Escaping the Gift Economy
Author(s): Jean‐Sébastien Marcoux
Source: Journal of Consumer Research , Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 671-685
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/600485
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671
᭧ 2009 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. ● Vol. 36 ● December 2009
All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2009/3604-0011$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/600485
Escaping the Gift Economy
JEAN-SE´BASTIEN MARCOUX*
Researchers have analyzed the dark side of the gift, but they have remained blind
to what it implies about the market. Drawing on the experiences of a group of
informants who participated in an ethnographical study of house moving in Montreal,
Canada, this article provides significant evidence that the unattractiveness
of the gift economy can incite people to turn to the market as an escape. It examines
how people use the market to free themselves from the straitjacket of social expectations—from
the sense of indebtedness and emotional oppression—which
constrains them in their reciprocity relations inside the gift economy. The standard
views of CCT researchers concerning the valorization of the gift economy are
challenged, as well as the axiology that implicitly informs their research. As a result,
it is necessary to discuss the inversion of this axiology.
It would be complicated to entrust [my cousin]
with the painting job because he won’t charge
me the market price. . . . I don’t want to feel
obliged. I don’t want to feel that I will have
to give back. (Mira)
Mira, 49, is a Yugoslav immigrant who works as an
architect. When I met her, she had just purchased a
condominium and was preparing her move. Mira considered
hiring an unemployed cousin to paint her new home. She
also thought of entrusting the moving of her possessions to
Yugoslav immigrants she knew—people who were receiving
social assistance. She gave up the idea of hiring these people,
however, for fear of becoming indebted, preferring to pay
professionals to do the job.
Mira’s case reveals the difficulty of receiving gifts, services,
or favors. It shows how the social indebtedness inherent
in the gift-giving process can produce negative feelings,
embarrassment, and a sense of dependence—a topic
analyzed by consumer culture theory (CCT) researchers interested
in the dark side of the gift (Giesler 2006; Joy 2001;
Morales 2005). But Mira’s case sheds new light on this
*Jean-Se´bastien Marcoux is an anthropologist at HEC Montre´al, Montreal,
Canada H3T 2A7 (js.marcoux@hec.ca). This research project was
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada)
and the Royal Anthropological Institute (UK). The author wishes to
thank Russell Belk, He´le`ne Buzelin, Jonathan Descheˆnes, Eileen Fischer,
Gu¨liz Ger, David Howes, Annamma Joy, Patrick Laviolette, Daniel Miller,
William Milnes, Cele Otnes, Lisa Pen˜aloza, Nigel Rapport, and Craig
Thompson for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. He also
wishes to thank the associate editor for making numerous helpful suggestions
and, in particular, for encouraging him to explore the idea of the
inversion of the axiology further. Finally, he would like to express his
gratitude to the reviewers for their insightful questions and advice.
John Deighton served as editor and Eric Arnould served as associate editor
for this article.
Electronically published May 20, 2009
topic because it indicates that people sometimes desire to
avoid the gift economy and that it is possible for them to
use the market as an escape. In other words, this case demonstrates
how people may move from the gift economy to
the market, and thus it raises new questions.
Notwithstanding the work on the dark side of the gift
(Ruth, Otnes, and Brunel 1999; Sherry, McGrath, and Levy
1993), many CCT researchers continue to treat gift giving
as a valorized alternative to commercial exchanges. They
praise it for humanizing market relationships, for making
the market meaningful, and for providing an escape from
the commodifying logic of capitalist exchanges. They describe
it as a social activity in which a humanizing logic is
applied at the interpersonal level. A significant body of
work—see, for example, Giesler (2006), Kozinets (2002),
Thompson and Arsel (2004), and Thompson and CoskunerBalli
(2007)—has projected this idea up to the level of the
gift economy; and the studies of brand communities by
Mun˜iz and O’Guinn (2001) and by Mun˜iz and Schau (2005)
have invoked a similar notion of the gift in order to make
an invidious comparison with the conventional market economy,
as have Price and Arnould (1999) in their research on
commercial friendship. Few of these authors, however, have
questioned the romantic view that exchanges in the gift
economy are ennobling, humanizing, or of greater moral
worth.
This article looks at the unwanted aspects of the reciprocity
relations characteristic of the gift economy. It analyzes
how people negotiate the social expectations inherent
in these reciprocity relations and how they turn to the anonymity
of marketplace exchanges as a kind of liberation
from debt-oriented supplications to givers. It seeks to provide
theoretical support for rethinking the celebratory accounts
of the gift economy in the literature and to show that
researchers have underestimated the extent to which the
market can be used as an escape from the systems of imThis
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672 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
placable indebtedness that reciprocity creates. The romanticization
of the gift economy raises the following questions:
(1) How is it possible for the gift economy to become unattractive?
(2) What implications does the dark side of the
gift economy have for the market? (3) How should the escape
from the gift economy to the market be conceptualized?
It is necessary to find answers to these questions.
The research presented here is from an ethnographical
study of house moving carried out in Montreal, Canada.
Moving is a social event particularly favorable to the emergence
of reciprocity relations. Moreover, many people who
move use both the gift economy and the market to do so.
Thus the analysis of moving, the latter seen as a point of
passage between the gift economy and the market, can help
us to think beyond the literature on reciprocity and gift
giving.
The article is structured as follows. The first section contains
a review of the literature on gift giving and the gift
economy. The second section sketches the methodology
used, and the third provides an analysis of the findings. In
the fourth section, the findings are examined in relation to
the existing literature, and the implications for consumer
research are discussed.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE
GIFT ECONOMY
In their studies of reciprocity relations, many CCT researchers—see,
for example, Belk (1979), Belk and Coon
(1993), Joy (2001), Morales (2005), Price, Arnould, and
Curasi (2000), and Sherry (1983)—draw on the work of
anthropologists like Le´vi-Strauss (1976), Godelier (1999),
Mauss (1923–24/2000), and Weiner (1992). Other researchers,
for example, Kozinets (2002), cite Putnam’s recent work
(2000) in sociology. However, Gouldner’s (1960) classic
sociology article on the norm of reciprocity is by far the
most popular reference of all, and Sahlins’s (1972) discussion
of reciprocity is perhaps the most influential.
Starting from the Hobbesian conception of social relations
(Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651/1985]) as it pertains to
Mauss’s work (1923–24/2000) on the gift as a social contract,
Sahlins (1972) devises a model for describing the various
forms of reciprocity. His model presents three types of
reciprocity that differ according to the kinds of relationships
involved, the expectations of return, and the time horizon.
Generalized reciprocity is characterized by exchanges that
entail a low obligation to reciprocate or no obligation to
reciprocate at all. Balanced reciprocity is characterized by
direct exchanges where reciprocation is culturally equivalent
and almost immediate. Negative reciprocity is characterized
by transactions aimed at making a profit. According to Sahlins
(1972), negative reciprocity dominates interactions
among strangers and the market. It is characterized by suspicion
and exploitation, and it involves an immediate return.
As Osteen (2002) notes, Sahlins’s (1972) spectrum is helpful
for categorizing social expectations. The spectrum captures
the duty-bound exchanges that occur among close relatives
where no direct reciprocation is expected, at least in the near
future. It shows that the less closely related the people involved
in an exchange are, the more the obligation to reciprocate
tends to increase and the more the time period for
reciprocating tends to diminish.
