16 Global International Relations

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Reader's Guide

This chapter examines International Relations (IR) as a field of study and its theories from a 'Global IR' perspective. The first part revisits the origins of IR. While the foundational narrative stresses the origin of IR as a normative project of avoiding war in Europe while obscuring its colonial and racist aspects, this chapter highlights broader concerns and contributions from the periphery, such as anti-colonialism, racism, underdevelopment, and world order. The second part captures IR's neglect and lack of fit with non-Western experiences during the postwar phase of Americanization with the help of a case study—of the liberal order—and the seminal work of Mohammed Ayoob dealing with Third World Security. Part three examines efforts in various parts of the world to develop arguments and positions that question the universality of the discipline and aspire to inject greater diversity into IR. I argue that such regional contributions to IR need not undermine the globalization of IR theory but can complement and enrich it in the path to a Global IR.

Introduction

Foundational myths, writes Ken Booth (1996: 328, 330), combine 'part fictions/part truths'. The myth about IR is that it was born at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (now Aberystwyth University) in 1919 with the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics, supported by an endowment from David Davies, 'a wealthy Liberal MP in Wales'. This reminds us of the religious doctrine of creationism, still popular among evangelicals, or the belief that 'the universe had a distinct starting point' and was created by God in a single act out of 'nothing' (cited in Lyons 2009: 174). Challenging this belief, the twelfth-century Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (also known as Averroes), invoked the Aristotelian doctrine of 'the eternity of the world', which he had revived and enriched, and which held that both time and matter were eternal.[1] Ibn Rushd's timely intervention influenced European thinking and shaped the Renaissance and the Enlightenment (Pelham 2016).

IR's foundational myth has been criticized, among others complaints, for drawing too sharp a contrast between the realist and idealist positions (Long 1995). This chapter goes further and challenges the creationist undertones of the myth and argues that IR was not created in a 'single act', episode, or place, 'out of nothing'. Instead, it emerged in multiple spaces around the world, including the colonial and postcolonial worlds. It also holds that whatever normative purpose lay behind the birth of IR at its 'founding' (as preventing another major war), it did not extend to ending imperialism and racialism. If anything, a concern for the preservation of the Western dominance by avoiding further catastrophic clashes within Western civilization might have joined the darker forces of geopolitics and racism in 'midwifing' IR's origin. The main challenges to the racist and imperialist impulses that had already laid the foundation of IR before the First World War came not from the West, but from the colonies or ex-colonies (as in Latin America). One key goal of this chapter is to highlight some of these contributions.

This counter-narrative lies at the heart of the Global IR perspective (Acharya 2014; 2016). At the outset, some caveats and clarification are in order about the purpose of this chapter and of the Global IR approach that it discusses. First, in keeping with the scope of this book, this chapter focuses on ideas, rather than the institutional development of IR which has been discussed in some detail elsewhere (Acharya and Buzan 2019). Second, this chapter is not a detailed discussion of any particular theory or theories, Western or non-Western, as is provided in other chapters of this book. Indeed, Global IR is not a theory, although it can lend itself to theoretical debates and innovations. The framework of Global IR as deployed here is a research program, and a way of redefining and broadening the discipline. As such, Global IR works with existing theories and concepts, including 'mainstream' theories such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, as well as critical approaches such as postmodern, postcolonial/decolonial, and feminist perspectives (**Chapters 10**, **11**, and **12**). Here, Global IR takes a broader view of what IR theory means, moving away from the 'hard positivist' theory in the United States and leaning more towards the 'softer reflectivist' theory more popular in Europe and other parts of the world (Acharya and Buzan 2010: 3–4; Wæver 1998). But unlike some postcolonial[2] and critical scholarship, Global IR does not reject theories such as realism (**Chapters 2** and **3**), liberalism (**Chapters 4** and **5**), and constructivism (**Chapter 9**). Rather, it interrogates their claims of universal relevance and applicability. In particular, Global IR calls upon mainstream theories and their challengers (including Western feminism, postmodernism, etc.) to include and build upon the histories, voices, and agency claims of actors—wherever they may be—that have long been excluded or marginalized by IR's core disciplinary narrative. Global IR rejects the claims of ideas and theories derived out of one context (however dominant) to be universal and hence serves as a general fit for the study of world politics as a whole. In a related sense, Global IR accepts neither the 'West' nor the 'Rest' (or 'Global South' or 'Third World') as enduring categories, but focuses on their mutual engagement and reconstruction.

To be sure, working with existing IR concepts and theories to assess or incorporate ideas from non-Western contexts may seem 'tempo-centric' (validating contemporary ideas by projecting them backwards in history). It may also entrench the very Western dominance that Global IR seeks to challenge.[3] But in highlighting the diverse origins of ideas and practices in IR with reference to some of the existing theories of the discipline, Global IR does not assume the latter's primacy. At the same time, removing existing theories or concepts entirely from the discussion and starting with a clean slate would make it difficult to have a meaningful comparison or dialogue between traditional and Global IR perspectives. Such a dialogue is helpful for the 'discovery' (Acharya 2011a) of ideas and practices that are challenging to

existing IR and may have a predominantly non-Western origin, with or without any counterparts or approximations in the existing conceptual apparatus of the IR discipline. Global IR embraces this 'pluralistic universalism' (Acharya 2014), which holds that true universalism does not lie in imposing any single set of ideas, theories, or values of a particular nation or civilization on all others, but in recognizing and respecting the diversity of the world while exploring any shared or connected meanings and practices among states, societies, and civilizations. While still a work in progress and not claiming to answer or address all the issues of exclusion or marginalization that are entrenched in the discipline, Global IR opens the door to greater debate about exclusion and Western-centrism and ways of addressing it.

IR's multiple and global foundations

It may be tempting to trace the pre-Second World War development of IR theories by using labels such as liberalism, constructivism, or postcolonialism. While some terms such as realism, utopianism (idealism), and Marxism were already in vogue since the nineteenth century, most of the theoretical terminology or categories one finds in the IR literatures today emerged after the Second World War, with some becoming prominent only in the post-Cold War period.

A more useful approach would be to look at some key ideas of the pre-Second World War period, on their own terms and in their own historical context, before ascertaining their relevance as precursors (directly or indirectly) to contemporary IR categories or paradigms, rather than the other way around, i.e. simply using modern theories as templates for analysing historical developments and discourses.

