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Down and Out

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## Down and Out:

### Founding Elections and Disillusionment with Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia

*Sharan Grewal and Steve L. Monroe*

*“She was in a state of shock and confusion. [...] It was one thing for the [Muslim] Brotherhood to win close to 40 percent, but how could 28 percent of her countrymen vote for ultraconservative Salafi parties? [...] She mourned not only for what she feared Egypt might become, but for a country that she could no longer recognize, a country that was no longer really hers. It raised the question: was [democracy] worth it? For liberals like [her], it apparently wasn’t.”<sup>1</sup>*

How citizens respond to electoral loss is critical to the success of democratic transitions.<sup>2</sup> Supporters of losing parties in founding elections must opt to remain within the democratic system for a nascent democracy to take root. Where electoral losers become disillusioned with democracy, they may turn to violence, encourage a coup, or support the revival of the former regime.

While existing literature on electoral losers’ attitudes toward democracy focuses on explaining cross-national variation, it does little to help transitional governments understand where disillusioned losers will be concentrated. Theory and evidence of subnational variation in losers’ disillusionment could help a democratic government decide where to target its resources to keep losers invested in the system. For instance, should the newly-elected government in Egypt in 2012 have prioritized accommodating losers in Cairo or Luxor? Despite its policy importance, few studies have attempted to explain subnational variation among losers in new democracies.<sup>3</sup>

Counter-intuitively, we argue that the most disillusioned losers following a founding election reside where their parties performed the best subnationally. This result stems from losers’ expectations of winning at the national level. Where a party is strong locally, party supporters will be more likely to expect to win nationally. When national electoral results upset that expectation, they may become disillusioned with democracy as they realize it will not bring them to power. Where a party is weak locally, on the other hand,

party supporters already expect to lose nationally, and thus will not become any more disillusioned when their expectation is simply confirmed. They likely opposed democracy from the start. We therefore hypothesize that the most disillusioned losers in new democracies will reside in areas where their party is strongest.

We test this theory in post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia. Islamist political parties swept these founding elections. Among the losers—non-Islamists—we examine whether support for democracy decreased the most in governorates where their parties were strongest. Using pre- and post-election survey data, we find that, on average, losers living in governorates where losing parties performed better became more disillusioned with democracy after the elections.

Shattered expectations of winning may drive these patterns in democratic disillusionment. First, losers in governorates where they were strong, and therefore expected to win, were more supportive of democracy pre-election than losers where they were weak. Second, the effect of loser strength on democratic disillusionment was greater for losers who were less aware of national-level politics, and thus whose expectations primarily stemmed from local-level information. Third, we find a similar expectations bump among electoral winners.

Losers' disillusionment with democracy did not result in political apathy. Losers in governorates where their parties were strong also became more supportive of authoritarian rule. Beyond these attitudinal results, we find that governorates where losers were strong witnessed a greater increase in votes for candidates affiliated with the former autocratic regimes in subsequent elections. These results provide important predictions on which electoral losers are likely to become disillusioned and spoil a democratic transition—crucial information for a transitional government seeking to consolidate democratic governance.

## **Disillusionment and Democratic Consolidation**

A central finding in the literature on democratic consolidation is that transitions are more likely to succeed when all players accept the rules of the game.<sup>4</sup> For democracy to take root, those who lose the founding elections must decide to remain within the system, temporarily assuming the role of the opposition while preparing to contest the next elections. Political culture models of democratization demonstrate that this acceptance of democracy must take place not only among the elite but also among the masses.<sup>5</sup> Where the supporters of losing parties become disillusioned with democracy, they may subvert nascent democratic institutions by turning to violence, or calling for the return of the former regime. Mass attitudes toward democracy have been correlated with democratic consolidation and breakdown,<sup>6</sup> in particular with military coups<sup>7</sup> and incumbent takeovers.<sup>8</sup> Mass attitudes are so integral to the success of a transition that they are often part of the definition of democratic consolidation.<sup>9</sup>

The literature on the “winner/loser gap” has demonstrated that electoral losers become less satisfied with democracy, while winners become more satisfied.<sup>10</sup> This

winner-loser gap is especially pronounced where it is most consequential: new democracies.<sup>11</sup> Beyond dissatisfaction with democracy, electoral losers have also been found to become more risk-seeking<sup>12</sup> and willing to protest.<sup>13</sup>

Why do some electoral losers become disillusioned while others support nascent democracies? Cross-nationally, the dominant explanation is how badly the losers have lost the election. The mechanisms are twofold. First, the better the losers do, the greater their representation and thus buy-in into the new system. Parliamentary systems and elections based on proportional representation are thought to more effectively keep losers within the system than winner-take-all, first-past-the-post elections, and presidential systems.<sup>14</sup> Second, the better the losers' performance in the founding elections, the more likely they are to believe that they can win subsequent elections.<sup>15</sup> These two mechanisms suggest that, cross-nationally, the better losers do in founding elections, the more likely democratic transitions are to succeed.

However, even in lopsided founding elections, not all losers turn against the system. As we will demonstrate, there remains considerable subnational variation in losers' disillusionment with democracy. The prevailing literature thus provides little guidance for transitional governments about which losers are most likely to play spoiler. Such information could prove useful in determining which losers the transitional government should make an extra effort to coopt into the nascent democratic system.

## A Theory of Expectations and Disillusionment

We begin with a common, simplifying assumption that voters have relatively stable preferences over the primary political cleavage. In political economy models of democratization, for instance, the poor are assumed to prefer redistribution/high tax rates, while the rich prefer low tax rates.<sup>16</sup> In polities where the dominant cleavage is ideological, such as Islamists versus secularists, we assume that secularists tend to remain secularists, even if their support for a particular secular party may change. While party identifications may be fluid, the preferences and ideologies underlying them are assumed to be relatively fixed. Accordingly, we define a winner/loser with respect to the policy agenda of the party receiving the largest number of votes in an election. If an Islamist party receives the most votes, then Islamists are the winners and secularists the losers.

With perfect information about who would win and lose a democratic election, few losers would support democracy.<sup>17</sup> However, when there is uncertainty about ensuing electoral results, losers who believe they may win may support democracy in the run-up to the first elections. Disillusionment, then, could occur when an individual expects to win but then loses: upon realizing their party or ideology only commands a minority, they may no longer feel that democracy is in their interest.

Once disillusioned, losers may join forces with those who always opposed democracy and begin subverting the transition. Indeed, given the frustrated expectations logic outlined in Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel*,<sup>18</sup> those losers who become disillusioned with democracy may be even more likely to rebel against the system than losers who

opposed democracy from the start. Since Gurr's writing, there has been extensive work in psychology and economics demonstrating that unmet expectations breed frustration, anger, and rebellion.<sup>19</sup>

Which losers expected to win? Numerous sources can shape expectations of winning an election. In mature democracies, individuals rely on past electoral results, opinion polls, and the media.<sup>20</sup> In new democracies, however, especially before the founding elections, there is no credible electoral history or media apparatus to help predict a party's strength at the national level.<sup>21</sup>

Voters' local context can also influence expectations of winning. During the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Miller et al. found that individuals in states won by Barack Obama were more likely to predict Obama's national victory, while individuals in states won by John McCain had incorrectly predicted a McCain victory.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, in the most recent U.S. presidential election, urban, coastal Democratic strongholds were reportedly the most shocked by Donald Trump's victory, as their local environment (their "liberal bubble") had colored their national-level expectations of who would win.

We contend that ahead of founding elections, an individual's strongest prior for how she expects her party to perform on a national level likely stems from local context: how strong her party is in her community. At the local level, she can observe like-minded partisans in her daily interactions. In the case of religious parties, she can observe attendance at the local mosque or church. As the campaign season progresses, she can observe each party's activity, the size of their local offices, and their ability to mobilize supporters. Ahead of the founding elections, individuals' expectations for how a party will perform nationally will thus be strongly conditioned by that party's local strength.

Where a loser's party is strong locally, those losers should be more likely to expect their party to be strong nationally prior to the elections. Accordingly, they should initially be supportive of democracy as they believe they will win overall. However, they should then become disillusioned upon learning from the elections that their party had limited national support. Where a loser's party is weak locally, on the other hand, she will tend to believe it is weak nationally as well, and thus feel that democracy is not in her interests even before the first elections. The elections simply confirm her expectations. Her attitudes towards democracy should remain relatively unchanged.

We therefore hypothesize that:

*H1:* In new democracies, losers in governorates where their party is strong should experience more disillusionment with democracy after the founding elections than losers in governorates where their party is weak.

To test the micro-foundations of the theory, we generate three testable implications:

1. *Losers in governorates where they are strong should be more supportive of democracy pre-election than losers in governorates where they are weak.* They should also be more optimistic about the election and more likely to report they plan to vote.