There are some similarities between Sahlins’s (1972)
framework and the continuum of gift giving developed by
Joy (2001), whose work describes how gift giving in the
cultural context of Hong Kong is guided by various types
of relationship norms. Joy (2001) reveals how relations with
romantic others, close friends or “just” friends, as well as
more distant and instrumental relations with people such as
guanxi, entail different kinds of reciprocity. Like Sahlins’s
(1972) spectrum, Joy’s (2001) continuum accounts for the
increasing social distance between exchange partners. Contrary
to Sahlins’s (1972) spectrum, however, her continuum
does not incorporate the market. Perhaps this is because for
Joy (2001) and other researchers—see Granovetter’s (1985)
economic sociology and Kozinets’s (2002) consumer research—the
market is embedded in the matrix of social
relations. Sahlins (1972) clearly implies that the market is
located at the end of the spectrum of estrangement, but
consumer researchers maintain that relations with people in
the market can stand at almost any point on Joy’s (2001)
continuum and that these relations are not irreconcilable with
proximity. In other words, they maintain that it is possible
to have close relations with someone from the marketplace
(Price and Arnould 1999).
Learning from the Dark Side of the Gift
Reciprocity in its various forms, from micro-individuallevel
(dyadic) exchanges to multilevel exchanges, is the focus
of most CCT research on gift giving. It is the central
concept in most of the research on the gift economy published
in the Journal of Consumer Research, from Burning
Man (Kozinets 2002) to Napster (Giesler 2006).
Grounded in cognitive consistency theory (Belk 1976),
in economic rewards theory (Fisher and Ackerman 1998),
in equity theory (Morales 2005), and in systemic theories
of social solidarity (Giesler 2006), the notion of reciprocity
used by consumer researchers often implies the norm of a
balanced exchange. The idea that reciprocity may entail
asymmetry, imbalances—even inequalities between the
givers and the receivers—is nonetheless an important, indeed
almost inescapable concept. At least, this is what
emerges from CCT research on the dark side of reciprocity.
The research on the topic uncovers the tensions manifest in
one-sided exchanges (Belk 1976, 1979), in unbalanced exchanges
(Belk and Coon 1993), not to mention those involved
in extortion or theft (Giesler 2006). It analyzes the
negative relational effects of gift giving (Ruth et al. 1999)
and the anxiety that can accompany gift giving (Wooten
2000). It also reveals how a sense of indebtedness may
produce negative feelings (Morales 2005), as well as how
it may lead to a condition of dependence (Giesler 2006),
even enslavement (Joy 2001). Sherry et al. (1993) question
the assumption that the exchanges are equal, and they critThis
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ESCAPING THE GIFT ECONOMY 673
icize what they view as the romanticized concept of gift
giving. In doing so, they echo Mauss’s classic work
(1923–24/2000) on excessive gifts and Bataille’s (1988) reflections
on sacrificial gifts.
The research on the dark side of the gift suggests that
gift giving is often embedded in less salubrious social dynamics.
It highlights the asymmetry of gift-giving relations,
the idea of the giver’s superiority, as well as the possible
use of gifts as a means of exerting power over people or
even oppressing them. It also makes clear that the norm of
balanced reciprocity (Sahlins 1972) described earlier may
be idealized and that more romanticized views of the gift
have a conceptual blind spot.
However, none of the research on the dark side of the
gift has examined how the systems of indebtedness that
reciprocity creates and the feeling of perpetual obligation
that the gift often entails can affect peoples’ attitudes toward
the market. And the possibility of people escaping from the
gift economy to the market is never discussed. This body
of research has also failed to examine the ways in which
people challenge the moral and ideological assumptions that
underlie the gift economy–market antithesis. In other words,
the authors who have analyzed the dark side of the gift have
failed to see that the fundamental axiology that informs their
own research is perhaps questionable.
Sociologists on the Concept of Escape
In critical sociology, French anti-utilitarians have an interesting
reading of the concept of escape. Anti-utilitarians
like Godbout (1994) acknowledge that reciprocity relations
may be constraining. They suggest that by turning to the
market for services that are usually obtained in the gift
economy, people can avoid the sense of obligation that is
inherent in the gift-giving process. In other words, for the
anti-utilitarians, escaping to the market is a form of social
divestment and can become a means of preserving auton-
omy.
It is important to mention that the anti-utilitarians consider
the gift to be one of the foundations of social life. For antiutilitarians
like Caille´ (1993, 2000), Godbout (1994, 1995,
1998), and Godbout and Caille´ (1998), the obligation to
give (as opposed to the Maussian obligation to reciprocate)
lies at the heart of social bonding, as does the desire to give
more to others than what one has received. As a result,
escaping to the market can only be seen as a manifestation
of rampant individualism, which leads to the dissolution of
social bonds or, even worse, to the death of the gift.
The anti-utilitarians provide a critique of the utilitarianinstrumental
construction of social relations that ostensibly
prevails in disciplines such as economics. To a certain extent,
their view corresponds to the position of authors like Hyde
(1983) who talk about the gift as “erotic” commerce, which
binds people together instead of separating and differentiating
them the way the market does. Their view also corresponds
to the position of CCT researchers like Belk and
Coon (1993), who analyze agapic gifts that entail no reciprocation,
or to the position of Kozinets (2002), who reflects
on emancipatory consumption while taking care not to celebrate
individualism.
However, the anti-utilitarian perspective raises moral and
ideological questions. It has been criticized for idealizing
and exoticizing gifts (Callon and Latour 1997): the antiutilitarians’
reading of Mauss (1923–24/2000), for example,
depends on an idealistic interpretation of gift giving in
“primitive” societies. According to this interpretation, gift
exchanges in such societies are based on gratuity, generosity,
and altruism, as opposed to calculation, interest, and instrumentality.
But a closer reading reveals that the Melanesian,
Polynesian, and Native American peoples described
by Mauss (1923–24/2000) are also gift-giving calculators.
It could even be argued that the anti-utilitarians’ interpretation
of the gift flirts with what Parry (1986) calls ideological
obfuscation because it masks the fact that no one
does anything for nothing.
By conceptualizing escape, the anti-utilitarian perspective
helps to take us outside reciprocity relations (at the point
where reciprocity is negated), but it becomes problematic
to the extent that it pits the gift economy against the market
and presupposes that the former is morally superior to the
latter. Anti-utilitarians not only idealize the gift, they also
hold the normative view that market relations are—by definition—less
authentic, less human, less important.
Anthropologists like Miller (1998) would challenge the
idea that the gift economy is inherently nobler than the market.
Miller (2001) inverts the standard gift economy–market antithesis
and even speaks of inalienable commodities and
alienable gifts. He attacks, though only indirectly, social
scientists such as the anti-utilitarians who idealize the gift,
and he tries to lead us out of the moral trap into which their
thinking has led us. Nevertheless, his position remains as
thorny as theirs, for it fails to recognize the role of escape.
METHODOLOGY
From the perspective of CCT research, house moving is
an interesting social phenomenon. It involves discourses,
practices, and rituals that dictate who can or cannot manipulate
the objects involved. When people move their possessions,
the norms that govern their relationships come into
play in revealing ways.
During a move, family members, friends—and also more
distant relations or acquaintances—give, swap, exchange,
and trade instrumental and emotional resources; they may
sell them as well, usually informally and sometimes illicitly.
They also draw on the market. Indeed, many of the people
who were interviewed during the course of this study indicated
that they often call on the market as a complement
to, a substitute for, or an exit from the gift economy.
In line with Arnould and Thompson’s (2005) position on
CCT research, it can be argued that house moving is an
exemplary social activity for researchers seeking concrete
empirical access to theoretical insights on the escape from
the gift economy to the market. In what follows, moving is
considered as one of those social events that Price et al.
(2000) describe as precipitating events. As such, it reveals
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674 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
some of the hidden aspects of reciprocity relations and the
gift economy.
