Thus far, the limited research has
supported the matching of crisis response strategy to the crisis threat (Coombs
& Holladay 1996; Coombs & Schmidt 2000). Table 1.3 provides an overview of
the major recommendations offered by SCCT.
SCCT is still developing as a theory. As Schwarz (2008) noted, there are other
aspects of AT that can be incorporated into SCCT. Moreover, additional factors
that have not been specified yet may shape the crisis threat, including the role of
culture (Lee 2005) and visual elements in crisis media coverage (Coombs & Holladay
2008). Also, the range of communicative recommendations has yet to addressed.
These points are developed more fully in a number of the chapters in Part VII
of this Handbook. Other researchers have examined crisis communication using
an AT framework and have reported findings consistent with SCCT (e.g., Dawar
& Pillutla 2000; Dean 2004; Klein & Dawar 2004; Lee 2004).
Contingency theory and crisis communication Contingency theory is a grand
theory of public relations that explains the degree to which an organization
uses an advocacy or accommodative response to conflicts with stakeholders
(e.g., Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Motrook 1997; Cameron, Pang, & Jin 2008).
Contingency theory is associated most strongly with Glen Cameron and is a very
complex conceptualization of public relations. As a grand theory, contingency
theory seeks to explain how public relations as a whole operates. More specifically,
it helps us to understand what guides policy-level decisions an organization makes
about goals, alignments, ethics, and relationships with publics and other forces
in its environment (Botan 2006). Historically, grand theories try to explain
an entire discipline and can be adapted to specific areas of the discipline.
42 W. Timothy Coombs
Contingency theory is being adapted to develop a line of inquiry involving
crisis communication.
Stance is the key variable in contingency theory. The stance is how an organization
responds to competition and conflicts with other parties. Stances are
placed on a continuum anchored by advocacy and accommodation. Advocacy is
when an organization argues for its own interests, while accommodation is when
the organization makes concessions to the other parties. The stance an organization
should take depends on the nature of the public relations situation.
Sometimes an organization needs to be accommodative, while at others it may
need to favor advocacy (Cameron et al. 2008).
Contingency theory draws on over 80 variables to help predict what stance
should be used in a particular situation. Predisposing variables shape stances prior
to the situation and represent “predisposed” stances. In other words, an organization
will have a default stance. Predisposing variables include organizational
characteristics, PR department characteristics, and individual characteristics
(Cancel et al. 1997; Shin, Cameron, & Cropp 2006). Situational factors, if they
are strong enough, can alter an organization’s stance. The situational factors can be
divided into five external factors and seven internal factors (Shin et al. 2006).
The complexity of contingency theory is drawn from trying to understand the
Table 1.3 SCCT recommendations
1 All victims or potential victims should receive instructing information, including recall
information. This is one-half of the base response to a crisis.
2 All victims should be provided an expression of sympathy, any information about
corrective actions, and trauma counseling when needed. This can be called the “care
response.” This is the second-half of the base response to a crisis.
3 For crises with minimal attributions of crisis responsibility and no intensifying factors,
instructing information and care response is sufficient.
4 For crises with minimal attributions of crisis responsibility and an intensifying
factor, add excuse and/or justification strategies to the instructing information and
care response.
5 For crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility, and no intensifying factors,
add excuse and/or justification strategies to the instructing information and care
response.
6 For crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility and an intensifying factor,
add compensation and/or apology strategies to the instructing information and care
response.
7 For crises with strong attributions of crisis responsibility, add compensation and/or
apology strategies to the instructing information and care response.
8 The compensation strategy is used anytime victims suffer serious harm.
9 The reminder and ingratiation strategies can be used to supplement any response.
10 Denial and attack the accuser strategies are best used only for combating rumors and/or
challenges to the morality of an organization’s behaviors.
Parameters for Crisis Communication 43
relationships between its many variables. See Table 1.4 for a list of the external
and internal factors.
A number of studies have begun applying contingency theory to crisis communication
(e.g., Hwang & Cameron 2008; Jin & Cameron 2007; Jin, Pang,
& Cameron 2007; Pang, Jin, & Cameron 2004). The research has noted the
similarity between the stances and the crisis response strategies from IR and
SCCT (Pang et al. 2004). All share accommodation as an underlying dimension.
Contingency theory examines threat differently from SCCT. Contingency theory
uses a threat appraisal model that utilizes threat type and threat duration to determine
the threat level. Threat type is whether the crisis is internal or external to
the organization, while threat duration is whether the crisis can be short term or
long term. Jin and Cameron (2007) found that an internal, long-term threat posed
the greatest threat and that a more accommodative response is favored when the
threat is high.
The threat appraisal also includes the affective response by integrating emotion
into the crisis communication process (Cameron et al. 2008; Jin & Cameron 2007).
While similar to SCCT in some respects, the contingency theory approach to
crisis communication offers a number of additional variables to consider when
trying to select an appropriate response to the crisis. The final part of this section
will consider how contingency theory and SCCT offer a promising synthesis of
ideas suggested by some researchers (Holtzhausen & Roberts 2009).
Future of formal audience effects crisis communication research One limitation
of grand theory is that it provides a generic explanation that is then applied to
specific aspects of a discipline. Middle range theories, to borrow the language of
sociologist Robert Merton (1968), are more useful in understanding specific aspects
Table 1.4 Internal and external factors in contingency theory
Internal variables*
• Organization characteristics
• Public relations department characteristics
• Characteristics of dominant coalition
• Internal threats
• Individual characteristics
• Relationship characteristics
External variables*
• Threats
• Industry environment
• General political/social environment/external culture
• External public
* These are variable labels and each label contains multiple variables. See Cameron et al. (2008) for
a complete list of the variables.
44 W. Timothy Coombs
of a discipline. Botan’s (2006) strategic theories are akin to middle range theory
because they involve the execution of grand theory. The grand theory provides
the framework for integrating ideas and the middle range theories provide ways
to examine these ideas.
Contingency theory offers a useful integrative framework but SCCT, as a middle
range theory, is useful to explain audience effects crisis communication research
as well. More precisely, SCCT can be used to operationalize, in the crisis communication
context, the critical variables identified by contingency theory. It is a
distinct possibility that the variables of contingency theory will vary in relevance
and operationlization for different public relations phenomena. SCCT provides a
more context specific framework for operationalizing and organizing the variables
for crisis communication.
Two points will be used to illustrate the potential for integration: stances and
threat. The stances and crisis response strategies share a concern for accommodation
but do not overlap completely. The contingency theory stances are
grounded in conflict, but not all crises have a strong conflict component. For crises
that stem from conflict, the stances would provide a more appropriate set of
communicative options, while the crisis response strategies would be more appropriate
when conflict is not a major component of the crisis. More work is needed
to integrate the two into a master list of crisis response strategies and recommendations
for when each would be appropriate.
Although both theories are driven by threat, they operationalize it differently.