2. *The differential effect of local strength on disillusionment with democracy should be more pronounced among losers who are less politically aware.* Losers who are more politically aware, for instance, by following the news or using the internet/social media, likely have a better sense of their national electoral weight before the elections than those who are not.
3. *Winners in governorates where they are weak should see a greater increase in support for democracy than winners in governorates where they are strong.* Mirroring the expectations gap among the losers, winners who are unsure of winning should see a greater jump in support for democracy upon winning the elections than winners who had expected to win.

We study the disillusioned because they are the most likely to spoil a democratic transition. We expect that:

*H2: Losers in governorates where they are strong should become more supportive of autocratic rule.*

Finally, to complement these attitudinal results, we predict the following behavioral outcome:

*H3: Losers in governorates where they are strong will be more likely to vote for candidates representing the former authoritarian regime in subsequent elections.*

Uncertainty about how a party will perform in the first elections is an important scope condition to our theory. It is therefore most relevant to new democracies where the primary political cleavage is economic or ideological, not based on relatively fixed, ascriptive categories. In new democracies where ethnic cleavages dominate politics, for instance, each ethnic group might already have a sense of their numbers ahead of the founding elections.<sup>23</sup> We assume, but do not test, that our theory applies to democratic transitions where the dominant political cleavage is not ascriptive. These include founding democratic elections in the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and East Asia.

Our theory is indifferent to the type of first election. Whether for a president, parliament, or constituent assembly, each type of election should play a similar role in updating voters' prior expectations of who will win subsequent national elections. While the type of election certainly affects the overall level of disillusionment among the losers, we expect similar patterns of subnational variation among losers within each type of electoral system. Indeed, we find similar subnational variation in Tunisia (with a PR, parliamentary system) and Egypt (with a presidential system and mixed PR/FPTP parliamentary elections).

None of these hypotheses deny the importance of other factors, such as income or education, in shaping losers' democratic attitudes. These factors, however, are generally fixed in the run-up and follow-up of a founding election. They cannot fully explain why some electoral losers opt in and then out of the democratic process in the medium and

short term. Indeed, it is these disillusioned losers that can tip the political scales and derail the democratic transition. In highlighting the overlooked informational role of founding elections, we argue that changes in losers' expectations of national victory underlie democratic defectors' attitudes and behavior precisely when democratic consensus is needed most: after the first election.

## **Research Design and Analysis**

We test this theory in Egypt and Tunisia, the epicenters of the Arab Spring. Popular protests in early 2011 toppled both countries' long-time dictators and initiated democratic transitions. Islamist political parties swept both countries' founding elections. In Tunisia, the Ennahda (Renaissance) party won the most votes (37 percent) in the Constituent Assembly elections. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won 37.5 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections. The Egyptian Brotherhood's victory was augmented by the ultraconservative Salafi Nour party's second place performance, adding an additional 25 percent of the vote to the Islamists' tally. Both countries quickly polarized along secular-religious lines, making secularists or "non-Islamists"<sup>24</sup> the losers of interest. While the secular-religious cleavage was not the only source of division, it became the primary cleavage in both countries.<sup>25</sup>

Egypt and Tunisia are prime locations for testing our theory because the dominant political cleavage was ideological, for which the informational role of their founding elections should be particularly strong. Indeed, the extent of the Islamist sweep in both elections came as a surprise to many secular activists.<sup>26</sup>

The two countries also capture cross-national variation in loser strength. The existing literature linking disillusionment with losers' cross-national strength would highlight that in Tunisia, the winning Islamists won just 37 percent of the vote, while in Egypt they won over 60 percent. By selecting two countries in which the losers have such large differences in strength, we seek to demonstrate that there exists considerable subnational variation in disillusionment, regardless of how the losers perform on a (cross-) national level.

Popular accounts provide initial support for our hypotheses. In Egypt, liberal activists in wealthy Cairo suburbs were shocked that their countrymen would vote in such numbers for Islamist movements. Liberal politician Mohamed ElBaradei observed that the revolutionary youth were "decimated" in the elections, disconnected "with the people on the street," and felt "let down" by democracy.<sup>27</sup> One liberal blogger noted that "everyone around me is falling apart: physically, psychologically, and emotionally." The electoral results made them realize that "you don't know this country, that you live in social and cultural ghettos of your own making."<sup>28</sup>

Similar shock and disillusionment rocked liberals in the wealthy coastal areas of Tunisia. Houda Cherif, co-founder of the secular, pro-business party Afek Tounes, realized after losing the elections that "the secular message was aimed at the elite," and made little headway in Tunisia's more conservative and impoverished interior regions.

“We were completely wrong.”<sup>29</sup> Moez Ali, founder of a secular organization in Tunis, observed that “there are a lot of people who are disappointed by the result.”<sup>30</sup>

We use pre- and post-election Arab Barometer survey data to empirically test our hypotheses. Wave II of the Arab Barometer was conducted in the summer of 2011, prior to the 2011 Tunisian Constituent Assembly Elections and the 2011–2012 Egyptian Parliamentary Elections. Wave III of the Arab Barometer, conducted in early 2013, provides a post-election measure of the same questions with the same sampling methodology. Figure A.4 in the Appendix displays a timeline of each survey and election in Egypt and Tunisia.<sup>31</sup>

Wave II (our pre-election survey) was implemented after Egypt’s March 2011 constitutional referendum. One may worry that results from this referendum may have already updated losers’ expectations about their national popularity before the Wave II survey. However, Egypt’s non-Islamist parties were divided on the referendum. This division clouded assessments of non-Islamist parties’ national weight. Moreover, the magnitude of the Salafi party’s success and the non-Islamists’ failure in the ensuing parliamentary elections was largely unexpected.<sup>32</sup> Polls showed the Salafi Al-Nour party with only 9 percent of the vote before the elections.<sup>33</sup> It would go on to win 25 percent of the vote. Wave II therefore still reflects Egyptian non-Islamists’ democratic attitudes prior to the shocking returns of the first parliamentary elections.

There are two major limitations to the Arab Barometer surveys. First, it is not a panel dataset. We employ a range of matching techniques (discussed below) to ensure a proper comparison of electoral losers from before to after the elections. Nevertheless, our results cannot directly address individual-level changes in attitudes towards democracy. Second, in an ideal world, our post-election survey would come immediately after the founding elections to measure the instantaneous feeling of shock and disillusionment. Wave III of the Arab Barometer, however, was conducted a year after the founding elections. This timing has both costs and benefits. On the one hand, there could have been other factors that affected democratic attitudes over the course of that year. Indeed, Egypt and Tunisia’s deteriorating security and economies from 2011 to 2013 undoubtedly dampened aggregate, national-level support for democracy. We show that these macro-level changes cannot explain subnational variation in democratic support. In robustness checks, we find that losers did not differ by governorate in their evaluations of the economy, of security, or in the provision of government services. By ruling out alternative explanations, we hope to increase confidence that the geographic variation in disillusionment with democracy stems from different expectations of winning the founding elections. The late timing of the post-election survey could also be a benefit. Existing studies that show an instantaneous disillusionment with democracy invariably provoke questions about this sentiment’s durability. Read in this light, our study suggests that this effect can endure a year after the founding elections. This echoes Dahlberg and Linde’s finding that losers’ disillusionment can last a parliament’s four-year tenure.<sup>34</sup>

While imperfect, the timing of these two waves of the Arab Barometer surveys allows us to cross-sectionally compare electoral losers’ democratic attitudes before and



after founding elections. We examine whether support for democracy decreased more in areas where non-Islamist parties were stronger.

We use specific questions in the Arab Barometer to identify the losers and their attitudes (see appendix for the wording of all questions used). Leveraging respondents' reported vote choice is unfeasible since the Arab Barometer did not ask about previous vote choice in the post-election survey.<sup>35</sup> In addition, only 19 percent of respondents named a party when asked for their intended vote choice in the pre-election survey. We use this intended vote choice question to isolate two powerful predictors of vote choice—trust in the winning Islamist party and support for shari'a law—which we will combine to identify non-Islamist respondents.

