

But time is of the essence. Some leading scientists believe that a further decade or two of slow, gradual action would make it impossible to avoid the disastrous impacts of climate change and ecological degradation (see Figure O). Confronted with the ill health of our Mother Earth in the second decade of the 21st century, it has become abundantly clear to many people that the contemporary phase of globalization has been the most environmentally destructive period in human history. It remains to be seen, however, whether the growing recognition of the ecological limits of our planet will translate swiftly into profound new forms of political cooperation across borders. As we will discuss in Chapter 7, much depends on challenging a powerful global ideology that is rooted in the utopia of unfettered markets and the desire for the unlimited accumulation and consumption of material things.

Globalization

Chapter 7

Ideologies of globalization: market globalism, justice globalism, religious globalisms

Ideologies are powerful systems of widely shared ideas and patterned beliefs that are accepted as truth by significant groups in society. Serving as political mental maps, they offer people a more or less coherent picture of the world not only as it is, but also as it ought to be. In doing so, ideologies help organize the tremendous complexity of human experiences into fairly simple claims that serve as guide and compass for social and political action. These claims are employed to legitimize certain political interests and to defend or challenge dominant power structures. Seeking to imbue society with their preferred norms and values, the codifiers of ideologies—usually social elites—speak to their audience in narratives that persuade, praise, condemn, distinguish ‘truths’ from ‘falsehoods’, and separate the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’. Thus, ideology connects theory and practice by orienting and organizing human action in accordance with generalized claims and codes of conduct.


Like all social processes, globalization operates on an ideological dimension filled with a range of norms, claims, beliefs, and narratives about the phenomenon itself. Indeed, the heated public debate over whether globalization represents a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing occurs in the arena of ideology. Today, three types of globalism compete for adherents around the world. *Market globalism* seeks to endow ‘globalization’ with free-market norms

and neoliberal meanings. Contesting market globalism from the political Left, *justice globalism* constructs an alternative vision of globalization based on egalitarian ideals of global solidarity and distributive justice. From the political Right, various *religious globalisms* struggle against both market globalism and justice globalism as they seek to mobilize a religious community imagined in global terms in defence of religious values and beliefs that are thought to be under severe attack by the forces of secularism and consumerism.

In spite of their considerable differences, however, these three globalisms share nonetheless an important function: they articulate and translate the rising global imaginary—a background understanding of community and belonging increasingly tied to the global—into concrete political programmes and agendas. Hence, it would be inaccurate to accuse the two ideological challengers of dominant market globalism of being ‘anti-globalization’. Rather, their position should be described as ‘alter-globalization’—subscribing to alternative visions of an integrated world that resist neoliberal projections of universal free-market principles.

To be sure, *there are* powerful voices of ‘anti-globalization’—national-populists and economic protectionists such as Donald Trump and most Tea Party adherents in the United States, Marine Le Pen in France, Nigel Farage in the UK, or Frauke Petry in Germany. Their respective programmes look very similar in their fierce opposition to globalizing dynamics that challenge national unity imagined in homogeneous terms.

In his successful 2016 US Presidential campaign, for example, Trump opposed the mainstream free trade stance of his party in favour of ‘economic nationalism’—the view that the economy should be designed in ways that serve narrow national interests (see Illustration 15). Although his brand name ‘Trump’ stands for a *global* network of hotels from Honolulu to Rio de Janeiro, the



15. Donald Trump addressing a crowd in Milwaukee, Wis., 4 April 2016.

American entrepreneur and Reality TV host frequently expressed his conviction that there exists at the core of contemporary American society an irrepressible conflict between the claims of American nationalism and the commands of the global economy. Moreover, Trump advocated the building of a wall along the 1,989-mile border with Mexico to keep illegal immigrants out. He also argued for the forcible deportation of millions of illegal immigrants as well as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s [USA] representatives can figure out what’s going on’. Clinging to the weakening national imaginary, national-populists like Trump can be viewed as ‘reactionaries’ in the sense of reacting against all three globalist ideologies without providing their national audiences with constructive articulations of the rising global imaginary.

