CHAPTER SEVEN
Escalation and Deescalation
an israeli army jeep patrols the streets of Hebron in occupied
Palestine. It has been doing this for months, without incident. But
today things go differently. Suddenly, a crowd of young Palestinians
starts throwing rocks at the jeep. The Israeli soldiers respond with gunﬁre.
Several youths are wounded. And an upward spiral of violence is
begun. Why?
Answers to this question cannot be found in the writings of classical
theoreticians. Although they spent considerable effort on the
fundamental causes of conﬂict, they were, by and large, uninterested
in its dynamics.1
Much more relevant for us are modern writers such
as Coleman (1957), Deutsch (1973), Pruitt and Rubin (1986), and
Kriesberg (1998). Their writings suggest that certain fundamental –
and controversial – aspects of escalation need to be considered ﬁrst.
Main Ingredients of Escalation
We may begin by asking a deceptively simple question. What makes
conﬂict escalation different from processes considered so far? And the
answer is again seemingly simple: the fact that there are two (or more)
contestants – the “Party” and the “Opponent” – who interact with each
other. This fact is of crucial theoretical importance, because it suggests
that Party’s escalation is driven by two separate forces: one that originates
within the Party itself, the other that originates in its Opponent.
98
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 99
The ﬁrst force may be called “unilateral” escalation (or deescalation),
the other “reciprocated” escalation (or deescalation). Let us begin by
considering how these two forces contribute to the intensiﬁcation of
the conﬂict.
Unilateral Escalation
A Party may wish to escalate unilaterally for any of the reasons we discussed
in Chapter 3. It may escalate because it has been deprived,
relatively or absolutely, by its Opponent; because it has a belligerent
culture or personality; because it plays a role that is incompatible
with that of the Opponent; or because its values are different
from the Opponent’s (see Figure 3.2). Unilateral escalation can also
occur for reasons discussed in Chapter 5, such as past and present
grievances, high level of frustration, or conﬂict-promoting interaction
(see Figure 5.2).
But Party can also escalate because, under certain circumstances,
escalation is rational. For example, when Party has overwhelming power
over its opponent, it makes sense to use it to overcome Opponent’s
resistance. In some cases, overwhelming power is used at the very beginning
of the struggle. For example, when the Germans attacked
Poland in 1939, they used every destructive means at their disposal, including
devastating bombing of civilian targets. In other cases, power
is applied mercilessly to subdue lasting resistance. And, sad to say, such
ruthlessness often pays – perhaps because Opponent, thinking rationally,
concludes that resistance is useless. For example, when the Nazis
annihilated the village of Lidice following the assassination by Czech
patriots of Heindrich, the Nazi governor of Czechoslovakia, the Czechs
were frightened by this savagery and concluded that extreme acts of
violence against the Germans were not in their best interests.
But extreme force, though effective in the short run, might ultimately
backﬁre. Particularly when it takes an unacceptable form, it
may anger the opponents, thereby increasing their solidarity and, ultimately,
their power. Familiar with this principle, savvy politicians often
try to provoke their more powerful opponents. For example, Fidel
Castro advanced his revolution against the Batista regime by attacking
small army units and provoking the government into harsh reprisals.
This strategy was successful, increasing Castro’s following and resulting
100 USING CONFLICT THEORY
in his victory. On the other hand, rational parties can refuse to be provoked.
For example, when Che Guevara tried Castro’s approach in
Venezuela, the government used only speciﬁc and limited countermeasures.
The insurrection failed (Kriesberg [1973] 1982, 203).
Reciprocated Escalation
Retaliation is a special case of reciprocation: it contributes to escalation
(whereas reciprocation may drive deescalation as well), and it often involves
greater violence than used by Opponent (whereas reciprocation
usually matches Opponent’s violence). In spite of these differences,
retaliation is driven by the same forces as reciprocation.
Retaliation (and, more broadly, reciprocation) often occurs for the
same reasons as unilateral escalation. It may be due to the distant past,
such as an injustice inﬂicted on one’s ancestors; it may be based on Opponent’s
recent actions, such as his latest atrocity; it may occur because
the actor is rational, such as when he or she has overwhelming power
over his or her adversary; or it may be due to his or her belligerent
ideology or personality.
Although identifying the main causes of retaliation is relatively easy,
specifying its consequences is much more difﬁcult. Does it invite further
retaliation? Or does it promote submission? Results of empirical
studies are inconclusive. Some research suggests that escalation invites
retaliation. For example, when in the 1960s college administrators responded
to students’ antiwar demonstrations by applying severe sanctions,
the conﬂicts tended to escalate (Morgan 1977). Other research
suggests quite the opposite. For example, highly coercive regimes tend
to have lower levels of internal conﬂict than regimes that are only moderately
coercive (Walton 1970).
In order to explain these seemingly inconsistent ﬁndings, let us
make two observations. First, retaliation seems to be a “normal” and
automatic reaction. As Coleman (1957, 13) puts it, “If you fail to smile,
but scowl instead, I may say a harsh word; you respond in kind, and
another chain of mutual reinforcement builds up – this time toward
antagonism. . . . The admonition to ‘turn the other cheek’ is not easily
obeyed.” The tendency to retaliate becomes even more entrenched
when it is culturally sanctioned. Thus the Old Testament demands
“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” – and the Israeli government
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 101
often uses this rule as a guide for its national policy. Many cultures,
including mainstream U.S. culture, emphasize and sanction the positive
side of reciprocation: when somebody does me a favor, I should
return it.