This leads to what can appear to be disparate advice. Contingency theory has found
that external threats create greater situational demands than internal crises, while
SCCT finds that crises with an internal focus can be more threatening than external
crises (Coombs & Holladay 1996, 2002; Jin & Cameron 2007). The difference
is the nature of the threat and the types of crises. Contingency theory
looked at the threat in terms of the situational demands for resources, while SCCT
focuses on the reputational threat posed by the crisis. In different crises, those
threats need not be the same. The Jin and Cameron (2007) study used activist
attacks as the external threat and employee rumors for the internal threat. For
SCCT, rumors are considered easier to address than challenges, thus, the results
are actually consistent (Coombs 2007b). Further investigation is warranted to map
crisis types and how they affect the results and prescriptions of contingency
theory and SCCT. Perhaps a fusion can eventually be achieved to form a new
theory.
There is a specific value in integrating SCCT and its AT roots into crisis
communication research. Marketing researchers have a history of utilizing AT in
their crisis research (e.g., Mowen 1980; Klein & Dawar 2004). The common
connection in AT provides a similar set of variables and relationships that makes
the crisis communication in marketing and communication easier to integrate and
compare. While operationalization may vary, the basic variables remain the same,
providing some mechanisms for comparing the results and constructing the data
for evidence-based crisis communication (Coombs 2007a). For instance, Laufer
Parameters for Crisis Communication 45
and Coombs (2006) were able to use AT as an organizing framework for
synthesizing the results on crisis research related to product-harm crises into a set
of evidence-based recommendations.
Post-crisis communication
Post-crisis communication covers the time period after a crisis is considered to be
resolved. The focus on managing the crisis is over, but managing the effects of
the crisis continue. Given that it can be difficult to precisely locate when a crisis
is over, post-crisis communication is largely an extension of crisis response communication
coupled with learning from the crisis.
Continuation of crisis communication Post-crisis communication heavily uses
stakeholder reaction management communication. As an organization returns to
normal operations, stakeholders must be updated on the business continuity efforts.
Employees, suppliers, and customers all want to know when “normal” operations
will occur and require regular updates on the situation. Organizations may need
to cooperate with investigations, generate their own reports, and/or issue their
reactions to investigation reports form external agencies such as the government.
Investigations are an extension of information about the crisis. The final reports
are very important when they are the first documented evidence of the cause of
the crisis. The reported cause could raise a new round of concerns for the organization
that demand a response. An organization must deliver all “promised”
information. If stakeholders requested information during a crisis and were
promised that information later, the organization must deliver on that promise
or lose trust from the stakeholders.
Memorials and commemoration are distinct forms of adjusting information that
extend well beyond the crisis. A physical memorial might be created, such as the
one to the bonfire victims at Texas A&M University or the victims of the West
Pharmaceutical explosion in Kinston, North Carolina. Or there may be memorial
services held on anniversaries. There is a case where after a hundred years an
industrial accident is still remembered annually in Germany. What role will the
organization play in the memorial and commemorations and how will it communicate
about these events? Providing psychological support for victims, including
employees, is another way that adjusting information extends into the
post-crisis phase. People need information about such programs.
Reputation repair continues in the post-crisis phase as well. Renewal is an
example of how reputation repair efforts extend beyond the crisis. The focus of
renewal is the future and rebuilding. It could take months or years of communicative
efforts to rebuild a reputation. Consider the years it took Tyco to recover
from the crisis of its leadership siphoning millions of dollars from the company.
A new CEO, new ethics officer, and new ethics program were part of the changes
that needed to be communicated to stakeholders. Hence, the discussion of
reputation repair in the previous section is applicable here as well.
46 W. Timothy Coombs
Organizational learning A common statement in crisis management writings
is that crises are a perfect learning experience. After the initial focus on managing
the crisis, people realize there is a problem and a need for change (KovoorMisra
& Nathan 2000). A crisis provides an opportunity to evaluate what an
organization has been doing, including what led to the crisis and the crisis
management effort. Crisis expert Ian Mitroff has emphasized the need to learn
from crises (e.g., Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington 1996). However, the problem
is that organizations are reluctant to learn from crises (Roux-Dufort 2000).
People get defensive and resist intensive investigations into the crisis. Reviewing
what happened and why becomes a threat as people fear blame and punishment.
Effective crisis learning reflects the crisis knowledge management aspect of
crisis communication. Crisis learning experts note the need to collect information
about the crisis and to analyze that information. A multifunctional team (composed
of people from various departments) should run the crisis post-mortem and
collect information from a wide range of stakeholders, including external stakeholders
(Elliot, Smith, & McGuiness 2002; Kovoor-Misra & Nathan 2000).
Management must model and promote an open climate that focuses on lessons
learned that is not blame oriented. Learning must be rewarded and evaluated.
Were the lessons implemented? Was the implementation successful? Were people
rewarded for the change? Learning audits can be used to determine if the lessons
are still being used and reinforced after the initial implementation (Kovoor-Misra
& Nathan 2000). Clearly, there are a variety of crisis knowledge management
communication issues that are emerging from crisis learning. It is an area that still
lacks development and exploration (a topic raised in chapter 38).
Conclusion
This chapter progressed from a definition of crisis to crisis management to crisis
communication. The progression was necessary as the definitions of crisis and
crisis management help to establish what constitutes crisis communication – its
parameters. This exploration demonstrates that crisis communication is multifaceted
rather than just one thing. Crisis communication occurs during all three phases
of crisis management: pre-crisis, crisis response, and post-crisis. Across these three
phases crisis communication tends to emphasize either crisis knowledge management
or stakeholder reaction management.
The most heavily researched area of crisis communication is stakeholder reaction
management. Within stakeholder reaction management, the bulk of the research
is on strategic crisis communication concerned with the crisis response. The attention
is warranted because the crisis response can improve or worsen the crisis for
the organization and/or its stakeholders. Moreover, stakeholders carefully scrutinize
the crisis response. Even with this intense focus there is still much more to
be learned about the utility of crisis communication during the crisis response.
The other areas of crisis communication have had minimal attention and are ripe
Parameters for Crisis Communication 47
for additional research. The parameters of crisis communication are rather broad,
leaving ample room for additional research, a point illustrated by the chapters
in this Handbook of Crisis Communication. After reading this volume, you will
realize there is still much to be learned about crisis communication that can help
make crisis management more effective at protecting stakeholders and organizations.
References
Allen, M. W. & Caillouet, R. H. (1994). Legitimation endeavors: Impression management
strategies used by an organization in crisis. Communication Monographs, 61: 44–62.
Arpan, L. M., & Pompper, D. (2003). Stormy weather: Testing “stealing thunder” as a
crisis communication strategy to improve communication flow between organizations
and journalists. Public Relations Review, 29: 291–308.
Arpan, L. M., & Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R. (2005). Stealing thunder: Analysis of the effects
of proactive disclosure of crisis information. Public Relations Review, 31: 425–433.
Barton, L. (2001). Crisis in organizations II (2nd edn.). Cincinnati: College Divisions
South-Western.
Benoit, W. L. (1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Benoit, W. L. (1997). Hugh Grant’s image restoration discourse: An actor apologizes.
Communication Quarterly, 45: 251–267.