Market globalism

Market globalism is without question the dominant ideology of our time. Since the 1990s, it has been codified and disseminated

worldwide by global power elites that include corporate managers, executives of large transnational corporations, corporate lobbyists, influential journalists and public-relations specialists, intellectuals writing for a large public audience, celebrities and top entertainers, state bureaucrats, and politicians. Serving as the chief advocates of market globalism, these individuals saturate the public discourse with idealized images of a consumerist, free-market world. Selling their preferred version of a single global marketplace to the public, they portray globalization in a positive light as an indispensable tool for the realization of such a global order.

Such favourable visions of globalization pervade public opinion and political choices in many parts of the world. Indeed, neoliberal decision-makers emerged as expert designers of an attractive ideological container for their market-friendly political agenda. Given that the exchange of commodities constitutes one of the core activities of all societies, the market-oriented discourse of globalization itself has turned into an extremely important commodity destined for public consumption. *Business Week*, *The Economist*, *Forbes*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Financial Times* are among the most powerful of dozens of magazines, journals, newspapers, and electronic media published globally that feed their readers a steady diet of market-globalist claims.

Thus, market globalism has become what some social theorists call a 'strong discourse'—one that is notoriously difficult to resist and repel because it has on its side powerful social forces that have already pre-selected what counts as 'real' and, therefore, shape the world accordingly. The constant repetition and public recitation of market globalism's core claims and slogans have the capacity to produce what they name. As more neoliberal policies are enacted, the claims of market globalism become even more firmly planted in the public mind.

Analysing hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles—both online and offline—I have identified five major ideological claims

Box 8 The five claims of market globalism

1. Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets
2. Globalization is inevitable and irreversible
3. Nobody is in charge of globalization
4. Globalization benefits everyone
5. Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world

that occur with great regularity in the utterances, speeches, and writings of influential market globalists (see Box 8).

It is important to note that globalists themselves construct these ideological claims in order to sell their political and economic agenda. Perhaps no single market-globalist speech or piece of writing contains all of the five assertions, but all of them contain at least some of these claims.

Like all ideologies, market globalism starts with the attempt to establish an authoritative definition of its core concepts. For neoliberals, such an account is anchored in the idea of the self-regulating market that serves as the framework for a future global order. But the problem with claim 1 is that its core message of liberalizing and integrating markets is only realizable through the *political* project of engineering free markets. Thus, market globalists must be prepared to utilize the *powers of government* to weaken and eliminate those social policies and institutions that curtail the market. Since only strong governments are up to this ambitious task of transforming existing social arrangements, the successful liberalization of markets depends upon *intervention* and *interference* by centralized state power. Such actions, however, stand in stark contrast to the neoliberal idealization of the limited role of government. Yet, globalists do expect governments to play an extremely active role in implementing their political agenda. The activist character of the earliest neoliberal administrations

asymmetrical power relations. Despite the rise of China and India, the United States is still the strongest economic and military power in the world, and the largest TNCs are based in North America. This is not to say that the USA rules supremely over these gigantic processes of globalization. But it *does* suggest that both the substance and the direction of globalization are to a significant degree shaped by American domestic and foreign policy.

Claim 4—globalization benefits everyone—lies at the very core of market globalism because it provides an affirmative answer to the crucial normative question of whether globalization should be considered a 'good' or a 'bad' thing. Market globalists frequently connect their arguments to the alleged benefits resulting from trade liberalization: rising global living standards, economic efficiency, individual freedom, and unprecedented technological progress. But when market dynamics dominate social and political outcomes, the opportunities and rewards of globalization are spread often unequally, concentrating power and wealth amongst a select group of people, regions, and corporations at the expense of the multitude. The same market logic also applies to access to information via digital technology (see Figure P). We will revisit the question of global inequality in Chapter 8.

Claim 5—globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world—is rooted in the neoliberal assertion that free markets and democracy are synonymous terms. Persistently affirmed as 'common sense', the actual compatibility of these concepts often goes unchallenged in the public discourse. Indeed, claim 5 hinges on a conception of democracy that emphasizes formal procedures such as voting at the expense of the direct participation of broad majorities in political and economic decision-making. This 'thin' definition of democracy reflects an elitist and regimented model of 'low-intensity' or 'formal' market democracy. In practice, the crafting of a few democratic elements onto a basically authoritarian structure ensures that those elected remain

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in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s attests to the importance of strong governmental action in engineering free markets.