Second, reciprocation (and sometimes retaliation) seems eminently
rational under certain circumstances. For example, the so-called
tit-for-tat strategy, recommended by some versions of the so-called
theory of games (see Luce and Raiffa 1967; Axelrod 1984), relies
heavily on reciprocation: when Opponent escalates, Party should escalate;
when he or she deescalates, Party should deescalate as well.
But this version of the tit-for-tat strategy does not stop there: it also
speciﬁes that, occasionally, Party should deescalate unilaterally. As the
Sicilian vendetta illustrates, reciprocation locks the adversaries into
a never-ending conﬂict that cannot be terminated unless somebody
takes the ﬁrst step toward reconciliation. Nonetheless, reciprocation
is both natural and, under most circumstances, rational.
Hence we propose the following view of retaliation. Most fundamentally,
retaliation should be viewed as a natural, spontaneous, and often
irrational response to coercion. This natural human tendency, however,
coexists with another, rational deliberation. In some instances,
the two forces are in harmony, but in other cases they are in opposition.
And in some cases, such as when facing overwhelming power,
rationality wins. These cases should be viewed as evidence that, when
the pressure is on, reason often overwhelms – but never extinguishes –
nature.
Thus use of force can have two different consequences: when it is
relatively weak, it tends to provoke retaliation; when it is overpowering,
it tends to induce submission. But we must always remember that the
use of extreme force may backﬁre in the long run.
Let us take a moment to consider a related issue – the controversy
about the so-called realistic perspective on foreign affairs (Morgenthau
1960). According to that perspective, a state should be viewed as a rational
actor that uses force to maximize its power. And the best way for
a state to prevent war with its neighbors is to become much more powerful
than they are. This theory has been opposed on many grounds.
One of them is that when a state attempts to increase its power, its
neighbors are likely to reciprocate by increasing theirs, thus creating
an arms race that precipitates a war. In practice, the realists often
102 USING CONFLICT THEORY
advocate creating a superpower that keeps peace, while their opponents
advocate a balance of power among equals (Kriesberg 1998,
137, 171).
Our theory may shed some light on the controversy. It suggests that,
as the realists argue, nations with overwhelming power indeed can
maintain peace. After all, the Romans did it and the United States
seems to be doing it. But there are at least two difﬁculties. First,
attempts to achieve such supremacy usually proceed in small increments
– and that provokes reciprocation, an arms race, and ultimately
threatens peace. Second, when the superpower is forced to actually
use extreme force, it provokes hostility, empowers the opposition, and
ultimately endangers peace. Thus we may conclude that, when unusual
circumstances have already thrust a nation into the position
of an unchallenged superpower, that superpower may help to keep
peace – for a while. But when a nation disturbs an existing balance
of power by trying to achieve superpower status, it endangers – rather
than promotes – peace.
Hostility-Driven Escalation
As you just saw, the fact that a conﬂict involves two (or more) interacting
participants compelled us to distinguish between two aspects of a
Party’s escalation, unilateral and reciprocated. Equally compelling is
another distinction, between conﬂicts driven by goal incompatibility
and those driven by hostility. Because hostility gives conﬂicts a unique
ﬂavor, it merits special consideration.
To begin with, hostility-driven escalation tends to occur for totally
trivial reasons, such as a harsh word or unfriendly look. It also tends
to be unnecessarily violent, as exempliﬁed when Israelis use live ammunition
to disperse a crowd of rock-throwing teenagers, and when
Palestinians retaliate by exploding bombs on crowded streets of Israeli
towns. Finally, escalation and deescalation may occur with surprising
suddenness, such as when riot police quickly disperse demonstrators
with water cannons and tear gas.
Moreover, hostility springs from different sources than goal incompatibility:
whereas goal incompatibility stems from contests over resources
or incompatible roles or values (Figure 3.2), hostility is caused
primarily by grievances and frustration (Figure 5.2). Some grievances
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 103
might be very old, such as when a Serb hates all Muslims because of
the ﬁfteenth-century Turkish victory over Serbs.
A Model of Escalation
You may agree with the main point made so far, that Party’s escalation
is driven by three forces: its own interests, acts of its Opponent, and its
hostility. You may also readily agree to the next point, that escalation
will slow down, stop, and eventually turn into deescalation if these
forces undergo certain changes: if Party starts deescalating, if Opponent
starts deescalating, if hatred is replaced by friendship.
Yet for certain important questions our discussion does not provide
a ready answer. Can escalation stop even when these three basic
forces do not change? What will happen if Party continues escalating
even though Opponent is ready to deescalate? Can lasting peace be
obtained without establishing a friendly relationship between former
foes? A formal model of conﬂict can provide the answers.