The first predictor is trust in the winning Islamist party (Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), asked on a 4-point scale from "absolutely no trust" to "a great deal of trust." Trust in a party is related to, though conceptually distinct from, party support. While support denotes an evaluation of the party's performance, trust refers to "a more generalized feeling" about whether they "can be trusted to take care of one's interests."<sup>36</sup> Given that in both Egypt and Tunisia's transitions the winning parties had never been in power and had no record of performance, trust is theoretically a more appropriate indicator.<sup>37</sup>

The second predictor is the respondent's support for the implementation of shari'a (Islamic law), a hallmark of the Islamists' agenda.<sup>38</sup> As the role of Islam in government was the dominant axis of contention in both Egypt and Tunisia,<sup>39</sup> this question helps distinguish individuals who support the winning Islamist parties from those who support the losing non-Islamist parties. Indeed, the secular-religious cleavage was the primary predictor of vote choice in other post-election surveys.<sup>40</sup>

Table A.2 in the Appendix demonstrates that both trust in Islamists and support for shari'a are strong predictors of intention to vote for the winning Islamist parties. While the two predictors are highly correlated, we include both to determine the losers for two reasons. First, there may be hardline Islamists (Salafis) who do not trust the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood/Ennahda, yet are not non-Islamist losers. Measuring support for shari'a allows us to exclude these Salafis and focus on non-Islamists. Second, the popularity of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood declined considerably during their time in office.<sup>41</sup> By the post-election survey, over half of the sample reported "absolutely no trust" in them. This large, post-election category likely includes some disaffected Ennahda/Muslim Brotherhood supporters, who are also not non-Islamist losers. By including support for shari'a, which remains much more consistent across the two surveys, we remove these disaffected winners from our sample of electoral losers. *Non-Islamists*, then, are identified as those respondents who exhibited lower than the median level of trust in Ennahda/the Muslim Brotherhood as well as lower than the median level of support for the implementation of shari'a both pre- and post-election.

Both the trust in Islamists and the support for shari'a questions suffer from missing data. Across the two variables, 842 of 4,810 respondents, almost 18 percent, are missing one or the other. While this rate of missingness is not abnormal, given that we wish to

test our hypotheses at the subnational level, every observation is important. We use Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) to account for these missing data. Imputation is a commonly applied solution to missingness.<sup>42</sup> Through predictive mean matching, MICE calculates predicted values for missing observations based on their values for other variables in the dataset (excluding our dependent variable of democratic attitudes). Beyond the standard demographic controls, we include in the dataset questions regarding individual piety, religion in public life, and the importance of piety in evaluating political candidates.

With the imputed data, 1,865 (38 percent) of the 4,810 respondents are coded as non-Islamist. Without imputation, the number of non-Islamists would be 1,398 (35 percent) of the non-missing 3,968. While we also present results with these data missing, we prefer to use the imputed data to maximize the information available from the Arab Barometer surveys.

We examine whether losers in areas where they were strong experienced greater disillusionment with democracy than where they were weak. We therefore subtract losers' support for democracy in 2011 from their support for it in 2013. While there is a number of questions in the Arab Barometer survey that measure support for democracy, we choose: "To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for your country?" for two reasons. First, the answers fall along a 0–10 scale, allowing for greater variance than the typical Likert scale-style democracy questions. Second, the question explicitly limits the context "to your country," instead of considerations of democracy in the abstract.

The winner/loser gap literature typically measures satisfaction with how democracy is working, rather than the suitability of democracy. Several studies have found that individuals may become dissatisfied with how democracy works but still support democracy as a system of rule.<sup>43</sup> By choosing this higher bar of the suitability of democracy, we intend to show that losing transitional elections can induce rejection of democratic governance in their country as a whole.

Consistent with our expectations, non-Islamists' Suitability of Democracy ratings fell considerably pre- to post-election. In Tunisia, the mean suitability of democracy among non-Islamists dropped from 5.8 to 5.0 points on the 0–10 scale. The mean suitability of democracy in Egypt fell from 6.6 to 4.6 after the elections. Consistent with the existing literature's cross-national predictions, losers' support for democracy appears to have fallen by a greater amount in Egypt where the losers performed worse.

We test whether, sub-nationally, losers in areas where they performed relatively well experienced greater disillusionment than those in areas where their parties performed relatively poorly. The key independent variable is Loser Strength, which is the vote share of the non-Islamist parties in the founding elections. While we would have liked to drill down to the district (*markaz/qism*) level, we are limited by the survey data, which provide only seven observations per district. As a result, we collect electoral data at the governorate (*muhafaza/wilayah*) level, equivalent to a U.S. state. Tunisia has twenty-four governorates, while Egypt has twenty-seven. We then identify Arab Barometer survey respondents by their governorate of residence. With the imputed data,

we have an average of thirty-six non-Islamists surveyed per governorate; with the data missing, thirty non-Islamists.

Figure 1 presents the mean disillusionment with democracy for each governorate in Egypt and Tunisia. The  $x$ -axis represents Loser Strength, while the  $y$ -axis represents a governorate's mean change in Suitability of Democracy among losers pre- to post-election.

Much of the data support our theoretical predictions. In Sidi Bouzid, where the Tunisian revolution began, non-Islamists performed incredibly well in the elections, receiving a whopping 84 percent of the governorate's votes, and were hugely disillusioned thereafter (experiencing an average drop of 4 points on the 0–10 scale).<sup>44</sup> More generally, non-Islamists were more disillusioned in the wealthy coastal areas of Sousse, Monastir, and Mahdia (the “Sahel”) and in the Northwest than they were in the Islamist strongholds in the neglected interior (e.g., Gabes, Mednine, and Gafsa). Similarly, in Egypt, non-Islamists were more disillusioned in Cairo and former NDP strongholds like Minya and Sohag than they were in Islamist strongholds like Beheira, Kafr el-Sheikh, and Ismailia.<sup>45</sup> While these lines of best fit do not include any individual-level demographic controls,<sup>46</sup> they suggest that governorates in which losers were relatively stronger saw greater disillusionment with democracy.

To include individual-level covariates, we shift the unit of analysis to the individual respondent and run multivariate linear regressions where the dependent variable is Suitability of Democracy. Our coefficient of interest is an interaction term between Time (0=pre-election; 1=post-election) and Loser Strength. For ease of interpretation, we recode loser vote share dichotomously, splitting it at its third quartile for each country.<sup>47</sup> For Tunisia, this means loser-strong governorates are coded as those in which non-Islamists received more than 69 percent of the governorate's vote share; for Egypt, this means loser-strong governorates refer to those with more than 45 percent of the governorate's vote share. The interaction term thus reveals how much more democracy scores fall for losers living in loser-strong areas than losers living in loser-weak areas pre- to post-election. We hypothesize a negative interaction term: losers living in areas where they are strong should see greater disillusionment with democracy.

Although demographic covariates are relatively balanced in loser-strong vs. loser-weak governorates (see Appendix, Figure A.5), we control for Age, Gender (Female), Education, Income, Urban, Religion (Muslim), and Governorate.<sup>48</sup> Ideally, we would test our theory with panel data, examining the democratic attitudes of the same individuals before and after losing the founding elections. However, the Arab Barometer does not survey the same individuals in both waves. To address this deficiency, we match our samples of pre- and post-election losers along the aforementioned demographic covariates. We generate covariate balancing propensity scores<sup>49</sup> and employ a “nearest” matching algorithm that removes observations that do not have counterparts in the other Barometer wave.<sup>50</sup> The covariate balance plot (see Appendix, Figure A.6) suggests that the matching algorithm helped create a similar set of losers pre- and post-election. Finally, despite our small sample size, we also test the robustness of our theory by clustering standard errors at the governorate level.

**Figure 1** Losers' Disillusionment with Democracy by Governorate in Tunisia and Egypt





Table 1 presents our main results. Model 1 is the original data with missing data excluded. Model 2 imputes the missing data. Model 3 adds the matching algorithm to the imputed data. Finally, Model 4 employs clustered standard errors on the imputed and matched data. The interaction term between Loser Strength and Time is negative and statistically significant at the .01 level for Models 1–3, and significant at the .05 level for Model 4.

The dotplot below presents the results of Model 3. It plots the average predicted democracy score for losers in governorates where they are strong and where they are weak pre- and post-election, holding all other covariates at their means.<sup>51</sup> While the average democracy score for losers in governorates where they are weak drops by about

**Table 1** Loser Strength and Disillusionment with Democracy (OLS)

	<i>DV: Suitability of Democracy (0-10)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time*	-0.954***	-0.853***	-1.249***	-1.249**
Loser Strength	(0.367)	(0.298)	(0.345)	(0.572)
Time	-1.303***	-1.296***	-1.526***	-1.526***
	(0.175)	(0.148)	(0.177)	(0.360)
Loser Strength	2.699**	2.811***	3.400***	3.400***
	(1.085)	(0.990)	(1.017)	(0.525)
Age	0.097*	0.141***	0.147***	0.147**
	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.067)
Female	-0.035	0.027	0.006	0.006
	(0.148)	(0.124)	(0.144)	(0.162)
Education	-0.060	-0.023	-0.026	-0.026
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.066)
Income	0.104*	0.103**	0.056	0.056
	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.097)	(0.108)
Urban	0.220	0.025	0.162	0.162
	(0.197)	(0.159)	(0.191)	(0.185)
Muslim	-0.520	-0.349	-0.346	-0.346
	(0.357)	(0.287)	(0.326)	(0.438)
Governorate PE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Imputation		✓	✓	✓
Matching (Nearest)			✓	✓
Clustered SE				✓
Constant	7.214***	6.584***	7.702***	7.702***
	(0.637)	(0.554)	(0.807)	(0.680)
Observations	1,162	1,579	1,218	1,218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.172	0.167	0.204	0.204
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.132	0.138	0.168	0.168

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Figure 2** Loser Strength and Disillusionment with Democracy

1.5 points (on the 0–10 scale) pre- to post-election, it falls roughly 2.7 points for losers in governorates where they are strong.