This analysis adopts a methodological perspective on
family and social networks that is very similar to the one
adopted by Epp and Price (2008), by Joy (2001), and by
U¨ stu¨ner and Holt (2007). It seeks to go beyond the individual
level of analysis. On a philosophical level, the research
presented here is in the tradition of the contemporary
material culture studies that have developed since the 1990s
at University College London based on the work of anthropologist
Daniel Miller (Miller 1987; Miller and Tilley
1996). Contemporary material culture studies focus on how
cultural phenomena become significant through the use of
material objects. They suggest that researchers can develop
an in-depth understanding of people’s practices by actively
participating in them—even in the most mundane activities—as
they are actually taking place in the material world.
In the case at hand, this meant getting actively involved in
the moving of people’s personal possessions.
The research presented here is from an ethnographical
study that began in 1997 with a pilot project. Intensive
fieldwork was carried out between January 1998 and July
1999, and follow-up was conducted until 2007. A mixture
of methods (Tilley 2001) was used in the fieldwork, including
formal interviewing, observation, and photography.
Data were also collected through participant observation,
that is, by accompanying people throughout the physical
and metaphorical journey of their move, from the early
stages, including the organizing and boxing of personal belongings,
on through moving day and the arrival at the new
home or residence. In many instances, in my role as researcher,
I accompanied people as they did what might be
described as an “archeological dig” in cluttered cupboards,
chests of drawers, and basements. I sorted things with them,
listened to them, and in some instances even helped them
move their furniture.
During the fieldwork, some 30 adult informants were recruited.
The informants were equally distributed between
the ages of 18 and 89 (see appendix). In most cases, I met
with them before moving day as well as during and after
the move. The length of the follow-up ranged from a few
weeks to a few months and sometimes to a few years. The
follow-up depended on the relationship that I had developed
with the informants, on their willingness to be accompanied,
and on respect for their privacy. It is important to mention
that people who are moving are often emotionally and psychologically
vulnerable and that this situation calls for special
care and concern on the part of the researcher. Indeed,
some of the participants in this study were moving in the
course of a separation or a divorce or because of health
problems or the death of a partner. One elderly woman died
during the research. When necessary, separate interviews
were conducted with family members who emerged as important
individuals. Interviews were also conducted with
professional resources such as health care workers and social
workers.
The data were analyzed following Thompson, Locander,
and Pollio’s (1990) interpretive methodology. As these authors
point out, at the idiographic level, the issue is to understand
how the phenomena under study are meaningfully
organized in the participant’s life world. At a nomothetic
level, the question is whether or not similar patterns emerge
for other participants. Particular attention was given at this
stage to comparing (and contrasting) people’s discourses and
practices. My field study observations were then taken into
account. These observations related to gift-giving behaviors
that were not consciously or reflexively commented upon
by informants themselves during the move. Three themes
were identified as part of this iterative process: the bright
side of the gift economy, the dark side of the gift economy,
and the opposition between the gift economy and the market.
FINDINGS: THE TWO FACES OF THE
GIFT ECONOMY
In Montreal, moving is grounded in the city’s workingclass
history (Choko 1980; Linteau 2000). Historians report
that until the 1960s–70s, working-class people and the poor,
who moved in great numbers every year, were often forced
to do so. In other words, moving was associated with poverty
and lack of stability, a permanent family home being a privilege
tied to social status and financial means.
The 1960s–70s constituted a particularly relevant era in
this regard. The extremely high number of tenants moving
in Montreal became a social concern. Unions, consumer
associations, and tenants’ associations fought for recognition
of tenants’ rights. They also called for greater state intervention
in the relationship between landlords and tenants.
It is worth mentioning that the 1960s–70s in the province
of Quebec are known for a process of political, institutional,
and social reforms commonly referred to as the Quiet Revolution
(Dickinson and Young 1995). This period witnessed
the establishment of the welfare state and the creation of
various government programs in the housing sector as well
as the adoption of legislation (commonly known as the Stability
Policy [Jobin 1982]) aimed at correcting the imbalance
of power between a small minority tenure class composed
of powerful owners and a large majority tenant class (Brossard
1974–75). In 1971, fully 80.8% of the dwellings in
Montreal were rented. In 1996, the year before I started my
fieldwork, this percentage remained high at 72.8%. It was
65.6% in 2006 (Statistics Canada). The percentage of people
who rent is important because most leases in Quebec are 1year
agreements beginning on July 1, which means that
almost all of the Montrealers who move do so at the same
time of the year.
Moving is still a strong feature of Montreal culture. It
has been characterized in the media as a “hobby” and even
as the “national sport” of the city’s inhabitants (Abley 1996;
Nadeau 1994). For many of them, moving is part of their
identity—part of what it means to be a Montrealer. As such,
it has inspired influential writers like Gabrielle Roy, whose
acclaimed novel The Tin Flute, published in 1945, portrays
the impoverished living conditions of a working-class family
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ESCAPING THE GIFT ECONOMY 675
FIGURE 1
THE MOVING-DAY RITUAL
NOTE.—This image is from a Labatt Blue TV commercial that aired in 2000. The scene takes place on a staircase somewhere in Montreal. A man is moving
with the help of his friends. They carry a sofa bed down the stairs while a woman brings up a case of beer. The ad emphasizes the sociality of the moving-day
ritual and the festive character of the event. Image reproduced with the kind permission of Labatt Breweries.
and their frequent moves. It inspired well-known Quebec
author Re´jean Ducharme and Quebec popular music icon
Robert Charlebois to cowrite the hit song “De´me´nager ou
rester la`” [Move out or stay put], which was interpreted by
Pauline Julien in 1972. More recently, it has influenced the
local advertising of corporations like Labatt Breweries,
McDonald’s, and Wal-Mart (Centre d’archives publicitaires,
Association des Agences de Publicite´ du Que´bec; see fig.
1).
Using the gift economy when moving was a widespread
economic solution in the 1970s, the obvious thing to do,
and this still remains the norm. Indeed, a popular image of
moving day in Montreal is that of family unity and social
network solidarity—a day when a few large pizzas are
washed down with a case of beer on the veranda at the new
house or on the balcony at the new apartment, the invitation
to partake of this communal meal serving as a means of
showing gratitude (Abley 1996). The situation is more complex,
however, than it might appear at first sight.
The Bright Side of the Gift Economy
Cooperation. The Montreal media describe people who
move themselves—those who do not use the market—as
“self-movers,” “apprentices,” and “do-it-yourself movers.”
Marjo, 30, and Rupert, 28, who moved in together before
the birth of their child, can be considered as such. Marjo
explained proudly:
We are almost professional movers [laugh]. . . . We got help
from my father, his girlfriend and my sister. We also got help
from my aunt, who came with her husband, my cousin who
brought her partner, and some of my friends. . . . Overall,
some 20 people helped with the carrying and the loading,
cleaned rooms and arranged things at the new place, lent cars
and trucks, and so forth.
Marjo’s depiction recalls the popular cliche´ of the movingday
party. It stresses the importance of family solidarity,
mutual aid, and resourcefulness. After the move was over,
she declared, “It was fun. It was a nice moving day—almost
a party. . . . Even if people struggle, well, it doesn’t matter.
There’s beer and pizza. . . . It’s a dirty job, but we have
to do it. If we have fun, so much the better!”
When I first met Marjo and Rupert, they had low incomes
and no job security. Marjo was a community worker, Rupert
a nonunionized municipal employee. Both had university
degrees in anthropology. Before moving in together, both
lived in a rented apartment and shared expenses with their
respective roommates. This form of arrangement is common
in Montreal, especially among students and young adults.
