MAX WEBER
On
The Methodology of the Social Sciences
Translated and Edited by
EDWARD A. SHILS and HENRY A. FINCH
With a Foreword by
EDWARD A. SHILS
THE FREE PRESS of G L E N C O E ,
ILLINOIS
19 4 9
Copyright 1949 by The Free Press
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form without permission in writirig from the publisher, except by a
reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a
magazine or neivspaper.
Printed in the United States of America
FIRST EDITION
W^^
FOREWORD
I
The essays in this book were written, as all methodological essays
should be written, in the closest intimacy with actual research and
against a background of constant and intensive meditation on the
substantive problems of the theory and strategy of the social sciences.
They were written in the years between 1903 and 1917, the most productive
years of Max Weber's life, when he was working on his studies
in the sociology of religion and on the second and third parts of Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft. Even before the earliest of the three published
here
—" 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy"^— was written,
Weber had achieved eminence in Germany in a variety of fields.
He had already done important work in economic and legal history
and had taught economic theory as the incumbent of one of the most
famous chairs in Germany; on the basis of original investigations, he
had acquired a specialist's knowledge of the details of German economic
and social structure. His always vital concern for the political
prosperity of Germany among the nations had thrust him deeply into
the discussion of political ideals and programmes. Thus he did not
come to the methodology of the social sciences as an outsider who
seeks to impose standards on practices and problems of which he is
ignorant. The interest which his methodology holds for us to-day is
to a great extent a result of this feature of Weber's career just as some
of its shortcomings from our present point of view may perhaps be
attributed to the fact that some of the methodological problems which
he treated could not be satisfactorily resolved prior to certain actual
developments in research technique.
The essay on "Objectivity" had its immediate origins in his desire
to clarify the implications of a very concrete problem. Weber, together
1 First published in the Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in
1904.
iv FOREWORD
with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaflfe, was assuming the editorship
of the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschajt und Sozialpolitik which was, from
his assumption of editorial rcsponsibiHty in 1904 until its suspension in
1933, probably the greatest periodical publication in the field of the
social sciences in any language. He wished to make explicit the
standards which the editors would apply and to which they would
expect their contributors to conform. In doing so, his powerful mind,
which strove restlessly for clarity at levels where his contemporaries
were satisfied with ambiguities and cliches, drove through to the fundamental
problems of the relationship between general sociological concepts
and propositions on the one hand, and concrete historical reality
on the other. Another problem which was to engage him imtil his
death — the problem of the relationship between evaluative standpoints
or normative judgments and empirical knowledge — received
its first full statement in this essay.
"Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" was published
in the Archiv in 1905. It must have been in the process of
production while he was also busy with a large scale investigation of
certain aspects of German rural society and with The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism. The intricate task of explaining causally
the emergence of an "historical individual" (in this instance, modern
capitalism) finds its methodological reflection in this essay which treats
of the nature of explanation of particular historical events in its relationship
to general or universal propositions. At the same time, he
continued, on this occasion much more specifically and with many
illustrations, to examine, as he had in the essay on "Objectivity", the
role of evaluative points of view in the selection of subject matters
and problems and in the constructive application of categories. His
efforts in this essay were partly a continuation of his long-standing,
self-clarifying polemic against "objec tivism" and "historicism" but its
analysis drew its vividness and its realistic tone from the fact that he
was continuously attempting to explain to himself the procedures
which he (and other important historians and social scientists) were
actually using in the choice of problems and in the search for solutions
to them.
"The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics"
was published in Logos in 1917, in the midst of the first World War.
FOREWORD V
It was a time when patriotic professors were invoking the authority
of their academic disciplines for the legitimation of their political
arguments, when Weber himself was engaged in a series of titanic
polemics against the prevailing political system and while he was still
working on the sociology of religion. (Perhaps he had already begun
by this time to work on the more rigorously systematic First Part of
Wirtschaft und Gesellschajt.'^) The essay itself was a revision of a
memorandum, written about four years earlier to serve as the basis
of a private discussion in the Verein fur Sozialpolitik and never made
publicly accessible. A mass of particular, concrete interests underlie
this essay — his recurrent effort to penerate to the postulates of
economic theory,^ his ethical passion for academic freedom, his fervent
nationalist political convictions and his own perpetual demand for
intellectual integrity. Max Weber's pressing need to know the grounds
for his own actions and his strong belief that man's dignity consists in
his capacity for rational self-determination are evident throughout
this essay—as well as his contempt for those whose confidence in the
rightness of their moral judgment is so weak that they feel the urge
to support it by some authority such as the "trend of history" or its
conformity with scientific doctrine in a sphere in which the powers of
science are definitely limited. On this occasion too, Weber worked his
way through to the most fundamental and most widely ramified
methodological problems in the attempt to reach clarity about the
bases of his own practical judgment. Here, of course, he was not
dealing primarily with the methodology of research, but his procedure
and his success illustrate the fruitfulness of methodological analysis
when it has actual judgments and observations to analyze rather than
merely a body of rules from which it makes deductions.
The three essays published here do not comprise all of Weber's
methodological writings^in the Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Wissenschaftslehre
they constitute only one third of a volume of nearly six
2 Recently published by Talcott Parsons under the title The Theory of
Social and Economic Organization (London 1947).
3 Cf. his contribution to the discussion on "Die Produktivitat der Volkswirtschaft"
at the meeting of the Verein fiir Sozialpolitik in 1909 {reprinted
in Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik) and "Die Grenzutzlehre
und das psychophysische Grundgesetz" (1908) (reprinted in Gesammelte
Aufsdtze zur Wissenschaftslehre)
.
vi FOREWORD
hundred pages. One of the most important of his methodological
essays — "Roscher und Knies und die logischen Problems der historischen
National okonomie" has not been included in the present
collection, while another important section of the German edition —
"Methodische Grundlagcn der Soziologie" — has already been published
in English.* Yet except for the analysis of the procedure involved
in the verstehende explanation of behaviour which is contained
in the latter essay and in an earlier and less elaborate version,
in the essay "Uber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," **
the main propositions of Weber's methodology are fully contained here.
11.
In many respects, social science to-day is unrecognizably different
from what it was in the years when these essays were written. Particularly
in the United States and Great Britain, the social sciences have
developed a whole series of techniques of observation and analysis
and have on the basis of these, proceeded to describe the contemporary
world with a degree of concreteness and accuracy which only a few
optimists could have expected in Weber's time. The number of social
scientists engaged in research has increased by a large multiple and
the resources available for financing research have likewise multiplied
many times over. The success of the social sciences in devising procedures
of convincing reliability have led to their marriage with policy
to an extent which could have been conceived only in principle in
Weber's time.
The turn of events and the passage of years have not however
reduced the relevance of these essays. The concrete incidents have
changed — we are no longer concerned to refute the errors of "objectivism"
and "professorial prophets" are not a very important problem
for us — but the relationship between concrete research, whether it
be descriptive concrete research or explanatory concrete research, and
general theory has become a problem more pressing than ever, even
* The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Chapter I.
5 First published in Logos (1913). Reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur
Wissenschajtslehre.
FOREWORD vii
though awareness of it is much less than universal. Many of our
current advances in research are made in ways which seem to avoid
raising the problem—so many of our successes are successes in accurate
description in investigations in which the problem of explanation is left
to those who requested the investigation or who are to "use" the
results. Sometimes our desire for accurate description is so great that
we feel that our intellectual needs are exhausted when that end has
been achieved. Moreover much of the acceptance and appreciation
of the utility of social science in the circles with the power to finance
it and use it, extends largely to just those aspects of social science
research which are almost exclusively descriptive or in which the task
of explanation is disposed of by correlations of indices of ambiguous
analytical meaning or by ad hoc common sense interpretations. The
fact that the correlations among the indices of ambiguous analytical
meaning is often high and that the possibilities of successful practical
manipulation are thus enhanced constitutes a barrier to our perception
of the need for theory. Here, these essays of Max Weber can perform
a very useful service. The substantive theory itself will not be found
here — that must be sought in part in the other writings of Max
Weber, in part it must be sought in other writers, and in largest part
it is still to be created —
but the rigorous and convincing demonstration
of the indispensability of theory in any explanation of concrete
phenomena will be found here. Although the content of the theory
will have to be sought elsewhere, Weber's methodological writings
also raise important questions regarding the structure of a theoretical
system, and the possibilities of a variety of theoretical systems constructed
around their central problems and ultimately "related to
values".
In the period of his life when he wrote "Objectivity in Social
Science and Social Policy," Weber still, under Rickert's influence,
regarded the particular and the concrete as the really "value-relevant"
phenomenon which the social scientist must understand and seek to
explain in the appropriate manner. For him, at this stage, a system
of general concepts and a general theory was simply an instrument.
It is really irrelevant as to whether we agree with Weber that it is the
"value relevance" of concrete events which distinguishes the social
from the natural sciences —- the important point was that he saw the
viii FOREWORD
possibility and significance of a general theory. It is most unfortunate
that when he began to elaborate the general conceptual system which
was to form the first four chapters of Wirtschaft and Gesellschajt, and
which must have been intended by him as part of a general theory
which would have explanatory value, he did not write a methodological
essay on the problems of theory-construction and systematization
in the social sciences. " 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social
Policy" brings the problem before us in a most intriguing way but
leaves it unsolved. In doing so however, it raises issues which contemporary
social scientists must face if our knowledge is to rise into
a systematic scientific theory and not merely pile up in a chaos of
unrelated monographs and articles.
The impressive improvement of social science over the three
decades since Weber's death has been accompanied by a vast sprawl
of interest over a multitude of subject matters which cannot readily
be coordinated intellectually into a unified body of knowledge. In
some measure this has been the outcome of random curiosity, in some
instances it has been the result of immediate practical problems. But
it is now appropriate to begin to pay more attention to the criteria
by which problems are to be selected. A healthy science, developing
in a balanced way, would not normally have to concern itself with
this matter. But it does seem that in the present state of social science
in which theory and observation have tended to run apart from one
another, and in which there has been a scatter of attention over a
large number of unconnected particular problems, some serious consideration
of the criteria of problem-selection would be fruitful. Here
Weber's discussion of "value-relevance" can help to bring order into
the social sciences. His discussion can heighten our self-consciousness
regarding the grounds on which we choose problems for investigation.
More self-consciousness about this process and more discussion about
it might also increase the amount of consensus about the substantive
as well as the formal criteria of problem-selection. And if this is
coupled with an intensified awareness of the theoretical necessities
entailed in concrete empirical investigation, the chances for a growth
of knowledge about certain crucial problems would appear, in the
light of our constantly improving technical resources, to be very good.
Weber's appositencss to the present situation of social science
FOREWORD ix
emerges again when wc turn to still another problem. In Weber's
own life-time social scientists were scarcely ever found in the employment
of governments. "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology
and Economics" was directed towards the social scientists in
universities who made assertions about the right ends of policy in the
name of their scientific or scholarly disciplines; it was intended to
clarify the ways and the extent to which statements about policy could
be based on scientific knowledge. The situation has changed greatly
since then. In both the United States and Great Britain very large
numbers of social scientists are employed in Governmental service, and
outside the Government social scientists are becoming increasingly
concerned with "applied social research". In most instances the ends
of policy are taken for granted, the social scientists working to provide
data about the present situation from which the policy is to take its
departure, or to provide estimates of the consequences of alternative
policies. In a smaller proportion of cases, social scientists believe that
the right ends of policy can be determined by social science research.
(This "scientistic" attitude seems to have become more pronounced
with the scientifically right and necessary ascent to pre-eminence of
the theory of personality, but it is by no means limited to social scientists
trained in psychology.) Weber's treatment of the relationship
between social science and the ends of action and therewith of policy
should aid social scientists to see both their possibilities and their
limitations. It should dissolve the false identification of an apolitical
attitude with scientific integrity, and it should help to refute the
baseless accusation that the social sciences arc ethically relativistic or
nihilistic either in their logical implications or in their empirical consequences.
If it helps social scientists to think better about the way
in which social science can clarify the assumptions of policy, it will
also help them in the clarification of the criteria of value-relevance.
By tracing the assumptions of any policy back to its postulates, the
establishment of the "value-relevance" of a subject matter or problem
will also be carried out on a more general or theoretical plane.
Problems for research will therefore themselves tend to be formulated
with closer regard for their theoretical assumptions; and the movement
of research interest on to a more abstract plane, where theory
and research will be fused, will become more likely.
X FOREWORD
But these are only a few of the many Hnes which connect Max
Weber's methodological analysis to the main issues of contemporary
social science.^
EDWARD A. SHILS.
London, April 1949
6 The most accurate and elaborate studies of Max Weber's methodology
are Alexander von Schelting: Max Weber's Wissenschaftslehre (Tubingen
1934) and Talcott Parsons: The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Illmois,
1949) (Chapter XVI). Useful analyses of some of Max Weber's methodological
problems will be found in F. A. Hayek. "Scientism and the Study of
Society": Economica: N.S.I. (1942) II. (1943), III (1944) and Karl
Popper: "The Poverty of Historicism" : Econonnca I & II (1944), III (1945).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
With an Analytical Summary
by
Henry A. Finch
PAGE
Foreword by Edward A. Shils iii
I. The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology
AND Economics 1
P. 1-3, Meaning of "value-judgment"— role of "value-judgment"
within science a different issue from desirability of espousing
"value-judgments" in teaching—critique of two points of view
on the latter issue—Weber's own view; P. 3-5, Waning of belief
that ultimately only one point of view on practical problems is
correct—implications thereof for "professorial prophets"—what
the student should obtain today from the university; P. 6, "Cult
of personality" and pseudo ethical neutrality rejected ; P. 6-8, Difficulties
in idea that university should be a forum for discussion of
value problems from all standpoints; P. 9-10, The difficulties involved
in respecting the distinction between empirical statements
of fact and "value-judgments"—dangers of pseudo-ethical neutrality—illusion
of scientific warrant for truth of via media; P. 10-12,
The mistaken objections to the distinction between empirical
statements of fact and "value-judgments"—the real issue concerns
the separation of the investigator's own practical valuations
from the establishment of empirical facts—ambiguities of taking
goals as facts; P. 12-13, Historical and individual variations in
evaluations does not prove the necessary subjectivity of ethics
—
deceptive self-evidence of widely accepted "value-judgments"
—science as a critic of self-evidence—realistic "science of ethics"
cannot determine what should happen; P. 14, Empirical-psychological
and genetic analysis of evaluations leads only to "understanding
explanation", but it is not negligible—its definite use in
regard to causal analysis and clarification; P. 16, Schmoller wrong
in contention that ethical neutrality implies acknowledgment of
only formal ethical rules—ethical imperitives not identical with
cultural values—normative ethics per se cannot affer unambiguous
directives for the solution of certain social-political problems—example
of indeterminate implications of postulate of
TABLE OF CONTENTS
justice—specific ethical problems, personal and social, which
ethics cannot settle by itself; P. 16-18, So-called strictly "formal"'
ethical maxims do have substantive meaning—an illustration
—
both empirical and non-empirical value-analysis of the illustration
inadequate to solve the crucial issue involved—human life
a series of ultimate decisions by which the soul "chooses its own
fate"; P. 18-9, Three things can be contributed by an empirical
discipline to the solution of policy issues—what it cannot supply
—the distinction between normative and scientific problems stated
in terms of a series of contrasted questions; P. 20-1, Three functions
of the discussion of "value-judgments"—such discussion is
emphatically not meaningless; P. 21-2, Selection of problems
in social science a matter of value-relevance—cultural interests
and direction of scientific work—the evaluative interests giving
direction to scientific work can be clarified and differentiated by
analysis of "value-judgments"—distinction between evaluation
and value-interpretation; P. 22-5, "Value-judgments" cannot be
derived from factual trends—illustration of the syndicalist
—
ethical and political limitations of policy of "adaptation to the
possible"; P. 25-6, Two meanings of "adaptation"—dispensibility
of the term when it is used evaluatively and not in its biological
meaning; P. 26-27, Conflict in social life cannot be excluded
—
its forms may vary—meaning of "peace"—evaluation of any type
of social order must be preceded by empirical study of its modes
of social selection, but the evaluation is distinct from the study;
P. 27-8, The problem of the meaning of "progress"— whether
mental and psychological "progressive differentiation" is progress
in sense of "inner richness" not scientifically determinable—however
the cost of such "progress" can be studied empirically —
P. 28-30, Applicability of "progress" in the empirical history of
art—in this use the concept of "progress" means "rational",
"technical" progress—illustration of Gothic architecture; P. 31-2,
Another illustration from the historic development of music in
Europe; P. 32, Technical progress in art does not necessarily
imply aesthetic improvement, although changes in technique are
causally speaking, the most important factors in the development
of art; P. 32-3, Historians are apt to confuse causal analysis and
"value-judgments"—causal analysis, aesthetic valuation and value
interpretation are all distinct procedures; P. 33-5, The meaning
of "rational progress"—three senses thereof which are generally
confused—distinction between subjectively "rational" action and
rationally "correct" action—where technical progress exists
—
conditions for legitimate use of term "economic progress"
;
P. 36-7, An illustration of debatable presuppositions of an action
claimed to be "objectively evaluated" as "economically correct"
;
P. 37-8, Meaning of technical evaluations of pure economics
—
they are unambiguous only when economic and social context are
given—when technical evaluations are made this does not settle
questions of ultimate evaluations ; P. 39-40, The normative validity
of objects of empirical investigation is disregarded during the
empirical investigation—example from mathematics—but this
disregard does not afTect the normative validity of normatively
valid truths as an a priori basis of all empirical science—and yet
"understanding" of human conduct is not in terms of that which
is normatively correct as an a priori condition of all scientific
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY xiii
investigations—the "understanding'" knowledge of human conduct
and culture involves conventional rather than normative validity;
P. 41-2, The truth value of ideas is the guiding value in the
writing of intellectual history—an illustration from military history
of the possible study of causal eflfccts of erroneous thoughts
and calculation—ideal types even of incorrect and self-defeating
thought necessary for the determining of causation of empirical
events; P. 43, The normative correctness of the ideal type not .
necessary for its use—the function of ideal-types vis-a-vis em- I
pirical reality; P. 43-6, Nature of pure economic theory—-its idealtypical
character —
it is apolitical, asserts no moral evaluations
but is indispensible for analysis—critique of theses of opponents of
pure economics—relationship of mean-end propositions to causeeffect
propositions which economic science can supply—other
problems of economics; P. 46, Factual importance of the state in
the modern social scene does not establish the state as an
ultimate value—the view that the state is a means to value is
defensible.
II. "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy. ... 50
P. 50, Introductory note on the responsibility for and content
of the essay; P. 50-1, Problem of relationship of practical social
criticism to scientific social research; P. 51-2, Points of view
hampering logical formulation of difference between "existential'
and "normative" knowledge in social-economic science; P. 52,
Rejection of view that empirical science provides norms and
ideals—however, criticism vis-a-vis "value-judgments" is not to be
suspended; P. 52-3, Appropriateness of means to, and chance of
achieving, a given end are accessible to scientific analysis; P. 53,
Scientific analysis can predict "costs" of unintended or incidental
consequences of action; P. 53-4, Scientific treatment of "valuejudgment"
can reveal "ideas" and ideals underlying concrete
ends; P. 55, The judgment of the validity of values is a matter
for faith or possibly for speculative philosophy, but not within
province of empirical science—the distinction between empirical
and normative not obliterated by the fact of cultural change
;
P. 55-7, Illusory self-evidence of consensus on certain goals
—
problems of social policy are not merely technical—naive belief in
the scientific deducibility of normatively desirable cultural
values—cultural values are ethical imperatives only for dogmatically
bound religious sects; P. 57-8, The via media of the
practical politician or syncretic relativism is not warranted as
correct by science ; P. 58, The inexpugnable difference between
arguments appealing to (1) enthusiasm and feeling (2) ethical
conscience (3) capacity as a scientific knower; P. 58-9, Scientifically
valid social science analysis can strive for supra-cultural
validity; P. 59-60, Reasons for expressing "value-judgments" if
they are clearly formulated as such and distinguished from scientific
statements; P. 61-2, The recognition of social problems is
value-oriented—character of the Archiv in the past, in the future;
P. 63, What is the meaning of objectively valid truth in the social
sciences; P. 63-4, Scarcity of means is the basic characteristic of
socio-economic subject matter—what a social science problem
is; P. 64-6, Distinction between "economic", "economically rele-
\\
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vant" and "economically conditioned" phenomena; P. 66, Condition
for the existence of social-economic problems—extent of the
range of social-economics; P. 66-7, Past concerns and central
present aim of the Archiv; P. 67, Study of society from the economic
point of view "one-sided" but intentionally so—the
"social"' as subject of study needs specification; P. 68-71, Cultural
phenomena not deducible from material interests—diflFerencc
between crude monistic materialistic conception of history
and useful critical use of the economic point of view—analogous
dogmatic excesses on the part of other sciences; P. 72, "Onesided"
viewpoints necessary to realize cognitive goal of empirical
social science inquiring into selected segments of concrete reality
;
P. 72-3, Criteria of historian's selection not solely from requirements
of discovery of laws or ultimate psychological factors
—
these are at most preliminary to the desired type of knowledge
—
characterization of the latter; P. 75-6, Four tasks of the desired
type of social science knowledge; P. 76, The decisive feature of
the method of the cultural sciences—the significance of cultural
configurations rooted in value-conditioned interest; P. 77, Two
types of analysis are logically distinct, in terms of laws and general
concepts and in terms of value-rooted meaning—analysis of
generic general features of phenomena a preliminary task to
analysis of cultural significance of concrete historical fact; P. 78-9,
The "historical" is "the significant in its individuality"—impossibility
of causal analysis of culture without selection of "essential"
features—in the study of "historical individuals" it is a
question of concrete causal relationships, not laws; P. 80, But
causal imputation of concrete causal effects to concrete cultural
causes presupposes knowledge of recurrent causal sequences, i.e.
of "adequate" causes—meaning thereof—certainty of imputation
a function of comprehensiveness of general knowledge—why it
is a meaningless ideal for social science to seek the reduction of
empirical reality to laws; P. 81, Non-equivalence of cultural significance
with positive cultural value ; P. 82, Why the view persists
that evaluative ideas are derivable from the "facts themselves"—
the personal element in research; P. 82, The necessity of "subjective"
evaluative ideas does not mean causal knowledge is absent
in cultural science—nor can causal knowledge be supplanted by
"teleology" ; P. 83-4, Evaluative ideas are "subjective," but
the results of research are not subjective in the sense of being
valid for one person and not for others ; P. 84-5, Meaninglessness
of the idea of a closed system of concepts from which reality is
deducible—shifts and movements in cultural problems; P. 85, A
basic question, the role of theory in the knowledge of cultural
reality; P. 85, Effect of natural law, rationalistic Weltanschauung,
natural-science conceptualization on practical "arts" and on
economics—seeming triumph of law-oriented analysis in historical
study under the influence of evolutionary biology—the
present confused situation and its origin; P. 87-88, Meaning and
contentions of "abstract" theoretical method in economics
—
fruitlcssness of debate concerning these contentions—social institutions
not deducible from psychological laws; P. 89-90, A kind
of concept construction peculiar to and, to a certain extent, indispensible
to the cultural sciences—an illustration; P. 90, The idealtypical
concept distinguished from an hypothesis, a description,
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY xv
an average—it is useful for both heuristic and expository purposes;
P. 90-1, Illustrations; P. 91-2, "Ideal" in logical sense to
be distinguished from "ideal" in ethical sense; P. 92-3, The sole
criterion justifying the use of the ideal type—illustrations of
idea-type conccpts^^they are not to be found according to a
scheme of genus proximum, differentia specifica—characteristics
of ideal-type concepts—their relationship to category of objective
possibility; P. 93-4, Elaboration of ideal-type concepts of
"church" and "sect" —cultural significance and ideal-type concepts;
P. 94-6, Three naturalistic misconceptions concerning
ideal-typical concepts—the ideal-typical concept of an epoch's
features and the ideas actually governing men—the latter is
indeed itself to be clearly formulated only in an ideal-type—an
illustration; P. 96-7, Varying relationship between ideal-type of
ideas of an epoch and empirical reality; P. 98, Ideal-types often
used not in a logical but in an evaluative sense—an illustration
—
these senses frequently confused in historical writing; P. 99, Ideal
typical concept of the state discussed; P. 100-1, The ideal-typical
concept in its relationship to class, generic or average concepts
;
P. 101 -3, Distinction between history and ideal-typical constructs
of developmental sequences—why it is difficult to maintain this
distinction; P. 103, Marxian "laws" are ideal-typical; P. 103, A
list of mental and conceptual constructs indicating ramifications
of methodological problems in the cultural sciences; P. 104-5,
Sense in which maturing social science transcends its ideal-types
—
the tension between the possibility of new knowledge and old
integrations the source of progress in the cultural sciences; P. 105,
interdependence of concept construction, problem setting and
content of culture; P. 106, Incompatibility of goal of social
sciences as viewed by the Historical School and modern, Kantian
theory of knowledge—the function of concepts is not the reproduction
of reality; P. 107-110, Dangers of neglect of clear cut
concept construction—two illustrations; P. 110-11, Recapitulation
of the argument; P. 112, "Subject matter specialists," "interpretive
specialists", their excesses—genuine artistry of the research
which avoids these excesses—and yet change of evaluative viewpoint
occurs even in an age of necessary speculation.
III. Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural
Sciences 113
I. A critique of Eduard Meyer's methodological views.
P. 113-4, Value of Meyer's book as a focus of discussion;
P. 115-6, The role of methodology in the advance of science
—
methodological interest of present situation in history; P. 116-7,
List of theses concerning history attacked by Meyer; P. 117-9,
Meyer's analysis of "chance" and its relationship to "free will"
;
P. 119, Meyer on "freedom" and "Necessity"; P. 119, Examination
of Meyer's conception of "free will"—his tendency to fuse
ethical and causal analysis; P. 122-4, Meyer's error in blurring
the distinction between historical knowledge and ethics, and in
equating freedom with irrationality of action; P. 124-5, Rationality
and freedom; P. 126-7, Contradictions in Meyer's conception
of historical causality—Meyer's discussion of "freedom" and
TABLE OF CONTENTS
"necessity" in their relation to "general", "particular", "individual",
"collectivity"—confusion therein; P. 129-30, What is historically
significant cannot be reached by subtracting the common
from unique traits; P. 130-1, Meyer's right instinct but poor
formulation concerning the role of the general, i.e. rules and concepts
in history—the logical problems of the ordering of historical
phenomena by concepts—the meaning of the category of possibility;
P. 131-2, Meyer's definition of "historical"—what determines
the historian's selection of events; P. 132-3, Instances of
confusion of ratio essendi with ratio cognoscendi in historical
study P. 134-6, Two distinct logical uses of data of cultural
reality—illustrations; P. 136, Meyer's confusion of heuristic device
with fact—his narrow view of the interest governing the historian's
selection; P. 137-8, What is the meaning of the effectiveness
of cultures or their components; P. 138-42, Meaning of
the "significant" and its relationship to historical effectiveness
—
the illustration of Goethe's letters; P. 143, A type of significance
which is neither heuristic nor causal—the object of interpretation—two
kinds of interpretation; P. 143-5, Meaning of "valueinterpretation—-its
distinction from linguistic-textual analysis
—
which "value-interpretations" can claim to be scientific; P. 145-7,
How value interpretation is dealt with by Heyer; P. 147-9, The
relationship of facts of value analysis to facts of history—analysis
of illustrative cases—Goethe's letters and Marx's Kapital—relevance
of historical facts for value-interpretations; P. 149-152,
Nature of value analysis; P. 152-6, Difficulties in Meyer's discussion
of the historical interest governing historian's selection
—role of the contemporaneity of the interest—confusion of historical
individual and historical cause; P. 156-8, Historical interest
determined by values, not by objective causal relationships
—confusion of "valuable" with "causally important"; P. 158,
Why the present is no subject matter for history; P. 158-160,
Summary statement on Meyer's inadequate equating of "effective"
with "historical"—summary on meaning of interpretation;
P. 160, Relationships between the philosophy of history, valueanalysis
and historical work; P. 161, Why historians are often
not aware of the value-analysis implicit in their work—Meyer's
correct recognition of the difference between historical work and
value-interpretation—problem of meaning of "systematics" in
historical, cultural science; P. 161-3, An illustration—three value
oriented points of view from which the classical culture of antiquity
can be treated.
II. Objective possibility and adequate causation in historical
explanation.
P. 164-66, No idle question for history to inquire into what consequences
were to be expected if certain conditions had been
other than they were—importance of such questions in determining
historical significance; P. 166-9, Sources for theory of
"objective" possibility—origins in juristic theory—history does
not share jurisprudence's ethical interest in the theory; P. 169,
Causal historical explanation deals with selected aspects of events
having significance from general standpoints; P. 171, A sufficient
condition establishing causal irrelevance of given circumstances
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
for an individual effect; P. 171-2, Account, with an illustration,
of logical operations which establish historical causal relations;
P. 172-3, Historians ought not to be reluctant to admit objective
possibility; P. 173-4, Isolations and generalizations required to secure
"judgment of possibility"—category of objective possibility
not an expression of ignorance or incomplete knowledge—such
judgments presuppose known empirical rules—instance of the
Battle of the Marathon ; P. 1 75, Meaning of "adequate causes"
;
P. 175, The simplest historical judgment is not simple registration
of something found and finished, rather does it presuppose the use
of a forming category and a whole body of empirical knowledge
;
P. 175-77, Psychological processes of historical discovery not to
be confused with its logical structure; P. 177-80, The causal analysis
of personal actions must also distinguish between categorically
formed constructs and immediate experience; P. 180, Recognition
of possibility in causal inquiry does not imply arbitrary
historiography, for category of objective possibility enables the
assessment of the causal significance of a historical fact; P. 181,
The certainty of judgments of objective possibility may vary in
degree—objective historical possibility is an analogue, with important
differences, of the kind of probability that is determined
from observed frequencies; P. 184-5, Definition of "adequate
causation"—application to Battle of Marathon, the March Revolution,
the unification of Germany—reiteration of constructive
nature of historian's conceptualization; P. 186-7, Binding's "anthropomorphic"
misunderstanding of objective possibility—real
meaning of "favoring" and "obstructing" conditions—the special
character of causality when adequacy of causation is concerned
needs further study.
The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrahty"
in Sociology and Economics
JD Y "VALUE-JUDGMENTS" are to be understood, where nothing
else is implied or expressly stated, practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory
or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence.
The problem involved in the "freedom" of a given science
from value-judgments of this kind, i.e., the validity and the meaning
of this logical principle, is by no means identical with the question
which is to be discussed shortly, namely, whether in teaching one
should or should not declare one's acceptance of practical valuejudgments,
deduced from ethical principles, cultural ideals or a philosophical
outlook. This question cannot be discussed scientifically.
It is itself entirely a question of practical valuation, and cannot
therefore be definitively settled. With reference to this issue, a wide
variety of views is held, of which we shall only mention the two
extremes. At one pole we find (a) the standpoint that the distinction
between purely logically deducible and empirical factual
assertions on the one hand, and practical, ethical or philosophical
value-judgments on the other, is correct, but that, nevertheless (or
perhaps, precisely because of this), both classes of problems properly
belong within the area of instruction. At the other pole we encounter
(b) the proposition that even when the distinction cannot be made
in a logically complete manner, it is nevertheless desirable that the
assertion of value-judgments should be held to a minimum.
The latter point of view seems to me to be untenable. Especially
untenable is the distinction which is rather often made in our field
between value-judgments of a partisan character and those which
are non-partisan. This distinction only obscures the practical impli-
2 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
cations of the preferences which are suggested to the audience. Once
the assertion of value-judgments from the academic platform is admitted,
the contention that the university teacher should be entirely
devoid of "passion" and that he should avoid all subjects which
threaten to arouse over-heated controversies constitutes a narrowminded,
bureaucratic opinion which every independent teacher must
reject. Of the scholars who believed that they should not renounce
the assertion of practical value-judgements in empirical discussions,
it was the most passionate of them — such as Treitschke — and
in his own way, Mommsen, who were the most tolerable. As a result
of their intensely emotional tone, their audiences were enabled to
discount the influence of their evaluations in whatever distortion was
introduced into their factual assertions. Thereby the audiences did
for themselves what the lecturers were temperamentally prevented
from doing. The effect on the minds of the students was thus guaranteed
the same depth of moral feeling which, in my opinion, the proponents
of the assertion of practical value-judgments in teaching
want to protect, without the audience's being confused as to the
logical disjunction between the different spheres. This confusion
must of necessity occur whenever the exposition of empirical facts
and the exhortation to take an evaluative position on important
issues are both done with the same cool dispassionateness.
The first point of view (a) is acceptable and, can indeed be acceptable
from the standpoint of its own proponents, only when the teacher
sets as his unconditional duty, in every single case, even to the point
where it involves the danger of making his lecture less lively or
attractive, to make relentlessly clear to his audience, and especially
to himself, which of his statements are statements of logically deduced
or empirically observed facts and which arc statements of practical
evaluations. Once one has acknowledged the logical disjunction between
the two spheres, it seems to me that the assumption of this
attitude is an imperative requirement of intellectual honesty; in this
case it is the absolutely minimal requirement.
On the other hand, the question whether one should in general
assert practical value-judgments in teaching (even with this reservation)
is one of practical university policy. On that account, it must
in the last analysis, be decided only with reference to those tasks
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 3
which the individual, according to his own vaiue-system, assigns to
the universities. Those who on the basis of their quaHfications as
teachers assign to the universities and thereby to themselves the universal
role of moulding human beings, of inculcating political, ethical,
aesthetic, cultural or other attitudes, will take a different position than
those who believe it necessary to affirm the fact (and its consequences)
that the academic lecture-hall achieves a really valuable influence
only through specialized training by specially qualified persons. For
the latter, therefore, "intellectual integrity" is the only specific virtue
which it should seek to inculcate. The first point of view can be
defended from as many different ultimate value-positions as the second.
The second (which I personally accept) can be derived from
a most enthusiastic as well as from a thoroughly modest estimate of
the significance of specialized training (Fachbildung) . In order to
defend this view, one need not be of the opinion that everyone should
become as specialized as possible. One may, on the contrary, hold
the view in question because one does not wish to see the ultimate
and highest personal decisions which a person must make regarding
his life, confounded with specialized training — however highly one
may estimate the significance of specialized training not only for
general intellectual training but indirectly also for the self-discipline
and ethical attitude of the young person. One may hold the latter
view because one does not wish to see the student so influenced by
the teacher's suggestions that he is prevented from solving his problems
on the basis of his own conscience.
Professor Schmoller's favorable disposition towards the teacher's
assertion of his own value-judgments in the classroom is thoroughly
intelligible to me personally as the echo of a great epoch which he
and his friends helped to create. But even he cannot deny the fact
that for the younger generation the objective situation has changed
considerably in one important respect. Forty years ago there existed
among the scholars working in our discipline, the widespread belief
that of the various possible points of view in the domain of practicalpolitical
preferences, ultimately only one was the correct one.
(Schmoller himself to be sure took this position only to a limited
extent) . Today this is no longer the case among the proponents of
the assertion of professorial evaluations — as may easily be demon-
4 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
strated. The legitimacy of the assertion of professorial evaluations
is no longer defended in the name of an ethical imperative whose
comparatively simple postulate of justice, both in its ultimate foundations
as well as in its consequences, partly was, and partly seemed to
be, relatively unambiguous and above all relatively impersonal (due
to its specifically suprapersonal character) . Rather, as the result
of an inevitable development, it is now done in the name of a patchwork
of cultural values, i.e., actually subjective demands on culture,
or quite openly, in the name of the alleged "rights of the teacher's
personality." One may well wax indignant over this, but one cannot
— because it is a value-judgment — refute this point of view. Of
all the types of prophecy, this "personally" tinted professorial type
of prophecy is the only one which is altogether repugnant. An unprecedented
situation exists when a large number of officially accredited
prophets do not do their preaching on the streets, or in churches
or other public places or in sectarian conventicles, but rather feel
themselves competent to enunciate their evaluations on ultimate
questions "in the name of science" in govemmentally privileged lecture
halls in which they are neither controlled, checked by discussion^
nor subject to contradiction. It is an axiom of long standing, which
Schmoller on one occasion vigorously espoused that what took place
in the lecture hall should be held separate from the arena of public
discussion. Although it is possible to contend that even scientifically
this may have its disadvantages, I take the view that a "lecture"
should be different from a "speech." The calm rigor, matter-offactness
and sobriety of the lecture declines with definite pedagogical
losses, when the substance and manner of public discussion are
introduced, in the style of the press. This privilege of freedom from
outside control seems in any case to be appropriate only to the
sphere of the specialized qualifications of the professor. There is,
however, no specialized qualification for personal prophecy, and for
this reason it is not entitled to that privilege of freedom from external
control. Furthermore, there should be no exploitation of the fact
that the student, in order to make his way, must attend certain educational
institutions and take courses with certain teachers, with the
lesult that in addition to what is required, i.e., the stimulation and
cultivation of his capacity for observation and reasoning, and a certain
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 5
body of factual information, the teacher slips in his own uncontradictable
evaluations, which though sometimes of considerable interest,
are often quite trivial.
Like everyone else, the professor has other facilities for the diffusion
of his ideals. When these facilities are lacking, he can easily
create them in an appropriate form, as experience has shown in the
case of every honest attempt. But the professor should not demand
the right as a professor to carry the marshal's baton of the statesman
or reformer in his knapsack. This is just what he does when he uses
the unassailability of the academic chair for the expression of political
(or cultural-political) evaluations. In the press, in public meetings,
in associations, in essays, in every avenue which is open to every other
citizen, he can and should do what his God or daemon demands.
Today the student should obtain, from his teacher in the lecture hall,
the capacity: (1) to fulfill a given task in a workmanlike fashion; (2)
definitely to recognize facts, even those which may be personally uncomfortable,
and to distinguish them from his own evaluations; (3)
to subordinate himself to his task and to repress the impulse to exhibit
his personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. This is vastly
more important today than it was forty years ago when the problem
did not even exist in this form. It is not true — as many people have
insisted — that the "personality" is and should be a "whole" in the
sense that it is injured when it is not exhibited on every possible
occasion.
Every professional task has its own "inherent norms" and should
be fulfilled accordingly. In the execution of his professional responsibility,
a man should confine himself to it alone and should exclude
whatever is not strictly proper to it — particularly his own loves and
hates. The powerful personality does not manifest itself by trying
to give everything a "personal touch" at every possible opportunity.
The generation which is now growing up should, above all. again
become used to the thought that "being a personality" is something
that cannot be deliberately striven for and that there is only one way
by which it can (perhaps!) be achieved: namely, the whole-hearted
devotion to a "task" whatever it (and its derivative "demands of the
hour") may be. It is poor taste to mix personal questions with specialized
factual analyses. We deprive the word "vocation" of the
'^
6 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
only meaning which still retains ethical significance if we fail to carry
out that specific kind of self-restraint which it requires. But whether
the fashionable "cult of the personality" seeks to dominate the throne,
public office or the professorial chair — its impressiveness is superficial.
Intrinsically, it is very petty and it always has prejudicial
consequences. Now I hope that it is not necessary for me to emphasize
that the proponents of the views against which the present essay
is directed can accomplish very little by this sort of cult of the "personality"
for the very reason that it is "personal." In part they see
the responsibilities of the professorial chair in another light, in part
they have other educational ideals which I respect but do not share.
For this reason we must seriously consider not only what they strive
to achieve but also how the views which they legitimate by their
authority influence a generation with an already extremely pronounced
predisposition to overestimate its own importance.
Finally, it scarcely needs to be pointed out that many ostensible
opponents of the assertion of political value-judgments from the academic
chair are by no means justified when, in seeking to discredit
cultural and social-political discussions which take place in public,
they invoke the postulate of "ethical neutrality" which they often
misunderstand so gravely. The indubitable existence of this spuriously
"ethically neutral" tendentiousness, which (in our discipline)
is manifested in the obstinate and deliberate partisanship of powerful
interest groups, explains why a significant number of intellectually
honest scholars still continue to assert their personal evaluations from
their chair. They are too proud to identify themselves with this
pseudo-ethical neutrality. Personally I believe that, in spite of this,
what is right (in my opinion) should be done and that the influence
of the value-judgments of a scholar who confines himself to championing
them at appropriate occasions outside the classroom, will
increase when it becomes known that he does only his "task" inside
the classroom. But these statements are in their turn, all matters
of evaluation, and hence scientifically undemonstrable.
In any case the fundamental principle which justifies the practice
of asserting value-judgments in teaching can be consistently held only
when its proponents demand that the spokesman for all partyprcfcrcnccs
be granted the opportunity of demonstrating their validity
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 7
on the academic platform.^ But in Germany, insistence on the right
of professors to state their evaluations has been associated with the
opposite of the demand for the equal representation of all (even the
most "extreme") tendencies. Schmoller thought that he was being
entirely consistent from his own premises when he declared that
"Marxists and Manchcsterites" were disqualified from holding academic
positions although he was never so unjust as to ignore their
scientific accomplishments. It is exactly on these points that I could
never agree with our honored master. One obviously ought not
justify the expression of evaluations in teaching — and then when the
conclusions are drawn therefrom, point out that the university is a
state institution for the training of "loyal" administrators. Such a
procedure makes the university, not into a specialized technical school
(which appears to be so degrading to many teachers) but rather into
a theological seminary — except that it does not have the latter's
religious dignity.
Attempts have been made to set up certain purely "logical" limits
to the range of value-judgments which should be allowed from the
academic chair. One of our foremost jurists once explained, in discussing
his opposition to the exclusion of socialists from university
posts, that he too would not be willing to accept an "anarchist" as
a teacher of law since anarchists deny the validity of law in general
— and he regarded his argument as conclusive. My own opinion
is exactly the opposite. An anarchist can surely be a good legal
scholar. And if he is such, then indeed the Archimedean point of
his convictions, which is outside the conventions and presuppositions
which are so self-evident to us, can equip him to perceive problems
in the fundamental postulates of legal theory which escape those who
take them for granted. Fundamental doubt is the father of knowledge.
The jurist is no more responsible for "proving" the value of
iHence we cannot be satisfied with the Dutch principle: i.e., emancipation
of even theological faculties from confessional reuirements, together with the
freedom to found universities as long as the following conditions arc observed
: guarantee of finances, maintenance of standards as to qualifications
of teachers and the private right to found chairs as a patron's gift to the university.
This gives the advantage to those with large sums of money and to
groups which are already in power. Only clerical circles have, as far as wc
know, made use of this privilege.
8 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
those cultural objects which are relevant to "law" than the physician
is responsible for demonstrating that the prolongation of life is desirable
under all conditions. Neither of them is in a position to do this
with the means at their disposal. If, however, one wishes to turn
the university into a forum for the discussion of values, then it
obviously becomes a duty to permit the most unrestrained freedom
of discussion of fundamental questions from all value-positions. Is
this possible? Today the most decisive and important questions of
practical and political values are excluded from German universities
by the very nature of the present political situation. For all those
to whom the interests of the nation are more important than any of
its particular concrete institutions, a question of central importance
is whether the conception which prevails today regarding the position
of the monarch in Germany is reconcilable with the world-interests
of the nation, and with the instruments (war and diplomacy) through
which these are expressed. It is not always the worst patriots nor
even anti-monarchists who give a negative answer to this question
and who doubt the possibility of lasting success in both these spheres
as long as very basic changes are not made. Everyone knows, however,
that these vital questions of our national life cannot be discussed
with full freedom in German universities.^ In view of the fact that
certain value-questions which are of decisive political significance are
permanently banned from university discussion, it seems to me to
be only in accord with the dignity of a representative of science to he
silent as well about such value-problems as he is allowed to treat.
But in no case, however, should the unrcsolvablc question — unresolvable
because it is ultimately a question of evaluation — as to
whether one may, must, or should champion certain practical values
in teaching, be confused with the purely logical discussion of the
relationship of value-judgments to empirical disciplines such as sociology
and economics. Any confusion on this point will impede the
thoroughness of the discussion of the actual logical problem. Its
solution will, however, not give any directives for answering the other
^This is by no means peculiar to Germany. In almost every country there
exist, openly or hidden, actual restraints. The only differences arc in the
character of the particular value-questions which arc thus excluded.
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 9
question beyond two purely logical requirements, namely: clarity and
an explicit separation of the different types of problems.
Nor need I discuss further whether the distinction between empirical
statements of fact and value-judgments is "difficult" to make.
It is. All of us, those of us who take this position as well as others,
encounter the subject time and again. But the exponents of the
so-called "ethical economics" particularly should be aware that even
though the moral law is perfectly unfulfillable, it is nonetheless "imposed"
as a duty. The examination of one's conscience would perhaps
show that the fulfillment of our postulate is especially difficult,
just because we reluctantly refuse to enter the very alluring area of
values without a titillating "personal touch." Every teacher has
observed that the faces of his students light up and they become
more attentive when he begins to set forth his personal evaluations,
and that the attendance at his lectures is greatly increased by the
expectation that he will do so. Everyone knows furthermore that in
the competition for students, universities in making recommendations
for advancement, will often give a prophet, however minor ,who
can fill the lecture halls, the upper hand over a much superior scholar
who does not present his own preferences. Of course, it is understood
in those cases that the prophecy should leave sufficiently untouched
the political or conventional preferences which are generally
accepted at the time. The pseudo-"ethically-neutrar' prophet who
speaks for the dominant interests has, of course, better opportunities
for ascent due to the influence which these have on the political
powers-that-be. I regard all this as very undesirable, and I will also
therefore not go into the proposition that the demand for the exclusion
of value-judgments is "petty" and that it makes the lectures
"boring." I will not touch upon the question as to whether lecturers
on specialized empirical problems must seek above all to be
"interesting." For my own part, in any case, I fear that a lecturer
who makes his lectures stimulating by the insertion of personal evaluations
will, in the long run, weaken the students' taste for sober
empirical analysis.
I will acknowledge without further discussion that it is possible,
vmder the semblance of eradicating all practical value-judgments, to
suggest such preferences with especial force by simply "letting the
10 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
facts speak for themselves." The better kind of our parliamentary
and electoral speeches operate in this way — and quite legitimately,
given their purposes. No \vords should be wasted in declaring that
all such procedures on the university lecture platform, particularly
from the standpoint of the demand for the separation of judgments
of fact from judgments of value, are, of all abuses, the most
abhorrent. The fact, however, that a dishonestly created illusion of
the fulfillment of an ethical imperative can be passed off as the
reality, constitutes no criticism of the imperative itself. At any rate,
even if the teacher does not believe that he should deny himself the
right of asserting value-judgments, he should make them absolutely
explicit to the students and to himself.
