Models of Politics
Some Help in Thinking About Public Policy
MODELS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
A model is a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world. It may be an actual physical
representation-a model airplane, for example, or the tabletop buildings that planners and architects use
to show how things will look when proposed projects are completed. Or a model may be a diagram-a road
map, for example, or a flow chart that political scientists use to show how a bill becomes law.
Uses of Models
The models we shall use in studying policy are conceptual models. These are word models that try to
• Simplify and clarify our thinking about politics and public policy.
• Identify important aspects of policy problems.
• Help us to communicate with each other by focusing on essential features of political life.
• Direct our efforts to understand public policy better by suggesting what is important and what is
unimportant.
• Suggest explanations for public policy and predict its consequences.
Selected Policy Models
Over the years, political science, like other scientific disciplines, has developed a number of models to help
us understand political life. Among these models are the following:
• Process model
• Institutional model
• Rational model
• Incremental model
15
16 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
• Group model
• Elite model
• Public choice model
• Game theory model
Each of these terms identifies a major conceptual model that can be found in the literature of
political science. None of these models was derived especially to study public policy, yet each offers
a separate way of thinking about policy and even suggests some of the general causes and conse~
quences of public policy.
These models are not competitive in the sense that any one of them could be judged "best." Each
one provides a separate focus on political life, and each can help us to understand different things
about public policy. Although some policies appear at first glance to lend themselves to explana~
tion by one particular model, most policies are a combination of rational planning, incremental~
ism, interest group activity, elite preferences, game playing, public choice, political processes, and
institutional influences. Following is a brief description of each model, with particular attention to
the separate ways in which public policy can be viewed.
PROCESS: POLICY AS POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Today political processes and behaviors are a central focus of political science. Since World War
II, modern "behavioral" political science has studied the activities of voters, interest groups,
legislators, presidents, bureaucrats, judges, and other political actors. One of the main purposes has
been to discover patterns of activities--or "processes." Political scientists with an interest in policy
have grouped various activities according to their relationship with public policy. The result is a set
of policy processes, which usually follow the general outline shown in Table 2-1. In short, one can
TABLE 2-1 The Policy Process
• Problem Identification. The identification of policy problems
through demand from individuals and groups for government
action.
• Agenda Setting. Focusing the attention of the mass media and
public officials on specific public problems to decide what will be
decided.
• Policy Formulation. The development of policy proposals by
interest groups, White House staff, congressional committees, and
think tanks.
• Policy Legitimation. The selection and enactment of policies
through actions by Congress, the president, and the courts.
• Policy Implementation. The implementation of policies through
government bureaucracies, public expenditures, regulations, and
other activities of executive agencies.
• Policy Evaluation. The evaluation of policies by government
agencies themselves, outside consultants, the media, and the
general public.
Institutionalism: Policy as Institutional Output 17
view the policy process as a series of political activities-problem
identification, agenda setting, formulation, legitimation,
implementation, and evaluation.
The process model is useful in helping us to understand
the various activities involved in policymaking. We want to
keep in mind that policymaking involves agenda setting (capturing
the attention of policymakers), formulating proposals
(devising and selecting policy options), legitimating policy
(developing political support; winning congressional, presidential,
or court approval), implementing policy (creating
bureaucracies, spending money, enforcing laws), and evaluating
policy (finding out whether policies work, whether they
are popular).
Processes: Applying the Model
Political processes and behaviors are
considered in each of the policy areas
studied in this book. Additional commentary
on the impact of political
activity on public policy is found in
Chapter 3, "The Policymaking Process:
Decision-Making Activities," and
Chapter 4, "Policy Evaluation: Finding
Out What Happens After a Law Is
Passed."
INSTITUTIONALISM: POLICY AS INSTITUTIONAL OUTPUT
Government institutions have long been a central focus ofpolitical science. Traditionally, political
science was defined as the study of government institutions. Political activities generally center
around particular government institutions--Congress, the presidency, courts, bureaucracies, states,
municipalities, and so on. Public policy is authoritatively determined, implemented, and enforced
by these institutions.
