

Diplomacy in East Asia

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Japanese Public Diplomacy (cont from last lecture) Sport Diplomacy, Informal Diplomacy and Panda Diplomacy

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Final Test - Questions

- Define and discuss the terms: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
- Diplomacy and Foreign policy making & leadership in East Asia
- Discuss the Public Diplomacy and provide examples
- Discuss the Cultural Diplomacy and provide examples
- Discuss the Coercive Diplomacy and provide examples
- Discuss the Economic Diplomacy and provide examples
- Discuss the Sport Diplomacy and provide examples

Final Test - Questions

- Discuss the soft and hard tools of Coercive diplomacy
- Discuss the role of diplomats in diplomacy
- Discuss the role of culture in diplomacy

The Trajectory Of Japan's Public Diplomacy In Three Phases

- Phase I: 1945-1950s
- Right after the World War II, Japan faced the challenge of transforming its image as a militaristic aggressor into that of a democratic, peace-loving nation. Japan's public diplomacy avoided material likely to arouse associations with the way of the samurai and with other elements of Japan's feudal past. Instead, it highlighted benign facets of Japanese culture, such as the tea ceremony and ikebana (flower arranging). Ikebana has remained to this day an emphasis in Japan's diplomatic PR, as seen in photographic calendars published and distributed annually. The government provided comparatively little support for overseas Japanese-language education until recent years. That was in deference to bad memories of imperial Japan's imposition of its language on its colonies. Also, Japan in the early postwar years lacked much latitude for the exercise of public diplomacy. Two obvious constraints in the era, which coincided with the Allied occupation, were Japan's shaky political foundation and a general shortage of resources.

- Phase II: 1960s-80s
- The US-Japan trade imbalance had become a contentious issue by the early 1960s, and the U.S. government had clamped limits on imports of Japanese textiles. US-Japanese relations would suffer another blow in 1971 in the form of a series of "Nixon shocks." Then-president Richard Nixon, without consulting his foreign counterparts, ended the convertibility between the dollar and gold and, also without prior consultation with the United States' allies, announced plans to visit China. In 1972, Japan's parliament passed the bill that provided for establishing the Japan Foundation in the name of promoting mutual understanding. It was also during this period that Japan's economic inroads in Southeast Asia had exacerbated latent ill will. People had come to regard Japanese as "economic animals." A popular epithet was "banana," yellow (Asian) on the outside but white (Western) on the inside. The animosity had boiled over into a vitriolic boycott of Japanese goods in Thailand in 1972. Southeast Asia also became a focus of Japanese public diplomacy in the late 1970s on par with the United States. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even published a condensed version in English of Chie Nakanishi's "Tateshakai no Ningenkankai" (human relations in vertical society) and distributed it in the United States, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Japan's public diplomacy became more assertive but thus remained reactive in its nature.

- Phase III: 1990s-present
- Calls arose in the United States and Europe in the 1980s for Japan to shoulder more responsibility as a member of the global community. Pressure mounted for Japan to provide support for multilateral peacekeeping operations and similar undertakings and to expand its government development assistance and other economic assistance for developing nations. Japan's burgeoning trade surplus with the United States had become an especially vexing problem. The nations' mutual-security arrangements, meanwhile, had long been a nagging source of mutual discontent. And that discontent had worsened amid U.S. dissatisfaction with Japan's contribution to the United Nations-authorized military action in the Gulf War. In 1991, the Japanese government invested \$0 billion in establishing the Center for Global Partnership (CGP) inside the Japan Foundation. Its founding mandate was to promote U.S.-Japanese cooperation in policy initiatives aimed at addressing global issues of mutual concern: for example, supporting democratization in developing nations, addressing threats to the environment, and combating contagious diseases. Unsurprisingly some in the United States viewed the Center warily as a vehicle for Japanese lobbying. The Japanese defused that criticism, however, by placing the Center under the supervision of a council that comprised American and Japanese members and by investing the Center with a full and convincing measure of autonomy inside the Japan Foundation. The establishment of CGP was a turning point in the history of Japanese public diplomacy. Establishing the Center was, to be sure, a reactive, rather than proactive, measure. Japan was, as always, scrambling to quell foreign criticism and to dampen bilateral frictions. But the Center attained an importance that transcended its initial purpose of dealing with issues that had arisen in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Its approach was a refreshing departure from Japan's all-too-familiar reliance on hackneyed pleas for understanding of the nation's "special circumstances." The Center marked a new departure in tackling global issues of multinational concern through a genuinely bilateral and sometimes multilateral approach.

- RECENT FOCUSES
- Cool Japan
- Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry embarked on a national branding campaign in 2011 to promote Japanese "content industries" internationally under the moniker "Cool Japan." That presumably reflects a sense of crisis about the long-term decline in Japanese manufacturing and a determination to offset the economic impact of that decline by promoting creative, post-manufacturing industries. But it also reflects informed perceptions of a genuine basis—a cultural commonality among East Asia, North America, and other regions—for chic national branding. What's cool about "Cool Japan," in other words, rests on a foundation of regionally and even globally shared culture. From a public diplomacy perspective, "Cool Japan" is valuable as a "gateway" to Japan, especially for the young generations of foreign countries. Some of them might choose to study Japanese language and culture, visit Japan, or even pursue Japan-related careers. They tend to have a more nuanced and contextual understanding of Japan, instead of being susceptible to soundbites, even at the time when the bilateral relations get sour.

- Human Security and Life Infrastructure
- In recent years, Japan's public diplomacy has addressed the international public interest in the spirit of "human security." And Japan's increasingly proactive stance in public diplomacy will benefit from the nation's history of creative and effective responses to adverse circumstances and events. That history and its legacy are just as valuable as pop culture and content industries in asserting an identity as

- "Cool Japan:" innovation in energy conservation and material recycling as a nation blessed with little in the way of energy resources and other natural resources; an extensive, systematic commitment to preserving environmental quality and maintaining healthful public sanitation as a nation that has experienced serious pollution; miraculous reconstruction efforts and a deep-rooted commitment to peace as a nation that has suffered calamitous natural disasters and devastating war. All of these and other challenges present a confluence of national interests and international interests. Japan's growing emphasis in public diplomacy on shared experience is part of a broader shift to proactive approaches in that realm.

- Liberal International Order Japan's diplomacy priority, including public diplomacy, is to preserve, protect and defend the "liberal international order" based on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free trade, et al. This is especially so when anti-liberal phenomena such as the spread of terrorism, the rise of authoritarian states, the unilateral change of status quo by force, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, et al. have become conspicuous.

- Bilateral Public Diplomacy One of the highlights of the bilateral public diplomacy events in recent years was President Barack Obama's visit to Hiroshima and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Pearl Harbor. Although the case of France-Germany relations is often referred to as a role model of post-war reconciliation, the case of the United States and Japan is no less dramatic and historic, particularly when cultural differences and geographic distance are taken into account. To date, the bilateral relation remains stable and strong, at least far better than many in Japan

- had feared at the inauguration of President Donald Trump. I would say, facing the common threat of nuclear North Korea, the alliance has never been more resilient. Bear in mind here that Japan retains high priority in U.S. public diplomacy. Interesting evidence of that priority is the number of American Centers in Japan. American Centers are public affairs outlets run by the U.S. State Department in nations worldwide. Japan is home to fully five Centers, in Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka. That is an unusually large number for an industrialized nation, because the United States, like other Western nations, is shifting its public affairs resources to developing nations in the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of Asia.

- Japan and the United States nonetheless have different concerns: From the U.S. side Apprehension about Japan's relationship with South Korea, especially over the "comfort women" issue, continues. So many emotions are embedded in this issue at grass-root levels, but we need at least a "political" solution, at the inter-governmental level, to keep the bilateral relations viable before the threat of North Korea. The 2015 Accord was significant in this respect. While the real intention of President Moon Jae-in's recent statement on the Accord (January 10, 2018) remains to be clarified, Japan holds that Accord should be duly fulfilled by both sides. Otherwise, any accord gets meaningless in the future, and the Japanese public will lose confidence in South Korea, which makes it more difficult for good-minded Japanese politicians and diplomats to take positive move towards South Korea. According to a most recent Yomiuri poll (January 10-12, 2018), 86 percent of Japanese respondents refused to take any new measurements to the Accord.

- There is also a persistent notion of Prime Minister Abe as being a nationalist. If the term "nationalist" implies "racist" (as in Europe), he is clearly not. I would consider him to be more a realist than an ideologue, and more a globalist than an isolationist. He has decided to cut a deal with South Korea over the comfort women issue in 2015 and to attend the Opening Ceremony of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in 2018 despite vehement oppositions from one of his key constituencies who are very conservative and (proudly) nationalistic. Another concern is the perception of Japan as still engaging in an unfair, "non-reciprocal" trade with the United States. This rhetoric was repeated by President Trump during his presidential campaign in 2016, but he still clings to it if not frequently. In fact, he could continue to embrace it towards the mid-term elections in autumn 2018 to shore up supports from his core constituencies. To the Japan side, Trump's claim is outdated and mostly baseless, yet there is every reason to suspect that Japan's past record on direct investment in the United States has been underestimated or misunderstood for the past few years. From the Japanese side The Trump administration's policy towards North Korea is the biggest concern while acknowledging the merits of "strategic ambiguity." If the United States ever cuts a surprise deal with North Korea without prior consultation with Japan, it would make a major blow to the alliance management. The US-DPRK summit meeting, alleged to take place by May 2018, needs close scrutiny in this regard and could be a game changer in the US-Japan relations. The Amnage-Nye Report in 2012 posed, "Does Japan desire to continue to be a tier-one nation, or is she content to drift into tier-two

- status?"³ While Prime Minister Abe set to become Japan's longest serving leader in 2018, many experts in Japan's diplomatic circle are apprehensive if President Trump's "America First" doctrine is synonymous with "America Alone," and ultimately, if the United States is building a wall between the liberal international order. Certainly, American retrenchment is not welcome, as it creates a serious vacuum of power in world politics including East Asia. In addition to this anxiety is a perception that the U.S. domestic politics is too divided to lead the world effectively, even if there is a bipartisan support for the U.S.-Japan relations in particular.

Japanese Soft Power

- Japan still has an image problem in East Asia today-sometimes as a country lacking in remorse for its past militarism and other times as a predatory and protectionist "economic animal".

- On the one hand, East Asians especially Chinese and Koreans view negatively Japanese war atrocities, Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine
- On the other, East Asian consumers have embraced things Japanese such as sushi, karaoke, rock garden, zen-inspired architecture, J-pop (popular music), J-fashion, electronic gizmos and games (Sony PlayStation 3 and Nintendo), television dramas, manga (comics) and anime (cartoons).

- Japan is burnishing its international image through the popular medium of manga and anime. These cultural products appear to have the best of both worlds: distinctively Japanese in style and yet have universal appeal among the young.1 Tokyo's Diplomatic Bluebook 2006 noted: "Japanese culture is currently attracting attention around the world as 'Cool Japan'. In order to increase interest in Japan and further heighten the image of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is working with the private sector through overseas diplomatic establishments and the Japan Foundation to promote cultural exchanges while taking into consideration the characteristics of each foreign country".

- The Japanese State: Embracing Pop Culture In April 2006, Foreign Minister Aso Taro proposed that manga and anime could be the key to China's heart. Addressing students at the University of Digital Content in Tokyo's Akihabara district (the Mecca of Japan's electronic gadgetries), Aso noted: "If you take a peek in any of the shops in China catering to the young otaku (nerdy)- type manga and anime fans, you will find the shops' walls lined with any and every sort of Japanese anime figurine you can imagine.We have a grasp on the hearts of the young people in many countries, not the least of which being China".

- Aso continued: "What is the image that pops into someone's mind when they hear the name 'Japan'? Is it a bright and positive image? Warm? Cool? The more these kinds of positive images pop up in a person's mind, the easier it becomes for Japan to get its views across over the long term. In other words, Japanese diplomacy is able to keep edging forward, bit by bit, and bring about better and better outcomes as a result."4 In November 2006, the Council on the Movement of People across Borders, an advisory council to Foreign Minister Aso, proposed that Japan should tap on the rising popularity of manga and anime especially among the young abroad.5 Headed by Chio Fujio, the chairman of Toyota Motor Corporation, the Council suggested the awarding of a "Japan Manga Grand Prize" to target foreign artists, and also appoint cultural ambassadors of anime to promote Japanese pop culture overseas.6 Subsequently, Aso, in his policy speech to the Diet (parliament) in January 2007, adopted Japanese pop culture as a diplomatic tool. He said: "What is important is to be able to induce other countries to listen to Japan. If the use of pop culture or various sub-cultures can be useful in this process, we certainly should make the most of them."7 Ironically, being "cool", "fun" and "hip" have now become serious business for the Japanese state. The appeal of Japanese cultural products in Asia and beyond is not a recent phenomenon. Long before the present wave of Doramen (the robot cat), Hello Kitty (the cute and ubiquitous cat) and Pokemon (pocket monster) captured the hearts and minds of many kids of this generation, Astro Boy, Ultraman and Godzilla had already done so in the previous generation. The creativity and non-conformity of Japanese artists and market forces have given rise to the success of these cultural products; the catalyst was not the Japanese state. However, the Japanese state today is trying to harness these products and harness them for its "soft power" even though that was not the original intent of the producers of manga and anime.

- Motivations for Japanese "Soft Power" It is perhaps no coincidence that Japan's new emphasis on its cultural products as a vehicle for its "soft power" is also made against the backdrop of a rising China and the establishment of its Confucian Institutes globally. It appears that the two great East Asian powers are locked in a rivalry for the number one spot in the region and the mutual pursuit of "soft power" is merely an extension of politics by other means.13 Yoshizaki Tatsuhiko proposed that Japan should market the Japanese brand and enhance its international image while facing China's challenge. He noted: "The challenge thrown down by China, however, has made Japanese diplomacy realize the necessity of making appeals for what it has to offer today. In the post-Cold War world, the opportunity to deploy real military or economic power has decreased, and the roles played by instruments of soft power such as culture and image have grown larger. Many of the confrontations in this era will take place through the interchange of words and ideas. It will be an era when the battles among countries are virtual ones. ... It is necessary to employ as many different routes as possible to create a broad base of Japanese fans."14 However, the China factor in Tokyo's quest for "soft power" should not be exaggerated. With or without China as a consideration, Japan, like other big powers, has been pursuing cultural diplomacy long before Nye popularized the term "soft power" and the hype over China's rise. What is new is the latest incarnation of Japanese cultural diplomacy: the use of manga and anime as novel instruments of global outreach and appeal.

- As early as 1925, Tokyo adopted cultural diplomacy when the Diet created a Special Account, based largely on the country's share of the Boxer indemnity to fund cultural activities related to China.15 In the same year, the Diet passed further legislation to establish the China Cultural Affairs Bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Japan's cultural diplomacy toward China was suspended in the 1930s after its occupation of Manchuria and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident which triggered war between the two Asian superpowers. Following its Second World War defeat, Tokyo concentrated on economic reconstruction and reentry into the international community instead of reparations and normalizing diplomatic ties. After settling some of these legacy issues, and becoming an economic superpower by the early 1970s, Tokyo was able to channel more resources and attention to cultural diplomacy such as establishing the Japan Foundation for global outreach. From the 1970s, Tokyo has placed emphasis on cultural diplomacy toward the US and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) – the former because of the US-Japan alliance and the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy and the latter because of markets and energy security – most Japanese oil tankers go through Southeast Asian waters and anti-Japanese sentiments have to be addressed in the region. Shocked by violent anti-Japanese riots in Bangkok and Jakarta against then Prime Minister Eisaku Kishida's 1974 visit to the region, Tokyo became more conscious of maintaining good international image. Subsequently, Japan modified the Fukuda Doctrine with the pledge to foster "heart-to-heart relations" with Southeast Asia and also maintained Japan Foundation offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Manila to pursue cultural diplomacy. Post-war Japan cannot exercise hard military power to coerce other states. Shocked by constitutional limitations (the no-war clause of Article 9) and mass pacifism after the nation's catastrophic defeat in war, Tokyo has to adopt a soft approach like foreign aid and cultural diplomacy in its foreign relations. In this regard, Japan today is different from other great powers which wield both "hard" and "soft" power – it lacks the will and capability to exercise "hard power".16 Cartoons also helped to make the Self Defense Force (SDF) in US-occupied Iraq appear non-threatening and friendly to the locals. Japan (4th most combat troops in Iraq) pursued a popular soccer cartoon (Captain Tsubasa in Japanese and Captain Maged in Arab countries) on their water trucks.17 Apparently, softening its military's image in Iraq via cute cartoon messages potential backlashes from the public in the Arab world against Japan. A Japanese diplomat who promoted Captain Tsubasa in Iraq noted: "Captain Tsubasa is famous throughout Iraq and the Middle East. The Iraq people didn't know he was Japanese – they thought Tsubasa was Saudi Arabian. But it was sure that Tsubasa would cheer up Iraq kids when they see his logo at the street... Tsubasa became the symbol of our goodwill."18 Conceivably, the new emphasis on cultural products may also mask the nationalist and rightwing agenda of the Abe Administration. Prime Minister Abe has urged the Defense Agency to the Minister of Defense and hopes to pass legislation that will permit a national referendum to revise the Constitution and transform the country into a "normal state" which engages in collective security. If this were to come to pass, Japan will no longer be constitutionally constrained to exercise only "soft power". Tokyo's new emphasis on cultural diplomacy is agreeable to most Japanese across the ideological spectrum to the left, a non-emancipatory approach to international

- Instruments of Japanese "Soft Power" Long before manga and anime were co-opted by the Japanese state to promote its public diplomacy, it has relied on the Japan Foundation, the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer program and Official Development Assistance. Encouraging foreign students to study in Japan is another approach to invest in a younger generation and hope that they, as beneficiaries of the Japanese educational system, will return home as cultural ambassadors and build friendships between their countries and Japan. Established in 1972, the Japan Foundation is a key institution to promote Japanese language education overseas and also art, cultural and intellectual exchanges between the nation and the world.22 The foundation has a budget of US\$18.5 million in fiscal year 2005. With 107 offices in 49 countries, the Japan Foundation is represented in Asia, Oceania, the Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa. Hirohito, the Japan Foundation has often promoted traditional art forms like the austere Noh theater, Ichiban (refined flower arrangements), shakyo (woodblock prints) and the Zen-inspired tea ceremony – exquisite, refined and quiet but of limited mass appeal. However, the Foundation is likely to move in tandem with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote pop culture like manga and anime for greater international outreach. In May 2007, Tokyo established the International Manga Award and the First International Manga Award. Necessary to honor manga artists who contribute to the promotion of manga abroad, the Committee comprises the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the President of the Japan Foundation, and the members of the special committee for pop culture of the Council on the Movement of People across Borders.23 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also supported the Japan Foundation's Association to send recognized manga artists to the Selection Committee of this award. The International Manga Award attracted 146 entries from 26 countries and regions globally. Interestingly, the largest number of entries came from the Chinese speaking world – 24 from China (including Hong Kong) and 11 from Taiwan. Ethnic Chinese also captured the top prize in June 2007: Lee Chi Chang (best work) from Hong Kong, Kai (runner up) also from Hong Kong and Beany Wong Thong Hou (runner up) from Malaysia.24 The Japan Foundation then invited the winners to Japan for a ten-day visit that included the award presentation ceremony, meetings with Japanese manga artists, and visits to related organizations. Conceivably, ethnic Chinese may win the International Manga Award in the next few years because of the huge base of ethnic Chinese manga artists and fans but it remains to be seen whether the allure of manga can melt the hearts of the Chinese people toward Japan given the lack of historical reconciliation. The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program is another important arm of its cultural diplomacy (see Appendix 1). In 2005, JET invited 3,853 youths from 44 countries to teach in Japanese schools, and foster international understanding and goodwill.25 By that year, JET has cumulatively sponsored more than 43,000 participants in this youth exchange program (see Appendix 2). Tokyo also has an equivalent to the US Peace Corps known as the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) program comprising volunteers between the ages of 20 and 39 to assist the socio-economic development of local communities. Since its establishment in 1965, the JOCV has dispatched more than 22,000 volunteers to third world countries.26 Another pillar of Japanese "soft power" is Official Development Assistance (ODA) (US\$ 24 billion in 2007), extended to win the goodwill of developing countries. In lieu of military power, Tokyo, more than any other great powers, relies on ODA as carrots to "purchase" peace.27

- Accepting foreign students to study in Japan and promoting a network of friendly alumni is another means to enhance goodwill toward the host country. The numbers of foreign students studying in Japan have climbed from slightly over 40,000 in 1990 to 121,812 in 2005.²⁸ Promoting the study of the Japanese language abroad is another way to enhance an understanding and appreciation of Japan. Interestingly, the number of foreign students studying the Japanese language in 1990 (just before the bubble economy burst) was 981,407 but climbed to 2,356,745 in 2003 despite the so-called "lost decade".²⁹ Apparently, many students from the bubble years studied the Japanese language for economic reasons but more students today are studying the language because of their fascination and love for manga and anime. In so doing, they may end up with a better understanding of Japan.