The traditional narrative of the birth of IR focuses heavily on the normative project of preventing war and building a universal collective security system, and the challenge it faced from 'realists', leading to the so-called Idealist–Realist Debate. In this story, the main narrators or 'founders' of IR were Western (mainly European and American) intellectuals and leaders. But viewed from a *global* perspective, this chapter argues, the foundational motivations and ideas behind IR were much broader, related not just to the scourge of war, but others such as colonialism, racism, and economic injustice. Below, I discuss them in terms of five broad categories: pan-nationalism and regional identity; universalism, international organization, and world order; fundamental norms (sovereignty and non-intervention); power politics; and underdevelopment and political economy.[4] While many of the ideas were framed within the anti-colonial struggles and nationalist sentiments, they also contained ideas about internationalism, world order, international development, cooperation, and justice. Moreover, the ideas from the periphery during the pre-Second World War period left a rich and long-term legacy for international and regional orders in the postwar period. For example, the Non-Aligned Movement, which was formally established in Belgrade in 1961, grew out of the Asian–African Conference in Bandung in 1955, which in turn was influenced by the First International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism held in Brussels in 1927 (Prasad 1962: 79–99). In fact, India's Jawaharlal Nehru was a key participant in all three: Brussels, Bandung, and Belgrade. Regional dynamics and institutions such as the Organization of American States, Arab League, and Organization of African Unity drew inspiration from the pan-American, pan-Arab, and pan-African ideals and movements respectively of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Pan-nationalism and regional identity

When it comes to foundational contributions to contemporary IR theory from the periphery, ideational currents and issues of identity are of special importance; hence the special relevance of constructivism in studying them. Lacking in material power, leaders and intellectuals from the colonies turned to ideas and identity-building as the 'weapons of the weak' to develop a voice in world affairs (Puchala 1995: 151). In particular, IR thinking in the colonies developed alongside anti-colonial and pan-nationalist movements, such as pan-Americanism, pan-Africanism, pan-Asianism, and pan-Arabism. These complemented, rather than conflicted with, nationalist movements. While the dominant spur to Western IR scholarship during the field's founding years might have been the First World War, anti-imperialism served the same function for intellectuals in the colonies in the development of their internationalist thought. While some Western texts on IR ignored or disparaged pan-nationalist ideas as a form of 'racial nationalism' (Buell 1925: 91–2), they contained visions about organizing the world and the region and served as the basis for developing the norms of conduct in international relations (Acharya 2009; 2011b). In so doing, these movements contained a variety of positions, including some that could be roughly identified with realism and liberalism, and often tried to reconcile nationalism with internationalism.

In Asia, Sun Yat-sen (1941) of China distinguished between the rule of 'Right', that is, by good principles of friendliness and reciprocity, and that of 'Might'. Associating the latter with European materialism and militarism, he urged Japan not to develop pan-Asianism through empire, but through ethics, righteousness, and benevolence. In Japan, while one strand of pan-Asianism was used to justify Japanese imperialism, others such as the ideas of Okakura (1903) promoted an egalitarian and cosmopolitan vision. Chinese intellectual Liang Qichao and the Asian Solidarity Society invoked Filipino nationalist José Rizal (Karl 1998: 1106) in promoting a non-Sino-centric vision of pan-nationalism. In Latin America, although efforts to develop a pan-American movement from the nineteenth century included the United States, the overall ethos of pan-Americanism was anti-hegemonic in nature, similar to the other pan-nationalist movements across the globe. In Latin America's case, the objectives included countering US hegemony and the Monroe Doctrine. Pan-Africanism, initially developed by leaders of African descent in the United States and the Caribbean, such as Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. Du Bois, did not just restrict itself to anticolonialism or racial discrimination against black people, but also espoused larger concerns and causes in international relations. Du Bois' invocation of the 'problem of the color line' was not only an internal problem of the United States but a larger problem for the whole world, including Africans in Africa. A series of Pan-African Conferences starting with London in 1900 pushed for decolonization and racial justice as universal aspirations.

In the Middle East, pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism played a key role in shaping international thought. Pan-Arabism had both secular and religious roots. The former included attempts by Syrian and Lebanese Christian Arabs to develop the Arabic language for education and literature. The latter involved attempts by Muslims to restore Arab glory by invoking the past greatness of Islam. It remained a secular nationalist movement especially with British support for the Arabs against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. But pan-Islamic movements also emerged during the late nineteenth century as a way of countering European encroachments into the Islamic world. In contrast to pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism

was concerned with the erosion of Islamic values, and rejected Westernization and secularism. A key figure in pan-Islamic thought was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97), a Persian-born journalist and political activist, who advocated a modernized Islam as the means to fight Western dominance (Kedourie 2018) that would inspire subsequent generations of Islamic Nationalists in South Asia (including Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah), Egypt, and Turkey (Mishra 2012: 46–123).

Universalism, international organization, and world order

This strain of internationalist thought in the non-Western world may have some affinities with liberalism. A leading example of universalist thought would be the ideas of India's Rabindranath Tagore, who denounced the 'idea of the nation' which led countries to engage in 'virulent self-seeking [behaviour] without being in the least aware of its moral perversion' (Tagore 2002: 98). Tagore warned during a visit to Japan in 1916 that nationalism bred competition, or a 'survival of the fittest' mindset, or an extreme version of the self-help principle: 'Help yourself, and never heed what it costs to others' (ibid.: 33) and a 'persistent misrepresentation of other races . . . thus continually brewing evil menace towards neighbours and nations other than their own' (ibid.: 35). Moreover, 'nations who sedulously cultivate moral blindness as the cult of patriotism will end their existence in a sudden and violent death' (ibid.: 34). Whereas Tagore criticized extreme devotion to nationalism, Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru reconciled internationalism with their leadership of India's nationalist movement. In 1924, Gandhi stated that 'the better mind of the world desired not absolutely independent states warring one against another, but a federation of friendly interdependent states' (cited in Prabhu 2017). In an essay written in 1944, Nehru rejected Nicholas Spykman's ideas (which had echoes in Walter Lippmann and Winston Churchill) that the postwar world order be organized around regional security systems under great power 'orbits'. Nehru characterized them as 'a continuation of power politics on a vaster scale . . . it is difficult to see how he [Lippmann] can see world peace or co-operation emerging out of it' (Nehru 2003: 539). Instead, he advanced the notion of a 'commonwealth of states', or a 'world association'. Later, he would expand on these ideas, urging a foreign policy of keeping 'away from the power politics of groups . . . which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disaster of an even vaster scale', and expressing optimism that 'in spite of its rivalries and hatreds and inner conflicts, moves inevitably towards closer cooperation and the building up of a world of commonwealth' were possible (cited in Mani 2004: 66).