Finally, we must oppose to the utmost the widespread view that
scientific "objectivity" is achieved by weighing the various evaluations
against one another and making a "statesman-like" compromise
among them. Not only is the "middle way" just as undemonstrable
scientifically (with the means of the empirical sciences) as the "most
extreme" evaluations; rather, in the sphere of evaluations, it is the
least unequivocal. It does not belong in the university — but rather
in political programs and in parliament. The sciences, both normative
and empirical, are capable of rendering an inestimable service
to persons engaged in political activity by telling them that ( 1
) these
and these "ultimate" positions are conceivable with reference to this
practical problem; (2) such and such are the facts which you must
take into account in making your choice between these positions.
And with this we come to the real problem.
Endless misunderstanding and a great deal of terminological —
and hence sterile — conflict have taken place about the term "valuejudgment."
Obviously neither of these has contributed anything to
the solution of the problem. It is, as we said in the beginning, quite
clear that in these discussions, we are concerned with practical evaluations
regarding the desirability or undesirability of social facts from
ethical, cultural or other points of view. In spite of all that I have
said,"'' the following "objections" have been raised in all seriousness:
31 must refer here to what I have said in other essays in this volume (the
possible inadequacies of particular formulations on certain points do not
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 1
1
science strives to attain "valuable" results, meaning thereby logically
and factually correct results which are scientifically significant; and
that further, the selection of the subject-matter already involves an
"evaluation." Another almost inconceivable misunderstanding which
constantly recurs is that the propositions which I propose imply that
empirical science cannot treat "subjective" evaluations as the subjectmatter
of its analysis — (although sociology and the whole theory of
marginal utility in economics depend on the contrary assumption).
What is really at issue is the intrinsically simple demand that
the investigator and teacher should keep unconditionally separate
the establishment of empirical facts (including the "value-oriented"
conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and
his own practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as
satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including among these facts evaluations
made_by_the empirical persons who are the objects of investigation.)
These two things are logically different and to deal with
them as though they were the same represents a confusion of entirely
heterogeneous problems. In an otherwise valuable treatise, an author
states "an investigator can however take his own evaluation as a
'fact' and then draw conclusions from it." What is meant here is as
indisputedly correct as the expression chosen is misleading. Naturally
it can be agreed before a discussion that a certain practical measure:
for instance, the covering of the costs of an increase in the size of
the army from the pockets of the propertied class should be presupposed
in the discussion and that what are to be discussed are means
for its execution. This is often quite convenient. But such a commonly
postulated practical goal should not be called a "fact" in the
ordinary sense but an " a priori end." That this is also of two-fold
significance will be shown very shortly in the discussion of "means"
even if the end which is postulated as "indiscussible" were as concrete
as the act of lighting a cigar. In such cases, of course, discussion
of the means is seldom necessary. In almost every case of a
generally formulated purpose, as in the illustration chosen above, it
affect any essential aspects of the issue), As to the "irreconcilability" of certain
ultimate evaluations in a certain sphere of problems, cf. G. Radbruch's
Einfuhrung in die Rechtwissenschaft (2d ed., 1913). I diverge from him on
certain points but these are of no significance for the problem discussed here.
12 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
is found that in the discussion of means, each individual understood
something quite different by the ostensibly unambiguous end. Furthermore,
exactly the same end may be striven after for very divergent
ultimate reasons, and these influence the discussion of means.
Let us however disregard this. No one will dispute the idea that a
certain end may be commonly agreed on, while only the means of
attaining it are discussed. Nor will anyone deny that this procedure
can result in a discussion which is resolved in a strictly empirical
fashion. But actually the whole discussion centers about the choice
of ends (and not of "means" for a given end) ; in other words, in
\vhat sense can the evaluation, which the individual asserts, be treated,
not as a fact but as the object of scientific criticism. If this question
is not clearly perceived then all further discussion is futile.
^Ve are not concerned with the question of the extent to which
difTerent types of evaluations may claim difTerent degrees of normative
dignity — in other words, we are not interested in the extent to
which ethical evaluations, for example, difTer in character from the
question whether blondes are to be preferred to brunettes or some
similar judgment of taste. These are problems in axiology, not in
the methodology of the empirical disciplines. The latter are concerned
only with the fact that the validity of a practical imperative
as a norm and the truth-value of an empirical proposition are absoluetely
heterogeneous in character. Any attempt to treat these logically
difTerent types of propositions as identical only reduces the
particular value of each of them. This error has been committed
on many occasions, especially by Professor von Schmoller.* Respect
for our master forbids me to pass over these points where I find
myself unable to agree with him.
At first, I might make a few remarks against the view that the
mere existence of historical and individual variations in evaluations
proves the necessarily "subjective" character of ethics. Even propositions
about empirical facts are often very much disputed and there
might well be a much greater degree of agreement as to whether
someone is to be considered a scoundrel than there would be (even
'*In his essay on "Volkswirtschaftslehrc" in the Handworterhuch der Staatswis-
senschaften.
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 13
among specialists) concerning, for instance, the interpretation of
a mutilated inscription. I have not at all perceived the growing
unanimity of all religious groups and individuals with respect to
value-judgments which Schmoller claims to perceive. But in any
case it is irrelevant to our problem. What we must vigorously oppose
is the view that one may be "scientifically" contented with the conventional
self-evidentness of very widely accepted value-judgments.
The specific function of science, it seems to me, is just the opposite:
namely, to ask questions about these things which convention makes
self-evident. As a matter of fact, Schmoller and his associates did
exactly this in their time. The fact that one investigates the influence
of certain ethical or religious convictions on economic life and estimates
it to be large under certain circumstances does not, for instance,
imply the necessity of sharing or even esteeming those casually very
significant convictions. Likewise, the imputation of a highly positive
value to an ethical or religious phenomenon tells us nothing at
all about whether its consequences are also to be positively valued to
the same extent. Factual assertions tell us nothing about these matters,
and the individual will judge them very differently according
to his own religious and other evaluations. All this has nothing to
do with the question under dispute. On the contrary, I am most
emphatically opposed to the view that a realistic "science of ethics,"
i.e., the analysis of the influence which the ethical evaluations of a
group of people have on their other conditions of life and of the influences
which the latter, in their turn, exert on the former, can produce
an "ethics" which will be able to say anything about what should happen.
A "realistic" analysis of the astronomical conceptions of the
Chinese, for instance — which showed the practical motives of their
astronomy and the way in which they carried it on, at which results
they arrived and why — would be equally incapable of demonstrating
the correctness of this Chinese astronomy. Similarly the fact that the
Roman surveyors or the Florentine bankers (the latter even in the
division of quite large fortunes) often came to results which were irreconcilable
with trigonometry or the multiplication table, raises no
doubts about the latter.
The empirical-psychological and historical analysis of certain
evaluations with respect to the individual social conditions of their
14 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
emergence and continued existence can never, under any circumstances,
lead to anything other than an "understanding" explanation.
This is by no means negHgible. It is desirable not only because of
the incidental personal (and non-scientific) effect : namely, being
able "to do justice" more easily to the person who really or apparently
thinks differently. It also has high scientific importance: (1) for
purposes of an empirical causal analysis which attempts to establish
the really decisive motives of human actions, and (2) for the communication
of really divergent evaluations when one is discussing
with a person who really or apparently has different evaluations from
one's self. The real significance of a discussion of evaluations lies in
its contribution to the understanding of what one's opponent — or
one's self — really means — i.e., in understanding the evaluations
which really and not merely allegedly separate the discussants and
consequently in enabling one to take up a position with reference
/ to this value. We are far removed, then, from the view that the
'
demand for the exclusion of value-judgments in empirical analysis
implies that discussions of evaluations are sterile or meaningless. For
the recognition of their evaluative character is indeed the presupposition
of all useful discussions of this sort. Such discussions assume
an insight into the possibility of, in principle, unbridgeably divergent
ultimate evaluations. "Understanding all" does not mean "pardoning
all" nor does mere understanding of another's viewpoint as such
lead, in principle, to its approval. Rather, it leads, at least as easily,
and often with greater probability to the awareness of the issues and
reasons which prevent agreement. This is a true proposition and it
is certainly advanced by "discussions of evaluations." On the other
handj this method because it is of a quite different character, cannot
create either a normative ethic or in general the binding force of an
ethical "imperative." Everyone knows, furthermore, that the attainment
of such an ethic is externally, at least, impeded by the relativizing
effects of such discussions. This does not imply that they should
be avoided on that account. Quite the contrary. An "ethical" conviction
which is dissolved by the psychological "understanding" of
other values is about as valuable as religious beliefs which are destroyed
by scientific knowledge, which is of course a quite frequent
occurrence. Finally, when Schmollcr asserts that the exponents of
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 15
"ethical neutrality" in the empirical disciplines can acknowledge only
"formal" ethical truths (in the sense of the Critique of Practical
Reason) a few comments are called for even though the problem, as
such, is not integral to the present issue.
First, we should reject Schmoller's implication that ethical imperatives
are identical with "cultural values" — even the highest of them.
For, from a certain standpoint, "cultural values" are "obligatory"
—
even where they are in inevitable and irreconcilable conflict with
every sort of ethics. Likewise, an ethic which rejects all cultural
values is possible without any internal contradictions. In any case,
these two value-spheres are not identical. The assertion that "formal"
propositions, for example, those in the Kantian ethics, contain
no material directives, represents a grave but widespread misunderstanding.
The possibility of a normative ethics is not brought into
question by the fact that there are problems of a practical sort for
which it cannot, by itself, offer unambiguous directives. (Among
these practical problems, I believe, are included in a particular manner,
certain institutional, i.e., "social-political" problems.) Nor is
the possibility of normative ethics placed in doubt by the fact that
ethics is not the only thing in the world that is "valid"; rather it
exists alongside of other value-spheres, the values of which can,
under certain conditions, be realized only by one who takes ethical
"responsibility" upon himself. This applies particularly to political
action. It would be pusillanimous, in my opinion, to attempt to deny
this conflict. This conflict moreover is not peculiar to the relations
between politics and ethics, as the customary juxtaposition of "private"
and "political" morality would have it. Let us investigate
some of the "limits" of ethics referred to above.
The implications of the postulate of "justice" cannot be decided
unambiguously by any ethic. Whether one, for example — as would
correspond most closely with the views expressed by Schmoller — owes
much to those who achieve much or whether one should demand
much from those who can accomplish much; whether one should,
e.g., in the name of justice (other considerations — for instance, that
of the necessary "incentives" — being disregarded for the moment)
accord great opportunities to those with eminent talents or whether
on the contrary (like Babeuf) one should attempt to equalize the
^
16 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
injustice of the unequal distribution of mental capacities through the
rigorous provision that talented persons, whose talent gives them
prestige, must not utilize their better opportunities for their own benefit
— these questions cannot be definitely answered. The ethical
problem in most social-political issues is, however, of this type.
But even in the sphere of personal conduct there are quite specific
ethical problems which ethics cannot settle on the basis of its
own presuppositions. These include above all, the basic questions:
(a) whether the intrinsic value of ethical conduct — the "pure will"
or the "conscience" as it used to be called — is sufficient for its justification,
following the maxim of the Christian moralists: "The Christian
acts rightly and leaves the consequences of his action to God";
or (b) whether the responsibility for the predictable consequences of
the action is to be taken into consideration. All radical revolutionary
political attitudes, particularly revolutionary "syndicalism," have their
point of departure in the first postulate; all Realpolitik in the latter.
Both invoke ethical maxims. But these maxims are in eternal conflict
— a conflict which cannot be resolved by means of ethics alone.
Both these ethical maxims are of a strictly "formal" character. In
this they resemble the well-known axioms of the Critique of Practical
Reason. It is widely believed that as a result of this formalism, the
latter did not generally contain substantive indications for the evaluation
of action. This however is by no means true. Let us purposely
take an example as distant as possible from politics to clarify the
meaning of the much-discussed "merely formal" character of this
type of ethics. If a man says of his erotic relationships with a woman,
"At first our relationship was only a passion, but now it represents a
value," — the cool matter-of-factness of the Kantian Critique would
express the first half of this sentence as follows: "At first, each of us
was a means for the other" and would therewith claim that the whole
sentence is a special case of that well-known principle, which people
have been singularly willing to view as a strictly historically conditioned
expression of an "individualistic" attitude, whereas it was, in
truth, a brilliant formulation which covered an immeasurably large
number of ethical situations, which must however be correctly understood.
In its negative form and excluding any statement as to what
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 17
would be the opposite of treating another person "as a means," it
obviously contains : ( 1
) the recognition of autonomous, extra-ethical
spheres, (2) the delimitation of the ethical sphere from these, and
finally, (3) the determination of the sense in which different degrees
of ethical status may be imputed to activity oriented towards extraethical
values. Actually, those value-spheres which permit or prescribe
the treatment of the other "only as a means" are quite heterogeneous
vis-a-vis ethics. This cannot be carried any further here;
it shows, in any case, that the "formal" character of that highly
abstract ethical proposition is not indifferent to the substantive content
of the action. But the problem becomes even more complicated.
The negative predicate itself, which was expressed in the words
"only a passion," can be regarded as a degradation of what is most
genuine and most appropriate in life, of the only, or, at any rate,
the royal road away from the impersonal or supra-personal "value"mechanisms
which are hostile to life, away from enslavement to the
lifeless routine of everyday existence and from the pretentiousness of
unrealities handed down from on high. At any rate, it is possible to
imagine a conception of this standpoint which — although scorning
the use of the term "value" for the concrete facts of experience to
which it refers — would constitute a sphere claiming its own "immanent"
dignity in the most extreme sense of the word. Its claims
to this dignity would not be invalidated by its hostility or indifference
to everything sacred or good, to every ethical or aesthetic law, and to
every evaluation of cultural phenomena or personality. Rather its
dignity might be claimed just because of this hostility or indifference.
Whatever may be our attitude towards this claim, it is still not demonstrable
or "refutable" with the means afforded by any "science."
Every empirical consideration of this situation would, as the
elder Mill remarked, lead to the acknowledgment of absolute polytheism
as the only appropriate metaphysic. A non-empirical approach
oriented to the interpretation of meaning, or in other words, a genuine
axiology could not, on proceeding further, overlook the fact that a
system of "values," be it ever so well-ordered, is unable to handle
the situation's crucial issue. It is really a question not only of
alternatives between values but of an irreconcilable death-struggle,
like that between "God" and the "Devil." Between these, neither
18 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
relativization nor compromise is possible. At least, not in the true
sense. There are, of course, as everyone realizes in the course of his
life, compromises, both in fact and in appearance, and at every point.
In almost every important attitude of real human beings, the valuespheres
cross and interpenetrate. The shallowness of our routinized
daily existence in the most significant sense of the word consists
indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not
become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of this
partly psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of
irreconcilably antagonistic values. They avoid the choice between
"God" and the "Devil" and their own ultimate decision as to which
of the conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which by
the other. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, which is distasteful to
the complacent but which is, nonetheless, inescapable, consists in the
insight that every single important activity and ultimately life as a
whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but
is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions
through vvhich the soul — as in Plato — chooses its own fate, i.e., the
meaning of its activity and existence. Probably the crudest misunderstanding
which the representatives of this point of view constantly
encounter is to be found in the claim that this standpoint is "relativistic"
— that it is a philosophy of life which is based on a view of
the interrelations of the value-spheres which is diametrically opposite
to the one it actually holds, and whic h (an be held with consistency
only if it is based on a very special type of ("organic") metaphysics.
Returning to our special case, it may be asserted without the
possibility of a doubt that as soon as one seeks to derive concrete directives
from practical political (particularly economic and socialpolitical)
evaluations, (1) the indispensable means, and (2) the
inevitable repercussions, and (3) the thus conditioned competition of
numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences, are
all that an empirical discipline can demonstrate with the means at its
disposal. Philosophical disciplines can go further and lay bare the
"meaning" of evaluations, i.e., their ultimate meaningful structure and
their meaningful consequences, in other words, they can indicate
their "place" within the totality of all the possible "ultimate" evaluations
and delimit their spheres of meaningful validity. Even such
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 19
simple questions as the extent to which an end should sanction unavoidable
means, or the extent to which undesired repercussions
should be taken into consideration, or how conflicts between several
concretely conflicting ends are to be arbitrated, are entirely matters
of choice or compromise. There is no (rational or empirical) scientific
procedure of any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a
decision here. The social sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences,
are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty of
making a choice^ and they should therefore not create the impression
that they can do so.
Finally it should be explicitly noted that the recognition of the
existence of this situation is, as far as our disciplines are concerned,
completely independent of the attitude one takes toward the very
brief remarks made above regarding the theory of value. For there
is, in general, no logically tenable standpoint from which it could be
denied except a hierarchical ordering of values unequivocally prescribed
by ecclesiastical dogmas. I need not consider whether there
really are persons who assert that such problems as (a) does a concrete
event occur thus and so or otherwise, or (b) why do the concrete
events in question occur thus and so and not otherwise, or (c) does
a given event ordinarily succeed another one according to a certain
law and with what degree of probability — are not basically different
from the problems: {ai) what should one do in a concrete situation,
or (bt) from which standpoints may those situations be satisfactory
or unsatisfactoiy, or (o) whether they are — whatever their
form — generally formulatable propositions (axioms) to which these
standpoints can be reduced. There are many who insist further that
there is no logical disjunction between such equiries as, {a) in which
direction will a concrete situation (or generally, a situation of a certain
type) develop and with what greater degree of probability in
which particular direction than in any other and (b) a problem
which investigates whether one should attempt to influence the development
of a certain situation in a given direction — regardless of
whether it be the one in which it would also move if left alone, or
the opposite direction or one which is different from either. There
are those who assert that (a) the problem as to which attitudes
towards any given problem specified persons or an unspecified number
20 THE MEANING OF 'ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
of persons under specified conditions will probably or even certainly
take and {b) the problem as to whether the attitude which emerged
in the situation referred to above is right — arc in no way difTerent
from one another. The proponents of such views will resist any statement
to the effect that the problems in the above-cited jutxapositions
do not have even the slightest connection with one another and that
they really are "to be separated from one another." These persons
will insist furthermore that their position is not in contradiction with
the requirements of scientific thinking. Such an attitude is by no
means the same as that of an author who conceding the absolute
heterogeneity of both types of problems, nevertheless, in one and the
same book, on one and the same page, indeed in a principal and
subordinate clause of one and the same sentence, makes statements
bearing on each of the two heterogeneous problems referred to above.
Such a procedure is strictly a matter of choice. All that can be demanded
of him is that he does not unwittingly (or just to be clever)
deceive his readers concerning the absolute heterogeneity of the
problems. Personally I am of the opinion that nothing is too
"pedantic" if it is useful for the avoidance of confusions.
Thus, the discussion of value-judgments can have only the following
functions:
a) The elaboration and explication of the ultimate, internally
"consistent" value-axioms, from which the divergent attitudes are derived.
People are often in error, not only about their opponent's
evaluations, but also about their own. This procedure is essentially
an operation which begins with concrete particular evaluations and
analyzes their meanings and then moves to the more general level of
irreducible evaluations. It docs not use the techniques of an empirical
discipline and it produces no new knowledge of facts. Its "validity"
is similar to that of logic.
b) The deduction of "implications" (for those accepting certain
value-judgments) which follow from certain irreducible value-axioms,
when the practical evaluation of factual situations is based on these
axioms alone. This deduction depends on one hand, on logic, and
on the other, on empirical observations for the completest possible
casuistic analyses of all such empirical situations as are in principle
subject to practical evaluation.
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 21
c) The determination of the factual consequences which the realization
of a certain practical evaluation must have : ( 1
) in consequence
of being bound to certain indispensable means, (2) in consequence of
the inevitability of certain, not directly desired repercussions. These
purely empirical observations may lead us to the conclusion that (a)
it is absolutely impossible to realize the object of the preference, even
in a remotely approximate way, because no means of carrying it out
can be discovered; (b) the more or less considerable improbability of
its complete or even approximate realization, either for the same
reason or because of the probable appearance of undesired repercussions
which might directly or indirectly render the realization undesirable;
(c) the necessity of taking into account such means or such
repercussions as the proponent of the practical postulate in question
did not consider, so that his evaluation of end, means, and repercussions
becomes a new problem for him. Finally: d) the uncovering
of new axioms (and the postulates to be drawn from them) which
the proponent of a practical postulate did not take into consideration.
Since he was unaware of those axioms, he did not formulate
an attitude towards them although the execution of his own postulate
conflicts with the others either (1) in principle or (2) as a result of
the practical consequences, (i.e., logically or actually). In (1) it is
a matter in further discussion of problems of type (a) ; in (2), of
type (c).
Far from being meaningless, value-discussions of this type can be
of the greatest utility as long as their potentialities are correctly
understood.
The utility of a discussion of practical evaluations at the right
place and in the correct sense is, however, by no means exhausted
with such direct "results." When correctly conducted, it can be extremely
valuable for empirical research in the sense that it provides
it with problems for investigation.
The problems of the empirical disciplines are, of course, to be
solved "non-evaluatively." They are not problems of evaluation. But
the problems of the social sciences are selected by the value-relevance
of the phenomena treated. Concerning the significance of the expression
"relevance to values" I refer to my earlier writings and above
all to the works of Hcinrich Rickert and will forbear to enter upon
22 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
that question here. It should only be recalled that the expression
"relevance to values" refers simply to the philosophical interpretation
of that specifically scientific "interest" which determines the selection
of a given subject-matter and the problems of an empirical analysis.
In empirical investigation, no "practical evaluations" are legitimated
by this strictly logical fact. But together with historical experience,
it shows that cultural (i.e., evaluative) interests give purely
empirical scientific work its ^^irection.; It is now clear that these
evaluative interests can be made more explicit and differentiated by
the analysis of value-judgments. These considerably reduce, or at any
rate lighten, the task of "value-interpretation" — an extremely important
preparation for empirical work — for the scientific investigator
and especially the historian.^
Instead of entering once more on this basic methodological problem
of value-relation, I will deal in greater detail with certain issues
which are of practical importance for our disciplines.
The belief is still widespread that one should, and must, or at any
rate, can derive value-judgments from factual assertions about
"trends." But even from the most unambiguous "trends," unambiguous
norms can be derived only with regard to the prospectively most
appropriate means — and then only when the irreducible evaluation
is already given. The evaluations themselves cannot be derived from
these "tendencies." Here, of course, the term "means" is being used
in the broadest sense. One whose irreducible value is, for instance,
the power of the state, may view an absolutistic or a radical
democratic constitution as the relatively more appropriate means,
depending on the circumstances. It would be highly ludicrous to
interpret a change from a preference for one of these types of con^Since
not only the distinction between evaluation and value-relations but
also the distinction between ev-aluation and value-interpretation (i.e., the
elaboration of the various possible meaningful attitudes towards a given phenomena)
is very often not clearly made and since the consequent ambiguities
impede the analysis of the logical nature of history, I will refer the reader
to the remarks in "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences."'
These remarks are not, however, to be regarded as in any way conclusive.
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 23
stitutions to another as a change in the "ultimate" evaluation itself.
Obviously, however, the individual is constantly being faced with the
problem as to whether he should give up his hopes in the realizability
of his practical evaluations if he is aware of a clear-cut developmental
tendency (a) which necessitates, if the goal is to be realized, the
application of new means which are ethically or otherwise dubious;
or (6) which requires the taking into account of repercussions which
are abhorrent to him, or (c) which finally renders his efforts quixotic
as far as their success is concerned. But the perception of such "developmental
tendencies" which are modifiable only with more or
less difficulty by no means represents a unique case. Each new fact
may necessitate the re-adjustment of the relations between end and
indispensable means, between desired goals and unavoidable subsidiary
consequences. But whether this readjustment should take
place and what should be the practical conclusions to be drawn therefrom
is not answerable by empirical science — in fact it can not be
answered by any science whatsoever. One may, for example, demonstrate
ever so concretely to the convinced syndicalist that his action
is socially "useless" i.e., it is not likely to be successful in the modification
of the external class position of the proletariat, and that he even
weakens this greatly by generating "reactionary" attitudes, but still
— for him —if he is really faithful to his convictions —this proves
nothing. And this is so, not because he is mad but because from his
point of view, he can be "right" — as we shall discuss shortly. On
the whole, people are strongly inclined to adapt themselves to what
promises success, not only — as is self-evident — with respect to the
means or to the extent that they seek to realize their ideals, but even
to the extent of giving up these very ideals. In Germany this mode of
behavior is glorified by the name Realpolitik. In any case, it is not
easily intelligible why the practitioners of an empirical science should
feel the need of furthering this kind of behavior by providing their
salute of approval for existing "trends." Nor do we see why empirical
scientists should transform the adaptation to these "trends" from
an ultimate value-problem, to be solved only by the individual as his
conscience dictates with reference to each particular situation, into
a principle ostensibly based on the authority of a "science."
In a sense, successful political action is always the "art of the
24 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
possible." Nonetheless, the possible is often reached only by striving
to attain the impossible that lies beyond it. Those specific qualities
of our culture, which, despite our differences in viewpoint, we all
esteem more or less positively, are not the products of the only consistent
ethic of " 'adaptation' to the possible," namely, the bureaucratic
morality of Confucianism. I, for my part, will not try to
dissuade the nation from the view that actions are to be judged not
merely by their instrumental value but by their intrinsic value as
well. In any case, the failure to recognize this fact impedes our understanding
of reality. To cite the syndicalist again: it is senseless even
logically to criticize in terms of its "instrumental value" an action
which — if consistent — must be guided by its "intrinsic value." The
central concern of the really consistent syndicalist must be to preserve
in himself certain attitudes which seem to him to be absolutely
valuable and sacred, as well as to induce them in others, whenever
possible. The ultimate aim of his actions which are, indeed, doomed
in advance to absolute failure, is to give him the subjective certainty
that his attitudes are "genuine," i.e., have the power of "proving"
themselves in action and of showing that they arc not mere swagger.
For this purpose, such actions are perhaps the only means. Aside
from that — if it is consistent — its kingdom, like that of every
"absolute value" ethics, is not of this world. It can be shown strictly
"scientifically" that this conception of his ideal is the only internally
consistent one and cannot be refuted by external "facts." I think
that a service is thereby rendered to the proponents as well as the
opponents of syndicalism — one which they can rightly demand of
science. Nothing is ever gained in any scientific sense whatever by
"on the one hand," and "on the other," by seven reasons "for" and
six "against" a certain event (for instance, the general strike) and
by weighing them off against one another in cameralistic fashion or
like modern Chinese administrative memoranda. \ The task of an
ethically neutral science in the analysis of syndicalism is completed
when it has reduced the syndicalistic standpoint to its most rational
and internally consistent form and has empirically investigated the
pre-conditions for its existence and its practical consequences. Whether
one should or should not be a syndicalist can never be proved without
reference to very definite metaphysical premises which are never
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 25
demonstrable by science. ; If an officer blows himself up with his
fortifications rather than surrender, his action may, in a given case,
be absolutely futile in every respect, but the existence or non-existence
of the attitude which impels such an action without inquiring into
its utility is not a matter of indiflference. In any case, it would be
just as incorrect to designate it as "meaningless" as would be such
a designation of the consistent syndicalist's action. It is not particularly
appropriate for a professor to recommend such Cato-like acts
of courage from the comfortable heights of a university chair. But
he is also not required to laud the opposite extreme and to declare
that it is a duty to accommodate one's ideals to the opportunities
which are rendered available by existing "trends" and situations.
We have been making repeated use of the . expression "adaptation"
{Anpassung) in a meaning which has been sufficiently clear
in each context. But actually it has two meanings: (1) the adaptation
of the means for attaining a given ultimate goal in a particular
situation {Realpolitik in the narrower sense), and (2) adaptation
to the chances, real or imaginary, for immediate success in the
selection of one's ultimate value-standpoint from among the many
possible ultimate value-standpoints (this is the type of Realpolitik
which our government has followed for the last 27 years with such
notable success!). But its connotations are by no means exhausted
with these two. For this reason, I think that it is advisable to drop
this widely misused term entirely when we discuss our problem —
evaluative problems as well as others. It is entirely ambiguous as a
scientific term, although it perpetually recurs both as an "explanation"
(of the occurrence of certain ethical views in certain social
groups under certain conditions) and as an "evaluation" (e.g., of
these factually existing ethical views which are said to be objectively
"appropriate" and hence objectively "correct" and valuable).
It is not very helpful in any of these usages since it must always
be interpreted in order for the propositions in which it is used to be
understood. It was originally used in biology and if it is understood
in its biological meaning, i.e., as the relatively determinable chance,
given by the environment, for a social group to maintain its own
psycho-physical heritage through reproduction, then the social strata
which are economically the best provided for and whose lives are the
26 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
most rationally regulated, are according to birth statistics, the worst
adapted. The few Indians who lived in the Salt Lake area before
the Mormon migration were in the biological sense — as well as in
all the other of its many conceivable empirical meanings — just as
well or poorly "adapted" as the later populous Mormon settlements.
This term adds absolutely nothing to our empirical understanding,
although we easily delude ourselves that it does. Only in the case of
two otherwise absolutely identical organizations, can one assert that
a particular concrete difTerence is more conducive to the continued
existence of the organization which has that characteristic, and which
is therefore "better adapted" to the given conditions. But as regards
the evaluation of the above situation, one person may assert that the
greater numbers and the material and other accomplishments and
characteristics which the Mormons brought there and developed,
are a proof of the superiority of the Mormons over the Indians, while
another person who abominates the means and subsidiary effects
involved in the Mormon ethics which are responsible at least in part
for those achievements, may prefer the desert and the romantic existence
of the Indians. No science of any kind can purport to be able to
dissuade these persons from their respective views. Here we are
already confronted with the problem of the unarbitratable reconciliation
of end, means, and subsidiary consequences.
Strictly and exclusively empirical analysis can provide a solution
only where it is a question of a means adequate to the realization of
an absolutely unambiguously given end. The proposition: x is the
only means by which y can be attained, is in fact merely the reverse
of the proposition: y is the effect of x. The term "adaptedness"
(and all other related terms) do not provide — and this is the
main thing — even the slightest hint about the value-judgments
which they contain and which they actually obscure — just as does
for example, the recently favored term "human economy" {Menschenokonomie)
which in my opinion is fundamentally confused. Depending
on how one uses the term, either everything or nothing in
society is "adapted." Conflict cannot be excluded from social life.
One can change its means, its object, even its fundamental direction
and its bearers, but it cannot be eliminated. There can be, instead
of an external struggle of antagonistic persons for external objects, an
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 27
inner struggle of mutually loving persons for subjective values and
therewith, instead of external compulsion, an inner control (in the
form of erotic or charitable devotion). Or it can take the form of a
subjective conflict in the individual's own mind. It is always present
and its influence is often greatest when it is least noticed, i.e., the
more its course takes the form of indifferent or complacent passivity
or self-deception, or when it operates as "selection." "Peace" is nothing
more than a change in the form of the conflict or in the antagonists
or in the objects of the conflict, or finally in the chances of
selection. Obviously, absolutely nothing of a general character can
be said as to whether such shifts can withstand examination according
to an ethical or other value-judgment. Only one thing is indisputable:
every type of social order, without exception, must, if one
wishes to evaluate it, be examined with reference to the opportunities
which it affords to certain types of persons to rise to positions of superiority
through the operation of the various objective and subjective
selective factors. For empirical investigation is not really exhaustive
nor does there exist the necessary factual basis for an evaluation,
regardless of whether it is consciously subjective or claims objective
validity. This should at least be borne in mind by our many colleagues
who believe that they can analyze social change by means of the
concept of "progress." This leads to a closer consideration of this
important concept.
One can naturally use the term "progress" in an absolutely nonevaluative
way if one identifies it with the "continuation" of some
concrete process of change viewed in isolation. But in most cases, ^
the situation is more complicated. We will review here a fe\s' cases
from difTcrcnt fields, in which the entanglement with value-judgments
is most intricate.
fin the sphere of the emotional, affective content of our own subjective
behavior, the quantitative increase and — what is usually
bound up with it — the qualitative diversification of the possible
modes of response can be designated as the progress of psychic,^"dif- ^y^
ferentiation" without reference to any evaluations. This usually implies
the preference for an increase in the "scope" or "capacity" of
a concrete "mind" or — what is already an ambiguous term — of
an "epoch" (as in Simmel's Schopenhauer und Nietzche)
.
28 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
Undoubtedly such a "progressive difTcrentiation" docs exist. Of
course, it must be recognized that it is not always really present when
it is believed to be. An increased responsivejiess to nuances — due
sometimes to the increased rationalization and intellectualization of
life and sometimes to the increase in the amount of importance which
the individual attributes to all his actions (even the least significant)
— can very often lead to the illusion of progressive difTcrentiation.
This responsiveness can, of course, either indicate or pron^ote this
progressive difTcrentiation. Appearances are deceitful, however, and
I think that the range of this illusion is rather considerable. Be that
as it may, it exists, and whether one designates progressive difTcrentiation
as "progress" is a matter of terminological convenience. But
as to whether one should evaluate it as "progress" in the sense of an
increase in "inner richness" cannot be decided by any empirical
discipline. The empirical disciplines have nothing at all to say about
whether the various possibilities in the sphere of feeling which have
just emerged or which have been but recently raised to the level of
consciousness and the new "tensions" and "problems" which are often
associated with them are to be evaluated in one way or another.
But whoever wishes to state a value-judgment regarding the fact of
differentiation as such — which no empirical discipline can forbid —
and seeks a point of view from which this can be done, will come
upon the question as to the price which is "paid" for this process
(insofar as it is more than an intellectualistic illusion). We should
not overlook the fact that the pursuit of "experience" — which has
been having a great vogue in Germany — might, to a large extent, be
the product of a diminishing power to stand the stress of everyday
life and that the publicity which the individual feels the increasing
need of giving to his "experience," can perhaps be evaluated as a
loss in the sense of privacy and therewith in the sense of propriety
and dignity. At any rate, in the sphere of the evaluation of subjective
experience, "progressive differentiation" is to be identified with
an increase in "value" only in the intellectualistic sense of an increase
in self-awareness or of an increasing capacity for expression and
communication.
The situation is somrwhat more complicated if we consider the
applicability of the (oiucpt of "progress" (in the evaluative sense)
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 29
in the sphere of art. It is from time to time energetically disputed,
rightly or wrongly, depending on the sense in which it is meant. There
has never been an evaluative approach to art for which the dichotomy
between "art" and "non-art" has sufficed. Every approach distinguishes
between "attempt" and "realization," between the values of
various realizations and between the complete fulfillment and that
which was abortive in one or more points but which was not nevertheless
entirely worthless. This is true for the treatment not only of
a concrete, individual creative action, but also for the artistic strivings
of whole epochs. The concept of "progress" when applied to such
situations is of trivial significance because of its usual utilization for
purely technical problems. But in itself it is not meaningless.
The problem is quite different as far as the purely empirical
history of art and the empirical sociology of art are concerned. For
the first, there is naturally no "progress" in art with respect to the
aesthetic evaluation of works of art as meaningful realizations. An
aesthetic evaluation cannot be arrived at with the means afforded
by an empirical approach and it is indeed quite outside its province.
The empirical history of art can use only a technical, rational concept
of "progress," the utility of which follows from the fact that it
limits itself entirely to the establishment of the technical means
which a certain type of artistic impulse applies when the end is
definitely given. The significance of these unpretentious investigations
is easily underestimated or else they are misinterpreted in the
fashion of the modish but quite unconsequential and muddle-headed
type of "connoisseur" who claims to have "understood" an artist as
a result of having peered through the blinds of the artist's studio and
examined what is obvious in his style, i.e., his "manner." "Technical"
progress, correctly understood, does indeed belong to the
domain of art history, because it (and its influence on the artistic
impulse) is a type of phenomenon which is determinable in a
strictly empirical way, i.e., without aesthetic evaluation. Let us cite
certain illustrations which will clarify the meaning of "technical"
as used in the history of art.
The origin of the Gothic style was primarily the result of the
technically successful solution of an architectural problem, namely,
the problem of the technical optimum in the construction of abut-
30 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
merits for the support of the cross-arched vauh, in connection with
certain details which we shall not discuss here. Quite concrete architectural
problems were solved. The knowledge that in this way a
certain type of vaulting of non-quadratic areas was also made possible
awakened the passionate enthusiasm of the early and perhaps forever
unknown architects to whom we owe the development of the new
architectural style. Their technical rationalism applied the new principle
with a thoroughgoing consistency. Their artistic impulse used
it as a means for fulfilling artistic tasks which had until then been
scarcely suspected and swung sculpture in the direction of a "feeling
for the body" which was stimulated primarily by the new methods
of treating space and surface in architecture. The convergence of
this primarily technically conditioned revolution with certain largely
socially and religiously conditioned feelings supplied most of those
problems on which the artists of the Gothic epoch worked. When
the history and sociology of art have uncovered these purely factual
technical, social, and psychological conditions of the new style, they
have exhausted their purely empirical task. In doing so, they do not
"evaluate" the Gothic style in relation, for instance, to the Romanesque
or the Renaissance style, which, for its own part, was very strongly
oriented towards the technical problems of the cupola and therewith
toward the socially conditioned changes in the architectural problemcomplex.
Nor, as long as it remains empirical, does art-history
"evaluate" the individual building esthetically. The interest in works
of art and in their aesthetically relevant individual characteristics is
heteronomously given. Tt is given by the aesthetic value of the work
of art, which cannot be established by the empirical disciplines with
the means which they have at their disposal.
The same is true in the history of music. From the standpoint
of the interests of the modern European ("value-relevance"!) its
central problem is: why did the development of harmonic music
from the universally popularly developed folk polyphony take place
only in Europe and in a particular epoch, whereas everywhere else
the rationalization of music took another and most often quite opposite
direction: interval development by division (largely the fourth)
instead of through the harmonic phrase (the fifth). Thus at the
center stands the problem of the origin of the third in its harmonic
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 31
meaningful interpretation, i.e., as a unit in the triad; further: the
harmonic chromatics; and beyond that, the modem musical rhythm
(the heavy and light beats) — instead of purely metronomic measuring
— a rhythm without which modem instrumental music is inconceivable.
Here again we are concerned primarily with problems of
purely technical "progress." The fact, for example, that chromatic
music was known long before harmonic music as a means of expressing
"passion" is shown by the ancient chromatic (apparently
homophonous) music for the passionate dochmiacs in the recently
discovered Euripides fragments. The difTerence between ancient music
and the chromatic music which the great musical experimenters
of the Renaissance created in a tremendous rational striving for new
musical discoveries and indeed for the purpose of giving musical
form to "passion," lay not in the impulse to artistic expression but
rather in the technical means of expression. The technical Innovation,
however, was that this chromatic music developed into our
harmonic interval and not into the Hellenic melodic half and quarter
tone distance. This development, in its turn, had its causes in the
preceding solutions of technical problems. This was the case in the
creation of rational notation (without which modem composition
would not even be conceivable) ; even before this, in the invention
of certain instruments which were conducive to the harmonic interpretation
of musical Intervals; and above all, in the creation of
rationally polyphonous vocal music. In the early Middle Ages, the
monks of the northern Occidental missionary area had a major share
in these accomplishments without even a suspicion of the later significance
of their action. They rationalized the popular folk polyphony
for their own purposes instead of following the Byzantine monks In
allowing the music to be arranged for them by the Hellenically trained
melopoios. Certain socially and religiously conditioned characteristics
of the Internal and external situation of the Occidental Christian
church enabled this musical problem-complex which was essentially
"technical" in nature, to emerge from the rationalism peculiar to
Occidental monastlclsm. On the other hand, the adoption and rationalization
of the dance measure, which Is the source of the musical
form expressed in the sonata, was conditioned by certain forms of
social life in the Renaissance. Finally the development of the piano-
32 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
forte — one of the most important technical instruments of modern
musical development — and its dissemination in the bourgeois class,
was rooted in the specific character of the rooms in the buildings in
the North European culture area. All these are "progressive" steps
in musical technique and they have greatly influenced the history of
music. The empirical history of music can and must analyze these
features of its development without undertaking, on its own part, an
aesthetic evaluation of the worth of musical art. Technical "progress"
has quite often led to achievements which, when evaluated aesthetically,
were highly imperfect. The focus of interest, i.e., the object
which is to be historically explained, is heteronomously given to the
history of music by its aesthetic significance.
In the field of painting, the elegant unpretentiousness of the formulation
of the problem in Wolfflin's Klassische Kunst is a quite outstanding
example of the possibilities of empirical work.
The complete distinction between the evaluative sphere and the
empirical sphere emerges characteristically in the fact that the application
of a certain particularly "progressive" technique tells us nothing
at all about the aesthetic value of a work of art. Works of art with
an ever so "primitive" technique —
for example, paintings made in
ignorance of perspective — may aesthetically be absolutely equal to
those created completely by means of a rational technique, assuming
of course that the artist confined himself to tasks to which "primitive"
technique was adequate. The creation of new techniques signifies
primarily increasing differentiation and merely offers the possibility
of increasing the "richness" of a work of art in the sense of intensifying
its value. Actually it has often had the reverse effect of "impoverishing"
the feeling for form. Empirically and causally speaking,
however, changes in "technique" (in the highest sense of the word)
are indeed the most important factors in the development of art.
Not only art-historians, but historians in general usually declare
that they will not allow themselves to be deprived of the right of
asserting political, cultural, ethical, and aesthetic value-judgments.
They even claim that they cannot do their work without them. Methodology
is neither able nor does it aim to prescribe to anyone what
he should put into a literary work. It claims for itself only the right
to state that certain problems are logically different from certain
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 33
other problems and that their confusion in a discussion results in the
mutual misunderstanding of the discussants. It claims furthermore
that the treatment of one of these types of problems with the means
afforded by empirical science or by logic is meaningful, but that the
same procedure is impossible in the case of the other. A careful
examination of historical works quickly shows that when the historian
begins to "evaluate," causal analysis almost always ceases — to the
prejudice of the scientific results. He runs the risk, for example, of
"explaining" as the result of a "mistake" or of a "decline" what is
perhaps the consequence of ideals different from his own, and so he
fails in his most important task, that is, the task of "understanding."
The misunderstanding may be explained by reference to two factors.
The first, to remain in the sphere of art, derives from the fact the
artistic works may be treated, aside from the purely aesthetically evaluative
approach and the purely empirical-causal approach, by still a
third, i.e., the \'?i\uc-interpretative approach. There cannot be the
least doubt as to the intrinsic value of this approach and its indispensability
for every historian. Nor is there any doubt that the
ordinary reader of historical studies of art also expects this sort of
treatment. It must, however, be emphasized that in its logical structure,
it is not identical with the empirical approach.
Thus it may be said; whoever wishes to do empirical research
in the history of art must be able to "understand" artistic productions.
This is, obviously enough, inconceivable without the capacity for
evaluating them. The same thing is true, obviously, for the political
historian, the literary historian, the historian of religion, or of philosophy.
Of course, this is completely irrelevant to the logical structure
of historical study.
We will treat of this later. Here we should discuss only the sense
in which, apart from aesthetic evaluation, one can speak of "progress"
in the history of art. It has been seen that this concept has a technical
and rational significance, referring to the means used for the
attainment of an artistic end. In this sense it is relevant to the empirical
analysis of art. It is now time to examine this concept of
"rational" progress and to analyze its empirical or non-empirical
character. For what has been said above is only a particular case
of a universal phenomenon.
34 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
Windelband's definition of the subject-matter of his History of
Philosophy (Tuft's translation, p. 9, 2nd edition) as ". . . the process
in which European humanity has embodied in scientific conceptions
its views of the world . ,
." conditions the practical use in his own
brilliant \vork of a specific conception of "progress" which is derived
from this cultural value-relevance. This concept of progress which,
although by no means imperative for every "history" of philosophy,
applies, given the same cultural value-relevance, not only to a history
of philosophy and to the history of any other intellectual activity but
(here I differ from Windelband [p. 7, No. 1, Section 2}) to every
kind of history. Nonetheless, in what follows we will use the term,
rational "progress" in the sense in which it is employed in sociology
and economics. European and American social and economic life
is "rationalized" in a specific way and in a specific sense. The explanation
of this rationalization and the analysis of related phenomena
is one of the chief tasks of our disciplines. Therewith there re-emerges
the problem, touched on, but left open in our discussion of the history
of art: namely, what is really meant when we designate a series of
events as "rational progress"?
There is a recurrence here of the widespread confusion of the
three following meanings of the term "progress"; (1) merely "progressive"
diflferentiation, (2) progress of technical rationality in the
utilization of means and, finally (3) increase in value. A subjectively
"rational" action is not identical with a rationally "correct" action,
i.e., one which uses the objectively correct means in accord with
scientific knowledge. Rather, it means only that the subjective intention
of the individual is planfully directed to the means which are
regarded as correct for a given end. Thus a progressive subjective
rationalization of conduct is not necessarily the same as progress in
the direction of rationally or technically "correct" behavior. Magic,
for example, has been just as systematically "rationalized" as physics.
The earliest intentionally rational therapy involved the almost complete
rejection of the cure of empirical symptoms by empirically tested
herbs and potions in favor of the exorcism of (what was thought to
be) the "real" (magical, daemonic) cause of the ailment. Formally,
it had exactly the same highly rational structure as many of the
most important developments in modern therapy. But we do not
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 35
look on these priestly magical therapies as "progress" towards a "correct"
mode of action as contrasted with rule-of-thumb empiricism.
Furthermore, not every "progressive" step in the use of "correct"
means is achieved by "progress" in subjective rationality. An increase
in subjectively rational conduct can lead to objectively more "efficient"
conduct but it is not inevitable. But [if, in a single case, the
proposition is correct that measure x is, let us say, the only means
of attaining the result y^ and if this proposition — which is empirically
establishable — is consciously used by people for the orientation
of their activity to attain the result y, then their conduct is oriented
in a "technically correct" manner. If any aspect of human conduct
(of any sort whatsoever) is oriented in a technically more correct
manner than it was previously, technical progress cxists.l Only an
empirical discipline, which accepts the standard as unambiguously
given, can determine whether "technical progress" exists.
Given a specified end, then it is possible to use the terms "technical
correctness" and "technical progress" in the application of
means, without any insuperable dangers of ambiguity. ("Technique"
is used here in its broadest sense, as rational action in general: in all
spheres, including the political, social, educational, and propagandist
manipulation and domination of human beings.) Only when a specified
condition is taken as a standard can we speak of progress in a
given sphere of technique, for example, commercial technique or legal
technique. We should make explicit that the term "progress" even
in this sense is usually only approximately precise because the various
technically rational principles conflict with one another and a compromise
can never be achieved from an "objective" standpoint but
only from that of the concrete interests involved at the time. We
may also speak of "economic" progress towards a relative optimum
of want-satisfaction under conditions of given resources — if it is
assumed that there are given wants, that all these wants and their
rank order are accepted, and that finally a given type of economic
order exists — and with the reservation that preferences regarding
the duration, certainty and exhaustiveness, respectively, of the satis''This
is an empirical statement and nothing but a simple inversion of the
causal proposition : y is an eflFect of x.
