Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International
Relations Theory
Author(s): Joe D. Hagan
Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions:
Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking (Summer, 2001), pp. 5-46
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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Does Decision Making Matter?
Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality
in International Relations Theory
Joe D. Hagan
West Virginia University
early fifty years ago Richard Snyder and his colleagues (1954) articulated
a foreign policy decision-making perspective th
people matter in international affairs. This now classic w
such enduring concepts as "definition of the situation" and "org
text." Soon recognized as a distinct "level of analysis" in the
national relations (e.g., Singer, 1961), by the 1970s decision mak
a dominant approach in the study of foreign policymaking wit
tion of such theoretical models as bureaucratic politics (Allis
erin, 1974) and groupthink (Janis, 1972) as well as a number of s
approaches to governmental decision making (Holsti, 1976; Jerv
prominence, however, did not last long. In the 1980s systemic th
on international structures regained their former primacy with
mulated neorealist (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981) and neoliberal arg
hane, 1984). A common feature in this "structural realism" was t
the significance of decision-making influences and other stateena
on policymaking. Waltz's critique was damning in two r
pointing out that state-level explanations rest on reductionis
trayed foreign policy analysis as divorced from the context of
politics; and (2) by asserting that the imperatives of systemic s
anarchy) were clear, he indicated that all leaders would readily u
and respond according to their state's position in the system. In
did decision-making approaches miss much of the substance
politics, they also dwelled on the largely irrelevant "noise" o
cesses in explaining state behavior. Yet by the 1990s systemic re
being subjected to provocative critiques, the most compelling of
? 2001 International Studies Association
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6 Joe D. Hagan
case studies by "soft" realists th
anomalies-in systemic explanatio
back to the Crimean War (e.g.,
Kupchan, 1994).
The premise of this article is t
positioned to contribute to the furth
This statement should not be cons
ments of the past two decades; no
stitutes a comprehensive theoretic
argument here is that decision-ma
account for some of the resulting
flict and war. The argument is ma
ing the origins of the twentieth c
War I, World War II, and the Cold
cannot be explained by the syste
proposal is asserted and discussed
because foreign policy problems
1974)-even in crisis situations whe
demonstrate this point, the prese
ses of the origins of WWI, WWII,
shows that the conditions inheren
hold up very well. Instead, to one
century's major crises (1) faced ve
national threats, (2) confronted tr
that of retaining power, and (3) o
ical authority was quite dispersed
understanding decision-making in
ers will respond to international (
concludes by exploring the implica
development of the decision-ma
making structures, or "units," ch
ments and are themselves variable
political structures.
EMPIRICAL LIMITS OF SYSTEMIC EXPLANATIONS OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY GREAT POWER CONFLICTS
This section draws upon the critiques of structural-realist theory that h
lated a key limitation in systemic explanations of war-the inability to
for the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars as well as the escalation of
the Cold War. Works by Snyder (1991), Rosecrance and Stein (1993), and
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Does Decision Making Matter? 7
Kupchan (1994) as well as Levy (1990-91) have collectively
the great powers acted in ways that cannot be readily ex
response to systemic imperatives. Although not rejecting th
view of states coping with systemic anarchy, this scholarship
zles" in which great powers pursued policies that were incon
severity of systemic threats and/or their capabilities relativ
States either underreacted by failing to balance against, and th
saries; or they overreacted to threats by overextending their
voking self-encirclement by other powers.
The outbreak of World War II seems to be the most divorced from the
systemic premises of structural-realist theories. If ever there was a clear threa
to international stability, it was Japan in East Asia and Germany in Europe by
the mid-1930s. Yet the major status quo powers of the time-Britain, France
and the United States-did very little to counter the rising power of Germany
and Japan.' These major powers failed to use their originally superior military
power to reverse Japan's initial aggression in Manchuria and left unchallenged
Germany's rearmament, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, and the incorporation
of Austria and the Sudetenland. Nor did Britain, France, or the U.S.
"balance" in the larger sense, engaging in at most slow and partial rearmament
and failing to form alliances with each other and/or the historically crucial
(Soviet) Russia. Ultimately, at the height of prewar tensions (the Munich crisis),
Hitler was met with forceful appeasement-not deterrence-by an assertive
British government, which was meekly followed by an ambivalent France
and an absent United States that hitherto responded with stricter neutrality acts.2
Also puzzling are the expansionist foreign policies of Germany and Japan.
Unless one assumes the darkest image of international systems, the "revisionist"
foreign policies of Germany and Japan in the 1930s are far more than a
response to the security dilemmas of international anarchy. Whatever the case
on this point, it is not apparent why these powers overextended themselves in
'This sketch of WWII puzzles closely follows those identified in the Snyder, Rosecrance
and Stein, and Kupchan volumes. In particular, Snyder (1991: ch. 4) questions
the Japanese attack on Manchuria, while Kupchan (1994: ch. 5) puzzles over the expansion
of the war into China and then the Pacific. On war in Europe, Kupchan (1994:
chs. 3, 4, and 7) is the most comprehensive, dealing with British, French, and U.S.
appeasement before WWII. Rosecrance and Steiner (1993) also address British appeasement,
while in the same volume Stein (1993) examines the underextension of American
power. On the distinction between revisionist and status quo states see Schweller (1994).
2Even after the start of the Second World War in Europe, the French, British, and
American governments persisted in, at best, weak balancing. Only with the fall of
France did Britain finally abandon thoughts of an accommodation with Germany (see
Lukacs, 1999) and the Roosevelt administration reverse the neutrality acts in major
ways through lend-lease aid (see Holsti, 1993).
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8 Joe D. Hagan
self-defeating ways. For example, e
quer resource-rich Manchuria, exp
and then launching a Pacific war ag
government's economic and milita
The occurrence of war does not d
tures of the 1930s. The outbreak of the First World War resulted from a decadelong
deterioration of the European balance-of-power system and was centered
around comparatively subtle "security dilemmas" among status quo (i.e., nonrevolutionary)
powers. Beginning with Wilhelmine Germany's abandonment
of Bismarckian restraint in favor of a militant diplomacy (itself a self-defeating
behavior), by 1912 most of the increasingly vulnerable European governments
had shifted to relatively hard-line foreign policies. Thus, by 1914, it is not
surprising that the European states would consider war-indeed, it is arguable
that the crisis was an exercise in diplomatic brinkmanship in which AustriaHungary
would quickly suppress Serbia, and Germany would threaten war to
neutralize Russia and destroy the Triple Entente. Following Levy's (1990-91)
analysis, what is so striking is that the attempt failed, and instead provoked a
European-wide war that neither aggressor had expected, desired, or ultimately
survived.3 The failure of crisis management (or micro-level balancing) in July
1914 presents several puzzles. First, why did it take the Austro-Hungarian government
nearly a month to strike at Serbia, a delay that saw European opinion
shift from sympathy regarding the assassination to alarm about European stability
leading to Russia's involvement in the crisis? Second, why did neither
normally cautious France nor the now frustrated Germany restrain their respective
allies before the crisis escalated, as they had done in previous crises over
the Balkans? Third, once the threat of a wider war became apparent, why were
the diplomatic initiatives of the British foreign secretary (Grey) and the German
chancellor (Bethmann-Hollweg) so completely ineffective in containing
the crisis, in marked contrast to the concert diplomacy of the previous Balkan
3This treatment of the July 1914 crisis as a systemic puzzle draws from Levy
(1990-91) as well as Hermann and Hermann (1969). It is consistent with but not
directly based on Snyder, Rosecrance and Stein, and Kupchan; none of these scholars
examined the outbreak of the war but, instead, explored balancing behavior in the
larger time frame. Some of the flaws in British decision making in the July 1914 crisis
noted here are downplayed by Kupchan, who argues that the British and French balanced
effectively before WWI. In the analysis here, the July 1914 crisis is viewed as
the culmination of a "spiral of conflict" (Jervis, 1976) and represents a failure of both
brinkmanship and deterrence-either of which points to a puzzling collapse of the
balance of power. As such, and like much of the literature on the July crisis, this
analysis falls between the image of the crisis as accidental and entirely unintended and
the view that it was planned by an expansionist Germany.