People like Marjo and Rupert privilege the gift economy
for economic purposes. The help they receive responds to
the needs of the moment. To the extent that it is directed
toward goals external to their relationship as a couple, it
corresponds to Belk and Coon’s (1993) definition of instrumental
gifts. This type of gift is also important, however,
as an expressive act of sharing. Rupert made this clear:
These people who helped us, I’ve helped them move in the
past. They helped me when I was seeking a job. . . . We,
our kind of people . . . how should I say? Not leftists, socialists
or, whatever, hippies, we don’t bother with this. . . .
We are proud, very proud to have people around us like this
and to receive so much. You feel you’re valued. Wow! People
are here for you. You’re not in a mess. You’re not alone.
You know some people. . . . I think it’s a gift they’ve made
to us. When they need some help in the future, I’ll be there.
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676 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Marjo and Rupert are people who praise resourcefulness.
They subscribe to a cooperative, communal ethos and use
the gift economy (as in the case of Kozinets’s [2002] informants)
to express this ideal. Their case finds an echo with
other tenants and small homeowners who consider the gift
economy an economic solution.
During the study, I also met people whose economic
condition was precarious, poor people who were forced to
use the gift economy when they moved. These people
tended to praise the gift economy even if it created tensions
in their lives. They were compelled to use solidarity
relations—sometimes with very negative emotional consequences—but
they still spoke about the help that they were
receiving as if accepting it were a choice. Their explicitly
articulated preference for the gift economy, and the embodiment
of this preference in their concrete everyday behavior
and practices, displayed what Bourdieu (1984) calls
a “taste for necessity.” They talked about an obligation, and
they acted in accord with overriding necessity, in ways that
suggested that it was a matter of free choice. In a word,
they transformed a social constraint into a preference.
Informants like Marjo and Rupert differ from the poor
people described above and from the working-class people
described by Bourdieu (1984). They are young, educated,
middle-class individuals with high cultural capital. Yet, just
like Bourdieu’s (1984) subjects, they celebrate an image—
perhaps a romanticized one—of working-class solidarity.
They extol the virtues of the gift economy as opposed to a
form of individualism that is objectified by the market. They
stand united against the market. Using the gift economy as
opposed to the market is, for them, a means of affirming a
shared, communal identity. This is clear when Marjo’s expertise
statement is examined. And it is obvious in Rupert’s
claim that “we” (as opposed to an abstract “other”) know
how to surround “ourselves” and share without keeping accounts.
Unlike Giesler’s (2006) informants, however, who
derive meaning from the ideological comparison to the marketplace,
these informants take pride in demonstrating their
capacity to avoid what might be called “the easy way out.”
The need to show resourcefulness is an important aspect
of the norm of the gift economy. It evokes the opposition,
documented by Kozinets (2002), between a creative, cooperative,
collective effort and a passive, selfish, individualistic
form of consumption. As such, it involves transforming
a constraint—marginalization from the market—into a
self-defining practice. In other words, moving becomes an
opportunity to exhibit social skills in what Holt (1998) calls
the “management of material contingencies.” It becomes a
means of affirming values.
Absolution. My field notes contain many observations
on people who moved during hard times. In contrast to the
previous informants, many of them used the market, but
they did so only to the extent that it did not compromise
their ideal of the gift.
The case of Bea, 41, is exemplary. Her friends “insisted”
on helping her on moving day because she was moving as
a result of a separation (field notes, June 27). They contended
that it was unwise for her to try to confront adversity alone
by taking on too many responsibilities without outside help.
Bea was pleased to be surrounded by her friends—her
“network”—at such a difficult time. A single mother and
teacher, Bea was a strong advocate of the gift economy. As
in Marjo and Rupert’s case, she identified herself with her
support network, composed essentially of women with children.
She went so far as to describe her network as her
family.
When I met her, Bea was receiving help from her friends.
But she insisted that it was essential for her to contribute
actively to her network and to help the other members when
needed. She maintained that the women of her network continually
help each other by swapping resources. Although
her friends did not provide the physical labor required to
move Bea’s possessions from her old residence to her new
one, they did help her to get settled in by cleaning rooms
and arranging things. They knew that she wanted to be able
to take her children to the new home the same evening.
Bea’s network, which provided her with basic instrumental
help, became truly meaningful owing to the emotional
and moral support that it provided. This is clear when
considering that she hired movers so as to spare her friends
the riskiest part of the work:
It is not worth hurting ourselves. I never let [my friends]
move things like the fridge, the washing machine, and the
dryer. . . . I prefer to hire people who are used to doing this
kind of job. . . . They don’t hurt themselves. They are paid
for this job. They have their own insurance policy. Everyone
is happy. I find it less dangerous.
Another case is that of Mathilde, 79, who acted as a
caretaker when her sister, Mrs. Bolduc, 89, moved into a
care facility. She was her sister’s only relative and sole
resource. She felt that she had to take care of everything.
She explained:
My sister did not want any strangers in her house. She did
not want strangers to handle her possessions. . . . I am the
one who has been taking care of everything. . . . I have been
fixing her meals, checking her medications, looking after her.
. . . I found her a room in residential care. I will decorate
that room. . . . [Pause] My sister is unable to do anything.
She is lucky, really, that someone takes care of her. . . . It’s
been an unpleasant chore. It wasn’t fun at all. I’m the one
who did everything. Was I right? [She asks me the question.]
While Bea’s friends spontaneously made themselves available—in
fact, nearly imposed themselves—Mathilde felt
duty-bound to help her sister. She did so at great effort,
however, going so far as to risk her own health despite her
age and her own family’s advice. Indeed, she added, “I
wonder if [my sister] is not relying too much on me. . . .
Now, my son and my daughter-in-law fear that I put too
many responsibilities on my shoulders. They worry for my
health.” The gifts, the services, and the favors provided by
Bea’s friends and the efforts made by Mathilde acquire a
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ESCAPING THE GIFT ECONOMY 677
particular meaning when cast into a broader ritual process.
They become a form of sacrifice (Miller 2001). This is consistent
with Ruth et al. (1999), who speak of how the amount
of effort and care invested in a gift reflects a relationship’s
degree of intensity.
If we push this line of thought further, we may begin to
appreciate why lack of effort is usually interpreted negatively.
Mrs. Debray, 68, who was depressed at the idea of
moving into residential care, expected her children to help
her. Mrs. Debray had hired a moving company to spare them
the most difficult part of the work, hoping that this would
encourage them to show up. On moving day, however, no
one but her brother came to help, which affected her (field
notes, December 29). The social worker who followed Mrs.
Debray told me that her children only showed up when there
were gifts for them: “Otherwise, they are not involved at
all.”
If the gift-giving effort is an essential part of the ritual,
the effort required from the givers is often a source of embarrassment
for the receivers. The informants who participated
in this study often talked about the embarrassment
and the fear of imposing themselves. Many of them used
the market to make sure that friends and family members
were not involved in reciprocal exchanges, at least not in
the riskiest ones, or in the most effortful or degrading parts
of the work. They released their friends and family members
from the obligation, or from the responsibility, to help them.
They used the market as a gift of absolution. As explained
earlier, Bea hired professional movers because she did not
want to expose her friends to the risk of injury. Mrs. Debray
hired movers because she did not want to burden her children
and grandchildren with the chores involved in moving.
Other informants radically withheld any requests for gifts,
services, or favors from significant others. One informant
even said that she refused to impose “slave labor” on her
friends.
The gift of absolution can be seen as an altruistic gesture.
It entails or authorizes using the market to help negotiate
the expectations of the gift economy. This use of the market
does not compromise a person’s faith in the gift, however.