Aside from universal organization, regionalism and regional organizations were advocated by leaders from Latin America, Asia, and the Arab world as a practical approach to challenges to peace and security, since regional groups would have a better understanding of regional conflicts than a distant UN Security Council and be in a better position to provide assistance and mediation. Thanks to Latin American advocacy, supported by Arab League member states, the UN Charter formally recognized the role of regional organizations as instruments of conflict control and peaceful settlement of local disputes. Aside from regionalism, Latin American countries championed human rights before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and had developed a tradition of human rights as a regional norm through institution-building before the European Union (EU) was conceived. These Latin American initiatives included the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico City in 1945 (The Chapultepec Conference). Three years later, twenty-one American countries signed the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man at Bogota, Colombia, in April 1948, seven months before the passage of the UDHR on 10 December 1948, which was clearly influenced by the former.

In addition, leaders from the postcolonial world conceptualized different configurations of position and power in world politics, such as Nehru's advocacy of 'non-involvement' (later non-alignment) and 'area of peace', Sukarno's contrast between the reactionary Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS) comprising the Western imperial powers and the progressive bloc of New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) in the postcolonial world, and Mao's Three Worlds theory, which differentiated between the superpowers, developing nations, and marginalized countries (Acharya and Buzan 2019: 166–67).

Rules and norms: sovereignty and non-intervention

Here, contributions from Latin America are particularly significant. Latin America adapted and extended the doctrines of *uti possidetis juris*, or honouring inherited boundaries, and non-intervention, both of which had originated in Europe. The former respected the Spanish empire's administrative boundaries (Dominguez 2007: 90), while the latter challenged US hegemony in the region. Also significant were the Calvo and Drago Doctrines. Argentine diplomat Carlos Calvo in 1868 asserted the authority of the host nation, rather than the foreign investing nation, to settle disputes related to foreign investment, while the Doctrine of Argentine Foreign Minister Luis María Drago in 1902 rejected the right of the United States and European powers to intervene to force states to honour their sovereign debts (Dominguez 2007: 92). Another contribution was the concept of declarative statehood contained in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States that was adopted at the Pan-American Conference in Montevideo in 1933. This convention codified in international law, perhaps for the first time, the definitional components of the state in IR: population, territory, government, and recognition. This is related to the concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Realism and realpolitik

Well before Carr's attack on utopianism, and at a time when Indian nationalists were preaching both resistance to Western colonialism and the unity of the world, Indian political scientists were drawing upon the recently discovered *Arthasastra* by Kautilya to lay out a doctrine of realpolitik. Indian scholar Benoy Kumar Sarkar laid out some key ideas about international relations drawing from classic Indian texts. For example, the Hindu concept of Matsya-Nyaya (the Logic of the Fish), contained in several Indian texts, both secular and religious, including the epic *Mahabharata*, the *Arthasastra*, the *Manu Samhita* (the Code of Manu), and the *Ramayana*, explained the creation of the state from the state of nature. The *Mahabharata* holds that in the absence of a state or ruler with the authority to punish, society will be governed by the logic of the fish whereby 'the stronger would devour the weak like fishes in water' (cited in Sarkar 1921: 80). Moreover, the same logic also applied to international relations. Invoking the *Arthasastra*, he wrote: 'In the absence of the wielder of punishment the powerful swallows the powerless' (ibid.: 81).

The early Japanese scholarship corresponded with the rise of Japan in international affairs as a great power and sought to understand Japan's place in the world, but was not entirely Japan-centric. For instance, the early scholarship was distinct from imperial Japanese policy of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that emerged in the 1930s. Indeed, the increasing predominance of these imperial policies retarded the growth of academic IR, which was suppressed by the authorities (Kawata and Ninomiya 1964: 194). But like most places, Japanese international thought was eclectic. In Japan, interwar international thought was strongly influenced by the German Staatslehre and Marxist traditions (Inoguchi 2007).

Lacking China's or India's 'deep past' for IR theory development, Japan has looked to ideas from its recent past, such as the Staatslehre tradition, which greatly influenced military and colonial studies in the prewar period and remained strong in a metamorphosed form even after 1945. The development of IR in Japan has been a mixed bag of foreign influence and national circumstance. A strong influence was Marxism, especially from the 1920s through the 1960s. Japanese IR scholarship was also shaped by other European social scientific thinkers, such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Leon Walras, and Alfred Marshall. Key individual figures of Japanese IR include Kitaro Nishida, Shigejiro Tabata, and Yoshitaro Hirano. Inoguchi likens Nishida's thoughts to constructivism, which philosophized on Japanese identity in international relations at a time when Japan was struggling to find its rightful place between the East and the West. Tabata's contribution focused on international law theory, presupposing the natural freedom of individuals. Hirano was an economist placing regional integration higher than state sovereignty (Inoguchi 2007, 2009).

Underdevelopment and political economy

In keeping with the radical tradition in international political economy, the 'drain' theory proposed by Indian intellectual Dadabhai Naoroji examined statistically the net national profit of India and concluded that most of India's wealth was being 'drained' by Britain, both by inhibiting the development of industry in India and by making the colony pay for the massive civil and administrative costs involved in maintaining the empire (Ganguli 1965). During the interwar period, Latin American thinkers foreshadowed Dependencia (Helleiner and Rosales 2017). Peruvian thinkers, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui La Chira, rejected the universal validity of European ideas, including Marxism, and criticized the lack of sensitivity to regional conditions in Latin America (or what both called 'Indoamerica') in the application of European political ideas. Mariátegui was especially concerned with Peru's heavy reliance on commodity exports controlled by foreign interests and hence its vulnerability to fluctuations in commodity prices. Both called for an 'Indoamerican' economic nationalism and development approach that incorporated the interests and values of marginalized indigenous people. Further work anticipating Dependencia came from Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch, who supported import substitution industrialization and argued for protection of infant industries to allow for local industrialization. Prebisch's work in the 1940s on the causes and remedies of trade imbalances were particularly influential on the international stage because he went on to serve as the head of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) at the time of its formation in 1948, and turned it into a 'launch pad' for his ideas. After this, Prebisch moved on to become the first Director-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and spearheaded the call for a new international economic order that would be more suited to the development needs of the Global South.