Benoit, W. L. (2005). Image restoration theory. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of
public relations: Volume1 (pp. 407–410). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Benoit, W. L., & Brinson, S. (1994). AT&T: Apologies are not enough. Communication
Quarterly, 42: 75–88.
Benoit, W. L., & Czerwinski, A. (1997). A critical analysis of USAir’s image repair
discourse. Business Communication Quarterly, 60: 38–57.
Benoit, W. L., & McHale, J. (1999). “Just the facts, ma’am”: Starr’s image repair
discourse viewed in 20/20. Communication Quarterly, 47: 265–280.
Benoit, W. L., & Pang, A. (2008). Crisis communication and image repair discourse.
In T. L. Hansen-Horn & B. D. Neff (Eds.), Public relations: From theory to practice
(pp. 243–261). New York: Pearson.
Bergman, E. (1994). Crisis? What crisis? Communication World, 11(4), 9–13.
Billings, R. S., Milburn, T. W., & Schaalman, M. L. (1980). A model of crisis perception:
A theoretical and empirical analysis. Administration Science Quarterly, 25: 300–316.
Botan, C. (2006). Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics in public relations. In C. Botan &
V. Hazleton (Eds.), Public Relation Theory II (pp. 223–248). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Bradford, J. L. & Garrett, D. E. (1995). The effectiveness of corporate communicative
responses to accusations of unethical behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 14: 875–
892.
Brummett, B. (1980). Towards a theory of silence as a political strategy. Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 66: 289–303.
Caillouet, R. H., & Allen, M. W. (1996). Impression management strategies employees
use when discussing their organization’s public image. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 8(4): 211–228.
48 W. Timothy Coombs
Caldeiro, C. T., Taylor, M., & Ungureanu, L. (2009). Image repair tactics and information
subsidies during fraud crises. Journal of Public Relations Research, 21(2).
Cameron, G. T., Pang. A., & Jin, Y. (2008). Contingency theory. In T. L. Hansen-Horn
& B. D. Neff (Eds.), Public relations: From theory to practice (134–157). New York:
Pearson.
Cancel, A. E., Cameron, G. T., Sallot, L. M., & Motrook, M. A. (1997). It depends:
A contingency theory of accommodation in public relations. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 9: 31–63.
Carney, A., & Jorden, A. (1993). Prepare for business-related crises. Public Relations Journal,
49: 34–35.
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009). Consumer responses to Mattel product recalls posted on
online bulletin boards: Exploring two types of emotion. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 21(2).
Cohen, J. R. (1999). Advising clients to apologize. Southern California Law Review,
72: 109–131.
Coombs, W. T. (1995). Choosing the right words: The development of guidelines for the
selection of the “appropriate” crisis response strategies. Management Communication
Quarterly, 8: 447–476.
Coombs, W. T. (1999). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Coombs, W. T. (2004a). A theoretical frame for post-crisis communication: Situational
crisis communication theory. In M. J. Martinko (Ed.), Attribution theory in the organizational
sciences: Theoretical and empirical contributions (pp. 275–296). Greenwich,
CT: Information Age Publishing.
Coombs, W. T. (2004b). Impact of past crises on current crisis communications: Insights
from situational crisis communication theory. Journal of Business Communication,
41: 265–289.
Coombs, W. T. (2006). The protective powers of crisis response strategies: Managing
reputational assets during a crisis. Journal of Promotion Management, 12: 241–260.
Coombs, W. T. (2007a). Attribution theory as a guide for post-crisis communication research.
Public Relations Review, 33: 135–139.
Coombs, W. T. (2007b). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and
responding (2nd edn.). Los Angeles: Sage.
Coombs, W. T. (2007c). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development
and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation
Review, 10(3): 163–177.
Coombs, W. T. (2008). Parallel process model and government preparedness messages:
Beyond duct tape and plastic sheeting. In M. W. Seeger. T. L. Sellnow, & R. R. Ulmer
(Eds.), Crisis communication and the public health (pp. 221–234). Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
Coombs, W. T. (2009). Conceptualizing crisis communication. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O’Hair
(Eds.), Handbook of crisis and risk communication (pp. 100–119). New York: Routledge.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (1996). Communication and attributions in a crisis:
An experimental study of crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research,
8(4): 279–295.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2001). An extended examination of the crisis situation:
A fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches. Journal of Public
Relations Research, 13: 321–340.
Parameters for Crisis Communication 49
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational
assets: Initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory. Management
Communication Quarterly, 16: 165–186.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2005). Exploratory study of stakeholder emotions:
Affect and crisis. In N. M. Ashkanasy, W. J. Zerbe, & C. E. J. Hartel (Eds.), Research
on emotion in organizations, Volume 1: The effect of affect in organizational settings
(pp. 271–288). New York: Elsevier.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2006). Unpacking the halo effect: Reputation and
crisis management. Journal of Communication Management, 10(2): 123–137.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2007). The negative communication dynamic:
Exploring the impact of stakeholder affect on behavioral intentions. Journal of Communication
Management, 11: 300–312.
Coombs, W. T., & Schmidt, L. (2000). An empirical analysis of image restoration:
Texaco’s racism crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12: 163–178.
Davies, G., Chun, R., da Silva, R. V., & Roper, S. (2003). Corporate reputation and competitiveness.
New York: Routledge.
Dawar, N., & Pillutla, M. M. (2000). Impact of product-harm crises on brand equity: The
moderating role of consumer expectations. Journal of Marketing Research, 27: 215–226.
Dean, D. H. (2004). Consumer reaction to negative publicity: Effects of corporate
reputation, response, and responsibility for a crisis event. Journal of Business Communication,
41: 192–211.
Dionisopolous, G. N., & Vibbert, S. L. (1988). CBS vs Mobil Oil: Charges of creative
bookkeeping. In H. R. Ryan (Ed.), Oratorical encounters: Selected studies and sources
of 20th century political accusation and apologies (pp. 214–252). Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press.
Dowling, G. (2002). Creating corporate reputations: Identity, image, and performance. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Elliot, D., Smith, D., & McGuiness, M. (2002). Exploring the failure to learn: Crises and
the barriers to learning. Review of Business, 21: 17–24.
Fearn-Banks, K. (1996). Crisis communication: A casebook approach. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Feeley, T. H., & de Turck, M. A. (1995). Global cue usage in behavioral lie detection.
Communication Quarterly, 43(4): 420–430.
Fink, S. (1986). Crisis management: Planning for the inevitable. New York: AMACOM.
Fombrun, C. J., & van Riel, C. B. M. (2004). Fame and fortune: How successful companies
build winning reputations. New York: Prentice-Hall/Financial Times.
Friedman, M. (2002). Everyday crisis management: How to think like an emergency physician.
Naperville, IL: First Decision Press.
Fuchs-Burnett, T. (2002). Mass public corporate apology. Dispute Resolution Journal, 57(3):
26–32.
Gibson, D. C. (1997). Print communication tactics for consumer product recalls: A prescriptive
taxonomy. Public Relations Quarterly, 42(2): 42–46.