Claim 2 establishes the historical inevitability and irreversibility of globalization understood as the liberalization and global integration of markets. The portrayal of globalization as some sort of natural force, like the weather or gravity, makes it easier for market globalists to convince people that they must adapt to the discipline of the market if they are to survive and prosper. Hence, the claim of inevitability depoliticizes the public discourse about globalization. Neoliberal policies are portrayed to be above politics; they simply carry out what is ordained by nature. This implies that, instead of acting according to a set of choices, people merely fulfil world-market laws that demand the elimination of government controls. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher used to say, 'There is no alternative.' If nothing can be done about the natural movement of economic and technological forces, then political groups ought to acquiesce and make the best of an unalterable situation. Resistance would be unnatural, irrational, and dangerous.

Market globalism's deterministic language offers yet another rhetorical advantage. If the natural laws of the market have indeed preordained a neoliberal course of history, then globalization does not reflect the arbitrary agenda of a particular social class or group. In that case, market globalists merely carry out the unalterable imperatives of a transcendental force. People aren't in charge of globalization; markets and technology are. But those voices behind claim 3 are right only in a formal sense. While there is no conscious conspiracy orchestrated by a single, evil force, this does not mean that nobody is in charge of globalization. The liberalization and integration of global markets does not proceed outside the realm of human choice. As we will discuss in Chapter 8, the market-globalist initiative to integrate and deregulate markets around the world both creates and sustains

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
creating collective meanings and shaping people's identities. Yet, as both massive justice-globalist protests and jihadist-globalist acts of terrorism have shown, the expansion of market globalism has encountered considerable resistance from both progressives and traditionalists.

Justice globalism

As the 20th century was drawing to a close, criticisms of market globalism began to receive more attention in the public discourse on globalization, a development aided by a heightened awareness of how extreme corporate profit strategies were leading to widening global disparities in wealth and wellbeing. Starting in the late 1990s and continuing throughout much of the 2000s, the contest between market globalism and its ideological challenger on the political Left erupted in street confrontations in many cities around the world. Who are these justice-globalist forces and what is their ideological vision?

Justice globalism refers to the political ideas and values associated with the social alliances and political actors increasingly known as the 'global justice movement' (GJM). It emerged in the 1990s as a progressive network of international NGOs we defined in Chapter 4 as a 'global civil society'. Dedicated to the establishment of a more equitable relationship between the global North and South, the GJM agitated for the protection of the global environment, fair trade and international labour issues, human rights, and women's issues.

Challenging the central claims of market globalism, justice globalists believe that 'another world is possible', as one of their principal slogans suggests. Envisioning the construction of a new world order based on a global redistribution of wealth and power, the GJM emphasizes the crucial connection between globalization and local wellbeing. It accuses market-globalist elites of pushing neoliberal policies that are leading to greater global inequality, high levels of unemployment, environmental degradation, and the



P. Global Internet users by regions (2015).

Source: Taken from <<http://www.internetworldstats.com>>, © 2015, Miniwatts Marketing Group

insulated from popular pressures and thus can govern 'effectively'. Hence, the assertion that globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world is largely based on a superficial definition of democracy.

Our examination of the five central claims of market globalism suggests that the neoliberal language about globalization is ideological in the sense that it is politically motivated and contributes toward the construction of particular meanings of globalization that preserve and stabilize existing power relations. But the ideological reach of market globalism goes far beyond the task of providing the public with a narrow explanation of the meaning of globalization. Market globalism consists of powerful narratives that sell an overarching neoliberal worldview, thereby

Box 9 Global New Deal: five demands

1. A global 'Marshall Plan' that includes a blanket forgiveness of all Third World Debt;
2. Levying of the so-called 'Tobin Tax': a tax on international financial transactions that would benefit the global South;
3. Abolition of offshore financial centres that offer tax havens for wealthy individuals and corporations;
4. Implementation of stringent global environmental agreements;
5. Implementation of a more equitable global development agenda.

demise of social welfare. Calling for a 'Global New Deal' favouring the marginalized and poor, justice globalists seek to protect ordinary people all over the world from a neoliberal 'globalization from above' (see Box 9).