In the 1930s, Latin American countries sought to establish an Inter-American Bank (IAB) to facilitate the flow of funds from the United States for the purposes of the development of these countries. While the IAB was stillborn, the proposals for it certainly influenced the US initial drafts of the Bretton Woods institutions of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) (Helleiner 2014). In fact, Helleiner shows how the Latin American countries, along with China and India, were key contributors at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.

The pan-African movement also echoed this note of underdevelopment and inadequate international efforts to address the problem. Interestingly, the First Pan-African Conference in 1900 was attended by Dadabhai Naroji, the originator of the 'drain theory' of British imperialism. W. E. B. Du Bois, who was a key figure in the pan-African movement, moved between advocating for 'black capitalism' and more socialist and Marxist-oriented ideas about the institutionalized difference in development of blacks and whites.

Just as the pre-Second World War period was an incubator of ideas about IR in the West, so it was in the periphery. Contributions from the periphery did not simply imitate the West, but were independently developed and forward-looking. Tagore's critique of nationalism long predated British intellectual Arnold Toynbee's. These not only critiqued imperialism, such as Naoroji's drain theory or C. L. R. James' argument for decolonizing the West Indies, and organized national and regional anti-colonial movements (e.g. Garvey's pan-Africanism). They also contributed to the critique of Western thought, as seen in the critiques of Marxism by Haya and Mariátegui, C. L. R. James of Trinidad, and M. N. Roy of India. Finally, many contributors to international thinking from the periphery combined political activism and leadership with intellectual explorations and analysis, with some of the most prominent examples being Gandhi, Rizal, al-Afghani, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, Garvey, and James (and subsequently Eric Williams of Trinidad, Walter Rodney and Chedi Jagan of Guyana, and Michael Manley of Jamaica). Moreover, there were interactions, and influencing; Tagore influenced Mahatma Gandhi, and Garvey influenced C. L. R. James, who would influence Kwame Nkrumah.

Americanization and its discontents

Case study: IR theories and world order

As the centre of gravity of IR moved to the United States after the Second World War, realism and liberalism offered different perspectives on continuity and change in the world order. Among the influential realist contribution to world order was the neorealist claim that bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity. Whether the leading neorealist scholar, Waltz (1964, 1979), took stability to mean the durability of the bipolar system as well as peace in the system, he failed on both counts.[5] The bipolarity disappeared faster than anticipated, and while the Cold War produced stability in Europe, it aggravated rivalry and violence in the Third World (see the 'featured book' box on Mohammed

(continued)

Ayoob's *Third World Security Predicament*), which accounted for more than ninety-eight per cent of all international conflicts between 1945 and 1986 (Luard 1986: Appendix 5).

Unlike realists, liberals imagined the post-Second World War order as a 'hierarchical system . . . built on both American power dominance and liberal principles of governance', in which the 'Weaker and secondary states were given institutionalized access to the exercise of American power' while 'The United States provided public goods and operated within a loose system of multilateral rules and institutions' (Ikenberry 2011: 7). Yet, like the neorealist claim for bipolarity, liberals also predicted longevity for the liberal hegemonic order. If anything, 'the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies and pressures for liberal international order' (ibid.: 6), and this would 'support a continued—if renegotiated—American hegemonic role' (ibid.: 9).

The election of Donald Trump was a major wake-up call to the liberals.[6] Trump's America First policy, his rejection of globalism, attack on free trade, admiration for populist strongmen leaders, and cutting back of US support for multilateralism, justified such fears. Yet Trump is the consequence rather than the cause of the decline of the Liberal International Order (LIO) (Acharya 2018). Even before Trump's entry into the US Presidential election, the fragility of the Liberal International Order had been apparent. It functioned more like a 'club of the West', its benefits accruing mainly to the members of the club, and its proponents exaggerated the element of consent and stability while downplaying its coercive and conflict-causing aspects.

The LIO was already fraying before the 2016 US Presidential election, especially due to the global powershift featuring the rise of new powers such as China and India and their misgivings about its institutional architecture that remained skewed in the favour of Western powers. Liberal hopes that it might co-opt the rising powers that have benefited from it proved too optimistic; while China might support the economic pillar of the liberal order (free trade), it was hardly likely to support its political aspects (democracy and human rights).

In short, neither the neorealist nor the liberal account offered a truly *global* perspective on international relations that reflected the positions and concerns of all its constituents, especially those who lived outside the West. A Global IR perspective challenges such perspectives, and stresses other actors and determinants of world order that would capture the broader forces at work in reshaping world politics and order.

What about other IR theories? The English School paid attention to the Global South but in markedly Eurocentric terms, at least initially, considering decolonization as a disruptive force and minimizing the Global South's agency in building world order. While constructivism allowed more space for considering ideational forces of the kind that Third World actors could deploy to a greater degree than material power, it also put a premium on Western ideas and agents in producing normative change. Critical theory, including postmodernism and poststructuralism, challenged neorealism and neoliberalism as epistemologically narrow and politically repressive, and espoused an emancipatory view of world politics and order that recognized the role of marginalized groups. But they relied too heavily on European, especially French, philosophy and epistemology. One of the major contributions to IR theory from the Global South, dependency theory, focused too much on material economic relations, and gave little space to the role of culture, ideas, and identity (important for the Global South) as well as issues of race and gender. Feminism offered crucial insights into the nature and dynamics of marginalization, but there remained a rift between Western feminists and their postcolonial counterparts from the Global South, who found the former overbearing and patronizing. Postcolonialism exposed the lingering legacy of inequality and injustice created by Western colonialism in the international system and highlighted resistance to it, but gave scant recognition to the positive agency of the Global South in the construction of world order. Yet these pushbacks against the Americanization of IR did make a significant contribution towards broadening

the debate on the nature of the postwar order and the prospects for its transformation, a contribution that the Global IR approach recognizes and draws from.