Basic Equations
The model consists of the following two equations:
dP/dt = r O − uP + h
r, u > 0
dO/dt = rP − uO + h
(7.1)
To a mathematician, these equations are simple. Although they may
send you into shock, there is a simple cure for that: read each equation
as if it stated the very same ideas as we just expressed in plain English – that
is, correlate English expressions with the symbols in the equation.
Observe that, to make this easier, we use symbols that correspond to
the ﬁrst letter of the English expression: P is used forParty, O for
Opponent, and so on. Some of the important “translations” follow:
1. Instead of speaking of “escalation,” the equation “says” dP/dt.
2. Instead of speaking about “unilateral deescalation,” the equation
uses −uP.2
3. Instead of speaking about “reciprocated escalation,” it uses rO.3
4. Instead of “hostility,” it uses h.
104 USING CONFLICT THEORY
With these interpretations in mind, you can see that the ﬁrst equation
in equations 7.1 says that Party’s escalation (d P/t) depends on its
readiness to reciprocate Opponent’s escalation (r O), on its readiness to deescalate
unilaterally (−uP), and on its hostility toward its opponent (h). The
second equation says the very same thing about the other side, the
Opponent.
You gain further insights when you realize that the equations’
right-hand side refers to certain “inner” tendencies, what the actors
contemplate doing, and the left-hand side to what the actors actually do.
The actors are portrayed as inﬂuenced by three distinct impulses: to
retaliate, to escalate, and to express hostility. What they actually do –
how much they actually escalate – is a compromise between these three
impulses. Technically, the compromise is reached by adding the three
impulses together. If you keep this point in mind, you will see that
it is perfectly possible for Party to wish to escalate and yet act in a
deescalatory manner.
Still, several puzzles remain. One of these concerns the symbols
“inside” the expressions such as rO: do r and O have meaning of their
own? They do. The following list – again, for simplicity’s sake, focusing
on the Party – might provide some answers:
P: coerciveness of Party’s action.
O: coerciveness of Opponent’s action.
dP/dt: escalation in Party’s coerciveness.4
r: extent to which Party wishes to reciprocate.5
u: extent to which Party wishes to act unilaterally.
h: extent to which Party wishes to express hostility.6
rO: Party’s reciprocation.
uP: Party’s unilateral escalation.
This list suggests that there is a conceptual distinction between
terms such as r and O. The term r corresponds to the extent to which
Party reciprocates throughout the conﬂict, O corresponds to Opponent’s
coerciveness. You may think of r as an “internal” tendency or
disposition that “normally” does not change because it is “ingrained” in
the actor’s personality or culture.7
Such terms are called “parameters.”
Term O refers to actual behavior, to the level of coerciveness used
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 105
by the Opponent. Because Opponent’s coerciveness can – and usually
does – change, it is called a “variable.”
You may also wonder why the three terms on the right-hand side are
added together. Why are they not multiplied? The answer is that these
equations are nearly identical to those used by Richardson (1960) to
determine the conditions under which an arms race could be contained.
Being familiar with various models of physical systems with
feedbacks,8
he chose one of the simplest – the equations 7.1.9
We
might add that, to make our discussion of the model as simple as possible,
a very special case is considered here: the adversaries are assumed
to have the same parameters r, u, and h.
Finally, you may wonder why we use −uP instead of +uP. The reason
is purely technical.10
Unfortunately, the term, −uP can be confusing.
But this confusion can be relieved if you remember two points.
(1) In general, the parameter u stands for the extent to which Party
acts unilaterally. (2) When we assume that u is a positive number, the
expression −uP signiﬁes that Party contemplates deescalation; when
we assume that u is a negative number, the expression −uP speciﬁes
that Party contemplates escalation.
Contributions of the Model
Remember that we promised earlier that a formal model would help us
answer three important questions. Can escalation stop even when the
“inner” predispositions (r, u, and h) do not change? What will happen
if only one opponent stops escalating? Can lasting peace be obtained
without establishing a friendly relationship between former foes?
To answer the ﬁrst question, we must for a moment go back to
Richardson’s analysis. By examining the implications of the equations
7.1, Richardson showed that the complex give-and-take of escalation
has a fairly simple endpoint: usually, Party’s coercivenes converges
toward an equilibrium.11
More precisely, if (and only if) it is true that
h > 0 and u > r, (7.2)
then the process will approach an equilibrium state given by Party’s
coerciveness P∗
and Opponent’s coerciveness O∗
as:
P∗
= O∗
=
h
u − r
(7.3)
106 USING CONFLICT THEORY
In plain English: if two similar12
adversaries are hostile toward each
other but are more intent on curbing escalation than on retaliating
(the equations 7.2), then their coerciveness will approach the level
given by equation 7.3, and, once reaching it, will stay at that level.