While losers in governorates where they are weak still have objectively lower levels of support for democracy, what is important is the size of the drop. This is the frustration caused by unmet expectations. This disillusionment is what is thought—and what we will show—leads to greater support for a return to authoritarian rule.

### Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations

We analyze Egypt and Tunisia separately to assess if one of the two countries may be driving these results. While this halves our sample size, Table A.8 in the Appendix shows that the interaction term remains negative and significant in each country, whether using the original or imputed data.

A respondent's perception of whether or not their country is a democracy may affect their expressed support for democracy. The Arab Barometer asks respondents to rank on a 0–10 scale how democratic their country currently is. While this variable is potentially post-treatment and thus we do not include it as a control in Table 1, results are robust to its inclusion. Results also hold when subtracting this 0–10 evaluation from the 0–10 support for democracy score and using this as the dependent variable (see Appendix, Table A.9).

Some may wonder if our results hold for voters and non-voters. Consistent with recent literature,<sup>52</sup> results are stronger among losers who reported voting, perhaps

reflecting a larger personal stake or investment in the electoral outcome. Results are in the right direction and in some models marginally significant for non-voters as well (see Appendix, Table A.10).<sup>53</sup>

There are three primary alternative explanations for our findings. First, perhaps losers in loser-strong areas experienced more cases of electoral fraud and became more disillusioned because of cheating, not losing. Electoral fairness at the local-level has been shown to color system-level judgments.<sup>54</sup> However, Table A.12 (Appendix) demonstrates that results hold when controlling for actual electoral fraud (Models 1–2).<sup>55</sup> Respondents in loser-strong governorates were no more likely to perceive fraud post-election (Models 3–4).

Redistribution is another alternative explanation. Losers in winner-dominated governorates may be less disillusioned because the winners were able to reallocate rents back home. While the authors' interviews with Brotherhood and Ennahda officials suggest that both countries' police and bureaucracy largely refused to cooperate with the winning Islamist parties,<sup>56</sup> and thus impeded rent reallocation, we check for these possibilities using the Arab Barometer data. We compare the attitudes of losers in loser-strong and loser-weak governorates towards government performance in providing security and a range of economic and social public goods (see Appendix, Tables A.13–A.15). Losers in loser-weak governorates were no more likely to report an improvement than losers in loser-strong governorates for each of these attitudes, suggesting little reallocation of rents to Islamist strongholds. Differences in the state's perceived economic, security, or administrative performance cannot explain our findings.

A final counter-explanation could be that losers in loser-strong governorates were ideologically different from losers in loser-weak governorates, perhaps more secular or more revolutionary. Electoral losers with policy preferences farther from the winning parties are likely to become more disillusioned.<sup>57</sup> However, Table A.16 (Appendix) shows that loser-strong governorates did not have higher levels of opposition to Egypt's and Tunisia's ousted autocratic leaders, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, prior to the first elections. Table A.17 (Appendix) demonstrates that results hold when controlling for level of trust in the winning Islamist party and support for shari'a. The underlying political identities or policy preferences of these losers therefore cannot explain the variation in their disillusionment with democracy.

## **Mechanisms and Testable Implications**

We now validate our proposed mechanism: expectations of winning. If strength at the local level conditions one's expectations for winning at the national level, we predict that:

1. Losers in loser-strong governorates should be more supportive of democracy pre-election, as they expect to win nationally.

2. The differential effect of local strength on disillusionment with democracy should be larger for those losers who are politically unaware.
3. Winners in winner-weak governorates should see a greater increase in support for democracy than winners in winner-strong governorates.

Table 1 confirms the first implication. The coefficient for Loser Strength is positive and significant at the .05 or .01 level in all models. Losers in governorates where they are strong have a higher baseline of support for democracy. Another test of this implication is that if losers in loser-strong governorates are more likely to think they will win nationally, they should also be more optimistic about the election and, therefore, more likely to report that they plan to vote. Table A.3 in the Appendix supports this proposition: losers in governorates where they are strong are significantly more likely to say they plan to vote pre-election.

Table A.4 in the Appendix tests the second implication. If disillusionment is due to a shattering of locally-generated expectations, then this disillusionment should be less pronounced among losers who have access to national information: losers who regularly watch the national news or are active on the internet/social media. Models 1–2 (and Figure A.7) show that the demoralizing effect of living in loser-strong governorates was concentrated among losers who do not watch the national news. Losers who self-report following the national news “to a great extent” were no more disillusioned in loser-strong than loser-weak governorates. Similarly, Models 3–4 show that losers who are rarely online became more disillusioned in loser-strong governorates than loser-weak governorates. However, daily internet users, who are more likely to access national news, were no more disillusioned in loser-strong or weak governorates. This differential effect by news and internet consumption suggests that those with purely local, firsthand information may have been more shocked by the electoral results.

The third testable implication is a similar expectations gap among winners. Winners in governorates where they are weak should be uncertain about their likelihood of national victory ahead of the elections. After being surprised with a victory, they should become more supportive of democracy. Winners in governorates where they are strong, by contrast, should already expect to win and thus should experience less change in their support for democracy before to after the elections. Splitting winner vote share at its median, the interaction term between Time and Winner Weak should therefore be positive.

Table A.5 in the Appendix supports this implication. The first two models show the pooled Egypt and Tunisia data (original then imputed), coding winners as the opposite of losers, either above the median in trust in the winning Islamist parties or above the median in support for shari‘a. In both models, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at the .05 level. Winners residing in governorates where they were weak had a stronger “expectations bump” than winners where they were strong.

In Egypt, there were two winning Islamist parties: the Muslim Brotherhood (with 37 percent of the vote) and the Salafi Nour party (with 25 percent). In Models 3–6 of



Table 4, we demonstrate that this positive expectations bump holds for each of these parties separately, using each party's vote share to code winner-weak governorates. To capture Muslim Brotherhood respondents, we take those above the median in trust in the Muslim Brotherhood. To capture Salafi supporters, we take those above the median in support for shari'a, but with below the median trust in the Muslim Brotherhood. Across the original or imputed data, the interaction term is positive and significant at the .1 level for the Muslim Brotherhood in Model 3 and significant at the .01 level for Salafis. The expectations bump is much larger for the Salafis, for whom winning came as more of a surprise.

These results offer additional evidence against the counter-explanation of rent reallocation. If winners had reallocated rents back to their strongholds, then winners in winner-strong governorates would have become more supportive of democracy. By contrast, it occurred in the winner-weak governorates, implying that it is instead about expectations of winning.

### **Disillusionment and Support for Authoritarianism**

Some may counter that far from inciting democratic defection, the disillusionment and frustrations of unmet electoral expectations could breed political apathy. We address this skepticism in two ways.

First, we use Arab Barometer data to show that disillusioned losers actually became more supportive of authoritarianism. The Arab Barometer asks respondents how they would rate "a political system with an authoritarian president (non-democratic) who is indifferent to parliament and elections." We rescale this variable from 1 (very bad) to 4 (very good) and then conduct the same analyses as in Table 1 with this dependent variable.

Table A.6 in the Appendix presents our results. In all but the last model, the coefficient between time and loser strength is positive and significant, suggesting that losers in governorates where they were strong became more supportive of authoritarian rule. The coefficient on loser strength is also insignificant: losers in governorates where they were strong were no more supportive of authoritarian rule pre-election, just as they were no more supportive of former autocrats Mubarak or Ben Ali pre-election. The founding election, however, disillusioned losers in loser-strong governorates and fueled support for authoritarianism. This rise in support for authoritarianism indicates that losers' democratic disillusionment did not induce political apathy but democratic hostility.

Second, we use voting data to investigate whether these attitudes in fact correlated with acts of democratic subversion. We test whether disillusioned losers became more likely to vote for candidates representing the ousted autocratic regime. As the return to power of the former autocratic regime is one of the primary means by which democratic transitions fail,<sup>58</sup> this is a crucial pathway to study.

Egypt provides a unique case to test this possibility. The country held presidential elections in May-June 2012 soon after the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections (the founding elections we have focused on thus far). The presidential elections pitted the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi against a candidate representing the former regime, retired General Ahmed Shafik. A former Prime Minister, Shafik was openly labeled as a *feloul* (one of the remnants of the former regime) and was nearly disqualified from the elections by a lustration law.