Nor does it challenge the moral and ideological primacy of
the gift economy. It reinforces an axiology that becomes
particularly meaningful in times of necessity. Of course, my
informants’ condition of necessity differs from that of the
working-class people analyzed by Bourdieu (1984) who
have no other choice but to rely on solidarity relations. Their
condition of necessity also differs from that of the disenfranchised
Turkish women studied by U¨ stu¨ner and Holt
(2007), who offer another example of the “taste for necessity”
and for whom social networks provide a fundamental
means of surviving on the margins of the market. Nevertheless,
moving is still a chore. It often reveals a crisis, and
it can be, in itself, a crisis to get through. Mrs. Debray, who
suffered from a heart condition and who was depressed at
the idea of moving into a care facility, died only a few days
afterward. I cannot adequately assess whether there is a
relationship between her move into a seniors’ residence, the
absence of her children at the peak of the crisis, and the
tragic deterioration of her condition, but it is plausible to
think that her move had a harmful effect.
The Dark Side of the Gift Economy
Subjection. In his research on the gift, Godelier (1999)
talks about the paradox of the gift. He contends that a gift
is an act of generosity and an act of subjection, for it places
the recipient in a position of dependence until the gift is
reciprocated, if it is ever reciprocated.
Mrs. Bolduc, for instance, knew about everything her
sister was doing for her. She knew that Mathilde generously
sacrificed herself, going so far as to put her health at risk.
She was grateful to her sister. At the same time, however,
she resented accepting her sister’s help. She explained:
It is difficult to watch Mathilde take care of everything and
not be able to help her. . . . It is appalling to feel so powerless.
. . . I always lived on my own, without asking anyone.
I have always been independent. It is a question of pride.
. . . Isn’t it? [She reflects loudly.] No, it is a question of
freedom. My freedom is my wealth. It is difficult to lose it.
Mrs. Bolduc’s case stands apart because of her old age, her
dependence on others, and her incapacity to reciprocate (or
pay back her debt) in like fashion, that is, by performing
strenuous labor. Nevertheless, her case is quite significant,
because it points to the feeling of subjection resulting from
the systems of indebtedness that the gift economy often
creates.
The relation of subjection that a gift instills (Godelier
1999) is inherent in many of the cases that were observed
during the course of the research presented here, even in
the cases involving the brightest manifestations of the gift
economy, as Mrs. Bolduc’s case shows. If Mrs. Bolduc accepted—with
resignation—this condition of subjection,
most of my informants resisted their loss of freedom. For
example, Bea often praised her support network. She
stressed how important it was for her to contribute to it, but
it is clear that insisting on her capacity to give to others was
essentially an effort to protect her sense of autonomy.
The fear of subjection is nowhere more evident, however,
than in the case of Mira, who, as explained in the introduction,
refused to draw on her personal network when she
moved. During the interviews, Mira often took pride in
saying that she had started from nothing when she had come
to Canada and that she had achieved a great deal. She often
stated that she could manage by herself. Her experience of
war and deprivation had probably tinged her view of solidarity
and the gift economy. She mentioned that during the
war in Yugoslavia, she had obtained basic goods, like shoes,
from the Red Cross. She went on to explain: “It is never
easy, you know, to accept help from other people. . . . It
is not easy for the one who receives it, but also for the one
who helps.” In fact, what Marjo and Rupert celebrated—the
romanticized ideal of working-class solidarity—was something
that Mira did not want to be associated with at all.
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678 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Mira knew that she could count on her cousin and her
compatriots. They had already offered her their services.
She was also aware of the possibility of offending them
by refusing their help. In this context, her refusal to become
obliged and her stressing the difficulty that receiving help
entails are very relevant. Her attitude in this respect tends
to show that she saw herself as the one who would be
helped if she accepted special treatment. Her decision to
favor the market over the gift economy brings to mind the
Turkish women followed by U¨ stu¨ner and Holt (2007), who
distanced themselves from the primary networks associated
with basic help, survival, and resourcefulness. However,
U¨ stu¨ner and Holt’s (2007) informants used the market
to break with tradition, whereas Mira acted as if she wanted
to show that she had freed herself from necessity. She
refused to appear needy, “broke,” or unable to provide for
herself. Her case points to the social stigma attached to
solidarity relations.
There is a link between the fear of subjection, as described
by Godelier (1999), and indebtedness, as analyzed in consumer
research. This link relates more to social than to
economic deficits (Giesler 2006; Joy 2001; Morales 2005).
Mrs. Bolduc was trapped into Godelier’s (1999) paradox
because of her incapacity to reciprocate. Bea sought to avoid
this trap by actively contributing to the gift economy. As
for Mira, she escaped the dilemma altogether by turning
away from the gift economy. She turned to the market in
order to shun any favored treatment, avoid obligations, and
preserve her autonomy. In a sense, she personifies the antiutilitarians’
fear of the dissolution of social bonding. Her
use of the market is diametrically opposed to the gift of
absolution. It is the perfect expression of the anti-gift.
People like Mrs. Bolduc, Bea, and Mira are not, properly
speaking, examples of the dark side of the gift as researchers
such as Ruth et al. (1999) and Sherry et al. (1993) understand
it. Yet they reveal the relational costs that can make the gift
economy unattractive. Their cases remind us that accepting
help from others can create obligations and demanding expectations.
They highlight the fact that becoming socially
indebted through the expectation of reciprocity is sometimes
embarrassing.
Humiliation. As pointed out earlier, moving reveals
some of the hidden aspects of reciprocity relations. It often
exposes the deeper conflicts within the gift economy. The
case of the Lamberts is illuminating in this respect. They
preferred not to call upon their family when they moved
into their new bungalow. Instead they relied on acquaintances
and colleagues for help.
Members of a nontraditional church, they contended that
their family rejected them because of their religious beliefs.
During a conversation with Mr. Lambert, 47, I commented
that moving was often a family matter, but he was evasive
and simply insisted that “many” of his colleagues had offered
their help. Mrs. Lambert, 42, explained:
We are not a religious sect. But they [our families] don’t
understand us. . . . My husband’s parents have been looking
at us as if we were weirdoes. They went as far as talking
about disinheriting us. . . . After all, we don’t care. We don’t
need money.
Mr. Richer, 81, who had had no contact with all but one
of his six children since the death of his ex-wife 10 years
earlier, provides another illuminating example. When he
moved, he refused to call upon his children, preferring to
rely on old friends, acquaintances, and ideally, the market.
He explained:
I don’t want to ask my children for anything. I don’t want
to oblige them to help me. . . . My children have not spoken
to me since the death of my ex-wife because I refused to
attend her funeral. . . . I have no close family anymore. . . .
One of my daughters, the older one, keeps going at me. She
never forgave me. I heard that, when she got married, she
was pleased to drop her maiden name. . . . I admit that I
was a bad provider. . . . But come on! They’re the ones who
should take the first steps.
Mr. Richer is not the only elderly person interviewed who
felt deeply uncomfortable about reciprocity relations at the
time of a move. Mrs. Bouchard, 69, talked about the anxiety
involved in depending on others and being left on her own.
She said, “I was scared, scared of having no one.” Like Mr.
Richer, she feared having to ask for help:
I asked my daughter and my son-in-law for some help. But
I had to pay someone else for the painting and someone else
for cleaning the kitchen. . . . For me, the whole situation is
stressful because I depend a lot on my daughter and her
husband. . . . What makes it so difficult is to ask those people
for help. . . . It is difficult when you must ask them for
favors.
Mr. Richer and Mrs. Bouchard both felt entitled to receive
help from their family. They alluded to family justice or
some form of equity. And yet they preferred not to claim
what they considered to be their due. Mr. Richer, for instance,
refused to call upon his children even when his health
deteriorated critically. This was a matter of pride for him.
He declared, “Never! I never want to take the first steps.
. . . I’d rather die than ask them for some help.”
As in the cases examined in the previous section, a fear
of subjection pervades these testimonies. An additional issue
also arises as important, however. It is the humiliation of
requesting gifts, services, or favors from family members
who should normally offer them spontaneously. People feel
deeply apprehensive about begging for help.
Anti-utilitarians like Godbout (2000) argue that help is a
special category of gift. In contrast to other gifts, which
must be provided voluntarily (Belk and Coon 1993; Godelier
1999), it can be requested when circumstances justify it. But
this conception of help does not fit well with the cases
examined here: the Lamberts rejected the idea of requesting
help from the people who had repudiated them; Mr. Richer
talked about the humiliation involved in begging his children
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ESCAPING THE GIFT ECONOMY 679
for aid; and Mrs. Bouchard dreaded requesting favors from
her daughter and possibly facing rejection.
It is not relevant, for the purpose of this discussion, to
disclose the reasons for the family tensions and disputes.
They relate to disagreements over values and beliefs, and
to unresolved conflicts. They conceal intimate, personal, and
family issues as well as taboos and secrets. There is also
the question of power and personal autonomy, especially in
the case of elderly people who feel that they depend on
others. The important point, however, is that using reciprocity
relations—even for basic, material, and instrumental
purposes—may revive conflicts and tensions. It may cause
difficult memories to resurface, because it is impossible to
mobilize family, friends, and social networks without bringing
into play, at the same time, the emotional history attached
to them.
Ruth et al. (1999), as well as Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry
(1989), note that gifts are often accompanied by bittersweet
memories and emotions. This is what is observed here. The
emotional effort that plays a central role in the gift-giving
ritual becomes an obstacle. Indeed, requesting a gift, a service,
or a favor may be so embarrassing that people prefer
more distant, more instrumental, less committing relations
to more intimate ones. People who do not share the same
history become useful because they do not bring the same
emotional baggage with them. Weak ties (cf. Granovetter
1973) take on a new meaning. There are no previous exchanges
with them and, thus, no bad memories. Their neutral,
“virgin” character makes them less difficult to deal with.
Pushing this line of thought further, it is important to
consider how anonymous market exchanges can represent
a positive alternative to difficult reciprocity relations with
friends, family members, and social networks. Mr. Richer’s
attempt to use the market can be understood in this light.
He desperately tried to find someone he could pay to move
his possessions instead of going through the humiliation of
asking help from his children. He said, “I just want to pay
and be free from any constraints.”
However, 7 months after this ethnographical study began,
Mr. Richer’s health seriously deteriorated, and he was forced
to move into a care facility (field notes, April 19). His sons
ended a 10-year silence and agreed to help him. They came
on moving day (field notes, May 22). They moved the bulk
of his possessions, but they left as soon as the job was done,
3 hours after their arrival. Mr. Richer’s attempts to invite
his sons for a meal, give them personal belongings as a
token of appreciation, and set up another meeting all failed.
One of his sons told him that he had no time for lunch. The
other one said that he was not hungry. They acted as if they
had fulfilled their duty or paid back what they had owed
him.
Afterward, Mr. Richer deeply regretted having gotten his
hopes up. A few days after the move, he said, with a sigh
of despair, “I stirred up all these memories. . . . For what?
I’m not even sure I will see them again.”
Oppression. One last case needs to be discussed because
it illustrates the emotional oppression that is exerted
via the gift economy. When I met Sandra, 41, she was
receiving social assistance and living in a government-subsidized
housing complex. The first interview took place 2
weeks before she was supposed to be expelled from her
home and relocated. In a word, she was moving at a time
of crisis.
Sandra’s situation was extremely precarious. She had very
little financial means. One of her sons did not reply to her
request for help. The other showed up but did not confirm
that he would be coming until the very last minute. She had
been relying exclusively on her boyfriend’s help, but 2
weeks before her move, they had had a serious argument.
She explained how she felt about her situation:
I’m really fed up. The guys, in fact everybody, let me down.
Then my boyfriend has not shown up for the last two weeks.
We had an argument; we had a fight. [Sandra had been physically
assaulted by her ex-boyfriend.] I told him he would
regret it. He’s a jerk! . . . He’d promised me he would give
me a hand and help me paint the rooms. . . . I don’t know
what to do. I don’t even have enough money to hire someone.
These statements do not fully reveal the emotional oppression
and nervousness that Sandra expressed during the interview.
What emerged from our first meeting was that she
depended on her boyfriend’s help and that she felt that he
was trying to emotionally blackmail her. The worst part was
that she could not afford to pay someone else to do the
work. The situation became even more complex when Sandra
and her boyfriend separated just a few days before moving
day. An excerpt from an interview conducted after the
move is relevant:
Moving day was tough. My ex was there. My son and his
girlfriend were there, too. . . . That morning, my ex said, “I
told you I would help you. I kept my word.” During the day
everybody was cool, making jokes, but I kept everything
inside. That was hard because nobody except the two of us
knew that we had split up. . . . On top of that, my son called
me the following morning to give me a load of bullshit. He
criticized me for not ordering pizza. I said I had offered the
Pepsi to everyone, but I had no money for the food.
Sandra relied exclusively on the gift economy. She broke
up with her boyfriend before the move and had to bear his
presence because she needed his help. Her condition of dependence
is reminiscent of Mrs. Bolduc’s situation, discussed
earlier, but there is an important difference between
the two cases. To move into a care facility, Mrs. Bolduc
received the help of her sister Mathilde, who felt duty-bound
to make an apparently generous sacrifice for her. In contrast,
Sandra’s ex-boyfriend was clearly acting with ill intentions.
He was trying to take advantage of the situation.
There is also a parallel between Sandra and Mr. Richer,
who depended on his children’s help. Both of their cases
reveal the asymmetry between the giver and the receiver
(Belk 1976; Belk and Coon 1993) by showing that the receiver
may be vulnerable and that the context of exchange
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680 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
may exacerbate his or her vulnerability. Their cases resonate
with the work of Mauss (1923–24/2000), who describes
excessive gift giving as a means for the giver to exert control.
According to Mauss (1923–24/2000), the incapacity to reciprocate
and the resulting feeling of indebtedness cause
embarrassment, with the possibility of emotional exploitation
and abuse. We see this in Sandra’s case.
Sandra’s case also raises the issue of intimate domination,
which must be distinguished from statutory domination
(Sherry et al. 1993). The latter involves officially sanctioned
hierarchical power relations in a public space. Intimate domination
involves power imbalances between persons such as
family members or close friends. Intimacy becomes a form
of tyranny that creates tremendous emotional pressure. It is
clear that through the manipulation of reciprocity relations,
this form of domination can occur in the gift economy.
Sandra’s ex-boyfriend used the “privileged” position that
intimacy conferred upon him to exert control. He attempted
to take advantage of the context of necessity that Sandra’s
move created. He knew that she could not afford to pay
someone else, and he deliberately manipulated her. Borrowing
Ruth et al.’s (1999) expression, we could say that he
tried to “hijack” the performance of the gift.
It is true that Sandra’s case involves a considerable degree
of violence and that this sets it apart. Nevertheless, her case
shows that intimate relations who exchange or offer services—even
the most instrumental ones—may be doing so
in order to exert oppressive emotional pressure. In other
words, it is possible for the gift economy to become a
tyranny.
DISCUSSION: INVERTING THE
AXIOLOGY OF THE GIFT ECONOMY
AND THE MARKET
The cases presented above have revealed the tensions that
often prevail within the gift economy and the pressure to
pull out. They have shown that the gift economy can be
emotionally demanding, perhaps even humiliating, or ty-
rannical.
It is true that like the informants in Kozinets’s (2002)
Burning Man study, some of the participants in the present
study imbued the gift economy with higher moral values.
The Burning Man participants struggled to seek refuge from
what they perceived as the almost inescapable dehumanization
brought on by the all-pervasive market (Kozinets
2002), while some of the informants in the present study,
in particular Marjo and Rupert, decided to turn away from
the market because they perceived it as the easy way out
and felt pride in opting for the gift economy as a personal
choice. Other participants in the present study, in particular
Bea and Mrs. Debray, withheld requests for gifts for fear
of imposing themselves. They drew on the market, but they
decommodified it and subjected it to the logic of the gift,
as Holt (1998) would put it. They used the market as a gift
of absolution.
However, many of the participants in the present study
did not invest the gift economy with higher values, in the
way that Kozinets’s (2002) informants did. In some cases—
think of Mr. Richer and his difficult relationship with his
children—they may have secretly wished or hoped that the
gift economy would live up to some higher, more idealistic
standard of human conduct, but they still saw the gift economy,
nevertheless, as disagreeable and even threatening because
of the emotional pressure and the sense of indebtedness
created by reciprocity relations, and they attempted
to avoid it by turning to the market. In other words, if
Kozinets’s (2002) research demonstrates that people may
seek to escape the market through festival events like Burning
Man that have the ritual power to “invert,” overturn
temporarily, or deny social order, the present research provides
significant evidence for the opposite tendency. It
shows that people may turn to the market in order to escape
the unattractiveness of the gift economy.
It is obvious that these observations run contrary to the
expectations of researchers like Kozinets (2002), but it is
also clear that they belie the expectations of researchers like
Joy (2001). Indeed, when analyzing the data using Joy’s
(2001) model of reciprocity, we can reasonably expect that
participants will privilege distant relations—strangers (even
the market)—for instrumental exchanges and that they will
reserve their closest or most intimate relations for higher
moral purposes such as emotional support. Yet neither Kozinets’s
(2002) nor Joy’s (2001) model can account for the
possibility of these participants’ turning away from intimate
relations in favor of the anonymous marketplace in order to
avoid emotional exchanges in times of crisis. In contrast to
Joy’s (2001) informants, the people described here are not
merely protecting their intimate relations by ensuring that
they do not have to do instrumental (inferior) work. They
are also protecting themselves from their intimate relations,
that is to say, from the difficult memories associated with
them, and from the emotional turmoil that may result from
participating in a network of gift exchanges with them.
But these observations not only challenge the expectations
of specific CCT researchers, they also put into question some
of the fundamental tenets of consumer research on the gift.
The gift is often praised for humanizing market relationships,
for making the market meaningful, and for providing
an alternative to the commodifying logic of capitalist exchanges.
Yet the research presented here shows that the
market is not always feared as dehumanizing, impersonal,
or anonymous. On the contrary, it can be valorized precisely
because of these features. This challenges the way researchers
in this field and elsewhere in the social sciences understand
the axiology that underpins the gift economy–market
antithesis. In other words, it shows that people may invert
this axiology—at least temporarily—and belie researchers’
expectations.
Of course, house moving involves a specific type of physical
activity that may partially explain why people who move
often privilege the market. But it would be a mistake to
reduce house moving to nothing over and above a specific
instance of the instrumentalization of physical labor. For
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ESCAPING THE GIFT ECONOMY 681
house moving is a social phenomenon that often includes
or requires sustained involvement in the reciprocity relations
characteristic of the gift economy. We have seen that for
some people, the emotional cost of such involvement may
be too high and that they may turn to the market as an
escape. However, the question remains: How should we conceptualize
the escape from the gift economy?
Revisiting the Concept of Escape
In the course of the discussion, several anthropologists
and sociologists have been mentioned. It should be clear by
now that the work of these social scientists does not provide
a sufficient conceptual apparatus for coming to terms with
the full complexity of the relationship between the gift economy
and the market.
Sahlins’s (1972) analysis takes market exchanges into account,
but it considers these under the umbrella of reciprocity
relations and describes them as a negative form. As
one moves along Sahlins’s (1972) spectrum of social relations,
as more and more alien members and outsiders become
participants in exchanges and, most importantly, as
market people become involved in these exchanges, the fear
of exploitation increases and there is an inversion of the
logic of reciprocity—a switch from generosity to exploi-
tation.
As for the anti-utilitarians, they provide some insights
into the question of escape. Authors like Godbout (1994,
1995, 1998) and Godbout and Caille´ (1998) think that the
market can provide an escape from social networks. But for
them, turning to the market is symptomatic of the dissolution
of social bonding. They are strong advocates of the primacy
of the gift. Thus they believe that privileging the market
and challenging the axiology that underpins the gift economy–market
antithesis are concomitant with moral and social
decline.
Miller (2001) stands in contrast to these authors, for he
questions the assumptions underlying the standard interpretation
of the gift economy–market antithesis. His work
shows that commodity relations have the potential to objectify
disinterested manifestations of generosity. Although
Miller (2001) does not use the specific term, it is clear that
for him commodity relations can be emancipatory. But Miller
(2001) not only attempts to invert the standard analysis
of the gift economy–market antithesis, he also challenges
the very idea of the antithesis itself. His position echoes that
of researchers like Granovetter (1985), Joy (2001), and Kozinets
(2002), for whom the market is socially embedded.
This means that there is no room for escape, that escape is
a conceptual impossibility.
The situation is much more complex, however, than the
above authors suggest. It cannot be an a priori truth, as
Sahlins (1972) implies, that market relations are necessarily
located at the far end of the spectrum. In some instances,
as CCT researchers have documented, people can have
close, trustworthy dealings with those they interact with in
the market (Price and Arnould 1999). As for the anti-utilitarian
concept of exit, it is problematic because it is imbued
with moral and ideological connotations. It idealizes the gift
while treating the market with great suspicion. And Miller’s
(2001) position is insightful, but it fails to account for the
perspective of people who are actually negotiating their way
through what—at the very least—they experience as a fundamental
opposition. In other words, it neglects the values
that people actually attach to the gift economy–market antithesis.
Indeed, the present study has shown that this antithesis,
which Miller (2001) seeks to overcome, has concrete
meaning for the people observed. It reflects a fundamental
construction of values that cannot be ignored.
In reality, people constantly move between the gift economy
and the market. Deviations from the norm of the gift
economy are mainly related to the systems of implacable
indebtedness that reciprocity creates. It is important to recognize,
however, that withholding requests for gifts, services,
and favors from significant others can be a driving
force for using the market. Thus researchers must not overlook
the essential distinction between the gift of absolution,
which reinforces the fundamental axiology underpinning the
gift economy–market antithesis, and the escape from the gift
economy, which challenges this axiology (see fig. 2).
The fear of indebtedness cannot be equated with selfishness
in any simple sense. Indeed, freeing oneself from the
obligations of the gift economy may mean freeing oneself
from emotional oppression and coercion, as they arise or
are exerted in the gift economy.
Implications for Consumer Research
The research presented here accords with the research of
Epp and Price (2008) and could enrich the framework that
they propose. It shows that people negotiate the social expectations
of their relatives by using the market as a complement
to the family or as a substitute for it. People may
do this to take pressure off their families or to protect them,
but they also withdraw—they even attempt to escape completely—from
family exchange relationships because of the
obligations that are entailed. In a word, the research presented
here draws attention to “the ebb and flow” (Epp and
Price 2008) of exchange relationships in and out of the
family.