36 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
faction of these wants may often conflict with each other.
Attempts have been made to derive the possibihty of unambiguous
and thereby purely economic evaluations from this. A characteristic
example of this is the case cited by Professor Liefmann
concerning the intentional destruction of goods in order to satisfy
the profit-interests of the producers when the price has fallen below
cost. This action is then "objectively" evaluated as "economically
correct." But the flaw in this assertion is that it — and every smiliar
statement — treats a number of presuppositions as self-evident when
they really are not self-evident: first, that the interests of the individual
not only often do continue beyond his death, but that they should
always do so. Without this leap from the "is" category to the "ought"
category, this allegedly "purely economic" evaluation could not be
made in any clear-cut fashion. Otherwise one cannot speak of the
interests of producers and consumers as if they were the interests of
persons who live on indefinitely. The individual's taking into account
of the interests of his heirs is, however, not a purely economic datum.
For concrete human beings are substituted impersonal interests who
use "capital" in "plants" and who exist for the sake of these plants.
This is a fiction which is useful for theoretical purposes, but even as
a fiction it does not apply to the position of the worker, especially the
childless worker. Secondly, it ignores the fact of "class position"
which, under competitive market conditions, can interfere with the
provision of certain strata of consumers with goods, not only in spite
of, but indeed in consequence of the "optimally" profitable distribution
of capital and labor in the various branches of production. That
"optimally" profitable distribution which conditions the constancy
of capital investment, is for its part, dependent on the distribution of
power between the different classes, the consequences of which in
concrete cases, can (but need not necessarily) weaken the position
of those strata on the market. Thirdly, it ignores the possibility of
persistently irreconcilable conflicts of interest between members
of various political groups and takes an a priori position in favor of
the "free trade argument." The latter is thus transformed from a
very useful heuristic instrument into a by no means self-evident evaluation
as soon as one begins to derive value-judgments from it. When,
however, the attempt to avoid this conflict is made by assuming the
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 37
political unity of the world economic system — as is theoretically
allowable — the destruction of those consumable goods in the interest
of the producer's and consumer's optimum return requires that the
forcus of the criticism be shifted. The criticism should then be directed
against the whole principle as such of market provision by means of
such indicators as arc given by the optimal returns, expressive in
money, to the economic units participating in exchange. An organization
of the provision of goods which is not based on the competitive
market will have no occasion to take account of the constellation of
interests as found in the competiti\c market. It will not, therefore,
be required to withdraw consumable goods from consumption once
they have been produced.
Only when the following conditions exist — ( 1 )
persistent interests
in profit on the part of unchanging persons guided by fixed wants,
(2) the unqualified prevalence of private capitalist methods of satisfying
wants through exchange in an entirely free market, and (3) a
disinterested state which serves only as a guarantor of the law — is
Professor Liefmann's proposition correct and then it is, of course,
self-evident. For the evaluation is then concerned Vv'ith the rational
means for the optimal solution of a technical problem of distribution.
The constructs of pure economics which are useful for analytical
purposes cannot, however, be made the sources of practical valuejudgments.
Economic theory can tell us absolutely nothing more
than that for the attainment of the given technical end x, y is the
sole appropriate means or is such together with y^ and y^; that in
the last analysis these and these differences in consequences and in
rationality arc associated with y, y^ and y" respectively; and that
their application and thus the attainment of the end x requires that
the "subsidiary consequences," z, z^ and z" be taken into account.
These are all merely reformulations of causal propositions, and to
the extent that "evaluations" can be imputed to them, they are exclusively
of the type which is concerned with the degree of rationality
of a prospective action. The evaluations are unambiguous only when
the economic end and the social context are definitely given and all
that remains is to choose between several economic means, when
these differ only with respect to their certainty, rapidity, and quantitative
productiveness, and are completely identical in every other
38 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
value-relevant aspect. It is only when these conditions have been
met that we evaluate a given means as "technically most correct,"
and it is only then that the evaluation is unambiguous. In every
other case, i.e., in every case which is not purely a matter of technique,
the evaluation ceases to be unambiguous and evaluations enter
which are not determinable exclusively by economic analysis.
But the unambiguousness of the final "evaluation" is naturally not
attained by the establishment of the unambiguousness of a technical
evaluation within the strictly economic sphere. Once we pass from
the sphere of technical standards, we are face to face with the endless
multiplicity of possible evaluations which can be reduced to
manageability only by reducing them to their ultimate axioms. For —
to mention only one — behind the particular "action" stands the
human being. An increase in the subjective rationality and in the
objective-technical "correctness" of an individual's conduct can,
beyond a certain limit — or even quite generally from a certain standpoint
— threaten goods of the greatest (ethical or religious) importance
in his value-system. Scarcely any of us will share the Buddhist
ethic in its maximum demands which rejects all purposeful conduct
just because it is purposeful and distracts one from salvation. But to
"refute" it in the way one refutes an incorrect solution in arithmetic
or an erroneous medical diagnosis is absolutely impossible. Even
without drawing on such an extreme example, it is easy to see that
as far as an evaluation of them is concerned even indisputably "technically
correct" economic actions are not validated through this
quality alone. This is true without exception for all rationalized actions,
including even such apparently technical fields as banking.
Those who oppose such types of rationalization are by no means
necessarily fools. Rather, whenever one desires to state a value-judgment,
it is necessary to take into account the subjective and objective
social influence of technical rationalization. The use of the term
"progress" is legitimate in our disciplines when it refers to "technical"
problems, i.e., to the "means" of attaining an unambiguously given
end. It can never elevate itself into the sphere of "ultimate" evalua-
tions.
After all has been said, I still regard the use of the term "progress,"
even in the limited sphere of its empirically unobjectionable
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 39
application, as very unfortunate. But the use of words is not subject
to censorship; one can, in the end, avoid the possible misunder-
standings.
Another group of problems concerning the place of the rational
in the empirical disciplines still remains to be discussed.
When the normatively valid is the object of empirical investigation,
its normative validity is disregarded. Its "existence" and not
its "validity" is what concerns the investigator. When, for example,
a statistical analysis is made of the number of "arithmetical errors"
in a certain group of calculations — which can indeed have a scientific
meaning — the basic propositions of the multiplication table are
valid for the investigator in two quite different senses. In the first
sense, its normative validity is naturally presupposed in his own calculations.
In the second, however, in which the degree of "correctness"
of the application of the multiplication table enters as the
object of the investigation, the situation is, logically, quite different.
Here the application of the multiplication table, by the persons whose
calculations are the subject-matter of the statistical analysis, is treated
as a maxim of conduct which they have acquired through education.
The investigator examines the frequency with which this maxim is
applied, just as another statistical investigation might examine the
frequency of certain types of perceptual error. The normative "validity,"
i.e., the "correctness" of the multiplication table is logically
irrelevant when its application is being investigated. The statistician,
in studying the calculations of the person investigated, must naturally
accept the convention of calculating according to the multiplication
table. But he would indeed also have to apply methods of calculation
which ai'c "incorrect" when viewed normatively, if such methods
happened to be regarded as correct in some social group and he had
to investigate statistically the frequency of its "correct" application
(i.e., "correct" from the standpoint of the group) . For the purposes
of empirical, sociological or historical analysis, our multiplication
table, as the object of such an analysis, is a maxim of practical conduct
which is valid according to the conventions of a given culture
and which is adhered to more or less closely. It is nothing more than
this. Every exposition of the Pythagorean theory of music must
accept the calculation which is, to our knowledge, "false," namely.
40 THE MEAMXG OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
that twelve fifths equal sexen oetaves. Ever)' history of logic must
likewise accept the historical existence of logical statements which,
for us, are contradictory. Although it is empathically understandable,
it is outside the realm of science to respond to such "absurdities" with
explosions of rage as a particularly eminent historian of medieval
logic once did.
This transformation of normatively valid truths into conventionally
valid opinions, to which all intellectual activities, including even
logic or mathematics, are subject whenever they become the objects
of empirical analysis''' is completely independent of the fact that the
normative validity of logical and mathematical propositions is at the
same time that a priori basis of all empirical science. Their logical
structure is less simple in the case of their function in the empirical
investigation of cultural phenomena. This "function" must be carefully
differentiated from (a) their function as the object of the investigation
and (b) their function as the a priori basis of the investigation. Every
science of psychological and social phenomena is a science of human
conduct (which includes all thought and attitudes). These sciences
seek to "understand" this conduct and by means of this understanding
to "explain" it "interpretatively." We cannot deal here with the
complex phenomenon of "understanding." All that we are interested
in here is one particular type: namely "rational" interpretation. We
obviously "understand" without further question a person's solution
of a certain problem in a manner which we ourselves regard as normatively
correct. The same is true of calculation which is "correct"
in the sense that means, which are "correct" from our viewpoint, are
applied to attain a desired goal. Our understanding of these events
is particularly evident (i.e., plausible) because it is concerned with
the realization of the objectively "valid." And nevertheless one must
guard one's self against the belief that in this case what is normatively
correct has, from the point of view of logic, the same function as it
has in its general position as the a priori of all scientific investigation.
Rather its function as a means of "understanding" is exactly the same
as it is in the case of purely psychological "empathy" with logically
''^The empirical analysis referred to above docs not attempt to determine their
normative correctness.
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 41
irrational feeling and affect-complexes, where it is a matter of obtaining
an "understanding" knowledge of them. The means employed
by the method of "understanding explanation" are not normative correctness,
but rather, on the one hand, the conventional habits of the
investigator and teacher in thinking in a particular way, and on
the other, as the situation requires, his capacity to "feel himself"
empathically into a mode of thought which deviates from his own
and which is normatively "false" according to his own habits of
thought. The fact that "error" is, in principle, just as accessible to
the understanding as "correct" thinking proves that we are concerned
here with the normatively "correct" type of validity, not as such but
only as an especially easily understandable cnjiventional type. This
leads now to a final statement about the role of "normative correctness"
in social science.
In order to be able to "understand" an "incorrect" calculation
or an "incorrect" logical^ assertion and to analyze its consequences,
one must not only test it in using methods of correct calculation or
logical thought but must indeed indicate by reference to the "correct"
calculation or "correct" logic, those points at which the calculation
or the logical assertion in question deviates from the one which the
analyst regards as normatively "correct." This is not merely necessary
for pedagogical purposes, which Windelband, for example,
emphasized in the Introduction to his History of Philosophy ("warning
signs" against "wrong roads"), and which is in itself only a
desirable by-product of historical study. Nor is it necessitated by the
fact that every historical inquiry, among the objects of which are
included all sorts of logical, mathematical, or other scientific knowledge,
rests only on the foundation of "truth-value" which we accept
and which is the only possible ultimate value criterion which determines
its selection and progress. Even if this were actually the
case, it would still be necessary to consider Windelband's oftenmade
point: i.e., that progress in the sense of an increase in correct
propositions, instead of taking the direct path, has — speaking in
terms of economics — frequently followed the "most productive
round-about path" in passing through "errors," i.e., problem-confusions.
This procedure is called for because and only to the extent
of the importance of those aspects in which the knowledge investi-
42 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
gated deviate from those which the investigator himself regards as
"correct." By importance we mean that the specifically "characteristic"
aspects in question are from the investigator's point of view
either directly value-relevant or are causally connected with other
value-relevant phenomena. This will, ordinarily, be the case, to the
degree that the truth-value of ideas is the guiding value in the writing
of intellectual history, e.g., in a history of a particular branch of
knowledge like philosophy or economic theory.
But it is by no means necessarily restricted to such cases. A somewhat
similar situation arises whenever one investigates a subjectively
rational action, in which errors in thinking or calculation can constitute
causal factors of the course of the action, lln order, for example,
to understand how a war is conducted, it is necessary to imagine an
ideal commander-in-chief for each side — even though not explicitly
or in detailed form. Each of these commanders must know the total
fighting resources of each side and all the possibilities arising therefrom
of attaining the concretely unambiguous goal, namely, the destruction
of the enemy's military power. On the basis of this knowledge,
they must act entirely without error and in a logically "perfect"
way. For only then can the consequences of the fact that the real
commanders neither had the knowledge nor were they free from
error, and that they were not purely rational thinking machines, be
unambiguously established. The rational construction is useful here
as a means of correct causal imputation. The "ideal" constructions
of rigorous and errorless rational conduct which we find in pure
economic theory have exactly the same significance. I
For purposes of the causal imputation of empirical events, we
need the rational, empirical-technical and logical constructions, which
help us to answer the question as to what a behavior pattern or
thought pattern (e.g., a philosophical system) would be like if it
possessed completely rational, empirical and logical "correctness" and
"consistency." From the logical viewpoint, the construction of such
a rationally "correct" "utopia" or "ideal" is, however, only one of
the various possible forms of the "ideal-type" — as I have called such
logical constructs. For not only are there cases in which an incorrect
inference or a self-defeating action would be more serviceable as idealtypes,
but there are whole spheres of action (the sphere of the "irra-
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 43
tional") where the simplicity ofTered by isolating abstraction is more
convenient than an ideal-type of optimal logical rationality. It is
true that, in practice, the investigator frequently uses normatively
^
"correctly" constructed "ideal-types." From the logical point of view, \
however, the normative "correctness" of these types is not essential.
For the purpose of characterizing a specific type of attitude, the
investigator may construct either an ideal-type which is identical
with his own personal ethical norms, and in this sense objectively
"correct," or one which ethically is thoroughly in conflict with his
own normative attitudes; and he may then compare the behavior of
the people being investigated with it. Or else he may construct an
ideal-typical attitude of which he has neither positive nor negative
evaluations. Normative "correctness" has no monopoly for such purposes.
\Whatever the content of the ideal-type, be it an ethical, a
legal, an aesthetic, or a religious norm, or a technical, an economic,
or a cultural maxim or any other type of valuation in the most
rational form possible, it has only one function in an empirical investigation.
Its function js_the comparison with empirical reality in
order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with \
the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and
explain them causally. Rational juridicial concepts supply this need
for the empirical history of law, and the theory of the rational calculation
of costs and revenue supplies the same service for the analysis
of the actual behavior of individual economic units in a profiteconomy.
\ Both of these disciplines, in addition to this heuristic function,
have as "practical arts" distinctly normative-practical aims. In
this respect, these disciplines are no more empirical in the sense used
here than are, for instance, mathematics, logic, normative ethics, and
aesthetics, from which they differ in other respects as much as the
latter differ among themselves.
Economic theory is an axiomatic discipline in a way which is
logically very different from that of the systematic science of law. Its
relationship to economic reality is very different from the relationship
of jurisprudence to the phenomena treated by the history and sociology
of law. The concepts of jurisprudence may and should be used
as ideal-types in empirical legal studies. Pure economic theory, in its
analysis of past and present society, utilizes ideal-tye concepts exclu-
44 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
sively. Economic theory makes certain assumptions which scarcely
ever correspond completely with reality but which approximate it in
various degrees and asks: how would men act under these assumed
conditions, if their actions were entirely rational? It assumes the
dominance of pure economic interests and precludes the operation
of political or other non-economic considerations.
Its fate, however, has been typical of "problem-confusions." Pure
economics is a theory which is "apolitical," which asserts "no moral
evaluations," and which is "individualistic" in its orientation in the
senses specified above. It is and will always be indispensable for
analytical purposes. The extreme free-traders, however, conceived
of it as an adequate picture of "natural" reality, i.e., reality not distorted
by human stupidity, and they proceeded to set it up as a moral
imperative — as a valid normative ideal — whereas it is only a convenient
ideal type to be used in empirical analysis. When in consequence
of changes in economic and social policy, the high estimation
of the state was reflected in the evaluative sphere, pure economic
theory was rejected not only as an ideal — in which role it could never
claim validity — but as a methodological device for the investigation
of empirical facts. "Philosophical" considerations of the most varied
sort were to supplant rational procedure. The identification of the
"psychologically" existent with the ethically valid obstructed the precise
distinction of value-judgments from assertions of fact.
The extraordinary accomplishments of the representatives of this
scientific tendency in the fields of history, sociology, and social policy
are generally acknowledged. But the unbiased observer also perceives
that theoretical and rigorously scientific analysis in economics has
been in a state of decay for decades as a natural consequence of that
confusion of problems. The first of the two main theses which the
opponents of pure economics set forth is that its rational constructions
are "pure fictions" which tell us nothing about reality. If rightly
interpreted, this contention is correct. Theoretical constructions never
do more than assist in the attainment of a knowledge of reality which
they alone cannot provide, and which, as a result of the operation of
other factors and complexes of motives which are not contained in
their assumptions, even in the most extreme cases, only approximate
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 45
to the hypothesized course of events. This, of course, does not diminish
the utiHty and necessity of pure theory. The second thesis of the
opponents of economic theory is that there cannot be a non-evaluative
theory of economic policy as a science. This is fundamentally
false; non-evaluativeness, in the sense presented above, is on the contrary
presupposed by every purely scientific analysis of politics, particularly
of social and economic policy. It would be superfluous to
repeat that it is obviously possible and scientifically useful and necessary
to establish propositions of the following type: in order to attain
the end x (in economic policy), y is the only means, or under
conditions h\, hi, and h^, yy, y-i, and yi are the only or the most effective
means. It should be emphatically recalled that the possibility
of the exact definition of the end sought for is a prerequisite to
the formulation of the problem. Hence it is simply a question of
inverting causal propositions; in other words, it is a purely "technical"
problem. It is indeed on this account that science is not compelled
to formulate these technical teleological propositions in any
form other than that of simple causal propositions, e.g., x is produced
by y, or x, under conditions h^, h"~, and hz is produced by
yi, )^2, and y^. For these say exactly the same thing, and the "man
of action" can derive his "prescriptions" from them quite easily. In
addition to the formulation of pure ideal-typical formulae and the
establishment of such causal economic propositions —
for such are
without exception involved when x is sufficiently unambiguous —
,
scientific economics has other problems. These problems include
the causal influence of economic events on the whole range of social
phenomena (by means of the hypotheses offered by the economic
interpretation of history) . Likewise included among the problems
of economics is the analysis of the various ways in which noneconomic
social events influence economic events (economic sociology
and economic history). Political actions and structures, especially
the state and the state-guaranteed legal system arc of primary importance
among these non-economic social events. But obviously,
political events are not the only ones — all those structures which
influence economic actions to the extent that they become relevant to
scientific interest must also be included. The phrase "theory of economic
policy" is naturally not very suitable for the totality of these
46 THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY"
problems. The fact that it is nevertheless used for this purpose is
due to the character of the universities as training schools for state
officials and to the great power of the state to influence the economic
system in very far-reaching ways. The inversion of "cause and effect"
propositions into "means-ends" propositions is possible whenever the
effect in question can be stated precisely. Naturally, this does not at
all affect the logical relationship between value-judgments and judgments
of fact. In conclusion, we should like to make one more
comment on this point.
The developments of the past few decades, and especially the unprecedented
events to which we are now witness, have heightened the
prestige of the state tremendously. Of all the various associations, it
alone is accorded "legitimate" power over life, death, and liberty. Its
agencies use these powers against external enemies in wartime, and
against internal resistance in both war and peace. In peacetime, it is
the greatest entrepreneur in economic life and the most powerful
collector of tributes from the citizenry; and in time of war, it disposes
of unlimited power over all available economic goods. Its
modern rationalized form of organization has made achievements
possible in many spheres which could not have been approximated
by any other sort of social organization. It is almost inevitable that
people should conclude that it represents the "ultimate" value — especially
in the political sphere — and that all social actions should be
evaluated in terms of their relations to its interests. This is an
inadmissible deduction of a value-judgment from a statement of fact,
even if we disregard, for the time being, the ambiguity of the conclusions
drawn from that value-judgment. The ambiguity would of
course become immediately apparent once we begin to discuss the
means (of maintaining or "advancing" the state) . In the face of
the great prestige of the state, it is worthwhile pointing out that there
are certain things which the state cannot do. This is the case even
in the sphere of military activity, which might be regarded as its
most proper domain. The observation of many phenomena which
the present war has brought about in the armies of nationally heterogeneous
states leads us to conclude that the voluntary devotion of
the individual to the tasks which his state calls for but which it cannot
compel, is not irrelevant in the determination of military success.
THE MEANING OF "ETHICAL NEUTRALITY" 47
And in the economic sphere, it should be pointed out that the transformation
of wartime forms and measures into permanent features
of the peacetime economy can have rapid resuhs which will spoil the
ideal of an expansive state for those who hold it. Nonetheless, we
will not concern ourselves further with this point. In the sphere
of value-judgments, however, it is possible to defend quite meaningfully
the view that the power of the state should be increased in order
to strengthen its power to eliminate obstacles, while maintaining that
the state itself has no intrinsic value, that it is a purely technical
instrument for the realization of other values from which alone it
derives its value, and that it can retain this value only as long as it
does not seek to transcend this merely auxiliary status.
We will not expound or defend either this or any other possible
evaluative standpoint here. We shall only state that if the professional
thinker has an immediate obligation at all, it is to keep a cool head
in the face of the ideals prevailing at the time, even those which
are associated with the throne, and if necessary, "to swim against
the stream." The "German ideas of 1914" were produced by dilettantes.
The "socialism of the future" is a phrase for the rationalization
of economic life by combining further bureaucratization and
interest-group adminstration. Today fanatical office-holding patriots
are invoking the spirit not only of German philosophy, but of religion
as well, to justify these purely technical measures instead of soberly
discussing their feasibility, which is quite prosaically conditioned by
financial factors. This kind of activity is nothing but a highly objectionable
form of poor taste manifested by dilettantish litterateurs who
take themselves over-seriously. But what the real "German ideas of
1918," on the formation of which the returning soldiers will have
to be heard, can or should be like, no one today can say in advance.
This will depend on the future.
''Objectivity" in Social Science
and Social Policy
Wherever assertions are explicitly made in the name of the editor
or when tasks are set for the Archiv in the course of Section I of the
foregoing essay, the personal views of the author are not involved.
Each of the points in question has the express agreement of the coeditors.
The author alone bears the responsibility for the form and
content of Section II.
The fact that the points of view, not only of the contributors but
of the editors as well, are not identical even on methodological
issues, stands as a guarantee that the Archiv will not fall prey to
any sectarian outlook. On the other hand, agreement as to certain
fundamental issues is a presupposition of the joint assumption of
editorial responsibility. This agreement refers particularly to the
value of theoretical knowledge from "one-sided" points of view, the
construction of precisely defined concepts and the insistence on the
rigorous distinction between empirical knowledge and value-judgments
as here understood. Naturally we do not claim to present
anything new therewith.
The extensiveness of the discussion {Section II) and the frequent
repetition of the same thought are intended only to maximize
the general understanding of our argument in wider circles. For the
sake of this intention, much — let us hope not too much — precision
in expression has been sacrificed. For the same reason, we have
omitted the presentation of a systematic analysis in favor of the present
listing of a few methodological viewpoints. A systematic inquiry
would have required the treatment of a large number of epistemological
questions which are far deeper than those raised here. We are
not interested here in the furtherance of logical analysis per se. We
are attempting only to apply the well-known results of modern logic
49
50 'OBJECTIVITY' IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
ti7 _ our own problems. Nor are we solving problems here; we are
trying only to make their significance apparent to non-specialists.
Those who know the work of the modern logicians — 7 cite only
Windclband, Simmel, and for our purposes particularly Heinrich
Rickert — will immediately notice that everything of importance in
this essay is bound up with their work.
wHEN A SOCIAL SCIENCE journal which also at times
concerns itself with a social policy, appears for the first time or passes
into the hands of a new editorial board, it is customaiy to ask about
its "line." We, too, must seek to answer this question and following
up the remarks in our "Introductory Note" we will enter into the
question in a more fundamental theoretical way. Even though or
perhaps because, we are concerned with "self-evident truths," this
occasion provides the opportunity to cast some light on the nature
of the "social sciences" as we understand them, in such a manner
that it can be useful, if not to the specialist, then to the reader who is
more remote from actual scientific work.
In addition to the extension of our knowledge of the "social
conditions of all countries," i.e., the facts of social life, the express
purpose of the Archiv ever since its establishment has been the education
of judgment about practical social problems — and in the
very modest way in which such a goal can be furthered by private
scholars — the criticism of practical social policy, extending even as
far as legislation. In spite of this, the Archiv has firmly adhered,
from the very beginning, to its intention to be an exclusively scientific
journal and to proceed only with the methods of scientific research.
Hence arises the question of whether the purpose stated
above is compatible in principle with self-confinement to the latter
method. What has been the meaning of the value-judgments found
in the pages of the Archiv regarding legislative and administrative
measures, or practical recommendations for such measures? What
are the standards governing these judgments? \Vhat is the validity
of the value-judgments which are uttered by the critic, for instance.
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 51
or on which a writer recommending a policy founds his arguments
for that policy? In what sense, if the criterion of scientific knowledge
is to be found in the "objective" validity of its results, has he re- ji
mained within the sphere of scientific discussion? We will first present
our own attitude on this question in order later to deal with the
broader one: in what sense are there in general "objectively valid
truths" in those., disciplines concerned _with social and cultural
phenomena? This question, in view of the continuous changes and
bitter conflict about the apparently most elementary problems of our
discipline, its methods, the formulation and validity of its concepts,
cannot be avoided. We do not attempt to offer solutions but rather
to disclose problems — problems of the type to which our journal,
if it is to meet its past and future responsibilities, must turn its
attention.
We all know that our science, as is the case with every
science treating the institutions and events of human culture,
(with the possible exception of political history) first arose in connection
with practical considerations. Its most immediate and often
sole purpose was the attainment of value-judgments concerning
measures of State economic policy. It was a "technique" in the
same sense as, for instance, the clinical disciplines in the medical
sciences are. It has now become known how this situation was
gradually modified. This modification was not, however, accompanied
by a formulation of the logical (prinzipielle) distinction between
"existential knowledge," i.e., knowledge of what "is," and "normative
knowledge," i.e., knowledge of what "should be." The formulation
of this distinction was hampered, first, by the view that
immutably invariant natural laws, — later, by the view that an
unambiguous evolutionary principle — governed economic life and
that accordingly, what was normatively right was identical — in the
former case — with the immutal)ly existent — and in the latter —
^This essay was published when the editorship of the Archiv fur Sozialwisscnschaft
und Socialpolitik was transferred to Edgar Jaffe, Werner Sombart and
Max Weber. Its form was influenced by the occasion for which it was written
and the content should be considered in this light. (Marianne Weber.)
52 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
with the inevitably emergent. With the awakening of the historical
sense, a combination of ethical evolutionism and historical relativism
became the predominant attitude in our science. This attitude
sought to deprive ethical norms of their formal character and through
J
the incorporation of the totality of cultural values into the "ethical"
{Sittlichen)
sphere tried to give a substantive content to ethical
/ norms. It was hoped thereby to raise economics to the status of an
"ethical science" with empirical foundations. To the extent that
an "ethical" label was given to all possible cultural ideals, the particular
autonomy of the ethical imperative was obliterated, without however
increasing the "objective" validity of those ideals. Nonetheless
we can and must forego a discussion of the principles at issue. We
merely point out that even today the confused opinion that economics
does and should derive value-judgments from a specifically "economic
point of view" has not disappeared but is especially current, quite
understandably, among men of practical affairs.
Our journal as the representative of an empirical specialized discipline
must, as we wish to show shortly, reject this view in principle.
It must do so because, in our opinion, it can never be the task of
an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which
directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.
What is the implication of this proposition? It is certainly not
that value-judgments are to be withdrawn from scientific discussion
in general simply because in the last analysis they rest on certain
ideals and are therefore "subjective" in origin. Practical action and
the aims of our journal would always reject such a proposition.
Criticism is not to be suspended in the presence of value-judgments.
The problem is rather: what is the meaning and purpose of the
scientific criticism of ideals and value-judgments? This requires a
somewhat more detailed analysis.
All serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaningful
human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories "end"
Jl I and "means." We desire something concretely either "for its own
^ I
sake" or as a means of achieving something else which is more highly
desired. The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving
a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch
as we are able to determine (within the present limits of our
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 53
knowledge) which means for the achievement of a proposed end
are appropriate or inappropriate, we can in this way estimate the
chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means. In
this way we can indirectly criticize the setting of the end itself as
practically meaningful (on the basis of the existing historical situation)
or as meaningless with reference to existing conditions. Furthermore,
when the possibility of attaining a proposed end appears
to exist, we can determine (naturally within the limits of our existing
knowledge) the consequences which the application of the means
to be used will produce in addition to the eventual attainment of
the proposed end, as a result of the interdependence of all events.
We can then provide the acting person with the ability to weigh
and compare the undesirable as over against the desirable consequences
of his action. Thus, we can answer the question: what will
the attainment of a desired end "cost" in terms of the predictable
loss of other values? Since, in the vast majority of cases, every goal
that is striven for does "cost" or can "cost" something in this sense,
the weighing of the goal in terms of the incidental consequences of
the action which realizes it cannot be omitted from the deliberation
of persons who act with a sense of responsibility. One of the most
important functions of the technical criticism which we have been
discussing thus far is to make this sort of analysis possible. To apply
the results of this analysis in the making of a decision, however, is
not a task which science can undertake; it is rather the task of the
acting, willing person: he weighs and chooses from among the values
involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of
the world. Science can make him realize that all action and naturally,
according to the circumstances, inaction imply in their consequences
the espousal of certain values — and herewith — what is
today so willingly overlooked — the rejection of certain others. The
act of choice itself is his own responsibility.
We can also offer the person, who makes a choice, insight into
the significance of the desired object. We can teach him to think
in terms of the context and the meaning of the ends he desires,
and among which he chooses. We do this through making explicit
and developing in a logically consistent manner the "ideas" which
actually do or which can underlie the concrete end. It is self-evident
<rl
54 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
that one of the most important tasks of every science of cultural life
is to arrive at a rational understanding of these "ideas" for which
men either really or allegedly struggle. This does not overstep the
boundaries of a science which strives for an "analytical ordering of
empirical reality," although the methods which are used in this interpretation
of cultural (geistiger) values are not "inductions" in the
usual sense. At any rate, this task falls at least partly beyond the
limits of economics as defined according to the conventional division
of labor. It belongs among the tasks of social philosophy. However,
the historical influence of ideas in the development of social
life has been and still is so great that our journal cannot renounce
this task. It shall rather regard the investigation of this phenomenon
as one of its most important obligations.
But the scientific treatment of value-judgments may not only
imdcrstand and cmpathically analyze {nncherleben) the desired ends
and the ideals which underlie them; it can also "judge" them critically.
This criticism can of course have only a dialetical character,
i.e., it can be no more than a formal logical judgment of historically
given value-judgments and ideas, a testing of the ideals according
to the postulate of the internal consistency of the desired end. It can,
insofar is it sets itself this goal, aid the acting willing person in attaining
self-clarification concerning the final axioms from which his
desired ends are derived. It can assist him in becoming aware of the
ultimate standards of value which he docs not make explicit to himself
or, which he must presuppose in order to be logical. The elevation
of these ultimate standards, which are manifested in concrete valuejudgments,
to the level of oxplicitness is the utmost that the scientific
treatment of value-judgments can do without entering into the realm
of speculation. As * /hether the person expressing these valuejudgments
should adh*" to these ultimate standards is his personal
affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.
An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do —- but
rather what he can do — and under certain circumstances — what
he wishes to do. It is true that in our sciences, personal value-judgments
have tended to influence scientific arguments without being
jexplicitly admitted. They have brought about continual confusion
and have caused various interpretations to be placed on scientific
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 55
arguments even in the sphere of the determination of simple casual
interconnections among facts according to whether the results increased
or decreased the chances of realizing orie's personal ideals,
i.e., the possibility of desiring a certain thing. Even the editors and
the collaborators of our journal will regard "nothing human as alien"
to them in this respect. But it is a long way from this acknowledgement
of human frailty to the belief in an "ethical" science of economics,
which would derive ideals from its subject matter and produce
concrete norms by applying general ethical imperatives. It is true
that we regard as objectively valuable those innermost elements of
the "personality," those highest and most ultimate value-judgments
which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance, to '
our life. We can indeed espouse these values only when they appear
to us as valid, as derived from our highest values and when they are
developed in the struggle against the difficulties which life presents.
Certainly, the dignity of the "personality" lies in the fact that for it
there exist values about which it organizes its life ; — even if these
values are in certain cases concentrated exclusively within the sphere
of the person's "individuality," then "self-realization" in those interests
for which it claims validity as values, is the idea with respect to
\vhich its whole existence is oriented. Only on the assumption of
belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgments
meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is
a matter of faith. It may perhaps be a task for the speculative interpretation
of life and the universe in quest of their meaning. But it
certainly does not fall within the province of an empirical science in
the sense in which it is to be practised here. The empirically demonstrable
fact that these ultimate ends undergo historical changes and
are debatable does not affect this distinction between empirical science
and value-judgments, contrary to what is often thought. For even
the knowledge of the most certain proposition of our theoretical
sciences — e.g., the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, like the
cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of culture.
However, when we call to mind the practical problems of economic
and social policy (in the usual sense), we see that there are many,
indeed countless, practical questions in the discussion of which there
seems to be general agreement about the self-evident character of
56 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
certain goals. Among these we may mention emergency credit, the
concrete problems of social hygiene, poor relief, factor)' inspection,
industrial courts, employment exchanges, large sections of protective
labor legislation — in short, all those issues in which, at least in appearance,
only the means for the attainment of the goal are at issue.
But even if we were to mistake the illusion of self-evidence for truth
— which science can never do without damaging itself — and wished
to view the conflicts immediately arising from attempts at practical
realization as purely technical questions of expediency — which would
very often be incorrect — even in this case we would have to recognize
that this illusion of the self-evidence of normative standards of
value is dissipated as soon as we pass from the concrete problems of
philanthropic and protective social and economic services to problems
of economic and social policy. The distinctive characteristic
of a problem of social policy is indeed the fact that it cannot be
resolved merely on the basis of purely technical considerations which
assume already settled ends. Normative standards of value can and
must be the objects of dispute in a discussion of a problem of social
policy because the problem lies in the domain of general cultural
values. And the conflict occurs not merely, as we are too easily
inclined to believe today, between "class interests" but between general
views on life and the universe as well. This latter point, however,
does not lessen the truth that the particular ultimate valuejudgment
which the individual espouses is decided among other factors
and certainly to a quite significant degree by the degree of affinity
between it and his class interests — accepting for the time being this
only superficially unambiguous term. One thing is certain under all
circumstances, namely, the more "general" the problem involved, i.e.,
in this case, the broader its cultural significance, the less subject it is
to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical
sciences and the greater the role played by value-ideas {Wertideen)
and the ultimate and highest personal axioms of belief. It is simply
naive to believe, although there are many specialists who even now
occasionally do, that it is possible to establish and to demonstrate as
scientifically valid "a principle" for practical social science from
which the norms for the solution of practical problems can be unambiguously
derived. However much the social sciences need the dis-
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 57
cussion of practical problems in terms of fundamental principles, i.e.,
the reduction of unreflective value-judgments to the premises from
which they are logically derived and however much our journal
intends to devote itself specially to them — certainly the creation of
a lowest common denominator for our problems in the form of generally
valid ultimate value-judgments cannot be its task or in general
the task of any empirical science. Such a thing would not only be
impracticable; it would be entirely meaningless as well. Whatever
the interpretation of the basis and the nature of the validity of the
ethical imperatives, it is certain that from them, as from the norms
for the concretely conditioned conduct of the individual, cultural
values cannot be unambiguously derived as being normatively desirable;
it can do so the less, the more inclusive are the values concerned.
Only positive religions — or more precisely expressed : dogmatically
bound sects — are able to confer on the content of cultural values the
status of unconditionally valid ethical imperatives. Outside these
sects, cultural ideals which the individual wishes to realize and ethical
obligations which he should fulfil do not, in principle, share the same
status. The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge
is that it must know that we cannot learn the yneaning of the
world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must
rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize
that general views of life and the universe can never be the
products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest
ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the
struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours
are to us.
Only an optimistic syncretism, such as is, at times, the product
of evolutionary-historical relativism, can theoretically delude itself
about the profound seriousness of this situation or practically shirk
its consequences. It can, to be sure, be just as obligatory subjectively
for the practical politician, in the individual case, to mediate between
antagonistic points of view as to take sides \vith one of them. But
this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific "objectivity."
Scientifically the "middle course" is not truer even by a hair's breadth,
than the most extreme party ideals of the right or left. Nowhere are
the interests of science more poorly served In the long run than in
58 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
those situations where one refuses to see uncomfortable facts and the
realities of life in all their starkness. The Archiv will struggle relentlessly
against the severe self-deception which asserts that through
the synthesis of several party points of view, or by following a line
between them, practical norms of scientific validity can be arrived at.
It is necessary to do this because, since this piece of self-deception
tries to mask its own standards of value in relativistic terms, it is
more dangerous to the freedom of research than the former naive
faith of parties in the scientific "demonstrability" of their dogmas.
The capacity to distinguish between empirical knowledge and valuejudgments,
and the fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual
truth as well as the practical duty to stand up for our own ideals
constitute the program to which we wish to adhere with ever increasing
firmness.
There is and always will be — and this is the reason that it
concerns us — an unbridgeable distinction among ( 1
) those arguments
which appeal to our capacity to become enthusiastic about
and our feeling for concrete practical aims or cultural forms and
values, (2) those arguments in which, once it is a question of the
validity of ethical norms, the appeal is directed to our conscience,
and finally (3) those arguments which appeal to our capacity and
need for analytically ordering empirical reality in a manner which
lays claim to validity as empirical truth. This proposition remains
correct, despite, as we shall see, the fact that those highest "values"
underlying the practical interest are and always will be decisively
significant in determining the focus of attention of analytical activity
{ordfiende Tdtigkeit des Denkens) in the sphere of the cultural sciences.
It has been and remains true that a systematically correct
scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose,
must be acknowledged as correct even by a Chinese — or — more
precisely stated — it must constantly strive to attain this goal, which
perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore,
the successful logical analysis of the content of an ideal
and its ultimate axioms and the discovery of the consequences which
arise from pursuing it, logically and practically, must also be valid
for the Chinese. At the same time, our Chinese can lack a "sense"
for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often will deny
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 59
the ideal itself and the concrete value-judgments derived from it.
Neither of these two latter attitudes can affect the scientific value of
the analysis in any way. Quite certainly our journal will not ignore
the ever and inevitably recurrent attempts to give an unambiguous
interpretation to culture. On the contrary, these attempts themselves
rank with the most important products of this cultural life and,
under certain circumstances, among its dynamic forces. We will
therefore constantly strive to follow with care the course of these
discussions of "social philosophy" (as here understood). We are furthermore
completely free of the prejudice which asserts that reflections
on culture which go beyond the analysis of empirical data in
order to interpret the world metaphysically can, because of their
metaphysical character fulfil no useful cognitive tasks. Just what
these cognitive tasks are is primarily an epistemological question, the
answer to which we must and can, in view of our purpose, disregard
at this point. There is one tenet to which we adhere most firmly in
our work, namely, that a social science journal, in our sense, to the
extent that it is scientific should be a place where those truths are
sought, which — to remain with our illustration — can claim, even
for a Chinese, the validity appropriate to an analysis of empirical
reality.
Of course, the editors cannot once and for all deny to themselves
or their contributors the possibility of expressing in value-judgments
the ideals which motivate them. However two important duties
arise in connection with this. First, to keep the readers and themselves
sharply aware at every moment of the standards by which they
judge reality and from which the value-judgment is derived, instead
of, as happens too often, deceiving themselves in the conflict of
ideals by a value melange of values of the most different orders
and types, and seeking to offer something to everybody. If this obligation
is rigorously heeded, the practical evaluative attitude can be
not only hannless to scientific interests but even directly useful, and
indeed mandatory. In the scientific criticism of legislative and other
practical recommendations, the motives of the legislator and the ideals
of the critic in all their scope often can not be clarified and analyzed
in a tangible and intelligible form in any other way than through
the confrontation of the standards of value underlying the ideas criti-
60 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
cized with others, preferably the critic's own. Every meaningful
value-judgment about someone else's aspirations must be a criticism
from the standpoint of one's own Weltanschauung; it must be a struggle
against another's ideals from the standpoint of one's occn. If in a
particular concrete case, the ultimate value-axioms which underlie
practical activity are not only to be designated and scientifically
analyzed but are also to be shown in their relationship to other valueaxioms,
"positive" criticism by means of a systematic exposition of
the latter is unavoidable.
In the pages of this journal, especially in the discussion of legislation,
there will inevitably be found social policy, i.e., the statement
of ideals, in addition to social science, i.e., the analysis of facts. But
we do not by any means intend to present such discussions as "science"
and we will guard as best we can against allowing these two to be
confused with each other. In such discussions, science no longer has
the floor. For that reason, the second fundamental imperative of
scientific freedom is that in such cases it should be constantly made
clear to the readers (and — again we say it — above all to one's self!)
exactly at which point the scientific investigator becomes silent and
the evaluating and acting person begins to speak. In other words,
it should be made explicit just where the arguments are addressed
to the analytical understanding and where to the sentiments. The
constant confusion of the scientific discussion of facts and their evaluation
is still one of the most widespread and also one of the most
damaging traits of work in our field. The foregoing arguments are
directed against this confusion, and not against the clear-cut introduction
of one's own ideals into the discussion. An attitude of rnoral
indifference has no connection with scientific "objectivity." The
Archiv, at least in its intentions, has never been and should never be
a place where polemics against certain currents in politics or social
policy are carried on, nor should it be a place where struggles are
waged for or against ideals in politics or social-policy. There are
other journals for these purposes. The peculiar characteristic of the
journal has rather been from the very beginning and, insofar as it is
in the power of the editors, shall continue to be that political antagonists
can meet in it to carr)' on scientific work. It has not been a
"socialist" organ hitherto and in the future it shall not be "bourgeois."
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 61
It excludes no one from its circle of contributors who is willing to
place himself within the framework of scientific discussion. It cannot
be an arena for "objections," replies and rebuttals, but in its
pages no one will be protected, neither its contributors nor its editors,
from being subjected to the sharpest factual, scientific criticism.
Whoever cannot bear this or who takes the viewpoint that he does
not wish to work, in the service of scientific knowledge, with persons
whose other ideals arc different from his own, is free not to partici-
pate.
However, we should not deceive ourselves about it — this last
sentence means much more in practice than it seems to do at first
glance. In the first place, there are psychological limits everywhere
and especially in Germany to the possibility of coming together
freely with one's political opponents in a neutral forum, be it social
or intellectual. This obstacle which should be relentlessly combatted
as a sign of narrow-minded party fanaticism and backward political
culture, is reenforced for a journal like ours through the fact that
in social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is
in actuality always given by practical "questions." Hence the very
recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally,
with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values.
A journal which has come into existence under the influence of a
general interest in a concrete problem, will always include among its
contributors persons who are personally interested in these problems
because certain concrete situations seem to be incompatible with, or
seem to threaten, the realization of certain ideal values in which they
believe. A bond of similar ideals will hold this circle of contributors
together and it will be the basis of a further recruitment. This in
turn will tend to give the journal, at least in its treatment of questions
of practical social policy, a certain "character" which of course
inevitably accompanies every collaboration of vigorously sensitive
persons whose evaluative standpoint regarding the problems cannot
be entirely expressed even in purely theoretical analysis; in the criticism
of practical recommendations and measures it quite legitimately
finds expression — under the particular conditions above discussed.
The Archil' first appeared at a time in which certain practical aspects
of the "labor problem" (as traditionally understood) stood in the
62 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
forefront of social science discussions. Ihose persons for whom the
problems which the Archiv wished to treat were bound up with
ukimate and decisive value-judgments and who on that account became
its most regular contributors also espoused at the same time
the view of eulture which was strongly influenced by these valuejudgments.
We all know that though this journal, through its explicit
self-restriction to "scientific" discussions and through the express invitation
to the "adherents of all political standpoints," denied that it
would pursue a certain "tendency," it nonetheless possessed a "character"
in the above sense. This "character" was created by the group
of its regular contributors. In general they were men who, whatever
may have been other divergences in their points of view, set as
their goal the protection of the physical well-being of the laboring
masses and the increase of the latters' share of the material and intellectual
values of our culture. As a means, they employed the combination
of state intervention into the arena of material interests
with the freer shaping of the existing political and legal order.
Whatever may have been their opinion as to the form of the social
order in the more remote future — for the present, they accepted the
emergent trends of the capitalist system, not because they seemed better
than the older forms of social organization but because they seemed
to be practically inevitable and because the attempt to wage a fundamental
struggle against it appeared to hinder and not aid the cultural
rise of the working class. In the situation which exists in Germany
today — we need not be more specific at this point — this was not
and is not to be avoided. Indeed, it bore direct fruit in the successful
many-sidedness of the participation in the scientific discussion and
it constituted a source of strength for the journal; under the given
circumstances it was perhaps even one of its claims to the justification
for its existence.
There can be no doubt that the development of a "character,"
in this sense, in a scientific journal can constitute a threat to the
freedom of scientific analysis; it really does amount to that when
the selection of contributors is purposely one-sided. In this case the
cultivation of a "character" in a journal is practically ecjuivalent to
the existence of a "tendency." The editors are aware of the responsibility
which this situation imposes upon them. They propose neither
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 63
the deliberate transformation of the character of the Archiv nor its
artificial preservation by means of a careful restriction of the contributors
to scholars of certain definite party loyalties. They accept
it as given and await its further "development." The form which it
takes in the future and the modifications which it may undergo as a
result of the inevitable broadening of its circle of contributors wdll
depend primarily on the character of those persons who, seeking to
serve the cause of science, enter the circle and become or remain
frequent contributors. It will be further affected by the broadening
of the problems, the advancement of which is a goal of the journal.