Shafik campaigned on a platform to “restore the greatness of the old Egypt,”<sup>59</sup> pledging to restore order even at the cost of democracy. “Security is one of the top needs for the Egyptian people,” he claimed. “Democracy has limits. Unrest is not democracy.”<sup>60</sup> In the run-off presidential election, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi narrowly defeated this autocratic challenger with 51 percent of the vote.


In the first round of the presidential elections, however, the non-Islamist vote had been split between Shafik and several more “revolutionary” candidates. The proportion of the non-Islamist (non-Morsi)<sup>61</sup> vote in this first round going to Shafik varied widely by governorate, from 9 percent in Kafr el-Sheikh to 68 percent in Monufia. We hypothesize that loser-strong governorates, which we found earlier had greater disillusionment among their losers, will have a higher proportion of losers’ votes going toward Shafik.

The first graph in Figure 3 plots each Egyptian governorate with the proportion of losers’ votes going to Shafik on the *y*-axis, and on the *x*-axis the same loser vote share in the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections as before. As expected, loser-strong governorates, which had become more supportive of authoritarianism, also had a higher proportion of losers’ votes going toward the autocratic candidate. Recoding loser strength dichotomously at its median, loser-strong governorates have on average a 15 percent higher proportion of votes going toward Shafik. Model 1 in Table A.7 in the Appendix finds that this relationship is significant at the .05 level.

One may counter that perhaps these loser-strong governorates had already been more in favor of autocratic candidates prior to the disillusionment of the founding elections. To test this possibility, we examine whether loser-strong governorates were more likely to vote for autocratic parties in the founding 2011–2012 parliamentary elections. While technically banned from competing, several parties affiliated with remnants of the old regime ran in the elections.<sup>62</sup> In total, these remnant parties received some 8.4 percent of the vote (or 25 percent of the non-Islamist votes). But as Model 2 of Table A.7 (Appendix) demonstrates, loser-strong governorates were no more likely to vote for these parties than loser-weak governorates. This suggests that losers in each type of governorate had equal levels of support for autocratic parties before the founding elections.

From this baseline of autocratic vote share in the founding elections, we probe whether support for autocratic candidates increased more in loser-strong governorates than loser-weak ones. Model 3 of Table 7 reveals that loser-strong governorates saw a statistically significant increase (at the .05 level) in autocratic vote share from the founding elections to the 2012 presidential elections than loser-weak governorates. The

**Figure 3** Loser Strength and Autocratic Vote Share in Egypt's 2012 Presidential Election (First Round)



second graph in Figure 3 presents these results. While votes going to autocratic candidates increased by just 7 percentage points on average, some loser-strong governorates like Monufia and El Sharqiya saw increases of more than 30 percentage points.

In sum, losers in governorates where they were strong appear to have been more likely to vote for candidates representing the former autocratic regime. While this analysis suffers from ecological inference, it is consistent with the individual-level Arab Barometer survey data suggesting that losers in governorates where they were strong became more supportive of authoritarianism. Although each analysis may have its flaws, taken together, the findings provide consistent evidence from two independent data sources that disillusioned losers turned not to apathy but to rejection of the democratic transition.

## **Conclusion**

In new democracies, electoral losers residing in areas where they are strong may become more disillusioned with democracy than losers in areas where they are weak. We suggest that expectations drive this effect: ahead of the founding elections, losers in loser-strong governorates tend to believe they are also strong nationally and are thus initially supportive of democracy. They then become disillusioned after elections reveal their true national popularity. Losers in governorates where they are weak, however, are more likely to already believe they are weak nationally. The elections simply confirm their expectations.

This finding has important implications for the consolidation of democratic transitions. Disillusioned losers have the potential to spoil transitions. We provide sub-national predictions on which losers are likely to initially join the democratic coalition but then defect (those in loser-strong governorates) and which losers are likely to oppose democracy from the start (those in loser-weak governorates).

These subnational findings offer one piece of a broader investigation on the collapse and consolidation of democratic transitions. A number of other factors—the national level of disillusionment, losers' ability to find like-minded allies in the military, etc.—affected why one country in our analysis succumbed to a military coup (Egypt) while the other remains on the path to consolidation (Tunisia). Yet, despite these cross-national differences, our analysis uncovers subnational similarities regarding who is likely to play spoiler in a democratic transition.

These findings imply that transitional governments ought to make extra effort to include losers in loser-strong areas within the democratic system. Although losers in loser-strong governorates may receive representation in parliament, they will remain a minority in national-level institutions. Decentralizing power, however, especially through the election of governors and local councils, can empower losing parties locally. In both Egypt and Tunisia, governors were appointed, and there were no municipal elections during either transition.<sup>63</sup> Since losers in loser-strong areas may win

at the local level, decentralization would give these otherwise disillusioned losers some modicum of power in governorates where they are strong. This buy-in into democracy at the local level may make electoral losers less likely to oppose the system and subvert nascent democratic institutions.

## NOTES

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3. Important exceptions include Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and Nicholas Kerr, "Dynamics of Democratic Satisfaction in Transitional Settings: Evidence from a Panel Study in Uganda," *Political Research Quarterly*, 68 (September 2015), 593–606; Luigi Curini and Willy Jou "The Conditional Impact Of Winner/Loser Status And Ideological Proximity On Citizen Participation," *European Journal of Political Research*, 55 (November 2016), 767–88; and Andrew Daniller, "Can Citizens Care Too Much? Investment in Election Outcomes and Perceptions of Electoral Legitimacy," *Electoral Studies*, 44 (December 2016), 151–61.

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31. Due to space constraints, the Appendix is not in the print version of this article. It can be viewed in the online version, at [www.ingentaconnect.com/cuny/cp](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/cuny/cp).
32. Cambanis, 2015.
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36. David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science*, 5 (October 1975), 449.
37. Given that there were tens of secular parties, the Arab Barometer chose to ask for trust in the winning Islamist party rather than each secular party.

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39. Hamid, 2014; Brownlee et al., 2015.

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45. See, e.g., Atef al-Saadawy, "What the Brotherhood Lost," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/48832>. The Brotherhood was founded in Ismailia by Hassan al-Banna, who hailed from Beheira.

46. Lines of best fit contain subregion fixed effects, but no individual demographic covariates.

47. Results hold when coding it at the median or when leaving the variable continuous.

48. Results hold without governorate fixed effects (see appendix, Table A.11), or with random effects for governorate (available from authors).

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54. Jonathan Hiskey and Shaun Bowler, "Local Context and Democratization in Mexico," *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (January 2005), 57–71.

55. In Tunisia, this refers to seats won by Aridha Chaabia (the Popular Petition) that the electoral commission nullified on account of fraud (5 out of 24 governorates). In Egypt, this refers to districts with sufficient electoral irregularities to warrant a re-run of their election in later phases of the parliamentary elections (8 of 21 governorates).

56. Interviews with Muslim Brotherhood minister Amr Darrag, Istanbul, July 11, 2016; Ennahda Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, Sousse, December 17, 2015.

57. Singh et al., 2012; Curini and Jou, 2016; Daniller, 2016.

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60. "Where they stand—Egyptian candidates Shafiq and Mursi," *BBC News*, Jun. 6, 2012.

61. Results hold when calculating the non-Islamist vote as non-Morsi and non-Aboul-Futouh. Aboul-Futouh was endorsed by the leadership of the Salafi Nour party, but very few of its base actually turned out for him, seeing him as too liberal.

62. These parties include the Freedom, National of Egypt, Democratic Peace, Egyptian Citizen, Union, New Independents, Modern Egypt, Conservative, and Reform and Development parties.


63. Tunisia plans to hold municipal elections in May 2018.



# APPENDIX

## 1. Timeline of Arab Barometer Surveys

Figure A.4 Timeline



## 2. Arab Barometer Questions

Sample: Electoral Losers

- **[Trust]** “I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust each of them” (to a great extent, to a medium extent, to a limited extent, absolutely do not trust)
  - The Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt only)
  - Al-Nahda Movement/Party (Tunisia only)
- **[Shari’a Index]** “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following principles in the enactment of your country’s laws and regulations?” (strongly agree to strongly disagree)
  - “The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law.”
  - “The government and parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with Islamic law.”
  - “The government and parliament should enact personal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law.”
  - “The government and parliament should enact inheritance laws in accordance with Islamic law.”

Dependent Variables

- **[Suitability of Democracy]** “Suppose there was a scale from 1-10 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for your country, with 1 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for your country and 10 meaning that democracy is completely appropriate for your country. To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for your country?”



- **[Support for Authoritarianism]** “I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the country’s governance – for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? [...] A political system with an authoritarian president (non-democratic) who is indifferent to parliament and elections.”