However, it also reveals some of the limitations of Epp
and Price’s (2008) framework. For it shows the need to
develop a systematic framework for studying family consumption
in a way that better integrates the issues of gift
giving, exchanging, and sharing. Epp and Price (2008) discuss
intergenerational transfers but remain silent on the logic
that governs these exchanges and the power relations that
underlie them. The family is at the heart of the gift economy.
It is a privileged provider of emotional and instrumental
gifts, services, and favors, especially in times of need. It
would be an idealistic romanticization of the family (Pitrou
1996), however, to assume that gift exchanges between family
members are completely gratuitous and never carry with
them the obligation to reciprocate. In times of need, people
often have to decide between the family and the market,
and this requires that they weigh the instrumental, emotional,
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682 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 2
TENSIONS IN THE GIFT ECONOMY
NOTE.—This figure represents the tension between the bright side (left) and the dark side (right) of the gift economy. The gift of absolution, which is related to
the fear of imposition, authorizes a use of the market that does not compromise the primacy of the gift economy. Instead, it reinforces the fundamental axiology.
This is depicted by the arrow that points up (1). In contrast, the escape to the market, which is related to the fear of indebtedness, challenges this axiology. It
inverts the hierarchy of the gift economy and the market. This is depicted by the arrow that points down (2).
and relational costs and benefits of relying on their relatives
for help. As we have seen, some people are afraid of indebtedness
and wary of normative expectations. This shows
that gift exchanges between relatives are not always gratuitous
and that the norm of reciprocity plays a fundamental
role in families.
In other words, we need to provide a better account of
the dark side of family exchanges and their implications for
the market. We need to enrich the current reflections on the
generalized form of reciprocity that prevails inside families,
as well as among close and intimate relations (Sahlins 1972).
A generalized form of reciprocity entails almost no obligation
to reciprocate, but it brings with it other forms of
personal, intimate, and emotional expectations that have the
potential to become oppressive. Epp and Price (2008) discuss
at length the use of marketplace resources and the threat
that the outsourcing of family tasks to the market may pose.
This question is important, but the evidence presented here
also shows the need to address the question of the inverse
tendency. For it highlights the threat of not turning to the
market.
While it is difficult to discuss the family or the gift economy
without addressing the question of indebtedness, it is
also difficult to analyze the moral aspects of owing without
tackling the issue of memory. Indeed, we cannot understand
how people choose between the gift economy and the market
merely by looking at the record of previous exchanges.
When making a decision, people do not simply weigh up
what they owe to others with respect to what they have
given others. People’s personal histories and their most intimate
memories (the positive ones as well the negative ones,
for instance, those concerning tensions, taboos, and secrets)
are important in explaining the choice between the gift economy
and the market.
A debt can be paid—and erased—but the memories of
previous exchanges do not simply vanish. On the contrary,
they often become part of a person’s, a family’s, or a network’s
history. In other words, previous exchanges become
part of what Epp and Price (2008) call a person’s sense of
continuity. Extending the conclusions of these authors’ work,
it seems safe to suggest that gift economy exchanges are
related to identity formation and that indebtedness, particularly
when it comes to debts that cannot be paid or to those
that are too difficult to bear, will be avoided, at least ideally,
so as to ward off threats to personal identity or autonomy.
Nevertheless, more investigation may be needed here.
CONCLUSION
In spite of the work on the dark side of the gift, most
consumer research has ignored the question of how negative
experience in the gift economy can affect attitudes and behavior
toward the market. Researchers have analyzed the
gift economy and the market separately as two autonomous
entities, and they have given almost no consideration to the
moral and ideological hierarchy of the two. They have often
demonstrated that the gift economy can be a protective haven
against the alienation of the market and that gift giving
can be a means of appropriating the market, contesting it,
or even escaping from it. Yet they have been blind to the
inverse tendency. They have failed to see that the unattractiveness
of reciprocity relations can lead people to turn away
from the gift economy and privilege the market.
The present article has taken a different stance. It has
shown that people often confront the social expectations and
consequences of the gift economy—for example, they try
to avoid indebtedness—by shifting back and forth between
the gift economy and the market. But more importantly, and
contrary to what the work of many CCT researchers would
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ESCAPING THE GIFT ECONOMY 683
lead one to expect, it has shown that people may escape to
the market. The research presented here offers a fresh look
at the fundamental axiology informing our understanding of
the gift economy–market antithesis. It suggests that the escape
to the market can be understood as an inversion of this
axiology. The claim is not, however, that the market can or
should be imbued with the higher moral values that consumer
researchers and social scientists have traditionally
attributed to the gift economy. The claim is that consumer
researchers cannot avoid recognizing and questioning the
moral and ideological hierarchy of the gift economy and the
market. In other words, they must acknowledge that the
antithesis of the two spheres of exchange plays a meaningful
role in consumer behavior.
It is hoped that the present discussion will help consumer
researchers to achieve a better understanding of how people
choose between the gift economy and the market, how they
shift back and forth from one to the other, and how they
sometimes come to privilege the market over the gift economy,
contrary to what CCT research has led us to expect.
By recognizing that people sometimes challenge the axiology
that underpins the gift economy–market antithesis,
researchers will be able to work out a more adequate analysis
of the regimes of value that guide consumer behavior.
APPENDIX
PROFILES OF INFORMANTS
Pseudonym Age Sex Family status Children Occupation New status
Kim 18 F Single University student Tenant
Marie-Sol 18 F Single University student Tenant
Julia 20 F In couple University student Tenant
Caroline 23 F Single Horticulturist Tenant
Julius 25 M In couple Delivery person Tenant
Celine 25 F Single Student Tenant
Charles 26 M Single Social worker Owner
Julie 27 F Single Social worker Tenant
Rupert 28 M In couple 1 daughter Municipal employee Tenant
Marjo 30 F In couple 1 daughter Community worker Tenant
Ann 30 F Single Professional researcher Tenant
Mr. Rivera 34 M Married 2 daughters, 1 son Print worker Tenant
Regina 37 F Single Chief nursing assistant Owner
Mrs. Rivera 38 F Married 2 daughters, 1 son Manufacturing worker Tenant
Gigi 40 F Single 1 son Unemployed Tenant
Sandra 41 F Separated 3 sons Unemployed Tenant
Mrs. Blackburn 41 F Separated 1 son Teacher Owner
Bea 41 F Separated 2 sons Teacher Owner
Mrs. Lambert 42 F Married 1 daughter, 1 son Part-time shop assistant Owner
Mr. Lambert 47 M Married 1 daughter, 1 son Electrician Owner
Mira 49 F Single 1 daughter Architect Owner
Mr. Legrand 63 M Single Retired civil servant Tenant
Mrs. Debray 68 F Widowed 1 daughter, 2 son Retired writer Tenant
Mrs. Bouchard 69 F Divorced 1 daughter Retired waitress Tenant
Mr. Ricard 71 M Widowed 1 daughter, 3 sons Retired teacher Tenant
Mr. Trenet 73 M Single Retired musician Tenant
Mrs. Cabot 78 F Widowed 2 daughters, 1 son Retired homemaker Tenant
Mr. Richer 81 M Divorced 4 daughters, 2 sons Retired foreman Tenant
Mrs. Hebert 89 F Widowed 2 sons Retired secretary Tenant
Mrs. Bolduc 89 F Single Retired fashion designer Tenant
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684 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
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