With these remarks we come to the question on which we have
not yet touched, namely, the factual delimitation of our field of
operations. No answer can, however, be given without raising the
question as to the goal of social science knowledge in general. When
we distinguished in principle between "value-judgments" and "empirical
knowledge," we presupposed the existence of an unconditionally
valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i.e., the analytical
ordering of empirical social reality. This presupposition now becomes
our problem in the sense that we must discuss the meaning
of objectively "valid" truth in the social sciences. The genuineness
of the problem is apparent to anyone who is aware of the conflict
about methods, "fundamental concepts" and presuppositions, the
incessant shift of "viewpoints," and the continuous redefinition of
"concepts" and who sees that the theoretical and historical modes of
analysis are still separated by an apparently unbridgeable gap. It
consitutes, as a despairing Viennese examinee once sorrowfully complained,
"two sciences of economics." What is the meaning of "objectivity"
in this context? The following discussion will be devoted
to this question.
Ill
This journal has from the beginning treated social-economic data
as its subject-matter. Although there is little point in entering here
into the definition of terms and the delineation of the proper boundaries
of the various sciences, we must nonetheless state briefly what
we mean by this.
Most roughly expressed, the basic element in all those phenomena
64 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
which we call, in the widest sense, "social-economic" is constituted
by the fact that our physical existence and the satisfaction of our most
ideal needs are everywhere confronted with the quantitative limits
and the qualitative inadequacy of the necessary external means, so
that their satisfaction requires planful provision and work, struggle
with nature and the association of human beings. The quality of an
event as a "social-economic" event is not something which it possesses
"objectively." It is rather conditioned by the orientation of
our cognitive interest, as it arises from the specific cultural significance
which we attribute to the particular event in a given case.
Wherever those aspects of a cultural event which constitute its specific
significance for us are connected with a social-economic event
either directly or most indirectly, they involve, or at least to the extent
that this connection exists, can involve a problem for the social
sciences. By a social science problem, we mean a task for a discipline
the object of which is to throw light on the ramifications of
that fundamental social-economic phenomenon : the scarcity of means.
Within the total range of social-economic problems, we are now
able to distinguish events and constellations of norms, institutions,
etc., the economic aspect of which constitutes their primary cultural
significance for us. Such are, for example, the phenomena of the
stock exchange and the banking world, which, in the main, interest
us only in this respect. This will be the case regularly (but not exclusively)
when institutions are involved which were deliberately
created or used for economic ends. Such objects of our knowledge
we may call "economic" events (or institutions, as the case may be).
There are other phenomena, for instance, religious ones, which do
not interest us, or at least do not primarily interest us with respect
to their economic significance but which, however, under certain circumstances
do acquire significance in this regard because they have
consequences which are of interest from the economic point of view.
These we shall call "economically relevant" phenomena. Finally
there are phenomena which are not "economic" in our sense and the
economic effects of which are of no, or at best slight, interest to us
(e.g., the developments of the artistic taste of a period) but which
in individual instances are in their turn more or less strongly influenced
in certain important aspects by economic factors such as,
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 65
for instance, the social stratification of the artistically interested public.
We shall call these "economically conditioned phenomena." The constellation
of human relationships, norms, and normatively determined
conduct which we call the "state" is for example in its fiscal aspects,
an "economic" phenomenon; insofar as it influences economic life
through legislation or otherwise (and even where other than economic
considerations deliberately guide its behavior), it is "economically
relevant." To the extent that its behavior in non-"economic" affairs
is partly influenced by economic motives, it is "economically conditioned."
After what has been said, it is self-evident that: firstly), the
boundary lines of "economic" phenomena are vague and not easily
defined; secondly), the "economic" aspect of a phenomenon is by
no means only "economically conditioned" or only "economically
relevant"; thirdly), a phenomenon is "economic" only insofar as and
only as long as our interest is exclusively focused on its constitutive
significance in the material struggle for existence.
Like the science of social-economics since Marx and Roscher, our
journal is concerned not only with economic phenomena but also
with those which are "economically relevant" and "economically
conditioned." The domain of such subjects extends naturally — and
varyingly in accordance with the focus of our interest at the moment
— through the totality of cultural life. Specifically economic motives
— i.e., motives which, in their aspect most significant to us, are
rooted in the above-mentioned fundamental fact — operate wherever
the satisfaction of even the most immaterial need or desire is bound
up with the application of scarce material means. Their force has
everywhere on that account conditioned and transformed not only
the mode in which cultural wants or preferences are satisfied, but
their content as well, even in their most svibjective aspects. The indirect
influence of social relations, institutions and groups governed
by "material interests" extends (often unconsciously) into all spheres
of culture without exception, even into the finest nuances of aesthetic
and religious feeling. The events of everyday life no less than the
"historical" events of the higher reaches of political life, collective
and mass phenomena as well as the "individuated" conduct of statesmen
and individual literary and artistic achievements arc influenced
by it. They are "economically conditioned." On the other hand,
66 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
all the activities and situations constituting an historically given culture
afTect the formation of the material wants, the mode of their
satisfaction, the integration of interest-groups and the types of power
which they exercise. They thereby affect the course of "economic
development" and are accordingly "economically relevant." To the
extent that our science imputes particular causes — be they economic
or non-economic — to economic cultural phenomena, it seeks "historical"
knowledge. Insofar as it traces a specific element of cultural
life (the economic element in its cultural significance) through the
most diverse cultural contexts, it is making an liistorical interpretation
from a specific point of view, and offering a partial picture, a
preliminary contribution to a more complete historical knowledge of
culture.
Social economic problem.s do not exist everywhere that an economic
event plays a role as cause or effect — since problems arise
only where the significance of those factors is problematical and can
be precisely determined only through the application of the methods
of social-economics. But despite this, the range of social-economics
is almost overwhelming.
After due consideration our journal has generally excluded hitherto
the treatment of a whole series of highly important special fields
in our discipline, such as descriptive economics, economic history in
the narrower sense, and statistics. It has likewise left to other journals,
the discussion of technical fiscal questions and the technical
economic
problems of prices and markets in the modern exchange
economy. Its sphere of operations has been the present significance
and the historical development of certain conflicts and constellations
of interests which have arisen through the dominant role of investment-seeking
capital in modern societies. It has not thereby restricted
itself to those practical and historical problems which are designated
by the term "the social question" in its narrower sense, i.e., the place
of the modern working class in the present social order. Of course,
the scientific elaboration of the interest in this special question which
became widespread in Germany in the '80's, has had to be one of its
main tasks. The more the practical treatment of labor conditions
became a permanent object of legislation and public discussion in
Germany, the more the accent of scientific work had to be shifted
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 67
to the analysis of the more universal dimensions of the problem. It
had thereby to culminate in the analysis of all the cultural problems
which have arisen from the peculiar nature of the economic bases of
our culture and which arc, in that sense, specifically modern. The
journal soon began to deal historically, statistically and theoretically
with the most diverse, partly "economically relevant," and partly
"economically conditioned" conditions of the other great social classes
of modern states and their interrelations. We arc only drawing the
conclusions of this policy when we state that the scientific investigation
of the general cultural significance of the social-economic structure
of the human community and its historical forms of organization
is the central aim of our journal. This is what we mean when we
call our journal the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft. The title is intended
to indicate the historical and theoretical treatment of the
same problems, the practical solution of which constitutes "social
policy" in the widest sense of this word. We thereby utilize the right
to apply the word "social" in the meaning which concrete presentday
problems give to it. If one wishes to call those disciplines which
treat the events of human life with respect to their cultural significance
"cultural sciences," then social science in our sense belongs in
that category. We shall soon see what are the logical implications
of this.
Undoubtedly the selection of the social-economic aspect of cultural
life signifies a very definite delimitation of our theme. It will
be said that the economic, or as it has been inaccurately called, the
"materialistic" point of view, from which culture is here being considered,
is "one-sided." This is true and the one-sidedness is intentional.
The belief that it is the task of scientific work to cure the
"one-sidedness" of the economic approach by broadening it into a
general social science suffers primarily from the weakness that the
"social" criterion (i.e., the relationships among persons) acquires
the specificity necessary for the delimitation of scientific problems
only when it is accompanied by some substantive predicate. Otherwise,
as the subject matter of a science, it would naturally comprehend
philology, for example, as well as church history and particularly
all those disciplines which concern themselves with the state which
is the most important form of the normative regulation of cultural
68 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
life. The fact that social-economics concerns itself with "social" relations
is no more justification for regarding it as the necessary precursor
of a "general social science" than its concern with vital phenomena
makes it a part of biology, or its preoccupation with events on one
of the planets makes it a part of an extended and improved astronomy
of the future. It is not the "actual" interconnections of "things"
but the conceptual interconnections of problems which define the
scope of the various sciences. A new "science" emerges where new
problems are pursued by new methods and truths are thereby discovered
which open up significant new points of view.
It is now no accident that the term: "social" which seems to have
a quite general meaning, turns out to have, as soon as one carefully
examines its application, a particular specifically colored though often
indefinite meaning. Its "generality" rests on nothing but its ambiguity.
It provides, when taken in its "general" meaning, no specific
point of view, from which the significance of given elements of culture
can be analyzed.
Liberated as we are from the antiquated notion that all cultural
phenomena can be deduced as a product or function of the constellation
of "material" interests, we believe nevertheless that the analysis
of social and cultural phenomena with special reference to their economic
conditioning and ramifications was a scientific principle of
creative fruitfulness and with careful application and freedom from
dogmatic restrictions, will remain such for a very long time to come.
The so-called "materialistic conception of history" as a Weltanschauung
or as a formula for the casual explanation of historical reality is
to be rejected most emphatically. The advancement of the economic
interpretation of history is one of the most important aims of our
journal. This requires further explanation.
The so-called "materialistic conception of history" with the crude
elements of genius of the early form which appeared, for instance,
in the Communist Manifesto still prevails only in the minds of laymen
and dilettantes. In these circles one still finds the peculiar condition
that their need for a casual explanation of an historical event
is never satisfied until somewhere or somehow economic causes are
shown (or seem) to be operative. Where this however is the case,
they content themselves with the most threadbare hypotheses and
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 69
the most general phrases since they have then satisfied their dogmatic
need to believe that the economic "factor" is the "real" one, the
only "true" one, and the one which "in the last instance is everywhere
decisive." This phenomenon is by no means unique. Almost
all the sciences, from philology to biology have occasionally claimed
to be the sources not only of specialized scientific knowledge but of
"Weltnnschauungen" as well. Under the impression of the profound
cultural significance of modern economic transformations and especially
of the far-reaching ramifications of the "labor question," the
inevitable monistic tendency of every type of thought which is not
self-critical naturally follows this path.
The same tendency is now appearing in anthropology where the
political and commercial struggles of nations for world dominance
are being fought with increasing acuteness. There is a widespread
belief that "in the last analysis" all historical events are results of the
interplay of innate "racial qualities." In place of uncritical descriptions
of "national characters," there emerges the even more uncritical
concoction of "social theories" based on the "natural sciences." We
shall carefully follow the development of anthropological research in
our journal insofar as it is significant from our point of view. It is
to be hoped that the situation in which the casual explanation of
cultural events by the invocation of "racial characteristics" testifies
to our ignorance — just as the reference to the "milieu" or, earlier,
to the "conditions of the age" —• will be gradually overcome by research
which is the fruit of systematic training. If there is anything
that has hindered this type of research, it is the fact that eager dilettantes
have thought that they could contribute something different
and better to our knowledge of culture than the broadening of the
possibility of the sure imputation of individual concrete cultural
events occurring in historical reality to concrete, historically given
causes through the study of precise empirical data which have been
selected from specific points of view. Only to the extent that they
are able to do this, are their results of interest to us and only then
does "racial biology" become something more than a product of the
modern passion for founding new sciences.
The problem of the significance of the economic interpretation
of history is the same. If, following a period of boundless over-
70 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
estimation, the danger now exists that its scientific value will be
underestimated, this is the result of the unexampled naivete with
which the economic interpretation of reality was applied as a "universal"
canon which explained all cultural phenomena — i.e., all
those which arc meaningful to us — as, in the last analysis, economically
conditioned. Its present logical form is not entirely unambiguous.
Wherever the strictly economic explanation encounters difficulties,
various devices are available for maintaining its general validity as the
decisive casual factor. Sometimes every historical event which is not
explicable by the invocation of economic motives is regarded for that
very reason as a scientifically insignificant "accident." At others, the
definition of "economic" is stretched beyond recognition so that all
human interests which are related in any way whatsoever to the use
of material means are included in the definition. If it is historically
undeniable that difTerent responses occur in two situations which are
economically identical — due to political, religious, climatic and
countless other non-economic determinants — then in order to maintain
the primacy of the economic all these factors are reduced to
historically accidental "conditions" upon which the economic factor
operates as a "cause." It is obvious however that all those factors
which are "accidental" according to the economic interpretation of
history follow their own laws in the same sense as the economic
factor. From a point of view which traces the specific meaning of
these non-economic factors, the existing economic "conditions" are
"historically accidental" in quite the same sense. A favorite attempt
to preserve the supreme significance of the economic factor despite
this consists in the interpretation of the constant interaction of the
individual elements of cultural life as a casual or functional dependence
of one on the other, or rather of all the others on one, namely,
the economic clement. When a certain 7ion-economic institution has
functioned for the benefit of certain economic class interests, as, for
example, where certain religious institutions allowed themselves to
be and actually were used as "black police," the whole institution is
conceived either as having been created for this function or — quite
metaphysically — as being impelled by a "developmental tendency"
emanating from the economic factor.
It is unnecessary nowadays to go into detail to prove to the spe-
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 71
cialist that this interpretation of the purpose of the economic analysis
of culture is in part the expression of a certain historical constellation
which turned its scientific interest towards certain economically
conditioned cultural problems, and in part the rabid chauvinism of
a specialized department of science. It is clear that today it is antiquated
at best. The explanation of everything by economic causes
alone is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever in any sphere of
cultural phenomena, not even in the "economic" sphere itself. In
principle, a banking history of a nation which adduces only economic
motives for explanatory purposes is naturally just as unacceptable
as an explanation of the Sistine Madonna as a consequence of the
social-economic basis of the culture of the epoch in which it was
created. It is no way more complete than, for instance, the explanation
of capitalism by reference to certain shifts in the content of the
religious ideas which played a role in the genesis of the capitalistic
attitude; nor is it more exhaustive than the explanation of a political
structure from its geographical background. In all of these cases,
the degree of significance which we are to attribute to economic factors
is decided by the class of causes to which we are to impute
those specific elements of the phenomenon in question to which we
attach significance in given cases and in which we are interested.
The justification of the one-sided analysis of cultural reality from
specific "points of view" — in our case with respect to its economic
conditioning — emerges purely as a technical expedient from the
fact that training in the observation of the effects of qualitatively
similar categories of causes and the repeated utilization of the same
scheme of concepts and hypotheses {begrifflich-methodischen Apparates)
offers all the advantages of the division of labor. It is free
from the charge of arbitrariness to the extent that it is successful in
producing insights into interconnections which have been shown to
be valuable for the casual explanation of concrete historical events.
However — the "one-sidedness" and the unreality of the purely economic
interpretation of history is in general only a special case of a
principle which is generally valid for the scientific knowledge of cultural
reality. The main task of the discussiori to follow is to make
explicit the logical foundations and the general methodological implications
of this principle.
i^
i'/
^
72 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
There is no absolutely "objective" scientific analysis of culture —
or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently
for our purposes — of "social phenomena" independent of special and
"one-sided" viewpoints according to which •
— expressly or tacitly, consciously
or unconsciously — they are selected, analyzed and organized
for expository purposes. The reasons for this lie in the character
of the cognitive goal of all research in social science which seeks to
transcend the purely formal treatment of the legal or conventional
norms regulating social life.
The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical
science of concrete reality {Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) . Our aim is the
understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which
we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships
and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary
manifestations and on the other the causes of their being
historically so and not otherwise. Now, as soon as we attempt to
reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete
situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and
coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both "within" and
"outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is
seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on
a single "object," for instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as
we seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual
components of this "individual phenomena," to say nothing of explaining
it casually. All the analysis of infinite reality which the
finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that
only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific
investigation, and that only it is "important" in the sense of being
"worthy of being known." But what arc the criteria by which this
segment is selected? It has often been thought that the decisive
criterion in the cultural sciences, too, was in the last analysis, the
"regular" recurrence of certain casual relationships. The "laws"
which we are able to perceive in the infinitely manifold stream of
events must — according to this conception — contain the scientifically
"essential" aspect of reality. As soon as we have shown some
causal reltaionship to be a "law," i.e., if we have shown it to be universally
valid by means of comprehensive historical induction or have
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 73
made it immediately and tangibly plausible according to our subjective
experience, a great number of similar cases order themselves
under the formula thus attained. Those elements in each individual
event which are left unaccounted for by the selection of their elements
subsumablc under the "law" are considered as scientifically unintegrated
residues which will be taken care of in the further perfection
of the system of "laws." Alternatively they will be viewed as "accidental"
and therefore scientifically unimportant because they do not
fit into the structure of the "law" ; in other words, they are not typical
of the event and hence can only be the objects of "idle curiosity."
Accordingly, even among the followers of the Historical School we
continually find the attitude which declares that the ideal which all
the sciences, including the cultural sciences, serve and towards which
they should strive even in the remote future is a system of propositions
from which reality can be "deduced." As is well known, a leading
natural scientist believed that he could designate the (factually
unattainable) ideal goal of such a treatment of cultural reality as a
sort of "astronomical" knowledge.
Let us not, for our part, spare ourselves the trouble of examining
these matters more closely — however often they have already been
discussed. The first thing that impresses one is that the "astronomical"
knowledge which was referred to is not a system of laws at all.
On the contrary, the laws which it presupposes have been taken from
other disciplines like mechanics. But it too concerns itself with the
question of the individual consequence which the working of these
laws in an unique configuration produces, since it is these individual
configurations which are significant for us. Every individual constellation
which it "explains" or predicts is causally explicable only as
the consequence of another equally individual constellation which has
preceded it. As far back as we may go into the grey mist of the faroff
past, the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally
individual, equally undeducible from laws. A cosmic "primeval
state" which had no individual character or less individual character
than the cosmic reality of the present would naturally be a meaningless
notion. But is there not some trace of similar ideas in our field
in those propositions sometimes derived from natural law and sometimes
verified by the observation of "primitives," concerning an
74 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
economic-social "primeval state" free from historical "accidents," and
characterized by phenomena such as "primitive agrarian communism,"
sexual "promiscuity," etc., from which individual historical development
emerges by a sort of fall from grace into concreteness?
The social-scientific interest has its point of departure, of course,
in the real, i.e., concrete, individually-structured configuration of our
cultural life in its universal relationships which are themselves no
less individually-structured, and in its development out of other social
cultural conditions, which themselves are obviously likewise individually
structured. It is clear here that the situation which we illustrated
by reference to astronomy as a limiting case (which is regularly
drawn on by logicians for the same purpose) appears in a more
accentuated form. Whereas in astronomy, the heavenly bodies are
of interest to us only in their quantitative and exact aspects, the
qualitative aspect of phenomena concerns us in the social sciences.
To this should be added that in the social sciences we are concerned
with psychological and intellectual {geistig) phenomena the empathic
understanding of which is naturally a problem of a specifically different
type from those which the schemes of the exact natural sciences
in general can or seek to solve. Despite that, this distinction in
itself is not a distinction in principle, as it seems at first glance.
Aside from pure mechanics, even the exact natural sciences do not
proceed without qualitative categories. Furthermore, in our own
field we encounter the idea (which is obviously distorted) that at
least the phenomena characteristic of a money-economy — which are
basic to our culture — are quantifiable and on that account subject
to formulation as "laws." Finally it depends on the breadth or narrowness
of one's definition of "law" as to whether one will also
include regularities which because they are not quantifiable are not
subject to numerical analysis. Especially insofar as the influence of
psychological and intellectual (gestige) factors is concerned, it does
not in any case exclude the establishment of rules governing rational
conduct. Above all, the point of view still persists which claims that
the task of psychology is to play a role comparable to mathematics
for the Geisteswissenschaften in the sense that it analyzes the complicated
phenomena of social life into their psychic conditions and
effects, reduces them to their most elementary possible psychic factors
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 75
and then analyzes their functional interdependences. Thereby, a sort
of "chemistry" if not "mechanics" of the psychic foundations of social
life would be created. Whether such investigations can produce
valuable and—what is something else—useful results for the cultural
sciences, we cannot decide here. But this would be irrelevant
to the question as to whether the aim of social-economic knowledge
in our sense, i.e., knowledge of reality with respect to its cultural
significance and its casual relationships can be attained through the
quest for recurrent sequences. Let us assume that we have succeeded
by means of psychology or otherwise in analyzing all the observed
and imaginable relationships of social phenomena into some ultimate
elementary "factors," that we have made an exhaustive analysis and
classification of them and then formulated rigorously exact laws covering
their behavior.—What would be the significance of these results
for our knowledge of the historically given culture or any individual
phase thereof, such as capitalism, in its development and
cultural significance? As an analytical tool, it would be as useful
as a textbook of organic chemical combinations would be for our
knowledge of the biogenetic aspect of the animal and plant world.
In each case, certainly an important and useful preliminary step
would have been taken. In neither case can concrete reality be deduced
from "laws" and "factors." This is not because some higher
mysterious powers reside in living phenomena (such as "dominants,"
"entelechies," or whatever they might be called). This, however,
a problem in its own right. The real reason is that the analysis
of reality is concerned with the configuration into which those (hypothetical!)
"factors" are arranged to form a cultural phenomenon
w-hich is historically significant to us. Furthermore, if we wish
to "explain" this individual configuration "causally" we must invoke
other equally individual configurations on the basis of which
we will explain it with the aid of those (hypothetical!) "laws."
The determination of those (hypothetical) "laws" and "factors"
would in any case only be the first of the many operations which
would lead us to the desired type of knowledge. The analysis of the
historically given individual configuration of those "factors" and their
significant concrete interaction, conditioned by their historical context
and especially the rendering intelligible of the basis and type of
76 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
this significance would be the next task to be achieved. This task
must be achieved, it is true, by the utilization of the preliminary
analysis but it is nonetheless an entirely new and distinct task. The
tracing as far into the past as possible of the individual features of
these historically evolved configurations which are contemporaneously
significant, and their historical explanation by antecedent and equally
individual configurations would be the third task. Finally the prediction
of possible future constellations would be a conceivable fourth
task.
For all these purposes, clear concepts and the knowledge of
those (hypothetical) "laws" are obviously of great value as heuristic
means — but only as such. Indeed they are quite indispensable for
this purpose. But even in this function their limitations become evident
at a decisive point. In stating this, we arrive at the decisive
feature of the method of the cultural sciences. We have designated
as "cultural sciences" those disciplines which analyze the phenomena
of life in terms of their cultural significance. The significance of a
configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance
cannot ho\vever be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of
analytical laws (Gesetzesbegriffen), however perfect it may be, since
the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation
towards these events. The concept of culture is a value-concept.
Empirical reality becomes "culture" to us because and insofar as we
relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those
segments of reality which have become significant to us because of
this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing concrete
reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is
significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships
which are important to us due to their connection with our values.
Only because and to the extent that this is the case is it worthwhile
for us to know it in its individual features. We cannot discover,
however, what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless"
investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness
to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation.
Meaningfulncss naturally does not coincide with laws as
such, and the more general the law the less the coincidence. For the
specific meaning which a phenomenon has for us is naturally not to
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 77
be found in those relationships which it shares with many other
phenomena.
The focus of attention on reaHty under the guidance of values
which lend it significance and the selection and ordering of the phenomena
which are thus affected in the light of their cultural significance
is entirely different from the analysis of reality in terms of
laws and general concepts. Neither of these two types of the analysis
of reality has any necessary logical relationship with the other. They
can coincide in individual instances but it would be most disastrous
if their occasional coincidence caused us to think that they were not
distinct in principle. The cultural significance of a phenomenon,
e.g., the significance of exchange in a money economy, can be the
fact that it exists on a mass scale as a fundamental component of
modem culture. But the historical fact that it plays this role must
be causally explained in order to render its cultural significance
understandable. The analysis of the general aspects of exchange and
the technicjue of the market is a — highly important and indispensable
— preliminary task. For not only does this type of analysis leave
unanswered the question as to how exchange historically acquired its
fundamental significance in the modern world; but above all else,
the fact with which we are primarily concerned, namely, the cultural
significance of the money-economy, for the sake of which we are
interested in the description of exchange technique and for the sake
of which alone a science exists which deals with that technique — is
not derivable from any "law." The generic features of exchange,
purchase, etc., interest the jurist —but we are concerned with the
analysis of the cultural significance of the concrete historical fact that
today exchange exists on a mass scale. When we require an explanation,
when we wish to understand what distinguishes the socialeconomic
aspects of our culture for instance from that of antiquity in
which exchange showed precisely the same generic traits as it does
today and when we raise the question as to where the significance
of "money economy" lies, logical principles of quite heterogeneous
derivation enter into the investigation. We will apply those concepts
with which we are provided by the investigation of the general features
of economic mass phenomena — indeed, insofar as they are
relevant to the meaningful aspects of our culture, we shall use them
78 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
as means of exposition. The goal of our investigation is not reached
through the exposition of those laws and concepts, precise as it may
be. The question as to what should be the object of universal conceptualization
cannot be decided "presuppositionlessly" but only with
reference to the significance which certain segments of that infinite
multiplicity which we call "commerce" have for culture. We seek
knowledge of an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant
in its individuality (Eigenart) . And the decisive element in
this is that only through the presupposition that a finite part alone
of the infinite variety of phenomena is significant, does the knowledge
of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. Even
with the widest imaginable knowledge of "laws," we are helpless in
the face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an individual
fact possible — since a description of even the smallest slice of
reality can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes
which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is
nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone
meriting attention. A chaos of "existential judgments" about countless
individual events would be the only result of a serious attempt to
analyze reality "without presuppositions." And even this result is
only seemingly possible, since every single perception discloses on
closer examination an infinite number of constituent perceptions
which can never be exhaustively expressed in a judgement. Order
is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case
only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because
only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach
reality. Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon,
namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance
— are therefore worthwhile knowing. They alone are objects
of causal explanation. And even this causal explanation evinces the
same character; an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete
phenomena in its full reality is not only practically impossible — it is
simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be
imputed in the invidiual case, the "essential" feature of an event.
Where the individuality of a phenomenon is concerned, the question
of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships;
it is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 79
general rubric as a representative case but of its imputation as a
consequence of some constellation. It is in brief a question of imputation.
Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural phenomenon
— an "historical individual" *^^
is under consideration, the
knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only
a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation
to their concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the
individuality of which is culturally significant. So far and only so
far as it achieves this, is it valuable for our knowledge of concrete
relationships. And the more "general," i.e., the more abstract the
laws, the less they can contribute to the causal imputation of individual
phenomena and, more indirectly, to the understanding of the
significance of cultural events .
What is the consequence of all this?
Naturally, it does not imply that the knowledge of universal
propositions, the construction of abstract concepts, the knowledge of
regularities and the attempt to formulate "laws" have no scientific
justification in the cultural sciences. Quite the contrary, if the causal
knowledge of the historians consists of the imputation of concrete
efTects to concrete causes, a valid imputation of any individual effect
without the application of "nomological" knowledge — i.e., the knowledge
of recurrent causal sequences — would in general be impossible.
Whether a single individual component of a relationship is, in a concrete
case, to be assigned causal responsibility for an effect, the causal
explanation of which is at issue, can in doubtful cases be determined
only by estimating the effects which we generally expect from it and
from the other components of the same complex which are relevant
to the explanation. In other words, the "adequate" efifects of the
causal elements involved must be considered in arriving at any such
conclusion. The extent to which the historian (in the widest sense
of the word) can perform this imputation in a reasonably certain
manner with his imagination sharpened by personal experience and
trained in analytic methods and the extent to which he must have
recourse to the aid of special disciplines which make it possible, varies
<2)Wc will use the term which is already occasionally used in the methodology
of our discipline and which is now becoming widespread in a more precise
forumlation in logic.
80 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
with the individual case. Everywhere, however, and hence also in
the sphere of complicated economic processes, the more certain and
the more comprehensive our general knowledge the greater is the
certainty of imputation. This proposition is not in the least affected
by the fact that even in the case of all so-called "economic laws"
without exception, we are concerned here not with "laws" in the
narrower e.xact natural science sense, but with adequate causal relationships
expressed in rules and with the application of the category
of "objective possibility." The establishment of such regularities is
not the end but rather the means of knowledge. It is entirely a question
of expediency, to be settled separately for each individual case,
whether a regularly recurrent causal relationship of everyday experience
should be formulated into a "law." Laws are important and
valuable in the exact natural sciences, in the measure that those
sciences are universally valid. For the knowledge of historical phenomena
in their concreteness, the most general laws, because they
are most devoid of content are also the least valuable. The more
comprehensive the validity, — or scope — of a term, the more it leads
us away from the richness of reality since in order to include the
common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it
must necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence devoid of content.
In the cultural sciences, the knowledge of the universal or
general is never valuable in itself.
The conclusion which follows from the above is that an "objective"
analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according to the
thesis that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical reality
of "laws," is meaningless. It is not meaningless, as is often maintained,
because cultural or psychic events for instance are "objectively"
less governed by laws. It is meaningless for a number of
other reasons. Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not
knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used
by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of
cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance
which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain
individual concrete situations. In which sense and in which situations
this is the case is not revealed to us by any law; it is decided according
to the value-ideas in the light of which we view "culture" in each
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 81
individual case. "Culture" is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity
of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer
meaning and significance. This is true even for the human being
who views a particular culture as a mortal enemy and who seeks to
"return to nature." He can attain this point of view only after viewing
the culture in which he lives from the standpoint of his values,
and finding it "too soft." This is the purely logical-formal fact which
is involved when we speak of the logically necessary rootedness
of all historical entities (historische Individuen) in "evaluative ideas."
The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science Yi^^nol
in our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in general to
be valuable but rather in the iact that, we are CM/fura(^& endowed
with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude
towards the world and to lend it sigyiificance. Whatever this significance
may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena jof human
existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively
or negatively) meaningful. Whatever may be the content of
this attitude — these phenomena have cultural significance for us
and on this significance alone rests its scientific interest. Thus when
we speak here of the conditioning of cultural knowledge through
evaluative ideas [Wertideen) (following the terminology of modern
logic), it is done in the hope that we will not be subject to crude
misunderstandings such as the opinion that cultural significance
should be attributed only to valuable phenomena. Prostitution is a
cultural phenomenon just as much as religion or money. All three
are cultural phenomena only because and only insofar as their existence
and the form which they historically assume touch directly or
indirectly on our cultural interests and arouse our striving for knowledge
concerning problems brought into focus by the evaluative ideas
which give significance to the fragment of reality analyzed by those
concepts.
All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge
from particular points of view. When we require from the historian
and social research worker as an elementary presupposition
that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that he
should have the necessary "point of view" for this distinction, we
mean that they must understand how to relate the events of the real
82 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
world consciously or unconsciously to universal "cultural values" and
to select out those relationships which are significant for us. If the
notion that those standpoints can be derived from the "facts themselves"
continually recurs, it is due to the naive self-deception of the
specialist who is unaware that it is due to the evaluative ideas with
which he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has
selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of
which he concerns himself. In connection with this selection of individual
special "aspects" of the event which always and everywhere
occurs, consciously or unconsciously, there also occurs that element
of cultural-scientific work \vhich is referred to by the often-heard
assertion that the "personal" element of a scientific work is what is
really valuable in it, and that personality must be expressed in every
work if it existence is to be justified. To be sure, without the investigator's
evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of
subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality.
Just as without the investigator's conviction regarding the significance
of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reality
is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal belief, the
refraction of values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his
work. And the values to which the scientific genius relates the object
of his inquiry may determine, i.e., decide the "conception" of a whole
epoch, not only concerning what is regarded as "valuable" but also
concerning what is significant or insignificant, "important" or "unimportant"
in the phenomena.
Accordingly, cultural science in our sense involves "subjective"
presuppositions insofar as it concerns itself only with those components
of reality which have some relationship, however indirect, to
events to which we attach cultural significance. Nonetheless, it is
entirely causal knowledge exactly in the same sense as the knowledge
of significant concrete {individueller) natural events which have a
qualitative character. Among the many confusions which the overreaching
tendency of a formal-juristic outlook has brought about in
the cultural sciences, there has recently appeared the attempt to
"refute" the "materialistic conception of history" by a scries of clever
but fallacious arguments which state that since all economic life must
take place in legally or conventionally regulated forms, all economic
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 83
"development" must take the form of striving for the creation of new
legal forms. Hence, it is said to be intelligible only through ethical
maxims and is on this account essentially different from every type
of "natural" development. Accordingly the knowledge of economic
development is said to be "teleological" in character. Without wishing
to discuss the meaning of the ambiguous term "development," or
the logically no less ambiguous term "teleology" in the social sciences,
it should be stated that such knowledge need not be "teleological" in
the sense assumed by this point of view. The cultural significance
of normatively regulated legal relations and even norms themselves
can undergo fundamental revolutionary changes even under conditions
of the formal identity of the prevailing legal norms. Indeed,
if one wishes to lose one's self for a moment in phantasies about the
future, one might theoretically imagine, let us say, the "socialization
of the means of production" unaccompanied by any conscious "striving"
towards this result, and without even the disappearance or addition
of a single paragraph of our legal code; the statistical frequency
of certain legally regulated relationships might be changed fundamentally,
and in many cases, even disappear entirely; a great number
of legal norms might become practically meaningless and their whole
cultural significance changed beyond identification. De lege ferenda
discussions may be justifiably disregarded by the "materialistic conception
of history" since its central proposition is the indeed inevitable
change in the significayice of legal institutions. Those who view the
painstaking labor of causally understanding historical reality as of
secondary importance can disregard it, but it is impossible to supplant
it by any type of "teleology." From our viewpoint, "purpose"
is the conception of an effect which becomes a cause of an action.
Since we take into account eveiy cause which produces or can produce
a significant effect, we also consider this one. Its specific significance
consists only in the fact that we not only observe human conduct
but can and desire to understand it.
Undoubtedly, all evaluative ideas are "subjective." Between the
"historical" interest in a family chronicle and that in the development
of the greatest conceivable cultural phenomena which were
and are common to a nation or to mankind over long epochs, there
exists an infinite gradation of "significance" arranged into an order
84 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
which differs for each of us. And they are, naturally, historically
variable in accordance with the character of the culture and the
ideas which rule men's minds. But it obviously docs not follow from
this that research in the cultural sciences can only have results which
are "subjective" in the sense that they are valid for one person and
not for others. Only the degree to which they interest different persons
varies. In other words, the choice of the object of investigation
and the extent or depth to which this investigation attempts to penetrate
into the infinite causal web, are determined by the evaluative
ideas which dominate the investigator and his age. In the method
of investigation, the guiding "point of view" is of great importance
for the construction of the conceptual scheme which \vill be used in
the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator
is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here
as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who
seek the truth.
However, there emerges from this the meaninglessness of the
idea which prevails occasionally even among historians, namely,
that the goal of the cultural sciences, however far it may be from
realization, is to construct a closed system of concepts, in which
reality is synthesized in some sort of permanently and universally
valid classification and from which it can again be deduced. The
stream of immeasurable events flows unendingly towards eternity.
The cultural problems which move men form themselves ever anew
and in different colors, and the boundaries of that area in the infinite
stream of concrete events which acquires meaning and significance
for us, i.e., which becomes an "historical individual," arc constantly
subject to change. The intellectual contexts from which it is viewed
and scientifically analyzed shift. The points of departure of the cultural
sciences remain changeable throughout the limitless future as
long as a Chinese ossification of intellectual life docs not render mankind
incapable of setting new questions to the eternally inexhaustible
flow of life. A systematic science of culture, even only in the sense
of a definitive, objectively valid, systematic fixation of the problems
which it should treat, would be senseless in itself. Such an attempt
could only produce a collection of numerous, specifically particularized,
heterogeneous and disparate viewpoints in the light of which
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 85
reality becomes "culture" through being significant in its unique
character.
Having now completed this lengthy discussion, we can finally
turn to the question which is methodologically relevant in the consideration
of the "objectivity" of cultural knowledge. The question
is: what is the logical function and structure of the concepts which
our science, like all others, uses? Restated with special reference to
the decisive problem, the question is: what is the significance of
theory and theoretical conceptualization {theoretische Begriffshildung)
for our knowledge of cultural reality?
Economics was originally — as we have already seen — a "technique,"
at least in the central focus of its attention. By this we
mean that it viewed reality from an at least ostensibly unambiguous
and stable practical evaluative standpoint: namely, the increase of
the "wealth" of the population. It was on the other hand, from the
very beginning, more than a "technique" since it was integrated into
the great scheme of the natural law and rationalistic Weltanschauung
of the eighteenth century. The nature of that Weltanschauung with
its optimistic faith in the theoretical and practical rationalizability
of reality had an important consequence insofar as it obstructed the
discovery of the problematic character of that standpoint which had
been assumed as self-evident. As the rational analysis of society
arose in close connection with the modern development of natural
science, so it remained related to it in its whole method of approach.
In the natural sciences, the practical evaluative attitude toward what
was immediately and technically useful was closely associated from
the very first with the hope, taken over as a heritage of antiquity and
further elaborated, of attaining a purely "objective" (i.e., independent
of all individual contingencies) monistic knowledge of the totality
of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity and mathematical
form. It was thought that this hope could be realized by
the method of generalizing abstraction and the formulation of laws
based on empirical analysis. The natural sciences which were bound
to evaluative standpoints, such as clinical medicine and even more
what is conventionally called "technology" became purely practical
"arts." The values for which they strove, e.g.. the health of the
patient, the technical perfection of a concrete productive process,
86 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
etc., were fixed for the time being for all of them. The methods
which they used could only consist in the application of the laws
formulated by the theoretical disciplines. Every theoretical advance
in the construction of these laws was or could also be an advance
for the practical disciplines. With the end given, the progressive
reduction of concrete practical questions (e.g., a case of illness, a
technical problem, etc.) to special cases of generally valid laws,
meant that extension of theoretical knowledge was closely associated
and identical with the extension of technical-practical pos-
sibilities.
When modern biology subsumed those aspects of reality which
interest us historically, i.e., in all their concreteness, under a universally
valid evolutionary principle, which at least had the appearance
— but not the actuality — of embracing everything essential about
the subject in a scheme of universally valid laws, this seemed to be
the final twilight of all evaluative standpoints in all the sciences. For
since the so-called historical event was a segment of the totality of
reality, since the principle of causality which was the presupposition
of all scientific work, seemed to require the analysis of all events into
generally valid "laws," and in view of the overwhelming success of
the natural sciences which took this idea seriously, it appeared as if
there was in general no conceivable meaning of scientific work other
than the discovery of the laws of events. Only those aspects of phenomena
which were involved in the "laws" could be essential from
the scientific point of view, and concrete "individual" events could
be considered only as "types," i.e., as representative illustrations of
laws. An interest in such events in themselves did not seem to be
a "scientific" interest.
It is impossible to trace here the important repercussions of this
will-to-believe of naturalistic monism in economics. When socialist
criticism and the work of the historians were beginning to transform
the original evaluative standpoints, the vigorous development of zoological
research on one hand and the influence of Hegelian panlogism
on the other prevented economics from attaining a clear and full
understanding of the relationship between concept and reality. The
result, to the extent that we are interested in it, is that despite the
powerful resistance to the infiltration of naturalistic dogma due to
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 87
German idealism since Fichte and the achievement of the German
Historical School in law and economics and partly because of the
very work of the Historical School, the naturalistic viewpoint in certain
decisive problems has not yet been overcome. Among these
problems we find the relationship between "theory" and "history,"
which is still problematic in our discipline.
The "abstract"-theoretical method even today shows unmediated
and ostensibly irreconcilable cleavage from empirical-historical research.
The proponents of this method recognize in a thoroughly
correct way the methodological impossibility of supplanting the historical
knowledge of reality by the formulation of laws or, vice versa,
of constructing "laws" in the rigorous sense through the mere juxtaposition
of historical observations. Now in order to arrive at these
laws — for they are certain that science should be directed towards
these as its highest goal — they take it to be a fact that we always
have a direct awareness of the structure of human actions in all their
reality. Hence — so they think — science can make human behavior
directly intelligible with axiomatic evidentness and accordingly reveal
its laws. The only exact form of knowledge — the formulation of
immediately and intuitively evident laws — is however at the same
time the only one which offers access to events which have not been
directly observed. Hence, at least as regards the fundamental phenomena
of economic life, the construction of a system of abstract and
therefore purely formal propositions analogous to those of the exact
natural sciences, is the only means of analyzing and intellectually mastering
the complexity of social life. In spite of the fundamental methodological
distinction between historical knowledge and the knowledge
of "laws" which the creator of the theory drew as the first and only
one, he now claims empirical validity, in the sense of the deducibility
of reality from "laws," for the propositions of abstract theory. It is
true that this is not meant in the sense of empirical validity of the abstract
economic laws as such, but in the sense that when equally "exact"
theories have been constructed for all the other relevant factors,
all these abstract theories together must contain the true reality of the
object — i.e., whatever is worthwhile knowing about it. Exact economic
theory deals with the operation of one psychic motive, the
88 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
other theories have as their task the formulation of the behavior of
all the other motives into similar sorts of propositions enjoying hypothetical
validity. Accordingly, the fantastic claim has occasionally
been made for economic theories — e.g., the abstract theories of price,
interest, rent, etc., — that they can, by ostensibly following the analogy
of physical science propositions, be validly applied to the derivation
of quantitatively stated conclusions from given real premises, since
given the ends, economic behavior with respect to means is unambiguously
"determined." This claim fails to observe that in order to be
able to reach this result even in the simplest case, the totality of the
existing historical reality including every one of its causal relationships
must be assumed as "given" and presupposed as known. But
if this type of knowledge were accessible to the finite mind of man,
abstract theory would have no cognitive value whatsoever. The
naturalistic prejudice that every concept in the cultural sciences
should be similar to those in the exact natural sciences has led in
consequence to the misunderstanding of the meaning of this theoretical
construction {theoretische Gedankengebilde) . It has been believed
that is is a matter of the psychological isolation of a specific
"impulse," the acquisitive impulse, or of the isolated study of a specific
maxim of human conduct, the so-called economic principle. Abstract
theory purported to be based on psychological axioms and as a result
historians have called for an empirical psychology in order to show
the invalidity of those axioms and to derive the course of economic
events from psychological principles. We do not wish at this point
to enter into a detailed criticism of the belief in the significance of
a —still to be created — systematic science of "social psychology" as
the future foundation of the cultural sciences, and particularly of
social economics. Indeed, the partly brilliant attempts which have
been made hitherto to interpret economic phenomena psychologically,
show in any case that the procedure docs not begin with the analysis
of psychological qualities, moving then to the analysis of social institutions,
but that, on the contrary, insight into the psychological preconditions
and consequences of institutions presupposes a precise
knowledge of the latter and the scientific analysis of their structure.
In concrete cases, psychological analysis can contribute then an extremely
valuable deepening of the knowledge of the historical cultural
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 89
conditioning and cultural significance of institutions. The interesting
aspect of the psychic attitude of a person in a social situation is specifically
particularized in each case, according to the special cultural
significance of the situation in cjuestion. It is a question of an extremely
heterogeneous and highly concrete structure of psychic
motives and influences. Social-psychological research involves the
study of various very disparate individual types of cultural elements
with reference to their interpretability by our empathic understanding.
Through social-psychological research, with the knowledge of individual
institutions as a point of departure, we will learn increasingly
how to understand institutions in a psychological way. We will not
however deduce the institutions from psychological laws or explain
them by elementary psychological phenomena.
Thus, the far-flung polemic, which centered on the question of
the psychological justification of abstract theoretical propositions, on
the scope of the "acquisitive impulse" and the "economic principle,"
etc., turns out to have been fruitless.
In the establishment of the propositions of abstract theory, it is
only apparently a matter of "deductions" from fundamental psychological
motives. Actually, the former are a special case of a kind of
concept-construction which is peculiar and to a certain extent, indispensable,
to the cultural sciences. It is worthwhile at this point
to describe it in further detail since we can thereby approach more
closely the fundamental question of the significance of theory in the
social sciences. Therewith we leave undiscussed, once and' for all,
whether the particular analytical concepts which we cite or to which
we allude as illustrations, correspond to the purposes they are to serve,
i.e., whether in fact they are well-adapted. The question as to how
far, for example, contemporary "abstract theory" should be further
elaborated, is ultimately also a question of the strategy of science,
which must, however concern itself with other problems as well. Even
the "theory of marginal utility" is subsumable under a "law of marginal
utility."
We have in abstract economic theory an illustration of those synthetic
constructs which have been designated as "ideas" of historical
phenomena. It offers us an ideal picture of events on the commoditymarket
under conditions of a society organized on the principles of
90 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
an exchange economy, free competition and rigorously rational conduct.
This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships
and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an
internally consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is
like a Utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation
of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to the empirical data^
consists solely in the fact that where market-conditioned relationships^
of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or
suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the charac-_^
teristic teatures ot this relationship pragmatically clear and under-
^
standabte by referefldfe t6 ail JdMl-V^fe. This procedure can be
jjit 1 Tndisperisable ioi\uieuristi(JWs well aslfexpository purposes.'! The ideal
I typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in rgsearch
. i t is no "hypothesis" but it offers guidance to the construction
of hypotheses. Jit is not a description of reality but it aims to give
unambiguous "means of expression to such a description. It is thus
the "idea" of the historically given modern society, based on an exchange
economy, which is developed for us by quite the same logical
principles as are used in constructing the idea of the medieval "city
economy" as a "genetic" concept. When we do this, we construct
the concept "city economy" not as an average of the economic structures
actually existing in all the cities observed but as an ideal-type.
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete,
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena,
which are arranged according to those cne-sidedly emphasized
viewpoints into a unified analytical construaK{Gedankenbild)
.
In its conceptual purity, t his mental construct {Gedankenbildf\Qd.n->^
not be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a Utopia. Historical
research7aces~tFic~TasTr~or'detOT each individual case,
the extent to wliich this ideal-construct approximates to (h (Hxcicfs
from reality, to what extent for example, the economic structure ol
a certain city is to be classified as a "city-economy." When carefully
applied, those concepts are particularly useful in research and exposition.
In very much the same way one can work the "idea" of
"handicraft" into a Utopia by arranging certain traits, actually found
in an unclear, confused state in the industrial enterprises of the most
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 91
diverse epochs and countries, into a consistent ideal-construct by an
accentuation of thcin'cssential tendencies. This ideal-type is then
related to the idea {Gedankeyiausdruck) which one finds expressed
there. One can further delineate a society in which all branches of
economic and even intellectual activity are governed by maxims
which appear to be applications of the same principle which charactrizes
the ideal-typical "handicraft" system. Furthermore, one can
juxtapose alongside the ideal typical "handicraft" system the antithesis
of a correspondingly ideal-typical capitalistic productive system, which
has been abstracted out of certain features of modern large scale industry.
On the basis of this, one can delineate the Utopia of a "capitalistic"
culture, i.e., one in which the governing principle is the investment
of private capital. This procedure would accentuate certain
individual concretely diverse traits of modern material and intellectual
culture in its unique aspects into an ideal construct which from
our point of view would be completely self-consistent. This would
then be the delineation of an "idea" of capitalistic culture. We must
disregard for the moment whether and how this procedure could
be carried out. It is possible, or rather, it must be accepted as
certain that numerous, indeed a very great many, Utopias of this
sort can be worked out, of which none is like another, and none of
which can be observed in empirical reality as an actually existing
economic system, but each of which however claims that it is a representation
of the "idea" of capitalistic culture. Each of these can claim
to be a representation of the "idea" of capitalistic culture to the extent
that it has really taken certain traits, meaningful in their essential
features, from the empirical reality of our culture and brought them
together into a unified ideal-construct. For those phenomena which
interest us as cultural phenomena are interesting to us with respect
to very different kinds of evaluative ideas to which we relate them.
Inasmuch as the "points of view" from which they can become significant
for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be applied
to the selection of the traits which are to enter into the construction
of an ideal-typical view of a particular culture.
What is the significance of such ideal-typical constructs for an
empirical science, as we wish to constitute it? Before going any further,
we should emphasize that the idea of an ethical imperative, of
<^
92 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
a "model" of what "ought" to exist is to be carefully distinguished
<'from the analytical construct, which is "ideal" in the strictly logical
sense of the term. It is a matter here of constructing relationships
which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as
"objectively possible" and which appear as adequate from the nomological
standpoint.
Whoever accepts the proposition that the knowledge of historical
reality can or should be a "presuppositionless" copy of "objective"
facts, will deny the value of the ideal-type. Even those who recognize
that there is no "presuppositionlcssncss" in the logical sense and
that even the simplest excerpt from a statute or from a documentary
source can have scientific meaning only with reference to "significance"
and ultimately to evaluative ideas, will more or less regard
the construction of any such historical "utopias" as an expository
device which endangers the autonomy of historical research and which
is, in any case, a vain sport. And, in fact, whether we are dealing
simply with a conceptual game or with a scientifically fruitful method
of conceptualization and theory-cor\%X.r\xciion can never be decided a
priori. Here, too, there is only one criterion, namely, that of success
in revealing concrete cultural phenomena in their interdependence,
their causal conditions and their significance. ^^hc construction
of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as .a
meansJi Every conscientious examination of the conceptual elements
(*)f~historical exposition shows however that the historian as soon as
he attempts to go beyond the bare establishment of concrete relationships
and to determine the cultural significance of even the simplest
individual event in order to "characterize" it, must use concepts which
are precisely and unambiguously definable only in the form of ideal
types. Or arc concepts such as "individualism," "imperialism," "feudalism,"
"mercantilism," "conventional," etc., and innumerable concepts
of like character by means of which we seek analytically and
empathically to understand reality constructed substantively by the
"presuppositionless" description of some concrete phenomenon or
through the abstract synthesis of those traits which are common to
numerous concrete phenom(^na? Hundreds of words in the historian's
\'ocabulary arc ambiguous constructs created to meet the unconsciously
felt need for adequate expression and the meaning of which
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 93
is only concretely felt but not clearly thought out. In a great many
cases, particularly in the field of descriptive political history, their
ambiguity has not been prejudicial to the clarity of the presentation.
It is sufficient that in each case the reader should feel what the historian
had in mind; or, one can content one's self with the idea that
the author used a particular meaning of the concept with special
reference to the concrete case at hand. The greater the need however
for a sharp appreciation of the significance of a cultural phenomenon,
the more imperative is the need to operate with unambiguous
concepts which are not only particularly but also systematically
defined. A "definition" of such synthetic historical terms according
to the scheme of genus proximum and differentia specifica is naturally
nonsense. But let us consider it. Such a form of the establishment
of the meanings of words is to be found only in axiomatic disciplines
which use syllogisms. A simple "descriptive analysis" of these concepts
into their components either does not exist or else exists only
illusorily, for the question arises as to which of these components
should be regarded as essential. When a genetic definition of the
content of the concept is sought, there remains only the ideal-type
in the sense explained above. It is a conceptual construct [Gedankenbild)
which is neither historical reality nor even the "true" reality.
It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation
or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance
of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or
action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its
significant components. Such concepts are constructs in terms of
which we formulate relationships by the application of the category
of objective possibility. By means of this category, the adequacy of
our imagination, oriented and disciplined by reality, is judged.
In this function especially/^he ideal-type is an attempt to analyze -^
historically unique configurations or their individual components by^^
means of genetic concepts^ Let us take for instance the concepts
"church" and "sect." Th^ may be broken down purely classificatorily
into complexes of characteristics whereby not only the distinction
between them but also the content of the concept must constantly
remain fluid. If however I wish to formulate the concept of "sect"
genetically, e.g., with reference to certain important cultural signifi-
94 "OBJECTIMTY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
cances which the "sectarian spirit" has had for modern culture^ certain
characteristics of both become essential because they stand in an
adequate causal relationship to those influences. _ However, the concepts
thereupon become ideal-typical in the sense that they appear
in full conceptual integrity either not at all or only in individual
instances. •
Here as elsewhere every concept which is not purely
classificatory diverges from reality. But the discursive nature of our
knowledge, i.e., the fact that we comprehend reality only through a
chain of intellectual modifications postulates such a conceptual shorthand.
Our imagination can often dispense with explicit conceptual
formulations as a means of investigatioti. But as regards exposition,
to the extent that it wishes to be unambiguous, the use of precise
formulations in the sphere of cultural analysis is in many cases absolutely
necessary. Whoever disregards it entirely must confine himself
to the formal aspect of cultural phenomena, e.g., to legal history.
The universe of legal norms is naturally clearly definable and is valid
(in the legal sense!) for historical reality. But social science in our
sense is concerned with practical significance. This significance however
can very often be brought unambiguously to mind only by relating
the empirical data to an ideal limiting case. If the historian (in
the widest sense of the word) rejects an attrnipt to construct such
ideal types as a "theoretical construction," i.e., as useless or dispensable
for his concrete heuristic purposes, the inevitable consequence is
either that he consciously or unconsciously uses other similar concepts
without formulating them verbally and elaborating them logically or
that he remains stuck in the realm of the vaguely "felt."
Nothing, however, is more dangerous than the confusion of theory
and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion
expresses itself firstly in the belief that the "true" content and the
essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs
"*
or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustcan bed into
which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such
"ideas" as real "forces" and as a "true" reality which operates behind
the passage of events and which works itself out in history.
This latter danger is especially great since we are also, indeed
primarily, accustomed to understand by the "ideas" of an epoch the
thoughts or ideals which dominated the mass or at least an historically
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 95
decisive number of the persons living in that epoch itself, and who
were therefore significant as components of its culture. Now there
are two aspects to this: in the first place, there are certain relationships
between the "idea" in the sense of a tendency of practical or
theoretical thought and the "idea" in the sense of the ideal-typical
portrayal of an epoch constructed as a heuristic device. An ideal type
of certain situations, which can be abstracted from certain characteristic
social phenomena of an epoch, might — and this is indeed quite
often the case — have also been present in the minds of the persons
living in that epoch as an ideal to be striven for in practical life or
as a maxim for the regulation of certain social relationships. This is
true of the "idea" of "provision" (Nahrungsschutz) and many other
Canonist doctrines, especially those of Thomas Aquinas, in relationship
to the modern ideal type of medieval "city economy" which we
discussed above. The same is also true of the much talked of "basic
concept" of economics: economic "value." From Scholasticism to
Marxism, the idea of an objectively "valid" value, i.e., of an ethical
imperative was amalgamated with an abstraction drawn from the
empirical process of price formation. The notion that the "value" of
commodities should be regulated by certain principles of natural law,
has had and still has immeasurable significance for the development
of culture — and not merely the culture of the Middle Ages. It has
also influenced actual price formation very markedly. But what was
meant and what can be meant by that theoretical concept can be
made unambiguously clear only through precise, ideal-typical constructs.
Those who are so contemptuous of the "Robinsonades" of
classical theory should restrain themselves if they are unable to
replace them with better concepts, which in this context means
clearer concepts.
Thus the causal relationship between the historically determinable
idea which governs the conduct of men and those components of
historical reality from which their corresponding ideal-type may be
abstracted, can naturally take on a considerable number of different
forms. The main point to be observed is that in principle they are
both fundamentally different things. There is still another aspect:
those "ideas" which govern the behavior of the population of a certain
epoch i.e., which are concretely influential in determining their
96 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
conduct, can, if a somewhat complicated construct is involved, be
formulated precisely only in the form of an ideal type, since empirically
it exists in the minds of an indefinite and constantly changing
mass of individuals and assumes in their minds the most multifarious
nuances of form and content, clarity and meaning. Those elements of
the spiritual life of the individuals living in a certain epoch of the
Middle Ages, for example, which we may designate as the "Christianity"
of those individuals, would, if they could be completely portrayed,
naturally constitute a chaos of infinitely differentiated and
highly contradictory complexes of ideas and feelings. This is true
despite the fact that the medieval church was certainly able to bring
about a unity of belief and conduct to a particularly high degree. If
we raise the question as to what in this chaos was the "Christianity"
of the Middle Ages (which we must nonetheless use as a stable concept)
and wherein lay those "Christian" elements which we find in
the institutions of the Middle Ages, we see that here too in every
individual case, we are applying a purely analytical construct
created by ourselves. It is a combination of articles of faith, norms
from church law and custom, maxims of conduct, and countless concrete
interrelationships which we have fused into an "idea." It is a
synthesis which we could not succeed in attaining with consistency
without the application of ideal-type concepts.
The relationship between the logical structure of the conceptual
system in which we present such "ideas" and what is immediately
given in empirical reality naturally varies considerably. It is relatively
simple in cases in which one or a few easily formulated
theoretical main principles as for instance Calvin's doctrine of predestination
or clearly definable ethical postulates govern human
conduct and produce historical effects, so that we can analyze the
"idea" into a hierarchy of ideas which can be logically derived from
those theses. It is of course easily overlooked that however important
the significance even of the purely logically persuasive force of ideas
— Marxism is an outstanding example of this type of force — nonetheless
empirical-historical events occurring in men's minds must be
understood as primarily psychologically and not logically conditioned.
The ideal-typical character of such syntheses of historically effective
ideas is revealed still more clearly when those fundamental main
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 97
principles and postulates no longer survive in the minds of those
individuals who are still dominated by ideas which were logically or
associatively derived from them because the "idea" which was historically
and originally fundamental has either died out or has in
general achieved wide diffusion only for its broadest implications. The
basic fact that the synthesis is an "idea" which we have created
emerges even more markedly when those fundamental main principles
have either only very imperfectly or not at all been raised to the
level of explicit consciousness or at least have not taken the form
of explicitly elaborated complexes of ideas. When we adopt this
procedure, as it very often happens and must happen, we are concerned
in these ideas, e.g., the "liberalism" of a certain period or
"Methodism" or some intellectually unelaborated variety of "socialism,"
with a pure ideal type of much the same character as the
synthetic "principles" of economic epochs in which we had our point
of departure. The more inclusive the relationships to be presented,
and the more many-sided their cultural significance has been, the
more their comprehensive systematic exposition in a conceptual
system approximates the character of an ideal type, and the less is it
possible to operate with one such concept. In such situations the
frequently repeated attempts to discover ever new aspects of significance
by the construction of new ideal-typical concepts is all the
more natural and unavoidable. All expositions for example of the
"essence" of Christianity are ideal types enjoying only a necessarily
very relative and problematic validity when they are intended to be
regarded as the historical portrayal of empirically existing facts.
On the other hand, such presentations are of great value for research
and of high systematic value for expository purposes when they are
used as conceptual instruments for comparison with and the measurement
of reality. They are indispensable for this purpose.
There is still another even more complicated significance implicit in
such ideal-typical presentations. They regularly seek to be, or arc
unconsciously, ideal-types not only in the logical sense but also in the
practical sense, i.e., they are model types which — in our illustration —
contain what, from the point of view of the expositor, should be and
what to him is "essential" in Christianity because it is enduringly
valuable. If this is consciously or — as it is more frequently — un-
98 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
consciously the case, they contain ideals to which the expositor
evaluatively relates Christianity. These ideals are tasks and ends
towards which he orients his "idea" of Christianity and which naturally
can and indeed doubtless always will differ greatly from the
values which other persons, for instance, the early Christians, connected
with Christianity. In this sense, however, the "ideas" are
naturally no longer purely logical auxiliary devices, no longer concepts
with which reality is compared, but ideals by which it is
evaluatively judged. Here it is no longer a matter of the purely
theoretical procedure of treating empirical reality with respect to
values but of value-judgments which are integrated into the concept
of "Christianity." Because the ideal type claims empirical validity
here, it penetrates into the realm of the evaluative interpretation of
Christianity'. The sphere of empirical science has been left behind and
we are confronted with a profession of faith, not an ideal-typical
construct. As fundamental as this distinction is in principle, the confusion
of these two basically different meanings of the term "idea"
appears with extraordinary frequency in historical writings. It is
always close at hand whenever the descriptive historian begins to
develop his "conception" of a personality or an epoch. In contrast
with the fixed ethical standards which Schlosser applied in the spirit
of rationalism, the modern relativistically educated historian who on
the one hand seeks to "understand" the epoch of which he speaks
"in its own terms," and on the other still seeks to "judge" it, feels the
need to derive the standards for his judgment from the subject-matter
itself, i.e., to allow the "idea" in the sense of the ideal to emerge from
the "idea" in the sense of the "ideal-type." The esthetic satisfaction
produced by such a procedure constantly tempts him to disregard the
line where these two ideal types diverge — an error which on the one
hand hampers the value-judgment and on the other, strives to free
itself from the responsibility for its own judgment. In contrast with
this, the elementary duty of scientific self-control and the only way
to avoid serious and foolish blunders requires a sharp, precise distinction
between the logically comparative analysis of reality by idealtypes
in the logical sense and the value-judgment of reality on the
basis of ideals. An "ideal type" in our sense, to repeat once more,
has no connection at all with value-judgments, and it has nothing to
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 99
do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one. There
are ideal types of brothels as well as of religions; there are also ideal
types of those kinds of brothels which are technically "expedient"
from the point of view of police ethics as well as those of which the
exact opposite is the case.
It is necessary for us to forego here a detailed discussion of the
case which is by far the most complicated and most interesting, namely,
the problem of the logical structure of the concept of the state. The
following however should be noted : when we inquire as to what corresponds
to the idea of the "state" in empirical reality, we find an
infinity of diffuse and discrete human actions, both active and passive,
factually and legally regulated relationships, partly unique and
partly recurrent in character, all bound together by an idea, namely,
the belief in the actual or normative validity of rules and of the authority-relationships
of some human beings towards others. This belief is in
par consciously, in part dimly felt, and in part passively accepted by
persons who, should they think about the "idea" in a really clearly
defined manner, would not first need a "general theory of the state"
which aims to articulate the idea. The scientific conception of the
state, however it is formulated, is naturally always a synthesis which
we construct for certain heuristic purposes. But on the other hand, it
is also abstracted from the unclear syntheses which are found in the
minds of human beings. The concrete content, however, which the
historical "state" assumes in those syntheses in the minds of those
who make up the state, can in its turn only be made explicit through
the use of ideal-typical concepts. Nor, furthermore, can there be the
least doubt that the manner in which those syntheses are made
(always in a logically imperfect form) by the members of a state, or
in other words, the "ideas" which they construct for themselves about
the state — as for example, the German "organic" metaphysics of
the state in contrast with the American "business" conception, is of
great practical significance. In other words, here too the practical
idea which should be valid or is believed to be valid and the heuristically
intended, theoretically ideal type approach each other very
closely and constantly tend to merge with each other.
We have purposely considered the ideal type essentially — if not
100 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
exclusively — as a mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic
characterization of individual concrete patterns which are significant
in their uniqueness, such as Christianity, capitalism, etc. We
did this in order to avoid the common notion that in the sphere
of cultural phenomena, the abstract type is identical with the abstract
kind (Gattufigsmdssigen) . This is not the case. Without being able
to make here a full logical analysis of the widely discussed concept
of the "typical" which has been discredited through misuse, we can
state on the basis of our previous discussion that the construction of
type-concepts in the sense of the exclusion of the "accidental" also
has a place in the analysis of historically individual phenomena.
Naturaly, however, those generic concepts which we constantly encounted
as elements of historical analysis and of concrete historical
concepts, can also be formed as ideal-types by abstracting and accentuating
certain conceptually essential elements. Practically, this
is indeed a particularly frequent and important instance of the
application of ideal-typical concepts. -Every individual ideal type
comprises both generic and ideal-typically constructed conceptual
elements. In this case too, we see the specifically logical function
of ideal-typical concepts. The concept of "exchange" is for
instance a simple class concept (Gattungsbegriff) in the sense of a
complex of traits which are common to many phenomena, as long
as we disregard the meaning of the component parts of the concept,
and simply analyze the term in its everyday usage. If however we
relate this concept to the concept of "marginal utility" for instance,
and construct the concept of "economic exchange" as an economically
rational event, this then contains as every concept of "economic
exchange" does which is fully elaborated logically, a judgment concerning
the "typical" conditions of exchange. It assumes a genetic
character and becomes therewith ideal-typical in the logical sense,
i.e., it removes itself from empirical reality which can only be compared
or related to it. The same is true of all the so-called "fundamental
concepts" of economics: they can be developed in genetic
form only as ideal types. The distinction between simple class or
generic concepts {Gattungsbegriffe) which merely summarize the
common features of certain empirical phenomena and the quasigeneric
(Gattungsmdssigen) ideal type —-as for instance and ideal-
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 101
typical concept of the "nature" of "handicraft" — varies naturally
with each concrete case. But no class or generic concept as s\uh has
a "typical" character and there is no purely generic "average"
type. Wherever we speak of typical magnitudes — as for example, in
statistics — we speak of something more than a mere average. The
more it is a matter of the simple classification of events which appear
in reality as mass phenomena, the more it is a matter of class concepts.
On the other hand, the greater the event to which we
conceptualize complicated historical patterns with respect to those
components in which their specific cultural significance is contained,
the greater the extent to which the concept — or system of concepts
— will be ideal-typical in character. The goal of ideal-typical con- ^^
cept-construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or ^^ jp
average character but rather the unique individual character ot
cultural phenomena.
le fact that ideal types, even classificatory ones, can be and are
applied, first acquires methodological significance in connection with
another fact.
Thus far we have been dealing with ideal-types only as abstract
concepts of relationships which are conceived by us as stable in the
flux of events, as historically individual complexes in which developments
are realized. There emerges however a complication, which
reintroduces with the aid of the concept of "type" the naturalistic
prejudice that the goal of the social sciences must be the reduction of
reality to "laws.'' i^Jevelopmental sequences toJ> can be constructed
into ideal types and these constructs c an have quite considerable heunsticvaTue.
But this quite particularly gives rise to the danger that
The ideal type and reality will be confused with one another. One
can, for example, arrive at the theoretical conclusion that in a society
which is organized on strict "handicraft" principles, the only source
of capital accumulation can be ground rent. From this perhaps, one
can — for the correctness of the construct is not in question here —
construct a pure ideal picture of the shift, conditioned by certain
specific factors — e.g., limited land, increasing population, influx of
precious metals, rationalisation of the conduct of life — from a
handicraft to a capitalistic economic organization. Whether the
empirical-historical course of development was actually identical with
102 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
the constructed one, can be investigated only by using this construct
as a heuristic device for the comparison oT the i deal type and the
.'
H'a^'^s ,
" It the ideal tvpp were "rnrrprtlv" constructed and the actual
course of events did not correspond to that predicted by the ideal
type, the hypothesis that medieval society was not in certain respects a
strictly "handicraft" type of society would be proved. And if the
ideal type were constructed in a heuristically "ideal" way — whether
and in what way this could occur in our example will be entirely
disregarded here — it will guide the investigation into a path leading
to a more precise understanding of the non-handicraft components
of medieval society in their peculiar characteristics and their historical
significance. // it leads to this result, it fulfils its logical purpose,
even though, in doing so, it demonstrates its divergence from reality.
/It was — in this case — the test of an hypothesis. This procedure
j
gives rise to no methodological doubts so long as we clearly keep in
mind that ideal-typical developmental constructs and history are to
be sharply distinguished from each other, and that the construct here
is no more than the means for explicitly and validly imputing an historical
event to its real causes while eliminating those which on the
basis of our present knowledge seem possible.
The maintenance of this distinction in all its rigor often becomes
uncommonly difficult in practice due to a certain circumstance. In
the interest of the concrete demonstration of an ideal type or of an
ideal-typical developmental sequence, one seeks to make it clear by
the use of concrete illustrative material drawn from empirical-historical
reality. The danger of this procedure which in itself is entirely
legitimate lies in the fact that historical knowledge here appears as a
servant of theory instead of the opposite role. It is a great temptation
for the theorist to regard this relationship either as the normal
one or, far worse, to mix theory with history and indeed to confuse
them with each other. This occurs in an extreme way when an ideal
construct of a developmental sequence and a conceptual classification
of the ideal-types of certain cultural structures (e.g., the forms of
industrial production deriving from the "closed domestic economy"
or the religious concepts beginning with the "gods of the moment")
are integrated into a genetic classification. The series of types which
results from the selected conceptual criteria appears then as an
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 103
historical sequence unrolling with the necessity of a law. The logical
classification of analytical concepts on the one hand and the empirical
arrangements of the events thus conceptualized in space, time,
and causal relationship, on the other, appear to be so bound up
together that there is an almost irresistible temptation to do violence
to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct.
We have intentionally avoided a demonstration with respect to that
ideal-typical construct which is the most important one from our point
of view; namely, the Marxian theory. This was done in order not to
complicate the exposition any further through the introduction of an
interpretation of Marx and in order not to anticipate the discussions
in our journal which will make a regular practice of presenting critical
analyses of the literature concerning and following the great thinker.
We will only point out here that naturally all specifically Marxian [ \\^
"laws" and deyelopmental constructs — insofar as they are theoretic^ally
sound — are ideal types. The eminent, indeed unique, heuristic •
\
significance of these ideal types when they are used for the assessment
of reality is knbwri to everyone who has ever employed Marxian
concepts and hypotheses. Similarly, their perniciousness, as soon as
they are thought of as empirically valid or as real (i.e., truly metaphysical)
"effective forces," "tendencies," etc. is likewise known to
those who have used them.
Class or generic concepts (Gattungsbegriffe) — ideal types|
—
ideal-typical generic concepts — ideas in the sense of thought-patterns
which actually exist in the minds of human beings — ideal types of
such ideas — ideals which govern human beings — ideal types of
such ideals — ideals with which the historian approaches historical
facts — theoretical constructs using empirical data illustratively —
historical investigations which utilize theoretical concepts as ideal
limiting cases — the various possible combinations of these which
could only be hinted at here ; they are pure mental constructs, the relationships
of which to the empirical reality of the immediately given
is problematical in every individual case. This list of possibilities only
reveals the infinite ramifications of the conceptual-methodological
problems which face us in the sphere of the cultural sciences. We
must renounce the serious discussion of the practical methodological
issues the problems of which were only to be exhibited, as well as
104 "OBJECTI\ ITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
the detailed treatment of the relationships of ideal types to "laws,"
of ideal-typical concepts to collective concepts, etc. . .
The historian will still insist, even after all these discussions, that
the prevalence of ideal-typical concepts and constructs are characteristic
symptoms of the adolescence of a discipline. And in a certain
sense this must be conceded, but with other conclusions than he could
draw from it. Let us take a few illustrations from other disciplines.
It is certainly true that the harried fourth-form boy as well as the
primitive philologist first conceives of a language "organically," i.e.,
as a meta-empirical totality regulated by norms, but the task of linguistic
science is to establish which grammatical rules should be valid.
The logical elaborations of the written language, i.e., the reduction
of its content to rules, as was done for instance by the Accademia delta
Crusca, is normally the first task which "philology" sets itself. When,
in contrast with this, a leading philologist today declares that the
subject-matter of philology is the "speech of every individual," even
the formulation of such a program is possible only after there is a
relatively clear ideal type of the written language, which the otherwise
entirely orientationless and unbounded investigation of the infinite
variety of speech can utilize (at least tacitly). The constructs
of the natural law and the organic theories of the state have exactly
the same function and, to recall an ideal type in our sense, so does
Benjamin Constant's theory of the ancient state. It serves as a harbor
until one has learned to navigate safely in the vast sea of empirical
facts. The coming of age of science in fact always implies the transcendance
of the ideal-type, insofar as it was thought of as possessing
empirical validity or as a class concept (Gattungsbegriff) . However,
it is still legitimate today to use the brilliant Constant hypothesis to
demonstrate certain aspects and historically unique features of ancient
political life, as long as one carefully bears in mind its ideal-typical
character. Moreover, there are sciences to which eternal youth is
granted, and the historical disciplines are among them — all those to
which the eternally onward flowing stream of culture perpetually
brings new problems. At the very heart of their task lies not only the
transciency of all ideal types but also at the same time the inevitability
of new ones.
The attempts to determine the "real" and the "true" meaning of
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 105
historical concepts always reappear and never succeed in reaching
their goal. Accordingly the synthetic concepts used by historians are
either imperfectly defined or, as soon as the elimination of ambiguity
is sought for, the concept becomes an abstract ideal type and reveals
itself therewith as a theoretical and hence "one-sided" viewpoint
which illuminates the aspect of reality with which it can be related.
But these concepts are shown to be obviously inappropriate as schema
into which reality could be completely integrated. For none of
those systems of ideas, which are absolutely indispensable in the
understanding of those segments of reality which are meaningful at
a particular moment, can exhaust its infinite richness. They are all
attempts, on the basis of the present state of our knowledge and the
available conceptual patterns, to bring order into the chaos of those
facts which we have drawn into the field circumscribed by our interest.
The intellectual apparatus which the past has developed through the
analysis, or more truthfully, the analytical rearrangement of the immediately
given reality, and through the latter's integration by concepts
which correspond to the state of its knowledge and the focus of its
interest, is in constant tension with the new knowledge which we can
and desire to wrest from reality. The progress of cultural science
occurs through this conflict. Its result is the perpetual reconstruction
of those concepts through which we seek to comprehend reality. The
history of the social sciences is and remains a continuous process
passing from the attempt to order reality analytically through the
construction of concepts — the dissolution of the analytical constructs
so constructed through the expansion and shift of the scientific
horizon — and the reformulation anew of concepts on the foundations
thus transformed. It is not the error of the attempt to construct
conceptual systems in general which is shown by this process —
every science, even simple descriptive history, operates with the conceptual
stock-in-trade of its time. Rather, this process shows that
in the cultural sciences concept-construction depends on the setting
of the problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture
itself. The relationship between concept and reality in the cultural
sciences involves the transitoriness of all such syntheses. The great
attempts at theory-construction in our science were always useful for
revealing the limits of the significance of those points of view which
106 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
provided theii" foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of
the social sciences are substantively tied up with the shift in practical
cultural problems and take the guise of a critique of concept-construction.
Adherence to the purpose of this critique and therewith
the investigation of the principles of syntheses in the social sciences
shall be among the primary tasks of our journal.
In the conclusions which are to be drawn from what has been
said, we come to a point where perhaps our views diverge here and
there from those of many, and even the most outstanding, representatives
of the Historical School, among whose offspring we too are to
be numbered. The latter still hold in many ways, expressly or tacitly,
to the opinion that it is the end and the goal of every science to order
its data into a system of concepts, the content of which is to be
acquired and slowly perfected through the observation of empirical
regularities, the construction of hypotheses, and their verification,
until finally a "completed" and hence deductive science emerges.
For this goal, the historical-inductive work of the present-day is a
preliminary task necessitated by the imperfections of our discipline.
Nothing can be more suspect, from this point of view, that the construction
and application of clear-cut concepts since this seems to
be an over-hasty anticipation of the remote future.
This conception was, in principle, impregnable within the framework
of the classical-scholastic epistemology which was still fundamentally
assumed by the majority of the research-workers identified
with the Historical School. The function of concepts was assumed
to be the reproduction of "objective" reality in the analyst's imagination.
Hence the recurrent references to the unreality of all clear-cut
concepts. If one perceives the implications of the fundamental ideas
of modern epistemology which ultimately derives from Kant; namely,
that concepts are primarily analytical instruments for the intellectual
mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the fact that precise
genetic concepts are necessarily ideal types will not cause him to
desist from constructing them. The relationship between concept and
historical research is reversed for those who appreciate this; the goal
of the Historical School then appears as logically impossible, the
concepts are not ends but are means to the end of understanding
phenomena which are significant from concrete individual viewpoints.
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 107
Indeed, it is just because the content of historical concepts is necessarily
subject to change that they must be formulated precisely and
clearly on all occasions. In their application, their character as ideal
analytical constructs should be carefully kept in mind, and the idealtype
and historical reality should not be confused with each other. It
should be understood that since really definitive historical concepts
are not in general to be thought of as an ultimate end in view of the
inevitable shift of the guiding value-ideas, the construction of sharp
and unambiguous concepts relevant to the concrete individual viewpoint
which directs our interest at any given time, alTords the possibility
of clearly realizing the limits of their validity.
It will be pointed out and wc ourselves have already admitted, that
in a particular instance the course of a concrete historical event can
be made vixidly clear without its being analyzed in terms of explicitly
defined concepts. And it will accordingly be claimed for the
historians in our field, that they may, as has been said of the political
historians, speak the "language of life itself." Certainly! But it should
be added that in this procedure, the attainment of a level of explicit
awareness of the viewpoint from which the events in question get
their significance remains highly accidental. We are in general not in
the favorable position of the political historian for whom the cultural
views to which he orients his presentation are usually unambiguous —
or seem to be so. Every type of purely direct concrete description
bears the mark of artistic portrayal. "Each sees what is in his own
heart." Valid judi^ments always presuppose the looical analysis of
what is concretely and immediately perceived, i.e. the use of concepts.
It is indeed possible and often aesthetically satisfying to keep these
in petto but it always endangers the security of the reader's orientation,
and often that of the author himself concerning the content and
scope of his judgments.
The neglect of clear-cut concept-construction in practical discussions
of practical, economic and social policy can, however, become
particularly dangerous. It is really unbelievable to an outsider what
confusion has been fostered, for instance, by the use of the term
"value" — that unfortunate child of misery of our science, which can
be given an unambiguous meaning only as an ideal type — or terms
like "productive," "from an economic viewpoint," etcetera, which in
108 "OBJECTIVITY' IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
general will not stand up under a conceptually precise analysis.
Collective concepts taken from the language of everyday life have particularly
unwholesome effects. In order to have an illustration easy
for the layman to understand, let us take the concept of "agriculture"
especially as it appears in the term "the interests of agriculture."
If we begin with "the interests of agriculture" as the empirically
determinable, more or less clear subjective ideas of concrete
economically active individuals about their own interests and disregard
entirely the countless conflicts of interest taking place among
the cattle breeders, the cattle growers, grain growers, corn consumers,
corn-using, whiskey-distilling farmers, perhaps not all laymen,
but certainly every specialist will know the great whirlpool of antagonistic
and contradictory forms of value-relationship (
Wertbezie-^
hung) which are vaguely thought of under that heading. We will
enumerate only a few of them here: the interests of farmers, who
\vish to sell their property and who are therefore interested in a
rapid rise of the price of land; the diametrically opposed interest of
those who wish to buy, rent or lease; the interest of those who wish to
retain a certain property to the social advantage of their descendants
and who are therefore interested in the stability of landed property;
the antagonistic interests of those who, in their own or their childrens'
interests, wish to see the land go to the most enterprising
farmer — or what is not exactly the same — to the purchaser with
the most capital; the purely economic interest in economic freedom
of movement of the most "competent farmer" in the business sense;
the antagonistic interests of certain dominating classes in the maintenance
of the traditional social and political position of their own
"class" and thereby of their descendants; the interest of the socially
subordinated strata of farmers in the decline of the strata which arc
above them and which oppress them ; in occasional contradition to this
the interest of this stratum in having the leadership of those above
them to protect their economic interests. This list could be tremendously
increased, without coming to an end although we have been as
summary and imprecise as possible.
We will pass over the fact that most diverse purely ideal values are
mixed and associated with, hinder and divert the more "egoistic" interests
in order to remind ourselves, above all, that when we speak of the
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 109
"interests of agriculture" we think not only of those material and ideal
values to which the farmers themselves at a given time relate their
interests, but rather those partly quite heterogeneous value-ideas
which we can relate with agriculture. As instances of these valueideas
related to agriculture we may cite the interests in production
derived from the interests in cheap and qualitatively good food,
which two interests are themselves not always congruous and in
connection with which many clashes between the interests of city
and country can be found, and in which the interests of the present
generation need not by any means always be identical with the interests
of coming generations; interests in a numerous population, particularly
in a large rural population, derived either from the foreign or
domestic interests of the "State," or from other ideal interests of the
most diverse sort, e.g., the expected influence of a large rural population
on the character of the nation's culture. These "populationinterests"
can clash with the most diverse economic interests of all
sections of the rural population, and indeed with all the present
interests of the mass of rural inhabitants. Another instance is the
interest in a certain type of social stratification of the rural population,
because of the type of political or cultural influence which will be
produced therefrom; this interest can, depending on its orientation,
conflict with every conceivable (even the most urgent present and
future) interests of the individual farmers as well as those "of the
State." To this is added a further complication: the "state," to the
"interests" of which we tend to relate such and numerous other
similar individual interests, is often only a blanket term for an
extremely intricate tangle of evaluative-ideas, to which it in its turn
is related in individual cases, e.g., purely military security from
external dangers; security of the dominant position of a dynasty or a
certain class at home; interest in the maintenance and expansion of
the formal-juridicial unity of the nation for its own sake or in the
interest of maintaining certain objective cultural values which in
their turn again are very diff'erentiated and which we as a politically
unified people believe we represent; the reconstruction of the social
aspects of the state according to certain once more diverse cultural
ideas. It would lead us too far even merely to mention what is
contained under the general label "state-interests" to which we can
110 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
relate "agriculture." The illustrations which we have chosen and
our even briefer analyses arc crude and simplified. The non-specialist
may now analyze similarly (and more thoroughly) for instance "the
class interests of the worker" in order to see what contradictory elements,
composed partly of the workers' interests and ideals, and
partly of the ideals with which we view the workers, enter into this
concept. It is impossible to overcome the slogans of the conflict of
interests through a purely empirical emphasis on their "relative"
character. The clear-cut, sharply defined analysis of the various
possible standpoints is the only path which will lead us out of verbal
confusion. The "free trade argument" as a Weltanschauung or as a
valid norm is ridiculous but — and this is equally true whichever
ideals of commercial policy the individual accepts — our underestimation
of the heuristic value of the wisdom of the world's greatest merchants
as expressed in such ideal-typical formulae has caused serious
damage to our discussions of commercial policy. Only through
ideal-typical concept-construction do the viewpoints with which we
are concerned in individual cases become explicit. Their peculiar
character is brought out by the coiijrontation of empirical reality
with the ideal-type. The use of the undifferentiated collective concepts
of everyday speech is always a cloak for confusion of thought
and action. It is, indeed, very often an instrument of specious and
fraudulent procedures. It is, in brief, always a means of obstructing
the proper formulation of the problem.
We are now at the end of this discussion, the only purpose of
which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science
from faith and to make explicit the meaning of the quest for social
and economic knowledge. The objective validity of all empirical
knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality
according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely,
in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are
based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical
knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our
science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no
value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of
scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product
of man's original nature. Those for whom scientific truth is of no
"OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 111
value will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of
science in just those respects in which it is unique, namely, in the
provision of concepts and judgments which are neither empirical
reality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering
in a valid manner. In the empirical social sciences, as we have
seen, the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for
us in the infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting
application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character,
which, in the last analysis, arc oriented on the basis of evaluative
ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable
and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but
their validity can 7iot be deduced from empirical data as such. The
"objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that
the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which
alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical
data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can
never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof
of the validity of the evaluative ideas. The belief which we all have
in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity of ultimate and
final values, in which the meaning of our existence is rooted, is not
incompatible with the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoints,
from which empirical reality gets its significance. Both these
views are, on the contrary, in harmony with each other. Life with
its irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible.
The concrete form in which value-relevance occurs remains perpetually
in flux, ever subject to change in the dimly seen future of human
culture. The light which emanates from those highest evaluative
ideas always falls on an ever changing finite segment of the vast
chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time.
Now all this should not be misunderstood to mean that the proper
task of the social sciences should be the continual chase for new viewpoints
and new analytical constructs. Oji the contrary, nothing
should be more sharply emphasized than the proposition that the
knowledge of the cultural significance of concrete historical events
and patterns is exclusively and solely the final end which, among
other means, concept-construction and the criticism of constructs
also seek to serve.
112 "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
There are, to use the words of F, Th. Vischer, "subject matter
speciaHsts" and "interpretative specialists." The fact-greedy gullet
of the former can be filled only with legal documents, statistical worksheets
and questionnaires, but he is insensitive to the refinement of a
new idea. The gourmandlse of the latter dulls his taste for facts by
ever new intellectual subtilities. That genuine artistry which, among
the historians, Ranke possessed in such a grand measure, manifests
itself through its ability to produce new knowledge by interpreting
already kyiown facts according to known viewpoints.
All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization,
once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular
settings of problems and has established its methodological principles,
will consider the analysis of the data as an end in itself. It will
discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of
their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it will lose its
awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general.
And it is well that should be so. But there comes a moment when
the atmosphere changes. The significance of the unreflectively utilized
viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight.
The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then
science too prepares to change its standpoint and its analytical apparatus
and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought.
It follows those stars which alone are able to give meaning and
direction to its labors:
" der neue Trieb erwacht,
Ich eile fort, ihr ewiges Licht zu trinken,
Vor mir den Tag und unter mir die Nacht,
Den Ilimmel iiber mir und unter mir die Wellen."^
^Faust: Act I, Scene II. (Translated by Bayard-Taylor)
"The newborn impulse fires my mind,
I hasten on, his beams eternal drinking,
The Day before me and the Night behind,
Above me Heaven unfurled, the floor of waves beneath me."
Critical Studies in the Logic
of the Cultural Sciences
A CRITIQUE OF EDUARD MEYER'S
METHODOLOGICAL VIEWS
wHEN ONE OF OUR most eminent historians feels impelled
to give an account to himself and his colleagues of the aims and
methods of his scholarly work, this must necessarily arouse an
interest far beyond the limits of his special discipline because in doing
so he passes beyond the boundaries of his special discipline and
enters into the area of methodological analysis. This has to begin
with certain unfavorable consequences. The categories of logic,
which in its present state of development is a specialized discipline
like any other, require, if they are to be utilized with assurance, the
same daily familiarity as those of any other discipline. Obviously,
Eduard Meyer, whose Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschitchte
(Hadle, 1900) ) we are discussing here, does not and cannot claim
such constant contact with logic anymore than the author of the following
pages. The methodological details of that work are, so to
speak, a diagnosis not by the physician but by the patient himself,
and they are intended to be evaluated and understood as such. The
professional methodologist will take umbrage at many of Meyer's
formulations and he will not learn much that is really new for his
113
114 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
purposes from the work itself. But this does not diminish its significance
for the neighboring special disciplines.^
Indeed, the most significant achievements of specialist methodology
use "ideal-typically" constructed conceptions of the objectives and
methods of the special disciplines, and are therefore so far risen over
the heads of the latter that it is often difficult for the special disciplines
to recognize themselves with the naked eye in these discussions.
For this reason methodological discussions rooted within their own
subject matter may be more useful for the self-clarification of special
disciplines in spite of, and in a sense even because of, their methodologically
imperfect formulation. Indeed, the easy intelligibility of
Meyer's exposition offers the specialist in the neighboring disciplines
the opportunity to focus attention on a whole series of points for the
purpose of resolving certain logical problems which he shares in
common with "historians" in the narrower sense of the word.
Such is the aim of the following discussions which, in connection
with Meyer's book, will attempt to elucidate concretely a whole
series, in sequence, of specific logical problems, and will then critically
review a number of further newer works on the logic of the
cultural sciences from the standpoint arrived at in the course of
our discussion of Meyer. We are intentionally taking our point of
departure in purely historical problems and will enter only in the
later stage of our discussions on those disciplines concerned with
social life which seek to arrive at "rules" or "laws"; we do this
especially because hitherto the attempt has usually been made to
define the nature of the social sciences by distinguishing them from
the "natural sciences." In this procedure there is always the tacit
assumption that history is a discipline which devotes itself exclusively
to the collection of materials, or if not that, is a purely descriptive
discipline which in fortunate cases drags in "facts" which serve as the
'^Mt is to be hoped that the reader will not attribute the following criticism,
which purposely searches out the weaknesses in Meyer's formulations, to the
need to appear clever. The errors which an outstanding author makes are
more instructive than the correct statements of a scientific nonentity. It is
not our intention to assess the achievement of Eduard Meyer but rather the
contrary: to learn from his inadequacies in such a way that we can understand
how he attempted, with very different degrees of success, to cope with
certain important problems of historical methodology.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 115
building materials for the intellectual work which "really" begins
only after the historical work has been done. And what is more, even
the professional historians, unfortunately, have contributed not a
little to the strengthening of the prejudice that "historical work" is
something qualitatively different from "scientific work" because "concepts"
and "rules" are of "no concern" to history; they have done
this by the way in which they have sought to define the specific
character of "history" in the specialist's sense of the word. Since
social science is itself usually given an "historical" foundation because
of the persisting influence of the "historical school," and since for
this reason the relationship of our discipline to theory has remained
problematic even as it was twenty-five years ago, it appears to be
correct procedure to ask, first, what is to be understood logically by
"historical" research, and to decide this question in the domain of
what is indubitably and generally acknowledged to be historiography,
with which the book we are now criticizing is primarily concerned.
Eduard Meyer begins with a warning against the over-estimation
of the significance of methodological studies for the practice of history:
the most comprehensive methodological knowledge will not
make anyone into an historian, and incorrect methodological viewpoints
do not necessarily entail erroneous scientific practice; they
show, rather, only that the historian can formulate or interpret incorrectly
his own correct maxims of procedure. The following proposition
recommends itself as essentially true: methodology can only
bring us reflective understanding of the means which have demonstrated
their value in practice by raising them to the level of explicit
consciousness; it is no more the precondition of fruitful intellectual
work than the knowledge of anatomy is the precondition for "correct"
walking. Indeed, just as the person who attempted to govern his
mode of walking continuously by anatomical knowledge would be
in danger of stumbling so the professional scholar who attempted to
determine the aims of his own research extrinsically on the basis of
methodological reflections would be in danger of falling into the same
difficulties.^ If methodological work — and this is naturally its
" This would, as we shall show, also happen in the case of Eduard Meyer if
he began taking many of his own assertions with literal seriousness.
116 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
intention — can at some point serve the practice of the historian
directly, it is indeed, by enabling him once and for all to escape from
the danger of being imposed on by a philosophically embellished
dilettantism. Only by laying bare and solving substantive problems
can sciences be established and their methods developed. On the
other hand, purely epistemological and methodological reflections
have never played the crucial role in such developments. Such discussions
can become important for the enterprise of science only
w^hen, as a result of considerable shifts of the "viewpoint" from which
a datum becomes the object of analysis, the idea emerges that the
new "viewpoint" also requires a revision of the logical forms in which
the "enterprise" has heretofore operated, and when, accordingly,
uncertainty about the "nature" of one's own work arises. This situation
is unambiguously the case at present as regards history, and
Eduard Meyer's view about the insignificance in principle of methodology
for "practice" has rightly not prevented him from now busying
himself with methology.
He begins, first, with an exposition of those theories which recently,
from the methodological standpoint, have sought to transform
historical studies, and he formulates the standpoint which he will wish
to criticize in particular (page 3), as asserting that:
1. the following are insignificant for history and are thus not
to be looked upon as properly belonging to a scientific exposition:
a. the "accidental";
b. the "freely" willed decision of concrete personalities;
c. the influence of "ideas" on the actions of human beings;
— as asserting on the contrary,
2. that the proper objects of scientific knowledge are:
a. "mass phenomena" in contrast to individual actions;
b. the "typical" in contrast with the "particular";
c. the development of "communities," especially social
"classes" or "nations," in contrast with the political actions of
individuals;
and as asserting finally that
3. historical development, because it is scientifically intelligible
only in a causal manner is to be conceived as a process
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 117
following "laws," Consequently, the discovery of the necessary
"typical" sequence of "developmental stages" of human communities
and the integration of the rich variety of historical data
into this sequence are the proper aims of historical research.
In the following discussion, all of those points in Meyer's analysis
which deal particularly with the criticism of Lamprecht will, for the
time being, be left entirely to one side, and I allow myself the liberty
of rearranging Meyer's arguments, singling out certain of them for
particular discussion in the following sections in accordance with the
requirements of the following studies, which do not have as their
goal the mere criticism of Eduard Meyer's book.
In order to oppose the point of view which he is combatting, Meyer
first refers to the very great role which "free will" and "chance"
—
both of which are in his view perfectly "definite and clear concepts"
—have played in history and in life in general.
As regards the discussion of "chance" (p. 17 ff.), Eduard Meyer
obviously does not interpret this concept as objective "causelessness"
("absolute" chance in the metaphysical sense), nor does he interpret
it as the absolute subjective impossibility of knowledge of the causal
conditions which necessarily recurs in regard to each individual instance
of the class of events (as, for example, in the toss of dice)
("absolute" chance in the epistcmological sense )."^ He understands
by "chance," rather, "relative" chance in the sense of a logical relationship
between groups of causes conceived as distinct complexes
and understands it, in the main, in the way, although naturally not
always "correctly" formulated, that this concept is accepted by professional
logicians, who despite many advances in detail still base their
theory in this regard on Windelband's earliest writing. In the main,
he makes a correct distinction between two concepts of chance: (1)
the causal concept of "chance" ("relative chance" so-called) : —the
"chance" effect here stands in contrast with such an effect as would
^ This sort of "chance" lies, for example, at the basis of the so-called games
of "chance" such as dice and lotteries. The absolute unknowability of the
influence of certain parts of the concrete determining conditions of the specific
efTect on the outcome of the event is constitutive for the possibility of "probability
calculation" in the strict sense of the term.
118 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
be "expected" from the event's causal components which we have synthesized
into a conceptual unity — that is a matter of "chance" which
is not usually derivable in accordance with general rules of change
from those determinants which alone have been taken into account
in the unification of causal components into causes but which has
been caused by the operation of some conditions lying "outside" them
(pp. 17-19). From this causal conception of "chance," he distinguishes
(2) the rather different teleological concept of "chance," the opposite
of which is the "essential" reality; here either it is a question
of the construction of a concept for heuristic purposes through the
exclusion of those elements or components of reality which are "unessential"
("chance" or "individual") for the knowledge, or it is a
question of assessment of certain real or conceptualized objects as
"means" to an "end," in which case, then, certain characteristics
alone are practically relevant as "means" while the others are treated
in practice as "indifferent" (pp. 20-21).* Of course, the formulation
(especially on page 20 et seq., where the contrast is conceived as one
between "events" and "things") leaves much to be desired, and it
will become quite clear by our further discussion of Meyer's attitude
toward the concept of development (in Section II) that the problem
has not been fully thought out in its logical implications. However,
what he says is adequate for the needs of historical practice. What
interests us here, however, is the way in which at a subsequent passage
(p. 28) he recurs to the concept of "chance." "Natural science can
. . . assert," Meyer says, "that when dynamite is set on fire an explosion
will take place. But to predict whether and when in a specific
instance this explosion will take place, and whether in such a situation
a particular person will be wounded, killed, or saved, that is impossible
for natural science because that depends on chance and on the free
will of which science knows nothing but with which history deals."
Here we see the very close union of "chance" with "free will." It
* These concepts of "chance" are not to be excluded from a discipline which
is only relatively historical (for example, biology). L. M. Hartmann {Die
geschichtliche Entwicklung, pp. 15 and 25) speaks only of this and the "pragmatic"
concept of "chance"—obviously following Meyer; he does not, however,
in any case, in spite of his false formulation, do as Eulenburg claims,
that is, transform "the causeless into the casual' {Deutsche Liter aturzeitung
1905, No. 24).
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 119
appears even more prominently when Meyer cites as a second example
the possibility of "calculating" with "certainty" the possibility of a
constellation by use of the devices of astronomy, meaning by "certainty"
the assumption of the non-occurrence of "disturbances" such
as, for example, the intrusion of strange or foreign planets into the
solar system. In contrast with this, he declares it to be impossible to
predict with certainty that the constellation will be "observed." In
the first place, that intrusion of the foreign planet, according to
Meyer's assumption, would be "incalculable" — in that sense astronomy,
and not only history, has to take "chance" into account. Secondly,
it is normally very easily "calculable" that some astronomer
will also attempt to "observe" the calculated constellation, and when
no "chance" disturbances intrude, will actually succeed in observing
it. One obtains the impression that Meyer, although interpreting
"chance" in a thoroughly deterministic fashion, has in mind, without,
however, clearly expressing it, a particularly close affinity between
"chance" and "free will" which determines a characteristic irrationality
in historical events. Let us examine this more closely.
What Meyer designates as "free will" does not involve, according
to him, in any way (p. 14) a contradiction of the "axiomatic" "principle
of sufficient reason" which is, in his view, unconditionally valid
even for human conduct. Rather, the distinction between "freedom"
and "necessity" in conduct is resolved into a simple distinction of
points of view. In one case, we are contemplating what has happened,
and this appears to us as "necessary," including the decision that was
once actually made. In the case of freedom, however, we look on
the event as "becoming," that is, as not yet having occurred, and
thus as not "necessary"; it is, in this form, only one of infinitely
numerous "possibilities." From the point of view of a development in
process, we can, however, never assert that a human decision could
not have been made differently than it actually was made later. In
the discussion of human action, "we can never transcend the 'I will'."
The question now arises: is it Meyer's view that this distinction
between two viewpoints (i.e. (1) "development in process" which
is for that reason conceived as "free" and (2) "events" which have
"occurred" and for that reason conceived as "necessary'") is to be
applied only in the sphere of human motivation and not in the sphere
120 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
of "dead" nature? Since he remarks on page 15 that the person who
"knows the personality and the circumstances" can predict the result,
that is, the decision which is "evolving" "perhaps with a very high
probability," he does not appear to accept such a distinction. But a
really exact prediction of an individual event from given conditions
is also dependent, in the sphere of "dead" nature, on these two presuppositions:
(1) that there are involved "calculable," that is, quantitatively
expressible components of the event, and (2) that all of the
conditions which are relevant for the occurrence can really be known
and measured exactly. Otherwise, and this is always the rule wherever
it is a question of the concrete individuality of an event, such as the
exact character of the weather on a particular day in the future, we
cannot transcend probability judgments of various degrees of certainty.
"Free" will, then, would not have any special status, and "I
will" would only be the same as the formal "fiat" of consciousness
discussed by James, which is, for example, accepted by the determinist
criminologists without any damage to their theories of legal
responsibility.^ "Free will" signifies, then, only that causal significance
has been attributed to the "decision" which has arisen from causes
which are, perhaps, never fully to be discovered, but which are in any
case "sufficient"; and this will not be seriously contested even by a
strict determinist. If there were nothing more involved in this, then
we would be unable to see why the concept of irrationality of historical
events, which is occasionally mentioned in discussions of "chance,"
would not be acceptable.
But for such an interpretation of Meyer's point of view, it is
disturbing to note that he finds it necessary in this context to emphasize
freedom of the will, as a fact of inner experience, as indispensable
if the individual is to be responsible for his own voluntary acts. This
would be justified only if Meyer were intending to assign to history
the task of judging its heroes. It is therefore a question to what extent
Meyer actually holds this position. He remarks (p. 16) : "We attempt
to uncover the motives which have led them" — for example,
Bismarck in 1866-— "to their decisions and to judge the correctness
of these decisions and the value {nota bene\) of their personality."
5 See, for example, Liepmann's Einleitung in das Strafrecht.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 121
In view of this formulation, one may well believe that Meyer regards
it as the highest task of history to obtain value judgmerits concerning
the "historically acting" personality. Not only his attitude toward
"biography," which is still to be mentioned, but also the highly pertinent
remarks regarding the non-equivalence of the "intrinsic value" of
historical personalities and their causal significance (pp. 50-51) make
it certain that by "value" of personality in the foregoing sentence he
means only, or can consistently only mean, the causal significance of
certain actions or certain qualities of those concrete persons which
may be positive, or also, as in the case of Friedrich Wilhelm IV,
negative, for some value judgment. But what is meant by the "judgment"
of the "correctness" of those decisions may be understood
again in a variety of ways: as either (1) a judgment of the "value"
of the goal which lay at the basis of the decision — for example, the
goal of driving Austria out of Germany from the standpoint of the
German patriot — or as (2) an analysis of those decisions with reference
to the question whether, or, rather, since history has answered
this question affinnativcly, — why the decision to go to war was at
that moment the appropriate means to achieve the goal of the
unification of Germany. We may pass over the question whether
Meyer has, in actuality, clearly distinguished in his own mind these
two ways of putting the question. In an argument regarding historical
causality, obviously only the second one is relevant; for this judgment
of the historical situation, "teleological" in form, and expressed in
terms of the categories of "means and ends," is obviously meaningful
in a presentation which takes the form, not of a book of instructions
for diplomats, but of "history," as rendering possible a judgment of
the causal historical significance of events. Such a judgment asserts
that at that moment an "opportunity" to make a decision was not
"passed over" because the "maker" of the decision, as Meyer says,
possessed the "strength of soul and mind" to maintain it in the face of
all obstacles; in this way is determined what is to be attributed causally
to that decision and its characterological and other preconditions;
in other words, the extent to which, and the sense in which, for example,
the presence of those "character qualities" constituted a "factor"
of historical "importance." Such problems causally relating a
certain historical event to the actions of concrete persons are, however,
122 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
obviously to be sharply distinguished from the question of the meaning
and significance of ethical "responsibility."
We may interpret this last expression in Eduard Meyer's writing
in the purely "objective" meaning of the causal ascription of certain
effects to the given "characterological" qualities and to the "motives"
of the acting personalities which are to be explained by these characterological
qualities and the numerous "environmental" circumstances
and by the concrete situation. But then it becomes strikingly noteworthy
that Meyer, in a subsequent passage in his treatise (pp. 44-45),
indicates that the "investigation of motives" is "secondary" for history.
The reason which is alleged, namely, that inquiry' into motives
passes beyond what is secure knowledge, that it often indeed results
in a "genetic formulation" of an action which cannot be satisfactorily
explained in the light of the available data and which action is, therefore,
to be simply accepted as a "datum," cannot, however correct
it may be in individual instances, be adhered to as a logical criterion
in view of the often equally problematic "explanations" of concrete
external natural or physical events. However that may be, Meyer's
point of view regarding inquiry into motives, in association with his
strong emphasis on the significance of the essential factor of the
"willed decision" for history and the quoted remark concerning
"responsibility" leads in any case to the suspicion that as far as
Meyer is concerned, the ethical and the causal modes of analyzing
human action — "evaluation" and "explanation" — reveal a certain
tendency to fuse with one another.*^ For quite apart from the question
as to whether one regards as adequate Windelband's formulation
that the idea of responsibility has a meaning which does not involve
that of causality and constitutes a positive basis for the normative
dignity of ethical consciousness,— in any case this formulation adequately
indicates how the world of "norms" and "values" as envisaged
from the empirical, scientific, causal point of view is delimitable
from such a standpoint.^
' What is to be included under "investigation into motives" is not clearly stated
here, but cjuite obviously it is understood that we regard the "decision" of a
"concrete personality" as the absolutely "ultimate" fact only when it appears
to us to be, in a "pragmatic" view, accidental, that is neither accessible nor
worthy of a meaningful interpretation; thus, for example, the wild decrees of
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 123
Naturally, in judging a certain mathematical proposition to be
"correct," the question as to how the knowledge of it came about
"psychologically" and whether "mathematical imagination," for instance,
is possible to the highest degree only as an accompaniment of
certain anatomical abnormalities of the "mathematical brain," does
not arise at all. The consideration that one's own ethically judged
"motive" is, according to the theory of empirical science, causally
determined does not carry any weight before the forum of conscience;
nor does the consideration that an instance of artistic bungling must
be regarded as being as much determined in its genesis as the Sistine
Chapel carry any weight in aesthetic judgment. Causal analysis provides
absolutely no value judgment^ and a value judgment is absolutely
not a causal explanation. And for this very reason the evaluation
of an event — such as, for instance, the "beauty" of a natural
phenomenon — occurs in a sphere quite different from its causal
explanation; for this reason concern on the part of history to judge
of historical actions as responsible before the conscience of history
or before the judgment seat of any god or man and all other modes
of introducing the philosophical problem of "freedom" into the
procedures of history would suspend its character as an empirical
science {Erjahrungwissenschajt) just as much as the insertion of miracles
into its causal sequences. Following Ranke, the latter is naturCzar
Paul, which were impelled by madness. However, one of the most certain
tasks of history has always consisted in understanding empirically given
"external actions" and their results in the light of historically given "conditions,"
"goals," and "means" of action. Nor does Meyer himself proceed in
any other fashion. The "investigation of motives" that is, the analysis of
what was really "sought" and the basis of this desire — is on the one hand
the means of avoiding the petering out of the analysis into an unhistorical
body of pragmatic rules, while on the other it is one of the major points of
departure of the "historical interest": we wish, indeed, among other things,
to see "how the desires" of hiunan beings are transformed in their "significance"
by the concatenation of historical "destinies."
'^
Windelband, (Uber Willensfreiheit, last chapter), selects this formulation
in particular in order to exclude the question of "freedom of the will" from
criminological discussions. However, it is a question whether it is adequate
for the criminologist since the type of casual interconnection is never entirely
irrelevant for the applicability of the norms of criminal law.
8 But we do not mean by this that the "psychological' faciliation of the
"understanding" of the value-significance of an object (e.g., a work of art)
does not gain something very essential from the causal analysis of its genesis.
We shall come back to this later.
124 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
ally rejected by Eduard Meyer (p. 20) in the name of the "sharp
distinction between historical knowledge and religious Weltanschauung"
and it would have been better, in my opinion, if he had not
allowed himself to be misled by Stammler's arguments which he cites
(p. 26; fn. 2) and which blur the equally sharp distinction between
historical knowledge and ethics. Just how disastrous this mixing up of
different standpoints can be from the methodological point of view is
demonstrated immediately when Meyer (p. 20) claims that by means
of the empirically given ideas of freedom and responsibility a "purely
individual factor" is present in historical development, which is
"never capable of being reduced to a formula" without "annihilating
its true nature" and when he then seeks to illustrate this proposition
by the high historical (causal) significance of the individually willed
decision of particular personalities. This old error® is so dangerous
precisely from the point of view of preserving the specific character
of history because it introduces problems from quite distinct fields
into history and produces the illusion that a certain (anti-deterministic)
conviction is a presupposition of the validity of the historical
method. The error in the assumption that any freedom of the
will — however it is understood — is identical with the "irrationality"
of action, or that the latter is conditioned by the former, is
quite obvious. The characteristic of "incalculability," equally great
but not greater than that of "blind forces of nature," is the privilege
of — the insane.^^ On the other hand, we associate the highest
measure of an empirical "feeling of freedom" with those actions which
we are conscious of performing rationally — i.e., in the absence of
physical and psychic "coercion," emotional "affects" and "accidental"
^ I have criticized this error in detail in my essay "Roschcr und Knies und die
logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalokonomie."
10 The actions of Czar Paul of Russia in the last stages of his mad reign arc
treated by us as not meaningful interpretable and therefore as "incalculable,"
like the storm which broke up the Spanish Armada. In the case of the
one as well as the other we forbear from the "investigation of motives," obviously
not because we interpret these events as "free" and also not because
their concrete causation must remain hidden from us—in the case of Czar Paul
pathology could perhaps supply the answer—but because they arc not sufficiently
interesting to us historically. We shall deal with this more closely
later.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 125
disturbances of the clarity of judgment, in which wc pursue a clearly
perceived end by "means" which are the most adequate in accordance
with the extent of our knowledge, i.e., in accordance with empirical
rules. If history had only to deal with such rational actions which
are "free" in this sense, its task would be immeasurably lightened:
the goal, the "motive," the "maxims" of the actor would be unambiguously
derivable from the means applied and all the irrationalities
which constitute the "personal" element in conduct would be excluded.
Since all strictly teleologically (purposefully) occurring actions
involve applications of empirical rules, which tell what the appropriate
"means" to ends are, history would be nothing but the applications
of those rules.^^ The impossibility of purely pragmatic history
is determined by the fact that the action of men is not interpretable
in such purely rational terms, that not only irrational "prejudices,"
errors in thinking and factual errors but also "temperament," "moods"
and "affects" disturb his freedom — in brief, that his action too —
to very different degrees —-partakes of the empirical "meaninglessness"
of "natural change." Action shares this kind of "irrationality"
with every natural event, and when the historian in the interpretation
of historical interconnections speaks of the "irrationality" of human
action as a disturbing factor, he is comparing historical-empirical
action not with the phenomena of nature but with the ideal of a
purely rational, i.e., absolutely purposeful, action which is also absolutely
oriented towards the adequate means.
Eduard Meyer's exposition of the categories of "chance" and "free
will" which are characteristic of historical analysis, reveals a somewhat
unclear disposition to introduce heterogeneous problems into
11 Cf. in this connection, the considerations present in "Roscher und Knies"—
strictly rational action—one could also put it thus—would be the simple and
complete "adaptation" to the given "situation." Menger's theoretical schemata,
for example, presuppose the strictly rational "adaptation" to the "market situation"
and exhibit the consequences there of in "ideal-typical" purity. History
would in fact be nothing more than a body of practical patterns (pragmatics)
of "adaptation"—which is what L. M. Hartmann would like to make it—if it
were solely an analysis of the emergence and interconnections of the particular
"free," i.e., teleologically absolutely rational, actions of single individuals.
If one excludes this teleological-rational meaning from the conception of
"adaptation," as Hartmann does, it becomes, as we shall have further occasion
to show, an absolutely indifferent idea for historical studies.
126 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
historical methodolgy; it is further to be observed that his conception
of historical causality contains striking contradictions. He emphasizes
very strongly on page 40 that historical research always seeks out
causal sequences by proceeding from effect to cause. Even this — in
Eduard Meyer's formulation^ -— can be disputed: is is from the nature
of the case quite possible to formulate in the form of an hypethesis
the effects which could have been produced by a given historical
event or by a newly ascertained historical occurrence and to verify
this hypothesis by testing it with the "facts." What is really meant, as
we shall see, is something quite different — that which has recently
been called the principle of "teleological dependence" and which dominates
history's interests in causes. Furthermore, it is of course also
unsatisfactory when the aforementioned ascent from effect to cause is
claimed to be peculiar to history'. The causal "explanattion" of a concrete
"natural event" proceeds exactly in this way and in no other.
And while the view is put forward on page 14—as we have seen—that
what has already "occurred" is for us tantamount to the absolutely
"necessary" and only what is conceived as "becoming" is to be interpreted
by us as mere "possibility," on page 40 he emphasizes the contrary
proposition, stressing the particularly problematic element in the
inference of the cause from the effect, in such a way that Eduard
Meyer himself feels called upon to avoid the term "cause" in historical
studies and, as we have seen, the "investigation of motives" becomes
discredited in his eyes.
One could try, taking Eduard Meyer's point of view, to resolve
this last contradiction by a formulation in which the problematic
element in the inference from effect to cause was seen to be grounded
in the fundamental limitations of our capacities for knowledge, while
determinism remained an ideal postulate. But he decisively rejects
this procedure too (p. 23) and follows it (p. 24) with a discussion
which once more raises serious doubts. At one time Eduard Meyer
identified, in the introduction to Die Geschichte des Altertums, the
relation between the "general" and the "particular" with that between
"freedom" and "necessity" and both of these with the relationship
^'^ He says rather unfortunately: "historical research proceeds in its inferences
from effect to cause."
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 127
between the "individual" and the "collectivity"; in consequence of
this (cf. above), the "individual" was dominant in "detail" (in the
particular instance), while the "major trends" of historical events
were governed by "law" or "rule." This view, which prevails among
many "modern" historians and which in this formulation is entirely
and basically confused is expressly withdrawn by him on page 25,
partly on the authority of Rickert, partly on the authority of von
Below. The latter had taken particularly objection to the notion of
a "development governed by law"; against Eduard Meyer's example
— that the development of Germany to a unified nation
appears to us as an "historical necessity," while the time and form
of the unification into a federal state with twenty-five members
depends, on the contrary, on the "individuality of the historically
operating factors," von Below complained: "Could it not have
happened otherwise?" Meyer is unquestionably open to this criticism.
But it appears to me to be quite easy to see — however one judges
the Meyerian formulation which is attacked by von Below — that
this criticism in any case proves too much and therefore proves
nothing. For the same objection is appropriate when we, along
with von Below and Eduard Meyer, apply the concept of "lawgoverned
development" without any qualms. The fact that a human
being has developed or will develop from a human foetus appears
to us as a /a zi; -governed development — and still it could undoubtedly
"have a different outcome" as a result of external "accidents" or
"pathological" inheritance. In the polemic against the theorists of
"development" it is obviously only a question of correctly perceiving
and logically delimiting the meaning of the concept of "development"
— the concept obviously can not simply be eliminated by such
arguments as the foregoing. Eduard Meyer himself is the best instance
of this contention. For it is the case that only two pages later (p. 27)
he again proceeds in a footnote which designates the concept of
"middle ages" as "a clearly defined concept," in accordance with a
schema set forth in the "Introduction" which he had repudiated: and
in the text, he says that the word "necessity" in history signifies only
that the "probability" of an historical consequence following from
given conditions, attains a very high level, that the whole development
so to speak, presses on to a single outcome. He did not wish, more-
128 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
ever, to say more than that by his remark about the unification of
Germany. And when he emphasizes in this connection that there
was, despite everything, a possibility of the event's non-occurrence,
we wish to recall that he had stressed in connection with astronomical
calculations that they could possibly be "disturbed" by wandering
heavenly bodies. There is indeed in this respect no distinction from
particular natural events, and even in explanations in the sphere of
nature,-"^*^ whenever it is a question of concrete events, the judgment of
necessity is by no means the only or even merely the major form in
which the category of causality can appear. One will not go wrong
with the hypothesis that Eduard Meyer arrived at his distrust of the
concept of "development" through his discussions with J. VVellhausen
in which it was essentially (but not only) a matter of the following
contrast: whether to interpret the "development" of Judaism as one
which had occurred essentially "from the inside outwards" ("evolutionalistically")
or as one that had been conditioned by certain concrete
historical forces entering from the "outside," in particular, the
imposition of "laws" by the Persian kings out of considerations deriving
from Persian politics and which are not related to the intrinsic
characteristics of the Jews ("epigenetically"). However that may be,
it is in no case no improvement on the formulation used in the Introduction
when (p. 46) "the general" appears as "the essentially (?)
negative," or more sharply formulated, the "limiting" "condition"
which set the "boundaries," within which the infinite possibilities of
historical development lie, while the question as to which of these
possibilities becomes a "reality"^* depends on the "higher (?) individual
factors of historical life." Thereby, the "general" {das "Allgemeine")
— i.e., not the "general milieu" which is wrongly confused
with the "general" ("generellcn") but rather the rule which is an
abstract concept—is hypostasized into an effective force operating
^3 It would lead too far afield to examine this problem here in more detail.
Cf. my "Roscher und Knics."
1* This formulation recalls certain modes of thought which were common in
the Russian sociological school (Mikhailowski Karcyev, ct al.), which are reviewed
in Kistiakowski's essay in the "Problems of Idealism" (edited by
Novgorodzev, Moscow, 1902) concerning the "Russian sociological school"
and the category of possibility in the problems of the social sciences. We
shall return to this essay later.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 129
behind the historical scene, and this ignores the elementary fact —
which Eduard Meyer stresses clearly and sharply at other places
— that reality is constituted only by the concrete and particular.
This dubious formulation of the relations between the "general"
and the "particular" is by no means peculiar to Eduard Meyer and
it is by no means confined to historians of his stamp. On the contrary,
it lies at the basis of the popular conception which is nonetheless
shared, by many "modern" historians — but not by Eduard Meyer
— which maintains that in order to establish the study of history
in a rational manner as a "science of the individual," it is necessary
to establish the similarities and identities of patterns of human development,
in which case the particularities and the incomparable and
unanalyzable elements remain as a residue, or as Breysig once said,
"the finest flowers." This conception which comes closer to actual
historical practice represents an advance as contrasted with the naive
belief in the vocation of history to become a "systematic science."
But it, too, is very naive in its own way. The attempt to understand
"Bismarck" in his historical significance by leaving out of account
everything which he has in common with other men and keeping
what is "particular" to him would be an instructive and amusing
exercise for beginners. One would in that case — assuming naturally,
as one always does in logical discussions, the ideal completeness of
the materials — preserve, for example, as one of those "finest flowers"
his "thumbprint," that most specific indication of "individuality"
which has been discovered by the criminal police and the loss of
which for history would be irreplaceable. And if to this argument it
were indignantly countered that "naturally" only "spiritual" (geistigc)
or "psychological" qualities and events can be taken into consideration
as "historical," his daily life, were we to know it "exhaustively,"
would ofTer us an infinity of expressive traits which would never be
found in this blend and pattern in any other person in the world, and
which would not exceed his thumbprints in their interest. If it is
further objected that quite "obviously," as far as science is concerned,
only the historically "significant" constituents of Bismarck's
life are to be considered, the logical answer would be: that that very
"obviousness" involves the decisive problem since it raises the question
as to what is the logical criterion of the historically "significant"
130 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
constituent parts.
This exercise in subtraction of the common from the unique —
assuming the absolute completeness of the data — would never be
brought to an end even in the most remote future, and there would
still remain, after subtraction of an infinity of "common qualities,"
a further infinity of constituent parts; even aften an eternity of the
most energetic subtraction from this latter infinity of particular parts,
not a single further step would have been taken to answer the question
as to what is historically "essential" among these particularities.
This \vould be the sole insight which would emerge from an attempt
to perform this exercise. The other insight is that this operation of
subtraction presupposes such a perfect grasp of the causal course
of events, as" no science could aspire to even as an ideal goal. As a
matter of fact, every "comparison" in the historical sphere presupposes
that a selection has already been made through reference to
cultural "significances" and that this selection positively determines
the goal and direction of the attribution of causal agency while it
excludes a rich infinity of "general" as well as "particular" elements
in the data. The comparison of "analogous" events is to be considered
as a means of this imputation of causal agency, and indeed, in my
view, one of the most important means and one which is not used to
anywhere near the proper extent. We shall deal later with its logical
meaning.
Eduard Meyer does not share, as his remark on page 48 which
is still to be discussed shows, the erroneous view that the particular
as such is the subject matter of history' and his comments on the significance
of the general in history to the effect that "rules" and concepts
are only "means" and "presuppositions" of historical work
(p. 29 middle) is as we shall sec logically right in the main. It is
only his formulation which we have criticized above that is doubtful
and it reveals the same tendency as the error which we have just
criticized.
Now in spite of all these criticisms the professional historian will
retain the impression that the usual kernel of "truth" is contained
in the views which are here criticized. That this is the case goes
without saying for an historian of such distinction who discusses his
own procedure. Indeed, he has come quite close many times to the
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 131
logically correct formulation of the elements of truth which are
contained in his arguments. For instance, on page 27, top, where it
is said of "developmental stages" that they are "concepts" which can
serve as guiding threads for the discovery and ordering of facts, and
particularly in the numerous passages where he employs the category
of "possibility." It is here however that the logical problem really
begins; we must discuss the question of how the ordering of historical
events occurs by means of the concept of development, and what is
the logical meaning of the "category of possibility" and the way in
which it is applied in the elaboration of historical interconnections.
Since Eduard Meyer failed to confront these issues he was able to
"feel" what is correct in regard to the role which the "laws" governing
events play in historical research, but he was not able — as it
seems to me — to give it an adequate formulation. This task will
be undertaken in a special section of these studies (II). Here we
shall concern ourselves, after these necessarily essentially negative remarks
against Eduard Meyer's methodological formulation, first with
the treatment of discussions of the problem of what is the "object"
of history, which is dealt with in the second (pp. 34-44) and third
(pp. 54-56) parts of his essay — a question on which the considerations
just presented have indeed already touched on.
We, too, may along with Eduard Meyer also formulate the question
as follows: "Which of the events on which we have information
are 'historical'?" He answers it at first in quite general form: "that is
historical which has consequences and which has occurred." This
means that the "historical" is that which is causally important in a
concrete individual situation. We disregard all other questions which
are relevant here in order to point out that Eduard Meyer on page 37
gives up this conception which he has just formulated on page 36.
It is clear to him that —as he says —"even if we were to confine
ourselves to that which produces effects," "the number of particular
events would still remain infinite." He rightly asks: what governs
"the selection which every historian makes among them?" And he
answers, "historical interest." He adds, however, after some considerations
with which we shall deal later, that there are no absolute
norms of historical interest and he elucidates this thesis in such a way
that, as we previously mentioned, he once more renounces his re-
132 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
striction of the "historical" to the "effective." On Rickert's illustrative
remark "that . . . Friedrich Wilhelm IV turned down the German
crown is an 'historical' event but it is entirely indifferent which tailor
made his coats" he comments: "the tailor in question might of course
always remain indifferent for political history but wc can easily imagine
taking an historical interest in him in connection for instance
with the history of fashions or of the tailoring industry or of prices,
etc." This is certainly to the point — although Eduard Meyer can
scarcely overlook on further reflection that the "interest" which we
take in these different cases involves quite considerable differences
in logical structure and that the failure to bear these differences in
mind leads to the danger of confusing two fundamentally different
but often identified categories: the ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi.
Since the case of the tailor is not entirely unambiguous,
let us make the distinction in question clear with an illustration which
exhibits this confusion in a more explicit fashion.
K. Breysig in his essay on "Die Entstehung dcs Staats . . . bei
Tlinkit und Iroskesen"-*^^ attempts to show that certain events which
occur among these tribes, which he interprets as the "origin of the
state from the kinship constitution" ( "Geschlechterverfassung" ) are
"important as representative of a species"; i.e., in other words, they
represent the "typical" form of the formation of the state — and possess
on that account "validity ... of almost universal significance."
Now the situation obviously — on the assumption of the correctness
of Breysig's factual assertions — is are follows : the fact of
the emergence of these Indian "states" and the way in which it
occurred remains of extraordinarily slight significance for the causal
nexus of the development of world history. No single "important"
fact of the later political or cultural development [Gestaltung) of
the world is influenced by it, i.e., can be related to it as a cause. For
the formation of the political and cultural situation in the contemporary
United States, the mode of origin of those Indian states and probably
their very existence as well is "indifferent"; i.e., there is no
^^ Schmollers Jahrbuch 1904, pp. 483 ff. Naturally I do not enter here in
any way into the question of the substantive value of the work; on the contrary,
the correctness of all of Breysig's assertions will be assumed in this as in
all the illustrations which I cite.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 133
demonstrable causal connection between the two while the aftereffects
of certain decisions of Themistocles are still visible today —
however disappointingly this may block the attempt to construct an
imposing unified scheme of "evolutionary historical development." On
the other hand—if Breysig is right—the significance of the propositions
produced by his analyses concerning the process of the formation of
those states would, in his opinion, be epoch-making for our knowledge
of the way in which states arise in general. If Breysig's view of the
course of development as "typical" were correct and if it constituted
a new addition to knowledge — we would then be in a position to
formulate certain concepts which quite apart from their value for
the conceptualization of the theory of the state, could at least be
applied as heuristic devices in the causal interpretation of other historical
developments. In other words, as a real historical factor, that
specific development is of no significance, but as supplying a possible
"principle of knowledge" his analysis is uncommonly significant
(according to Breysig) . On the other hand, to have knowledge of
Themistocles' decisions, for example, signifies nothing for "psychology"
or any other conceptualizing science; the fact that statesman "could"
in the situation in question decide in that manner is intelligible to
us without the aid of a "science constituted by laws" and our understanding
of that fact is indeed the presupposition of our knowledge
of the concrete causal nexus but it implies no enrichment of our generalized
knowledge.
Let us take an example from the sphere of "nature": those particular
X-rays which Roentgen saw flashing from his screen have left
certain concrete eflfects which according to the law of the conservation
of energy must still be acting somewhere in the cosmic system. But
the "significance" of those particular rays in Roentgen's laboratory
does not lie in their character as cosmic real causes. What happened
in Roentgen's laboratory, just like every experiment, has importance
only as the ground for inferring certain "laws" of the occurrence of
events. -"^^
16 This does not mean that these particular Roentgen rays could not figure as
"historical" events: in a history of physics. The latter could concern itself
among other things with the "accidental" circumstances which brought about
the complex of factors in Roentgen's laboratory on those particular days, which
134 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
This is, of course, exactly how the situation stands in those cases
which Eduard Meyer cites in a footnote to the passages which we
are criticizing here (p. 37, fn. 2). He recalls there that "the most
indifferent person whom we come to know by chance (in inscriptions
or documents) acquires historical interest because we can come to
know the circumstances of the past through them." And the same
confusion occurs when — if my memory does not fail me — Breysig
(in a passage which I cannot locate at the moment) believes that he
can completely destroy the argument that the selection of subject
matter in historical research is oriented towards the "significant," the
individually "important," by reference to the fact, that research has
achieved many of its most important results from the use of "clay
fragments" and the like. Similar arguments are very popular
today and their affinity with Friedrich Wilhelm IV's "coat" and the
"insignificant persons" in Eduard Meyer's inscriptions is quite apparent
— as is that confusion which is once again under discussion here.
For as we have said, Breysig's "fragments of clay" and Eduard Meyer's
"insignificant persons" are not — any more than the particular X-rays
in Roentgen's laboratory — integrated as causal links in the historical
sequence; rather, certain of their characteristic properties are means
of ascertaining certain historical facts which facts in their turn
become important for "the elaboration of concepts", i.e., they can
occasioned the radiation and which thereby led causally to the discovery of
the "law" in question. It is clear that the logical status of those rays would,
in this context, be completely changed. This is possible because these events
play a role here which is rooted in values ("the progress of science"). It
might perhaps be asserted that this logical distinction is only a result of having
moved into the area of the subject matter of the "Geisteswissenschaften,"
that the cosmic effects of those particular rays have therefore been left out of
consideration. It is, however, irrelevant whether the particular "evaluated"
object for which these rays were causally "significant" is "physical" or "psychic"
in nature, provided only that it "means" something for us, i.e., that
it is "evaluated." Once we assume the factual possibility of knowledge
directed towards that object, the particular cosmic (physical, chemical, etc.)
effects of those particular rays could (theoretically) become "historical facts"
—
but only if—lines of causation led from them to some particular result which
was an "historical individual," i.e., was "evaluated" by us as universally significant
in its particular individual character (individueUen Eigenart) . Such an
attempt would be meaningless merely on the ground that such a relationship
of the rays to a universally significant object is in no way discernible even if
the causal lines could actually be established.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 135
themselves become heuristic instruments for the estabUshment of the
generic "character" of certain artistic "epochs" or for the causal
interpretation of concrete historical interconnections. This division
of the logical use of the data given by cultural reality^''' into ( 1
) conceptuaization
with the illustrative use of "particular facts" as "typical"
instances of an abstract "concept," i.e., as an heuristic instrument
on the one hand — and (2) integration of the "particular fact" as
a link, i.e., as a real causal factor into a real, hence concrete context
with the use among other things of the products of conceptualization
on the one hand as excmplificatory and on the other as heuristic devices
— entails the distinction between what Rickert called the "natural-scientific"
and Windelband the "nomothetic" procedure (ad 1)
and the logical goal of the "historical cultural sciences" (ad 2). It
also implies the only justified sense in which history can be called a
science of reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) . For the meaning of
history as a science of reality can only be that it treats particular elements
of reality not merely as heuristic instruments but as the objects
of knowledge, and particular causal connections not as premises of
knowledge but as real causal factors. We shall, moreover, see how
inaccurate is the naive popular view that history is the "mere" description
of a pre-existent reality or the simple reproduction of
"facts."i8
Rickert's "tailor" whom Eduard Meyer criticizes is in the same
position as the clay fragments and the "insignificant persons" of the
inscriptions. The fact that a certain tailor delivered a certain coat
to the king is prima facie of quite inconsequential causal significance,
even for the cu\tura\-historical causal interconnection of the development
of "fashion" and the "tailoring industry." It would cease to be
so only when as a result of this particular delivery historical effects
^'''Here the author wrote on the margin of the proofs: A step in reasoning has
been missed here. Add: that a fact where it is considered as an instance of
a class-concept (GattungsbegrifT) is a heuristic instrument {Erkenntnis mittel)
.
But not every heuristic instrument is a class concept.
1^ The term "science of reality" in the sense in which it is used here is perfectly
adequate for the essential nature of history. The misunderstanding
which contains the popular interpretation of this term as referring to a
simple presuppositionless "description" has been dealt with adequately by
Rickert and Simmel.
136 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
were produced, e.g., if the personality of this tailor, or the fortunes
of his enterprise were causally "significant" from some standpoint for
the transformation of fashion or industrial organization and if this
historical role had been causally affected by the delivery of that very
coat.
As an heuristic device for the ascertainment of fashion, etc., on
the other hand, the style of Friedrich Wilhelm IV's coats and the
fact that they came from certain (e.g., Berlin) workshops can certainly
achieve as much "significance" as anything else which is accessible
to us as material for the discovery of the fashion of that period.
The coats of the king are, in this case, to be considered as instances
of a c/fl^5-concept, which is being elaborated as an heuristic instrument
— the rejection of the Kaiser's crown, on the other hand, with
which they are compared, is to be viewed as a concrete link in an
historical situation as real effect and cause in a specific real series
of changes. These are absolutely fundamental logical distinctions
and they will always remain so. And however much these two
absolutely distinct standpoints become intertwined in the practice of
the student of culture — this always happens and is the source of the
most interesting methodological problems — no one will ever succeed
in understanding the logical character of history if he is unable to
make this distinction in a clearcut manner.
Eduard Meyer has however presented two mutually incompatible
viewpoints regarding the mutual relationship of these two logically
distinct categories of "historical reality." On the one hand he confuses,
as we have seen, the "historical interest" in the historically
"effective," i.e., the real causal links in historical interconnections
(rejection of the Kaiser's crown) with those facts (Friedrich Wilhelm
IV's coat, the inscriptions) which can become important for
the historian as heuristic instruments. On the other hand, however
—
and now we shall speak of this — the distinction of the "historically
effective" from all other objects of our actual or possible knowledge
is so sharpened that he makes assertions about the limits of the scientific
"interest" of the historian, the realization of which to almost
any degree in his own great work would necessarily be deeply regretted
by its admirers. He says (p. 48), "I have long believed that
in the selection which the historian must make, what is characteristic
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 137
(i.e., what is characteristically singular and which distinguishes an
institution or an individuality from all other analogous and similar
ones) is decisive. This is undeniably the case but it is of concern
for history only insofar as we are able to grasp the individuality of
a culture by its characteristic features. Thus the historian's selectivity
is historically always only a means which renders the culture's
historical effectiveness . . . conceivable to us." This is, as all the
previous considerations show, entirely correct, as are the conclusions
drawn therefrom: that the popular formulation of the question of
the "significance" of the particular and of personalities for history is
poorly put, that the "personality" "enters into" history, by no means
in its totality but only in its causal relevance for the historical situation
as this latter is established by the science of history, that the
historical significance of a particular personality as a causal factor
and the general "human" significance of the same personality in the
light of its "intrinsic value" have nothing to do with one another, and
that the very "inadequacies" of a personality in a decisive position
can be causally significant. This is all perfectly right. And yet the
question still remains whether — or let us rather say at once — in
which sense is it right to assert that the analysis of the content of
culture — from the historical viewpoint —
can aim only to make the
cultural events under consideration intelligible in their eflfectiveness.
The logical importance of this question is disclosed as soon as we
consider the conclusions which Eduard Meyer draws from his thesis.
At first (p. 48) he concludes that "existing circumstances in themselves
are never the object of history but rather become such when
they become historically efTective." A work of art, a literary product,
an institution of constitutional law, mores, etc., cannot possibly be
analyzed in "all their aspects" in an historical work (including art
and literary history) ; nor is it appropriate — since in doing this, elements
must be considered which do "not achieve historical effectiveness";
while on the other hand the historian must include in his
work "details which are of quite subordinate status in a system" (e.g.,
of constitutional law) because of their causal significance. He concludes
further from the aforementioned principle of historical selection
that biography is a "literary" and not an historical discipline.
Why? Its object is the particular given personality in its total intrin-
138 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
sic nature and not as an historically effective factor — that it was
historically effective is here merely the presupposition, the reason for
its having a biography devoted to it. As long as the biography is
only a biography and not the history of the age of its hero, it cannot
fulfill the task of history: the presentation of an historial event. To
this assertion, one responds with the question: Why is this special
status accorded to "personalities"? Do "events" like the Battle of
Marathon or the Persian Wars in general "belong" in their "totality"
in an historical narration, described in all their specimina fortitudinis
in the style of the Homeric recital? Obviously even in the case of
the instances just mentioned only those events and conditions belong
in an historical narration which are decisive for historical causal
connections. This has been so in principle, at least, ever since heroic
myths and history began to follow divergent paths. And now what
is the case with regard to "biography"? It is, whatever one may
say, obviously false ( or a rhetorical hyperbole) to assert that "all
the details ... of the external and inner life of its hero" belong in
a biography, however much the Goethe-research which Eduard
Meyer has in mind seeks to give that impression. It is simply a
question here of collections of materials which aim to include everything
which can possibly acquire significance for Goethe's life-history,
be it as a direct link in a causal series — i.e., as an historically relevant
fact — or be it as a means of establishing historically relevant
facts, i.e., as a "source material." In a Goethe biography which meets
high scholarship standards, however, only those facts which are significant
obviously belong as elements in the presentation.
Here we of course come up against an ambiguity in the meaning
of this word ("significant") which requires logical analysis and which
analysis, as we shall see, can disclose the "correct kernel" of Eduard
Meyer's views as well as the defect in the formulation of his theory
of the historically "effective" as the object of history.
In order to see the various logical standpoints from which the
"facts" of cultural life may be scientifically considered, let us take an
example: Goethe's letters to Frau von Stein. It is not — let us clear
this up in advance — the perceivable "fact" before us, i.e., the written
paper, which is treated as "historical." This paper is rather only
the means of knowing the other fact, namely, that Goethe had the
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 139
sentiments expressed there, wrote them down and sent them to
Frau von Stein, and received answers from her, the approximate
meaning of which can be inferred from the correctly interpreted
"content" of Goethe's letters. This "fact" which is disclosed by an
"interpretation" of the "meaning" of the letters — undertaken ultimately
by "scientific" procedures — is in truth what we have in mind
when we refer to these "letters." This fact may (1) be integrated
directly as such in an historical causal context: for example, the
ascetic restraint of those years which was bound up with a passion
of unheard of force obviously left profound traces in Goethe's development
which were not extinguished even when he was transformed
under the Southern skies. To investigate these effects in Goethe's
"personality," to trace their influence in his creative work, and to
"interpret" them causally by showing their connection with the events
of those years to the extent that this is possible, are among the least
questionable tasks of literary history. The facts of which those letters
are evidence are "historical" facts, i.e., as we have seen, are real
links in a causal chain. Now let us assume — we do not raise here
the question as to the probability of this or any other assumptions
that we may make henceforward — that it may be positively demonstrated
in some way that those experiences had no influence whatsoever
on Goethe's personal and literar)' development; that is, that
absolutely none of his traits or productions which "interest" us were
influenced by them. In that case, despite their causal ineffectiveness,
these experiences could (2) gain our interest as heuristic means; they
could present something "characteristic"— as it is usually said — of
Goethe's historical uniqueness. This means, however, that we could
perhaps — whether we could really do it is not at issue — derive
from them insights into a type of conduct and outlook on life which
were peculiar to him throughout his life or for a substantial period
and which influenced markedly his literary expressions and personal
traits which interest us historically. The "historical" fact which
would then be integrated as a real link in the causal nexus of his
"life" would be that "outlook on life"— a conceptual complex of
grouped qualities constituted by the inherited personal qualities
of Goethe and those which were acquired through education, milieu
and in the fortunes of his life and (perhaps) by the deliberately ac-
140 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
quired "maxims" according to which he Hved and which played a
part in the determination of his conduct and his creations. The experiences
with Frau von Stein would indeed in this case — since
that "outlook on life" is a collective concept {bcgriffliches Kollektivum)
which is "expressed" in particular events — be real components
of an "historical" fact. But they obviously would not come up for
our consideration—under the assumptions made above—essentially as
such, but rather as "symptoms" of that outlook on life, i.e., as heuristic
means. Their logical relationship to the object which is to be known
has therewith undergone a shift.
Let us now further assume that this, too, is not the case. Those
experiences contain nothing which \vould in any respect be characteristic
of Goethe in contrast with other contemporaries; instead they
correspond completely to something which is thoroughly "typical" of
the pattern of life of certain German social circles of that period.
In that case they would not tell us anything new for our historical
knowledge of Goethe, but they could under certain circumstances
probably (3) attract our interest as a conveniently usable paradiom
of that type, as, in other words, a means of knowing the "characteristic"
features of the mental and spiritual attitudes of those circles.
The particular features of the attitudes which are "typical"— on the
basis of our assumptions — of that group in the past and that pattern
of life which was its expression, would, in its contrast with the pattern
of life of other epochs, nations, and social strata, be the "historical"
fact to be integrated into a cultural-historical causal context as
real cause and effect; it would then have to be causally "interpreted"
with respect to its difference from the Italian cicishea and the like in
the light of a "history of German morals and manners" or to the extent
that such national divergences are considered non-existent, in the light
of a general history of the morals and manners of that age.
Let us now suppose further that the content of these letters is not
useful even for this purpose, and that on the contrary it is shown that
phenomena which are in certain "essential" respects of the same sort
regularly occur under certain cultural conditions — in other words,
that in these respects those experiences (of Goethe) reveal no peculiar
features of German or Ottocento culture but rather certain features
common to all cultures under certain conditions which are capable
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 141
of being formulated in precise concepts. In this event then it would
(4) be the task of a "cultural psychology" or a "social psychology,"
for instance, to determine by analysis, isolating abstraction and generalization,
the conditions under which these common components
emerge, to "interpret" the basis of the regular sequence and to express
the "rule" so achieved as a genetic c/ai^-concept {Gattungsbegriff)
.
These thoroughly general (Gattungsmdssige) components of Goethe's
experiences which are highly irrelevant as regards his particular and
unique features would, then, be of interest simply as means of attaining
this class-concept {Gattunsbegriff)
.
And finally, (5) it must be regarded a priori as possible that those
"experiences" contain nothing at all which is characteristic of any
stratum of the population or any cultural epoch. But even in the
absence of all occasion for a "cultural-scientific" {Kulturwissenschaftlicher")
interest, it is conceivable — whether it is actually so is once
again indifferent here — that a psychiatrist interested in the psychology
of love-relationships might view them from a variety of "useful"
viewpoints, as an "ideal-typical" illustration of certain ascetic "disturbances,"
just as Rousseau's Confessions, for example, are of interest
to the specialist in nervous diseases. Naturally, the possibility here
must be taken into account — that the letters are to be considered
as serving all these various scientific purposes — of course, the variety
does not entirely exhaust the logical possibilities — through the various
components of their content, as well as serving various purposes
through the same components.•'^^
Upon reviewing the foregoing analysis in reverse order, we see that
these letters to Frau von Stein, i.e., the content which can be derived
from them with regard to Goethe's utterances and experience, acquire
"meaning" in the following ways: (a) in the last two cases (4, 5) as
instances of a class, and hence as heuristic means (Erkenntnismittel)
to the disclosure of their general nature (No. 4, 5) ;
(b) as "characteristic"
components of a composite phenomenon (Kollektivum) and
on that account as a heuristic means to the disclosure of its particular
^9 This will obviously not prove, for instance, that logic is wrong in rigorously
distinguishing these various standpoints which can be found within one and
the same scientific presentation. Yet this is the assumption of many wrongheaded
objections to Rickert's views.
142 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
{individuellen) features (No. 2, 3) ;"° (c) as a causal component of
an historical nexus {Xusammenhang) (No. 1). In the cases listed
under (a) (No. 4 and 5), "significance" for history exists only insofar
as the class concept {Gattungsbegriff) , constructed with the aid of
these particular instances, can become important under certain conditions
— to be dealt with later — in checking an historical demonstration.
On the other hand, when Eduard Meyer confines the
range of the "historical" to the "effective"— i.e., to No. 1 (c) of
the foregoing list — it cannot possibly mean that the consideration of
the second category of cases of "significance" under (b) lies outside
the purview of history, that, in other words, facts which are not themselves
components of historical causal sequences but which only serve
to disclose the facts which are to be integrated into such causal sequences,
e.g., such components of Goethe's correspondence which
"illustrate" for instance those "particular features" of Goethe which
are decisive for his literary production or which "illustrate" those
aspects of the culture of the society of the Ottocento which are essential
for the development of morals and manners. In other words, it
cannot possibly mean that these facts which serve to produce the kind
of knowledge just referred to should be once and for all disregarded
by history — if not (as in No. 2) by the "history" of Goethe, then by
a "history of manners" of the 18th century (No. 3). Meyer's own
work must be carried on continuously with such heuristic means.
What is meant here can only be that, in any such work, the "components
of an historical nexus" (Tusammenhang) are a different
thing from an "heuristic means." But neither "biography" nor "classical
studies" uses such "characteristic" details as the aforementioned
components of Goethe's correspondence in any way contrary to this
distinction. It is obvious that this is not the stumbling block for
Eduard Meyer.
"0 The discussion of these special cases will concern us more closely in a subsequent
section. For this reason we deliberately leave untouched here the
question as to the extent to which it is to be viewed as something logically
unique. We wish to state here, only because of its greater certainty, that it
naturally does not in any way obscure the logical distinction between the historical
and nomothetic uses of "facts," since in any case, the cojirrete fact is
not being used here "historically" in the sense adhered to in this discussion,
namely as a link in a concrete causal series.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES. 143
Now, however, a type of "significance" greater than all of those
already analyzed comes before us. Those experiences of Goethe — to
adhere to our example — are "significant" for us not only as "cause"
or as "heuristic means" but — quite apart from whether we obtain
from them some new and hitherto completely unkown knowledge of
Goethe's outlook on life, the culture of the 18th century, or the "typical"
course of cultural events, etc., and quite apart from whether
they have had any sort of causal influence on his development — the
uniquely characteristic content of these letters is also an object of
valuation {Bewertung) for us — just as it is and without and strained
search for any "meanings" which lie outside it and which are not
contained in it. The letters would be such an object of valuation
even ir nothing else at all was known of their author. Now what primarily
interests us here involves two points: first, the fact that this
"valuation" is connected with the incomparable, the unique, the irreplaceable
literary element in the object and — this is the second point
— that this valuation of the object in its characteristic uniqueness
{ijidividuellen Eigenart) supplies the reason why the object becomes
an object of reflection and of — at this point we will deliberately avoid
saying "scientific"— intellectual treatment, that is, it becomes an
object of interpretation. This "interpretation""-^ can take two paths
which in actual practice almost always merge but which are, however,
to be sharply distinguished from one another logically. Interpretation
can and does become first "value-interpretation" {Wertinterpretation),
i.e., it teaches us to "understand" the intellectual, psychological
and spiritual {geistigen) content of that correspondence; it develops
and raises to the level of explicit "evaluation" that which we
"feel" dimly and vaguely. For this purpose, interpretation is not at
all required to enunciate or to "suggest" a value judgment. What it
actually "suggests" in the course of analysis are rather various possible
relationships of the object to values {Wertheziehungen des Objektes).
The "attitude" which the evaluated object calls forth in us
need not be a positive one : thus in the case of Goethe's relations with
Frau von Stein, the usual modern sexual philistine, for example, just
21 Here the German word Interpretation is used — and is equated by Weber
with Deutung which is the term he usually employs in the text and which is
<»lw>vs translated here by "interpretation." (E.A.S.)
144 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
as well as, let us say, a Catholic moralist, would take an essentially
negative attitude, if at all an "understanding" one. Or when we successively
consider Karl Marx's Kapital, or Faust, or the ceiling of the
Sistine chapel or Rousseau's Conjessions, or the experiences of St.
Theresa, or Mme. Roland or Tolstoi, or Rabelais, or Marie Bashkirtseff,
or the Sermon on the Mount as objects of interpretation,
there confronts us an infinite multiplicity of "evaluative" attitudes.
The "interpretation" of these very different objects shares — if the
interpretation is thought to be worthwhile and is undertaken, which
we assume here for our purposes — only the formal feature that the
meaning of interpretation consists in disclosing to us the possible "evaluative
standpoints" and "evaluative approaches," Interpretation
imposes a certain valuation as the only "scientific" one only where,
as in the case of the intellectual content of Karl Marx's Kapital, for
instance, norms (in that case, of thought) come into account. But
here, too, the objectively valid "valuation" of the object (in this case,
the logical "correctness" of the Marxian forms of thought) are not
necessarily involved in the purpose of an "interpretation." And such
an imposition of a valuation would be, where it is a question not of
"norms" but of "cultural values," a task completely transcending the
domain of "interpretation." One can, without any logical or substantive
contradiction — that is all that is involved here — reject as inherently
without validity all the products of the poetic and artistic culture
of antiquity or the religious attitude of the Sermon on the Mount just
as well as that mixture — contained in our example of the letters to
Frau von Stein — of glowing passion on the one side, asceticism on
the other with all those flowers of emotional life which are so superlatively
fine from our standpoint. That negative "interpretation" would
not, however, be at all "valueless" for the person making it for such
an interpretation can despite its negative character, indeed even because
of it, provide "knowledge" for him in the sense that it, as we
say, extends his "inner life," and his "mental and spiritual {geistigen)
horizon," and makes him capable of comprehending and thinking
through the possibilities and nuances of life-patterns as such and to
develop his own self intellectually, aesthetically, and ethically (in the
widest sense) in a differentiated way — or in other words, to make
his "psyche," so to speak, more "sensitive to values." The "interpre-
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 145
tation" of intellectual and mental {geistigcn) , aesthetic or ethical creations
has in this respect the cfTccts of the latter, and the assertion that
"history" in a certain sense is an "art" has in this respect its jutifiablc
"kernel of truth," no less than the designation of the cultural and
humanistic sciences {"Gcistcswissenschaften") as "subjectivizing." In
this function of interpretation, however, we reach the outermost edge
of what can still be called the "elaboration of the empirical by
thought"; there is here no longer a concern with "historical work" in
the proper and distinctive sense of the word.
It is probably clear that by what he called the "philosophical consideration
of the past," Eduard Meyer meant this type of interpretation
which has its point of departure in what are in essence atemporal
relations of "historical" objects, i.e., their axiological validity {Wertgeltung)
and which teaches us to "understand" them. This is indicated
by his definition of this type of scientific activity (p. 55) which
according to him, "places the products of history in the present and
hence deals with them as finished" treating the object, "not as becoming
and having historical efTects but as being," and therefore in contrast
with "history," treating it in "all its aspects" ; it aims, according
to Eduard Meyer, at an "exhaustive interpretation of particular creations,"
primarily in the fields of literature and art, but also as he
expressly adds, of political and religious institutions, manners and
attitudes, and "ultimately of the entire culture of an epoch treated
as a unity." Naturally, this type of "interpretation" has nothing
"philological" about it in the sense appropriate to the specialized
linguistic disciplines. The interpretation of the textual-linguistic
"meaning" of a literary object and the interpretation of "mental,
intellectual and spiritual (geistigen) content," its "meaning" in this
value-oriented sense of the word may in fact proceed hand in hand,
ever so frequently and with good reason. They are nonetheless logically
fundamentally difTerent procedures; the one, the textual -linguistic
interpretation, is the elementary prerequisite — not in regard to the
value and intensity of the mental work which it requires but with
respect to its logical role — for all types of the scientific treatment and
utilization of "source materials." It is, from the historical standpoint,
a technical means of verifying "facts"; it is a "tool" of history (as well
as of numerous other disciplines) . "Interpretation" in the sense of
146 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
"value-analysis" {Wrrianalyse) — as we shall designate in ad hoc
fashion the procedure which has just been described above^'^ — does
not in any case stand in the same relationship to history. Now, since
this type of "interpretation" is oriented neither towards the disclosure
of facts which arc "causally" relevant for an historical context nor
toward the abstraction of "typical" components which are usable for
the construction of a class concept (Gattunsbe^riff) , since in contrast
with these it rather considers its object, i.e., to keep Eduard Meyer's
example, the "total culture," let us say, of the high point of Hellenistic
civilization as a unity —"for its own sake" and makes it intelligible
in its "value-relations." Hence it is not subsumable under any of the
other categories of knowledge, the direct or indirect relations of
which to "liistory" were prc\iously discussed. This type of interpretation
can not, in particular, be properly deemed as an "auxiliary" to
history —^ as Eduard Meyer (p. 54, bottom) views his "philology"
—
for it indeed treats its objects from viewpoints quite other than history
does. If the distinction between the two kinds of interpretation
were to be sought only in this, that the one (i.e., value-analysis)
treats its objects "statically" as finished products while the other
(history) treats its objects "developmentally," the former cutting a
cross section through events, the latter a longitudinal section, then it
would assuredly be of quite minor significance. Even the historian,
e.g., Eduard Meyer in his own works, must in order to weave
his design, take his point of departure in certain "given" beginnings
which he describes "satically" [zustdndlich) and he will, in the
(oursc of his exposition, repeatedly group the "results" of "developments"
into "static" cross sections. A monographic presentation, for
instance, of the social composition of the Athenian ccclesia at a certain
point of time for the purpose of helping to make clear its own
causal-historical conditions on the one hand and its effect on the
political "situation" in Athens on the other, is certainly, even according
to Eduard Meyer, an "historical" work. The distinction in
question seems for Eduard Meyer rather to lie in the fact that "philological"
(i.e., "value-analytical") work can and indeed normally
22 This is done essentially to distinguish this type of "interpretation" from that
which is only tcxual-linguistic. The fact that this distinction docs not invariably
actually occur in practice should not impede the logical distinction.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 147
will concern itself with facts which are relevant to history but that
tog'lher with these, it will have occasion to concern itself with facts
which are quite different from those dealt with by history. "Valueanalysis
deals with facts which are neither (1) themselves links in an
historical causal sequence, nor (2) usable as heuristic means for
disclosing facts of category ( 1
) . In other words, the facts of valueanalysis
stand in none of the relations to history which have been
hitherto considered. In what other relations then do they stand, or
does this value-analytical approach have no relationship whatsoever
to any type of historical knowledge?
To get ahead with our discussion, let us turn to our example of
the letters of Frau von Stein and let us take as a second example Karl
Marx's Kapital. Both can obviously become the objects of interpretation,
not only of textual-linguistic interpretation of which we shall
not speak here, but also of the "value-analytical" interpretation which
enables us to "understand" their relations to values [Wertbeziehungen)
and which analyzes and "psychologically" interprets the letters
of Frau von Stein in the way, for instance, in which one "interprets"
"Faust" or investigates Marx's Kapital with respect to its intellectual
content and expounds its intellectual but not its historical — relationship
to other systems of ideas concerned with the same problems.
"Value-analysis" treats its objects for this purpose, following Eduard
Meyer's terminology, primarily in a "static" (zustdndlich) way, i.e.,
in a more correct formulation, it takes its point of departure in their
character as "values" independent of all purely historical-causal significance,
and to that extent as having a status which is for us, beyond
history. But does "value-analytical" interpretation confine itself to
such an object? Certainly not! — an interpretation of those letters
of Goethe no more than one of Das Kapital or of Faust or of Orestes
or of the Sistine Chapel paintings. It would rather, precisely in
order wholly to attain its own goal, take into account that that Ideal
value-object (Wertobjekt) was historically conditioned, that numerous
nuances and turns of thought and sentiment remain "incomprehensible,"
when the general conditions, e.g., the social "milieu" and
the quite concrete events of the days on which those Goethe-letters
were written are unknown, when the historically given "problemsituation"
of the time In which Marx wrote his book and his develop-
148 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
nient as a thinker remain undiscussed. Thus the "interpretation" of
Goethe's letters requires for its success an historical investigation of the
conditions under which they came into being, including all those very
minor as well as the most comprehensive relationships {YMsammenhange)
in Goethe's purely personal
—"domestic"—environment as
well as in the total broader cultural environment in its widest sense
which were of causal significance —"effective" in Eduard Meyer's
words — for their particular quality. For the knowledge of all these
causal conditions teaches us indeed the psychic constellations in which
those letters were born, and thereby it enables us really to "understand"
them. ^^
23 Even Vossler, in his analysis of a fable of La Fontaine contained in his brilliantly
written, intentionally one-sided Die Sprache ah Schopfung und Entwickhing
(Heidelberg 1905, p. 8 and fT.), provides confirmation of this statement
although he does not wish to do so. The only "legitimate" task of "aesthetic"
interpretation is, for him, (as it is for Croce, whose position is close to his own)
to show that, and to what extent, the literary "creation" is an adequate
"expression."
Nevertheless he, too, is compelled to have recourse to a reference to
the quite concrete "psychic" characteristics of La Fontaine (p. 93) and beyond
these to "milieu" and "race" and yet we cannot discern the reasons why this
causal imputation, this inquiry into the origins of what exists, which, by the
way, always operates with generalizing concepts (on this point, more later)
breaks off at the very point at which this very attractive and instructive sketch
does or why the extension of this causal imputation for purposes of "interpretation"
is thought to become useless, as Vossler seems to think at this point.
When Vossler again retracts those concessions by saying that he recognizes the
"spatial" and "temporal" conditionedness "only for the matter" (StofTj
(p. 95) but asserts that the "form" which is alone aesthetically essential, is a
"free creation of the spirit," it must be recalled that he is following a terminology
like that of Croce. Accordingly, "freedom" is equivalent to "conformity
with norms" (Normgemassheit) and "form" is correct expression in Croce's
sense, and as such is identical with resthetic value. This terminology involves
the danger, however, of leading to the confusion of "existence" and "norm."
It is the great merit of Vossler's stimulating essay that it once more stresses
very strongly, against the pure phoneticists and linguistic positivists, that (
I
)
there exists the entirely autonomous scientific task of the interpretation of the
"values" and "norms" of literary creations as well as the physiology and psychology
of language, "historical" investigations, and those seeking to establish
"phonetic" laws; and that (2) the very understanding and "experience" of
these "values" and norms is also a sine qua non for the causal interpretation of
the origin and conditionedness of mental and spiritual creations, since the
creator of literary productions or of linguistic expressions himself "experiences"
them. However, it should be noted that in this case where the values and
norms are the means of causal knowledge and not standards of value they come
into play in the logical role, not of "norms" but rather in their pure factuality
as "possible" empirical contents of a "psychic" event. They are in this role,
not different "in principle '
from the delusions of a paralytic. I believe that
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 149
But it still remains true, on the other hand, that causal "explanation,"
here as elsewhere, undertaken for its own sake, and a la Duntzer,
"grasps only part of the matter." And obviously, that type of "interpretation"
which we have alone called "value analysis" functions as
a guide for this other "historical," i.e., causal type of "interpretation."
The former type of analysis reveals the "valued" components of the
object, the causal "explanation" of which is the problem of the latter
type of analysis. The former creates the points of attachment from
which there are to be regressively traced the web of causal connections
and thus provides causal analysis with the decisive "viewpoints"
without which it would indeed have to operate, as it were, without a
compass on an uncharted sea. Now, anyone can — and many will —
deny
that there is need, as far as they themselves are concerned, to
see the whole apparatus of historical analysis straining at the task of
the historical "explanation" of a series of "love letters," be they ever
so sublime. Certainly—but the same is true, however, disrespecful it
seems, of Karl Marx's Das Kapital, and for all the objects of historical
research. The knowledge of the materials out of which Marx constructed
his work, the knowledge of how the genesis of his ideas was
historically conditioned, and any historical knowledge of today's power
relationship, or of the development of the German political system
in its particular characteristics can, of course, appear to anyone to be
a thoroughly dull and fruitless thing or, at least, one of wcvy secondary
importance and one which as an end in itself is indeed quite meaningless.
But neither logic nor scientific experience can "refute" him, as
Eduard Meyer has expressly conceded, although certainly in a somewhat
curt way.
It will be profitable for our purposes to dwell a bit longer on the
logical nature of value-analysis. The attempt has been made in all
seriousness to understand or to "refute" H. Rickert's very clearly
\'^ossler's and Crocc's terminology, which tends repeatedly towards the logical
confusion of "valuation" and (causal) "explanation" and to a denial of the
autonomy of the latter, weakens the cogency of the argument. Those tasks
of purely empirical work themselves are and remain, alongside of those tasks
which Vossler calls "aesthetics," autonomous, both in substance and in logical
function. That such causal analysis is today called "folk psychology" or "psychology'"
is a result of a terminological fad; but this can not, ultimately, in
any way affect the objective justification for this type of analysis.
150 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
developed idea that the construction of the "historical individual" is
conditioned by "value-relevance" {Wertbcziehung) as asserting that
this relevance to values is identical with a subsumption under general
concepts"* such as the "state," "religion," "art," etc., and similar concepts,
which are assuredly, it is said, the "values" in question; the
fact that history brings its objects into relation with these values and
thereby attains specific "viewpoints" is then equivalent — this is what
is added — to the separate treatment of the "chemical," "physical,"
etc., "aspects" of events in the sphere of the natural sciences.^^ These
are remarkable misunderstandings of what is and must be understood
by "value-relevance" (Wertbcziehung) . An actual "value-judgment"
concerning a concrete object or the theoretical establishment of the
possible "value-relations" of the object does not imply that I subsume
them under a certain class-concept: "love letter," "political structure,"
"economic phenomenon." Rather, the "value-judgment" involves my
"taking an attitude" in a certain concrete way to the object in its
concrete individuality; the subjective sources of this attitude of mine,
of my "value-standpoints" which are decisive for it are definitely not
a "concept," and certainly not an "abstract concept" but rather a
thoroughly concrete, highly individually structured and constituted
"feeling" and "preference"; it may, however, be under certain circumstances
the consciousness of a certain, and here again, concrete kind
of imperative (sollens) . And when I pass from the stage of the actual
evaluation of an object into the stage of theoretical-interpretative
reflection on possible relevance to values, in other words, \vhcn I construct
"historical individuals" from the objects, it means that I am
making explicit to myself and to others in an interpretative way the
concrete, individual, and on that account, in the last analysis, unique
form in which "ideas"-— to employ for once a metaphysical usage —
are "incorporated" into or "work themselves out" in the political structures
in question (e.g., in the "state of Frederick the Great"), of the
personality in question (e.g., Goethe or Bismarck) or the literary prod^'^
This is the view of Schmcidler in Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie
III, pp. 24 ff.
25 This view, to my astonishment, was also taken by Franz Eulenberg in the
Archiv fur Sozialwissenschnft. His polemic apainst Rickert and "his men" is
only possible in my opinion precisely because he excludes from his considerations
the object the logical analysis of which is at issue, namely, "history."
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 151
uct in question (e.g., Marx's Kapital). Or in a different formulation
which avoids the always dubious and moreover avoidable metaphysical
mode of expression: in constructing historical individuals I elaborate
in an explicit form the focal points for possible "evaluative"
attitudes which the segment of reality in question discloses and in
consequence of which it claims a more or less universal "meaning"—
which is to be sharply distinguished from causal "significance." Das
Kapital of Karl Marx shares the characteristic of being a "literary
product" with those combinations of printers' ink and paper which
appear weekly in the Brockhaus List — what makes it into an "historical"
individual for us is, however, not its membership in the class
of literary products but rather on the contrary, its thoroughly unique
"intellectual content," which "we" find "set down" in it. In the
same way the quality of a "political event" is shared by the pothouse
political chatter of the philistine having his last drink at closing time
with that complex of printed and written paper, sound waves, bodily
movements on drill grounds, clever or also foolish thoughts in the
heads of princes, diplomats, etc., which "we" synthesize into the individual
conceptual structure of the "German Empire" because "we"
turn to it with a certain "historical interest" which is thoroughly
unique for us, and which is rooted in innumerable "values"— and
not just political values either. To express this "significance"— the
content of the object, for instance, of Faust, with respect to possible
relevance to values, or stated in another way, to think of expressing
the "content of our interest" in the historical individual — by means
of a class-concept is obviously nonsense. Indeed, the inexhaustibility
of its "content" as regards possible focal points for our interest is
what is characteristic of the historical individual of the "highest"
order. The fact that we classify certain "important" tendencies in
the ways of relating historical objects to relevant values and that this
classification is then useful as a basis for the division of labor of the
cultural sciences, naturally leaves entirely unaffected^^ the fact that
26 When I investigate the social and economic determinants of the emergence
of a concrete "embodiment" of "Christianity," for instance, of the provencal
knightly poetry, I do not thereby turn these latter into phenomena which are
"evaluated" for the sake of their economic significance. The way in which the
individual investigator or the particularly traditionally delimited "discipline"
defines its "sphere" out of purely technical considerations of the division of
labor, is of not logical significance here.
152 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
the proposition: a "value" of "general, i.e., universal significance" is a
"general," i.e., abstract (genereller) concept is just as curious as the
opinion that one can express "the truth" in a single sentence or perform
"the ethically right" in one single action or embody "the beautiful"
in one single work of art.
But let us return to Eduard Meyer and his attempts to cope with
the problem of historical "significance." The foregoing reflections do
indeed leave the sphere of methodology and touch on the philosophy
of history. From the point of view which stands firmly on the ground
of methodolog)', the circumstance that certain individual components
of reality are selected as objects of historical treatment is to be justified
only by reference to this factual existence of a corresponding interest.
"Value-relevance" cannot indeed mean more for such a view which
docs not enquire after the meaning of this interest. And thus Eduard
Meyer, too, is on this matter, content to say — justifiably from this
point of view — that the fact of the existence of this interest suffices
for history, however lowly one might rate this interest in itself. But
certain obscurities and contradictions in his discussion are clearly
enough the results of such an imperfect philosophical-historical orien-
tation.
"The selection" (of history) "rests on the historical interest, which
the present has in any effect, in the results of historic development,
so that it feels the need of tracing the causes which have brought it
about," says Eduard Meyer (p. 37). He later interprets this to mean
(p. 45) that the historian finds "the problems with which he approaches
history within himself," and that these problems then give
him "the guiding principles by which he orders the material."
This agrees entirely with what has already been said and is, moreover,
the only possible sense in which the previously criticized statement
of Eduard Meyer about "the ascent from effect to cause" is
correct. It is not a question here, as he believes, of utilizing the
concept of causality in a way peculiar to history but rather of the
fact that only those "causes" are "historically significant" which the
regressus, which begins with a "valued" cultural component, must
incorporate into itself as indispensable components. What is involved
here, then, is the principal of "teleological dependence" as it has been
designated in a phrase which is sure to be subject to misunderstanding.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 153
But the question then arises: must this point of departure of the
regressus always be a component of the present, as might, on the basis
of the quotation cited above, be believed to be Eduard Meyer's view?
As a matter of fact, Eduard Meyer does not take an entirely certain
position on this point. He provides no clear indication — this is
apparent from what has already been said — of what he really understands
by his term "historically effective." For — as has already been
pointed out to him by others — if only what has "effects" belongs in
history, the crucial cjuestion for every historical exposition: for example
his own Geschichte des Altertums: is then: what final outcome
and which of its elements should be taken as fundamental, as having
been "effected" by the historical development to be described; it must
also be decided, in that event, whether a fact bcause it has no causal
significance for any component of that final outcome must be excluded
as being historically inconsequential. Many of Eduard Meyer's assertions
create the impression at first that the objective "cultural situation"
of the present — as we shall call it for the sake of brevity —
should be decisive here. According to this view, only facts which
still today are of causal significance, in our contemporary political,
economic, social, religious, ethical, scientific, or any other sectors of
our cultural life, and the "effects" of which are directly perceptible
at present (cf. p. 37) belong in an "History of Antiquity"; on the
other hand, however, it would be an entirely irrelevant criterion
whether a fact were even of the most fundamental significance for
the particular character of the culture of antiquity (cf. p. 48) . Eduard
Meyer's work would shrink rather badly — think of the volume on
Egypt, for instance, if he took this proposition seriously and many
would not indeed find precisely that which they expect in a history
of antiquity if this were so. But he leaves another path open (p. 37) :
we can also experience it — i.e., what was historically "effective"
—
"in the past to the extent that we treat any phase of it as if it were
contemporaneous." In view of this, any cultural component whatsoever
can surely be "treated" as "effective" from some standpoint,
however chosen, in a history of antiquity — but in that case, the
delimitation which Eduard Meyer seeks to establish would dissolve.
And there would still arise the question: which feature of events is
accepted by an "History of Antiquity" as the criterion of what is of
154 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
essential importance for the historian? From Eduard Meyer's standpoint,
the answer must be: the "end" of ancient history, i.e., the
situation which appears to us as the appropriate "end point"— thus,
for example, the reign of the Emperor Romulus, or the reign of
Justinian — or probably better — the reign of Diocletian. In this
event, everything in any case which is "characteristic" of this "final
epoch," this "old age" of antiquity would undoubtedly belong, to its
fullest extent, in the exposition of the age's close as would all the
"facts" which were causally essential ("effective") in this process of
"aging." This inclusiveness is necessary because the object of historical
explanation is constituted by what is characteristic of the epoch.
At the same time we would have to exclude, for example, in the
description of Greek culture, everything which no longer exercised
any "cultural influences" at that time (i.e., during the reigns of
Emperors Romulus or Diocletian), and this in the then existing state
of literature, philosophy and general culture, would be a terribly
large part of those very elements which render the "history of antiquity"
valuable to us and which we, fortunately, do not find omitted
from Eduard Meyer's own work.
An history of antiquity which would include only what exercised
causal influences on any later epoch, would — especially if one regards
political relations as the true backbone of the historical,— appear
as empty as a "history" of Goethe which "mediatized" him — to use
Ranke's expression, in favor of his epigoni, which in other words,
described only those elements among his characteristics and his
actions which remain "influential" in literature; there is no distinction
in principle in this regard between scientific (wissenschaftliche)
"biography" and historical objects which are otherwise delimited.
Eduard Meyer's thesis is not realizable in the formulation which he
has given to it. Or do we have, in his case, too, an escape from the
contradiction between his theory and his own practice. We have
heard Eduard Meyer say that the historian derives his problems "from
within himself, and he adds to this remark: "the present in which
the historian works is a factor which can not be excluded from any
historical presentation." Are we to regard the "effectiveness" of a
"fact" which marks it as "an historical fact" as existing where a modern
historian interests himself and is able to interest his readers in the
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 155
fact in its particular individuality and in those features of its origins
through which it has become what it is and not something else?
Obviously, Eduard Meyer's arguments (pp. 36, 37, and 45) confuse
two quite different conceptions of "historical facts." The first
refers to such elements of reality which are "valued," it might be said,
"for their own sake" in their concrete uniqueness as objects of our
interest; the second, to those components of reality to which attention
is necessarily drawn by our need to understand the causal determination
of those "valued" components — this second type of "historical
fact" is the one which is historically "effective" in Eduard Meyer's
sense, i.e., as a "cause" in the causal regress. One may designate the
former as historical individuals, the latter as historical (real) causes,
and, with Rickert, distinguish them as "primary" and "secondary"
historical facts. A strict confinement of an historical analysis to historical
"causes," i.e., to the "secondary" facts in Rickert's sense, or,
in other words, to the "effective" facts in Eduard Meyer's sense is,
naturally, only possible for us if it is already unambiguously clear with
which historical individual the causal explantion is to be exclusively
concerned. However inclusive this primary object might be — it
might be, for example, the total "modern culture," i.e., the presentday
Christian capitalistic constitutional {rechtsstaatliche) culture
which "radiates" from Europe and which is a phantastic tangle of
"cultural values" which may be considered from the most diverse
standpoints — the causal regress which explains it historically must,
if it extends back into the Middle Ages or Antiquity, nonetheless
omit, because they are causally unimportant, a great wealth of objects
which arouse to a high degree our "interest" "for their own sake."
These latter facts can become "historical individuals" in their own
right from which an explanatory causal regress might have its point
of departure. It is certainly to be granted that "historical interest"
in these latter facts is particularly slight in consequence of their lack
of causal significance for a universal history of contemporary culture.
The cultural development of the Incas and Aztecs left historically
relevant traces to such a relatively very slight extent that a universal
history of the genesis of modern culture in Eduard Meyer's sense could
perhaps be silent about it without loss. If that is so — as we shall
now assume — then what we know about the cultural development
156 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
of the Incas and Aztecs becomes relevant to us, in the first instance,
neither as an "historical object," nor as an "historical cause" but
rather as an "heuristic instrument" for the formation of theoretical
concepts appropriate to the study of culture. This knowledge may
function positively to supply an illustration, individualized and specific,
in the formation of the concept of feudalism or negatively, to delimit
certain concepts with which we operate in the study of European cultural
history from the quite different cultural traits of the Incas and
the Aztecs; this latter function enables us to make a clearer genetic
comparison of the historical uniqueness of European cultural development.
Precisely the same considerations apply, of course, to those
components of ancient culture which Eduard Meyer — if he were
consistent — would have to exclude from a history of antiquity oriented
towards present cultural situation, because they did not become
historically "effective."
Despite all this, it is obviously neither logically nor in the nature
of facts, to be excluded in regard to the Incas and the Aztecs, that
certain elements of their culture in its characteristic aspects could be
made into an historical "individual," i.e., they could first be analyzed
"interpretatively" with respect to their "relevance to values," and
then they could once more be made into an object of "historical"
investigation so that now the regressive inquiry into causes would proceed
to the facts concerning the cultural development of those elements
which become, in relation to the historical individual, its "historical
causes." And if anyone composes an "Histor)- of Antiquity" it is a
vain self-deception to believe that it contains only facts which are
causally "effective" in our contemporary culture because it deals only
with facts which are significant either "primarily" as evaluated "historical
individuals" or "secondarily" as "causes" (in relation to these
or other "individuals").
It is our interest which is oriented towards "values" and not the
objective causal relationship between our culture and Hellenic culture
which determines the range of the cultural values which are controlling
for a history of Hellenic culture. That epoch which we
usually — valuing it entirely subjectively — view as the "pinnacle" of
Hellenic culture, i.e., the period between Aeschylus and Aristotle,
enters wdth its cultural contents as an "intrinsic value" (Eigenwert)
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 157
into every "History of Antiquity," including Eduard Meyer's. This
could change only if, in the event that some future age became only
as capable of attaining a direct "value-rapport" {Wertbeziehung) to
those cultural "creations" of antiquity as we are today in relation to
the "songs" and "world view" of a central African tribe, which arouse
our interest only as instances of cultural products, i.e., as means of
forming concepts or as "causes." The matter then may be put as follows:
we human beings of the present day possess "'z^a/w^-rapport" of
some sort to the characteristic embodiments of ancient culture and this
is the only possible meaning which can be given to Eduard Meyer's
concept of the "effective" as the "historical." How much, on the other
hand, Eduard Meyer's own concept of the "efTective" is made up of
heterogeneous components is shown by his account of the motivation
of the specific interest which history shows in the "advanced cultures."
"This rests," he says (p. 47) "on the fact that these peoples and cultures
have been 'effective' to an infinitely higher degree and still
influence the present." This is undoubtedly correct but it is by no
means the sole reason for our decided "interest" in their significance
as historical objects; it is especially impossible to derive from this
proposition another proposition according to which as Eduard Meyer
asserts (ibid.), "the interest becomes greater the more advanced they
(i.e., the historically advanced cultures) are." The question of the
"intrinsic value" of a culture which we touch on here, has nothing to
do with the question of its historical "effectiveness" ; — here Eduard
Meyer merely confuses "valuable" with "causally important." However
unconditionally correct it is that every history is written from the
standpoint of the value-interests of the present and that every present
situation poses or can pose new questions to the data of history bepause
its interest, guided by value-ideas, changes, it is certain that
this interest "values" and turns into historical "individuals" cultural
components that are entirely of the past, i.e., those to which a cultural
component of the present day cannot be traced by a regressive
causal chain. This is just as true of minor objects like the letters to
Frau von Stein as of major ones like those components of Hellenic
culture whose effects modern culture has long since outgrown. Eduard
Meyer, has, as we saw, indeed conceded this implicity through the
possibility which he proposed : namely, that a moment in the past can
158 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
be "treated," as he put it, as contemporaneous"^ (p. 47). With this
he has, in fact, admitted that even "past" cultural components are
historical objects regardless of the existence of a still perceptible
"effect" and can, e.g., as the "characteristic" values of anticjuity, supply
the standards for the selection of facts and the direction of historical
research in a "History of Antiquity." And now to continue.
When Eduard Meyer cites as the exclusive reason why the present
does not become the object of "history," the argument that one does
pot yet know and cannot know which of its components will show
themselves to be "effective" in the future, this proposition concerning
the (subjective) unhistoricity of the present is right at least to a qualified
extent. Only the future "decides" conclusively about the causal
significance of the facts of the present as "causes." This is not, however,
the only aspect of the problem, even after, as is here understood,
one disregards such incidental factors as the lack of written sources and
records, etc. The really immediate present has not only not yet become
an historical "cause," but it has not yet become an historical "individual"—
any more than an '
'experience" is an object of empirical
"knowledge" at the moment in which it is occurring "in me" and
"about me." All historical "evaluation" includes, so to speak, a "contemplative"
element. It includes not primarily, and only, the immediate
valuation of the "attitude-taking subject" — rather is its
essential content, as we have seen, a "knowledge" of the object's
possible "relations to values" {Wertbeziehungen) . It thus presupposes
a capacity for change in the "attitude" towards the object, at
least theoretically. This used to be expressed as follows: we "must
become objective" towards an experience before it "belongs to history"
as an object — but this does certainly not imply that it is causally
"effective."
But we are not to elaborate further this discussion of the relationship
of "experiencing" and "knowing" here. It is enough that in the
course of the foregoing extensive exposition, it has become quite
clear not only that, but also why, Eduard Meyer's concept of the
27 Which procedure, however, according to his remarks on p. 55, can be done
after all, really only by "philology."
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 159
"historical" as the "effective" is inadequate. It lacks, above all, the
logical distinction between the "primary" historical object, that very
valued cultural individual to which attaches the interest in the causal
explanation of its coming to be, and the "secondary" historical facts,
the causes to which the "valued" characteristics of that "individual"
are related in the causal regress. This imputation of causes is made
with the goal of being, in principle, "objectively" valid as empirical
truth absolutely in the same sense as any proposition at all of empirical
knowledge. Only the adequacy of the data desides the question,
which is wholly factual, and not a matter of principle, as to whether
the causal analysis attains this goal to the degree which explanations
do in the field of concrete natural events. It is not the determination
of the historical "causes" for a given "object" to be explained which
is "subjective" in a certain sense which we shall not discuss here again
— rather is it the delimitation of the historical "object," of the "individual"
itself, for in this the relevant values are decisive and the conception
of the values is that which is subject to historical change. It
is therefore incorrect in the first place when Eduard Meyer asserts
(p. 45) that we are "never" able to attain an "absolute and unconditionally
valid" knowledge of anything historical — this is not correct
for "causes." It is, however, also equally incorrect when he then asserts
that the situation is "no different" with respect to the validity of
knowledge, in the natural sciences from what it is in the historical
disciplines. The latter proposition is not true for the historical "individuals,"
i.e., for the way in which "values" play a role in history,
nor does it hold for the mode of being of those "values." (Regardless
of how one conceives of the "validity" of those "values" as such,
—
the "validity" of the values is in any case something which is different
in principle from the validity of a causal relationship which is an
empirical truth, even if both should in the last analysis also be conceived
of philosophically as normatively bound.) The "points of
view," which are oriented towards "values," from which we consider
cultural objects and from which they become "objects" of historical
research, change. Because, and as long as they do, new "facts" will
always be becoming historically "important" [wesentlich) , and they
will always become so in a new way — for in logical discussions such
as these we assume once and for all that the source materials will
160 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
remain unchanged. This way of being conditioned by "subjective
values" is, however, entirely ahen in any case to those natural sciences
which take mechanics as a model, and it constitutes, indeed, the distinctive
contrast between the historical and the natural sciences.
To summarize: insofar as the "interpretation" of an object is, in
the usual sense of the word, a "philological" interpretation, e.g., of
its linguistic "meaning," it is a technical task preliminary to the historical
work proper. Insofar as it analyzes "interpretatively" what is
characteristic of the particular features of certain "cultural epochs"
or certain personalities or certain individual objects (such as works of
art or literature), it aids in the formation of historical concepts. And
indeed from the point of view of its logical role, it functions either
as an auxiliary insofar as it aids in the recognition of the causally
relevant components of a concrete historical complex as such; it
functions, conversely, as a source of guidance and direction, insofar
as it "interprets" the content of an object — e.g., Faust, Orestes,
Christianity of a particular epoch — with respect to its possible relations
to values. In doing the latter it presents "tasks" for the causal
work of history and thus is its presupposition. The concept of the
"culture" of a particular people and age, the concept of "Christianity,"
of "Faust," and also — there is a tendency to overlook this — the
concept of "Germany," etc., are individualized value-concepts formed
as the objects of historical research, i.e., by relations with value-ideas.
If these values themselves with which we approach the facts are
made the objects of analysis, we are — depending on the aim of our
knowing — conducting studies in the philosophy of history or the
psychology of "historical interest." If, on the other hand, we treat a
concrete object from the standpoint of "value analysis," i.e., "interpreting"
it with respect to its particular characteristics so that the
possible evaluations of the object are "suggestively" made vivid to
us, an "empathic experience" {"Nacherleben") as it used to be called
(albeit veiy incorrectly), of a cultural creation is aimed at, this is
still not "historical work"— this is the "justified kernel" in Eduard
Meyer's formulation. But even though it is not historical work, it is
the inevitable "forma formans" of historical "interest" in an object,
of its primary conceptualization into an "individual" and of the causal
work of history which only then becomes meaningfully possible. In
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 161
ever so many cases, the adduced evaluations of daily life have formed
the object and paved the way for historical research — this occurs
even in the beginnings of all historical writing in political communities,
especially in the historian's own state. The historian might thus
come to believe when he confronts these fixed and firm "objects"
which apparently — but only apparently and only in the range of
familiar, routine use — do not require any special value-interpretation,
that he is in his "proper" domain. As soon, however, as he leaves the
broad highway and seeks also to achieve great new insights into the
"unique" political "character" of a state or in the "unique character"
of a political genius, he must proceed here, too, as far as the logical
principle is concerned, as does the interpreter of Faust. But, of course
— and here Eduard Meyer is correct, where an analysis remains at the
level of such an "interpretation" of the intrinsic value of the object, the
task of the ascertainment of causes is left undone and the question is
not even raised in regard to the object, as to what it "signifies" causally
with respect to other more comprehensive, more contemporaneous
cultural objects. At this point, historical research has not yet got
under way and the historian can perceive only the raw materials of
historical problems. It is only the way in which Meyer tries to ground
his belief that is in my opinion untenable. Since Eduard Meyer
perceives especially the "static," "systematic" treatment of data as
representative of the opposite principle from that of history, and since,
e.g., Rickert too, after having seen the "systematic," which is characteristic
of a "natural science" view even in the social and mental
sphere, in opposition to the "historical cultural sciences," has more
recently formulated the concept of the "systematic cultural sciences"
— the task then is, to raise the following problem later in another
section: what "systematics" can properly mean and in what different
sets of relationships it stands to the historical approach and the
"natural sciences.""^
The mode of treatment of ancient, particularly Hellenic culture
which Eduard Meyer calls the "philological method," i.e., which
takes the form of "classical studies," is indeed primarily actually realizes
With this we really enter into a discussion of the various possible principles
of a "classification" of the "sciences."
162 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
able through the requisite Hnguistic mastery of the sources. But it is
determined not only by that but also by the particular characteristics
of certain outstanding scholars, and above all by the "significance"
which the culture of classical antiquity has had for our own spiritual
and intellectual discipline. Let us attempt to formulate those standpoints
towards ancient culture which are, in principle, conceivable,
in an extremely schematic and hence purely theoretical fashion. ( 1
)
One point of view would be the conception of the absolute value of
ancient culture, the exemplifications of which in humanism, as expressed,
for instance, in Winckclmann, and ultimately in all the variants
of so-called "classicism" we shall not investigate here. According
to this conception, if we follow it to its uttermost implications, the
elements of ancient culture are — insofar as neither the Christian
components of our culture nor the products of rationalism have "supplemented"
or "re-shaped" it — at least virtual elements of culture as
such. They are such, not because they have been "causally" effective
in Eduard Meyer's sense of the term, but rather because on account
of their absolute value they should be causally effective in our education.
Hence, ancient culture is primarily an object of interpretation
in usum scholarum, for purposes of educating one's own people to the
level of an advanced state of culture. "Philology" in its most comprehensive
meaning, i.e., as the "knowledge of what has been known,"
perceives in classical antiquity something which is in principle more
than merely historical, something timelcssly valid. (2) The other,
modern point of view stands in extreme contrast: the culture of
antiquity, according to this view, is so infinitely remote from us as
regards its true individuality that it is entirely meaningless to wish to
give the "all too many" an insight into its true "essence." It is rather
a sublime valued object for the few who imbue themselves with the
highest form of humanity which cannot in any essential features recur
and who wish to "enjoy" it in a somewhat aesthetic way."'' (3) Finally,
the methods of classical studies are of service to a scientific
interest for which the source materials of antiquity provide primarily
an uncommonly rich body of ethnographic data which can be used
23 It could he the reputed "esoteric" doctrine of U. von Willamowitz against
which Eduard Meyer's attack is primarily directed.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 163
for the acquisition of general concepts, analogies, and developmental
laws applicable in the pre-history, not only of our own culture, but
of "every" culture A pertinent instance is the development of the
study of comparative religion — the attainment of its present high level
would have been impossible without the exhaustive survey of antiquity
made possible through strictly philological training. Antiquity comes
into consideration on this view insofar as its cultural content is appropriate
as an heuristic means for the construction of general "types."
In contrast with the first "point of view," thus one does not regard
classical antiquity as providing an "enduring" cultural norm, and in
contrast with the second, it does not look on classical antiquity as an
absolutely unique object of individual contemplative evaluation.
We quickly see that all three of these "theoretically" formulated
conceptions are interested for their own purposes in the treatment of
ancient history in the form of "classical studies." We also do not need
a special comment to see that, in each of them, the interest of the
historian in fact falls short of exhausting their interest, since all three
have something different from "history" as their primary aim. But
when, on the other hand, Eduard Meyer seriously seeks to eradicate
from the history of antiquity that which is no longer historically
"effective" in the contemporary world, he would be justifiably open
to the criticism of his opponents in the eyes of all those who look
for more than an historical "cause" in antiquity. And all the admirers
of his great work rejoice that he cannot at all proceed with any fidelity
to these ideas, and they hope that he will not even attempt to do so
for the sake of an erroneously formulated theory.^^
30 The breadth of the foregoing discussions is obviously incommensurate with
what "comes out" of them in directly practical results for "methodology." To
those who for this reason regard them as superfluous, it can only be recommended
that they simply avoid questions bearing on the "meaning" of knowledge
and content themselves with the acquisition of "valuable" knowledge by
concrete research. It is not the historians who have raised these questions
but those who have put forward the wrong-headed view, and who are still
playing variations on the theme, that "scientific knowledge" is identical with
the "discovery of laws." This is definitely a question of the "meaning" of
knowledge.
OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY AND ADEQUATE CAUSATION
IN HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
II
"The outbreak of the Second Punic War," says Eduard Meyer
(p. 16), "is the consequence of the willed decision of Hannibal; that
of the Seven Years War, of Frederick the Great; that of the War of
.1866, of Bismarck. They could all have decided differently and
other persons would have . . . decided differently. In consequence,
the course of history would have been different." To this he adds
in a footnote (p. 10, fn. 2) : "By this we do not mean to assert or
deny that in the latter case, these wars would not have occurred:
this is a completely unaswerable and superfluous question." Disregarding
the awkward relationship between the second sentence and
his earlier proposition about the relationship between "freedom" and
"necessity" in history, we must here question the view that questions
which we cannot answer, or cannot answer with certainty, are on
that acount "idle" questions. It would go poorly with the empirical
sciences, too, if those highest problems to which they can give no
answer were never raised. We are not considering here such "ultimate"
problems; we are rather dealing with a question which has, on the
one hand, been "dated" by the course of events, and which, on the
other, cannot in fact be answered positively and unambiguously in
the light of our actual and possible knowledge — it is a question
which, moreover, viewed from a strictly "deterministic" standpoint,
discusses the consec|uences of that which was, in view of the given
"determinants," impossible. ^ And yet, despite all this, the problem:
what might have happened if, for example, Bismarck had not decided
to make war, is by no means an "idle" one. It does indeed bear on
something decisive for the historical moulding of reality, namely, on
what causal significance is properly to be attributed to this individual
decision in the context of the totality of infinitely numerous "factors,"
all of which had to be in such and such an arrangement and in no
other if this result were to emerge, and what role it is therefore to be
asigned in an historical exposition. If history is to be raised above the
'evel of a mere chronicle of notable events and personalities, it has
no alternative but to pose such questions. And so indeed it has pro'^eeded
since its establishment as a science. This is the correct element
164
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 165
in Eduard Meyer's previously quoted formulation that history considers
events from the standpoint of "becoming" and that accordingly
its object is not in the domain of "necessity" which is characteristic
of what has already "occurred"; that the historian behaves in the
estimation of the causal significance of a concrete event similarly to
the historical human being who has an attitude and will of his own
and who would never "act" if his own action appeared'^^ to him as
"necessary" and not only as "possible." The distinction is only this:
the acting person weighs, insofar as he acts rationally — we shall
assume this here — the "conditions" of the future development which
interests him, which conditions are "external" to him and are objectively
given as far as his knowledge of reality goes. He mentally rearranges
into a causal complex the various "possible modes" of his
own conduct and the consequences which these could be expected to
have in connection with the "external" conditions. He does this in
order to decide, in accordance with the (mentally) disclosed "possible"
results, in favor of one or another mode of action as the one
appropriate to his "goal." The historian has, however, the advantage
over his hero in that he knows a posteriori whether the appraisal of
the given external conditions corresponded in fact with the knowledge
and expectations which the acting person developed. The answer to
this question is indicated by the actual "success" of the action. And
with that ideal maximum knowledge of those conditions which we
will and may theoretically assume here once and for all while clarifying
logical questions — although in reality such a maximum be
achieved ever so rarely, perhaps never — the historian can carry out
retrospectively the same mental calculation which his "hero" more or
less clearly performed or could have performed. Hence, the historian
is able to consider the question : which consequences were to be anticipated
had another decision been taken, with better chances of success
than, for example, Bismarck himself. It is clear that this way of
looking at the matter is very far from being "idle." Eduard Meyer
himself applies (p. 43) very nearly this procedure to the two shots
which in the Berlin March days directly provoked the outbreak of the
•^^ The correctness of this proposition is not affected by Kistiakowski's criticism
(op. cit., p. 393) which does not apply to this concept of "possibility."
166 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
street fighting. The question as to who fired them is, he says, "historically
irrelevant." Why is it more irrelevant than the discussion of
the decisions of Hannibal, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck? "The
situation was such that any accident whatsoever would have caused
the. conflict to break out." ( !
) Here we see Eduard Meyer himself
answering the allegedly "idle" question as to what "would" have happened
without those shots;, thus their historical "significance" (in this
case: irrelevance) is decided. The "situations" were obviously, at
least in Meyer's view, different in the case of the decisions of Hannibal,
Frederick the Great, and Bismarck. They certainly were not such
that the conflict would have broken out in any case or under the
concrete political constellation which actually governed its course and
outcome, if the decision had been different. For if otherwise, these
decisions would be as insignificant as those shots. The judgment that,
if a single historical fact is conceived of as absent from or modified in
a complex of historical conditions, it would condition a course of historical
events in a way which would be different in certain historically
important respects, seems to be of considerable value for the determination
of the "historical significance" of those facts. This is so
even though the historian in practice is moved only rarely — namely,
in instances of dispute about that very "historical significance"— to
develop and support that judgment deliberately and explicitly. It is
clear that this situation had to call forth a consideration of the logical
nature of such judgments as assert what the effect of the omission or
modification of a single causal component of a complex of conditions
would have been and of their significance for history. Wc shall attempt
to secure a clearer insight into this problem.
The poor condition of the logical analysis*''-^ of history is also
shown by the fact that neither historians nor mcthodologists of history
but rather representatives of very unrelated disciplines have
conducted the authoritative investigations into this important question.
The theory of the so-called "objective possibility" which we deal
32 The categories to be discussed subsequently find application, as may be
expressly remarked, not only in the domain of the usually so-called specialist
discipline of "history" but also in the "historical" ascertainment of causes of
every individual event, including even the individual events of "inanimate
nature." The category of the "historical" here considered is a logical category
and not one restricted to the technique of a single discipline.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 167
with here rests on the works of the distinguished physiologist v. Kries^^
and the common use of the concepts in the works which follow him
or criticize him. These works are primarily criminological but they
are also produced by other legal writers, particularly Merkel, Riimelen,
Liepmann, and most recently, Radbruch.^* In the methodology of
the social sciences von Kries' ideas have hitherto been adopted only
in statistics.
^^
33 Ober den Begriff der objektiven Moglichkeit und einige Anwendungen desselben.
(Leipzig 1888.) Important bases for these discussion were first set
forth by Von Kries in his Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. It
should ht noted here in advance that, in accordance with the nature of the
historical "object," only the most elementary components of Von Kries' theory
are significant for the methodology of history. The adoption of the principles
of the so-called "calculus of probability" in the strict sense obviously not only
is not to be considered for the work of causal analysis in history but even the
attempt to make an analogical use of its points of view demands the greatest
caution.
3* The most deeply penetrating criticism of the use of von Kries' theory in the
analysis of legal problems has been made by Radbruch {Die Lebre von der
adequaten Verursachung Bd I. NF. Heft 3 of Ahhandlungen des von Lisztschen
Seminars in which references to the most important other literature are to be
found. His analytical articulation of the concept of "adequate causatiori" can
be taken into account only later, after the theory has been presented in the
most simple possible formulation (for which reason, as we shall see, the formulation
will be only provisional and not definitive).
35 Of the theoretical statisticians, L. von Bortkiewicz stands in a very close
relationship to von Kries' theories. Cf. his "Die erkenntnistheoretischen
Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung" in Conrads' Jahrbucher, 3rd
Series, vol. XVII, (Cf. also vol. XVIII), and "Die Theorie der Bevolkerungs—
und Moralstatistik nach Lexis" (ibid. vol. XXVII). The von Kries' theory
is also basic for A. Tschuprow, whose article on "Moral Statistics" in the
Brockhaus-Ephron Encyclopoedic Dictionary, was unfortunately inaccessible to
me. Cf. his article "Die Aufgaben der Theorie der Statistik" in Schmoller's
Jahrbuch 1905, p. 421 f. I cannot agree with Th. Kistiakowski's criticism (in
the essay, cited earlier, in Problems of Idealism, p. 378 ff.) which for the time
being is, of course, presented only in the form of a sketch with the understanding
that a more detailed presentation is reserved for later publication. His
central charge (p. 379) is that the theory uses a false concept of cause, based
on Mill's Logic; in particular the category of "complex" and "partial cause"
which itself rests on an anthropomorphic interpretation of causality (in the
sense of "efficacy" {Wirkens). (Radbruch also adumbrates the latter point,
op. c''., p. 22 ff.) But the notion of "efficacy" {Wirkens), or as it has been
callec more neutrally but with identical meaning, the "causal bond" is entirely
insep^iable from any study of causes which deals with series of individualized
qualitative changes. We will discuss later the point that the notion of efficacy
need not and must not be encumbered with unnecessary and dubious metaphysical
presuppositions. (Cf. concerning causal plurality and elementary
causes, Tschuprow's exposition, op. cit. p. 436.) We shall only remark here
that "possibility" is a "moulding" "formende" category, i.e., it functions in
168 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
It is natural tliat it was precisely the jurists and primarily the
jurists specializing in criminal law who treated the problem since the
qucsUon of penal guilt, insofar as it involves the problem: under what
circumstances can it be asserted that someone through his action has
"caused" a certain external efTect, is purely a question of causation.
And, indeed, this problem obviously has exactly the same logical
structure as the problem of historical "causality." For, just like
history, the problems of practical social relationships of men and
especially of the legal system, are "anthropocentrically" oriented, i.e.,
they enquire into the causal significance of human "actions." And
just as in the question of the causal determinateness of a concrete
injurious action which is eventually to be punished under criminal
law or for which indemnity must be made under civil law, the historian's
problem of causality also is oriented towards the correlation
of concrete eflfects with concrete causes, and not towards the establishment
of abstract "uniformities" (Gesetzliclikeiten) . Jurisprudence,
and particularly criminal law, however, leaves the area of problems
shared with history for a problem which is specific to it, in consequence
of the emergence of the further problem: if and when the objective
purely causal imputation of an effect to the action of an individual
also suffices to define the actions as one involving his own subjective
"guilt." For this question is no longer a purely causal one, soluble
by the simple establishing of facts which are "objectively" discoversuch
a way as to determine the selection of the causal links to be incorporated
into an historical exposition. The historical material once formed, on the
other hand, contains nothing of "possibility," at least, ideally. Subjectively
for the mind of the historian himself the historical exposition only very seldom
attains judgments of necessity but objectively the historical exposition undoubtedly
is governed by the assumption that the "causes" to which the "cfTect" is
imputed have to be regarded as unqualifiedly the sufficient conditions for its
occurrence. (It is, of course, to be clearly noted that an infinity of conditions
which are only summarily referred to as scientifically "without interest" arc
associated with the causes which are deemed the sufficient conditions of the
cfTect.) The use of the category of objective possibility does not in the least
involve the conception, long overcome by the theory of causality, that certain
links in real causal connections were, so to speak, "hovering about without
efTect" up to the time of their entry into the causal chain. Von Krics himself
has shown the contrast between his theory and John Stuart Mill's (op. cit., p.
107) in a way which is entirely convincing to me. (Concerning this, cf.
infra.) Still it is true that Mill, too, discussed the category of objective possibility
and in doing so, upon occasion also constructed the concept of "adequate
causation." (Cf. Wcrkc, III, p. 262, Gomperz edition.)
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 169
able by perception and causal interpretation. Rather, is it a problem
of criminal policy oriented towards ethical and other values. For it
is a priori possible, actually frequent, and regularly the case today,
that the meaning of legal norms, explicitly stated or elicited by
interpretation, inclines to the view that the existence of "guilt" in the
sense of the applicable law should depend primarily on certain
subjective facts in regard to the agent (e.g., intent, subjectively conditioned
capacity of foresight into the effects, etc.). Under these circumstances,
the import of the logically distinctive characteristics of
pure causal connection will be considerably modified.•'^'^
It is only
in the first stages of the discussion that this difference in the aims of
investigation are without significance. We ask first, in common with
juristic theory, how in general is the attribution of ,1 concrete effect
to an individual "cause" possible and realizable in principle in view
of the fact that in truth an infinity of causal factors have conditioned
the occurrence of the individual "event" and that indeed absolutely
all of those individual causal factors were indispensable for the occurrence
of the effect in its concrete form.
The possibility of selection from among the infinity of the determinants
is conditioned, first, by the mode of our historical interest.
When it is said that history seeks to understand the concrete reality
of an "event" in its individuality causally, what is obviously not meant
by this, as we have seen, is that it is to "reproduce" and explain causally
the concrete reality of an event in the totality of its individual qualities.
To do the latter would be not only actually impossible, it would
also be a task which is meaningless in principle. Rather, history is
exclusively concerned with the causal explanation of those "elements"
3^ Modern law is directed against the agent, not against the action (cf. Radbruch,
op. cit., p. 62). It enquires into subjective "guilt" whereas history, as
long as it seeks to remain an empirical science, inquires into the "objective"
grounds of concrete events and the consequences of concrete 'actions" ; it does
not seek to pass judgment on the agent. Radbruch's criticism of von Kries is
rightly based on this fundamental principle of modern — but not of all — law.
He himself thus concedes, however, the validity of von Kries' theory in cases
of so-called unintended damage, of compensation on account of the "abstract
possibility of an interfering effect," (p. 71) of profit insurance and of the
insurance of those incapable of "responsibility," i.e., wherever "objecti\e"
causality comes clearly into question. History, however, is in exactly the sar.ie
logical situation as those cases.
170 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
and "aspects" of the events in question which are of "general significance"
and hence of historical interest from general standpoints, exactly
in the same way as the judge's deliberations take into account
not the total individualized course of the events of the case but rather
those components of the events which are pertinent for subsumption
under the legal norms. Quite apart from the infinity of "absolutely"
trivial details, the judge is not at all interested in all those things
which can be of interest for other natural scientific, historical and
artistic points of view. He is not interested in whether the fatal
thrust leads to death with incidental phenomena which might be
quite interesting to the physiologist. He is not interested in whether
the appearance of the dead person or the murderer could be a suitable
object of artistic representation ; nor, for instance, in whether the
death will help a non-participating "man behind the scene" to gain
a "promotion" in a bureaucratic hierarchy, i.e., whether from the
latter's standpoint it would therefore be causally "valuable." Nor is
the judge interested in whether the death became, say the occasion
of certain security measures by the police, or perhaps even engendered
certain international conflicts and thus showed itself to be "historically"
significant. All that is relevant for him is whether the causal
chain between the thrust and the death took such a form and the
subjective attitude of the murderer and his relation to the deed was
such that a certain norm of criminal law is applicable. The historian,
on the other hand, is interested in connection, for example, with
Caesar's death, neither in the criminal-legal, nor in the medical problems
which the "case" raises, nor is he interested in the details of the
event — unless they are important either for the "particular characteristic
features" of Caesar or for the "characteristic features" of the
party situation in Rome, i.e., unless they are of import as "heuristic
instruments" or lastly unless they are important in relation to the
"political eflfect" of his death, i.e., as "real causes." Rather, is he
concerned, in this affair, primarily with the fact that the death occurred
under concrete political conditions, and he discusses the question
related thereto, namely, whether this fact had certain important
"consequences" for the course of "world history."
Hence, there is involved in the problem of the assignment of
historical causes to historical effects as well as in the problem of the
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 171
imputation of actions under the law, the exclusion of an infinity of
components of a real action as "causally irrelevant." A given circumstance
is, as we see, unimportant not only when it has no relationship
at all with the event which is under discussion, so that we can conceive
it to be absent without atiy modification in the actual course of
events being introduced; it is indeed sufficient to establish the causal
irrelevance of the given circumstance if the latter appears not to have
been the co-cause of that which alone interests us, i.e., the concretely
essential components of the action in question.
Our real problem is, however: by which logical operations do we
acquire the insight and how can we demonstratively establish that such
a causal relationship exists between those "essential" components of
the effects and certain components among the infinity of determining
factors. Obviously not by the simple "observation" of the course of
events in any case, certainly not if one understands by that a "presuppositionless"
mental "photograph" of all the physical and psychic
events occurring in the space-time region in question — even if such
were possible. Rather, does the attribution of effects to causes take
place through a process of thought which includes a series of abstractions.
The first and decisive one occurs when we conceive of one or
a few of the actual causal components as modified in a certain direction
and then ask ourselves whether under the conditions which have
been thus changed, the same effect (the same, i.e., in "essential"
points) or some other efTect "would be expected." Let us take an
example from Eduard Meyer's own work. No one has set forth the
world historical "significance" of the Persian Wars for the development
of western culture as vividly and clearly as he has. How does
this happen, logically speaking? It takes place essentially in the following
way: it is argued that a "decision" was made between two
"possibilities." The first of these "possibilities" was the development of
a theocratic-religious culture, the beginnings of which lay in the mysteries
and oracles, under the aegis of the Persian protectorate, which
wherever possible utilized, as for example, among the Jews, the national
religion as an instrument of domination. The other possibility
was represented by the triumph of the free Hellenic circle of ideas,
oriented towards this world, which gave us those cultural values from
which we still draw our sustenance. The "decision" was made by a
172 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
contest of the meager dimensions of the "battle" of Marathon. This
in its turn was the indispensible "precondition" of the development
of the Attic fleet and thus of the further development of the war of
liberation, the salvation of the independence of Hellenic culture, the
positive stimulus of the beginnings of the specifically western historiography,
the full development of the drama and all that unique life
of the mind which took place in this — by purely quantitative standards
— miniature theater of world history.
The fact that that battle "decided" between these two "possibilities"
or at least had a great deal to do with the decision, is obviously
— since we are not Athenians — the only reason why we are historically
interested in it. Without an appraisal of those "possibilities" and
of the irreplaceable cultural values which, as it appears to our retrospective
study, "depend" on that decision, a statement regarding its
"significance" would be impossible. Without this appraisal, there
would in truth be no reason why we should not rate that decisive contest
equally with a scuffle between two tribes of Kaffirs or Indians
and accept in all seriousness the dull-witted "fundamental ideas" of
Helmolt's Wcltgeschichte, as has indeed actually been done in that
"modern" collective work.^''' When modern historians, as soon as they
are required by some inquiry to define the "significance" of a concrete
event by explicit reflection on and exposition of the developmental
"possibilities," ask, as is usual, to be forgiven their use of this apparently
anti-deterministic category, their request is without logical justification.
Karl Hampe, for example, in his Conradin, presents a very
instructive exposition of the historical "significance" of the Battle of
Togliacozza, on the basis of weighing the various "possibilities," the
"decision" between which was made by the battle's entirely "accidental"
outcome ("accidental" meaning here: determined by quite
individual tactical events) ; then he suddenly weakens and adds: "But
37 It goes without saying that this judgment dors not apply to the individual
essays contained in this work, some of which are quite distinquished achievements,
although some are thoroughly "old fashioned" methodologically.
The notion of a sort of "social" justice which would —
finally, finally! — take
the contemptibly neglected Kafir and Indian tribes at least as seriously as the
Athenians and which in orde' to make this just treatment really explicit and
pronounced, resorts to a geographical organization of the data, is merely
childish.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 173
history knows no possibilities." To this we must answer: that process
{Geschehen) which, conceived as subject to deterministic axioms,
becomes an "objective thing," knows nothing of "posibihties" because
it "knows" nothing of concepts. "History," however, does recognize
possibiHtics, assuming that it seeks to be a science. In every
Hne of every historical work, indeed in every selection of archival
and source materials for publication, there are, or more correctly,
piust, be, "judgments of possibility," if the publication is to have value
for knowledge.
What, then, is meant when we speak of a number of "possibilities"
between which those contests are said to have "decided"?.. It involves
first the production of — let us say it calmly —"imaginative constructs"
by the disregarding of one or more of those elements of
"reality" which are actually present, and by the mental construction
of a course of events which is altered through modification in one or
more "conditions." Even the first step towards an historical judgment
is thus — this is to be emphasized — a process of abstraction. This
process proceeds through the analysis and mental isolation of the components
of the directly given data — which are to be taken as a
complex of possible causal relations — and should culminate in a synthesis
of the "real" causal complex. Even this first step thus transforms
the given "reality" into a "mental construct" in order to make it into
an historical fact. In Goethe's words, "theory" is involved in the
"fact."
If now one examines these "judgments of possibility"— i.e., the
propositions regarding what "would" happen in the event of the exclusion
or modification of certain conditions — somewhat more closely
and inquires: how are we really to arrive at them — there can be
no doubt that it, is a matter of isolations and generalizations. This
means that we so decompose the "given" into "components" that
every one of them is fitted into an "empirical rule" ; hence, that it can
be determined what effect each of them, with others present as "conditions,"
"could be expected" to have, in accordance with an empirical
rule. A judgment of "possibility" in the sense in which the expression
is used here, means, then, the continuous reference to "empirical
rules" {Erjahrungsregeln) . The category of "possibility" is thus not
used in its negative form. It is, in other words, not an expression of
174 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
our Ignorance or incomplete knowledge in contrast with the assertative
or apodictic judgment. Rather, to the contrary, it signifies here the
reference to a positive knowledge of the "laws of events," to our
"nomological" knowledge, as they say.
When the question whether a certain train has already passed a
station is answered "it is possible," this assertion means that the person
who answered the question subjectively does not know the facts,
which would exclude this belief, but that he is also not in a position
to argue for its correctness. It means, in other words, "jiot knowing."
If, however, Eduard Meyer judges that a theocratic-religious development
in Hellas at the time of the Battle of Marathon was "possible,"
or in certain eventualities, "probable," this means, on the contrary,
the assertion that certain components of the historically given situation
were objectively present; that is, their presence was such as can now
be ascertained with objective validity, and that they were, when we
imagine the Battle of Marathon as not having happened or as having
happened differently (including, naturally, a host of other components
of the actual course of events), "capable" according to general empirical
rules, of producing such a theocratic-religious development, as we
.might say in borrowing for once from criminological terminology.
The "knowledge" on which such a judgment of the "significance" of
the Battle of Marathon rests is, in the light of all that we have said
hitherto, on the one hand, knowledge of certain "facts," ("ontological"
knowledge), "belonging" to the "historical situation" and ascertainable
on the basis of certain sources, and on the other — as we have
already seen — knowledge of certain known empirical rules, particularly
those relating to the ways in which human beings are prone to
react under given situations ("nomological knowledge"). The type
of "validity" of these "empirical rules" will be considered later. In
any case, it is clear that in order to demonstrate his thesis which is
decisive for the "significance" of the Battle of Marathon, Eduard
Meyer must, if it is challenged, analyze that "situation" into its
"components" down to the point where our "imagination" can apply
to this "ontological" knowledge our "nomological" knowledge which
has been derived from our own experience and our knowledge of the
conduct of others. When this has been done, then we can render
a positive judgment that the joint action of those facts — including
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 175
the conditions which have been conceived as modified in a certain
way — "could" bring about the cfTcct which is asserted to be "objectively
possible." This can only mean, in other words, that // we
"conceived" the effect as having actually occurred under the modified
conditions we would then recognize those facts thus modified to be
"adequate causes."
This rather extensive formulation of a simple matter, which was
required for the sake of clearing away ambiguity, shows that the formulation
of propositions about historical causal connections not only
makes use of both types of abstraction, namely, isolation and generalization;
it shows also that the simplest historical judgment concerning
the historical "significance" of a "concrete fact" is far removed from
being a simple registration of something "found" in an already finished
form. The simplest historical judgment represents not only a
categorially formed intellectual construct but it also does not acquire
a valid content until we bring to the "given" reality the whole body
of our "nomological" empirical knowledge.
The historian will assert against this, correctly, that the actual
course of historical work and the actual content of historical
writing follows a different path. The historian's "sense of the situation."
his "intuition" uncover causal interconnections — not generalizations
and reflections of "rules." The contrast with the natural
sciences consists indeed precisely in the fact that the historian deals
with the explanation of events and personalities which are "interpreted"
and "understood" by direct analogy with our own intellectual,
spiritual and psychological constitution. In the historical treatise it
is repeatedly altogether a question of the "sense of the situation," of
the suggestive vividness of its account report which allows the reader
to "empathize" with what has been depicted in the same way as that
in which it is experienced and concretely grasped by the historian's
own intuition, for the historian's account has not been produced by
"clever" ratiocination. Moreover, it is further asserted, an objective
judgment of possibility regarding what "would" have happened according
to the general empirical rules, when a causal component is
conceived as excluded or as modified, is often highly uncertain and
often cannot be arrived at at all. Hence, such a basis for the attribution
of causes in history must in fact be permanently renounced, and
176 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
thus it cannot be a constitutive element in the logical value of historical
knowledge.
Arguments such as these confuse, basically, problems of distinct
character. They confuse the psychological course of the origin of
scientific knowledge and "artistic" form of presenting what is known,
which is selected for the purpose of influencing the reader psychologically
on one hand, with the logical structure of knowledge, on the
other.
Ranke "divines" the past, and even the advancement of knowledge
by an historian of lesser rank, is poorly served if he does not
possess this "intuitive" gift. Where this is so, he remains a kind of
lower rung-bureaucrat in the historical enterprise. But it is absolutely
no different with the really great advances in knowledge in
mathematics and the natural sciences. They all arise intuitively in
the intuitive flashes of imagination as hypotheses which are then "verified"
vis-a-vis the facts, i.e., their validity is tested in procedures involving
the use of already available empirical knowledge and they arc
"formulated" in a logically correct way. The same is true in history:
when we insist here on the dependence of the knowledge of the "essential"
on the use of the concept of objective possibility, we assert nothing
at all about the psychologically interesting question which does not,
however, concern us here, namely, how does an historical hypothesis
arise in the mind of the investigator? We are here concerned only
with the question of the logical category under which the hypothesis
is to be demonstrated as valid in case of doubt or dispute, for it is that
which determines its logical "structure." And if the historian's mode
of presentation communicates the logical result of his historical causal
judgments to the reader with reasoning in a manner which dispenses
with the adduction of the evidence for his knowledge, i.e., if he "suggests"
the course of events rather than pedantically "ratiocinating"
about it, his presentation would be an historical novel and not at all
a scientific finding, as long as the firm skeletal structure of established
causes behind the artistically formed facade is lacking. The dry
approach of logic is concerned only with this skeletal structure for even
the historical exposition claims "validity" as "truth." The most important
phase of historical work \vhich we have hitherto considered,
namely, the establishment of the causal regress, attains such validity
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 177
only when, in the event of challenge, it is able to pass the test of the
use of the category' of objective possibility which entails the isolation
and generalization of the causal individual components for the purpose
of ascertaining the possibility of the synthesis of certain conditions
into adequate causes.
It is, however, now clear that the causal analysis of personal
actions proceeds logically in exactly the same way as the causal analysis
of the "historical significance" of the Battle of Marathon, i.e., by
isolation, generalization and the construction of judgments of possibility.
Let us take a limiting case : the reflective analysis of one's ow7i
action of which logically untrained sentiment tends to believe that it
certainly does not present any "logical problems" whatsoever, since
one's action is directly given in experience and — asuming mental
"health"^— is "understandable" without further ado and hence is
naturally "reproducible" in memory directly. Very simple reflections
show that it is not, however, so, and that the "valid" answer to the
question: why did I act in that way, constitutes a categorially formed
construct which is to be raised to the level of the demonstrable judgment
only by the use of abstractions. This is true even though the
"demonstration" is in fact here conducted in the mind of the "acting
person" himself.
Let us assume a temperamental young mother who is tired of
certain misdeeds of her little child, and as a good German who does
not pay homage to the theory contained in Busch's fine lines, "Superficial
is the rod — only the mind's power penetrates the soul," gives
it a solid cuff. Let us further assume that she is sufficiently "sicklied
o'er with the pale cast of thought" to give a few moments of reflection
after the deed has been done to the question of the "pedagogical
utility," of the "justice" of the cuff, or at least of the considerable "expenditure
of energy" involved in the action. Or still better, let us
assume that the howls of the child release in the paterfamilias, who,
as a German, is convinced of his superior understanding of everything,
including the rearing of children, the need to remonstrate with "her"
on "teleological" grounds. Then "she" will, for example, expound
the thought and offer it as an excuse that if at that moment she had
not been, let us assume, "agitated" by a quarrel with the cook, that
the aforementioned disciplinary procedure would not have been used
178 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
at all or would not have been applied "in that way" ; she will be inclined
to admit to him: "he really knows that she is not ordinarily in
that state." She refers him thereby to his "empirical knowledge"
regarding her "usual motives," which in the vast majority of all the
generally possible constellations would have led to another, less irrational
effect. She claims, in other words, that the blow which she
delivered was an "accidental" and not an "adequately" caused reaction
to the behavior of her child, to anticipate the terminology which we
shall shortly employ.
This domestic dialogue has thus sufficed to turn the experience in
question into a categorially formed "object." Even though, exactly
like Molicre's philistine who learned to his pleasant surprise that he
had been speaking "prose" all his life, the young woman would cei"tainly
be astounded if a logician showed her that she had made a
causal "imputation" just like an historian, that, to this end, she had
made "judgments of objective possibility" and had "operated" with the
category of "adequate causation," which we shall shortly discuss more
closely — yet such is precisely and inevitably the case from the point
of view of logic. Rcfletive knowledge, even of one's own experience,
is nowhere and never a literally "repeated experience" or a simple
"photograph" of what was experienced; the "experience," when it
is made into an "object," acquires perspectives and interrelationships
which were not "known" in the experience itself. The idea
formed in later reflection, of one's own past action is no different in
this respect from the idea so formed of a past concrete natural event
in the external world, which had been experienced by one's self or
which was reported by someone else. It will probably not be necessary
to elucidate further''^ the universal validity of this proposition
.38 We will here consider briefly only one more example which K. Vossler (op.
rit., p. 101 ff. ) analyzes in order to illustrate why there must be failure in
the construction of "laws." He mentions certain linguistic idiosyncrasies
which, within his family, "an Italian linguistic island in the sea of German
speech," were developed by his children and imitated by the parents in
their conversations with the children; its origin goes back to quite concrete
stimuli which are still completely clear in his memory. He then asks:
What does folk psychology, and we may add in accordance with his outlook,
any "law-seeking science," still wish to explain in these cases of linguistic
development? The event, considered in and of itself, is in fact prima facie
fully explained and nonetheless, this does not imply that it cannot be an object
for further elaboration and use. First, the fact that the causal relationship is
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES .79
with complicated examples, or to state expressly, that we proceed logically
in the same way in the analysis of a decision of Napoleon or
Bismarck as we did in the example of our German mother.
The distinction that the "inward aspect" of the action which is
to be analyzed is directly given to her in her own memory, whereas we
must "interpret" the action of a third party from the "outside," is,
despite the naive prejudice to the contrary, only a gradual continuous
definitely discoverable could (at least conceivably—we are only arguing the
possibility) be used as an heuristic means in order to test other events of
linguistic development in order to see whether the same causal relationship
can be confirmed as probable in their case. This requires, however, from a
logical standpoint, the subsumption of the concrete case under a general rule.
Vossler himself has also formulated the rule as follows: "the more frequently
used forms attract the less frequently used ones." But that is not enough. We
have said that the causal explanation of the case in question was prima facte
inadequate. But it must not be forgotten that every individual causal complex,
even the apparently "simplest," can be infinitely subdivided and analzyed.
The point at which we halt in this process is determined only by our causal
interests at the time. And in the present case, nothing at all is said to the
effect that our causal need must be satisfied with the "objective" process enunciated
in the rule. Precise observation would possibly, for example, show that
the very "attraction" which conditioned the children's linguistic innovations
and similarly the parental imitation of this juvenile linguistic creation took
place to a very different extent for different word-forms. The question could
then be raised whether something might not be said about why for given wordforms,
the attraction or the imitation did not happen more frequently or less
frequently or did not appear at all. Our need for causal explanation would
be satisfactorily met only when the conditions of this frequency of occurrence
were formulated in rules and the concrete case could be "explained" as a
particular constellation arising from the "joint action" of such rules under
concrete "conditions." At this point Vossler would have the repulsive search
for laws, isolation, generalization in the very intimacy of his home. And
what is more, through his own fault. For his own general conception, "Analogy
is a question of psychic power," compels us quite inescapably to ask the question
whether absolutely nothing general can be discovered and stated about
the "psychic" conditions of such "psychic power relations." And at first
glance it forcibly draws in — in this formulation — what appears to be Vossler's
chief enemy, namely, "psychology," into the question. Whenever in the
concrete case, we content ourselves with the simple presentation of what concretely
occurred, the reason for this may be twofold—: first: those "rules"
which could be discovered, for instance, by further analysis would, in the given
case, probably not afford any new insights for science — in other words, the
concrete event is not very significant as a "heuristic means" ; and second, that
the concrete occurrence itself, because it became effective only in a narrow
circle, had not universal significance for linguistic development, and thus remained
"insignificant" as a "real historical cause." Only the limits of our
interest, then, and not its logical meaninglessness account for the fact that the
occurrence of the formulation of linguistic idiosyncrasies in Vossler's family
presumably remains exempt from "conceptualization."
180 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
difference in the degree of accessibility and completeness of the "data."
We are indeed always inclined to believe that if we find the "personality"
of a human being "complicated" and difficult to interpret,
that he himself must be able to furnish us with the decisive information
if he really honestly wished to do so. We will not discuss further
at this point either the fact that or the reason why this is not so —
or, indeed, why the contrary is often the case.
Let us turn rather to a closer examination of category of
"objective possibility" which we have thus far dealt with only very
generally in respect to its function. We shall examine in particular
the question of the modality of the "validity" of the "judgment of
possibility." The question should be asked: whether the introduction
of "possibilities" into the "causal enquiry" implies a renunciation of
causal knowledge altogether; whether in spite of all that has been
said above about the "objective" foundation of the judgment of possibility
— in view of the relegation of the determination of the "possible"
course of events to the "imagination"^—- the recognition of the
significance of this category is not equivalent to the admission that the
door is wide open to subjective arbitrariness in "historiography." Is
not the "scientific" status of historiography therefore destroyed by the
very use of this category? In fact, what "would" have happened if
a certain conditioning factor had been conceived of or modified in a
certain way — this question, it will be asserted, is often not answerable
definitely with any degree of probability by the use of general
empirical rules even where the "ideal" completeness of the source
materials exists. '^'^
However, that ideal completeness of source materials
is not unconditionally required. The assessment of the causal
significance of an historical fact will begin with the posing of the following
question : in the event of the exclusion of that fact from the
complex of the factors which are taken into account as co-determinants,
or in the event of its modification in a certain direction, could
the course of events, in accordance with general empirical rules, have
taken a direction in any way different in any features which would
be decisive for our interest? For we are indeed concerned only with
^^ The attempt to hypothesize in a positive way what "would" have happened
can, if it is made, lead to grotesque results.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 181
this, namely, how are those "aspects" of the phenomenon which interest
us affected by the individual co-determinant factors? It we cannot
obtain a corresponding "judgment of objective possibility" to this
essentially negatively posed question, or — what amounts to the same
thing — if in the case of the exclusion or modification of the aforementioned
fact, the course of events in regard to historically important
features, i.e., those of interest to us, could in accordance with
the state of our present knowledge, be expected to occur, in the light
of general empirical rules, in the way in which it had actually occurred,
then that fact is indeed causally insignificant and absolutely does not
belong to the chain which the regressive causal analysis of history
seeks to establish and should establish.
The two shots fired in Berlin on that March night belong, according
to Eduard Meyer, almost entirely in this class of causally insignificant
facts. It is possible that they do not belong there completely
because even on his view of the matter, it is conceivable that the
moment of the outbreak might at least have been con-determined by
them, and a later moment might have led to a different course of
development.
If, however, in accordance with our empirical knowledge, the
causal relevance of a factor can be assumed in regard to the points
which are important for the concrete study which is under way, the
judgment of objective possibility which asserts this relevance is capable
of a whole range of degrees of certainty. The view of Eduard Meyer
that Bismarck's "decision" "led" to the War of 1866 in a sense quite
different from those two shots, led to the events of '48, involves the
argument that if we were to disregard this decision from our analysis,
the other remaining determinants of the situation in '66 would force
us to accept as having a "high degree" of objective possibility a development
which would be quite different (in "essential" respects!).
This other development would have included, for instance, the conclusion
of the Prussian-Italian Treaty, the peaceful renunciation of
Venice, the coalition of Austria with France, or at least a shift in the
military and political situation which would have, in fact, made Napolean
the "master of the situation."
The judgment of "objective" possibility admits gradations of degree
and one can form an idea of the logical relationship which is
182 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
involved by looking for help in principles which are applied in the
analysis of the "calculus of probability." Those causal components
to the effect of which the judgment refers are conceived as isolated
and distinguished from the totality of all the conditions which are at
all conceivable as interacting with them. One then asks how the
entire complex of all those conditions with the addition of which
those isolatedly conceived components were "calculated" to bring
about the "possible" effect, stands in relation to the complex of all
those conditions, the addition of which would not have "foreseeably"
led to the effect. One naturally cannot in any way arrive by this
operation at an estimate of the relationship between these two possibilities
which will be in any sense "numerical." This would be attainable
only in the sphere of "absolute chance" (in the logical sense),
i.e., in cases where — for example, as in the throwing of dice, or the
drawing balls of various colors from an urn, unaflfected in composition
by the drawings therefrom — given a very large number of cases,
certain simple and unambiguous conditions remain absolutely the
same. Also, all the other conditions, however, vary in a way which
is absolutely inaccessible to our knowledge. And, those "features" of
the effects concerning which there is interest — in the throwing of
dice, the number of eyes which are uppermost, in the drawing from
the urn, the color of the ball — are so determined as to their "possibility"
by those constant and unambiguous conditions (the structure
of the dice, the composition of the urn), that all other conceivable
conditions, show no causal relationship to those "possibilities" expressible
in a general empirical proposition. The way in which I grasp and
shake the dice box before the toss is an absolutely determining causal
component of the number of eyes which I concretely toss — but there
is no possibility whatsoever, despite all superstitions about the "bones,"
of even thinking of an empirical proposition which will assert that a
certain way of grasping the box and shaking it is "calculated" to
favor the toss of a certain number of eyes. Such causality is, then,
wholly a "chance" causality, i.e., we are justified in asserting that the
physical style of the thrower has no influence "stateable in a rule" on
the chances of tossing a certain number of eyes. With every style the
"chances" of each of the six possible sides of the dice to come out
facing upwards are "equal." On th(" other hand, there is a general
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 183
empirical proposition which asserts that where the center of gravity
of the dice is displaced, there is a "favorable chance" for a certain
side of these "loaded" dice to come out uppermost., whatever other
concrete determinants arc also present. We can even express numerically
the degree of this "favorable chance," of this "objective possibility,"
by sufficiently frequent repetition of the toss. Despite the
familiar and fully justified notice which warns against the transference
of the principles of the calculus of probabilities into other domains, it
is clear that the latter case of favorable chance or "objective probability,"
determined from general empirical propositions or from
empirical frequencies, has its analogues in the sphere of all concrete
causality, including the historical. The only difference is that it is
precisely here in the sphere of concrete causality that ability to assign
a numerical measure of chance is wholly lacking since this presupposes
the existence of "absolute chance" or certain measurable or countable
aspects of phenomena or results as the sole object of scientific interest.
But despite this lack, we can not only very well render generally valid
judgments which assert that as a result of certain situations, the occurrence
of a type of reaction, identical in certain respects, on the part
of those persons who confront these situations, is "favored" to a more
or less high degree. When we formulate such a proposition, we are
indeed also in a position to designate a great mass of possible circumstances
which, even if added to the original conditions, do not affect
the validity of the general rule under which the "favoring" of the
occurrence in question is to be expected. And we can finally estimate
the degree to which a certain efTect is "favored" by certain "conditions"—
although we cannot do it in a way which will be perfectly
unambiguous or even in accordance with the procedures of the calculus
of probability. We can, however, well enough estimate the relative
"degree" to which the outcome is "favored" by the general rule by a
comparison involving the consideration of how other conditions operating
differently "would" have "favored" it. When we carry through
this comparison in our imagination by sufficiently numerous conceivable
modifications of the constellation of conditions, then a considerable
degree of certainty for a judgment of the "degree" of objective
possibility is conceivable, at least in principle,— and it is only its conceivability
in principle which concerns us here primarily. Not only
184 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
in daily life but also and indeed in history we constantly use such
judgments regarding the degree to which an effect is "favored"
—
indeed, without them, a distinction of the causally "important" and
"unimportant" would simply not be possible. Even Eduard Meyer in
the work which we are discussing here has used them without hesitation.
If both of those shots, which have been frequently mentioned,
were causally "irrelevant" because "any accident whatsoever" according
to Eduard Meyer's view, which we shall not criticize for actual
correctness here, "must have caused the conflict to break out," this
means, at any rate, that in the given historical constellation certain
"conditions" are conceptually isolatable which would have led to that
effect in a preponderantly great majority of instances given even the
co-presence in that constellation of other possible conditions; while at
the same time, the range of such conceivable causal factors, that given
their addition to the original constellation, other effects (i.e., "other"
with respect to aspects decisive for our interest!) would seem to us to
be probable, appears as relatively very limited. We will not accept
Eduard Meyer's view that the chance of any other effect was indeed
equal to zero, despite his use of the words "must have" in view of his
heavy emphasis on the irrationality of historical events.
We shall designate as cases of "adequate" causation*^ in accordance
with the linguistic usage of the theorists of legal causality established
since the work of von Kries, those cases in which the relationship of
certain complexes of "conditions" synthesized into a unity by historical
reflection and conceived as isolated, to an "effect" that occurred,
belongs to the logical type which was mentioned last. And just like
Eduard Meyer — who, however, does not define the concept clearly —
we shall speak of "chance" causation where, for the historically relevant
components of the result, certain facts acted to produce an effect
which was not "adequate," in the sense just spoken of in relation to a
complex of conditions conceptually combined into a "unity."
To return to the examples which we used above, the "significance"
of the Battle of Marathon according to Eduard Meyer's view is to be
stated in the following logical terms: it is not the case that a Persian
victory must have led to a quite different development of Hellenic and
^0 Of such and such components of the effect by such and such conditions.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 185
therewith of world cuhure — such a judgment would be quite impossible.
Rather is that significance to be put as follows : that a different
development of Hellenic and world culture "would have" been the
"adequate" effect of such an event as a Persian victory. The logically
correct formulation of Eduard Meyer's statement about the unification
of Germany, to which von Below objects, would be: this unification
can be made understandable, in the light of general empirical rules,
as the "adequate" effect of certain prior events and in the same way
the March Revolution in Berlin is intelligible on the basis of general
empirical rules as the "adequate" effect of certain general social and
political "conditions." If, on the contrary, for example, it were to
be argued convincingly that without those two shots in front of the
Berlin Castle, a revolution "would," in the light of general empirical
rules, have been avoidable with a decidedly high degree of probability,
because it could be shown in the light of general empirical rules that
the combination of the other "conditions" would not, or at least not
considerably, have "favored"—in the sense explained before the out-
break
—
without the intervention of those shots, then we would speak of
"chance" causation and we should, in that case—a case, to be sure, very
difficult to envisage—have to "impute" the March Revolution to those
two shots. In the example of the unification of Germany, the opposite
of "chance" is not, as von Below thought, "necessity," but rather
"adequate" in the sense, which, following von Kries, we developed
above.*^ And it should be firmly emphasized that in this contrast of
"chance" and "adequate," it is never a matter of distinction pertaining
to the "objective" causality of the course of historical events and their
causal relationships but is rather always altogether a matter of our
isolating, by abstraction, a part of the "conditions" which are embedded
in "the raw materials" of the events and of making them into
objects of judgments of possibility. This is done for the purpose of
gaining insight, on the basis of empirical rules, into the causal "significance"
of individual components of the events. In order to pene*^
We shall deal later with the question of whether and to what extent wc
have the means of assuring the "degree" of adequacy, and whether so-called
"analogies" play a role here, and if so, which role they play particularly in
the analysis of complex "total causes" into their "components"—since no
"analytical key" is objectively given to us. The present formulation is necessarily
provisional.
186 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
trate to the real causal interrelationships, we construct unreal ones.
The fact that abstractions are involved in this process is misunderstood
especially frequently and in a quite specific way which has its
counterpart in theories of certain writers on legal causality who base
their views on John Stuart Mill's views and which has been convincingly
criticized in the previously cited work of von Kries.*"
Mill held that the fraction numerically expressing the degree of
probability of an expected result indicated the relationship between
causes which act to bring about the result and those which act to
"prevent" the same, both kinds of causes existing objectively at the
given moment of time. Following Mill, Binding asserts that between
those conditions "which act for the realization of a given result" and
those "resisting" it, there is in some cases a numerically determinable
relationship, (or, in any case, one which can be estimated) which
objectively exists; under certain conditions, in a "state of equilibrium."
The process of causation occurs, according to Binding, when the former
kind of condition outweighs the latter.*-"^ It is quite clear that here
the phenomenon of the "conflict of motives" which presents itself
as an immediate "experience" in deliberation concerning human
"actions" has been transformed into a basis for the theoiy of causality.
Whatever general significance may be attributed to this phenomenon,*'*
it is, however, certain no rigorous causal analysis, even in history, can
accept this anthropomorphism."*^
^^ I scarcely mention the extent to which here again, as in so much of the preceding
argument, I am "plundering" von Kries' ideas. While at the same
time the formulation thereof is often necessarily inferior in precision to von
Kries' own statement. But both of these deficiencies are unavoidable in view
of the purposes of the present study.
^•^ Binding, Die Normen und ihre Ubertretung, I, p. 41 flf. Cf. also von Kries,
op. cit., p. 107.
** H. Gomperz, Uber die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Willensentscheidungen,
Vienna, 1904. (OflT-print from Sitzungsberichten der Wiener Akademie, Philosophisch-Hislorische
Klasse, vol. 149), has used the phenomenon referred to
as the basis of a phcnomenological theory of "decision." I will not take it
upon myself to pass a judgment on the value of his presentation of the process.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that apart from this, Windelband's — intentionally,
for his own purposes —- purely conceptual-analytical identification of the
"stronger" motive with the one which ultimately "precipitates" the decision
in its favor is not the only possible wav of dealing with the problem. (Cf.
Uber Willensjreiheit, p. 36 fT.)
^" Kistiakowski is right to this extent. Op. cit.
THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES 187
Not only is the conception of two "opposed" working "forces" a
spatial and physical image which can be used without self-deception
only in discussing events — particularly those which are mechanical
and physical in nature — which involve two physical "opposite" results,
each of which can be realized only by the one or the other of
the "opposed" forces. Rather it is to be emphasized once and for all
that a concrete result cannot be viewed as the product of a struggle
of certain causes favoring it and other causes opposing it. The situation
must, instead, be seen as follows: the totality of all the conditions
back to which the causal chain from the "effect" leads had to "act
jointly" in a certain way and in no other for the concrete effect to be
realized. In other words, the appearance of the result is, for every
causally working empirical science, determined not just from a certain
moment but "from eternity." When, then, we speak of "favoring"
and "obstructing" conditions of a given result, we cannot mean thereby
that certain conditions have exerted themselves in vain in the concrete
case to hinder the result eventually realized, while others, despite the
former ultimately succeeded in bringing it about, rather the expression
in question must always and without exception mean only this: that
certain components of the reality which preceded the result in time,
isolated conceptually, generally in accordance with general empirical
rules, favor a result of the type in question. This means, however,
as we know, that this result is brought about by those previously
mentioned components of reality in the majority of the conceivably
possible combinations with other conditions which are conceived of
as possible while certain other combinations generally do not produce
this result but rather another. When Eduard Meyer, for example,
says of cases where (p. 27) "Everything pressed towards a certain
result," it is a question of a generalizing and isolating abstraction
and not of the reproduction of a course of events which in fact
occurred. What is meant, however, if correctly formulated logically,
is simply that we can observe causal "factors" and can conceptually
isolate them, and that expected rules must be thought of as standing
in a relationship of adequacy to those factors, while relatively few
combinations are conceivable of those conceptually isolated "factors"
with other causal "factors" from which another result could be "exj)ccted"
in accordance with general empirical rules. In instances
188 THE LOGIC OF THE CULTURAL SCIENCES
where the situation is in our conception of it just as it is described by
Eduard Meyer, we speak'*^ of the presence of a "developmental tendency"
oriented toward the result in question.
This, like the use of images such as "driving forces" or the reverse
"obstacles" to a development, e.g., of capitalism — no less than the
usage which asserts that a certain "rule" of causal relationship is
"transcended" in a concrete case by certain causal linkages or (still
more imprecisely) a "law" is "overruled" by another "law"— all such
designations are irreproachable if one is always conscious of their conceptual
character, i.e., as long as one bears in mind that they rest on
the abstraction of certain components of the real causal chain, on the
conceptual generalization of the rest of the components in the form
of judgments of objective possibility, and on the use of these to mould
the event into a causal complex with a certain structure.*^ It is not
sufficient for us that in this case one agrees and remains aware that
all our "knowledge" is related to a categorially formed reality, and
that, for example, "causality" is a category of "our" thought. Causality
has a special character^^ when it is a question of the "adequacy"
of causation. Although we do not in so doing intend to present an
exhaustive analysis of this category of adequate causation, still it will
be necessary at least to present one briefly in order to clarify the
strictly relative nature of the distinction between "adequate" and
"chance" causation which is determined by any of the possible goals
of knowledge. This will have to be done in order to make understandable
how the frequently very uncertain content of the proposition
included in a "judgment of possibility" harmonizes with the claim
to validity which it nonetheless asserts and with its usefulness in the
construction of causal sequences which exists in spite of the iuk ertainty
of the content.'*''^
46 The unattractiveness of the words docs not afTcct the existence of the logical
matter in any way.
*'''
It is only where this is forgotten — as happens, of course, often enough —
that Kistiakowski's criticisms (op. cit. ) concerning the "metaphysical" character
of this causal approach are justified.
"^^ Here, too, the decisive viewpoints have been in part explicitly presented,
and in part touched upon by von Kries (op. cit.) and by Radbruch (op. cit.).
'*^ A further essay was to have followed.
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