Furthermore, it can be shown that Party will escalate if its ﬁrst conﬂict
action falls below its equilibrium point. For example, suppose that two boys
have been competing in a schoolyard, getting increasingly irritated
with each other. Finally, open ﬁghting breaks out as one of the boys
yells that the other is cheating. Considering how hostile the boy feels
and how much he wants to win, this action is fairly mild, much less
than what it is bound to become. (Translation: the ﬁrst conﬂict action
is below the equilibrium point.) The other boy responds by calling the
ﬁrst boy a “creep”; the ﬁrst boy responds by hitting him; the second boy
hits back even harder; and so on. Ultimately, they are ﬁghting steadily,
exchanging blows whose severity is determined by their anger and will
to win the contest. It stays at that level for a while. (Translation: they
reached the equilibrium point and are remaining at it.) Of course, they
will not ﬁght indeﬁnitely: either they become exhausted, one of them
gives up, or the teacher breaks up the ﬁght. (These are deescalation
processes, to be considered shortly.)
We are now ready to answer the ﬁrst question: even when Party’s
“inner” tendencies (speciﬁed by parameters r, u, and h) remain unchanged,
its overt behavior can change dramatically, going from escalation
to a steady – equilibrium – level of coerciveness. This will
happen if (1) Party is hostile toward Opponent (if h is positive), if (2) it
is more intent on curbing escalation than on retaliating (if u > r),13
and if (3) Party starts below the equilibrium level of coerciveness (see
equation 7.3).
A visual illustration might be helpful at this point. Suppose that
the two adversaries’ parameters (r , u, and h) are identical and that, although
they are hostile to each other (h > 0), they prefer deescalation
to retaliation (u > r) – thus satisfying condition 7.2. We chose parameters
that meet these assumptions and, although somewhat arbitrary,
are fairly realistic:
dP/dt = .3Y − .8P + 5
dY/dt = .3P − .8Y + 5
(7.4)
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 107
2: Opponent
1: Party
Coerciveness 121212121212
12
1.00 5.75 10.50 15.25 20.00
Time
Figure 7.1. Escalating toward an Equilibrium
Moreover, to make our illustration more informative, we assumed that
Party starts being more aggressive than Opponent.
Using these equations in a computer simulation, we obtained a
picture shown in Figure 7.1. Note that, because the inequalities in (7.2)
are satisﬁed, both actors’ coerciveness converges toward equilibrium;
because both start below the equilibrium, their coerciveness escalates
until the equilibrium level is reached; because they have the same
parameters, they reach the same equilibrium. Note that the fact that
they start at a different level of coerciveness does not matter – the equilibrium
level depends only on the three parameters.
The second question was, What will happen if Party continues escalation
even though Opponent is ready to deescalate? To answer this
question, we ran another computer simulation. We again used equations
7.4 but with one modiﬁcation: we made Party quarrelsome by
setting its unilateral deescalation parameter to u = −1. The results
are shown in Figure 7.2: as expected, Party continues its nonstop escalation;
but – and this may come as a surprise – Opponent engages in
nonstop escalation as well, in spite of his conciliatory intentions!
108 USING CONFLICT THEORY
1.00 5.75 10.50 15.25 20.00
1
1
2
2
22222
1
1
1
1
1
Time
2: Opponent
1: Party
Coerciveness
Figure 7.2. Party’s Strong Tendency to Escalate Causes Opponent to Escalate
As Well
We now can answer the second question: as long as Party is on the
path of ever increasing escalation, Opponent will follow suit even when
he does not want to. This discrepancy between his intentions and his
actual behavior occurs because, once Party is locked in an uncompromising
stance, once its parameters guarantee never-ending escalation,
Opponent’s tendency to reciprocate (rP) is sufﬁcient to pull him into
what he does not wish to do, resulting in a runaway escalation.
The third question our model was supposed to answer was, Can
stable peace be obtained without establishing a friendly relationship
between former foes? If we understand by “stable peace” a condition
of zero coerciveness,14
then the answer is, No, lasting peace can be
obtained only when all hostilities disappear. This is because the only
way of achieving an equilibrium of P∗
= O∗
= 0 is when h = 0.15
The Model and the Real World
Rapoport ([1960] 1961, 37) shows that the equations 7.1 do a fairly
good job of predicting what Richardson intended them to predict – an
arms race. But when they are used to do what they were not designed
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 109
to do – to describe general conﬂict behavior – do they perform equally
well? The answer seems to be that they do, provided we change some
of the assumptions we made in equations 7.1.
We may start by considering the assumption about the ﬁrst parameter,
the reciprocation parameter r. Were we justiﬁed assuming that
the actors will always try to reciprocate (r > 0)? Recall that we argued
that, although the tendency to retaliate (and, more generally, to reciprocate)
can be “outvoted” by rational considerations, it can never be
extinguished. This means that our original assumption was correct, that
actors will always reciprocate (that r will always be a positive number).
But the assumption that actors will always try to deescalate the conﬂict
(that u > 0) is a different story. We have argued that under certain
conditions actors may in fact escalate so heavily that their tendency to
act unilaterally must be escalatory (that parameter u must be negative).
This can happen when an aggressor, wanting to win quickly,
uses all the force he or she can muster; when a nation has overwhelming
power; or when an actor has a belligerent personality or culture.
Thus we must allow that the unilateral action parameter u be not only
positive but negative as well.
But we must recognize that if the conﬂict lasts long enough, actors
with a tendency to escalate unilaterally (u < 0) are bound to reverse
themselves. Sooner or later, a feedback will occur that forces them to
halt escalation and, ultimately, to start unilateral deescalation (u > 0) –
if for no other reason than because they have reached the end of their
resources. (See the discussion of feedbacks given later in this chapter.)