González-Herrero, A., & Pratt, C. B. (1996). An integrated symmetrical model for crisiscommunications
management. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(2): 79–105.
Guth, D. W. (1995). Organizational crisis experience and public relations roles. Public
Relations Review, 21(2): 123–136.
Härtel, C., McColl-Kennedy, J. R., & McDonald, L. (1998). Incorporating attribution
theory and the theory of reasoned action within an affective events theory framework
50 W. Timothy Coombs
to produce a contingency predictive model of consumer reactions to organizational
mishaps. Advances in Consumer Research, 25: 428–432.
Hazleton, V. (2006). Toward a theory of public relations competence. In C. H. Botan and
V. Hazleton (Eds.), Public relations theory II (pp. 199–222). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Hearit, K. M. (1994). Apologies and public relations crises at Chrysler, Toshiba, and Volvo.
Public Relations Review, 20: 113–125.
Hearit, K. M. (1995a). “Mistakes were made”: Organizations, apologia, and crises of social
legitimacy. Communication Studies, 46: 1–17.
Hearit, K. M. (1995b). From “we didn’t do it” to “it’s not our fault”: The use of
apologia in public relations crises. In W. N. Elwood (Ed.), Public relations inquiry as
rhetorical criticism: Case studies of corporate discourse and social influence. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
Hearit, K. M. (1996). The use of counter-attack in apologetic public relations crises: The
case of General Motors vs. Dateline NBC. Public Relations Review, 22(3): 233–248.
Hearit, K. M. (2001). Corporate apologia: When an organization speaks in defense of itself.
In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Handbook of public relations (pp. 501–511). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Hearit, K. M. (2006). Crisis management by apology: Corporate response to allegations of
wrongdoing. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Heath, R. L. (2005). Issues management. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of public
relations I (pp. 460–463). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Heath, R. L., & Palenchar, K. J. (2000). Community relations and risk communication:
A longitudinal study of the impact of emergency response messages. Journal of Public
Relations Research, 12: 131–161.
Heath, R. L., Lee, J., & Ni, L. (2009). Crisis and risk approaches to emergency management
planning and communication: The role of similarity and sensitivity. Journal of
Public Relations Research, 21(2).
Hobbs, J. D. (1995). Treachery by any other name: A case study of the Toshiba public
relations crisis. Management Communication Quarterly, 8: 323–346.
Holladay, S. J. (2009). Crisis communication strategies in the media coverage of chemical
accidents. Journal of Public Relations Research, 21.
Holtzhausen, D. R., & Roberts, G. F. (2009). An investigation into the role of image
repair theory in strategic conflict management. Journal of Public Relations Research,
21.
Huang, Y. H. (2006). Crisis situations, communication strategies, and media coverage:
A multicase study revisiting the communicative response model. Communication Research,
33: 180–205.
Huang, Y. H., Lin, Y. H., & Su, S. H. (2005). Crisis communicative strategies in Taiwan:
Category, continuum, and cultural implication. Public Relations Review, 31: 229–
238.
Hwang, S., & Cameron, G. T. (2008). Public’s expectation about an organization’s stance
in crisis communication based on perceived leadership and perceived severity of
threats. Public Relations Review, 34: 70–73.
Ice, R. (1991). Corporate publics and rhetorical strategies: The case of Union Carbide’s
Bhopal crisis. Management Communication Quarterly, 3: 41–62.
Ihlen, Ø. (2002). Defending the Mercedes A-class: Combining and changing crisis
response strategies. Journal of Public Relations Research, 14: 185–206.
Parameters for Crisis Communication 51
Jin, Y., & Cameron, G. T. (2007). The effects of threat type and duration on public relations
practitioners’ cognitive, affective, and conative responses to crisis situations. Journal
of Public Relations Research, 19: 255–281.
Jin, Y., Pang, A., & Cameron, G. T. (2007). Integrated crisis mapping: Towards a publicbased,
emotion-driven conceptualization in crisis communication. Sphera Publica,
7: 81–96.
Jolly, D. W., & Mowen, J. C. (1985). Product recall communications: The effects of source,
media, and social responsibility information. Advances in Consumer Research, 12:
471–475.
Jorgensen, B. K. (1996). Components of consumer reaction to company-related mishaps:
A structural equation model approach. Advances in Consumer Research, 23: 346–351.
Kelley, H. H. (1971). Attribution in social interaction. New York: General Learning Press.
Klein, J., & Dawar, N. (2004). Corporate social responsibility and consumers’ attributions
and brand evaluations in a product-harm crisis. International Journal of Research in
Marketing, 21: 203–217.
Kolfschoten, G. L., & Appelman, J. H. (2006). Collaborative engineering in crisis situations.
Paper presented at ISCRAM-TIEMS Summer School, Tilburg, Netherlands.
Kovoor-Misra, S., & Nathan, M. (2000). Timiing is everything: The optimal time to learn
from crises. Review of Business, 21: 31–36.
Laufer, D., & Coombs, W. T. (2006). How should a company respond to a product harm
crisis? The role of corporate reputation and consumer-based cues. Business Horizon,
10(2): 123–137.
Kelley, H. H. (1971). Attribution in social interaction. New York: General Learning Press.
Lee, B. K. (2004). Audience-oriented approach to crisis communication: A study of Hong
Kong consumers’ evaluations of an organizational crisis. Communication Research,
31: 600–618.
Lee, B. K. (2005). Crisis, culture, and communication. In P. J. Kalbfleisch (Ed.), Communication
yearbook 29 (pp. 275–308). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lerbinger, O. (1997). The crisis manager: Facing risk and responsibility. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Loewendick B. A. (1993). Laying your crisis on the table. Training and Development: 15–17.
McDonald, L., & Härtel, C. E. J. (2000). Applying the involvement construct to organizational
crises. Proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand Marketing Academy
Conference, Visionary Marketing for the 21st Century: Facing the Challenge. Griffith
University, Department of Marketing, Gold Coast, Australia, pp. 799–803.
Marcus, A. A., & Goodman, R. S. (1991). Victims and shareholders: The dilemmas of
presenting corporate policy during a crisis. Academy of Management Journal, 34:
281–305.
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Mitroff, I. I. (1994). Crisis management and evironmentalism: A natural fit. California
Management Review, 36(2): 101–113.
Mitroff, I. I., & Anagnos, G. (2001). Managing crises before they happen: What every executive
and manager needs to know about crisis management. New York: AMACOM.
Mitroff, I. I., Harrington, K., & Gai, E. (1996). Thinking about the unthinkable. Across
the Board, 33(8): 44–48.
Mitroff, I. I., Pearson, C. M., & Harrington, L. K. (1996). The essential guide to managing
corporate crises: A step-by-step handbook for surviving major catastrophes. New York:
Oxford University Press.
52 W. Timothy Coombs
Mowen, J. C. (1979). Further perceptions on consumer perceptions of product recalls.
Advances in Consumer Research, 7: 519–523.
Mowen, J. C. (1980). Further information on consumer perceptions of product recalls.
Advances in Consumer Research, 8: 519–523.