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Does Decision Making Matter? 9
crises? Finally, why did the British government fail to expr
ner its commitment to intervene on the side of its fellow
Germany attacked France? The irreality of Britain's failure
brinkmanship is as striking as the ineptitude of Austria-Hun
its military force against Serbia.
In many respects the Cold War is not puzzling. It can b
Soviet Union and the United States balanced each other more
for nearly forty years and that the bipolar structure of the
explains much of that stability.4 However, there are impor
questions to be asked. Not only why did the wartime allianc
matically as to lead to the point of war in Europe (the Berlin
the United States, in particular, continue to expand its comm
the strategic areas of Western Europe and the offshore East
fact, the culmination of the "origins" of the U.S. policy of c
Korean War-not the initial intervention to contain the Nor
but rather the attempted "rollback" of communism to th
provoked the full-scale military intervention of China. Not
at rollback create an entirely new war lasting over two
reinforced ties between China and the Soviet Union against
Ultimately, although not explored here, these events set th
costly East Asian intervention: the "Americanization" of th
1965, a sustained buildup until 1968, and then a prolong
recognizing the impossibility of military victory over North
early realists such as George Kennan and Hans Morgenth
first to question these wars, but the puzzle remains for cont
neorealist) theory: why did the U.S. engage in such extende
wars beginning in Korea?5
Taken together, the above examples make a critical point
nations of war cannot alone account for the behavior of key
twentieth century's major conflicts. This statement poses a
temporary realist theory. Not only are the origins of WWI,
4 Also, from a domestic politics and decision-making perspectiv
political systems were reasonably stable such that their crises (e.
crisis) were usually handled by relatively effective small-group d
(e.g., the National Security Council and the Politburo).
5 Snyder (1991: ch. 7), Stein (1993), and Kupchan (1994: ch. 7
foreign policy after WWII; their analyses as well as that by Chris
the dynamics of the "origins" of the Soviet-U.S. Cold War to
commitments to East Asia and, ultimately, war against China are
ling, and can be extended to the similarly puzzling American com
(also see Gelb with Betts, 1979; Berman, 1982).
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10 Joe D. Hagan
War major international events, but
of phenomenon that should be expl
respond to the threats posed by an
Once again, the premise here is tha
tional insights into these (and other
the reader should keep in mind tha
that decision-making structures som
national conflicts. The historical research examined below makes clear that
there were very real pressures from the international system (as well as dome
tic systems), and that leaders in these powers were more or less rational
attempting to cope with these clearly dangerous situations. What decision
making analysis can usefully explain is why leaders responded in ways th
seem distorted in terms of systemic imperatives and their states' military cap
bilities. In other words, in line with Rosecrance's (1995) "Goldilocks" pro
lem, the puzzle is why do states overreact or underreact to internation
pressures-or, following Richard Snyder and his associates (1954), how d
they cope with the international situation as they define it.
EVIDENCE THAT WAR DECISIONS ARE COMPLEX
This section's survey of historical evidence is intended to show that decision
making situations prior to WWI, WWII, and the Cold War were quite comple
and, thus, the responses to international threats by the great power leaders we
not entirely obvious. In other words, systemic assumptions about decision mak
ing did not hold, which arguably accounts for some of the state responses tha
pose puzzles to realist theory as discussed above. As explicated by Waltz (1979
see also Bueno de Mesquita, 1981), systemic theories assume that decisio
makers respond more or less directly to the systemic imperatives posed by a
anarchic international order. Particularly in international crises, the premise
that the dangers of war are so clear-cut that decision makers recognize t
threat and can quickly agree on strategies to deal with it, focus exclusively o
the goal of national security, and have the foreign policy authority necessary
commit the state's resources in responding to the threat. In short, systemic
explanations of foreign policy apply under three conditions: information cer
tainty, goal maximization, and the presence of an essentially unitary actor.
When looking at the twentieth century's great conflicts, however, these
assumed decision-making conditions simply do not hold up very well. As
result, the responses of decision makers to even the most threatening situatio
often did not make sense in terms of international system imperatives. An anal
sis of these conflicts suggests that there are at least three conditions that ma
foreign policy problems (in our case, the threat of war) fundamentally more
"complex" than is generally assumed in systemic theory:
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Does Decision Making Matter? 11
First, there is uncertainty, i.e., imperfect correspondence between
and the environment. Second, two or more values are affected by
and there is a trade-off relationship between the values such that a
to one can be obtained only at a loss to the other. Third, the power
decision is dispersed over a number of individual actors and/or o
units. (Steinbruner, 1974:16)
The value of this concept of "complex decision" is that it i
those empirical conditions that are likely to make decision-mak
systemic imperatives more problematic-or, at the least, not au
ous. Where there is "uncertainty" about threats and how to
governments' responses will depend upon how leaders percei
the threats based on their own belief systems. When leaders c
offs," responses to threats involve simultaneous judgments ab
issues, including how foreign policy actions will influence t
hold on power (or vice versa). Moreover, in governments where
ity is dispersed, state actions revolve around the political man
to achieve agreement to support an alliance, defense expen
mately the declaration of war. Furthermore, as will be argued a
essay, the extent to which authority is dispersed will significan
government resolves the choices posed by uncertainty and val
The main point of this essay is simply that the decisions th
leading to WWI, WWII, and the Cold War were fundamenta
involved uncertainty, value trade-offs, and the dispersion of aut
ment is based on the wealth of historical research that has em
these conflicts over the past few decades. What follows is a co
rather standard historical evidence indicating that complexity p
uations in the approach to the First and Second World Wars an
the Cold War. The reader should note that the evidence presen
ever, is not compiled from case study research by IR theorist
and Kupchan; nor is it based upon studies by political scientist
advocating a decision-making perspective. Rather, this evidenc
widely cited secondary analyses by historians on government
in the three conflicts. Three types of historical sources are us
general historical studies of the origins of each conflict, partic
examine foreign policy decision making in the various bell
such, show the interactive sequence of state decisions that esc
flict. The second set of sources are country-specific historical
power's foreign policy decision making leading up to WWI, W
War. These studies are often impressive, not only in terms of
nation of policy debates, political structures, and specific deci
their review of historiographical debates concerning each pow
war. The third set of sources are general domestic political hist
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12 Joe D. Hagan
the great powers. Although usually
studies survey the larger domestic
political groups, competing policy i
way these latter sources place speci
developments across the longer t
WWI (e.g., 1890s-1914), WWII (19
The Pervasiveness of Uncerta
A key theme in this historical liter
fronted significant uncertainty in
threats in the periods leading up
problematic was the choice between
threats and the assessment of the
actual use of military force. Although
within the government about thre
fundamental and often unresolvable
ership if there are opposing belie
affairs.7 For our purposes here, th
coexistence of "moderate" and "h
the government regarding adversar
favor diplomatic accommodation
often because of an aversion to the
war or, more extremely, because o
6No claim is made to have consulted
such as those by Albertini (1952-57) or
original findings on these conflicts; ra
tions in terms of the received wisdom
The works cited are useful in that they s
of research on each country's role and
of the use of standard historical source
constructing political histories of the
7 In contrast, studies of perception an
at the judgments of decision makers as
ers now know them. See, in particular
before the First and Second World W
Jervis (1976) and Lebow (1981).