Limits to Japanese "Soft Power" While Foreign Minister Aso is flattered that many foreigners are mesmerized by manga, the reality is often just the opposite. The Chinese media has noted that certain manga promote anti-China sentiments.³⁰ Indeed, not-so-quiet rightwing artists, especially Kobayashi Yoshinori, have sold millions of copies of manga which portrays Imperial Japan as fighting a righteous war to liberate Asia from Western colonialism. While manga and anime do heighten some foreigner's desire to visit Japan, they also attract attention to the authors' views on politics, religion, and culture. They would consider certain adult manga and anime - often featuring violence and sexual content - to be grossly offensive. Japan's "soft power" has its limits. With a historical consciousness such as South Korea, Japan's inability to reach out to the future and mobilize the Chinese and Korean people, notwithstanding the alliance of convenience that exists, "soft power" undoubtedly cultivated over the years can easily be undermined by the insensitive statements and clumsy behavior of a new generation of nationalist leaders over politically sensitive issues pertaining to Japan's past mistakes. Prime Minister Abe's attempt to establish an alliance with the US to counter China's rise in Asia is a case in point. While the US government is using state resources to set Japan's path, the "soft power" of Japan's "soft power" is being eroded. In 2007, a group of Japanese right-wing politicians from both the LDP and the main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), academics, journalists and commentators took a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post on June 20, 2007 and indignantly denounced the "soft power" of Japan as a gross distortion. They set of demand and penalties not only affecting the receipt of more US politicians to support the Japanese but also damaged the international image of Japan as a country lacking civility and sincerity over its wartime aggression and atrocities. The comment of the Aso cabinet in 2007, "It takes months, even years, to build up the respect that gives soft power, and all that is gained can be lost in a moment. When the Prime Minister or leading politicians make provocative remarks that stir mistrust or anger, for instance, Japan quickly loses to 'attractiveness' to other countries."³¹ Other limits to Japan's "soft power" include the lack of a CNN, NBC, ABC, etc. equivalent to project its voice globally, the absence of its universities to have foreign faculty members, the relatively slow process of its society to integrate immigrants and social minorities, and the fact that Japanese is not a global language. The best students in Asia would head to the Americas by Google and Britain's Channel 4, not necessarily the University of Tokyo, Waseda and Keio. To improve, the country needs to open up to the world and not just to the US. In the US, some and Japanese media are such as manga, anime, and video games, but they are not enough to appeal to a broad cross-section of the world's population. Though Japan and Korea are sports fans, the Olympics Games they put in global popularity competition to soccer and basketball. In contrast, the English Premier League, the Spanish La Liga and the Italian Serie A transfer over a hundred million into the living rooms of East Asia. So, naturally, while Japan has succeeded in exporting small numbers of baseball players to the US and a few footballers to Europe, its domestic baseball and soccer leagues lack global appeal. Moreover, Japan does not represent any universal values and ideals which transcend Western values, especially the US, champion human rights and democracy. Even though Tokyo recently adopted the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, other Asians do not necessarily see Japan as the purveyor of those values given its past treatment of colonized nations (Japan took Korea and the Philippines) and its increasing of wartime atrocities against the Chinese and Koreans. In November 2006, Foreign Minister Aso advanced a "value-oriented diplomacy" based on the "universal" values of democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and market economy. A core message of that era for Japan to be perceived as a legitimate proponent of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia is particularly important given its role in so to an imperial past.³² Unfortunately, many politicians from the ruling LDP and the main opposition DPJ have failed to do so. Moreover, of the Abe Administration were to suddenly champion democracy as a foreign policy based on shared values with the US, Australia and India, this message may be lost because it may exclude and alienate Asian countries especially China which do not subscribe to liberal democracy.

- Conceivably, Japan's domestic experiences in environmental protection and role in the Kyoto Protocol (which sets targets for countries to reduce carbon dioxide emission and global warming) can conjure an attractive image of an environmentally friendly nation. However, the Kyoto Protocol will expire in 2012. To ensure that Japan will lead in environmental protection in the years ahead, Prime Minister Abe has advocated the curbing of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and would seek to forge an anti-global warming framework when Japan hosts the G-8 summit in Toyakocho, Hokkaido in July 2008. But Tokyo has stubbornly insisted on waiting for "scientific research" despite condemnation from international conservationists that Japanese whaling fleets are pushing some species to the brink of extinction. Being one of the few countries in the world that seeks to overturn the ban on commercial whaling gives Japan a bad international image in the environmental domain.³⁴ The commercial value of Japanese cultural products in the world was estimated at US\$12.5 billion in 2002-35. Harder to assess is the efficacy of Japanese "soft power". Can Japanese ODA and cultural diplomacy sway the Asian countries to do what Japan wants? The answer is contextual. It really depends on what Japan wants and whether such desires and messages are acceptable to those Asian countries. Having large budgets for ODA, the Japan Foundation, JET and JOCV programs are no guarantee that others will do Tokyo's bidding. Atrocities of Japanese cuisine will view it as refined, tasty and healthy but it is a failure to assume that most sushi-lovers will support Japan's quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council or the Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Japanese state and society should not be conflated together. Indeed, a liking for Japanese society and culture is not easily translated into support for the Japanese state and its foreign policy goals. Public opinion polls in the US and Asia toward Japan can reveal the efficacy of its cultural diplomacy. If the American and Asian public were to think poorly of Japan, it is doubtful that the latter has indeed conducted a successful cultural diplomacy. The 2006 Image of Japan Study shows that 91 percent of American public opinion leaders and 69 percent of the general public view Japan as a dependent ally.³⁶ According to various surveys, public opinion in Southeast Asia tends to view Japan very favorably while those in China and South Korea do not (see Appendix 3).³⁷ It appears that Japan lacks "soft power" toward China and South

Korea due to historical problems and territorial disputes, notwithstanding the appeal of Japanese cultural products. While Koreans, like the Southeast Asian, also have an appreciation for manga and anime, these cultural products are necessary but not sufficient for Japan to establish an affection for Japan in South Korea (see Appendix 4). Beyond Japanese "soft power" The utility of manga and anime for Japanese foreign relations is likely to be quite limited. For every Asian country and entertained by these cultural products, there is probably another who finds such things to be rather antipathetic and frivolous and therefore unappealing. Moreover, in a globalized world, the Asian countries are also bombarded with multiple images and cultural products from China, South Korea, India and the West and is unlikely to be attracted to only thing. Support. It would be naive to exaggerate the influence of Japanese cultural products if Tokyo were to pursue policies deemed by its neighbors to be against their interest. Indeed, all the cultural ambassadors and manga prizes from Japan would not be able to soothe the Chinese and Koreans if a Japanese Prime Minister were to visit Yasukuni Shrine again. A difficult challenge for Japan and East Asia in the 21st century is to transcend racial prejudice and outdated products "East Asian" cultural products which can appeal to the West and the rest. If trans-national collaboration were to take place in movies, TV serials, music and theater performances among East Asian countries in the next few decades, it may not only ease a handsome profit but also pave the way for a nascent East Asian Community in which common cultural underpinnings are indispensable. Cultural products including manga and anime then will not merely be markers of a unique Japanese identity and pride but emblems of a greater East Asia - entertaining, appealing and profitable beyond its shores. If that scenario were to come to fruition, it will be more meaningful to talk about the "soft power" of East Asia and not merely that of China or Japan. In March 2007, Japan and Singapore agreed to establish a Japan Center to disseminate Japanese popular culture in Southeast Asia. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded: "Prime Minister Abe stated that the establishment of the Japan Center (note: a proposal by Singapore to establish a base in Singapore to disseminate information about Japan, especially on cultural information) was of significance. Prime Minister Lee (Hoon Loong) on his part stated that the Japan Center could serve as the foundation for Japan to exert its soft power in Southeast Asia, and proposed that the two countries jointly produce television or programs that showcased information on Japanese culture and lifestyles for broadcasting throughout Southeast Asia and that the two countries collaborate in interactive media industry."³⁸ Perhaps the Japan-Singapore model of cultural collaboration can be tried out in Japan's relations with other Southeast Asian countries, and China and South Korea in the next decade. Rather than just a one-way street in which Tokyo seeks to

- promote its culture and "soft power" in East Asia, it should also explore joint ventures to encourage Southeast Asia, China and South Korea to establish their cultural centers in Japan. An acceptance and appreciation of the contemporary cultures of other East Asian countries by Japan will probably make them even more receptive to Japanese "soft power". And if Japan can settle the history issue with its neighbors, Japanese "soft power" will be further enhanced in the region.

- ### Taiwan Informal Diplomacy
- In 1996, the Republic of China on Taiwan enjoyed formal diplomatic relations with 32 other states.
 - By April 1998, the number had fallen to 28
 - In 2019 – 17 countries recognizes ROC

Recognition of Taiwan

Africa – 1	Eswatini
Europe – 1	Holy See
Oceania – 6	Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau Solomon Islands, Tuvalu
Caribbean – 4	Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Central America – 4	Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
South America – 1	Paraguay

Taiwan Informal Diplomacy

- The largest and most important was South Africa which had always maintained consular relations with Taipei, and upgraded its representation to ambassadorial level in 1976.
- There was never any reason to suspect that the situation might change. President Nelson Mandela had said on several occasions that his government would not switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing at the expense of Taiwan

Taiwan Informal Diplomacy

- 31 December 1997, Pretoria recognized the Communist government of the People's Republic of China and severed all formal links with Taiwan.
- o mark the occasion Beijing and Pretoria issued a joint communiqué, declaring that:
 - 'The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China', and stated that South Africa 'recognizes China's position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China'

Taiwan Informal Diplomacy

- The development of informal diplomatic relations with South Africa is particularly illuminating.
- In 1996, the ROC was South Africa's sixth largest trading partner, while South Africa was the ROC's biggest trading partner in Africa.
- South Africa was the main market for consumer goods that were produced in Taiwan, while Taiwan bought coal and uranium from South Africa.
- Depending on which source one consults, Taiwan interests owned anything between 120 and over 285 factories in South Africa

Taiwan Informal Diplomacy

- There are also reports of cooperation in military intelligence and nuclear research.
- As the President of the ROC, Lee Tenghui, said upon his return from a visit to Singapore in July 1988:
 - 'When a country wishes to have diplomatic relations with Peking, it does not necessarily mean that the ROC has to sever its contact with that country. Peking's diplomatic gains, in other words, need not be interpreted as the ROC's total loss as it has been.

Pragmatic Diplomacy

- Following Pretoria's announcement that it would sever relations at the end of 1997, Taipei decided to cancel 36 mostly bilateral economic agreements with South Africa.
- This was a most revealing development; among the projects abandoned was investment in a petrochemical plant by a Taiwanese consortium of private and public companies.
 - Otherwise straightforward commercial deal was cancelled by a political decision taken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 - Evidence suggests that this may be a characteristic of the structure of informal diplomacy

Pragmatic Diplomacy

- The opening of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (formerly the Far Eastern Trading Company, which, commented Senator William O'Chee, 'sounds like a couple of guys selling noodles') in Canberra, Australia, in 1991 was tempered by caution:
 - the Australian Foreign Minister announced that this 'did not imply any departure from Australia's strict adherence to the one China policy'

Pragmatic Diplomacy

- By 1996, the ROC had three representative offices in Toronto, Vancouver and Ottawa, all of which are called the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office.
- Meanwhile, in 1995, a Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre was opened in New Delhi, paving the way for a reciprocal move by the Indian government (opening the India-Taipei Association) in the ROC.
- Understandably, the ROC celebrated a 1992 fisheries pact with Russia, but its significance was downplayed by the Russians themselves.
 - One official described it merely as 'a low-scale commercial deal'

Informal Diplomacy

- The ROC no longer wishes to force other governments to choose between the ROC and PRC. Pragmatism allows previously hesitant governments to inch closer to Taipei while continuing formal relations with Beijing.²² As Byron S. J. Weng wrote in 1984, Taiwan 'is a unique international entity to which substantive, if less than full diplomatic recognition is given in a semi-formal manner'
- Linjun Wu, informal relations help Taiwan 'at a minimum, to uphold the political status quo, to maintain economic prosperity and to avoid being further politically isolated'

How does informal diplomacy work?

- Taiwan's contacts with other states have been regular and close, and these have been facilitated by the large number of representative offices that are found in those countries that do not recognize the ROC
- Unlike the so-called 'diplomatic fronts', which are representative organizations having genuine 'cover' functions (for example trade), representative offices are openly diplomatic in purpose and method.
- They have a larger staff and more resources to devote to diplomacy than the diplomatic fronts.
- These offices are all forced by the international political climate to use the word 'Taipei' in their title; 'Taiwan' suggests acceptance of a two-China policy, whereas 'Republic of China' is offensive to Beijing

Informal Diplomacy

- Through this diplomacy, the ROC influences the policy choices of other states, cooperating and resolving its differences with them.
- In all but name and formal structure, Taiwan's informal diplomacy is little different from the kind of diplomacy pursued by so-called '**legitimate**' and recognized international political actors.
- Indeed the high number of formal agreements reached between Taipei and Washington during the Clinton administration, covering everything from trade to immigration, arms sales to education, postage and technical cooperation, and including a series of unofficial visits of high-ranking personnel between the two countries (including reciprocal visits by leaders of both governments), suggest that formal nonrecognition is simply a hindrance rather than an obstacle to effective diplomatic relations
- One member of Clinton's administration has observed that this unofficial relationship 'is closer and more productive than the official diplomatic ties we have with many countries'

Informal Diplomacy

- The growing number of high-level reciprocal visits between the ROC and New Zealand were defined as '**unofficial**' but this did not prevent speculation that the delegations had discussed matters of great importance to both sides
- G. R. Berridge has observed that non-recognition can make even *informal* diplomacy difficult, especially if the nation, state or government concerned is not a member of the United Nations.

Informal Diplomacy

- It is then unable to take full advantage of informal meetings which take place, for example in the corridors of the UN or at working funerals.
- The only heads of state or government to attend Chiang Kai-shek's memorial service in 1975 were **Premier Kim Jong Pil of South Korea, and the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, Elizabeth Domitien.**
- The American delegation was led by Vice President Rockefeller, though the first choice was Earl Butz, the US Secretary of State for Agriculture.
- His absence was a slight for the ROC and a reflection of deteriorating relations between the two governments.
- Similarly, the only foreign leaders to attend Chiang Ching-kuo's funeral in 1988 were Premier Kim Chung Yul of South Korea, and President Clarence Segnoret of the Dominican Republic.

Sport Diplomacy

- For millennia, there has been a close relationship between politics, diplomacy, and sport. During the Ancient Olympiad, for example, the Truce was an aspirational ideal that aimed to offer travelling fans and competitors' protection during the Games. The "Greek word (for truce) *ekecheiria*, 'a staying of the hand'" conferred on the Games a sanctity, an immunity from attack during the tournament

Sport Diplomacy

- Like music or art, sport is a universal language that can transcend acrimonious diplomatic relationships, offer high profile pathways for dialogue beyond the negotiating table and, idealistically, unite disparate nations and their publics through a mutual affection for physical exercise, competition and games.
- As Nelson Mandela (2000) noted
 - sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. Sport can awaken hope where there was previously only despair. Sport speaks to people in a language they can understand.

Sport Diplomacy

- If, for instance, a government wins the rights to host a megaevent such as the World Cup, billions of foreign perceptions about the host country can be enhanced over a period of weeks.
- In the pluralistic, modern diplomatic environment sport can positively attract 'others' to the attributes of the host country and in this sense it is a potent soft power tool.
 - However, for cynics and sceptics, sports diplomacy is amorphous, idealised, often exploited by politicians or rogue actors and nothing more than a parody of international relations;

Sport Diplomacy

- When thinking of traditions in sports diplomacy, its most obvious form is as a tool that governments consciously and sporadically employ to achieve foreign policy goals. Sport, in other words, is a diplomatic means to foreign policy ends
- Jackson and Haigh (2008: 354) argue that when this happens, sport is 'coopted by politics.' Well aware of the power of sport to mediate, sublimate or, in more egregious cases, increase separation, states of all kinds have long been drawn to sport and sporting competitions.

Sport Diplomacy

- Athletes at the Olympic Games form a type of Olympic diplomatic corps. East German officials used to advise their
- departing competitors, 'you are sports-diplomats in track suits'. Of course, such messages as these from the
- GDR and other governments were (p. 715) frowned upon by the IOC as 'politicizing' the Games (in this case with
- Marxist-Leninist ideology), but the mission of Olympism is actually strikingly similar.

Olympics Games

- On the surface and for the few weeks that they occur, these are great festivals of sport; however, they also afford states tremendous diplomatic opportunities.
- Obviously they provide a shop window for host nations to show off, be it their athletic prowess, organisational capacities, culture, values or ideology.
- The right to host such an event can also be seen as a reward for good international citizenship and one that creates significant avenues for public diplomacy. As Grix and Lee (2013) suggest, the politically savvy governments of China (2008 Olympic Games), South Africa (2010 World Cup) and Brazil (2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics)

Olympics Games

- coveted megaevents as 'relatively cheap means of improving' their 'image, credibility, stature, economic competitiveness and (they hope) ability to exercise agency on the international stage.'
- Over the course of the tournament, billions of people tune in, and if the diplomatic posture, brand and message are thoughtfully crafted, foreign publics can be engaged and influenced, not to mention the trade opportunities that arise or the financial gains that host nations can enjoy.

Megaevents

- Megaevents can also be used to reduce tensions, consolidate political relationships or bring old enemies together, as was the intent behind the 2002 World Cup, co-hosted by Japan and South Korea.
- However, disdain for a host nation can also be expressed via megaevents or if so inclined a nation can boycott and say, simply, we're not playing. During the Euro 2012 football tournament, for example, the British, Germans, Swedes and the European Union (EU) boycotted any matches played in Ukraine because of the host nation's selective justice in the case of the jailed Ukrainian opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko

- Viviane Reading, the EU Justice Commissioner, pointed out that 'you cannot close your eyes on human rights, even during a great sporting celebration'
- In more extreme cases, a nation can withdraw altogether, as was the case when the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a gesture reciprocated by the Soviet Union and thirteen satellite states four years later at the 1984 Los Angeles Games. In the build-up to megaevents, there is usually an equal focus on the politics of the host nation as there is on the sport.

- Traditional sports diplomacy is also a versatile tool within bilateral relationships.
- For one, international sporting competition can allow states to test possible policy shifts and bring leaders together.
- The best known example of this is Ping-Pong diplomacy, which occurred after a warm, chance and wellpublicised meeting between American player Glenn Cowan and the then Chinese World Champion Zhuang Zedong at the World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan, in March 1971.

- More often than not sporting contests generate ad-hoc summits for high profile politicians or leaders to meet informally.
- Various leaders of bitter rivals India and Pakistan, for instance, have repeatedly met on the sidelines of cricket matches between their national teams.
- These cricket diplomacy meetings have occurred since the early 1980s as a way of decreasing tensions over nuclear ambitions, Kashmir, terrorism or any number of other disputes.
- Similarly, the presidents of long-time adversaries Turkey and Armenia met during two historic World Cup qualifying matches between their national teams in 2008 and 2009, a gesture that helped the eventual diplomatic reconciliation between the two countries

- Dilma Rousseff, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and Jacob Zuma all enjoyed a chat in the VVIP room before, during and after the half-time break of the 2014 World Cup Final.
- On such occasions, international sport generates productive and informal opportunities for leaders of states to come together.

- The Americans perhaps best embody this practice, first employing the famed sprinter Jesse Owens as a goodwill ambassador to nations with questionable attitudes toward racial integration in the 1960s.
- More recently, the State Department has employed dozens of sports envoys. Two openly gay athletes – Billie Jean King (a retired tennis player) and Caitlin Cahow (a hockey player) – figured prominently in the US delegation for the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.
- Their inclusion was both a response and challenge to Russia's draconian anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) policies.
- China has also used specialist sports emissaries. Before the 2008 Olympic Games, the giant basketball player Yao Ming was able to attract millions of Chinese fans to the National Basketball Association (NBA) and, vice-versa, expose millions of Americans to the 'new' China.

- Perhaps because most Americans love innovation and sports, as well as their pioneering spirit, the **American State Department was the first player to experiment with a more sustainable, amateur and inclusive form of sports diplomacy.**
- A proactive 2.0 form emerged at the turn of the last century when America sought to boost its public diplomacy profile abroad and complement other soft power tools (such as Voice of America or the Fulbright scholar program) with exchanges built around sport.
- The State Department's flagship initiative is *SportsUnited*, which aims 'to build ever-strengthening relations between the United States and other nations [and] which uses the universal passion for sports as a way to transcend linguistic and sociocultural differences' (Sports Diplomacy, n.d.).

- Remarking on the initiative, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011)
 - noted that: ... our sports exchanges are the most popular exchanges we do. When I go to other countries and we talk about what kind of exchanges that people are looking for, very often a leader will say, how about a sports exchange?
- On the other side of the Atlantic, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) provides a second, richer example of sports diplomacy 2.0.
- States, CSOs, foreign publics, players, coaches, etc., have formed a network bound and driven by a common interest in sport and the right to play.

- Seeking to capitalise on the London 2012 Olympic Games, the FCO coordinated a network – the British Council, UNICEF, UK Sport, Comic Relief, Laureus Sport for Good Foundation, the Youth Sport Trust, and individual donors – which designed and implemented a sports legacy programme called International Inspiration (II).
- At heart, the programme sought to 'enrich the lives of children and young people of all abilities, in schools and communities across the world, particularly in developing countries, through the power of high quality and inclusive physical education (PE), sport and play' (International Inspiration, 2014).
- In other words, II hoped to get more children playing sport by educating, funding and helping schools and governments develop sustainable programmes built around games and exercise.

- According to Ecorys (2014), an external consultancy firm hired to evaluate the success of the initiative, the programme exceeded all initial key performance indicators.
- The programme ran for seven years (2007–2014) and during this time 'over 25 million children and young people were enriched; 55 national policies, strategies and legislative changes were influenced and over 250,000 practitioners (teachers, coaches and leaders) trained in over 21 countries'

- By sheer volume it was a success and, in the sports diplomacy 2.0 context, the FCO successfully managed and coordinated a network of actors, created a favourable impression amongst millions of people overseas and learned 'important lessons for the future of other sport and development programmes' (Ecorys, 2014: 11).
- Moreover, the programme shied away from using high profile politicians and professional sports people preferring amateurs such as teachers, coaches and children.

- China has a long history of old and new sports diplomacy.
- Likewise, Japan invests heavily in domestic and international football in order to overcome imperial stereotypes and better reflect 'a level worthy of its economic power and overall achievements after 40 years of postwar peace and prosperity' (Manzenreiter, 2008: 417).
- Cuba's public diplomacy continues to focus on sports as a 'vitaly important mechanism for furthering the causes of the Cuban revolution and garnering international admiration and respect'

- Sport is used by governments as a vehicle to proselytise the values that certain nations often champion.
- For example, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's new sports diplomacy programme focusses on participation, gender equality, discipline and teamwork.
- Instead of being geared around elite-to-elite theatre, version 2.0 targets and embraces the amateur levels of sport, not just the megaevents and superstars.
- The attraction for governments is partly practical. Sports diplomacy 2.0 is relatively 'low-risk, low-cost and high profile' (Keech and Houlihan, 1999: 112).

- Moreover, by engaging with new methods, the culture of a state's diplomacy can be less aloof, hermetic and 'dead' and more innovative, effective, public and even fun (Ramsay, 2006: 273). Perhaps the most significant lesson to be drawn from the above examples is that traditional diplomatic institutions are but one actor among a cast of others. In the British case, the FCO participated, coordinated and facilitated; but it did not direct.

- further understand the concept of sports diplomacy, regimes, clubs and individuals can be thought of as diplomatic actors.
- A postpositivist theory – one that 'encompasses a broader range of actors and processes' than a state-centric, rationalist understanding of diplomacy – facilitates such an exercise (Pigman, 2013: 78).
- Seen through this lens, powerful non-state actors such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), multinational corporations, security, television and media outlets, teams and prominent sporting heroes, national sports associations and CSOs all continuously and diplomatically interact to make international sport possible in the first place (Pigman, 2013: 78).

- The actors that constitute these vast sporting networks have been briefly studied. Murray and Pigman (2013), for example, argue that powerful administrative institutions such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) can be thought of as para-diplomatic actors. They practise core diplomatic functions such as negotiation,

- communication and representation; they have interests and agendas to pursue; they have charters, constitutions, presidents and mission statements which define their objectives and guide their interactions; and they have institutional structures, rules, norms and flags, which they use in 'a highly self-conscious effort to brand themselves and their sport' (Murray and Pigman, 2013: 14). Considering the benefits a megavevent can generate for host nations – anything from new infrastructure to public diplomacy opportunities – these international sporting regimes are immensely powerful, and states will go to great lengths to secure certain tournaments. Paying exorbitant amounts of money just to bid for the tournament, states covet the Olympics or World Cup just as athletes and national teams would a medal or trophy. Little wonder that senior representatives from the IOC or FIFA presidents are given the red carpet treatment wherever they go. The same can be said of the role certain superstar athletes play in international relations, off the pitch, court or running track. Borrowing from Cooper's work on celebrity diplomacy, Roger Federer, Usain Bolt or Leo Messi can be considered as celebrity sporting diplomats, people who 'fuse' the attention they receive to focus the cameras on international issues (Cooper, 2008: 7). Messi, for instance, acts as a Goodwill Sports Ambassador at Team UNICEF, using his profile to raise awareness of children's rights, health, education and sport all over the world. In a postpositivist view, even clubs such as Messi's F.C. Barcelona, the New York Yankees or Manchester United (with its 650 million fans) can also be considered as 'significant diplomatic actors in contemporary international affairs' according to Rofo (2014: 1136).

- The list of actors in international sport is a long one – non-profit CSOs such as the Beyond Sport Foundation, the MNCs that sponsor sport on a global scale and the television companies that screen events are also notable diplomatic players. This acceptance illustrates several vital points for those interested in sports diplomacy 2.0: the international sporting system is extremely complex, much more than simply megavevent tournaments or a superstar basketballer touring Africa under the auspices of the UN in the off-season. Sports diplomacy can be thought of a series of domestic and international networks that continuously interact and often overlap in order to make sport possible in the first place. To boost public diplomacy efforts, governments are increasingly tapping into these networks.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SPORTS DIPLOMACY

- Compared to some of the major issues in twenty-first century international relations – terrorism, poverty and climate change, to name but a few – sports diplomacy is a generally positive phenomenon. Granted, many states will continue to use sport to further self-serving national interests and foreign policy goals. However, it is important to remember the core, diplomatic components of sports diplomacy: to overcome separation between disparate peoples, nations and states and to reduce misunderstandings between 'them' and 'us' by demonstrating that strangers speak a shared, universal language of sport. For the most part, sports diplomacy aims to foster peace and unity, not conflict and (more) separation. For sports diplomacy to realise its potential, however, a frank appraisal of its limitations is important. This is not to support its detractors but to encourage thinking, collaboration and scholarship on ways to overcome or at least negate certain received truths about sport, international relations and diplomacy. Below, six limitations are presented (although the list is by no means exhaustive). First, the rhetoric this chapter began with – that 'sport has the power to change the world' – could suggest that sport is some magical remedy that has hitherto been neglected or ignored by theorists and practitioners. This is quite incorrect. It is self-evident that sport alone cannot eliminate poverty in Africa, encourage gender equality, women's rights or the right to play in traditional, fundamentalist societies. These types of sport-development or sport-for-peace projects have been going on for decades with limited or mixed results. Such projects will continue but they are increasingly being subsumed under broader sports diplomacy strategies orchestrated by diplomats. As a result, the capacity for sport to contribute, in part, to alleviating some of the major problems of our time will improve. Second, sport and politics do mix, like it or loathe it. For idealists, sport has a 'spiritual power' (Bodker, 2008: 490) and exists in a hallowed realm 'above' (Allison, 1993: 5) government, untainted by the divisiveness of politics. The reality of the relationship between sport, diplomacy and politics suggests otherwise. In the lead up to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, for example, Russia was accused by many states of graft, illegal dumping of construction waste, forced evictions, bizarre anti-LGBT policies and disputes with Circassian nationalists demanding Russia apologise for its genocidal policies of the nineteenth century. All the while, however, Russia insisted that sport and politics *should not mix* (just as the Chinese government claimed during the lead up to the 2008

- Beijing Olympics) and that concerned leaders, states and members of the global public *should focus on the sport*. Such rhetoric is problematic. Sport and politics have always mixed and always will. In the pluralistic, twenty-first century the 'mixing' of sport should be considered a *given*. Russia's typical behaviour also alludes to a third limitation of sports diplomacy: the temporal reality of megavevents. These huge tournaments are a unique feature of international relations. No other event has the ability to unify and rally states, CSOs, global publics and media, who often use the tournament as a vehicle to express dissatisfaction with the host nation. However, any political and diplomatic opportunities occur *before* the event. When the actual games begin, sport takes over and concerns over shocky human rights records, corruption, the plight of the oppressed and so on are immediately forgotten. For example, the pressure on Russia before the Sochi Winter Olympics evaporated as soon as the first starter's pistol was fired. Positive, diplomatic messages and pressure were lost to sport *during and after* the tournament. Just weeks after the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics closing ceremony, Russia began meddling in Ukrainian politics (just as they did in Georgia after the 2008 Olympics) and it played a vital role in the annexation of Crimea and the war waged by so-called separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. In a matter of weeks, the megavevent is over, concerns are forgotten, the global public begins salvaging over the next glamorous festival of sport and the host nation is left to behave as it did before the event. The challenge for those interested in further developing sports diplomacy is to overcome the temporal nature of megavevents and build real, lasting, *diplomatic* legacies during and after significant tournaments. A fourth limitation of sports diplomacy is that just as sport can bring people and nations together it can also drive them apart. It can increase estrangement, in other words. In international sport, the anthems, flags and sense of tribe all heighten feelings of

- nationalism, sometimes in a manner unbecoming of diplomacy. During the 2004 Asian Cup hosted by China, for example, the Japanese team was hounded everywhere they played. Chinese spectators heckled the players, sang anti-Japanese songs from the war of liberation and displayed banners reading 'Look into history and apologise to the Asian People', or 'Return the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands!' (Mannemreiter, 2008: 423). In this case, sport contradicted a core diplomatic function: the minimisation of friction in international affairs. In addition, sport and violence are sometimes inextricably linked. In the past, terrorists have used sport as a way of spreading anti-diplomatic messages to vast, global audiences. Jackson and Hagg (2008: 351) note that, between 1972 and 2005, '171 sport-related terrorist attacks have been logged'. The most egregious example was the 1972 Munich Games tragedy when eleven Israeli athletes were kidnapped and eventually murdered by Black September, a radical Palestinian organization. A week after the incident the group issued the following statement: 'A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao-Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the operation at Munich... the choice of the Olympics, from a purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100 percent successful. It was like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth.' (In Itokey, 2008: 434) Just as sports can disseminate and represent positive values about unity, fair play and harmony, there has sometimes been an undeniable association between sport and terrorism, war, violence and separation. Fifth, this occasional disconnect between sporting idealism and reality is given further credence by briefly discussing the diplomatic qualities of sporting administrators and their behemoth organisations. In the formal world of diplomacy, Satow (2009:

- attaches great importance to dignity, self-control, empathy ('to listen and not to talk'), calmness, fairness, humility, virtue and so on. Professional diplomats are also accountable to both the sending and receiving state and are legally bound to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Conversely, international sporting organisations and their staff are not bound by any such rules or norms. As such, large, influential sporting organisations such as FIFA, the IOC or the International Cricket Council (ICC) often make headlines for behaviour, customs and practices that are hardly diplomatic (at least in terms of how Satow and others have *imagined* it). The Salt Lake City 'bribery scandal', where six IOC officials who accepted gifts and 'hundreds of thousands of dollars' from local officials were sacked, serves a historic case in point (The Guardian, 1999). More recently, FIFA's behaviour has come under intense scrutiny from the BBC, the Sunday Times newspaper and the Swiss Government (FIFA's HQ is in Zurich). As one, they have accused FIFA of ticket scandals, vote-rigging during presidential elections (incumbent President, Joseph 'Sepp' Blatter, was the only candidate in the last election) and bribery and negligence, particularly over the award of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, a tiny desert nation of two million people with a dreadful human rights record and summer temperatures that exceed 50°C. The FIFA President and his all-powerful Executive Committee engage in one-way communication with the public, any negotiation with states that bid for the World Cup is rather one-sided and who or what does FIFA actually represent? Indeed, can FIFA, the IOC or the ICC be considered diplomatic at all? As noted earlier, further research is required to answer such questions. Such questions relate to the sixth and final limitation: the diplomatic calibre of the sports diplomats themselves. As Murray and Pigman (2013: 8) note, there seems to be:

- [a] disconnect between competitors used as national representatives and the bulk of their fellow sportsmen and women. Those chosen to become sports envoys embody the aspirational version of sport that governments imagine and are thus unrepresentative of real sport. Success in sport does not equate to success in diplomacy. Compared with the number of senior sportspeople that play and have played, only a few are considered fit for envoy or ambassadorial work. Many will never be considered at all. Moreover, perhaps many sportspeople wouldn't want the job. The case of the boxer Mohammed Ali, who had 'no quarrel with them Viet Cong', comes to mind. Sports envoys such as David Beckham – handsome, charming and instantly recognisable – seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Former NBA superstar player Dennis Rodman's odd, alcohol-fuelled 2014 outburst at a CNN reporter who questioned his motives during his third visit to the basketball-loving North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un revealed a stark truth: not every sportsperson can be a sports diplomat. The six limitations mentioned above help to confirm that there can be a dark side to sport. However, the same can be said of diplomacy. Like diplomacy, the failures of international sport seem to attract more interest than its successes. Egregious examples such as the Fascist Games (the 1936 Olympics and 1938 World Cup, which Mussolini's 'black shirts' won, incidentally) are well known, and perhaps account for the trepidation many governments recently showed about consciously 'mixing' sport and politics. Consequently, and as noted, the traditional co-option of sport by states has often been rather clumsy, opportunistic, short-lived and centred at the elite level. Relatively speaking, however, it should be remembered that examples of bad sports diplomacy are the exception rather than the norm. If an objective perspective is adopted, the observer will realise that sport often celebrates the best of humanity and generally brings people together.

Benefits of Sport Diplomacy

- There are seven reasons why governments are increasingly attracted to using international sport as a diplomatic tool.

- First, the post-Cold War diplomatic environment has forced governments to reform, change, and experiment with the way they conduct diplomacy. Moving toward new and innovative forms of diplomacy is one way to counter the irrelevance, obsolescence, and deliquescence arguments consistently levelled at traditional diplomacy and its culture. Sports-diplomacy is a proactive, original, and pioneering form of engagement that illustrates to the public at home and abroad that a state's diplomacy is no longer elite, aloof, and out-of-date but reforming to maximise the new diplomatic network opportunities that the twenty-first century offers.

- The second flows from the first. Sport and sporting institutions are increasing in scope, power, and appeal. Always perceptive to the whims of the public, post-Cold War governments are keen to coat-tail on the growth in sport and the relevance of powerful non-state actors such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) or sporting demi-gods like Yao Ming. Nobody is opposed to sports: it has global appeal: "who is against sport? No one, or almost no one. The Inuits are as interested in the World Cup as the Argentineans, Congolese, and Europeans."²⁸ Moreover, amongst the public there appears to be a collective moral myopia when it comes to sport: if only the public saw politicians and diplomats in the same light.²⁹ Governments hope to tap into some of that sporting magic, and who can bemoan or criticise them: better sport than nuclear weapons.

- Third, sport as a soft power overture, as a means bringing estranged peoples, nations, and states closer together or a way of demonstrating the collegiality of a relationship, is today a far more effective method of diplomacy than its traditional variant. Diplomatic outreach through hard power and diplomacy built on the high politics of arms treaties, border demarcation, or alliances—whilst, obviously, still important—does not engage or hold the same amount of attention amongst the public as it once did. In the post-modern information age, sport, culture, and diplomacy are proving that they are no longer niche or deliquescent institutions but relevant foreign policy tools.

- Sport, fourthly, is a major part of modern life and driven by an Akirastyle media is worldwide in its audience. Sporting mega-events like the World Cup and the Olympic Games can offer host nations significant opportunities to boost engagement with the foreign public through sport. In 2008, after an often-farcical build-up to the most expensive Olympics in history, Beijing proselytised an image of China as a rising, modern economic, and sporting powerhouse aligned with the gracious values the Olympic movement aspires to embody. The Chinese Communist Party used the Games to assert its identity at home and abroad and gained much praise from "the recognition of its technical and organizational competencies and the ostentatious showcasing of its economic power."³⁰ Similarly, awarded both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazil will likely promote itself as a responsible and major player in the international community, a safe, welcoming, and secure host, and assert itself as a regional leader in terms of its economy, its society, and its sport.

- The fifth reason that sport and diplomacy are moving closer concerns representation. As an institution, diplomacy supposedly represents the business of peace and the notion of international order and stable society amidst international anarchy. Through negotiation, compromise, and conciliation based on clear and accurate communication, it embodies noble values and its practitioners are men and women of "truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty, (and) loyalty"³¹ Likewise, sport represents honourable qualities and values that appeal to governments and their diplomats. The former United States ambassador to Denmark, Jim Cain, said as much at the Second Hague Conference in Diplomacy in 2009: sports can be a powerful medium to reach out and build relationships . . . across cultural and ethnic divides, with a positive message of shared values: values such as mutual respect, tolerance, compassion, discipline, equality of opportunity and the rule of law. In many ways, sports can be a more effective foreign policy resource than the carrot or the stick.³² Sports-diplomacy exchanges can promote international understanding and friendship, as well as dispel stereotypes and prejudices. Not to mention, they are also "low-risk, low-cost and high profile"

- Sixth, diplomacy and sport share other loose affiliations amplified by globalisation. Just as the soldier is no longer a soldier but also an aid worker, a construction worker, a diplomat, and so on, the same is true of both the diplomat and the sportsperson. Their roles are changing and public demand exists for more awareness of social responsibility by both professions. Under such conditions, sport and diplomacy have naturally gravitated toward one another: patriots representing their state as a privilege of international duty staff both institutions and, whether it is the roundtable or the running track, both sports people and diplomats want to win for their state. Therefore, there is an obvious symbiosis

- Finally, estranged states can use sport as a way of exploring the normalisation of diplomatic relations. The best example is, of course, the 1971 case of Ping-Pong diplomacy between Chinese and American table tennis players. These games paved the way for the normalisation of relations between the Peoples Republic and the United States—after 23 years of Cold War animosity—pursued by Henry Kissinger and, subsequently, effected by President Richard Nixon's landmark visit to Beijing in February 1972. A more recent example involves the cricket-diplomacy between Pakistan and India. After years of acrimony, suspicion, and near war brought on by nuclear brinkmanship, the Kashmir crises, and the scourge of terror, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani accepted an invitation from his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, to attend the Cricket World Cup semi-final match between the South Asian rivals in March 2011. The occasion constituted "an attempt to use sport to create a feel-good atmosphere between the two countries at a time when the atmosphere of suspicion and hostility towards Pakistan in India is very strong."³⁶ Tapping into the "Mumbai Spirit"—the special atmosphere—Singh and Gilani met again on 10 November 2011 in the Maldives when attending a South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation meeting and promised to open "a new chapter" in bilateral relations.³⁷

Trump and Golf Diplomacy

- Golf diplomacy humanizes world leaders
- Golf diplomacy is the regular practice of country leaders playing golf together, which can help bolster ties between countries
- Golf in China
 - Golf is controversial in China and party officials are essentially banned from playing.
 - Since Mao Zedong called golf a "sport for millionaires," it has occupied a moral grey area in a Communist country trying to operate a capitalist economy. And though Xi could probably afford a golf club membership, the sport remains politically taboo, even for the country's leader.

Trump and Golf Diplomacy

- Golf diplomacy is popular between leaders because it encompasses critical aspects of traditional diplomacy — having open communication and strengthening ties between leaders — in a relaxed, low-pressure environment.
- Ahead of a game with Abe earlier this year, [Trump said](#) "that's the one thing about golf; you get to know somebody better on a golf course than you will over lunch."

Abe and Trump – 2017



'Golf diplomacy' under fire as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe courts US President Donald Trump

- South China Morning Post
- <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2111846/golf-diplomacy-under-fire-japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe>
 - Abe was the first foreign leader to meet Trump after his election victory in November, bearing as a gift a US\$3,000 gold-plated golf club
 - He returned in February for discussions on trade, security and other bilateral issues, with Trump inviting him to his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida where the two leaders played a 27-hole round of golf over five hours.
 - Explaining his philosophy ahead of the game, Trump told reporters: "That's the one thing about golf; you get to know somebody better on a golf course than you will over lunch."
 - Opposition politicians in Tokyo were less impressed with the prime minister's plans, with Seiji Mataichi, the head of the Social Democratic Party, telling a news conference Abe was going to "embarrassing" lengths to curry favour with Trump.

- Abe and Trump – 2017 - at Trump's resort with the owner of the Super Bowl Champion New England Patriots
 - test in Applied Asian Diplomacy Between the summit with Abe, the North Korean missile test, and the phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and he passed.
 - Trump affirmed the "One China" policy after saying the United States should not be bound by it, responded to North Korea's test with measured tones and didn't overreact on Twitter, and reaffirmed the U.S. alliance with Japan after attacking them on the campaign trail.
 - Given Defense Secretary James Mattis's successful visit to South Korea and Japan the week before, the Trump administration's Asia policy appears fairly conventional and consistent with past U.S. policy.

- Less than two weeks after Trump's January inauguration Abe again visited the US and played 18 holes with Trump — one of the first times the president had played since taking office.
- And on Trump's recent visit to Japan, Abe organized for the two to play nine holes with Japan's Hideki Matsuyama, the world's No. 4 golf player, before gifting Trump with a golf cap emblazoned with the two leaders' names.
- Abe even described his actions as golf diplomacy during Trump's visit.
- "Yesterday's diplomacy between Donald and me attracted so much attention, and we actually made everything public, except for the score. When you play golf with someone not just once, but for two times, the person must be your favorite guy," said Abe.

- The closeness of the two leaders is also evident in the frequency of their communications. Aside from the two visits and games of golf, Abe has spoken to Trump 13 times on the phone — more than he did with Obama during his second term in office.

Xi Jinping and Trump

- Xi Jinping doesn't play golf. How will he and Trump talk shop at Mar-a-Lago?
- Trump's golf diplomacy lands in the rough ahead of Xi Jinping meeting
 - Xi Jinping is unlikely to follow the example of Japan's prime minister, who joined Trump on the green: China long banned the 'sport for millionaires

- 24 – 28 April 2019
- Program:
 - 25 April – Celebration of Recognition of PRC by Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (4 October 1949)
 - Soviet Union recognized PRC on 2nd October 1949
 - 27 April – Meeting with Ren Zhengfei – founder of Huawei



- Jaromír Jágr is to be the public face of the ice hockey tournament at Beijing's Winter Olympic Games in 2022. Jágr thus joins Canadian legend Wayne Gretzky among the personalities that are helping prepare and develop Chinese ice hockey

- The announcement came after a meeting between Czech President Miloš Zeman and the Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council, Sun Chunlan, in Lány on Monday.
- Jágr is not the only hockey star to become involved in developing hockey in the Asian superpower. Wayne Gretzky recently announced his involvement as well.
- Hockey expert Pavel Procházka from the Czech newspaper Deník N, which broke the story, explains China's motivation behind the move.
- *"They are collecting the most famous players of ice hockey history in order to popularize the sport in China. Wayne Gretzky has his own hockey school for young players and it seems likely it will be open to Chinese talent as well."*

- It is not the first co-operation announcement between Czech representatives of the sport and their Chinese counterparts. In 2017 a memorandum between the Czech Ice Hockey Association and China was signed. It featured pledges to cooperate in training camps for young players, coach exchanges and methodology.
- The association's spokesman, Zdeněk Zikmund, described ongoing activities.
- *"It is more of a general document which serves as an umbrella for mutual activities on club level. Nevertheless, some projects have already taken place."*
- *"For example, we had a group of Chinese players between the ages of 14-16 attend a week long training camp. They were trained by Czech coaches. The players were also accompanied by coaches from China, who received a number of specialised lectures."*

- In 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States led a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.
- And in 1984, Soviet bloc countries retaliated by boycotting the Los Angeles Olympics.

Olympic games and environmental issues

- Air pollution was at least two to three times higher than levels deemed safe by the World Health Organization
- In 2007 - Beijing committed to remove 60,000 taxis and buses from the roads
- Relocation of 200 local factories, including a prominent steel factory
- In 2008, stricter emergency pollution controls were introduced, including suspending production at more factories and coal-fired power plants, lowering the number of cars on the road and expanding driving restrictions to nearby Tianjin.

Olympic games and environmental issues

- Beijing ordered 40 factories in Tianjin and 300 factories in Tangshan to begin suspend operations
- In July additional factories were shut down
- license plate restrictions which allowed Beijing motorists to drive on alternate days only
- air quality in Beijing improved significantly against prior expectations

- **Senator Hillary Clinton, D-Presidential Candidate:** "The president should not attend the opening ceremonies at the Olympics."
- **Senator Barack Obama, D-Presidential Candidate:** "I think it's appropriate for the president to decline the invitation to the opening ceremonies."
- **Senator John McCain, R-Presidential Candidate:** "I would not go to the opening ceremonies."
- However, President Bush says he will attend the Games. "I don't view the Olympics as a political event. I view it as a sporting event," he said.

- The major state actors in China's public diplomacy system are the Office of the Foreign Propaganda of the Communist Party of China; State Council Information Office; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and China's national leader
- The Olympic Games are a global multi-sport event that promotes realization of individual and collective dreams in sportsmanship and enhances human interaction, friendship and solidarity (Olympic Charter, 2007, p. 1)
- According to Liu Qi, President of the Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG), 204 Olympic teams competed in 302 events at 37 venues, 12 and broke 38 world and 85 Olympic records (Xinhua, 2008).

- Beijing won its bid to host the 2008 Olympics against Toronto in July 2001
- Being hosted in China for the first time, the largest Games in the Olympic history had the opening and closing ceremonies at the Beijing National Stadium also known as the Bird's Nest.
- Despite China's celebration, Verena Harpe, a human rights expert at the Amnesty International, reportedly remarked that China's human rights situation had actually worsened, not in spite of the Olympics but because of the Olympics (The Calgary Herald, 2008).
- While hosting the Olympics, and in an effort to be better appreciated, China displayed its attractive culture in form of performances and entertainment, art and music, food and dress as well their basic values and spirit to foster mutual understanding with the world.


- The Olympic drive also provided an opportunity for infrastructure development, environmental improvements and city transformation leading to a better reputation supportive of Beijing's business and tourism.
- Show to a global audience provides an opportunity for national branding from the host country's corporate story as well as commercial product branding.
- Besides branding, China used the event to show-case its recent remarkable economic achievements, portray a successful brand image and promote business and tourism opportunities, effectively utilising instant communication, internet and social media.
- However, the foreign media also carried criticism of Chinese politics, Games-related abuses and organisational mishaps while some of its sections manifested cynicism and hostility towards China. The Olympic Torch routing from Athens to Beijing was blended with political signalling.

- It covered China's historical allies like South Korea, Russia and Tanzania; notable neighbours and competitors like India, Japan and South Korea; and strategic allies and rivals including France, UK and US.
- The Torch met some hostilities in California, London, New Delhi and Paris; skipped Taipei and delayed to reach Lhasa as a statement of China's domestic and foreign policy challenges especially revolving around Taiwan, Tibet and Trade (Mahala, 2008). Despite the setbacks, the Beijing Games were successfully staged under three major themes of Green Olympics, High-Tech Olympics and People's Olympics.
- The opening of the Beijing Olympics at the Bird's Nest Stadium, a four-hour dazzling ceremony on the auspicious 08/08/08, had 29-foot-print fireworks, 2,008 drummers and 15,000 musicians staging acrobatics in meticulous sequences. Centred on major Chinese inventions of gunpowder, compass, porcelain, papermaking, printing and fine arts, the 50-minute show overseen Zhang Yimou intricately incorporated 5000 years of Chinese history.
- The Olympics bolstered China's soft power not just through Zhang Yimou's striking performance, attractive culture and rich national heritage, but also through masterpiece architecture, organisational process and excellent athletic and music stars like Jackie Chan, Lang Lang and Liu Huan (Yang, 2009, p. 17).

- Technological extravaganza depicted China's glorious past, a confident present and a promising future in tandem with modernisation.
- International television networks, internet highways, social and print media lent themselves to China's cause in furtherance of its appeal to the world despite some criticism and negative images they occasionally transmitted.
- With the Games and opening ceremony variously described by IOC President as truly exceptional; by Philippines President Gloria Arroyo as the world's most memorable Olympics; and by George Bush as spectacular and successful, China effectively used the Olympics as a tool of public diplomacy.

- the Olympics spotlighted China's human rights record, the situation worsened in March 2008 when government violently cracked down on Tibetan protesters;
- President Hu Jintao felt the Olympic-pressure when Spielberg and 80 Nobel laureates, politicians and artists wrote to him urging his leverage to end human suffering in Darfur. As the Games drew closer, suspected terrorists linked to East Turkistan Movement killed 16 policemen and injured 16 others in an attack in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on 4 August 2008.

- Besides, rumours that terrorists would put a bomb on Air China and crash it in the National Stadium led to more apprehension and heightened security measures, and prompted Chinese government security assurances next day after opening the Games, an American tourist was stabbed and killed in Beijing by a Chinese national before jumping to his death; an act that cast doubt on security assurances
- Intensive tree planting, factory closures and relocations and demobilisation of 1.3 million vehicles achieved desired air quality just in the nick of time for the Games to avoid an Olympic embarrassment
- Revelations that the exciting 29 footprint fireworks were not real but a computer animation attracted strong criticism to the organizers



Controversies

- Torch Relay
 - The torch relay became truly political and caused many protests, mainly in London, Paris and San Francisco
- Human rights

Chinese political strategies

- Opening ceremony
 - the main messages of the opening ceremony were „harmony“, „peace“, „unity“ and „power and innovation“
 - The Chinese could not omit to present their main inventions given to the world
 - papermaking, movable type printing, the compass and gunpowder.
 - The timing of the opening ceremony at 8:08 pm sharp, August 8, 2008 is in perfect symbiosis with Chinese numerology, where the number 8 symbolizes „prosperity, fortune, happiness, and good luck“
 - presenting 56 Chinese ethnic groups

Animal Diplomacy

- Although China's panda diplomacy is the most well-known, it is far from the only country using cute animal in order to drive their political agenda.
- In fact, Julie Bishop, the former minister of foreign affairs in Australia “ranked koala cuddling first among other soft power strategies that help build a stronger, connected and more prosperous region”.
- The koala diplomacy was on full display during G20 leader's meeting in 2014 where Obama and Putin were given the animal to cuddle in front of the world's media.
- Vietnam sent elephants to Mao Zedong on various occasions during the 1950's
- Turkmenistan gifted Xi Jinping with a “heavenly horse” back in 2014.
- China being the biggest customer for natural gas from Turkmenistan might have something to do with the sudden majestic endowment.

Animal Diplomacy

- Czechs send genetic horse sample to British royal wedding couple
- The Czech government is dispatching a genetic sample from a stallion presented to William and Kate before the gift is sent



- Panda diplomacy is the common name for the act of China sending giant pandas to other countries. Because of the popularity of the animal it usually attracts a lot of attention from both the public and the press. The event where the agreement is signed, or when it is announced that pandas will be sent to another nation, is often very ceremonial and on a high official level.

- the panda giving can arguably still be regarded as a diplomatic tool as not any nation is entrusted with a panda.
- According to Lin (2009) the agreement that another country will receive pandas are commonly announced during formal meetings such as state visits.
- The high annual fee of keeping and renting a panda further makes panda diplomacy mostly applicable to developed countries.
- This is the probable reason why pandas are only found in Western and some Asian countries' zoos

- The pandas are seen as a symbol of cooperation between China and the receiving country.
- Expressing China's good will (Lin 2009).
 - They are also a tool for increased scientific and technological cooperation.
 - However, the keeping of the pandas are not the only thing negotiated. Buckingham, et al. (2013) concluded that pandas are representing a seal of approval, if a government agrees to take care of the pandas it shows a long-term commitment to the relationship between the countries.

Panda Diplomacy

- “panda diplomacy” and it's thought to have started as early as the Tang Dynasty in the 7th century when Empress Wu Zeitan sent a pair of bears (believed to be pandas) to Japan.
- This Chinese policy of sending pandas as diplomat gifts was revived in 1941, on the eve of the United States entering World War II, when Beijing sent two cuddly black-and-whites to the Bronx Zoo as a “thank you” gift.
- Chairman Mao frequently engaged in panda diplomacy in the 1950s, sending bears as gifts to China's communist allies (such as North Korea and the Soviet Union).

- Using the actual pandas and not just the symbol, there are many ways that pandas can be seen as a source of soft power.
- The connection between pandas and China is therefore important to maintain.
- Giving the pandas Chinese names, having the zoos create a Chinese influenced section where the pandas are, is therefore vital. As people who sees the pandas in the zoo will also connect it with China, much more than other animals even though they might also be from a very specific part of the world, they are not connected with that part in the same way.
- here seems to be a connection between panda diplomacy and bilateral agreements between China and the receiving country (Buckingham et al. 2013).

- By asking why pandas suddenly were sent to a Scottish zoo, there seemed to be a link between a newly formed trade agreement between Scotland and China
- The trade agreement also coincided with the loss of the traded resource as the relation between the former trading partner Norway, had deteriorated since the visit from the Dalai Lama and decision to name a Chinese dissident the Nobel laureate of peace in early 2010.

- All of China's major trading partners (except India) has received pandas, and there seems to be a connection between uranium exporters, such as Canada, France, and Australia which all have received pandas after 2008.
- Later initiated panda loans seem to follow the same trend with trade agreements and cooperation in scientific fields being the common connection.
- The trade agreements do not always have a direct connection and are from time to time signed later than the panda - rental agreement, but countries which received pandas seem to be more likely to score one

- Two months after Richard Nixon's landmark trip to China in 1972, which ended 25 years of isolation and tension between the United States and the People's Republic, the president and his wife, Pat, greeted the adorable 18-month-old pair named Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling.
- This gift from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai created a nationwide "Panda-Monium," causing American zoos from the Bronx to San Diego to fiercely lobby the White House to become the pandas' new home.
- In the end the Washington, D.C.'s National Zoo won, and the two celebrities received over 20,000 visitors on their first day on display.
- The following Sunday, 75,000 people flooded the zoo, waiting in a quarter-mile-long line to see America's newest sensations, who graced magazine covers and proved to be an economic boon for producers of toys and stuffed animals.
- In return, the U.S. government sent China a pair of musk oxen

- Pandas have since then been given as gifts to countries when different states of heads came to visit China, but this practice was later condemned from international NGOs and environmentalist disagreeing with the handling of an endangered animal. Since then the pandas are now being loaned to other nations

- This exchange was seen as so successful it inspired British Prime Minister Edward Heath to ask for a panda loan during his 1974 visit to China. Chia-Chia and Ching-Ching arrived at their new digs, the London Zoo, a few weeks later.
- The tradition saw a significant shift in 1984, when China amended its panda protocols.
- Moving forward, the animals would only be sent out on 10-year loans, would require payment of a standard annual fee (for the U.S. it was \$1 million) and decreed that all cubs birthed from loaned pandas were Chinese citizens, regardless of place of birth.
- The U.S., in turn, shifted its acceptance policy in 1998, only allowing a panda to reside in the States if more than half of its annual fee was given to conservation efforts for wild pandas and their habitats.

- In 2008, a devastating earthquake rippled across China's Sichuan province, destroying 67 percent of China's wild panda habitats.
- With its largest and most prestigious conservation center destroyed, China needed to find foster homes for all 60 of its surviving residents.
- This natural disaster, combined with what appeared to be another shift in panda policy (China now said they would only send pandas to countries for breeding and biological research), caused some to note that China's loans seemed to be coinciding with trade deals for valuable resources and technology.

- Japan received two pandas from China in 2008. On a state visit to Japan three months before the start of the Beijing Olympic Games, the former Chinese president, Hu Jintao, was quoted as saying:
 - “Giant pandas are very popular among the Japanese, and they are a symbol of the friendly ties between Japan and China.”

- China uses “panda diplomacy” to emphasise the importance of a given state in Chinese foreign policy.
 - Malaysia, which received pandas in 2014 on the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the countries.
 - Malaysia is one of China's major allies in Asia and has a large Chinese minority (about 25% of its population).
 - The Malaysian authorities' disputes with China over territorial claims in the South China Sea are not high on their agenda.

- Belgium, which received pandas during Xi's visit to Brussels in 2014.
 - Although the animals were sent to a Belgian zoo, Xi's visit had an EU aspect—it was the first time a PRC chairman has visited EU institutions.
 - As a follow-up to this visit, China published a new document about its policy towards the EU.
 - In July 2017, during Xi's visit to Berlin, China handed pandas to Germany.
 - The bears also are loaned to countries with which China has signed significant economic contracts.

- German
- Read more at <http://www.reuters.com/story/germany-china-panda-berlin-2017-07-08>



German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the welcome ceremony for Chinese panda bears Meng Meng and Jiao Qing in Berlin. (Reuters Photo)

- in 2008, they couldn't hold out against the fuzzy power any longer and Taipei accepted Tuan Tuan and Yuan Yuan.

- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAMLXPUE3E>

North and South Korea marched together under one flag at the Olympics

- North and South Korea marched under a united flag at the 2018 Winter Olympics opening ceremony in Pyeongchang on Friday in a symbolic break in tensions between the two nations over North Korea's nuclear program.
- Athletes from the two countries entered the Pyeongchang Olympic stadium together, joined hands, and marched under the Korean Unification flag, which displays the entire Korean peninsula in blue against a white backdrop.
- It was a rare but not unprecedented spectacle. The two countries first displayed the flag at the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships and most recently at the 2006 Winter Olympics in Italy.
- But this year's gesture of unity comes at a crucial moment. Tensions between North Korea and South Korea have skyrocketed as Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic missile programs have advanced at an astonishing pace in the past year, and North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un, has persistently demonstrated a readiness to make use of them.

- During his New Year's Day speech, Kim reached out to South Korea and raised the idea of starting high-level talks for the first time in two years to discuss the possibility of North Korea's participation in the Olympics.
- South Korea eagerly took him up on the offer, and through negotiations at the border village of Panmunjom the two countries quickly agreed not only to march under a united flag but also to form a joint women's ice hockey team, marking the first time they have contributed athletes to the same team at the Olympics.
- North Korea then further pressed its charm offensive, sending Kim's younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, to the opening ceremony—the first time a member of his immediate family has set foot in South Korea since the Korean war in the mid-20th century. She shook hands with South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the beginning of the ceremony.
- Kim Yo Jong also sat just feet away from Vice President Mike Pence. But there's currently no indication that they exchanged any pleasantries.



- Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of Kim Jong-un, North Korea's leader, was sitting at the opening ceremony closely behind Vice President Mike Pence, who led the American delegation. Also present was the father of **Otto Warmbier**, the American student who was jailed in North Korea last year, returned home in a coma and died shortly afterward.
- The United States warned against a North Korean charm offensive and announced plans to impose its toughest sanctions yet against Pyongyang, which staged a military parade featuring ICBMs just a day before the Games opened.



Ping Pong Diplomacy

- "Friendship First, Competition Second". During the isolationist years, athletes were among the few PRC nationals who were allowed to travel overseas.
- In 1963 the Sino-Soviet relations became almost confrontational.
 - The situation was obviously unfavourable to both sides, particularly to China which was falling into isolation.
 - As a result, Chinese leaders began to search for a way of open the country to the international community.
 - It maintained close relations with the non-aligned countries, but concerning its situation, establishing closer ties with the West was a natural, although risky solution.

Ping Pong Diplomacy

- Relations with the US were particularly important as China desired to join United Nations, possibly bring Taiwan back under Beijing's control and to some extent – to deter against the Soviet Union
- The strategic position of the US was completely different at the beginning of the 1970s, but Americans were also interested in establishing closer relations with communist China, especially after Richard Nixon became the President.
 - Nixon even before being elected claimed that the US need to reposition its policy regarding China.
 - As he stated already in 1967, "taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture their fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbours. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation"

Ping Pong Diplomacy

- After becoming the President, Nixon made the issue of China one of his priorities.
- It was hardly possible to enhance the level of bilateral relations with the use of traditional diplomatic channels then.
 - Admittedly, at the time China distanced itself from the USSR, but the ideology remained the key issue.
 - Another important factor should be associated with the Republic of China (Taiwan), which government did not accept the existence of the PRC. Americans were maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan and US troops stationed on the island. Americans had to act very carefully then

Ping Pong Diplomacy

- Nixon presented a completely new approach to the issue of Taiwan – as he was reported to have said during a private conversation with Nicolae Ceaucescu, "Taiwan was not an international but an internal problem, to be resolved by the Chinese themselves in a peaceful way"
- at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s there was a will for political rapprochement expressed both by American and Chinese policy-makers, despite many unfavourable circumstances.
- After Nixon became the President, he once again tried to employ the earlier "Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw", in which US and Chinese ambassadors to Poland met and talked in Warsaw, but with no effect (Itoh, 2011, pp. 16 – 17). A so called Pakistani channel – contacting via Pakistan's diplomats – was more successful

Ping Pong Diplomacy

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- At the time, as a consequence of the conflict with Taiwan, the PRC was not a member of most of international sports federations after it withdrew from them in 1958
- However, China sustained its membership in International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF). Despite it did not compete in two previous world championships, Chinese government was planning to send team in 1971
 - It was problematic that Taiwan was a member of Table Tennis Federation of Asia, while the PRC pursued a policy, according to which it could not be a member of any international sports organization that Taiwan belonged to

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- Chinese leadership was not unanimous about the idea of sending national team to the table tennis world championships. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were in favour, while opposite views were presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Physical Culture and Sport Commission.
 - Despite that Mao was determined to use the opportunity that sport offered and decided that Chinese team should go to Nagoya

- Before departing, a send-off ceremony was organized in the Great Hall of the People. Prime minister Enlai asked athletes to abide the principle ‘friendship first, than competition’. There was also a number of instructions issued by the government concerning contacts with Americans. For instance, Chinese athletes were not allowed to be the first to greet or exchange flags, while they were allowed to shake hands
- During the event Chinese world champion Zhuang Zedong (Zhuāng Zédōng) was reported to have talked to a member of American team Glenn Cowan, who was late for his team bus and got a ride by the Chinese team. The two men exchanged gifts and the Chinese offered an arrangement of Chinese-American table tennis meeting

- Chinese support for the idea of inviting American team was not shared by all political leaders in China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs was suggesting, that the invitation might have an adverse impact on China. Enlai consulted Mao, who decided that Americans should be invited (Xia, 2006, p. 153). As a result, a formal invitation to play a series of matches in China was addressed to the American team on April 6, 1971



- As a result of the earlier developments, nine American table tennis players with four officials and two companions crossed the bridge between Hong Kong and mainland China on April 10, 1971. Americans visited Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou and played two exhibition matches. Chinese prime minister's meeting with Chinese, American and four other teams in the Great Hall of the People on April 14 was to be a highlight of the visit. At the time Zhou stated: "a new chapter has been opened in the relations between our two peoples. Your visit to China has opened the door to friendly contacts between our two countries. We believe that such friendly contacts will be favoured and supported by the majority of the two peoples." few hours later Washington lifted the trade embargo on China that was in force for 22 years and permitted trade of close equivalents goods exchanged with the USSR. Other gestures of the US encompassed termination of the American currency control in regard to China and visa facilitation for the Chinese visiting the United States (Xia, 2006, pp. 153 – 154; Pigman, 2010, p. 193). Shortly after the sports exchange the developments were rapid afterwards. In July 1971 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China and met with prime minister Zhou Enlai. The visit was secret, but Nixon soon made it public.

Opening to West

- The first Chinese nuclear test, code-named 596, occurred on 16 October 1964.
- In fall 1969, there was no official channel of communication between China and the United States.
- The last meeting of Sino-American ambassadorial talks was held in Warsaw in January 1968.
- July 1969, Nixon wanted to talk to Chinese he had to talk to Pakistani president Mohammad Yahya Khan and Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu
- Indirect Contacts
- Slow contacts / Slow communications
- Taiwan Issue
- Albania – Criticism of China-US talks

Ping-Pong Diplomacy

- April 1971- 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan
- Glenn Cowan, missed his U.S. team bus
- Zhuang Zedong, a three-time World Men's Singles Champion, presented him with a silk-screen portrait of the famous Huangshan Mountains
- PRC responded by inviting the American ping pong team to tour mainland China.



Kissinger's role and his trip

- In July 1971 Henry Kissinger, while on a trip to Pakistan, feigned illness and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a top-secret mission to Beijing to open relations with the government of the PRC. On July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the mission to the world and that he had been invited to visit the PRC and that he had accepted.

United Nations

- China's seat in the United Nations and membership of the United Nations Security Council has been occupied by the People's Republic of China (PRC) since October 25, 1971
- Supported by the Third world countries