The relationship between public policy and government institutions is very close. Strictly
speaking, a policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted, implemented, and enforced
by some government institution. Government institutions give public policy three distinctive
characteristics. First, government lends legitimacy to policies. Government policies are generally
regarded as legal obligations that command the loyalty of citizens. People may regard the policies
of other groups and associations in society-corporations, churches, professional organizations,
civic associations, and so forth-as important and even binding. But only government policies
involve legal obligations. Second, government policies involve universality. Only government policies
extend to all people in a society; the policies of other groups or organizations reach only a
part of the society. Finally, government monopolizes coercion in society-only government can
legitimately imprison violators of its policies. The sanctions that can be imposed by other groups
or organizations in society are more limited. It is precisely this ability of government to command
the loyalty of all its citizens, to enact policies governing the whole society, and to monopolize the
legitimate use of force that encourages individuals and groups to work for enactment of their preferences
into policy.
The Constitution of the United States establishes the fundamental
institutional structure for policymaking. It is "the supreme Law of
the Land" (Article VI). Its key structural components-separation
of powers and checks and balances among the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the national government-together with
federalism--dividing power between the nation and the states-were
designed by the Founders in part "to form a more perfect Union."
These institutional arrangements have changed significantly over more
than two centuries, yet no other written constitution in the world
has remained in place for so long. Throughout this volume we will be
Institutionalism: Applying the Model
In Chapter 5, "Federalism and State
Policies: Institutional Arrangements
and Policy Variations," we shall
examine some of the problems
of American federalism-the
distribution of money and power
among federal, state, and Local
governments.
18 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
FEDERAL SYSTEM
Federal government and
states derive authority
independently from the people.
National Government
vStates
People
FIGURE 2-1 An Institutional Model: American Federalism Governmental institutional
arrangements affect public policy, including federalism-the distribution of money and power
among federal, state, and Local governments. (Fotalia)
concerned with the effect of these institutional arrangements on public policy. And in Chapter 5 we
shall explore in some detail the effect offederalism.
Federalism recognizes that both the national government and the state governments derive
independent legal authority from their own citizens (Figure 2-1): both can pass their own laws,
levy their own taxes, and maintain their own courts. The states also have important roles in the
selection of national officeholders-in the apportionment of congressional seats, in the alloca~
tion of two U.S. senators to each state, and in the allocation of electoral votes for president. Most
important, perhaps, both the Congress and three~quarters of states must consent to any changes in
the Constitution itself.
RATIONALISM: POLICY AS MAXIMUM SOCIAL GAIN
A rational policy is one that achieves "maximum social gain"; that is, governments should choose
policies resulting in gains to society that exceed costs by the greatest amount, and governments
should refrain from policies if costs exceed gains.
Note that there are really two important guidelines in this definition of maximum social gain.
First, no policy should be adopted if its costs exceed its benefits. Second, among policy alterna~
tives, decision makers should choose the policy that produces the greatest benefit over cost. In
other words, a policy is rational when the difference between the values it achieves and the values
it sacrifices is positive and greater than any other policy alternative. One should not view rational~
ism in a narrow dollars~and~cents framework, in which basic social values are sacrificed for dollar
savings. Rationalism involves the calculation of all social, political, and economic values sacrificed
or achieved by a public policy, not just those that can be measured in dollars.
Rationalism: Policy as Maximum Social Gain 19
To select a rational policy, policymakers must (1) know all the society's value preferences and
their relative weights, (2) know all the policy alternatives available, (3) know all the consequences
of each policy alternative, (4) calculate the ratio of benefits to costs for each policy alternative,
and (5) select the most efficient policy alternative. This rationality assumes that the value preferences
of society as a whole can be known and weighted. It is not enough to know and weigh the
values of some groups and not others. There must be a complete understanding of societal values.
Rational policymaking also requires information about alternative policies, the predictive capacity to
foresee accurately the consequences of alternate policies, and the intelligence to calculate correctly
the ratio of costs to benefits. Finally, rational policymaking requires a decision-making system that
facilitates rationality in policy formation. A diagram of such a system is shown in Figure 2-2.
However, there are many barriers to rational decision making, so many, in fact, that it rarely
takes place at all in government. Yet the model remains important for analytic purposes because it
helps to identify barriers to rationality. It assists in posing the question, Why is policymaking not
a more rational process? At the outset we can hypothesize several important obstacles to rational
policymaking:
•
•
•
•
Many conflicting benefits and costs cannot be compared or
weighed; for example, it is difficult to compare or weigh the
value of individual life against the costs of regulation.
Policymakers may not be motivated to make decisions on the
basis of societal goals but instead try to maximize their own
rewards-power, status, reelection, and money.
Policymakers may not be motivated to maximize net social gain
but merely to satisfy demands for progress; they do not search
until they find "the one best way"; instead they halt their search
when they find an alternative that will work.