8This distinction is based mainly o
(1977). Although in another place the
distinction, the basic dichotomy is suff
policy positions. The main caution her
across political systems as well as with
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Does Decision Making Matter? 13
in contrast, call for sustained confrontation with adversaries
ening the use of military force, which they view as the on
deterring an inherently aggressive adversary-at the extreme
alist arguments favoring military aggression or expansion. Al
dichotomy, this hard-line-moderate distinction is simplistic, it
efficient and theoretically meaningful device for making the
often governments do not operate according to one well-defin
clear systemic imperative. More important, the distinction ad
much of the rich historical research that suggests that, even at
governments have to make choices under conditions of great
Although the pre-WWI period saw the rise of hard-liners in
ments of most of the great powers, these groups had not entire
more moderate arguments that had restrained European affairs
A wide variety of views was especially evident in government
Entente, where alternative arguments coexisted right up to the
The political leadership of Third Republic France had long b
the question of "normal" relations with Germany, with little
calling for a revanchist war to regain the lost provinces of Als
Rather, hard-liners called for assertive diplomacy against G
through a strong alliance with Russia and ties with Britain, w
favored Franco-German d6tente via cooperation on trade a
tions. Although dating back to the defeat by Prussia, these di
had, if anything, been sustained by the simultaneous revival of
socialism in prewar French politics.9 As for autocratic Russia,
line among the country's elites in the decade before the war wa
toward Austria-Hungary over Balkans questions. The members
elite were less united about relations with Russia's other adver
Hard-liners favored confronting Austria-Hungary while "dete
by building strong alliance ties with France and Britain, while
the cost of a premature war and advocated the "deflection" of
through d6tente on common issues.'~ In Britain, the ruling Liberal
viewed by the electorate as the "peace party" when compared
9For the variety of French viewpoints prior to WWI see Keiger (
(1993). Several of the general French histories focus on the logic of
line and moderate beliefs through the nineteenth century, e.g., Zeld
(1990); and Wright (1995). Tombs (1996) is especially useful in showi
of moderate, risk-averse arguments growing out of domestic up
1848, 1871) and military defeat (1815 and 1871).
1oThese descriptions are by Leiven (1983), who emphasizes the
opinion in Tsarist circles; but see also works by Geyer (1987), Sprin
(1992), and Neilson (1995).
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14 Joe D. Hagan
vative Party, actually encompassed
in power after 1905. These ranged f
ened alliances with France and Russ
to "radicals" with a Gladstonian ave
thy for human rights (e.g., in Russ
crisis, Liberal leaders were divided
ain's intervention in the war."
Admittedly, the range of debate i
powers that started the war) was re
Entente powers.12 In 1897 in a cru
government, William II appointed h
istry (Bulow) and Navy (Tirpitz).
cated a militant diplomacy to bre
tightening of the alliance with Aus
in the form of colonial expansion a
of hard-line dominance occurred in
appointed to the Foreign Ministry (
ership (Conrad von Hotzendorf). T
assertive foreign policy in the Balk
rising ethnic tensions.14 Yet all th
meaningful debate, particularly wh
icies could increase, not decrease,
weakness of Austria-Hungary's situ
of war as a means of arresting the
' Political divisions among the British
iamson (1969), Steiner (1977), Kenn
(1988), Wilson (1995), Young (1997),
12 Note that just the opposite was the
Alliance, whose choices were severely
or Austria-Hungary) and military def
views see Thayer (1964), C. Seton-W
Clark (1996), and Mack Smith (1997).
13Most German histories acknowledge a fundamental shift in the course of the
Second Reich with the rise of its pre-WWI hard-liners and that these changes were
especially important on the road to WWI. See Berghahn (1973), Kennedy (1980), and
Mommsen (1995) as well as general histories such as those by Ramm (1967), Holborn
(1969), and Craig (1978). Kagan's (1995) analysis of WWI's origins begins with the
fall of Bismarck and then addresses these subsequent leadership changes.
14 Sked (1989), Williamson (1991), Fellner (1995), and in the larger context, Okey
(2001) note the importance of this leadership change, while acknowledging the persistence
of some dissenting arguments up through WWI.
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Does Decision Making Matter? 15
constrained by less risk prone officials, such as the aging
Josef, the reformist Archduke Ferdinand, and the Hungarian
Tisza. Nor was the more powerful Germany immune from
given its encirclement by the growing power and cohesion of
ance. Thus, despite the talk of preventive war among some
1912 "war council"), a sort of "preventive diplomacy" was
Kaiser to attract his Tsarist counterpart, while his chancel
Hollweg) held out hope for relaxed tensions with Britain and,
least the country's neutrality in the case of war.15 By July 1
the Archduke Ferdinand's assassination provided an excellen
take preventive action against the Serbian threat and Enten
throughout the crisis advocates of preventive war in both gov
fend off, first, the diplomatic arguments against war by the
minister and, later, the risk-averse hesitations of the German
chancellor about the escalating crisis.
The range of debate in the major powers prior to World War
dramatic. At one extreme, Nazi Germany and militarist Japan
tively little debate. Both these countries had foreign policies g
atic expansion through the use of military force.16 Hitler's
closest to having had a grand plan of expansion with the goals
the Versailles settlement, gaining diplomatic dominance in the
jugating the Slavic states to the East. Japanese foreign policy
rists is arguably not nearly as coherent, but the range of p
relatively limited, having to do with the pace and direction of
15Sources detailing prewar debates, and especially the position
Hollweg in Wilhelmine Germany include Stern (1967), Berghahn (19
Kennedy (1980), Schmidt (1990), and Herwig (1997). Of course, other
Fischer tradition stresses the coherence of the German hard-line; a
(1967), see Kaiser (1983), Wehler (1985), Pogge von Strandmann
(1995).
16The expansionist core of Nazi foreign policy is widely noted, al
the latter part of the 1930s there were different views over the pace
see works by Holborn (1969), Hildebrand (1970), Craig (1978), M
Muller (1983), Bell (1986), Berghahn (1987), Kaiser (1992), and K
Japanese policy debates see works by Borton (1970), Fairbank, Reisc
(1973), Barnhart (1987, 1995), Beasley (1987), Sagan (1988), Iriye
(2000). The foreign policies of Stalin's Soviet Union and Mussolin
cally portrayed as far more reactive and hardly conforming to a syst
the extent that uncertainty existed, it was in the mind of each leade
competing policy arguments in the 1930s. On Mussolini see, e.g.
Mack Smith (1997), and Knox (2000). On the USSR see McCauley
(1993), and Hosking (2001).
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16 Joe D. Hagan
sion in China and the Pacific. Far
debate in these authoritarian regim
democracy-Great Britain. Throughou
revolved around a consensus in the
imacy in German complaints about t
any renewed commitment to the defe
by the growing German threat afte
a shift from "passive" to "active" a
diplomacy.17 Only after Hitler's un
mantling of non-German Czechoslov
But, remarkably, as Lukacs (1999) h
failure did not create a solid hard-l
France's collapse in May 1940, the B
ing a comprehensive peace with H
tinuing the war (e.g., Churchill).
Like this final British debate, in
responses of France and the United
mid-1930s. Both of these polities
how-and, indeed, whether or not-t
out the interwar period French pol
cabinets) exhibited a clear "ambiv
hard-line and moderate strategies fo
man power."' Indeed, by the mid
wing and left-wing blocs were po
ultimately, the question of which
Europe under Germany or in a com
the United States, the rising Germ
larizing debates. Although the Roos
ognize the imperative of deterring
remained a very powerful force th
within Congress. Even after the f
'7These versions of appeasement ar
concise overview of the limited range
Bell (1986), Hughes (1988), Kagan (1
tories note the broad consensus within
(1970), Beloff (1984), Williams and
(1994).