Mowen, J. C., Jolly, D., & Nickell, G. S. (1981). Factors influencing consumer responses
to product recalls: A regression analysis approach. Advances in Consumer Research,
8: 405–407.
Ogrizek, M., & Guillery, J. M. (1999). Communicating in crisis: A theoretical and practical
guide to crisis management. Piscataway, NJ: Aldine Transaction.
Olaniran, B., & Williams, D. E. (2008). Applying anticipatory and relational perspectives
to the Nigerian delta region oil crisis. Public Relations Review, 34: 57–59.
Pang, A., Jin, Y., & Cameron, G. T. (2004). “If we can learn some lessons in the process”:
A contingency approach to analyzing the Chinese government’s management
of the perception and emotion of its multiple publics during the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis. Miami: IPRRC.
Patel, A., & Reinsch, L. (2003). Companies can apologize: Corporate apologies and legal
liability. Business Communication Quarterly, 66: 17–26.
Principles of Emergency Management (2003). Washington, DC: Emergency Management
Institute.
Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of
Management Review, 23(1): 59–76.
Perry, D. C., Taylor, M., & Doerfel, M. L. (2003). Internet-based communication in crisis
communication. Management Communication Quarterly, 17: 206–232.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1988). Disaster crisis management: A summary of research findings.
Journal of Management Studies, 25: 373–385.
Regester, M. (1989). Crisis management: What to do when the unthinkable happens.
London: Hutchinson Business.
Rousseau, D. M. (2005). Is there such a thing as “evidence-based management”?
Academy of Management Review, 31: 256–269.
Roux-Dufort, C. (2000). Why organizations don’t learn from crises: The perverse power
of normalization. Review of Business, 21: 25–30.
Schwarz, A. (2008). Covariation-based causal attributions during organizational crises:
Suggestions for extending situational crisis communication theory. International
Journal of Strategic Communication, 2: 31–53.
Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (1998). Communication, organization and
crisis. In M. E. Roloff (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 21 (pp. 231–275). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sellnow, T. L., Ulmer, R. R., & Snider, M. (1998). The compatibility of corrective action
in organizational crisis communication. Communication Quarterly, 46: 60–74.
Shin, J. H., Cameron, G. T., & Cropp, F. (2006). Occam’s razor in the contingency
theory: A national survey of 86 contingent variables. Public Relations Review, 32:
282–286.
Smith, D. 1990. Beyond contingency planning: Towards a model of crisis management.
Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4: 263–275.
Stacks, D. W. (2002). Primer of public relations research. New York: Guilford Press.
Stephens, K. K., & Malone, P. (2009). If the organizations won’t give us information . . . :
The use of multiple new media for crisis technical translation. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 21(2).
Parameters for Crisis Communication 53
Stephens, K. K., Malone, P. C., & Bailey, C. M. (2005). Communicating with stakeholders
during a crisis: Evaluating message strategies. Journal of Business Communication,
42: 390–419.
Stockmyer, J. (1996). Brands in crisis: Consumer help for deserving victims. Advances in
Consumer Research, 23: 429–435.
Sturges, D. L. (1994). Communicating through crisis: A strategy for organizational survival.
Management Communication Quarterly, 7(3): 297–316.
Taylor, M., & Perry, D. C. (2005). The diffusion of traditional and new media tactics in
crisis communication. Public Relations Review, 31: 209–217.
Ulmer, R. R. (2001). Effective crisis management through established stakeholder relationships.
Management Communication Quarterly, 14: 590–615.
Ulmer, R. R., Seeger, M. W., & Sellnow, T. L. (2007). Post-crisis communication and
renewal: Expanding the parameters of post-crisis discourse. Public Relations Review,
33(2): 130–134.
Wan, H. H., & Pfau, M. (2004). The relative effectiveness of inoculation, bolstering, and
combined approaches in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research,
16(3): 301–328.
Ware, B. L., & Linkugel, W. A. (1973). They spoke in defense of themselves: On the
generic criticism of apologia. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59: 273–283.
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York:
Springer.
Weiner, B. (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An attributional
approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Williams, D. E., & Olaniran, B. A. (1998). Expanding the crisis planning function:
Introducing elements of risk communication to crisis communication practice. Public
Relations Review, 24(3): 387–400.
Witte, K., Meyer, G., & Martell, D. (2001). Effective health risk messages: A step-by-step
guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
2
Crisis Communication and
Its Allied Fields
W. Timothy Coombs
Increasing interest in crisis communication has begun to reveal its close connection
with the allied fields of risk communication, issues management, reputation
management, and disaster communication. The purpose of this chapter is to
outline the connections between these allied fields. The connections serve as points
for guiding the research and understanding of crisis communication. It also serves
to establish crisis communication’s place within the larger venues of public relations
and corporate communication.
By allied fields we mean fields that overlap in conceptualization and application.
While the list could be extremely long, we have identified the four basic
allied fields: disaster communication, issues management, risk management and
communication, and reputation management. Each of these fields shares an
important connection to crisis communication. These links have influence and will
continue to shape the field of crisis communication. This chapter reviews the
connection to the allied fields, then highlights how these fields connect with
various chapters in this Handbook.
It is not revolutionary to link crisis communication with the allied fields below.
However, it is informative to appreciate how crisis communication fits with the
allied fields because it helps us to understand how these fields inform one
another. The discussion also foreshadows a number of topics to be covered in
later chapters.
Issues Management
Issues management is composed of efforts to identify and to affect the resolution
of issues. An issue is a problem ready for resolution and typically involves policy
decisions. The goal in issues management is to lessen the negative impact or to
create a positive effect from an issue. However, issues management is not the
unbridled pursuit of self-interest. As Robert Heath (2005), the foremost expert
Crisis Communication and Its Allied Fields 55
in issues management, notes, the field is about “strategic and ethical public
policy formation” (p. 44). One outcome of issues management is organizational
change to adapt to new demands generated by issues. Heath (2005) captures the
complexity of issues management in his definition: “a strategic set of functions
used to reduce friction and increase harmony between organizations and their publics
in the public policy arena” (p. 460).
Issues management and crisis management have a reciprocal relationship. An
issue can create a crisis or a crisis can create an issue. First, issues can create crises
for organizations (Heath 1997). For example, a governmental ban on a chemical
can create a crisis for an organization that uses that chemical as part of a product
or of its production process. The potential ban is the issue. If the ban is not
stopped (the negative outcome for the organization), it can threaten to damage
the organization and disrupt operations – become a crisis. Examples would be
the ban on Alar in fruit production and the proposed ban on phlatylates in toys.
Apple farmers had to stop using Alar, but it was not a necessary component of
apple growing. The Alar ban led consumers to question the safety of apples that
were on the market at the time of the ban. Apple growers took huge losses that
year as people avoided their product (Negin 1996). Phlatylates are found in a
wide array of children’s toys. A ban would create similar product avoidance
by consumers and place toy manufacturers in the difficult position of finding and
utilizing a viable replacement for phlatylates. An issue can create a crisis. Of course,
clever organizations should identify the warning signs for the crisis and be prepared
for various outcomes from the issues management effort. As González-Herrero
and Pratt (1996) noted, issues management can be used to prevent a crisis.