In North America, the progressive journalist Naomi Klein and the human rights proponent Noam Chomsky are leading representatives of justice globalism. In Europe, the spokespersons for established Green parties have long suggested that unfettered neoliberal globalization has resulted in a serious degradation of the global environment. Neo-anarchist groups in Europe and the United States such as the 'Black Bloc' concur with this perspective, and some of these groups are willing to make selective use of violent means in order to achieve their objectives. In the global South, justice globalism is often represented by democratic-popular and indigenous peoples' movements of resistance against neoliberal policies. Most of these groups have forged close links to other justice-globalist international NGOs (see Figure Q).

Today, there exist thousands of these organizations in all parts of the world. Some consist only of a handful of activists, while others attract a much larger membership.

Areas of concern/focus	Location	Name of Organization
Reform of global financial institutions and infrastructure	Paris, France plus multiple regional offices	Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC))
Rights of women, indigenous people and the marginalized	Montevideo, Uruguay	Articulación Feminista Mercosur (Southern Common Market)
Trade and investment issues in Africa; reform of global financial system	East Legion, Accra, Ghana	Africa Trade Network
Human, environmental, and worker rights at the local, national and global levels; transparency and accountability into global finance and trade	San Francisco, California, USA	Corpwatch
Promote the right to food, food sovereignty, and food security around the world	Heidelberg, Germany	Food First International Action Network
Policy research, advocacy, activism, and grassroots capacity building, critique of corporate-led globalization, neoliberalism and militarization	Manila, Philippines; Bangkok, Thailand; Delhi, India	Focus on the Global South

In the early 21st century, the forces of justice globalism have gathered political strength. This is evidenced by the emergence of the World Social Forum (WSF) and various 'Occupy' movements around the world. In the USA, Occupy Wall Street burst onto the political scene in 2011 as part of a global Occupy movement that drew activists in the world's major cities within months. Inspired by the popular protests of the 'Arab Spring' and Los Indignados ('the indignents') encampments in Spain, Occupy demonstrators expressed outrage at the inequalities of global capitalism and the irresponsible practices of many financial institutions, all of which had been on stark display during the Global Financial Crisis. Brandishing their slogan 'We are the 99%', Occupy protesters across the world occupied spaces of symbolic importance—such as New York City's Zuccotti Park near Wall Street—and sought to create—in miniature—the kind of egalitarian society they wanted to live in. Rejecting conventional organizational leadership formations, Occupy formed General Assemblies and working groups that reached decisions through a consensus-based process.

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In spite of the mass appeal of the Occupy movement against the '1%', however, the WSF still serves as the key ideological site of justice globalism. It draws to its annual meetings in the global South tens of thousands of delegates from around the world. The proponents of justice globalism deliberately set up the WSF as a 'shadow organization' to the market-globalist World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Just like market globalists who treat the WEF as a platform to project their ideas and values to a global audience, justice globalists utilize the WSF as the main production site of their ideological and policy alternatives (see Box 10).

Most of the justice-globalist groups affiliated with the WSF started out as small, seemingly insignificant groups of like-minded people in South America and Europe. Many of them learned important theoretical and practical lessons from justice-globalist struggles in developing countries, particularly from the Mexican

Box 10 From the WSF Charter of Principles

1. The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences, and interlinking for effective action by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism and are committed to building a planetary society directed toward fruitful relationships among humankind and between it and the Earth...
8. The World Social Forum is a plural, diversified, confessional, nongovernmental, and non-party context that, in a decentralized fashion, interrelates organizations and movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international to build another world...
13. As a context for interrelations, the World Social Forum seeks to strengthen and create new national and international links among organizations and movement of society that—in both public and private life—will increase the capacity for non-violent social resistance to the process of dehumanization the world is undergoing...

Zapatista Army of National Liberation 1994 uprising against neoliberal free trade policies (see Box 11).

Following five years later, the legendary 'Battle of Seattle' in late 1999 initiated a decade-long series of large-scale confrontations between the forces of market globalism and justice globalism. Taking part in this massive anti-WTO protest in Seattle, Washington, were 40,000 to 50,000 people. In spite of the predominance of North American participants, there was also a significant international presence. Articulating some of the five principal justice-globalist claims, this eclectic alliance included

Box 11 Five principal claims of justice globalism

1. Neoliberalism produces global crises.
2. Market-driven globalization has increased worldwide disparities in wealth and wellbeing.
3. Democratic participation is essential in solving global problems.
4. Another world is possible and urgently needed.
5. People power, not corporate power!

consumer activists, labour activists (including students demonstrating against sweatshops), environmentalists, animal rights activists, advocates of Third World debt relief, feminists, and human rights proponents. Eventually, large groups of demonstrators interrupted traffic in the city centre and managed to block off the main entrances to the convention centre by forming human chains. As hundreds of delegates were scrambling to make their way to the conference centre, Seattle police employed tear gas, batons, rubber bullets, and pepper spray stingers against the demonstrators (see Illustration 16). Altogether, the police arrested over 600 persons.

Ironically, the Battle of Seattle proved that many of the new technologies hailed by market globalists as the true hallmark of globalization could also be employed in the service of justice-globalist forces and their political agenda. Text messaging on mobile devices enabled the organizers of events like the one in Seattle to arrange for new forms of protest such as a series of demonstrations held simultaneously in various cities around the globe. As we have seen in the Middle East uprisings and the Occupy protests in the 2010s, individuals and groups all over the world can utilize social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook to readily and rapidly recruit new members, establish dates, share experiences, arrange logistics, and identify and publicize




16. Police confronting WTO protestors in downtown Seattle, 30 November 1999.

targets—activities that only two decades ago would have demanded much more time and money. Digital technologies also allow demonstrators not only to maintain close contact throughout the event, but also to react quickly and effectively to shifting police tactics. This enhanced ability to arrange and coordinate protests without the need for a central command, a clearly defined leadership, a large bureaucracy, and significant financial resources has added an entirely new dimension to the nature of justice-globalist demonstrations.

Religious globalisms

Justice globalists were preparing for a new wave of demonstrations against the IMF and World Bank, when Al Qaeda terrorists struck on 11 September 2001. Nearly 3,000 innocent people perished in less than two hours, including hundreds of heroic New York police and firefighters trapped in the collapsing towers of the World Trade Center (see Illustration 17). In the years following the attacks, it became clear that Islamist extremists were



17. The burning twin towers of the World Trade Center, 11 September 2001.

not confining their terrorist activities to the United States. Regional jihadist networks like ISIL, Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiya, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, and Abu Sayyaf targeted civilians and military personnel around the globe, most recently in Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Dhaka (2016), Istanbul (2016), and Nice (2016). In fact, jihadist globalists like Ahmed Omar, *emir* (leader) of the Somali jihadist network Al Shabaab, encourage Muslims residing in the West to organize their own independent terror cells in their 'holy war' against 'unbelief'—another chilling example of the intensifying 'glocalization' of human activities we discussed in Chapter 1.

But ISIL and Al Qaeda are but two extremely violent examples of organizations that subscribe to various forms of religious globalism. Other religiously inspired visions of global political community include some fundamentalist Christian groups such as the Army of God and Christian Identity, the Mormon Church, the Falun Gong sect, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, and Chabad, an orthodox Jewish movement with clear global ambitions. Despite

their deep conservatism, religious globalisms also promote an alternative global vision. This is not to suggest that *all* religiously inspired visions of global community are conservative, reactionary, or violent. Indeed, most religions incorporate a sense of a global community united along religious lines, although in general this is largely informal. A key point about the religious globalist visions, however, is that these groups desire their version of a global religious community to be all-encompassing and to be given primacy and superiority over state-based and secular political structures. In some extreme cases like ISIL or Aum Shinrikyo, they are prepared to use extremely violent means to achieve their end goal.

While jihadist Islamism—represented by such groups as ISIL and Al Qaeda—is today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism, it would be a mistake to equate the ideology of the ISIL or Al Qaeda variety with the religion of Islam or even more peaceful strands of 'political Islam' or 'Islamist fundamentalism'. Rather, the term 'jihadist Islamism' is meant to apply to those extremely violent strains of Islam-influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies to be applied worldwide. As the recent terrorist activities of ISIL or Boko Haram have shown, jihadist Islamism is the most influential and successful attempt yet to articulate the rising global imaginary into a religious globalism—even after the killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy SEALs in Pakistan on 2 May 2011 (see Box 12).

Jihadist Islamism is anchored in the core concepts of *umma* (Islamic community of believers) and *jihad* (armed or unarmed struggle against unbelief purely for the sake of God and his *umma*). Indeed, jihadist globalists understand the *umma* as a single community of believers united in their belief in the one and only God. Expressing a religious-populist yearning for strong leaders who set things right by fighting alien invaders and corrupt Islamic elites, they claim to return power back to the 'Muslim

Box 12 The late Osama bin Laden on *jihad* and the West

And the West's notion that Islam is a religion of *jihad* and enmity toward the religions of the infidels and the infidels themselves is an accurate and true depiction. . . For it is, in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs on others. . . Their [moderate Muslims] reluctance in acknowledging that offensive *jihad* is one of the exclusive traits of our religion demonstrates nothing but defeat. (2003)

I tell you [Americans] that the war [on terror] will be either ours or yours. If it is the former, it will mean your loss and your shame forever—and the winds are blowing in this direction, by Allah's grace. But if it is the latter, then read history, for we are a people who do not stand for injustice, and we strive for vengeance all days of our lives. And the days and nights will not pass until we avenge ourselves as we did on September 11. (2006)

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masses' and restore the *umma* to its earlier glory. In their view, the process of regeneration must start with a small but dedicated vanguard of warriors willing to sacrifice their lives as martyrs to the holy cause of awakening people to their religious duties—not just in traditionally Islamic countries, but wherever members of the *umma* yearn for the establishment of God's rule on earth. With a third of the world's Muslims living today as minorities in non-Islamic countries, jihadist Islamists regard the restoration as no longer a local, national, or even regional event. Rather, it requires a concerted *global* effort spearheaded by jihadists operating in various localities around the world.

Thus, jihadist globalism takes place in a global space emancipated from the confining territoriality of 'Egypt', or the 'Middle East' that used to constitute the political framework of religious nationalists fighting modern secular regimes in the 20th century. Although

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organizations like ISIL embrace the Manichean dualism of a 'clash of civilizations' between their imagined *umma* and 'global unbelief', their globalist ideology clearly transcends clear-cut civilizational fault lines. Their desire for the restoration of a transnational *umma* attests to the globalization of the Muslim world just as much as it reflects the Islamization of the West. Constructed in the ideational transition from the national to the global imaginary, jihadist Islamism still retains potent metaphors that resonate with people's national or even tribal solidarities. And yet, their focus is firmly on the global as jihadist Islamists have successfully redirected militant Islamism's struggle from the traditional 'Near Enemy' (secular-nationalist Middle Eastern regimes) to the 'Far Enemy' (the globalizing West).

Jihadist globalism's core ideological claim—to rebuild a unified global *umma* through global *jihad* against global unbelief—resonates well with the dynamics of a globalizing world. It holds special appeal for Muslim youths between the ages of 15 and 30 who have lived for sustained periods of time in the individualized and deculturated environments of Westernized Islam. This new wave of jihadist recruits, responsible for the most spectacular terrorist operations like the Brussels bombings of 22 March 2016, were products of a Westernized Islam. Most of them resided in Europe or North Africa and had few or no links to traditional Middle East political parties. Their enthusiasm for the establishment of a transnational *umma* by means of *jihad* made them prime candidates for recruitment. These young men followed in the footsteps of Al Qaeda's 'first-wavers' in Afghanistan in the 1980s who developed their ideological outlook among a multinational band of idealistic *mujahideen* bent on bringing down the 'godless' Soviet empire.

Their extremist rhetoric notwithstanding, jihadist Islamists never lose sight of the fact that jihadist globalists are fighting a steep uphill battle against the secular forces of market globalism and justice globalism. And yet, even against seemingly overwhelming

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military odds that translated into a significant weakening of the Al Qaeda network over the last decade, new powerful jihadist organizations like ISIL have emerged in recent years. Taking advantage of the shifting power dynamics in the Islamic world, ISIL leaders have been able to recruit as many as 30,000 foreigners to their principal battlegrounds in Syria, Iraq, and Libya in the 2010s. Despite its chilling and violent content, their vision contains an ideological alternative to market globalism and justice globalism that nonetheless imagines community in unambiguously global terms.