'8Adamthwaite (1995) and Young (1
politics underlying French foreign po
(1984), Bernard and Dubief (1975), A
(1997).
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Does Decision Making Matter? 17
U.S. leaders for responding to Churchill's pleas for military an
for Britain's defense against the impending Nazi onslaught.
tack on Pearl Harbor resolved American uncertainty regarding
of the German threat in Europe and Japan's conquests in E
security.19
Turning to the Cold War, it would be expected that the level
in a bipolar world would be fundamentally less when compare
ously discussed multipolar systems (e.g., Waltz, 1979). To an ext
but there are still some interesting complications. Postrevision
the "origins of the Cold War" stresses the uncertainties in the
American tensions after WWII. Once again, the Soviet case und
ably revolved around his personal assessment of threats. Althou
that Stalin had definite postwar goals and demands, key litera
Soviet postwar actions were not guided by a grand plan and th
actions were often ad hoc.20 Far more striking is the America
larly if one recognizes that it took half a decade for hardpolicies
to take shape. Initially, the Truman administration attem
Soviet moves in Eastern Europe and the Near East using compe
what Yergin (1977) calls the moderate "Yalta" axioms favoring
mal diplomacy vs. the more hard-line "Riga" axioms pushing fo
diplomacy toward Stalin. Subsequently, after having define
ernment as the dominant postwar threat, new uncertainties aro
of that threat: was it essentially political and economic (Ke
essentially military (Acheson and Nitze)?21 The latter view wo
68), but still new uncertainties appeared when the "loss o
debates about the geographical range of the communist threat
Western Europe or East Asia, or both? Only the shock of t
invasion of South Korea created, as had Pearl Harbor nine year
domestic consensus about U.S. international commitments.22 So certain was
this new consensus that the U.S. leaders became trapped by arguments insisting
19 On interwar policy divisions in the United States see Divine (1965), Dallek (1979,
1983), and Small (1996) as well as general treatments in Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan
(1983), LaFeber (1989), and Schulzinger (1998).
20 Mastny (1979) and Taubman (1982) are especially useful in conveying the uncertainty
in Stalin's foreign policy, although of course such was not manifest in postwar
Kremlin debates.
21 Works by Gaddis (1978, 1982), Larson (1985), Leffler (1992), and Yergin (1997)
are especially effective in portraying the uncertainty in postwar U.S. foreign policy
and the progression of debates that shaped the evolution of these policies. On alternative
Cold War postures see also Dallek (1983).
22 See Jervis (1980) and LaFeber (1989) on the impact of the Korean War.
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18 Joe D. Hagan
on intervention in the Third World
War to the north and ultimately a
tion of the Vietnam War in the mid
War consensus meant that there wa
of world affairs; debate was restri
instruments of military containmen
Value Trade-offs Under Thre
A second assumption found in syste
other policy concerns, both at hom
historical research on the origins
typically portrays leaders as dealing
set involved the trade-offs between
rial goals in Africa and Asia. These
balanced because scarce resources for the defense of the "core" were often
allocated to the protection of the "peripheries." 23 A second type of trade-o
centered around balancing domestic vs. foreign policy priorities. In the 1930
dominant reality was that the economic collapse of the Great Depression had
severely undercut the financial resources available for rearmament, at least fo
those governments that adhered to conservative fiscal policies-most clear
Britain under the Conservative Party and France under Radical Party influenc
Even in the more prosperous pre-WWI era, the resources available to Europe
governments (both democratic and authoritarian) were constrained not just
Liberal reformers as in Britain, but also by archaic systems of taxation a
military deployment defended by traditional elements such as the Prussian ar
tocracy.24 The third type of trade-off concerned the larger domestic politic
context and, in particular, the desire of leaders to retain power and preserv
their regimes. Without reverting to arguments about the primacy of intern
politics, the evidence suggests that domestic politics conditioned how leaders
responded to foreign pressures leading up to WWI, WWII, and the Cold War. I
short, despite the immediacy of international threats, decisions to go to war
often involved the logic of Putnam's (1988) "two-level game." Given the per-
23 Kupchan (1994) emphasizes this trade-off. Such trade-offs raised further unce
tainties because continental adversaries were potential allies in imperial matters and
the other way around; e.g., although the British might ally with France and Russia
response to Germany, they were traditionally opposed to these two powers in colonia
matters.
24 In Britain this opposition was broken by the Liberals, but in France and Germ
entrenched groups resisting social and political reform restricted the revenue availa
to the military (see, e.g., Lamborn, 1991, and D'Lugo and Rogowski, 1993).
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Does Decision Making Matter? 19
vasiveness of these domestic political influences as well as the e
regarding their effects, it is worth focusing on this third typ
detail.
Mounting domestic political crises were a common problem for European
rulers prior to WWI, being almost as disruptive as the deterioration of the European
balance of power. This domestic political decay took place in two stages.
In the first, conservative leaders in all five powers coped with escalating, domestic
political crises in the decade prior to the war.25 Not only was Tsarist Russia
shaken by the 1905 revolution and Austria-Hungary's progressive ethnic disintegration,
but leaders in all of the powers faced problems in managing tenuous
majorities in legislative bodies; that is, Austria-Hungarian parliamentary deadlocks
and calls for reform of the Dual Monarchy, the rising power of the Social
Democratic Party in Germany in an increasingly polarized Reichstag, Russian
nationalist and Panslavic extremists in the new Duma, French Socialist Parties
encroaching upon Radical Republican dominance, and the flux posed by the
emerging Labour Party in Britain and the civil unrest in Ireland.26 In the second
stage, this political decay was intensified as rulers shifted to diversionary political
strategies in which foreign policy prestige and nationalism were used to
mobilize domestic support and isolate internal oppositions.27 One key turning
point was Wilhelmine Germany's 1897 adoption of the policies of Sammlungpolitik
and Weltpolitik to deflect socialist opposition. This strategy was not
unique. Similar shifts occurred in Austria-Hungary in 1906, in Russia under the
pressure of the new Duma monarchy after 1906, and with France's nationalist
25 Useful overviews of these crises are found in Mayer (1969), Joll (1984: ch. 5),
and Kagan (1995), while Kaiser (1990) and Levy (1990-91) place these crises into the
larger domestic and international contexts.
26The rise of domestic oppositions and resulting political tensions are documented
in the larger context in the standard nineteenth-century histories of each of the powers.
For Austria-Hungary see May (1951), Macartney (1968), and Kann (1974), and assessments
by Sked (1989), Williamson (1991), and Mason (1997); for Germany see Ramm
(1967), Holborn (1969), and Craig (1978), as well as structural arguments in Wehler
(1985) and qualifications in Berghahn (1973), Kaiser (1983), Herwig (1992), Retallack
(1992), and Mommsen (1995); for Russia see works by H. Seton-Watson (1967), Rogger
(1983), Westwood (1993), and Hosking (2001), as well as the structural analysis by
Geyer (1987); for France see works by Bury (1956), Brogan (1957), Cobban (1965),
Mayeur and Reberioux (1984), and McMillan (1992), and analyses by Anderson (1977),
Gildea (1996), and Tombs (1996); for Britain see Feuchtwanger (1985), McCord (1991),
Robbins (1994), Rubinstein (1998), and Pugh (1999), and especially Williams and
Ramsden (1990).
27 On diversionary approaches to foreign policy, see the critical analyses by Levy
(1988, 1989), while Hagan (1994) explicates the alternative strategies from which
leaders can choose in dealing with domestic opposition.