While issues management originated in the policy arena, issues are no longer
solely the province of government decision makers. Stakeholders can raise issues
about an organization’s operations or policies. Pressure from angry stakeholders
can create a crisis as the organization’s reputation comes into question.
Stakeholder expectations have been violated and reputational assets are threatened.
The garment industry provides a perfect example. Stakeholder complaints over
sweatshops using forced labor, child labor, and abusive management practices
created a crisis for Nike and other apparel manufacturers. Stakeholders expected
fair and decent treatment of workers and that expectation had been violated. Negative
media coverage and Internet postings threatened to erode valuable corporate
reputations – a crisis existed. Stakeholders defined corporate actions as immoral
and management had to decide how to address the crisis. Forward thinking apparel
makers managed the crisis by reforming their practices and monitoring their
suppliers for compliance.
Effective issues management is a form of crisis prevention (Coombs 2007). By
locating nascent issues, crisis managers can take action before the issue develops
into a full-blown crisis. For example, suppose a legitimate stakeholder concern
about the environmental impact of banana production begins to emerge.
Crisis/issues managers work with stakeholders to find a way to correct the problem
– by developing environmentally friendly banana production. The issue is
56 W. Timothy Coombs
resolved, as Heath (2005) suggests, because there is now harmony between banana
producers and their stakeholders. In the end there is no crisis as the threat was
defused. Chiquita essentially did just that when it partnered with the Rainforest
Alliance to establish criteria for ecologically friendly banana production and
certification through the Better Banana Project (Coombs & Holladay 2007a). We
will return to this point in the reputation management discussion.
Second, crises can generate issues by focusing attention on a problem (Heath
1997). A crisis can expose a risk that society might feel needs to be addressed – an
issue forms. Stakeholders raise concerns about the risk and policy makers entertain
possible solutions, including new laws or regulations. The possibility of issues
developing is one reason entire industries can become concerned with a crisis. In
2008 the US Chemical Safety Board proposed new regulations for the sugar industry
following the deadly explosion and fire at the Imperial Sugar refinery in Port
Wentworth, Georgia. Hence, a crisis may trigger the need for issues management
by revealing an unknown or under-evaluated risk.
We have seen a wide range of issues in the US develop, including illnesses on
cruise ships, fires in college dormitories, and e. coli in tacos. These issues arise not
from the quality of the crisis management but from the elevation of risks. True,
ineffective crisis management can intensify the concern, but risks should emerge
on their own. In fact it would be unethical to use crisis management as a means
of “covering up” a risk that should be a public concern. Crisis communication
can avoid needed discussion of responsibility and correction by distracting stakeholders
from those concerns. The issues form because the risk is made salient by
the crisis and stakeholders desire actions to reduce that risk. Conveniently, risk
management and communication is the next allied area.
Risk Management and Risk Communication
We have already introduced the term “risk” in the previous section. It is instructive
to specify how we are using it. A risk represents the potential to inflict harm
or, more generally, the potential exposure to loss. The term “threat” is used to
denote the quantified potential of a risk. Consider how the insurance industry
uses data to quantify how risky a person is to insure. The notion of threat is
inherent in the discussion of risk. For risk, a threat is the magnitude of negative
consequences from an event and the likelihood of the event happening. Risk management
seeks to reduce the threat level of a risk. Again, there is a reciprocal
relationship between crisis management and risk management.
First, a risk can develop into a crisis. Much of the scanning by crisis managers
is designed to locate risks before they develop into crisis and crisis preparation
itself is guided by risk assessments (Williams & Olaniran 1998). Effective risk
management can prevent crises. Crisis managers can locate a risk that could evolve
into a crisis and take actions to reduce or eliminate that risk (Coombs 2007).
Second, a crisis can expose an overlooked or undervalued risk. Terrorism was
Crisis Communication and Its Allied Fields 57
seldom a significant part of crisis planning prior to the events of 9/11. A crisis
can create the need to manage a particular risk. Managers must consider a wide
range of crisis risks rather than just a narrow band of possible crises.
Risk communication is “a community infrastructure, transactional communication
process among individuals and organizations regarding the character, cause,
degree, significance, uncertainty, control, and overall perception of risk” (Palenchar
2005: 752). At its core, risk communication is a dialogue between organizations
that create risks and stakeholders that must bear the risk. Risk communication
helps risk bearers, those who must face the consequences of the risk, become more
comfortable with the risk. Part of the risk communication process is explaining
risks to risk bearers and trying to understand their concerns about the risks.
Risk communication can be a valuable part of crisis preparation. By sharing
crisis preparation with risk bearers, including seeking their input, organizations
can demonstrate they have taken responsibility for the risk and are working with
risk bearers to manage the risk. Research by Heath and Palenchar (2000) found
that knowledge of emergency warning systems increased concern over risks while
still increasing acceptance for the organization. Informed community members
were vigilant and not lulled into a false sense of security. We want vigilance, not
complacency, in a crisis management. People should be prepared to act. Community
members realized that the organization had emergency plans and that those
emergency plans will work.
Risk communication may also be needed in the crisis response phase. Risk
information and concerns may be part of the communicative needs after the
crisis. For instance, what risk exists from a chemical leak now and in the future?
Risk communication is relevant to both instructing and adjusting information.
Instructing information helps victims protect themselves physically from a crisis
while adjusting information helps them to cope psychologically with the crisis
(Sturges 1994). If community members are told to evacuate or to shelter-in-place,
they will be more compliant if they (1) know what that means and (2) believe
the suggested behavior will work. So, if the risk communication was effective in
the preparation stage, the directions to evacuate or to shelter-in-place should
produce better results than if no attention was given to risk communication in
the community prior to the crisis.
Adjusting information includes explaining what happened in the crisis. Technical
information and risk information can be a part of that explanation. Risk communication
can help with the translation process and create a sensitivity for how
stakeholders are reacting to the risk. The sensitivity of stakeholders to risk is a
critical point. Although management may think the risk is negligible, if stakeholders
are upset about it, that changes the nature and demands of the adjusting
information. To be effective, adjusting information must help stakeholders cope
psychologically with the crisis. Risk communication can provide insights into how
people are reacting and the types of information they need to cope with the
crisis. For example, we know that knowledge about the risk and feelings of
control are essential to risk bearing. It follows that the same principles should
58 W. Timothy Coombs
hold true for the risk communication demands found in adjusting information
(Palenchar & Heath 2007).
Reputation Management
Reputations have quickly become a critical resource and concern for organizations.
A favorable reputation helps to motivate employees, attract customers, promote
investment, attract top employees, and improve financial performance. Roughly,
a reputation is how stakeholders perceive an organization (Davies, Chun, da Silva,
& Roper 2003; Dowling 2002; Fombrun & van Riel 2004). More precisely, a
reputation is the aggregate evaluation constituents make about how well an organization
is meeting constituent expectations based on its past behaviors (Rindova
& Fombrun 1999; Wartick 1992). Reputation is a form of attitude based on how
well an organization does or does not meet certain criteria or expectations stakeholders
have for organizations. It represents the evaluative criteria they apply.