Escalation Due to “Original” Conditions
Because much of the early escalation in a conﬂict is due to the same
main conditions that led to the start of open conﬂict actions, the theory
of Chapter 5 helps us to understand not only why conﬂicts become
open but also why they escalate. In particular, high conﬂict solidarity
and abundant conﬂict resources – the main reasons for the start of
open conﬂicts (see Figure 5.2) – determine how much Party will escalate
unilaterally, how strongly it will reciprocate Opponent’s conﬂict
actions, and how hostile it will feel toward him. For example, the warlike
culture of the Apaches – an important component of their conﬂict
solidarity – would not only cause them to attack another tribe; it would
110 USING CONFLICT THEORY
also induce them to escalate violence once a conﬂict was on its way:
they might kill those who opposed them as well as those who did not,
and they might burn the entire village.
Escalation Due to Changing Conditions
Some conﬂicts last for a long time. For example, Israel and Syria have
maintained a sporadic conﬂict for decades. Syria did it by proxy, by
supporting radical movements that made sporadic attacks on Israel;
Israel did it more directly, by attacking suspected enemy bases with retaliatory
air strikes. But many conﬂicts, after remaining in an equilibrium
for a while, begin either to escalate or to deescalate. Technically,
this means that in these conﬂicts some of the model’s parameters (r, u,
or h) have changed.
To see what happens when even one of the parameters is changed,
let us rerun the simulation that yielded Figure 7.2. As in that ﬁgure, Opponent
favors deescalation while Party is bent on escalation (u = −.1).
But the situation soon changes: at time t = 10 Party starts favoring
strong unilateral deescalation (u = +.9). True, this is a drastic change,
but such changes can occur in the real world. For example, Party might
have suffered a crushing defeat that destroyed its resources and demoralized
its troops. In any case, as Figure 7.3 shows, the consequences of
1.00 5.75 10.50 15.25 20.00
Time
1
1
2
2
2
2
12
12 12
1
1
173.36
131
2: Opponent
1: Party
Coerciveness
Figure 7.3. When Party Starts Deescalating, Opponent Follows
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 111
this parameter shift are startling: at t = 10, Party (whose behavior is
represented by line 1) begins deescalating rapidly, continuing to do so
until it reaches an equilibrium of low coerciveness. Because we chose
the ﬁnal parameters of the two sides to be the same, Opponent and
Party ultimately reach the same equilibrium.
Why then do adversaries ever go above the equilibrium levels of coerciveness,
becoming more willing to escalate unilaterally, more bent
on revenge, or more hostile? Some of the causes are external to the
conﬂict itself. For example, one of the conﬂict groups may gain new
allies and thus become more powerful. But by far the most common
reason is that the feedbacks from the conﬂict transform the adversaries
themselves.
Feedbacks That Increase Escalation
As the conﬂict progresses, it unleashes certain processes that magnify
the propensities that govern escalation: the propensity to escalate
unilaterally, to retaliate, or to be hostile. Some of these changes occur
because of events that strengthen Party’s solidarity.
Increase in Conﬂict Solidarity. Some theories and research suggest
that conﬂict solidarity can increase because individual perceptions have
changed. As Kriesberg (1998, 152–154) notes, this happens when individual
members strive to resolve their “cognitive dissonance” by
justifying the violence of their actions; when they start to “perceive
selectively,” ignoring their own excesses and exaggerating those of
the opponents; and when, being “entrapped” by having invested
heavily in the conﬂict, they begin to protect their investments. Because
making these changes is not easy, they seek advice and reinforcement
from fellow members of the group, so free interaction
increases. This interaction ultimately results in a new, more radical
ideology and greater conﬂict solidarity. As an example of how these
processes can change individual perceptions, recall that, in the notso-distant
past, some presumably law-abiding Americans took part in
lynching – an action that was not only illegal but normally morally
repugnant.
Opponent’s coercive behavior also tends to strengthen conﬂict solidarity.
This is particularly true when the Opponent commits brutal
112 USING CONFLICT THEORY
acts, as when police beat up demonstrators or when the military executes
innocent civilians. Such acts cause the members of the aggrieved
group to see the opponents as subhuman and evil and create a desire
for revenge.
A long-lasting conﬂict can also increase conﬂict solidarity by making
the goals of the conﬂict groups more incompatible. This may occur when
radical groups – such as minorities or special interest groups – join in
the conﬂict, and their goals are added to the agenda. For example, an
early conﬂict between the timber industry and the U.S. Forest Service
was about areas in which trees might be cut. When environmentalists
joined the ﬁght, the industry’s right to cut any trees at all was questioned.
Another possibility is that, as conﬂict proceeds, minor issues
may gain symbolic importance (Kriesberg 1998, 158–159). For example,
the proposed regulation of hand guns may come to symbolize a
threat to a constitutional right to bear arms.
As conﬂict progresses, certain structural changes may occur. The
original leaders may become more radical; radical leaders may emerge
as marginal groups join the struggle; specialists in violence, such as
police and the military, may be brought in to direct conﬂict behavior.