Today, mainstream IR theorists, realist or liberal, are once again ignoring the broader global forces shaping the twenty-first-century world order. Most of them see the emerging world order as a return to multipolarity, a concept that traditionally revolves around material power, Great Power agency, and their global influence, more or less. Thus, multipolarity is 'a system in which power is distributed at least among 3 significant poles concentrating wealth and/or military capabilities' and in which each of these poles is 'capable of producing order or generating disorder [to] influence . . . global outcomes beyond its own borders' (Zaki Laidi, no date). Moreover, to many, multipolarity has a deep association with pre-Second World War Europe; hence its historical referent point is a balance of power system, that also featured colonialism, trade manipulation, and Great Power Concert. Today, there is a far greater variety of actors and wider bases of interdependence: trade, finance, production networks, transnational threats, sans colonialism.

In such a world, power distribution or the number of poles may not be the sole or even the main determinant of world order. Different from this is the idea of a decentred and pluralistic world order whose defining feature is better described as *multiplexity* rather than *multipolarity*. This is a world without a hegemon, culturally and politically diverse yet economically and functionally interdependent, where the ability to generate order or disorder to influence global outcomes lies not just with great powers, but also non-state actors such as institutions, corporations, extremists, and social movements using material and ideational resources. In this world, liberal elements such as complex interdependence and US-inspired multilateral institutions remain, but global governance is increasingly diversified and less beholden to US or Western power and purpose and draws upon a range of ideas and leadership concerning security, governance, and development. Multiplexity also means a growing prominence of regional powers and orders, working towards both stability and conflict.

Case study questions

1. What are the weaknesses of realist and liberal understandings of international order?

2. What can Global IR perspectives bring to the table in understanding order and change in international politics?

🛈 Featured book

Mohammed Ayoob (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

This book brings together the major contributions of Mohammed Ayoob (1986, 1988, 1995), an Indian-born scholar whose student and professional career spanned India, the United States, Australia, and Singapore, in challenging the dominant concept of 'national security' and offering a theoretical framework for analysing the problems of conflict and instability in the Third World (Global South) that would foreshadow the agenda of security studies.

Emerging in the United States after the Second World War, the concept of national security denoted the ability of a state to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity from external military threats. Ayoob argued that while this understanding might describe the security concerns and responses of the Western countries, it was a poor fit for the Third World, for whom the major challenges to security came from *within* their borders, not from outside.

According to Ayoob, 'issues of regional security in the developed world are defined primarily in Cold War terms (NATO versus Warsaw Pact, etc.) and are, therefore, largely indivisible from issues of systemic security'. Yet 'the salient regional security issues in the Third World have a life of their own independent of superpower rivalry' (Ayoob 1986: 15). The security predicament of the Third World should receive greater attention, since it 'It is in the Third World that most instances of international violence have taken place since the end of World War II' (Ayoob 1988: 1).

What were then the principal sources of insecurity in the Third World? Ayoob identified two key sources. The first is the poor fit between the idea of the 'nation-state' and the ethno-political composition of societies. Most Third World states lack 'unconditional legitimacy', or the 'capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their inhabitants with the post-colonial structures that have emerged within colonially-dictated boundaries' (ibid.: 9–10). Second, the concept of national security made no distinction between the security of the 'state' and that of the 'regime' which presides over the state. Yet, when it comes to the Third World, 'In the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and in the absence of open political debate and contest, many of these states are ruled by regimes with narrow support bases—both politically and socially . . . Since it is these regimes . . . who define the threats to the security of their respective states, it is no wonder that they define it primarily in terms of regime security rather than the security of the society as a whole' (ibid.: 11).

Ayoob also challenged the view, popularized by neorealists such as Waltz, that the Cold War brought stability and order to the world as a whole. In Europe, the fear of the catastrophic escalation potential of any East–West confrontation prevented even the most minor form of warfare between the two power blocs. In the Third World, local and regional conflicts were not only deemed more 'permissible', but superpower intervention in them might also have served as a necessary 'safety valve' not available in the European context (ibid.: 14). Hence, ensuring the stability of the central strategic balance rendered a great deal of Third World conflicts necessary, as the superpowers viewed these conflicts 'as a way of letting off steam which helps to cool the temperature around the core issues which are directly relevant and considered vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system' (ibid.).

Finally, Ayoob's work provided a guide for analysing global insecurity after the Cold War. Some Western realists such as Van Evera (1999) dismissed the need for paying attention to the Third World in US foreign policy and national security, while Walt (1991) argued against a broadening of security studies to take into account problems other than war. But as the danger of East–West conflict diminished, the problems of state failure and regime struggle proliferated around the world, including in East and Central Europe, and emerged as major challenges to the security of the West, forcing a redefinition of the whole paradigm of national security and the agenda of security studies. In other words, the security predicament of the periphery became the core problem of global security in the post-Cold War era, just as Ayoob had earlier recognized.

Ayoob coined the term 'Subaltern Realism', drawing himself apart from the postcolonial scholarship despite its similarities with his approach. Subaltern realism kept realism's focus on the state and the primacy of politics, but redefined and enriched it with insights from the Third World. This illustrates an important aspect of Global IR, which does not reject existing theories, but calls upon them to shed their ethnocentrism and enrich themselves with insights into the dynamics of non-Western societies.

Fragmentation or globalization?

Since the Second World War, there has been a growth of IR around the world. What is the relationship between these regional and national perspectives on IR and the discipline? Can they address the gaps in Western IR theories? Will they lead to fragmentation of the discipline or facilitate its globalization? In addressing these questions, let me offer five main observations.

Growing interest in theory

In many parts of the Global South, IR studies began with the purpose of training diplomats and maintained a close nexus with foreign policy-making. This led to an emphasis on producing practical knowledge and foreign policy advice. To some observers, the Global South remains a consumer, not producer, of IR theories, in a 'division of labour' with the West which does most of the theoretical work, while the latter acts as a source of data or 'local knowledge' (Tickner and Wæver 2009a: 335; Tickner 2009: 36). A major exception is postcolonialism, which has displaced dependency as a theoretical contribution from the Global South.

But this tells only part of a complex picture. While the decline of dependency theory since the 1970s onwards has weakened Latin American IR's theoretical contribution, the region has offered concepts such as autonomy (Tickner 2009: 33). Ayoob's subaltern realism (which is state-centric), Escudé's concept of 'peripheral realism' (which stresses the role of non-state actors (cited in Tickner 2003a: 332)), Yan's (2011) 'moral realism' (which stresses that international stability depends not on material power or norms, but on the quality of leadership exercised by great powers), and Qin's (2018) relational theory (which stresses relationality over rationality in shaping world politics) should not be dismissed as slogans, but viewed as serious efforts to expand and enrich traditional realism and especially neorealism.

Much theoretical work in the Global South features middle-range theories, such as those related to balance of power, interdependence, institutions, or norm diffusions, thus reflecting a general trend in IR theory in recent years. But these works tend to be more contextually grounded (Acharya 2009) and do possess cross-national applicability. Turkish scholars both within and outside Turkey offer a good example of this approach, such as Rumelili (2004) on identity, Zarakol (2011, 2014) on stigmatization, and Kayaoğlu's (2010) work on extraterritoriality, drawing upon the European role in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China. In Iran, where IR before the revolution lacked methodological and theoretical rigour and focused on realism, with new approaches and schools of thought reaching the country only after the revolution, there is growing attention to theory (especially beyond realism) and methodology, and adoption of competing conceptual frameworks in understanding their country's foreign policy. In China, work on grand theory is emerging, a leading example being Tang's (2013) 'Social Evolution' approach, which argues that no single theory is valid across all time, and that IR theories, especially realism and liberalism, 'are appropriate to different phases of history' (Buzan 2013: 1304).

With the fall of communism, the IR community in the former Soviet Union and the communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe found more space to engage with a wider range of themes and theories. In Russia, interest emerged in globalization, regionalism, transnational challenges, and European integration, while liberalism and constructivism found footholds alongside realism and geopolitics (Lebedeva 2004: 275, 278). IR in East and Central European states in the post-communist era turned more towards Europe and the United States, with the emerging scholarship heavily influenced by Western theories and scholarship and financial support (Drulák, Karlas, and Königová 2009: 243).

Dominance does not mean deference

The dominance of Western authors in journal articles (Kristensen 2015) or syllabi offerings (Colgan 2016) does not necessarily translate into acceptance of their theories' explanatory power or normative appeal. Indeed, there is an overwhelming sense that scholars outside

the Western core find traditional theories unable to understand or explain local realities. In Asia, this has meant rejecting Eurocentric models of regional integration as well as neorealist predictions about multipolar rivalry. While some Russian scholars accept the relevance of Western IR theory, others reject it or argue that it needs to be interpreted according to Russian traditions, conditions, and identity. African scholars see traditional IR theory as a force for marginalizing Africa due to an 'arrogant assumption that it lacks meaningful politics', and uses Africa as the 'Other for the construction of the mythical Western Self' (Dunn 2001: 3). Out of Africa have come some of the most powerful arguments against the universality of the Westphalian state and national borders to the neglect of sub-state actors (Malaquias 2001: 27). The true 'structures of authority, sovereignty and governance' in Africa belong to 'warlords, non-governmental organizations or ethnic groups' (Smith 2012: 28). Instead of focusing on national security, African IR scholars have called for more attention to non-state actors and transnational challenges such as refugee crises, corruption, poor governance, authoritarianism, underdevelopment, food insecurity, HIV/AIDS, debt crises, gender, and environmental issues (Ofuho 2009: 76).

Localization and subsidiarity

A good deal of theoretical work in the Global South does not reject Western theories entirely, but provides the impulse for hybridity and novelty by marrying local concepts and conditions with outside ideas. This is consistent with the processes of localization and subsidiarity (Acharya 2004, 2009, 2011a). When Latin American IR scholars found imported IR theories deficient in explaining local reality, instead of completely abandoning them, they did 'hybridization', or the '"creative incorporation" of traditional IR principles into regional analyses of international relations', leading to the 'fusion of concepts from dependency theory, realism, and interdependence . . . that became fundamental to the analysis of global issues in many countries of the region' (Tickner 2003a: 331). African IR has both adopted and adapted Western IR concepts and theories, reflecting a divide between those who favour Western-based universalist frameworks and African-based contextualist ones (Ofuho 2009: 74). Global South scholars marry indigenous cultural and political concepts with imported ones to give them a more universal framing. As a global survey of IR by Tickner and Wæver (2009a: 338) concludes: 'International Relations the world over is clearly shaped by Western IR. And yet, the situation is certainly not one of "uniformity" and the "same," precisely because Western IR translates into something different when it travels to the periphery.' This may account for why so much non-Western IR appears 'almost the same [as Western IR] but not quite' (Bilgin 2008: 19–20).

Focus on agency

IR theorizing in the periphery is marked by a growing attention to agency. The case of African scholarship is instructive. It points to areas where Africa's contributions are especially visible and relevant, such as regionalism, security management, and Africa's relations with the outside world. African scholars (van Wyk 2016: 113–17) point to such examples of African agency as the successful international campaign against apartheid and providing leadership in the creation of international regimes such as the Kimberley process on blood diamonds.

Unlike in the past, the new discourse on African agency is not exclusively about 'African solutions to African problems'. Rather it covers a range of 'contributions in which Africans define the terms for understanding the issues and set the terms for the nature and scope of outside involvement' (Bischoff, Aning, and Acharya 2016a: 1–2). There is a tendency to emphasize a collectivist worldview over individualist ones (ibid.: 16), and collective action that has been suggested by political and intellectual leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah (Adebajo and Landsberg 2001) and Ali Mazrui (1967). Also noteworthy are the contributions by African leaders and diplomats, such as Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, Salim Ahmed Salim, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Francis Deng, in producing a global shift of attitude from the old doctrine of non-intervention to humanitarian intervention (Swart 2016) and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Acharya 2013).

Emergence of national and regional schools

There is ongoing discussion of how to bring about a Global IR by incorporating ideas and approaches from national, regional, and civilizational contexts other than Europe, the US, or the West. These include drawing upon the classical texts and traditions, the ideas of nationalist leaders and activists, distinctive regional or local patterns of international or foreign policy behaviour, and the writings of scholars from different regions (Acharya and Buzan 2007; Acharya and Buzan 2010). Lately, IR scholarship in some parts of the world is responding to global power shift as evident in recent theoretical work in China, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, and India. In China, the focus on theory has shifted from that of a socialist state to China as a rising global power. This is accompanied by a cultural or civilizational 'turn' whereby Chinese scholars are drawing on Chinese civilization, including Confucianism, the concept of *Tianxia* ('all under heaven'), schools of thought during the pre-Qin period (Yan 2010), relationality, and the tributary system (Qin 2010). In India, there is a less pronounced but visible interest in classical Indian texts such as the epic *Mahabharata* (Narlikar and Narlikar 2014; Datta-Ray 2015), the *Dharma* (righteousness) of Maurya ruler Ashoka, and the secular *Arthashastra* (Gautam 2015) to explain foreign policy and strategic choices. Without a classical tradition, Russian IR scholarship is addressing the question of whether Russia can recover its identity as a long-standing member of the European great power system, or develop a distinctive Russian identity vis-à-vis the West. While Islam's relevance for IR theory-building may seem problematic because of its rejection of the nation-state, others see this as an opportunity for developing alternatives including that based on community social relations and drawing on classical sources such as Qur'an, Hadith, Sunnah, and the *itjihad* (Tadjbakhsh 2010: 176–7).

Lack of space precludes a more detailed assessment of how various traditions from different parts of the world are entering into the discourse and vocabulary of IR, but a quick look at some of the scholarship from areas as diverse as China, India, Turkey, and Latin America points to a mixed outcome; while some of the scholarship from these parts of the world remain within existing Western paradigms, they also offer new concepts that have remained unnoticed or undertheorized in the past (those from China, India, or the Islamic world).[7]

The growing theoretical turn outside the IR core does not support either the emergence of any uniform non-Western or Global South perspective or, in most cases, national or regional 'schools of IR'. A key barrier to this is the sheer diversity of narratives and approaches between and within regions and even countries. Different regions have

stressed different core narratives; for example, dependency, hegemony, and autonomy for Latin America, marginalization and agency for Africa, and civilizational pasts, colonial humiliation, and rising status in Asia. Some places such as Israel (Kacowicz 2009: 192–3) and South Korea are marked by strong Western influences. Differences are also rife within regions and countries. African IR scholarship combines modernization, *dependencia*, and statist perspectives. In Latin America, the core ideas of dependency and autonomy have not spurred a Latin American school of IR, at least not at the expense of realism, liberalism, and Marxism (Frasson-Quenoz 2015: 72).

The very different trajectories taken by IR scholarship in Japan, China, and India make the prospects for any Asian School of IR an impossibility (Alagappa 2011). Despite much talk of a 'Chinese school' (Qin 2010), the idea is resisted by other IR scholars (such as Yan 2011). While a shared interest in pacifism, economic interdependence, regionalism (especially in the Asia-Pacific), and the idea of comprehensive security (later human security) have shaped a good deal of Japanese IR scholarship, it has not produced any meaningful move towards a distinctive Japanese School of IR. In India, there exists a plurality of thinking on global order (Bajpai 2003); with realist (Sisir Gupta), liberal internationalist (Appadorai), and postcolonialist (Ashis Nandy) elements (Mallavarapu 2018: 169–70), that precludes any single Indian School of IR (Behera 2010; Mallavarapu 2009).

There is also a concern that national schools might engender intellectual isolation of their proponents and fragmentation of the IR field. For example, Africa has been posited as the source of new or alternative thinking in IR (Dunn 2001: 6), the foundation for a different type of international system (Claassen 2011: 182), and the possible source of a distinctive IR theory based on the African intellectuals' return to pre-colonial and primordial political reality. But others have cautioned that this might lead to a 'further marginalization' of Africa (ibid: 181). Instead, 'African voices and contributions should have a global resonance and can be brought to the core of the discipline of IR' (Bischoff, Aning, and Acharya 2016a: 2). Some Russian IR scholars see multipolarity and civilization as the basis for developing a 'non-Western' Russian approach to IR, or even a school of IR (Makarychev and Morozov 2013: 329, 335). But this has been opposed by others for preventing the development of a broader global agenda in IR scholarship (ibid.: 339, 345).

From a Global IR perspective, national or regional schools of IR can add to the richness and diversity of IR in general while avoiding the risk of fragmenting the discipline if they address a number of concerns. First, they should be able to travel beyond the country or the region from which they originate and offer a more general framework for analysing world affairs. Second, and related to the above, they should attract and engage a critical mass of scholars within and beyond the country or the region of their origin. Third, they should generate a vibrant research agenda, meaning they should be taken up and applied by other scholars, especially students and a new generation of scholars to develop their own research and theoretical contribution. Fourth, they should enjoy some longevity, and not turn out to be a passing fad. Last but not the least, they should maintain some distance from the official policy of the country from which they emerge. This caution is applicable not just to non-Western scholars developing national or regional approaches, but also to Western IR intellectuals who advise governments and whose intellectual stance sometimes turns out to be apologies for the government of the day.

This chapter's space constraints prevent a fuller discussion of the considerable barriers to the realization of a Global IR, such as limited research and teaching capacity outside the Western core, the latter's intellectual gatekeeping through institutions and publication outlets, and the persistence of a Gramscian hegemony that perpetuates IR's foundational myth and that Western IR has already found adequate and right answers to the key questions of world politics (Acharya and Buzan 2007). But as the foregoing shows, some of these barriers are weakening. At the same time, the criticism that Global IR might lead to a fragmentation of the discipline is misplaced. This is not to say that the growth of IR outside the West will not be marked by some shared national or regional features. Indeed, this is already the case within 'Western' IR. But regionalization, contrary to a critique of the Global IR approach, does not necessarily mean a fragmentation of the field along national or regional lines. If anything, it would provide greater opportunity for closer two-way engagement with Western IR theories, providing one of the most promising avenues for moving IR away from its racist and colonial origins, and turning it increasingly, if incompletely, into a global enterprise. Regionalization and globalization might well complement each other.