Reputations are created through direct and mediated contact with an organization.
Direct experience includes buying a product, visiting a store, or using a
service. Mediated contact includes messages from the organization, word-of-mouth
communication, online messages from the organization and others, and news
media coverage about an organization. All the various points of contact with
an organization are fused in a stakeholder’s mind to create a mosaic that is the
organization’s reputation. Reputation management involves efforts to shape how
stakeholders perceive the organization with the goal of creating more favorable
impressions. To shape reputations, managers try to create positive points of
contact with an organization, including favorable shopping experiences, positive
publicity, favorable word-of-mouth, and advertisements that feature “the good
points” about an organization. Large organizations may spend millions of dollars
in efforts to craft and to cultivate a favorable reputation (Alsop 2004).
Any crisis threatens an organization’s reputation (Barton 2001; Dilenschneider
2000). A crisis is a miscue that signals a failure, in some way, by the organization.
Think of a reputation as a bank account. The organization devotes time and
energy to make deposits in the reputation account. Crises act to withdraw
reputation credits (Coombs & Holladay 2007b). That is why part of the crisis
response is devoted to reputation repair. Reputation is a vital, intangible resource
that must be protected. Effective crisis communication minimizes the damage a
crisis inflicts on the organization’s reputation and sets the foundation for repairing
the damage that did occur (Coombs 2007). Moreover, ineffective crisis communication
intensifies the damage inflicted on an organization’s reputation. For
these reasons, crisis communication is an important tool in efforts to build and
to maintain a favorable reputation. Therefore, it is not surprising that we see a
strong connection between reputation and crisis communication.
The reputation before a crisis (prior reputation) plays a role in crisis management.
A negative prior reputation hinders crisis management efforts by intensifying the
Crisis Communication and Its Allied Fields 59
reputational damage inflicted by a crisis, what has been termed the Velcro effect
(Coombs & Holladay 2006). Research has failed to demonstrate a halo effect for a
positive prior reputation. A halo effect claims a positive reputation will shield an
organization from reputational damage from a crisis. Researchers have found that
a crisis will inflict some reputational damage regardless of a positive prior reputation
(Coombs & Holladay 2006; Dean 2004). However, a positive prior reputation
may allow for a quicker recovery of a reputation from crisis damage and may
give an organization the benefit of the doubt from stakeholders (Alsop 2004).
The preceding discussion notes the crisis and post-crisis connection between
reputation and crisis communication. However, reputation is a factor in precrisis
prevention, too. The earlier discussion of issues management included social
issues. Social issues may be part of the evaluative criteria stakeholders employ
to judge reputations. In essence, managing social issues is a form of reputation
management. Imagine a particular social issue begins to emerge as an important
evaluative criterion for reputations. The organization decides to take actions to
align its behaviors with that social issue or it risks losing reputation credits
because of the misalignment. A crisis is averted. A crisis could have occurred if
stakeholders had begun to publicly criticize and attack the organization for failing
to address the social issue. Issues management helps to identify the relevant
social issue. Reputation management integrates the social issue into organizational
practices and conveys the organization’s commitment to the social issue through
various points of contact, such as advertising, news stories, web pages, and policies.
Issues management and reputation management combine to prevent crises
that could threaten an organization’s valuable reputation.
Disaster Communication
One emerging concern in crisis communication is the need to distinguish
between crisis communication and disaster communication. While often used interchangeably,
each field’s development would benefit by distinguishing between the
two. While all disasters spawn crises, not all crises are disasters. Moreover, there
are some unique features of disasters that shape the communication from those
managing the events. Crisis communication and disaster communication will have
similarities, but are not isomorphic.
We can begin the discussion with definitions. The problem is that there is no
universally accepted definition for disaster (Perry & Quarantelli 2005). I have selected
one common definition of disaster as a starting point for the discussion of disaster
and crisis communication. The US government defines a disaster as “A dangerous
event that causes significant human and economic loss and demands a crisis
response beyond the scope of local and State resources. Disasters are distinguished
from emergencies by the greater level of response required” (Principles 2003: 2.2).
Working from this definition of disaster and the earlier definition of crisis, we can
begin to differentiate between crisis and disaster.
60 W. Timothy Coombs
Disasters are large-scale events that demand multi-agency coordination. We can
argue that any event that cannot be handled at the local level is a disaster, thereby
disasters are not limited to only those events requiring federal assistance. It is
consistent with governmental views to label events that require federal assistance
as “major disasters.” The coordination of the multiple agencies becomes a
pivotal communication concern. A quick review of failed disaster responses in the
US illustrates the lack of coordination between agencies and communication as a
key contributor to the failure (Vanderford 2007). Similar problems have been
experienced in other countries as well. In addition, the disaster communication
becomes the responsibility of the lead agency and flows through various government
agencies (federal, state, and/or local), ideally in a coordinated fashion.
Individual, private sector organizations should not run the disaster response
because that responsibility, according to law, falls to the government.
However, disasters spawn crises for individual, private sector organizations. So while
the overall disaster communication is occurring, individual, private sector organizations
must engage in their own crisis communication. This is not to say that the
private sector organizations do not coordinate with government agencies. Even local
crises may require a coordinated response with local first responders. That is why
it is recommended that private sector organizations include first responders in their
full-scale crisis exercises. The point is that private sector organizations will have
their own needs and stakeholders to address in their crisis communication efforts.
The crisis concerns will be consistent with the larger disaster communication effort,
especially the priority placed on public safety. But the individual crisis communication
efforts are designed to meet the needs of the organization and its stakeholders.
Organizations need to address such questions as: “When will service be
returned?” “How will employees be paid?” “What effect will the event have on
the supply chain?” These questions are important to the organizations and their
stakeholders, but not so important to the disaster communication effort.
Disasters can become crises for government. We need look no further than
Hurricane Katrina. By poorly executing disaster management and communication,
a number of government entities created crises for themselves. The concern was not
about the disaster but about how the disaster was managed. The crises developed
because stakeholders evaluated the disaster management as incompetent. The
hurricane hitting the Gulf Coast was a disaster. The inept management of that
disaster spawned a crisis. While connected, they are distinct concerns with different
communicative demands. Disaster management centers on relief and restoration
efforts and the communicative demand they create. Charges of incompetence require
addressing the deficiencies and working to repair reputations.
Is the distinction between crisis and disaster communication always going to
be clear cut? The answer to that question is “No.” There will be times when the
two are difficult to separate, just as it is often difficult to separate the phases of
a crisis first proposed by Fink (1986) (see chapter 1). Still, we need to seek some
clarity so that we can be more precise in the discussion and development of crisis
communication, disaster communication, and their interrelationships. Chapter 4
Crisis Communication and Its Allied Fields 61
illustrates the need to sharpen the distinctions between disasters and crises. That
does not mean there is not some overlap between disaster and crisis communication.
Both fields demand an initial response that concentrates on public safety.
The initial responses must address instructing information and adjusting information.
Put simply, disaster and crisis communication share a need to help stakeholders
cope physically and psychologically with stressful events. But there are many
differences, such as the multi-agency nature of disasters and the reputation
concerns in crisis, that warrant differentiating between the two fields.
We need boundaries and markers to establish distinct areas of interest that emerge
from the explosive growth of crisis communication. Blurring the disaster and
crisis distinction can lead to theoretical and practical confusion. Certain principles
for crisis communication may be ineffective for disasters and vice versa. We
should be more precise in our use of the terms crisis communication and disaster
communication. At this point, disaster communication can be designated a
distinct, allied field of crisis communication.
Business Continuity
Business continuity tries to maintain operations, partial or complete, during a disaster
or crisis. The idea is that corporations lose money when they are not operating
or operating below regular levels (Sikich 2008). We can include with business
continuity efforts to salvage equipment and data, though that is traditionally known
as disaster recovery. Business continuity will operate in tandem with crisis management
as both fields seek to return the organization to normal operations.
Organizations should have business continuity plans and teams that coordinate
with the crisis management team (Coombs 2007). Part of that coordination is
communicating key messages to publics. Crisis and business continuity messages
are often done simultaneously because both need to reach stakeholders quickly.
Business continuity messages are primarily instructing information. The focus on
business continuity messages is to inform stakeholders how an event’s effect on
operations will affect the stakeholders. For example, how will the event affect when
and where employees work, the level and timing of shipments from suppliers, and
the level and timing of shipments to clients? To some observers, business continuity
messages seem very business-focused and callous. However, the messages
are extremely important to employees, suppliers, clients, and others affected by
the production ability and capacity of an organization. Part of effective crisis communication
is delivering business continuity messages.
Summary
Crisis communication is a specific area of research within public relations research
that continues to grow. It is safe to say that crisis management has become the
62 W. Timothy Coombs
dominant topic in public relations research. It could soon be the case where the
tail (crisis communication) wags the dog (public relations). Crisis communication
is intricately interconnected with three other key areas of public relations: (1) risk
communication, (2) issues management, and (3) reputation management. It
would be impossible and unwise to consider crisis communication separately from
these areas of public relations. Failures in risk communication, issues management,
or reputation management can result in the creation of crises and the need for
crisis communication. Crisis communication, especially when it is ineffective, can
create the need for risk communication, issues management, and reputation
management. Reputation and crisis communication have a very strong bond. Prior
reputation influences the crisis communication process and crisis communication
is essential to protecting reputational assets during a crisis. It is common for
crisis communication research to include discussions of reputation management,
risk communication, and/or issues management.
Crisis communication operates in a parallel fashion to disaster communication
and business continuity. Crisis and disaster are not synonymous. Disasters are larger
in scale and require interagency coordination. However, during disasters, organizations
may also need to engage in crisis communication. Crises can be embedded
within disasters and poor disaster management can create crises for the agencies
tasked with handling the disaster. Crises often require the execution of the business
continuity plan. In those cases, the crisis team must coordinate with the business
continuity team. The coordination will include the messages being sent to
stakeholders. Thus, crisis communication will often contain business continuity
messages. However, crisis communication research traditionally has shown little
sensitivity toward or appreciation for business continuity messages being a part of
crisis communication.
The allied fields help us to place crisis communication within a larger research
context. By appreciating how the various allied fields may affect crisis communication,
we can gain a better understanding of the process. Crisis communication
does not exist in isolation. It is related to other aspects of public relations and
potentially to disaster and/or business continuity. Recognizing these influences
can help us to better understand the content and constraints for crisis communication.
A number of chapters in this Handbook explore the connections to allied
fields.
References
Alsop, R. J. (2004). The 18 immutable laws of corporate reputation: Creating, protecting,
and repairing your most valuable asset. New York: Free Press.
Barton, L. (2001). Crisis in organizations II (2nd edn.). Cincinnati: College Divisions South-
Western.
Coombs, W. T. (2007). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding
(2nd edn.). Los Angeles: Sage.
Crisis Communication and Its Allied Fields 63
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2006). Unpacking the halo effect: Reputation and
crisis management. Journal of Communication Management, 10(2): 123–137.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2007a). It’s not just PR: Public relations in society.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2007b). The negative communication dynamic:
Exploring the impact of stakeholder affect on behavioral intentions. Journal of
Communication Management, 11: 300–312.
Davies, G., Chun, R., da Silva, R. V., & Roper, S. (2003). Corporate reputation and competitiveness.
New York: Routledge.
Dean, D. H. (2004). Consumer reaction to negative publicity: Effects of corporate
reputation, response, and responsibility for a crisis event. Journal of Business Communication,
41: 192–211.
Dilenschneider, R. L. (2000). The corporate communications bible: Everything you need to
know to become a public relations expert. Beverly Hills: New Millennium.
Dowling, G. (2002). Creating corporate reputations: Identity, image, and performance.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Fink, S. (1986). Crisis management: Planning for the inevitable. New York: AMACOM.
Fombrun, C. J., & van Riel, C. B. M. (2004). Fame and fortune: How successful
companies build winning reputations. New York: Prentice-Hall/Financial Times.
González-Herrero, A., & Pratt, C. B. (1996). An integrated model for crisis-communications
management. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(2): 79–105.
Heath, R. L. (1997). Strategic issues management: Organizations and public policy challenges.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Heath, R. L. (2005). Issues management. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of public
relations (pp. 460–463). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Heath, R. L., & Palenchar, K. J. (2000). Community relations and risk communication:
A longitudinal study of the impact of emergency response messages. Journal of Public
Relations Research, 12: 131–161.
Negin, E. (1996). The Alar “scare” was real; and so is the “veggie hate” movement. Columbia
Journalism Review, 35: 13–15.
Palenchar, M. J. (2005). Risk communication. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of
public relations (pp. 752–755). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Palenchar, M. J., & Heath, R. L. (2007). Strategic risk communication: Adding value to
society. Public Relations Review, 33: 120–129.
Perry, R. W., & Quarantelli, E. L. (2005). What is a disaster? New answers to old questions.
Philadelphia: Xlibris.
Principles of Emergency Management (2003). Washington, DC: Emergency Management
Institute.
Rindova, V., & Fombrun, C. (1999). Constructing competitive advantage: The role of
firm-constituent interactions. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 691–710.
Sikich, G. (2008). Business continuity. In W. T. Coombs (Ed.), PSI handbook of business security:
Securing the enterprise (pp. 120–132). Westport, CN: Praeger Security International.
Sturges, D. L. (1994). Communicating through crisis: A strategy for organizational survival.
Management Communication Quarterly, 7(3): 297–316.
Vanderford, M. N. (2007). Emergency communication challenges in response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Journal
of Applied Communication Research, 35: 9–25.
64 W. Timothy Coombs
Wartick, S. L. (1992). The relationship between intense media exposure and change in
corporate reputation. Business and Society, 31: 33–42.
Williams, D. E., & Olaniran, B. A. (1998). Expanding the crisis planning function:
Introducing elements of risk communication to crisis communication practice. Public
Relations Review, 24(3): 387–400.