#### Robustness checks

- **[Perception of Fraud]** “In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on (date of the last elections)? [Completely free and fair, minor breaches, major breaches, not free and fair].
- **[Curr Econ]** “How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?”
- **[Curr Safety]** “Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family’s safety and security are ensured or not?”
- **[Retro Safety]** “Compared to this time last year, do you feel that your own personal and your family’s safety and security are now... (better, same, worse)”
- “I am going to ask a number of questions related to the current government’s performance. How would you evaluate the performance of the current government’s [Insert]?”
  - **[Jobs]** “Creating employment opportunities”
  - **[Narrow]** “Narrowing the gap between rich and poor”
  - **[Manage]** “Managing the process of democratic transition process”
- “I will ask some questions about your ability to obtain certain services. Based on your actual experience, how difficult or easy is it to obtain...
  - **[Health]** “Appropriate medical treatment in a nearby clinic or public (government) hospital.”
  - **[Police]** “Assistance from public security (the police) when needed.”
  - **[Redress]** “Access to the concerned official to file a complaint when you feel that your rights have been violated.”
- **[Needs]** I will read you some statements related to your household income. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
  - Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save.
  - Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties.
  - Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs.
  - Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs.”

#### Voters v. Non-voters

- [Pre-Election, Egypt] “Will you vote in the next parliamentary elections?”
- [Pre-Election, Tunisia] “Will you participate in the upcoming elections of the Constituent Assembly (October 23rd, 2011)?”

- [Post-Election] “Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections that were held on (date of the last elections)”

#### News and Internet

- “To what extent do you follow political news in your country?” (to a great extent, to a medium extent, to a limited extent, I don’t follow political news at all).
- “Do you use the internet?” (Daily or almost daily; at least once a week; at least once a month; a few times a year; I do not use the Internet).

#### Satisfaction with Former Regime

- [Egypt] “Suppose that there was a scale from 1-10 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with the Mubarak regime, in which 1 means that you were absolutely unsatisfied with the regime and 10 means that you were very satisfied, to what extent were you satisfied with the Mubarak regime? (Egypt only)”
- [Tunisia] “Suppose that there was a scale from 1-10 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with the Ben Ali regime, in which 1 means that you were absolutely unsatisfied with the regime and 10 means that you were very satisfied, to what extent were you satisfied with the Ben Ali regime? (Tunisia only)”

#### Questions used for Multiple Imputation

- [Individual Piety] Do you...? (always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, never)
  - Pray daily.
  - Attend Friday prayer/Sunday services.
  - Listen to or read the Quran/the Bible.
- [Religion in Public Life] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly agree to strongly disagree):
  - Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should not interfere in voters’ decisions in elections.
  - Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state.
  - Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government decisions.
  - Religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life.
  - Religious associations and institutions (excluding political parties) should not influence voters’ decisions in elections.
  - Mosques and churches should not be used for election campaigning.
- Arrange the following characteristics in order of their importance for a person to be qualified for political leadership in the country. [...] Piety.

## Demographic Controls

- Age
- Gender:
- Monthly household income in 2011 US Dollars
- Level of education:
  - Illiterate/Literate
  - Elementary.
  - Preparatory/Basic.
  - Secondary.
  - Mid-level diploma/professional or technical (not included in Tunisia)
  - BA
  - MA and above
- Urban/Rural
- Religion
  - Muslim
  - Christian
  - Other

### 3. Predicting Vote Choice

Trust in Islamists and support for shari'a are strong predictors of intended vote choice:


**Table A.2** Effect of Trust and *Shari'a* on Vote Choice (OLS)

	<i>DV: Vote Choice (1=Islamist, 0=Non-Islamist)</i>			
	Tunisia		Egypt	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Trust in Ennahda/ Muslim Brotherhood Support for <i>Shari'a</i>	0.192 <sup>***</sup> (0.019)	0.193 <sup>***</sup> (0.021)	0.133 <sup>***</sup> (0.034)	0.122 <sup>***</sup> (0.037)
	0.163 <sup>***</sup> (0.042)	0.164 <sup>***</sup> (0.048)	0.178 <sup>***</sup> (0.059)	0.156* (0.083)
Age		-0.022 (0.022)		0.006 (0.046)
Female		-0.010 (0.048)		-0.103 (0.110)
Education		-0.120 (0.109)		-0.152 (0.206)
Income		0.132 (0.564)		0.833 (1.046)
Urban		-0.054 (0.056)		0.052 (0.106)
Muslim		-0.004 (0.423)		0.039 (0.256)
Constant	-0.423 <sup>***</sup> (0.114)	-0.317 (0.516)	-0.582 <sup>***</sup> (0.216)	-0.802* (0.475)
Observations	375	321	103	95
R <sup>2</sup>	0.309	0.317	0.201	0.218
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.306	0.300	0.185	0.145


Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 4. Covariate Balance

**Figure A.5** Covariate Balance in Loser-Strong v. Loser-Weak Governorates (Pre-Election)



**Figure A.6** Covariate Balancing among Pre- and Post-Election Losers (Nearest Matching)



## 5. Mechanism Tests

**Table A.3** Loser Strength and Likelihood of Voting Pre-Election (logit)

	<i>DV: Will you vote?</i>	
	Pre-Election	
	(1)	(2)
Loser Strength	0.955* (0.492)	0.682* (0.359)
Age	0.226** (0.110)	0.237*** (0.085)
Female	-1.066*** (0.281)	-0.901** (0.215)
Education	0.156** (0.077)	0.166** (0.065)
Income	0.126* (0.065)	0.138** (0.056)
Muslim	0.479 (0.460)	0.214 (0.420)
Urban	0.550* (0.311)	0.021 (0.246)
Subregion FE	✓	✓
Imputation		✓
Constant	-0.952 (1.381)	-0.713 (0.891)
Observations	528	779
Log Likelihood	-198.461	-319.804
Akaike Inf. Crit.	434.922	677.607


Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.4** The Moderating Effect of News and Internet

	<i>DV: Suitability of Democracy (0-10)</i>			
	(News)	(No News)	(Internet)	(No Internet)
Time*	0.347	-0.980***	-0.834	-0.783**
Loser Strength	(0.720)	(0.342)	(0.804)	(0.326)
Time	-1.001***	-1.408***	-0.281	-1.561***
Loser Strength	(0.353)	(0.166)	(0.379)	(0.164)
Age	0.178	3.704***	4.825*	2.507**
	(1.664)	(1.257)	(2.634)	(1.063)
Female	0.111	0.114**	0.089	0.148***
	(0.109)	(0.055)	(0.154)	(0.054)
Education	0.139	0.068	-0.010	0.100
	(0.292)	(0.138)	(0.321)	(0.137)
Income	-0.209**	0.018	-0.002	-0.027
	(0.082)	(0.043)	(0.120)	(0.042)
Urban	0.232**	0.077	-0.097	0.151**
	(0.109)	(0.054)	(0.128)	(0.052)
Muslim	-0.147	0.005	-0.471	0.064
	(0.382)	(0.176)	(0.458)	(0.175)
Governorate FE	-1.078	-0.405	-0.623	-0.320
Imputation	(0.732)	(0.313)	(0.790)	(0.310)
Constant	8.053***	6.336***	7.994***	6.306***
	(1.248)	(0.633)	(1.442)	(0.609)
Observations	387	1,192	289	1,290
R <sup>2</sup>	0.225	0.206	0.252	0.195
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.107	0.169	0.095	0.161

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Figure A.7** The Moderating Effect of News



**Table A.5** Winner Strength and Winners' Support for Democracy (OLS)

	<i>DV: Support for Democracy (0-10)</i>					
	Egypt and Tunisia		Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt)		Salafis (Egypt)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Time*	0.488**	0.392**	0.661*	0.498	1.433***	1.400***
Winner Weak	(0.199)	(0.193)	(0.379)	(0.349)	(0.501)	(0.501)
Time	-1.825***	-1.771***	-1.776***	-1.839***	-3.035***	-3.127***
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.283)	(0.260)	(0.352)	(0.351)
Winner Weak	-0.884	-0.665	1.404**	1.106**	-0.299	-1.518
	(0.612)	(0.643)	(0.565)	(0.526)	(1.958)	(1.685)
Age	0.139***	0.125***	0.064	0.071	-0.031	-0.037
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Female	0.056	0.063	-0.405**	-0.382**	0.011	0.015
	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.171)	(0.159)	(0.238)	(0.237)
Education	0.048	0.015	-0.037	-0.032	-0.081	-0.070
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Income	0.066*	0.056	0.167***	0.182***	0.113	0.084
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Urban	-0.123	-0.043	0.263	0.122	0.073	0.008
	(0.124)	(0.120)	(0.212)	(0.200)	(0.300)	(0.298)
Muslim	0.385	-0.172	-0.045	-0.076	-4.567*	0.359
	(0.342)	(0.389)	(0.422)	(0.391)	(2.649)	(1.579)
Governorate FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Imputation		✓		✓		✓
Constant	6.390***	7.140***	5.497***	5.587***	10.970***	6.294***
	(0.556)	(0.575)	(0.742)	(0.685)	(2.737)	(1.814)
Observations	2,614	2,768	749	851	487	497
R <sup>2</sup>	0.163	0.159	0.222	0.213	0.330	0.320
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.145	0.142	0.189	0.185	0.287	0.277