Large investments in existing programs and policies (sunk
costs) prevent policymakers from reconsidering alternatives
foreclosed by previous decisions.
Rationalism: Applying the Model
Chapter 6, "Criminal Justice:
Rationality and Irrationality in Public
Policy," shows that rational policies
to deter crime-policies ensuring
certainty, swiftness, and severity
of punishment-have seldom been
implemented. The problems of achieving
rationality in public policy are also
discussed in Chapter 7, "Welfare: The
Search for Rational Strategies," and in
Chapter 8, "Health Care: Attempting a
Rational-Comprehensive Transformation."
• There are innumerable barriers to collecting all the information
required to know all possible policy alternatives and the consequences of each, including the
cost of information gathering, the availability of the information, and the time involved in
its collection.
• Neither the predictive capacities of the social and behavioral sciences nor those of the
physical and biological sciences are sufficiently advanced to enable policymakers to
understand the full benefits or costs of each policy alternative.
• Policymakers, even with the most advanced computerized analytical techniques, do not
have sufficient intelligence to calculate accurately costs and benefits when a large number of
diverse political, social, economic, and cultural values are at stake.
• Uncertainty about the consequences of various policy alternatives compels policymakers
to stick as closely as possible to previous policies to reduce the likelihood of unanticipated
negative consequences.
• The segmentalized nature of policymaking in large bureaucracies makes it difficult to
coordinate decision making so that the input of all the various specialists is brought to bear at
the point of decision.
Input
All resources
needed for
pure rationality
process
All data
needed for
pure rationality
process
~
~
~
1. Establishment
of complete set of
operational goals
~with weights
3. Preparation of
complete set of
alternative policies
/2. Establishment
of complete
inventory of other
values and of
resources with
weights
4. Preparation of
complete set of
5. Calculation of
predictions of
benefits and ~ net expectation for
costs for each each alternative
alternative
6. Comparison of
net expectations
and identification
~ of alternative(s)
with highest net
expectation
~
~
Output
Pure rationality
policy (policies)
FIGURE 2-2 A Rational Model of a Dedsion System The rational model assumes complete agreement on goals, knowledge of alternative
policies, and the ability to calculate and select the policies with the greatest benefits and least costs.
N
0
N
Incrementalism: Policy as Variations on the Past 21
INCREMENTALISM: POLICY AS VARIATIONS ON THE PAST
Incrementalism views public policy as a continuation ofpast government activities with only incre~
mental modifications. Political scientist Charles E. Lindblom first presented the incremental model
in the course of a critique of the rational model of decision making.1 According to Lindblom,
decision makers do not annually review the whole range of existing and proposed policies, identify
societal goals, research the benefits and costs of alternative policies in achieving these goals, rank
order of preferences for each policy alternative in terms of the maximum net benefits, and then
make a selection on the basis of all relevant information. On the contrary, constraints of time,
information, and cost prevent policymakers from identifying the full range of policy alternatives
and their consequences. Constraints of politics prevent the establishment of clear~cut societal
goals and the accurate calculation of costs and benefits. The incremental model recognizes the
impractical nature of "rational~comprehensive" policymaking, and describes a more conservative
process of decision making.
Incrementalism is conservative in that existing programs, policies, and expenditures are con~
sidered as a base, and attention is concentrated on new programs and policies and on increases,
decreases, or modifications of current programs. (For example, budgetary policy for any gov~
emment activity or program for 2015 might be viewed incrementally, as shown in Figure 2-3.)
Policymakers generally accept the legitimacy of established programs and tacitly agree to continue
previous policies.
They do this because they do not have the time, information, or money to investigate all the
alternatives to existing policy. The cost of collecting all this information is too great. Policymakers
do not have sufficient predictive capacities to know what all the consequences of each altema~
tive will be. Nor are they able to calculate cost-benefit ratios for alternative policies when many
diverse political, social, economic, and cultural values are at stake. Thus, completely "rational"
policy may tum out to be "inefficient" (despite the contradiction in terms) if the time and cost of
developing a rational policy are excessive.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Policy
Increment
Past Policy
Commitments
FIGURE 2-3 The Incremental Model The incremental model assumes that policymakers
rarely examine past policy commitments, but rather focus their attention on changes in
policies and expenditures.
22 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
Moreover, incrementalism is politically expedient. Agreement comes easier in policymaking
when the items in dispute are only increases or decreases in budgets or modifications of exist~
ing programs. Conflict is heightened when decision making focuses on major policy shifts involv~
ing great gains or losses, or "all~or~nothing," "yes~or~no'' policy decisions. Because the political
tension involved in getting new programs or policies passed every year would be very great, past
policy victories are continued into future years unless there is a substantial political realignment.
Thus, incrementalism is important in reducing conflict, maintaining stability, and preserving the
political system itself.
Incrementalism: Applying the Model
Special attention to incrementalism is
given in the discussion of government
budgeting in Chapter 10, "Economic
Policy: Challenging Incrementalism."
But the incremental model may fail when policymakers are con~
fronted with crises. When faced with potential collapse of the nation's
financial markets in 2008, the president, Congress, the Treasury
Department, and the Federal Reserve Board came together to agree
on an unprecedented, nonincremental expansion of federal power
(see Chapter 10, "Economic Policy: Challenging Incrementalism").
Overall, federal spending and deficits increased dramatically, well
beyond any levels that might have been predicted by the incremen~
tal model. The Treasury Department was given unprecedented authority and $700 billion to "bail
out" the nation's major financial institutions. The Federal Reserve Board reduced interest rates
to their lowest in history and provided unprecedented amounts of credit to the financial system.
Congress itself passed a "stimulus package," the largest single spending bill in the nation's history.
Incrementalism was abandoned.
GROUP THEORY: POLICY AS EQUILIBRIUM
IN THE GROUP STRUGGLE
Group theory begins with the proposition that interaction among groups is the central fact of
politics.2
Individuals with common interests band together formally or informally to press their
demands on government. According to political scientist David Truman, an interest group is "a
shared~attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in the society"; such a group
becomes political "if and when it makes a claim through or upon any of the institutions of gov~
ernment."3 Individuals are important in politics only when they act as part of, or on behalf of,
Group Theory: Applying the Model
Throughout this volume we will
describe struggles over public policy.
In Chapter 9, "Education: Group
Struggles," we will examine group conflict
over public policy in the discussions
of education and school issues.
In Chapter 11, "Tax Policy: Battling
Special Interests," we will observe the
power of interest groups in obtaining
special treatments in the tax code
and obstructing efforts to reform the
nation's tax Laws.
group interests. The group becomes the essential bridge between the
individual and the government. Politics is really the struggle among
groups to influence public policy. The task of the political system
is to manage group conflict by (1) establishing rules of the game in
the group struggle, (2) arranging compromises and balancing inter~
ests, (3) enacting compromises in the form of public policy, and
(4) enforcing these compromises.
According to group theorists, public policy at any given time is
the equilibrium reached in the group struggle (see Figure 2-4). This
equilibrium is determined by the relative influence of various inter~
est groups. Changes in the relative influence of any interest group
can be expected to result in changes in public policy; policy will
move in the direction desired by the groups gaining influence and
away from the desires of groups losing influence. The influence of
I
I
I
I
\
I
\
"'/
'
Added Influence
' '
/
Alternative
Policy
Positions
\
I
\
\ Influence of
1 Group 8
Public
Policy
I I I I
PolicJ\AChang~
Equilibrium
Elite Theory: Policy as Elite Preference 23
Influence of
Group A
FIGURE 2-4 The Group Model The group model assumes that public policy is a balance of
interest group influence; policies change when particular interest groups gain or Lose influence.
groups is determined by their numbers, wealth, organizational strength, leadership, access to decision
makers, and internal cohesion.4
The whole interest group system-the political system itself-is held together in equilibrium
by several forces. First, there is a large, nearly universal, latent group in American society that supports
the constitutional system and prevailing rules of the game. This group is not always visible
but can be activated to administer overwhelming rebuke to any group that attacks the system and
threatens to destroy the equilibrium.
Second, overlapping group membership helps to maintain the equilibrium by preventing any one
group from moving too far from prevailing values. Individuals who belong to any one group also
belong to other groups, and this fact moderates the demands of groups who must avoid offending
their members who have other group affiliations.
Finally, the checking and balancing resulting from group competition also helps to maintain
equilibrium in the system. No single group constitutes a majority in American society. The
power of each group is checked by the power of competing groups. "Countervailing" centers
of power function to check the influence of any single group and protect the individual from
exploitation.
ELITE THEORY: POLICY AS ELITE PREFERENCE
Public policy may also be viewed as the preferences and values of a governing elite.5 Although
it is often asserted that public policy reflects the demands of "the people," this may express the
myth rather than the reality of American democracy. Elite theory suggests that the people are
apathetic and ill informed about public policy, that elites actually shape mass opinion on policy
questions more than masses shape elite opinion. Thus, public policy really turns out to be the
preferences of elites. Public officials and administrators merely carry out the policies decided on
by the elite. Policies flow downward from elites to masses; they do not arise from mass demands
(see Figure 2-5).
24 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
~Policy Direction ~
Policy Execution
Officials and
Administrators
Mass
FIGURE 2-5 The Elite Model The elite model implies that public policy does not
flow upward from demands by the people, but rather downward from the interests,
values, and preferences of elites.
Elite theory can be summarized briefly as follows:
• Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who do not. Only a small
number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide public policy.
• The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn
disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society.
• The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain
stability and avoid revolution. Only nonelites who have accepted the basic elite consensus
can be admitted to governing circles.
• Elites share consensus on behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation
of the system. In America, the bases of elite consensus are the sanctity of private property,
limited government, and individual liberty.
• Public policy does not reflect the demands of masses but rather the prevailing values of the
elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.
• Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses. Elites
influence masses more than masses influence elites.
What are the implications of elite theory for policy analysis? Elitism implies that public policy
does not reflect the demands of the people so much as it does the interests, values, and preferences
of elites. Therefore, change and innovations in public policy come about as a result of redefinitions
Public Choice Theory: Policy as Collective Decision Making by Self-Interested Individuals 25
by elites of their own values. Because of the general conservatism
of elites-that is, their interest in preserving the system-change
in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.
Changes in the political system occur when events threaten the sys~
tern, and elites, acting on the basis of enlightened self~interest, insti~
tute reforms to preserve the system and their place in it. The values
of elites may be very "public regarding." A sense of noblesse oblige
may permeate elite values, and the welfare of the masses may be an
important element in elite decision making. Elitism does not neces~
sarily mean that public policy will be hostile toward mass welfare but
only that the responsibility for mass welfare rests on the shoulders of
elites, not masses.
Elite Theory: Applying the Model
Chapter 12, "International Trade and
Immigration: Elite-Mass Conflict,"
expands on the elite model by arguing
that when elite preferences differ from
those of the masses, the preferences
of elites prevail. Chapter 14, "Civil
Rights: Elite and Mass Interaction,"
portrays the civil rights movement as
an effort by established national elites
to extend equality of opportunity to
blacks. Opposition to civil rights policies
is found among white masses in
the states.
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY: POLICY AS COLLECTIVE DECISION
MAKING BY SELF-INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS
Public choice is the economic study of nonmarket decision making, especially the application
of economic analyses to public policymaking. Traditionally, economics studied behavior in the
marketplace and assumed that individuals pursued their private interests; political science studied
behavior in the public arena and assumed that individuals pursued their own notion of the pub~
lie interest. Thus, separate versions of human motivation developed in economics and political
science: the idea of homo economicus assumed a self~interested actor seeking to maximize per~
sonal benefits; that of homo politicus assumed a public~spirited actor seeking to maximize societal
welfare.
But public choice theory challenges the notion that individuals act differently in politics from
the way they do in the marketplace. This theory assumes that all political actors-voters, taxpayers,
candidates, legislators, bureaucrats, interest groups, parties, and governments-seek to maxi~
mize their personal benefits in politics as well as in the marketplace. James Buchanan, the Nobel
Prize-winning economist and leading scholar in modem public choice theory, argues that individ~
uals come together in politics for their own mutual benefit, just as they come together in the mar~
ketplace; and by agreement (contract) among themselves they can enhance their own well~being,
in the same way as by trading in the marketplace.6 In short, people pursue their self~interest in
both politics and the marketplace, but even with selfish motives they can mutually benefit through
collective decision making.
Government itself arises from a social contract among individuals who agree for their mutual
benefit to obey laws and support the government in exchange for protection of their own lives,
liberties, and property. Thus, public choice theorists claim to be intellectual heirs to the English
political philosopher John Locke, as well as to Thomas Jefferson, who incorporated this social
contract notion into the American Declaration of Independence. Enlightened self~interest leads
individuals to a constitutional contract establishing a government to protect life, liberty, and
property.
Public choice theory recognizes that government must perform certain functions that the
marketplace is unable to handle; that is, it must remedy certain "market failures." First, govern~
ment must provide public goods-goods and services that must be supplied to everyone if they
are supplied to anyone. The market cannot provide public goods because their costs exceed
their value to any single buyer, and a single buyer would not be in a position to keep nonbuyers
26 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
Pollution as an Ugly "Extemaltty" Beach Litter at the Pembrookshire National Park creates an ugly scene. Public
choice tfleory views polhrt:ion as an "externality," a failure ofthe marlcetplace and a justification for government intervention.
Externalities are created when persons, firms, or governments impose uncompensated costs on others. («:> Andrew
Davies/SpecialistStockfCorbis)
Publtc Chotce: Applytng the Model
The public choice theory is employed
in Chapter 13, "'Energy and the
Environment: Externalities and
Interests,H to aid in recognizing environmental
pollution as a problem in
the control of externalities in human
activity. Public choice theory also
helps us to understand the behavior of
environmental interest groups in dramatizing
and publicizing their cause.
from using it. National defense is the most common example: pro,
tection from foreign invasion is too expensive for a single person
to buy, and once it is provided no one can be excluded from its
benefits. So people must act collectively through government to
provide for the common defense. Second, externalities are another
recognized market failure and justification for government inter;
vention. An externality occurs when an activity of one individ,
ual, firm, or local government imposes uncompensated costs on
others. The most common examples are air and water pollution:
the discharge ofair and water pollutants imposes costs on others.
Governments respond by either regulating the activities that pr~
duce externalities or imposing penalties (fines) on these activities
to compensate for their costs to society.
Public choice theory helps to explain why political parties and candidates generally fail to
offer clear policy alternatives in election campaigns. Parties and candidates are not interested
in advancing principles but rather in winning elections. They formulate their policy positions
to win elections; they do not win elections to formulate policy. Thus, each party and candidate
seeks policy positions that will attract the greatest number of voters.7 Given aunimodal dist:ribu,,
tion ofopinion on any policy question (see Figure 2~), parties and candidates wiU move toward the
Game Theory: Policy as Rational Choice in Competitive Situations 27
~
Q)
g
0
~
Q)
..c
E
:::::1
z
Liberal
Party A Party B
Conservative
Policy Position
FIGURE 2-6 Public Choice: A Vote-Maximizing Model of Party
Competition Public choice theory assumes that individuals and
organizations seek to maximize their own benefits in politics; for
example, parties and candidates whose policy views may be distinctly
Liberal or conservative move to the center at election time to win the
most votes.
center to maximize votes. Only "ideologues" (irrational, ideologically motivated people) ignore
the vote~maximizing centrist strategy.
GAME THEORY: POLICY AS RATIONAL CHOICE
IN COMPETITIVE SITUATIONS
Game theory is the study of decisions in situations in which two or more rational participants have
choices to make and the outcome depends on the choices made by each. It is applied to areas in
policymaking in which there is no independently "best" choice that one can make-in which the
"best" outcomes depend upon what others do.
The idea of "game" is that rational decision makers are involved in choices that are inter~
dependent. "Players" must adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own desires and abilities
but also their expectations about what others will do. Perhaps the connotation of a "game" is
unfortunate, suggesting that game theory is not really appropriate for serious conflict situations.
But just the opposite is true: game theory can be applied to decisions about war and peace, the
use of nuclear weapons, international diplomacy, bargaining and coalition building in Congress
or the United Nations, and a variety of other important political situations. A "player" may be an
individual, a group, or a national government-indeed, anybody with well~defined goals who is
capable of rational action.
Consider the game of"chicken." Two adolescents drive their cars toward each other at a high
speed, each with one set of wheels on the center line of the highway. If neither veers off course
they will crash. Whoever veers is "chicken." Both drivers prefer to avoid death, but they also
want to avoid the "dishonor" of being "chicken." The outcome depends on what both drivers
28 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
The game theorist himself or herselfsupplies the numerical values to the payoffs. If Driver A chooses to stay on course
and Driver B chooses to stay on course also, the result might be scored as -10 for both players, who wreck their cars.
But if Driver A chooses to stay on course and Driver B veers, then Driver A might get +5 ("courage") and Driver B
-5 ("dishonor"). If Driver A veers but Driver B stays on course, the results would be reversed. If both veer, each is
dishonored slightly (-1), but not as much as when one or the other stayed on course.
Stay on course
DRIVER B'S CHOICES
Veer
Stay on Course
A: -10
B: -10
A:+5
B:-5
DRIVER A'S CHOICES
Veer
A:-5
8:+5
A:-1
B:-1
FIGURE 2-7 A Game-Theoretic Matrix for the Game of Chicken Game theory suggests that policymakers,
or "players," adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own preferences but also the likely choices of
opponents.
do, and each driver must try to predict how the other will behave. This form of "brinkmanship"
is common in international relations (see Figure 2-7). Inspection of the payoff matrix suggests
that it would be better for both drivers to veer in order to minimize the possibility of a great loss
(-10). But the matrix is too simple. One or both players may place a different value on the out~
comes than is suggested by the numbers. For example, one player may prefer death to dishonor
in the game. Each player must try to calculate the values of the other, and neither has complete
information about the values of the opponent. Moreover, bluffing or the deliberate misrepre~
sentation of one's values or resources to an opponent is always a possibility. For example, a pos~
sible strategy in the game of chicken is to allow your opponent to see you drink heavily before
the game, stumble drunkenly toward your car, and mumble something about having lived long
enough in this rotten world. The effect of this communication on your opponent may increase
his or her estimate of your likelihood of staying on course, and hence provide incentive for your
opponent to veer and allow you to win.
An important component of game theory is the notion of deterrence. Deterrence is the effort
to prevent an opponent from undertaking an action by inspiring fear of the consequences of
Game Theory: Applying the Model
Game theory is frequently applied in
international conflicts. We wiLL explore
the utility of game theory, especiaLLy
the notion of deterrence, in Chapter 15,
"Defense Policy: Strategies for Serious
Games." We wiLL also explore the weakness
of deterrence in defending against
terrorism in Chapter 16, "Homeland
Security: Terrorism and Nondeterrable
Threats."
the action. Players engage in deterrence when they threaten their
opponents with retaliatory actions that promise to impose costs on
their opponents that are far in excess of any benefits their oppo~
nents might envision by taking these actions. Deterrence is really a
psychological defense: it tries to prevent opponents from undertaking a
particular action by creating in their minds the fear of costly retaliation.
The success of deterrence depends on the credibility of the
retaliatory threat and on the rationality of the opponent. Opponents
must truly believe that their actions will result in retaliatory
responses that inflict unacceptable costs on themselves, their peo~
ple, or their nation. Opponents who do not really believe a retalia~
tory attack will occur are not deterred. Moreover, opponents must
Models: How to Tell if They Are Helping or Not 29
be rational--opponents must weigh the potential costs and benefits of their actions and choose a
course of action that does not result in costs that exceed gains. Opponents who are irrationalwho
do not consider the costs of their actions to themselves, or their people, or their nation-are
not deterred.
MODELS: HOW TO TELL IF THEY ARE HELPING OR NOT
A model is merely an abstraction or representation of political life. When we think of political
systems or elites or groups or rational decision making or incrementalism or games, we are abstract~
ing from the real world in an attempt to simplify, clarify, and understand what is really important
about politics. Before we begin our study of public policy, let us set forth some general criteria for
evaluating the usefulness of concepts and models.
Order and Simplify Reality
Certainly the utility of a model lies in its ability to order and simplify political life so that we can
think about it more clearly and understand the relationships we find in the real world. Yet too
much simplification can lead to inaccuracies in our thinking about reality. On the one hand, if
a concept is too narrow or identifies only superficial phenomena, we may not be able to use it
to explain public policy. On the other hand, if a concept is too broad and suggests overly com~
plex relationships, it may become so complicated and unmanageable that it is not really an aid to
understanding. In other words, some theories of politics may be too complex to be helpful, while
others may be too simplistic.
Identify What Is Significant
A model should also identify the really significant aspects of public policy. It should direct
attention away from irrelevant variables or circumstances and focus on the real causes and
significant consequences of public policy. Of course, what is "real," "relevant," or "significant"
is to some extent a function of an individual's personal values. But we can all agree that the
utility of a concept is related to its ability to identify what it is that is really important about
politics.
Be Congruent with Reality
Generally, a model should be congruent with reality-that is, it ought to have real empirical
referents. We would expect to have difficulty with a concept that identifies a process that does
not really occur or symbolizes phenomena that do not exist in the real world. However, we
must not be too quick to dismiss unrealistic concepts if they succeed in directing our attention
to why they are unrealistic. For example, no one contends that government decision making is
completely rational-public officials do not always act to maximize societal values and minimize
societal costs. Yet the concept of rational decision making may still be useful, albeit unrealistic,
if it makes us realize how irrational government decision making really is and prompts us to
inquire why.
30 Chapter 2 Models of Politics
Provide Meaningful Communication
A concept or model should also communicate something meaningful. If too many people disagree
over the meaning of a concept, its utility in communication is diminished. For example, if no one
really agrees on what constitutes an elite, the concept of an elite does not mean the same thing to
everyone. If one defines an elite as a group of democratically elected public officials who are repre~
sentative of the general public, one is communicating a different idea in using the term than one
who defines an elite as an unrepresentative minority that makes decisions for society based on its
own interests.
Direct Inquiry and Research
A model should help to direct inquiry and research into public policy. A concept should be opera~
tional-that is, it should refer directly to real~world phenomena that can be observed, measured,
and verified. A concept, or a series of interrelated concepts (which we refer to as a model), should
suggest relationships in the real world that can be tested and verified. If there is no way to prove or
disprove the ideas suggested by a concept, the concept is not really useful in developing a science
of politics.
Suggest Explanations
Finally, a model should suggest an explanation of public policy. It should suggest hypotheses about
the causes and consequences of public policy-hypotheses that can be tested against real~world
data. A model that merely describes public policy is not as useful as one that explains public policy,
or at least suggests some possible explanations.
SUMMARY
Political science uses a variety of conceptual models
to help explain political life and public policy.
1. The process model views policymaking as a
series of political activities.
2. The institutional model focuses attention
on the effects of political and governmental
institutions on public policy.
3. A rational model implies that government
should choose policies that maximize societal
gains and minimize costs.
4. An incremental model views public
policy largely as a continuation of past
MySearcblab®EXERCISES
government activities with only incremental
modifications.
5. Group theory views public policy as the
outcome of the struggle among societal
groups.
6. The elite model views public policy as the
preferences and values of the nations governing
elite.
7. Public choice theory applies economic analysis
to the study of public policy.
8. Game theory portrays policy as the outcome
of interaction between two or more rational
participants.
Apply what you learned in this chapter on MySearchLab (www.mysearchlab.com).
NOTES
1. See Charles E. Lindblom,"The Science of
Muddling Through," Public Administration
Review, 19 {Spring 1959), 79-88; Aaron
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).
2. The classic statement on group theory is
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process
(New York: Knopf, 1951).
3. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Earl Latham,''The Group Basis of Politics,"
in Political Behavior, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BucHANAN, }AMES M., and GoRDON TuLLOCK. The
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Michigan Press, 1962.
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DowNs, ANTHONY. An Economic Theory of Democracy.
New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
DYE, THoMAs R. Top Down Policymaking. Washington,
DC: CQ Press, 2000.
WEB SITES
AMERICAN PoLITICAL SciENCE AssociATION. Home
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Web Sites 31
Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (New York:
Free Press, 1956), p. 239.
5. Elite theory is explained at length in
Thomas R. Dye and Harmon Zeigler, The
Irony of Democracy, 14th ed. (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2009).
6. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus ofConsent (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1962).
7. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
LINDBWM, CHARLES E., and EDWARD J. WooDHOUSE.
The Policy-Making Process, 3rd ed. New York:
Longman, 1993.
TRUMAN, DAVID B. The Government Process. New York:
Knopf, 1954.
WATSON, JoEL. Strategy: An Introduction to Game
Theory. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
WILDAVSKY, AARoN. The New Politics of the Budgetary
Process, 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.
THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION. Home page of the
Gallup public opinion organization. www.gallup.
com
NATIONAL CENTER FOR PoLICY RESEARCH. Conservative
policy research organization, with studies on
a variety ofpolicy issues. www.nationalcenter.org
PRoGRESSIVE PoLICY INSTITUTE. Liberal policy research
organization, with policy briefs on a variety of
issues. www.ppionline.org
NATIONAL IssuEs. Collection of current articles on
a variety of policy issues. www.nationalissues.com
Prasfdentlal PoUcy "lmtfatlon" President Barack Obama delivers the annual State of the Union Address to the Congress ofthe
United States in 2010. The State of the Union Address, together with the Budget of the United States Government, sets forth the
presidenrs policy proposals for the coming year. This constitutional obligation recognizes the president as the chief initiator of
policy, with the Congress playing a deliberative role-accepting, amending, or rejecting the presidenrs proposals. Only occasionally
does the Congress attempt to assume policy leadership. (Cl Brooks Kraft/Corbis)