Questions

1. What is the foundational myth of IR, and how has it been challenged?

2. What is 'pluralistic universalism' in IR theory and how can it be related to IR's call for 'theoretical pluralism'?

3. Can contributions to IR from the Global South be associated with traditional schools of thought in IR? Does Global IR complement or contest existing IR theories?

4. Critically discuss the contributions of any region from the Global South to IR theory and practice.

5. Are theories with local origins suitable solely for explaining and understanding the international relations of the concerned region or can they also be applied globally to other regions?

6. Is the liberal world order in inevitable decline? What is the role of the West and the Global South in maintaining/challenging the liberal order?

7. Using the example of security studies, and taking into consideration Ayoob's contribution, what advantages and pitfalls do you see in globalizing the IR discipline?

For additional material and resources, including web links, flashcard glossary, revision guide, and pointers on answering case study questions, please visit the Online Resources www.oup.com/he/Dunne-Kurki-Smith5e

Further reading

Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (eds) (2010), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (London: Routledge).

A collection that examines the multiple traditions of IR in Asia and explores the region's potential as a source of and contributor to IR theory, both complementing and furthering Western IR theory.

Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (2019), *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
    A detailed historical account of the conceptual and institutional development of IR, paying particular attention to the heretofore neglected contributions of the Global South. The book argues that adopting a truly global perspective of its origins and evolution is the way forward for IR.

Ayoob, M. (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
    A vanguard work that proposes a theory of IR, 'subaltern realism', that better captures the security problems and perspectives of postcolonial Third World states than traditional realism.

Bull, H. and Watson, A. (eds) (1984), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
    A renowned edited volume that analyses, from an English School perspective, how the international society of European states expanded to the whole world, eventually leading to the emergence of the contemporary international system.

Dunne, T. and Reus-Smit, C. (eds) (2017), *The Globalization of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
    One of the first books to explicitly identify with Global IR, this edited volume showcases the global origins of international society, exploring the contributions of non-European peoples and societies, and focuses on contestation as a key theme that exemplifies the historical and contemporary development of international society.

Ling, L. H. M. (2014), *The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge).
    An alternative, postcolonial-feminist approach to International Relations that borrows from Asian traditions of Buddhism and Daoism to understand world politics, showing how folk tales and popular culture are as important to IR as are liberal internationalist norms, rules, and practices.

Tickner, A. B. and Wæver, O. (eds) (2009a), *International Relations Scholarship Around the World* (Abingdon: Routledge).
    A worldwide survey that details the similar and diverse ways in which IR has developed in the different countries of the Global South.

Notes

1. In challenging creationism, Ibn Rushd (Averroes cited in Lyons 2009: 182) held that 'Denial of cause implies denial of knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies nothing in this world can be really known'.

2. This is not to say that Global IR has no affinity with postcolonial or decolonial approaches, which stress Eurocentrism of IR. Global IR affirms Krishna's (2012) contention that, in the emergence of IR as a discipline, 'power and knowledge were inextricably intertwined, and that "western" descriptions of the non-west were never innocent of their own political, economic and other interests in those spaces', and that the United States, the postwar colossus of the discipline, was itself a settler colony and a colonizer. Global IR also stresses the ignoring of colonialism, imperialism, race, and other forms of marginalized identity in the mainstream literature of IR (Jones 2006: book description; Acharya 2014). Moreover, Global IR's suggested ways of redefining IR include broadening its theoretical scope to bring in non-Western ideas, histories, and scholarship. This predates and supports a 2018 conference on the subject ('Inaugural Conference on "Decolonizing" International Relations', 2018), with the stated objective of expanding the 'theoretical scope and policy implications' of IR, 'to include non-Western/Eurocentric perspectives and experiences into the cannon of international relations', and 'to highlight and celebrate' the work of non-Western scholars. Here I take the decolonial approach as having close affinity with

postcolonialism, albeit with greater contributions from Latin America (compared to postcolonialism's distinctive South Asian intellectual heritage), and giving more focus to the creation of a Eurocentric modernity through settler colonial dynamics from the late fifteenth century onwards (Bhambra 2014: 115, 119). By strongly questioning Eurocentric narratives of IR, including those produced through European colonialism, the Global IR approach supports both postcolonial and decolonial perspectives, although Global IR also looks at pre-European colonial period as a source of IR thinking and theorising.

3. This is not a new concern. Western dominance is a fact and exists in both mainstream and critical theories (Acharya 2000). But considering Eurocentric frameworks as dominant and critiquing them do not necessarily reproduce Eurocentrism in IR, as feared by some (Alejandro 2018: 181). The challenge lies not only in identifying the Eurocentric or ethnocentric assumptions of existing theories, but identifying new concepts and approaches from non-Western or local contexts which are absent or silenced in the IR literature. Global IR not only seeks out such alternative or 'local' sources of knowledge, but also explores the two-way circulation between global and local ideas and practices (Acharya 2014: 654).

4. In keeping with the caveats against privileging existing theories or IR mentioned at the outset of this chapter, and at the risk of oversimplification and backward projection of contemporary categories, one can associate the first four of these with the central concerns of constructivism, English School, liberalism, and realism respectively, and the fifth with both postcolonialism and dependency theory.

5. While there is some debate over Waltz's contention that bipolarity is more stable than what he called a 'multipower' system, it is clear that Waltz took stability to mean both durability and peacefulness. As he put it, 'stability [is] measured by the peacefulness of adjustment within the international system and by the durability of the system itself' (Waltz 1964: 881). Neorealists like Mearsheimer (1990) have argued (despite his more nuanced view in Chapter 4 of this volume) that the end of the Cold War meant a heightened risk of international conflicts and violence.

6. A prime example is the special issue of *Foreign Affairs* (2017), a premier Western publication on world affairs which had completely missed foreseeing the serious challenges to the LIO until Trump's victory.

7. Two recent examples, both from China, would be Qin's (2018) 'Relational Theory', and Yan's (2018) 'Moral Realism', which engage constructivism and realism respectively, but do offer new insights and concepts previously undertheorized.