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



## 6. Authoritarianism Results

**Table A.6** Loser Strength and Support for Authoritarianism (OLS)

	<i>DV: Support for Authoritarianism (1-4)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time*	0.227**	0.226***	0.138*	0.138
Loser Strength	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.146)
Time	-0.206***	-0.179***	-0.159***	-0.159
	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.097)
Loser Strength	-0.027	-0.118	0.109	0.109
	(0.313)	(0.280)	(0.275)	(0.124)
Age	0.026	0.020	0.018	0.018*
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Education	-0.015	-0.018*	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Income	0.022	0.024*	-0.028	-0.028
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Female	0.044	0.030	0.057	0.057
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.042)
Urban	-0.041	-0.060	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Muslim	-0.051	-0.030	0.010	0.010
	(0.102)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.150)
Governorate FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Imputation		✓	✓	✓
Matching (Full)			✓	✓
Clustered SE				✓
Constant	1.549***	1.527***	1.669***	1.669***
	(0.182)	(0.156)	(0.189)	(0.248)
Observations	1,193	1,611	1,611	1,611
R <sup>2</sup>	0.136	0.112	0.104	0.101
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.096	0.082	0.074	0.074

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.7** Disillusionment and Votes for Autocratic Candidates in Egypt (OLS)

	<i>DV: Proportion of losers voting for autocratic candidates:</i>		
	<u>Pres Elcx 2012</u>	<u>Parli Elex 2011-12</u>	<u>Change in Proportion</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Loser Strength	0.152** (0.060)	0.001 (0.043)	0.151** (0.068)
Constant	0.249*** (0.042)	0.253*** (0.030)	-0.004 (0.046)
Observations	19	19	19
R <sup>2</sup>	0.272	0.00002	0.228
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.230	-0.059	0.183

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

## 7. Robustness Checks

These robustness checks include the following:

Table A.8 demonstrates that the main results hold when analyzing Egypt and Tunisia separately.

Table A.9 demonstrates that the main results remain when controlling for one's evaluation of how democratic their country is, and when subtracting this evaluation from their suitability of democracy and using that as the dependent variable. Table A.10 shows that effects hold when analyzing voting and non-voting losers separately. Table A.11 reveals that results hold without governorate fixed effects.

To counter alternative explanations, Table A.12 shows that results hold when controlling for electoral fraud, and that loser-strong governorates were no more likely to perceive fraud. Similarly, Tables A.13-15 find that losers in loser-strong governorates did not perceive a greater deterioration in their country's economic performance, security environment, or provision of government services than losers in loser-weak governorates. Table A.16 shows that losers in loser strong governorates were no more revolutionary (opposed to former autocrats) than losers in loser weak governorates. Finally, Table A.17 shows that results hold when controlling for trust in Islamists and support for shari'a.

**Table A.8** Democratic Disillusionment in Egypt and Tunisia, Separately (OLS)

	<i>DV: Support for Democracy (0-10)</i>			
	Egypt		Tunisia	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time*	-1.297***	-1.082***	-0.974*	-0.771*
Loser Strength	(0.482)	(0.414)	(0.573)	(0.427)
Time	-1.912***	-2.095***	-0.351	-0.511**
	(0.215)	(0.201)	(0.302)	(0.220)
Loser Strength	3.202***	3.208***	1.176	-0.818
	(1.077)	(0.985)	(1.181)	(0.772)
Age	0.162**	0.138**	-0.071	0.053
	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.072)
Female	-0.026	0.009	0.055	0.132
	(0.180)	(0.162)	(0.251)	(0.189)
Education	-0.061	-0.024	-0.063	-0.051
	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.084)	(0.063)
Income	0.182***	0.196***	0.021	0.056
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.177)	(0.117)
Urban	0.222	0.095	0.361	0.065
	(0.218)	(0.201)	(0.327)	(0.246)
Muslim	-0.596*	-0.407	1.221	-0.301
	(0.346)	(0.201)	(1.819)	(1.273)
Governorate FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Imputation		✓		✓
Constant	7.003***	6.598***	4.133*	5.418***
	(0.674)	(0.607)	(2.151)	(1.478)
Observations	718	848	444	731
R <sup>2</sup>	0.233	0.260	0.132	0.104
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.201	0.234	0.066	0.064

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.

**Table A.9** Extent to Which Country is Currently a Democracy

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<b>Suitability of Democracy</b>		<b>Suitability Extent</b>	
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>
Time*	-1.053*** (0.349)	-0.97*** (0.284)	-1.169*** (0.412)	-1.060*** (0.339)
Loser Strength Extent	0.359*** (0.031)	0.348*** (0.026)		
Time	-0.609*** (0.177)	-0.756*** (0.146)	0.629*** (0.196)	0.241 (0.168)
Loser Strength	2.893*** (1.026)	3.16*** (0.939)	3.170*** (1.213)	3.692*** (1.118)
Age	0.044 (0.054)	0.088* (0.046)	-0.051 (0.064)	0.006 (0.055)
Female	-0.027 (0.140)	-0.018 (0.119)	-0.014 (0.166)	-0.062 (0.141)
Education	-0.055 (0.041)	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.025 (0.043)
Income	0.114** (0.052)	0.12*** (0.046)	0.151** (0.061)	0.157*** (0.055)
Urban	0.270 (0.174)	0.118 (0.151)	0.356* (0.206)	0.303* (0.180)
Muslim	-0.799** (0.339)	-0.628** (0.276)	-1.312* (0.399)	-1.183*** (0.328)
Governorate FE Imputation	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	5.712*** (0.618)	5.279*** (0.537)	2.960*** (0.713)	2.744*** (0.629)
Observations	1,154	1,557	1,154	1,557
R <sup>2</sup>	0.264	0.256	0.132	0.102
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.228	0.229	0.090	0.070

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.

**Table A.10** Disillusionment with Democracy Among Voting and Non-Voting Losers (OLS)

	<i>DV: Suitability of Democracy</i>			
	Voters		Non-Voters	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time*	-0.728*	-0.820**	-1.264	-1.460*
Loser Strength	(0.406)	(0.336)	(1.094)	(0.820)
Time	-1.404***	-1.355***	-0.724	-0.788**
	(0.197)	(0.171)	(0.467)	(0.352)
Loser Strength	3.177***	3.257***	0.068	0.825
	(1.175)	(1.060)	(2.782)	(2.658)
Age	0.076	0.122**	0.049	0.118
	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.131)	(0.104)
Female	-0.125	-0.044	0.402	0.421
	(0.169)	(0.143)	(0.356)	(0.282)
Education	-0.083*	-0.026	-0.097	-0.082
	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.102)	(0.085)
Income	0.140**	0.134**	-0.067	-0.014
	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.129)	(0.110)
Urban	0.204	-0.052	0.117	0.211
	(0.207)	(0.180)	(0.467)	(0.362)
Muslim	-0.528	-0.506	-0.280	-0.222
	(0.382)	(0.320)	(0.969)	(0.700)
Governorate FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Imputation		✓		✓
Constant	7.155***	6.713***	7.963**	6.670***
	(0.714)	(0.626)	(1.473)	(1.208)
Observations	882	1,178	276	395
R <sup>2</sup>	0.179	0.179	0.262	0.2-11
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.140	0.109	0.129

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01.