All this tends to promote further escalation.
Increase in Conﬂict Resources. So far, we have been discussing feedbacks
that affect conﬂict solidarity and some processes related to it.
But Party’s changes in conﬂict resources can play an equally important
role: if they increase, unilateral escalation often results. Thus a wife
who has been unhappy with her marriage may decide to ﬁle for divorce
when she becomes ﬁnancially independent; nations at war may
capture weapons or territory that increase its capacity to escalate the
conﬂict.
Strategic Escalation. We need to account for a seemingly paradoxical
fact: Party often escalates when it is in danger of becoming weaker.
For example, a husband who has been ﬁghting with his wife discovers
that she is contemplating a divorce. To avoid heavy payments in case
a divorce occurs, he starts divesting himself of many of his funds (an
escalatory action). A general, on learning that the opposing army is
planning an attack, may forestall it by launching an attack of his own.
To account for this paradox, we need a new concept, one that takes into
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 113
account the fact that adversaries engage in strategic deliberations – the
concept of “strategic escalation.” Thus, when threatened, Party may
make a preemptive strike because to do so is to its strategic advantage
(because to do so is “rational”).
There are other situations that make strategic escalation advisable.
Some of them are “internal.” For example, when members grow dissatisﬁed
with the conﬂict, leaders may escalate in hopes that Opponent’s
response will infuriate their (Party’s) members and thus increase their
conﬂict solidarity.
Deescalation Due to Changing Conditions
After a conﬂict has been in an equilibrium for a long time, it tends to
deescalate. Again, some of the reasons may be external to the conﬂict
itself. For example, when NATO forces entered the Kosovo conﬂict,
Serbian forces began to withdraw. But there are internal reasons as
well, mainly the feedbacks from the conﬂict itself. Let us consider how
a change in action propensities may start a chain of deescalation.
Process of Deescalation
Our model suggests that a stalemated conﬂict will start deescalating
only if the equilibrium level of coerciveness (P∗
and O∗
) becomes lower.
And the equilibrium equation 7.3,
P∗
= O∗
=
h
u − r
,
suggests that this can occur for three main reasons: hostility (h) can
decrease, the tendency to deescalate (u) can increase, or the tendency
to retaliate (r) can become smaller.
Thus the stalemated conﬂict between the United States and Iraq
can start deescalating when the adversaries begin to be less hostile toward
each other (when their h decreases). For example, the media
in both countries may start depicting the opponent in less negative
terms. Deescalation can also start when both sides start deescalating
unilaterally more vigorously (when their u increases). For example,
the United States can start diminishing its ﬂights over Iraqi territory.
Or deescalation can start when the adversaries become less eager to
114 USING CONFLICT THEORY
retaliate (when r becomes smaller). For example, the United States may
decide not to tighten its embargo against Iraq when the latter refuses
to admit weapons inspectors to its military facilities.
The equations 7.1 suggest that, in order for deescalation to continue,
some of the three propensities (h, u, and r) must continue to
change in a manner that promotes deescalation. Thus the United States
and Iraq must become increasingly less hostile, or more intent on
curbing escalation, or less retaliatory. This approach makes sense intuitively:
if all three propensities remained the same while coerciveness
was decreasing, deescalation would soon stop at the level appropriate
to those propensities. But it is possible to prove this conclusion more
rigorously.16
Finally, the model suggests that deescalation will eliminate all coerciveness
(that P∗
and O∗
will become zero) only if all hostile feelings
stop (only if h becomes zero).17
Thus for the United States and Iraq to
stop all coercive interactions, their media may have to stop attacking
the other side altogether.
Feedbacks That Lead to Deescalation
As a struggle continues for a long time, forces may be unleashed that
lead to deescalation. Not suprisingly, they affect the main bases of
conﬂict action: conﬂict solidarity and conﬂict resources.
Decrease in Conﬂict Solidarity. As a war drags on, many individuals become
impoverished, possibly losing members of their families. At the
same time, the wealthy and the powerful may proﬁt from the conﬂict,
thus increasing social inequality and popular dissatisfaction with the
conﬂict. Military desertions and public demonstrations opposing the
conﬂict may occur with increasing frequency (Kriesberg 1998, 185).
Dissatisfaction and disillusionment that lower conﬂict solidarity may
bring about organizational changes. New leaders may emerge, opposing
the policies of the hard-liners, and advocating accommodation
with the enemy. The hard-liners may try to suppress the opposition,
but, as we saw earlier, this creates hostility toward them and ultimately
strengthens the opposition. For example, when, in the 1990s, the moderate
South African government freed Nelson Mandela, the leader of
the African National Congress (ANC), conservative white opposition
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 115
to the government grew, and in 1993 members of that opposition
assassinated a major ﬁgure in the ANC. This murder galvanized the
moderates into action: the ANC organized protest demonstrations and
the government arrested a member of the Conservative Party in connection
with the murder (Kriesberg 1998, 208).
Depletion of Conﬂict Resources. A long conﬂict also depletes adversaries’
conﬂict resources. The most obvious reason is that there are natural
limits on most conﬂict resources. For example, a labor union has only
limited funds to support the strikers; a nation has only a limited supply
of manpower and strategic materials such as oil; boys have only limited
strength they can apply against each other.
Another reason is that the conﬂict actions of the adversaries usually
destroy or disable each other’s “assets”: in a war, soldiers are killed, ships
are sunk, airplanes are shot down; during a strike, some of the strikers
may be arrested and put in jail; during a schoolyard ﬁght, the boys may
hurt each other. Wartime destruction not only hampers the efforts of
the ﬁghting forces but also causes shortages of food and disruption
of services, thus weakening conﬂict solidarity. But even nonmilitary
conﬂicts can lead to frustrating deprivations. When a union goes on
strike, the workers lose their pay and the company loses proﬁts; when
husband and wife ﬁght, they deprive each other of needed love and
support.
Strategic Deescalation. Depletion of conﬂict resources may do more
than hinder aggressive action, it may suggest that a fundamental reassessment
of conﬂict strategy is in order. After careful deliberation,
Party may decide that, even though it has sufﬁcient resources to continue
the struggle, the future looks bleak, and it may therefore decide
to sue for peace. Results may range from a total surrender that gives
the Opponent all or most of his goals to an accommodation in which
both sides reach some of their goals.
Ending the Conﬂict. Our earlier discussion notwithstanding,18
in the
real world the adversaries need not have the same levels of equilibrium
coerciveness. The adversary with more resources and greater conﬂict
solidarity will be able to sustain a higher level of coerciveness, thus gradually
wearing its opponent down. For example, when NATO became
116 USING CONFLICT THEORY
involved in the Kosovo conﬂict, the Serbs, being the weaker party, were
more eager to curb their coerciveness and less willing (and able) to retaliate
than were the NATO forces. Consequently, when that conﬂict
reached a stalemate, with NATO maintaining constant bombing of
Serb targets, the Serb position was gradually eroded. Finally, the Serbs
agreed to pull out of Kosovo, thus handing NATO what appeared to be
nearly complete victory, albeit at considerable human and economic
cost. Although the role of that bombing remains controversial,19
our
theory suggests that this show of overwhelming force made it rational
for Serbs to deescalate.
Of course, one can prevail by means other than wearing down the
opponent. In many cases, it sufﬁces for one of the adversaries suddenly
to become much stronger. This was the case when the United States
developed an atomic bomb and dropped it on Japan. Although Japan’s
forces were depleted by then and an end of war was in sight, Japan
probably capitulated earlier than it would have otherwise.20
But however the conﬂict ends, what matters most is what happens
afterward. Are the surrender terms so harsh that the defeated adversary
cannot live with them? When the Versailles treaty imposed humiliating
terms on Germany, the “victors” created conditions for a new, more
deadly conﬂict – World War II.
Ancient warriors were quite aware of this problem and had a cruel
“solution”: they often killed most of the defeated adversaries and
burned their towns to the ground. Fortunately, this strategy is impossible
today, so another approach is needed: the victors must be
generous, making it possible for the vanquished to live well. It is
not coincidental that victors in a sporting event heap praises on the
defeated opponent. Nor was it accidental that, some time after the
Germans were defeated in World War II, the United States offered
them economic help through the Marshall Plan. Although some scholars
question U.S. motivation, pointing out that this plan was very profitable
for American business, it is clear that it helped Germany reach
prosperity.
Accommodation. The second – and usually the best – way to end a conﬂict
is through an accommodation, an agreement that is acceptable
to both sides. The effectiveness of processes such as negotiation, mediation,
and arbitration has been well established (see Chapter 9).
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 117
Goal incom-
patibility
Conflict
Grievances solidarity Unilateral
Hostility escalation
Frustration Escalation
Reciprocation
Conflict-
promoting
interaction Hostility
Conflict
resources
Figure 7.4. Original Causes That Contribute to Escalation
Conclusions
One of the fundamental insights into escalation (and deescalation) is
that it may be driven by the very same causes that led to the outbreak
of hostilities in the ﬁrst place. Figure 7.4 expresses this insight graphically.
Note that this diagram is essentially the same as that given in
Figure 5.2: conﬂict solidarity and conﬂict resources again play a crucial
role. The main difference is that Figure 7.4 adds the three “forces”
that drive escalation: unilateral action (− uP), reciprocation (rO), and
hostility (h).
Although Figure 7.4 is largely self-explanatory, a clariﬁcation may
be helpful. Note that “hostility” appears twice, once as a cause of conﬂict
solidarity (original hostility), and once as a consequence of solidarity
(subsequent hostility). This is meant to suggest that the process
that increases conﬂict solidarity also tends to increase hostility toward
Opponent.
Although escalation can occur even when the original conditions do
not change, typically they do change. Theoretically most interesting are
the changes caused by the conﬂict itself, by its “feedbacks.” Figure 7.5
shows the most important escalatory feedbacks. It shows that some
feedbacks increase conﬂict solidarity. As reports of the opponents’ brutality
come in, members of the conﬂict group become increasingly
angry; as radical groups begin to participate in the conﬂict, and as
118 USING CONFLICT THEORY
Threat that opponent’s
resources will increase
Increase in own
resources
Strategic
escalation
Ongoing
conflict
Opponent’s
atrocities
Involvement of
radical groups
Leadership of
Greater conflict experts
conflict
solidarity Psychological Own
adjustments atrocities
Figure 7.5. Feedbacks Leading to Escalation
coerciveness experts move into leadership positions, the group’s ideology
becomes more radical; as it becomes obvious that “our side” is committing
brutal acts as well, members undergo psychological changes
that justify their actions and increase their participation. Other feedbacks,
such as their side’s victory, may increase their resources.
Ongoing conﬂict may also create conditions that call for strategic
escalation: if Party is threatened with an increase in Opponent’s resources,
it may be wise for it to make a preemptive strike; if its resources
are signiﬁcantly increased, then it may escalate in hopes of prevailing.
Note that one arrow in Figure 7.5 leads directly from “ongoing conﬂict”
to “strategic escalation”: this indicates that there may be other
feedbacks (not considered here) that invite strategic reassessment.
But a conﬂict can also create feedbacks that lead to deescalation.
As Figure 7.6 shows, when the conﬂict has lasted for a long time, it
generates feedbacks that decrease both conﬂict solidarity and conﬂict
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 119
Strategic Depleted
deescalation conflict
resources
Fewer
conflict
resources Personal Prolonged
losses conflict
Lesser
conflict Increased
solidarity inequality
Moderate
leadership
Figure 7.6. Feedbacks Leading to Deescalation
resources. Conﬂict solidarity may decrease because many are losing
wealth or family members; because proﬁteering increases economic
inequality; because, as fatigue spreads, moderate leaders gain power.
Moreover, as conﬂict continues, conﬂict resources get depleted. This
affects Party’s coerciveness in two ways: it decreases Party’s ability to
engage in coercive action and thus forces unilateral deescalation;21
and it calls for strategic reassessment that might suggest even more
drastic deescalation.
Not all conﬂicts end through gradual deescalation; some end in
sudden one-sided defeat. The old wisdom that one can win the war but
lose the peace is very pertinent here. Unless the “victors” are generous
and allow the defeated adversary to live well and with dignity, they will
have created conditions favoring a new conﬂict – one that they may
not win.
In the next chapter we shall apply our escalation theory to the
Bosnian civil war. But ﬁrst, it may be helpful to revisit the civil rights
conﬂict to see how our theory could account for its escalation.
The Civil Rights Struggle Revisited
If we review the historical path of the sit-ins in the civil rights struggle,
we can see clearly how the “root” causes, working through intermediate
causes, moved the activists and their opponents toward escalation.
Of course, not all the conditions need be present to the same degree
120 USING CONFLICT THEORY
for escalation to occur. The ideological tenets of racial equality and
nonviolent resistance to evil led the civil rights advocates to some acts
of unilateral escalation. Ideology also gave them a long-term perspective
requiring that they stand ﬁrm, even if that ﬁrmness was perceived
by their segregationist opponents as retaliation. Clear value incompatibility
between protesters and southern white society produced high
levels of black resentment, or what one may call restrained hostility.
The frustration over the slow pace of integration and an increased
sense of the injustice caused by unequal treatment combined to raise
protester hostility levels. A mood of challenge, readiness to push further,
and increasingly hostile feelings combined to move the sit-in
protesters to escalate the conﬂict.
It would be difﬁcult to imagine less compatible sets of values than
those that confronted one another in the South during the sit-ins.
Racial integration and racial segregation were diametrically opposed
concepts and practices. A majority of southern whites believed in racial
inequality and separation. That such a deeply rooted belief and practice,
indeed an entire way of life, was being called into question was
deeply disturbing to most whites. A high level of frustration and anxiety
was thereby produced among them.
Then there were the injustices and grievances perceived by the
defenders of segregation. For a century, as they saw it, during the
Civil War and after, the Union side had imposed its power and prejudice
upon the South. The resentment of the loser was still very much
present. With the racial integration the North was imposing its culture
and racial etiquette as well. These factors combined to produce
high levels of hostility, belligerence, and readiness to retaliate among
southern whites. Thus the potential for escalation was high, and it did
indeed occur over long periods and in many racial settings during the
1960s.
Escalation was also fueled by increasing solidarity. In the sit-in movement,
the African American students had many northern supporters
and a high level of solidarity to give them substantial if not overwhelming
power. The conviction of moral rightness was an additional source
of their strength.22
These conditions raised their readiness to be coercive
through physical intervention in the places that denied them
service by custom and law. Their conﬁdence also grew that they could
successfully retaliate against their opponents’ resistance.
ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION 121
Their opponents, the white segregationists, were likewise persuaded
toward escalation. Like the protesters, they felt that moral authority
(“separate is right”), backed by southern law and custom, was on their
side. Racial solidarity (despite obvious class differences) among whites
empowered them. They had most of the wealth, all of the police power,
and a major part of the organizational know-how to serve their resistance
to this challenge by blacks. And they certainly had a belligerent
ideology – combining southern military tradition, vigilante violence,
and racial hatred. These factors heightened their readiness to escalate
and to suppress the open challenge to Southern racial power
distribution that civil rights activism represented.