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20 Joe D. Hagan
revival under Poincar6 after 1911.
did leaders not shift to diversionar
In the July 1914 crisis, domestic p
out in different ways across the f
ulative diversionary strategies orig
linkage was greatest in the Austro
eign policy were largely inseparable
the risk of a war with Russia) was d
within this multinational empire.
found for Germany and Russia, th
losses than achieving political gai
ing the "blank check") and Nicho
vated, in part, by the fear that do
backing down in a major crisis. The
in prior crises, were now trapped
own diversionary strategies to the
French and British cases, the dyna
28The early adoption of diversionary
following sources. On Germany, see w
(1973), Kennedy (1980), Kaiser (1983
Austria-Hungary, Bled (1987), Sked (19
the post-1906 hard-line was an attemp
monarchy. In Russia, the post-1906 m
Tsar, reverted to the use of diversion
Leiven (1983, 1993), Geyer (1987), an
Poincard is largely pictured as playing
was most notable here was that the gov
of provoking unrest; see especially Ke
In the British case, Steiner (1977) is ex
but see also Gordon (1974), Kennedy
Italian governments under Giolitti's in
nationalistic foreign policies of earl
Watson, 1967; Bosworth, 1983; Clark
the prewar British and Italian govern
fought costly colonial wars in souther
29 Comparative judgments are, of course
July crisis typically portray these two
mestic consequences of backing down (
liam II's political fears behind the blank c
(1995) as well as Berghahn (1973) an
Hollweg was very pessimistic about the
is similar in analyses of Russian dec
McDonald, 1992; Hosking, 2001); Ni
when advisers raised the question of d
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Does Decision Making Matter? 21
more complex. Ironically, the actions of the otherwise politically
Third Republic appear to have been the least driven by domest
example, Poincar)'s necessarily reactive crisis management f
taining the Russian alliance. Actually, the main effect of dom
another parliamentary scandal, the Caillaux crisis) was to di
parliamentary opponents from what was happening until it w
that Germany would attack. Britain's politically constrained Lib
its Conservative predecessor) did not-in fact, could not-eng
ary strategies in July 1914. Not only was the cabinet preoc
threat of civil war in Ireland, but any public hint of continenta
provoked a parliamentary uproar among the party's moderate
certainly its antiwar Radicals and Labour Party allies.30
Linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy are e
ent in the case of WWII. Compared to conditions prior to the o
the presence of opposition varied widely across the differen
1930s the leaders of some powers actually faced very little org
tion and had little reason to expect domestic criticism of their
eign policy. Of course, in all of the totalitarian/authoritari
notably Germany and the Soviet Union) opposition groups
political institutions such as legislatures that were important
WWI had been largely neutralized and most publics were, if an
siastic about nationalistic foreign policies.31 Political constrain
Britain were not dramatically different, as the long-dominant C
continued to rely on a large parliamentary majority. Except f
such as Churchill, the Baldwin and Chamberlain cabinets encou
opposition from a unified and disciplined party that shared a
in favor of appeasement.32 Only in the American and French
30Along with Joll (1984) and Kagan (1995), domestic political c
Poincare's handling of the July crisis are discussed in Keiger (19
assessed in Magraw (1983), Cobb (1988), and Adamthwaite (1995
within British decision making see Gordon (1974), Steiner (1977)
and Ferguson (1999).
31 The progressive, and thorough, suppression of wider opposi
standard histories of Germany (e.g., Holborn, 1969; Craig, 1978;
Carr, 1991; also Kaiser, 1992) and the Soviet Union (e.g., McCauley, 1
1993; Hosking, 2001). The suppression of parliamentary democra
institutions was not as complete but still present in Italy (e.g., Dug
1996; Mack Smith, 1997; and Knox, 2000) and especially in Japan
Reischaur, and Craig, 1973; Duus, 1976; Berger, 1988; Pyle, 1996
32 On the political dominance of the cohesive Conservative Party in
politics see works by Beloff (1984), Williams and Ramsden (1990)
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22 Joe D. Hagan
significant domestic constraints, a
tionist sentiment remained entrenc
ing the 1940 election cycle at precis
policy was a potentially explosiv
desperate Britain could raise publ
draw the U.S. into another Europ
was also desperate. The depression a
ized French party politics, stimulat
and the increasingly authoritarian
Radical center. Unlike the underlyi
tries before WWI, distinctively right
neither of which was capable of go
sive parliamentary base.34
The WWII case also illustrates the
domestic opposition. Diversionary s
were not the dominant political dyn
the most severe oppositions-Fran
attempt to use foreign policy as a
anything, they consciously did the
from any course of action that inv
into controversial alliances (e.g., o
extreme, the need for foreign poli
apparent in the authoritarian/totali
ity. As a way of dealing with oppos
strategies influenced the shape of
leaders of both these regimes had s
they faced minimal constraints in
case) and coping with difficult al
of Japan and Italy, however, are m
Robbins (1994). Young (1997) and Hugh
foreign policy, a point emphasized i
33 Holsti's (1993) "destroyers for ba
ness; on domestic opposition to the
(1989), Guinsburg (1994), and Small (
34On the instability of interwar F
McMillan (1992), and Larkin (1997).
domestic politics as yet another area o
35 Controversy avoidance was inheren
footnote 34). In the American case,
accommodating political approach; e
and Farnham (1997) as well as Haines (1981) and LaFeber (1989).
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Does Decision Making Matter? 23
strategies arguably apply. In neither case had traditional insti
monarchy) been entirely eradicated; radical nationalism remaine
Mussolini's shift to a more aggressive foreign policy in th
motivated in part by the need for a dramatic policy succes
prestige of the regime as domestic problems persisted.36 Alth
cut, diversionary strategies in Japan's foreign policy reflect th
tending factions to appeal to the nationalism of larger audi
discrediting their factional opponents.37
Domestic politics also conditioned the rise of Cold War tens
rejecting the deterministic view that domestic structures alon
U.S. and USSR confrontation, the postrevisionist literature sug
need for both Truman and Stalin to posture to domestic audie
to the rise of hard-line policies. Even for the otherwise domina
the ideological card of capitalist encirclement was a key mean
dominance over the postwar Communist Party; for example, a
his hard-line reelection speech at the first postwar party cong
1946.38 The prestige of a strong foreign policy would remain a
foreign policy throughout the Cold War. The early political si
U.S. in the Truman administration was obviously different; y
standards, this administration faced considerable oppositio
the Cold War.39 Not only was the Republican Party bent
predepression/prewar dominance, the Democratic Party was b
fied over Truman as a successor to FDR. Almost immediatel
the wake of the Yalta controversies), tough responses to puzzl
enabled the vulnerable Truman to avoid accusations of appe
date his control over the administration, and later mobilize pu
new Cold War commitments over the next few years. The Tru
tion's ability to control anticommunist rhetoric, however, progr
ultimately leading to extreme conservative backlash-or blo
36Duggan (1994), Bosworth (1996), Clark (1996), Mack Smith
(2000), as well as Bell (1986) emphasize Mussolini's need for a fore
to enhance the image of his regime.
37 As explicated by Snyder (1991), public nationalism was crucial
infighting within the Japanese government (see Ogata, 1964; Berge
1995; Pyle, 1996).
38The need for Stalin to consolidate authority is evident not
histories such as Mastny (1979) and Taubman (1982), but also in gen
as those by McCauley (1993), Westwood (1993), and Hosking (200
39The larger domestic political scene is a prominent theme among
torians, in particular, Gaddis (1972), Paterson (1979, 1988), Divine (1
(1989); see also the analysis by Trout (1975).
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24 Joe D. Hagan
"loss of China," severely weakening
tration was hardly in a position to
munism be rolled back througho
enduring fixture of the Cold War
icy weakness could destroy an adm
tainty for U.S. presidents; for exam
Cuban missile crisis and Johnson
collapsed.
The Diffusion of Political Authority Across Multiple Actors
The final dimension in the concept of "complex decision" questions the premise
that states act as unitary actors; that is, there is a contraction of authority and
a single decision-making body evaluates distinct policy options and interests,
sorts them out, and arrives at a final option. Historical research suggests that
the key decisions surrounding WWI, WWII, and the early parts of the Cold War
departed from this idealized pattern of decision making. At one extreme was
the fragmentation of authority across competing factions, parties, or institutions,
such that no single actor had the authority to commit the state to war,
each wielding a veto over the others. Equally important, though, is the opposite
extreme: the concentration of power into the hands of a single leader who either
makes decisions alone or, if working with a single group, suppresses dissent so
that viable alternatives are not seriously considered. The point here is that even
the most severe international crises involve a wide variety of decision structures,
including ones that operate in reasonable ways. Although effective singlegroup
decision making undoubtedly occurs, the popular image of Kennedy's
ExCom in the Cuban missile crisis is hardly typical of the crises considered
here.
That there can be a variety of potential decision structures is quite apparent
in the period prior to WWI and in the July 1914 crisis. Turning first to the
powers that launched the war, neither Franz Josef nor William II dominated
foreign policymaking, despite their personal constitutional authority over foreign
policy and military affairs. In Austria-Hungary the ultimate decisionmaking
body was the Crown Council, consisting of the emperor, the empire's
common ministers (army, foreign affairs, and finance), and the Austrian and
Hungarian prime ministers responsible to the separate parliaments in their respective
halves of the empire. This decision-making body, an institution dating back
to the 1867 creation of the Dual Monarchy, formalized the emperor's consultation
with the key ministers and established the influence of the Hungarian
leadership on the decisions of the Habsburg ruling elite. This process was critical
during the July 1914 crisis; by then, the Hungarian prime minister (Tisza)
was the only remaining advocate of diplomatic restraint and, because of his
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Does Decision Making Matter? 25
de facto veto power within the Crown Council, could block
against Serbia.40 In contrast to Austria-Hungary, the federal
imperial Germany did not provide for a cabinet body to coo
decision making. Whereas Bismarck was personally able to coo
making, William II never established clear-cut lines of authority
ingly complex German government. Foreign policymaking
torted by this erratic decision-making pattern which became ev
1914 crisis. William II personally extended the "blank che
Hungary, and only afterwards sought the required approv
Bethmann-Hollweg and met with senior foreign and milita
lack of coordination appeared again at the height of the crisis. A
mobilization Bethmann-Hollweg and William II separately soug
the military option (now advocated by the army and finally pur
Hungary), but the German government gave mixed diplomatic
ing even their one ally to ask "who is in charge in Berlin?"41
Despite the common threat from Germany, decision-makin
Britain, Russia, and France were quite different, ranging from
to very fragmented. Surprisingly, French decision making had
cohesive when actually faced with the prospect of war. Despit
public's long record of weak cabinets (occasionally collapsin
threat), alarm over the German threat since the second Moroc
permitted the emergence of strong presidential authority ove
Thus, in the July 1914 crisis, President Poincar6 was able t
diplomacy (supporting Russia) and restrain military preparation
moderate and antiwar opposition in the new socialist-led cabin
repercussions from the cabinet's alarm over the Caillaux sc
40 Austro-Hungarian decision making in the July crisis is discussed
Jannen (1983), Williamson (1983, 1991), Sked (1989), Fellner (19
(1997) as well as emphasized by Joll (1984), Williamson (1988),
This decision making reflected the well-established, though fragmen
authority of the Dual Monarchy created in 1867. See overviews
(1951), Macartney (1968), Jelavich (1987), Sked (1989), and Beren
41 German decision making in the July crisis, particularly its unc
ter, is documented in works by Berghahn (1973), Kaiser (1983), Schm
sen (1995), and Herwig (1997) and is emphasized in the general
(1984), Rich (1992), and Kagan (1995). For studies that downplay d
German leaders and see imperial decision making in this crisis as m
check Fischer (1967, 1990) and ROhl (1995). The institutional fragme
rial Germany (especially without Bismarck's strong leadership) is di
by Ramm (1967), Holborn (1969), Berghahn (1973, 1994), Craig
(1980), and Wehler (1985).
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26 Joe D. Hagan
ment.42 Russian decision making wa
any of the powers, took place with
"unified government" reforms of th
not act on his own (as before the Ru
met with his Council of Ministers.
to have been reasonably wide rangin
advocate for avoiding war (Kokovtso
sensus not to back down again in t
ish cabinet decision making under
of the full range of the party's fa
Liberal cabinet. So long as British d
ments and war plans, Lord Grey's fo
macy without major constraints. H
full approval of the cabinet, and in t
minister (Asquith) had the authority
Taking such action on their own at
voked the defection of the party's "
of Liberal rule. Only the German inv
international law and human rights,
mize their support of a continental i
42Poincar6's dominance in the July 19
Keiger (1983, 1995), but it is a consist
waite, 1995) and is a key fixture in t
(1995). While most histories of Third Re
foreign affairs authority to the presidency
the country's prewar cabinets-particula
ty's pivotal position in successive cabine
analyses in works by Anderson (1977), M
McMillan (1992), and Gildea (1996).
43 Russian decision making in the July
1993), Joll (1984), Spring (1988), Geye
(1995), and Neilson (1995). These studi
reflected changes in the makeup of th
lyzes the institutional evolution of the "
For the larger institutional evolution
(1967), Rogger (1983), Westwood (199
44 These constraints are well documen
but also in studies of British decision m
Brock (1988), Wilson (1995), and Ferg
not an aberration is evidenced in examin
Victorian Britain; see, e.g., Feuchtwange
(1993), Robbins (1994), and Rubinstein (1998).
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Does Decision Making Matter? 27
Turning to the Second World War, the variety of decision st
so much else about that war's origins, far more clear-cut w
1914. However, by the mid-1930s, when the German and Japan
apparent, decision making in none of the powers appears to fit
model. There was, of course, the extreme concentration of au
Italy, the Communist Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany. Not onl
have totalitarian arrangements in which governing authority w
in a single institution, but Mussolini and certainly Hitler and
lessly consolidated their own personal authority over foreign p
all three cases decisions related to war reflected the unfettere
gle individual. Far more striking is the one additional case: th
decision making in the British cabinet under Prime Minist
Although structurally very different from the previous three
foreign policy authority was highly concentrated for a stable
part, this concentration was due to the dominance of interw
Conservative Party that, in contrast to the pre-WWI Libera
factionalized and had a solid consensus on foreign policy iss
ment). All this was further intensified when Chamberlain bec
ister. More so than his predecessor (Stanley) and in response to
demands, Chamberlain sought a comprehensive settlement thr
appeasement of Germany by aggressively conceding to their d
war. However, in the process of doing so, he oversaw the resi
on the cabinet who were skeptics of these active concessio
Minister Eden) and by the time of the Munich crisis operat
cabinet constraints.46 Only when appeasement had failed (wit
tion of the Munich accords) was Chamberlain's authority w
(along with military failure in Norway) eventually led to his re
more hard-line Churchill-a process of political adjustment tha
not occur in the totalitarian regimes.
France, the United States, and Japan all represent the frag
of pre-WWII decision making. In each, political authority was
politically autonomous factions, parties, and/or institutions. Th
45 On Hitler's personal dominance of foreign policy, including hi
override the cautious advice of the military and diplomats, see
(1986), Kaiser (1992), and Kagan (1995). Stalin's dominance over p
policymaking is implied in political histories (e.g., McCauley, 1993)
(1986) and Kennedy-Pipe (1998). Despite the absence of totalitaria
lini did have control over foreign policy decisions, as argued in Cla
Smith (1997) as well as Bell (1986).
46 Chamberlain's dominance over the cabinet is noted in Adams (19
Young (1997), and, more generally, Lloyd (1993).
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28 Joe D. Hagan
responded to the rising Fascist thre
ence found before WWI. In contras
interwar Third Republic retained cl
did parliamentarians allow the emer
cabinets were, however, hardly in
ical Party lost its pivotal position in
sharing in coalitions with either the L
wings of the already loosely struct
over foreign policy. The result was
right, faced collapse if it acted with
no institutional alternative to the c
pered by what were, in effect, coal
executive instability (or extra-parli
mitments by an increasingly alarm
formal congressional approval. Thi
trality acts by which the largely
national threats with increasing cl
fall of France (and actually beyon
precise legal and political restriction
late-1941 attack on Pearl Harbor w
control of foreign affairs.48 Even
United States-were the manifestati
ing. Unlike its Italian and German
militarist regime during the 1930s
the demise of civilian influence via
ambiguously dispersed across highl
army, navy, and imperial court. Al
not create the deadlock found in
distort Japan's judgments with res
also across the Pacific against the U
The imperative of rising post-WW
Union, like the previous decision-
47 The constraints posed by the divis
by Bernard and Dubief (1975), Azem
Young (1996), and Larkin (1997), as
48On the assertion of congressional au
see Dallek (1979), LaFeber (1989), Gu
49On factional conflict in Japan's m
Reischauer, and Craig (1973), Hosoy
(1988), Barnhart (1995), Pyle (1996),
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Does Decision Making Matter? 29
to more orderly decision structures in the Soviet Union and t
That was arguably often the case, even in the early period dur
the Cold War. There are few doubts that Stalin continued to make Soviet foreign
policy decisions (as noted above), although the succeeding Khrushchev
regime was never able to establish coherent foreign policymaking. Nor was
American foreign policy decision making necessarily disorderly. President Truman
had, in fact, returned White House decision making to the small-group
norm; he consulted with his advisers in key crises over Poland, Berlin, and
ultimately Korea. There is, though, one glaring exception. At key junctures,
Truman administration decisions required congressional ratification and/or funding
approval for new diplomatic and military commitments. Instead of conceding
to isolationist opposition in the now Republican Congress, the Truman
administration sought to mobilize its support by exaggerating the severity of
the communist threat in both military and ideological terms.50 The Truman
doctrine speech in March 1947 was the primary manifestation of this manipulative
strategy, one that within a few years would create difficulties in working
with the Congress. Namely, the "blowback" of this rhetoric ultimately led to a
"logroll" among the contending internationalist groups favoring European commitments
and those emphasizing East Asia. This larger political framework not
only enabled MacAuthur's expansion of the Korean War, but it ultimately necessitated
the Americanization of the war in Vietnam by a Johnson administration
fearful of losing congressional support for domestic programs and reforms.
The hard-line Cold War consensus rested upon domestic political imperatives
created after WWII.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD
The primary point of this article has been that decision-making conditions lead
ing to the twentieth century's three great conflicts-WWI, WWII, and the Co
War-were fundamentally more complex than generally assumed by systemic
explanations of war. This concluding section will use the historical evidence t
suggest the importance of a decision units perspective on foreign policymakin
which will be developed in the remainder of this special issue. The discussion
here will be in two parts: (1) an examination of the assertion that the decisio
unit is a critical channel through which uncertainty and value trade-offs are
defined-and that knowledge about the structure of the decision unit helps to
explain the key puzzles about the origins of WWI, WWII, and the Cold W
50Along with Snyder (1991) and Christensen (1996) see analyses by Lowi (1967
Trout (1975), and Small (1996) and accounts of the origins of the Cold War by, f
example, Gaddis (1972) and Paterson (1988).
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30 Joe D. Hagan
described earlier in this essay; an
types of decision structures and the
national systemic conditions or dom
theoretically fluid phenomenon that
temic or domestic structures.
Pivotal Role of Decision Units
One insight from the examination of the origins of WWI, WWII, and the Cold
War is that decision units helped to define the degree of uncertainty and the
value trade-offs in the situation. Even though wide-ranging debates occurred in
most of the political systems, the structure of the decision unit governed the
extent to which such debates were considered in the final decision to commit to
war. For example, a predominant leader could exclude other positions, while a
highly fragmented body enabled alternative positions and interests to coexist in
a contradictory way or, worse, immobilize the government. Moreover, the structure
of the decision unit affected how leaders responded to domestic political
pressures. Decision structures could, on the one hand, position a national leader
so that he/she could manipulate foreign policy politically and, on the other
hand, magnify political conflicts within a political system thereby raising larger
questions about the government's survival. Knowledge about the nature of the
decision unit can help us account for the distortions in the balance of power in
July 1914, at Munich, and in early Cold War crises-and, as such, can assist us
in finding answers to the puzzles identified earlier in this article.
Learning about decision structures is key to understanding how the July
1914 crisis led to a war that none of the participants originally desired. With
respect to the aggressive diplomacy of Austria-Hungary and Germany, perceived
constraints on the decision unit of each negated their strategy of quickly
suppressing Serbia and then forcing the Russians (and their French ally) to
back down diplomatically under the threat of war. The structure of AustriaHungary's
Crown Council enabled the otherwise isolated opposition of the Hungarian
prime minister to block the prowar consensus that now included even the
emperor. During this lag, the Russians and the French became alarmed, and for
the first time did not back down to the German threat of war. Decision structures
were crucial in this new willingness to risk war with Germany. The Russian
decision to mobilize is not entirely puzzling: its Tsar met with his Counc
of Ministers and considered options, which notably emphasized domestic consequences
as much as international ones. Much more striking is the role o
decision structures in the French case. Despite a cabinet dominated by moderates,
if not antiwar socialists, the relatively hard-line French president (Poincar
was able to control policy entirely, providing the Russian government wit
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Does Decision Making Matter? 31
initial assurances and ultimately mobilizing the cabinet's full su
ing Germany. In short, opposition to war was excluded from th
Decision units in the July 1914 crisis also undercut any det
aggression. Most glaring is the failure of the Triple Entente to
threat. This failure is mainly the collective fault of the British
just the foreign secretary, Lord Grey). Whereas Germany was
Russia and France, they did not seek war with the British and
neutrality. But because the British foreign policy leadership c
decision to go to war without consulting the entire cabinet
nated by opinion either unaware of, or outright opposed
commitment-throughout the month of July they were unable
the Germans that they would side with the French and Russian
over, decision structures hindered attempts at mediation duri
undercutting the impact of moderate arguments against hard-l
effect resulted from the insertion of military leaders into the
stemmed from the weakness of equally alarmed civilian leader
case, the lack of a single decision-making body meant that
undercut initiatives for restraint (e.g., those by Bethmann-H
fronting the Kaiser separately and by re-framing any signals
Austria-Hungary. Of course, any incentive for agreeing to th
minister's proposal for an international conference was underc
that Britain would remain neutral.
The role of decision structures is simpler in examining the road to the Second
World War. In Germany, Britain, Italy, and Russia, strong leaders did not have to
debate opposing positions (or could override them), nor were they forced to deal
with the trade-offs across other issues. This control meant they were minimally
constrained, and, as a result, could engage in risky, diplomatic initiatives. Thus,
in the Munich crisis, Hitler could go to the brink of war and Chamberlain could
grant the most extreme concessions without having to concede to skeptics. And,
all the while, Mussolini and Stalin had the ability to engage in flexible diplomacy;
for example, Stalin ultimately did not have constraints on dramatic alliance
shifts. Nor did any of these leaders have to worry about domestic opposition
to their moves; in fact, with the exception of Mussolini, their dominance largely
negated the need to engage in diversionary approaches or to listen to advisers concerned
with the possible domestic costs of any actions.
The situation in the more fragmented regimes-France, the United States,
and Japan-was one that greatly amplified uncertainties and intensified domestic
political constraints. For the U.S. and France, these constraints led to a
failure of deterrence. The ambivalence in French responses to the rising German
problem was embedded in fragile coalition governments, regardless of
whether on the Left or the Right. In neither the center-left nor center-right coalition
was there sufficient cabinet consensus to support an effective deterrent
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32 Joe D. Hagan
against Germany; for example, asser
ment choices with, say, Soviet Russ
Nor could the United States then or
FDR recognized the threat, the isolati
trality acts and other legislation-all w
strong deterrent by the presidency
sion forum in which presidential a
lenged, thereby raising the elector
war. Similar to the French case, th
led FDR's administration to engag
case is, of course, just the opposite
policy was amplified by political dy
one hand, factional infighting mag
cluded any compromise or policy in
played the nationalism card in order t
The origins of the Cold War are a
structures between adversaries. Un
highly concentrated. Although now
before the war, Stalin retained max
tion of U.S. power in world affairs
needed to consolidate authority at
ideology-card in defining anti-Am
War policies is far more complex an
United States responded to a risin
WWII, the Truman administration h
gress's formal approval for progra
reconstruction and then deploy mi
was not deadlock. Rather, the Trum
ated the Soviet threat to mobilize s
ment commitments. This strategy
public and became a fixture in U.S.
the most extreme view of the comm
man and successive administrations
mitments and two costly, self-def
Vietnam did the American political
congressional authority and a wid
Cold War and pragmatic engagemen
Variability in Decision-Makin
Another premise of this article an
structures are a highly variable ph
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Does Decision Making Matter? 33
der and his associates' (1954) situationally grounded concep
making. The wide variation in types of decision structures des
especially striking if one considers that we have been focu
narrow (albeit dramatic) aspect of international politics-the
war. Even though the great powers were all responding to the
crisis, the governments did not make decisions in the sam
strong leader (France), others involved formal groups with som
(Austria-Hungary and Britain) and some not (Russia), and anot
had decision-making authority that was especially fluid. The v
more clear-cut in the decisions made on the road to WWII:
typically involved either extremely cohesive states (Germany,
and even Britain) or highly fragmented states (France, the Un
Japan). While small groups (e.g., the U.S.'s National Security
Soviet Politburo) emerged as key Cold War decision-making
striking that the "origins" of that conflict involved a far wider
structures. In short, contrary to theoretical expectations, the
WWI, WWII, and the Cold War, although handled by senior le
characterized as the result of a highly coherent decision proce
range of debate.
The range of variation in decision structures is also strik
within each nation. The July 1914 crisis was one in a series
crises, but this time the European powers did not back aw
part, because of changes in the makeup of their respective de
the one hand, certain key leaders (William II, Franz Josef,
now accepted war, while, on the other hand, key opponent
previous crises were gone from the Russian and Austro-Hun
making bodies. In France, there had been an increasing con
thority in the presidency in the years leading up to1914 so tha
was dominated by a single leader capable of overcoming cab
Britain, a declaration of war required the formal approval of
leadership. That meant those in charge of foreign affairs had
opponents, announcing commitments unknown to the wider Li
ership and opposed by that party's Radical wing. World Wa
War also present an interesting variation in decision structure
appear to be tied to regime types. Among the surviving demo
policy failures led not only to policy adjustments but ultimatel
ment of political authority. After the fall of France, the hard
finally replaced Chamberlain as Britain's prime minister an
administration gradually gained greater authority to lend mat
the British. A decade later such a change occurred again in th
the rising Soviet threat contributed to a renewed dominance o
in making Cold War policy. These dynamics were just the
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34 Joe D. Hagan
totalitarian regimes. Hitler's Germ
rists ultimately overextended thems
politically entrenched and unwilling
Soviet Union is more mixed from Stalin to the reformist Khrushchev and the
consensus-oriented Brezhnev, but the failure to adjust was all too apparent by
the late 1980s.
This last point does not, however, suggest that decision structures and
their dynamics (including how such units respond to domestic pressures) are
a direct function of internal regime structure-such as democracy and democratization.
In fact, decision structures can vary even within the same type
of regime structure. Thus, predominant leaders are found not only in totalitarian
regimes (e.g., Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy), but also
in democratic states such as France in 1914, Britain in the late 1930s, and
the United States at the height of the Cold War. And fragmentation of authority
occurs not just in established democratic systems, such as Britain in
1914, France in the late 1930s, and the U.S. in the late 1930s and mid-
1940s, but also in authoritarian regimes such as Japan in the 1930s and in
anocratic (or democratizing) regimes like Germany and Austria-Hungary in
July 1914.
These observations lead to another point: the political dynamics of these
decision structures are not the same. For example, consider Germany, AustriaHungary,
and Russia during the crisis leading up to WWI. Among just these
three anocracies, there is little in common in decision making. AustroHungarian
foreign policy is constrained by internal divisions, while that of
imperial Germany is far more uncoordinated with few constraints and Russian
foreign policy is being made by a single group. What these anocratic regimes
had in common was how their leaders perceived vulnerability to domestic
opposition: a domestic ethnic crisis propelled Austria-Hungary into war, and
both William II and Nicholas II feared the domestic prospects of backing down
in another crisis. Although relatively democratic, pre-WWI France and Britain
also faced domestic crises, but they were either careful not to-or politically
unable to-manipulate the crisis for domestic gain. And, like Britain in 1914,
the leaders of neither the U.S. nor France in the 1930s were in a position to
inflame international affairs to resolve domestic pressures-to project threats
would have intensified domestic divisions, rather than quelled them. The dynamics
were the opposite for militarist Japan and Mussolini's Italy. Regimes
with a high concentration of authority were in a better position to manipulate
foreign policy for domestic purposes, although again the pattern is not
consistent-for example, only Mussolini seemed to be driven mainly by diversionary
strategies. In the Cold War, diversionary strategies became more
the norm-but for both the authoritarian Soviet Union and the democratic
United States.
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Does Decision Making Matter? 35
IN CONCLUSION
The basic point of this essay has been that decision making is an important
(albeit fluid) phenomenon in international relations, even in the most severe of
international conditions: that of the origins of war. As historical research has
documented, how decision makers were configured had a significant impact on
the outbreak of the twentieth century's great conflicts: WWI, WWII, and the
Cold War. In each case, the decision units responsible for committing the
resources of the government acted in ways that contributed to the conflict spiral,
deterrence failure, or both. We are not arguing here that decision structures
were the primary cause of these conflicts. Not only was the road to war a long
one domestically and internationally, but the leadership in these countries was
reacting to very real systemic pressures. Given, however, the complexity of
these pressures (the degree of uncertainty they generated, the value trade-offs
they provoked, and the dispersion of decision authority they encountered), it is
not obvious how the leadership would (or should) respond. Furthermore, it
should be evident from the previous discussion that the leadership's responses
are not necessarily associated with domestic political structures. Not only are
leaders rarely motivated solely by domestic concerns, but regime structures do
no better than international imperatives in explaining decision structures and
processes. Instead, decision units appear to operate in a way that is often independent
of the otherwise compelling constraints of both international and domestic
politics. As Richard Snyder's original formulation suggested and decades of
subsequent historical research seems to demonstrate, decision-making dynamics
cannot be inferred directly from international and domestic structures. Without
denying the importance of both domestic and international situations, all
that follows in this special issue is premised on the idea that decision units do
matter, although in complex ways that vary across time and political systems.
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