**Table A.11** Disillusionment with Democracy without Governorate FE (OLS)

	<i>DV: Suitability of Democracy</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time*	-0.621*	-0.643**	-1.096***	-1.096*
Loser Strength	(0.349)	(0.291)	(0.352)	(0.632)
Time	-1.376***	-1.376***	-1.469***	-1.469***
	(0.169)	(0.144)	(0.181)	(0.361)
Loser Strength	-0.091	-0.076	0.363	0.363
	(0.264)	(0.213)	(0.291)	(0.380)
Age	0.095*	0.153***	0.149***	0.149**
	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.074)
Female	0.005	0.048	0.017	0.017
	(0.147)	(0.125)	(0.147)	(0.175)
Education	-0.044	0.006	-0.0003	-0.0003
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.065)
Income	0.117**	0.107**	0.049	0.049
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.087)	(0.104)
Urban	0.205	0.113	0.277*	0.277
	(0.148)	(0.127)	(0.149)	(0.205)
Muslim	-0.392	-0.177	-0.094	-0.094
	(0.321)	(0.260)	(0.303)	(0.492)
Imputation		✓	✓	✓
Matching (Nearest)			✓	✓
Clustered SE				✓
Constant	5.789***	5.230***	5.581***	5.581***
	(0.506)	(0.436)	(0.693)	(0.866)
Observations	1,162	1,579	1,217	1,217
R <sup>2</sup>	0.096	0.095	0.115	0.115
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.090	0.109	0.109

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.12** Disillusionment with Democracy Accounting for Fraud (OLS)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>Suitability of Democracy</i>		<i>Free and Fair? (Post-Election only)</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time*	-0.753**	-0.846***		
Loser Strength	(0.354)	(0.295)		
Time	-1.333***	-1.319***		
	(0.169)	(0.143)		
Loser Strength	0.220	0.238	0.079	0.179
	(0.311)	(0.260)	(0.154)	(0.127)
Fraud	0.261	0.307*	-0.341***	-0.299***
	(0.184)	(0.163)	(0.122)	(0.105)
Age	0.098*	0.133***	0.045	0.062**
	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.029)
Female	-0.031	-0.015	0.079	0.057
	(0.148)	(0.125)	(0.089)	(0.076)
Education	-0.046	-0.006	-0.049*	-0.017
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Income	0.111**	0.067	-0.049	0.002
	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.066)	(0.049)
Urban	0.350**	0.239	-0.098	-0.126
	(0.168)	(0.145)	(0.103)	(0.089)
Muslim	-0.502	-0.377	0.540**	0.429**
	(0.335)	(0.273)	(0.251)	(0.182)
Subregion FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Imputation		✓		✓
Constant	5.211***	5.242***	2.727***	2.343***
	(0.722)	(0.601)	(0.589)	(0.446)
Observations	1,162	1,573	614	797
R <sup>2</sup>	0.123	0.123	0.247	0.272
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.107	0.111	0.223	0.254

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.13** Evaluation of the Economy in Loser Strong v. Weak Governorates (OLS)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Curr. Econ		Needs		Jobs		Narrow	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time*	0.158*	0.162**	-0.195	-0.146	0.099	0.108	0.066	0.121
Loser Strength	(0.089)	(0.072)	(0.122)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.080)
Time	-0.703***	-0.659***	-0.050	-0.058	-0.689***	-0.631***	-0.704***	-0.676***
Loser Strength	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.040)
	0.019	0.186	1.642***	1.485***	0.074	0.027	0.218	0.238
Age	(0.269)	(0.250)	(0.368)	(0.339)	(0.301)	(0.283)	(0.295)	(0.271)
	0.026*	0.036***	0.060***	0.038**	-0.0005	0.013	0.023	0.030**
Female	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
	-0.066*	-0.038	0.059	0.078*	0.008	0.003	0.022	0.033
Education	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.034)
	0.002	0.001	0.107***	0.118***	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	0.003
Income	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010*)
	0.036***	0.037***	0.149***	0.152***	0.039***	0.035***	0.024	0.027**
Urban	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)
	-0.039	-0.034	0.122**	0.162***	-0.106**	-0.053	-0.071	-0.057
Muslim	(0.044)		(0.061)		(0.050)		(0.050)	
	0.150*	0.127*	-0.098	-0.098	0.105	0.152*	0.060	0.028
Governorate FE	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.118)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.077)
Imputation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.423***	1.405***	0.293	0.284	1.691***	1.524***	1.659***	1.569***
	(0.155)	(0.137)	(0.213)	(0.186)	(0.175)	(0.156)	(0.172)	(0.150)
Observations	1,218	1,706	1,211	1,713	1,202	1,665	1,185	1,628
R <sup>2</sup>	0.300	0.256	0.226	0.214	0.259	0.209	0.261	0.230
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.268	0.232	0.190	0.189	0.225	0.183	0.227	0.204

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



Table A.14 Evaluation of Security in Loser Strong and Weak Governorates (OLS)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Curr Safety			Retro Safety			Police		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
Time*	-0.027	0.072	-0.096	0.071	0.120	0.150			
Loser Strength	(0.114)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.085)	(0.164)	(0.132)			
Time	-0.549***	-0.480***	0.010	0.010	-0.348***	-0.283***			
Loser Strength	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.066)			
	0.865***	0.910***	-0.214	-0.212	-0.738	-0.521			
Age	(0.343)	(0.317)	(0.323)	(0.296)	(0.492)	(0.457)			
	0.004	0.012	0.021	0.029**	0.036	0.015			
Female	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.022)			
	-0.067	-0.063	0.082*	0.054	0.058	0.099*			
Education	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.066)	(0.056)			
	-0.013	-0.001	0.014	0.013	0.001	0.017			
Income	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.017)			
	0.044***	0.041***	-0.010	-0.012	0.097***	0.095***			
Urban	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.022)			
	-0.007	-0.013	-0.083	-0.063	-0.183**	-0.158**			
Muslim	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.082)	(0.070)			
	0.048	0.093	0.142	0.090	0.004	-0.099			
Governorate FE	(0.109)	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.157)	(0.129)			
Imputation	↘	↘	↘	↘	↘	↘			
Constant	1.763***	1.683***	1.112***	1.127***	1.732***	1.837***			
	(0.198)	(0.175)	(0.187)	(0.163)	(0.284)	(0.250)			
Observations	1,213	1,698	1,209	1,694	1,213	1,697			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.239	0.209	0.142	0.125	0.153	0.111			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.204	0.183	0.102	0.097	0.114	0.082			

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.15** Evaluation of Health, Redress, and Management of Transition (OLS)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Health			Manage		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Time*	0.206*	0.268***	-0.222	-0.184	0.015	0.062
Loser Strength	(0.108)	(0.089)	(0.163)	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.090)
Time	-0.736***	-0.710***	-0.147*	-0.153**	-1.059***	-0.982***
Loser Strength	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.046)
	0.160	0.106	-0.536	-0.273	0.396	0.380
Age	(0.324)	(0.305)	(0.488)	(0.444)	(0.314)	(0.292)
	0.005	0.009	0.070***	0.046**	0.003	0.031**
Female	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.015)
	-0.001	0.018	0.235***	0.220***	0.019	-0.011
Education	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.038)
	-0.011	-0.016	0.031	0.044***	0.002	0.004
Income	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.011)
	0.049***	0.041***	-0.015	-0.001	0.050	0.042***
Urban	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)
	-0.100*	-0.063	-0.118	-0.132*	-0.101*	-0.084*
Muslim	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.081)	(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.048)
	-0.040	0.063	0.225	0.249**	-0.035	-0.028
Governorate FE	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.156)	(0.126)	(0.103)	(0.085)
Imputation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.811***	1.758***	1.909***	1.856***	2.023***	1.905***
	(0.188)	(0.169)	(0.283)	(0.244)	(0.186)	(0.166)
Observations	1,192	1,644	1,207	1,687	1,124	1,498
R <sup>2</sup>	0.259	0.226	0.115	0.086	0.391	0.358
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.224	0.200	0.075	0.057	0.361	0.335

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.16** Losers' Support for Former Autocratic Leaders; Pre-Election Survey (OLS)

	<i>DV: Support for Former Autocratic Leaders (1-10)</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Loser Strength	0.398 (0.645)	0.377 (0.595)
Age	0.008 (0.069)	0.014 (0.054)
Female	0.231 (0.181)	0.221 (0.137)
Education	-0.062 (0.050)	-0.041 (0.040)
Income	0.010 (0.048)	-0.008 (0.041)
Urban	-0.460** (0.208)	-0.255 (0.166)
Muslim	-0.313 (0.345)	-0.526* (0.306)
Governorate FE Imputation	↙	↙
Constant	2.156*** (0.745)	2.165*** (0.669)
Observations	527	770
R <sup>2</sup>	0.114	0.096
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.027	0.036

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.17** Disillusionment with Democracy controlling for Ideology (OLS)

	<i>DV: Suitability of Democracy</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Time*	-0.977***	-0.956***
Loser Strength	(0.368)	(0.301)
Time	-1.240***	-1.172***
Loser Strength	(0.194)	(0.162)
Trust in Islamists	2.639**	2.887***
Support for Shari'a	(1.086)	(0.991)
Age	0.077	0.148
Female	(0.232)	(0.194)
Education	0.190	0.310**
Income	(0.172)	(0.145)
Urban	0.096*	0.119**
Muslim	(0.057)	(0.048)
Governorate FE	-0.035	-0.004
Imputation	(0.148)	(0.124)
Constant	-0.055	-0.013
	(0.043)	(0.037)
	0.108**	0.059
	(0.054)	(0.047)
	0.216	0.104
	(0.184)	(0.157)
	-0.698*	-0.668**
	(0.393)	(0.317)
	✓	✓
	6.713***	6.049***
	(0.793)	(0.675)
Observations	1,162	1,573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.173	0.170
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.132	0.140

Note: \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .