grigorij meseZ¡ Nikov:
National Populism in Slovakia – Defining the
Character of the State and Interpreting Select
Historic Events
National Populism and the Context of its Existence in Slovakia
In recent years, political players in Slovakia have grown increasingly fond
of such patterns of appealing to the electorate that are based on applying
populism strategies with strong ethnic-nationalist undertones. This way of
addressing voters became typical for the country’s political life quite some
time ago. Since the 1989 collapse of the communist regime and reinstatement
of pluralistic democracy, it has proven to be sufficiently effective and
at times brought ample power and political gains to its upholders. The
recent revival of national populism is interesting especially because the conditions
for its existence are quite different compared to the mid-1990s –
they are characterized by generally successful social transformation that
helped build foundations of a liberal-democratic regime and achieve the
country’s integration goals, i.e. its full-fledged membership in the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO).
The term of “national populism” is generally used to describe political
activity (in the multitude of its displays) that focuses on addressing voters
via traditional populistic methods1
while accentuating strong ethnic-nationalist
(‘national’) chords. It applies to a broad spectrum of political players,
i.e. not only to supporters of extremist, radical and nationalistic ideas but
to all those politicians of various ideological affiliations (including declared
ones) whose preferred modus operandi combines populist appeal and ethnic
nationalism.
It is obvious that the prime mover behind recent activation of national
populism forces in Slovakia was the power change that took place after the
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2006 parliamentary elections when new government was formed by the
coalition of SMER–Social Democracy (SMER-SD) – Slovak National Party
(SNS) – People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), i.e.
three political subjects that view various elements of national populism as
part and parcel of their ideological and political arsenal. These parties’ combined
election result and their leaders’ subsequent decision to form a new
ruling coalition cannot be perceived outside the context of national populism
as a tool of voter mobilization and a cultural and political bond that
binds part of Slovakia’s party elite. The working of the national-populism
appeal during the period of 2006–2009 has affected the overall atmosphere
within society and significantly shaped the environment for mutual interactions
between various social groups.
When examining activities of political players that are considered protagonists
of national populism in Slovakia, one ought to bear in mind general
factors of socio-political as well as historical nature. It was long-term
working of these factors that formed the socio-cultural environment in
which national populists disseminated their messages and capitalized on
people’s response to them. Besides ethnicity-related issues they also included
other socio-political factors such as constitutional system Slovakia was
part of, types of political regimes in these constitutional systems, the character,
course and implications of social changes that occurred during periods
of government and societal transformation, the definition of statehood
and general pattern of power execution preferred by dominant political
forces, etc. In the course of the 20th
century, Slovakia formed part of five
different constitutional systems: Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovak
Republic, wartime Slovak State, restored Czechoslovak Republic and independent
Slovak Republic. These systems were home to different political
regimes, including monarchist semi-authoritarianism, pluralistic democracy,
fascist totalitarianism, restricted ‘national’ democracy, communist totalitarianism
and alternate regimes of liberal and non-liberal democracy between 1990
and 2006. Frequent changes in the system of government and political regime
within a relatively short historical period have caused a different degree of
various population groups’ self-identification with existing and/or obsolete
social order, including their self-identification with particular government formations;
at the same time, these population groups demonstrated their allegiance
to opposing types of political culture (i.e. democratic vs. authoritarian),
which immediately influenced their political behaviour as well as political
players’ preferred strategies of addressing them.
Following the collapse of communist regime in 1989 and subsequent
restoration of democratic regime with all procedural attributes, including
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electoral competition, political forces that are viewed as populist based on
their internal character, program, values, ideological background and preferred
methods of voter mobilization became an important part of the country’s
party system. Since 1992, these forces have regularly posted solid
results in parliamentary elections and – in case of favourable power configuration
– formed coalition governments that relied on majority in parliament.
Such was the case in 1992 when the HZDS formed a majority crypto-coalition
government with the SNS (that turned into overt coalition a
year later); in 1994 when early elections brought to power the coalition of
HZDS – ZRS – SNS; and finally in 2006 when the incumbent administration
was formed by the coalition of SMER-SD – SNS – ¼S-HZDS.
The general approach to power execution may be viewed as the basic
criterion to distinguish between different protagonists of populist politics in
Slovakia; based on this typology, one may identify ‘hard’ (authoritarian)
and ‘soft’ (prevailingly non-authoritarian) populism. In early stages of transformation,
i.e. before the process of EU integration was launched,
Slovakia’s political landscape generated the first generation of populist
politicians (i.e. ‘hard’ populists gathered at the time in the HZDS and SNS);
the second generation of populists began to emerge during the period of
reviving the country’s integration ambitions (i.e. between 1998 and 2002)
and gained its political foothold immediately before and after Slovakia’s EU
accession when ‘soft’ populists (SMER-SD) became a dominant political
force.2
The contemporary period may be characterized by mutual cooperation
between both generations and types of populist actors; in 2006, their
cooperation was upgraded to the government level.
Protagonists of National Populism
A typical representative of national populism in Slovakia is the Slovak
National Party (SNS). The party was founded in spring 1990 by the means
of publicly subscribing to the legacy of the historic SNS; several months
later, in the first free parliamentary elections in the country’s modern history,
it received enough votes to qualify to the national parliament, the
Slovak National Council. It has evolved into a relevant political subject and
has been represented in parliament ever since 1990, except for the hiatus
between 2002 and 2006 when it remained outside the assembly due to an
internal rift that led to a defeat in the 2002 elections.
Between 1990 and 1992, the party was the weightiest political representative
of Slovak separatism. Relatively soon after it emerged and entered
parliament, it began to champion the idea of Slovakia’s state sovereignty.
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Between 1993 and 1994, between 1994 and 1998 and after the 2006 elections
it was part of government, which enabled it to participate in shaping
policies in all relevant areas of public life. It is a radical nationalistic force
that uses far-right and anti-communist rhetoric. It is a sworn opponent of
the concept of civically defined political nation and advocates the concept
of ethnic nation. The SNS views the Slovak Republic as a national state of
ethnic Slovaks; with respect to ethnic minorities, it promotes the concept of
assimilation that manifests primarily – but is not limited to – in a priori
questioning ethnic Hungarians’ loyalty to the Slovak Republic. On the ‘theoretical’
level, this shows through questioning the fact that ethnic
Hungarians living in Slovakia are of truly Hungarian origin; in practice, it
shows through proposing measures that complicate practical exercise of ethnic
Hungarians’ rights in the field of political representation, use of language,
education, culture, regional development and maintaining ties with
Hungary, which ethnic Hungarians consider their motherland in terms of
culture and language. In the mid-1990s, the SNS unsuccessfully campaigned
to introduce the system of so-called alternative education for children
belonging to ethnic minorities. Its practical implementation would have
amounted to an irreparable decline in the standard of exercising minority
rights with all sorts of political implications.
SNS representatives have become notorious for using confrontational
rhetoric and aggressive tone; they regularly utter offensive statements with
respect to members of ethnic minorities and their political representatives.
The party appeals to people with proclivity to nationalist views and authoritarian
concepts of society’s political organization.
Another political subject that can be considered a protagonist of national
populism in Slovakia is the People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS). The party was founded in spring 1991 as a result of
internal rift within Public against Violence (VPN), a revolutionary and
reformist movement that was the architect of peacefully toppling the communist
regime in 1989 and won in the first free parliamentary elections in
June 1990. The initiators of the split led by then Prime Minister Vladimír
Meèiar advocated a model of transformation different from the ‘federal’
model that was implemented in Slovakia between 1990 and 1992 by VPN
and its coalition partners. Eventually they founded the HZDS that immediately
gained political support, especially among those voters who were disenchanted
by the course of the transformation process. Another item on the
movement’s political agenda and an important factor behind its strong voter
support was the issue of dissolving the Czechoslovak Federation. The
HZDS profiled itself as the promoter of Slovaks’ ‘national aspirations’ and
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proposed solutions to Czechoslovakia’s constitutional system that went
beyond the framework of the existing federative model. After scoring a
resounding success in the 1992 elections, the HZDS became the principal
political force behind the ‘velvet divorce’ in Slovakia; ever since 1993, it
has portrayed itself as “the architect of Slovak statehood”.
Ever since its emergence, the HZDS presented itself as a “nationally oriented”
and “pro-Slovak” political force. In the most flagrant form, its
‘national’ orientation was furthered by a group of party leaders whose views
regarding issues such as interethnic relations, the country’s history, the government’s
character, etc. were not essentially different from those shared by
SNS leaders. Between 1992 and 1998, this group of HZDS officials enjoyed
the broadest space to pursue their activities and influence the party’s actions
as well as its program and ideological profile. Between 1994 and 1998, the
HZDS was the backbone of the ruling coalition whose authoritarian methods
were incompatible with values of liberal democracy, which caused serious
democratic deficits in the country’s internal development and undermined
its integration aspirations. By 1998, though, the nationalist wing
began to lose its grip due to gradual electoral and general political debilitation
of the HZDS. Eight years in the opposition brought about a dramatic
decline in voter support and forced the party to regroup. Eventually, the
‘nationally oriented’ wing was elbowed out of the party; however, the
departure of nationalist leaders and authentic upholders of the ‘national’
agenda does not mean that the HZDS cannot be considered a party of
national populism anymore.
The third important representative of national populism in Slovakia is
SMER–Social Democracy (SMER-SD) that declares its social-democratic orientation.
The party was founded in 1999 by Robert Fico, former ViceChairman
of the Party of Democratic Left (SD¼) who refused to toe the party
line and moved on to fulfil his own political and leadership ambitions.
SMER-SD has covered a remarkable journey since its founding, moving
from the initial concept of a “non-ideological party of pragmatic solutions”
to a third-way party that according to its leaders amalgamated values
of conservatism, social democracy and liberalism (yet later those of
“leftists, social democrats and national liberals”) and finally to a party with
proclaimed social-democratic profile. From the very outset, the nationalist
element has been popular among SMER-SD leaders. It has manifested
through their adoption of “pro-Slovak” (i.e. pro-national) positions on issues
concerning interethnic and international relations, interpretation of various
historic events and figures, general perception of society’s development
after the fall of communism and pursued alliance strategies. When seeking
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a viable ideological anchor, party leaders did not hesitate to use nationalist
arguments. For instance Boris Zala, former party vice-chairman and one of
its principal ideologists wrote in 2002 that the third way concept (i.e. the
party’s new ideology) according to SMER-SD included a “renewed search
for national meaning and historical anchoring of Slovakness”.3
SMER-SD earned parliamentary representation in the 2002 parliamentary
elections. Between 2002 and 2006, it behaved as an implacable opposition
force that criticized all relevant socio-economic reform measures
adopted by the centre-right administration. It promised to carry out fundamental
changes once it would seize power. Its communication with voters,
sweeping criticism of government’s performance and proposed measures to
tackle existing problems all showed clear traces of populism. Messages of
nationalistic nature formed an integral part of the party’s mobilization
strategies. The party confirmed its ‘pro-national’ orientation by cooperating
with nationalistic-oriented subjects before presidential and regional elections
in 2004.
The decision of SMER-SD to form a new administration with the SNS
and the ¼S-HZDS after the 2006 elections was catalyzed primarily by
power ambitions. Leaders of SMER-SD tried to justify the decision by the
motivation to create favourable conditions for implementation of socio-economic
policies based on social-democratic values (e.g. building the welfare
state).
According to SMER-SD leaders, the Robert Fico administration pursues
social-democratic policies while its coalition partners endorse these policies
and even adapt their own priorities to them. In fact, two minor ruling parties
actively pursue their own ideas in several areas, which in the case of
radically nationalist SNS leads to direct attempts to meddle with the established
system of minority rights’ implementation, for instance in the field
of education and use of native languages. Government participation of the
SNS allows its leaders as well as representatives of related opinion streams
to take an active part in the public discourse and sway it toward strengthening
the concept of ethnic nationalism. This leads to a general change in
overall social atmosphere, including the area of interethnic relations.
There was one more relevant subject of the populist type on Slovakia’s
political scene, namely the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) that was
part of the ruling coalition between 1994 and 1998. Describing this party
as a typical protagonist of national populism would be little far-fetched,
mostly because the element of ethnic nationalism was largely absent from
its program profile, its voter mobilization strategies and its practical performance.
Nevertheless, it was a populist political subject that attracted votGrigorij
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ers mostly by emphasizing social issues, opposing systemic changes within
society after the fall of communism in general and liberal economic reforms
in particular and sharing nostalgia for “socially just” society before
November 1989. In terms of orientation the ZRS resembled a far-left organization
of the neo-communist type, this despite the absence of references to
the communist or Marx-Leninist ideology from its program documents and
its leaders’ public statements. Although the ZRS was not a typical national
populism subject, its participation in government alongside the HZDS
and SNS created favourable conditions for implementation of policies of
national populism.
The actual stance of national populists on various types of mutual interactions
(i.e. dialogue or conflict) between particular social groups in
Slovakia is not only reflected in their positions on issues concerning ethnic
minorities (although this is where ethnic nationalism is manifested the most
vividly) but also on issues such as understanding the fabric of society,
defining the character of the system of government, choosing the concept
of nation, tackling the dichotomy of ‘ethnic’ vs. ‘civil’, general harmony
between the political creed and liberal-democratic values and interpretation
of national history, including perception of particular historical periods,
events and figures.
Defining the Character of the State
Between 1994 and 1998, during the reign of ‘hard’ populists from the ruling
coalition of HZDS – ZRS – SNS, leading protagonists of national populism
strove to emphasize their exceptional role in the process of founding
independent Slovakia, a special value of the national state, Slovakia’s state
independence as the top social priority, and superiority of interests of government
and its institutions over those of individuals. At this point, emergence
of the independent Slovak Republic was quite a recent history and
the process of building state institutions had not yet been fully completed.
The degree of Slovak citizens’ self-identification with their recentlyemerged
country was relatively low; furthermore, for a significant part of
the population the acceptance of former Czechoslovakia’s dissolution was
mixed with frustration over their own incapacity to put through a different
solution to the constitutional system issue during the period of 1990–1992.
These sentiments were multiplied by authoritarian domestic politics of the
Vladimír Meèiar administration that inspired anxiety and provoked protests,
especially among people professing pro-democratic values. Members of ethNational
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nic minorities, particularly ethnic Hungarians, were discouraged from
endorsing the new country by nationalism that was manifested on the level
of state minority policy in the field of education, culture and use of native
languages.
The mentioned circumstances and phenomena created within society
favourable conditions for emergence and growth of mass displays of disagreement,
protests and support for alternative political concepts. Although
representatives of then-ruling parties proclaimed their respect for democratic
principles and standards, political practice often contradicted these declarations.
Symptomatic in this context was their justification of power measures
that flew in the face of democratic standards and traditions as well as
arguments they used to dismiss criticism (coming both from within and
abroad) the Meèiar administration faced for its authoritarian practices.
Ruling politicians tried to raise among citizens a permanent sense of
threat to the fundaments of Slovak statehood; they often put this danger in
the context with activities of domestic political opponents, particularly parliamentary
opposition and independent media. Relatively shortly after seizing
power in the early elections of 1994, the SNS and HZDS came up with
an idea of adopting a special act that was supposed to protect state and its
institutions as part of the penal law. In fact, it was motivated by the intention
to punish citizens who participated in opposition political activities,
championed different political concepts including a different understanding
of power execution and spread abroad such information on the country’s
internal development the incumbent administration considered “false” or
“untrue”. In April 1996, Prime Minister and HZDS Chairman Vladimír
Meèiar said in justification of the necessity to pass a “law on the protection
of the republic” (an amendment to the Criminal Code) that Slovakia
needed such legislation due to “permanent and intensifying assaults on government
organs that are designed to bring about their moral and political
disintegration and discredit them in the eyes of the public regardless of
facts”.4
The proposed amendment to the Criminal Code even sought to protect
the state against opinions ruling parties viewed as “unreasonable” and
aimed “against statehood”. Parliament Chairman Ivan Gašparoviè (HZDS)
declared that Slovakia is “truly a small and young state that needs to have
certain defence systems in the beginning that would eliminate those not
always reasonable opinions of some people who within young Slovakia
seek to materialize certain measures that are aimed against statehood of the
Slovak Republic”.5
MP Kamil Haapka (SNS) seconded this view by saying
that his party considered it inevitable to put through such legislative
measures that should prevent “displays of bias and questioning of Slovak
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statehood, unjustified attacks against emergence and existence of the state,
its territorial integrity and democratic constitutional system”.6
Representatives of national-populist parties saw threats to Slovak statehood
even in attempts to provide critical information on Slovakia’s internal
situation abroad. For instance, MP Dušan Slobodník (HZDS) accused
domestic political opposition and independent media that their criticism of
government, particularly “criticism insidiously communicated abroad is an
attempt to destroy Slovak statehood”.7
SNS Chairman Ján Slota expanded
the list of people potentially targeted by the act on the protection of the
republic to include representatives of Hungarian political parties in Slovakia
and “other high representatives of Slovak politics” who “very often express
themselves in a way that has nothing to do with the fact that they would
have a positive relation to the state”.8
During a party meeting in April 1996, one of HZDS prominent representatives
Augustín Marián Húska served a thorough idea about the values
on which the HZDS based its activities when building the new state following
its emergence in 1993. In his speech, Húska enumerated “seven
virtues” of the HZDS that had allegedly predetermined its success in building
Slovakia anew. According to him, they included “brilliant improvisation”,
“complex providence and program creativity”, “ability to capitalize
on intergeneration synergy”, “rootedness in national identity”, “rootedness
in spiritual experience”, “ability to forge social solidarity” and “ability to
forge Slovakia’s capital-generation layer”9
. The said list of ‘virtues’ was
completely free of any references to values that would indicate orientation
on developing the state’s democratic character.
According to Húska, the independent Slovak Republic emerged as an
“unwanted child of superpowers” and the West’s criticism of Slovakia’s
internal situation had to do with a thousand year-old struggle over the
important space in the centre of Europe.10
HZDS Chairman Meèiar repeatedly
called for social unity (“unification”) that according to him entailed
“especially acknowledging the basic needs of the nation and state we live
in and mutually respecting these interests everywhere”.11
In 1997, Meèiar
said that “state interests prevail over interests of parties, groups and persons;
they must be complied with and furthered everywhere in the world”.12
The SNS emphasized that Slovakia’s independent statehood should be
guided by its own original understanding of democracy as opposed to concepts
imported from abroad. On the occasion of the 7th
anniversary of overthrowing
the communist regime, SNS Vice-Chairperson Anna Malíková
declared: “The meaning of November 89 is to preserve free, critical and –
most of all – original way of thinking so that we are able to prevent othNational
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ers from telling us what is and what is not correct or democratic … The
principal challenge for the future is to defend an independent and sovereign
Slovakia and build it in a way we imagined it to be”.13
According to the
SNS, “the most tangible” and “historically most valuable” outcome of the
regime change from 1989 was the split of former Czechoslovakia that followed
and the subsequent emergence of the independent Slovak Republic,
i.e. exercising the Slovak nation’s right of self-determination.14
When interpreting interests of the state, HZDS representatives always
liked to point out that their political subject was their authentic upholder, not
only as the initiator of processes that eventually led to emergence of independent
Slovakia but also as a political subject that enjoyed the highest voter
support. According to this interpretation, activities by opposition forces or any
opponents of the government should be perceived as “hostile to the state”.
SNS leaders embraced identical argumentation. Their party could not boast
such a massive voter support as the HZDS could at the time; however, they
strove to emphasize the fact that the SNS was the first political subject in
Slovakia to further the concept of Slovakia’s state independence after
November 1989 and therefore it was the true upholder of “national values”.
Along the same lines, SNS representatives often dismissed criticism from
their political and ideological opponents as “anti-national”.
While the ZRS, the second largest ruling party in the period of
1994–1998, lacked any detailed concept of Slovakia’s statehood, it always
advertised its reluctance to embrace fundamental changes introduced after
1989, including the democratic regime. In fact, ZRS leaders viewed various
social problems and negative social phenomena as a direct consequence
of the regime change. “Our young Slovak Republic is just being born and
that’s why we struggle with many problems. We create laws and develop
the economy, but democracy has brought us a lot of misfortune to us,” ZRS
Chairman Ján ¼upták said in 1997.15
“All November 17 means is that we
have paid too big a toll for freedom of speech and democracy in the welfare
area … This nation had to learn the hard way and that’s why we don’t
subscribe so much to [the ideas] they proclaimed on the streets … After
all, November means nothing to me.”16
The anti-capitalist profile of the ZRS
was manifested especially through efforts to halt the process of denationalizing
economy, particularly privatization of so-called strategic enterprises.
The party appealed mostly to people with etatist, egalitarian and anti-freemarket
views; however, the ZRS electorate was not sufficiently stable and
its strongly submissive position in the coalition with the HZDS and SNS
was one of principal reasons behind its defeat in the 1998 parliamentary
elections.
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The attitude to power execution all ruling parties shared between 1994
and 1998 largely stemmed from their preferred model of governance; this
understanding became the main driving force behind serious democratic
deficits that eventually dashed the country’s integration ambitions, led to
society’s political polarization and strengthened confrontation between principal
political forces. These deficits motivated democratically-oriented citizens
to increase their participation in the 1998 parliamentary elections. High
voter mobilization contributed to changing the political landscape and forming
a ruling coalition that comprised non-populist, non-nationalist and prodemocratic
parties. For almost eight years that followed (i.e. 1998–2006),
national populism parties were banned from the executive.
The key factor that laid the ground for national populists’ mutual cooperation
after the 2006 elections was that in terms of preferred governance
model and political regime, all three parties of the incumbent ruling coalition
– SMER-SD, SNS and HZDS – may be described as etatist parties,
although etatism in their activities shows to a different degree and is differently
accentuated.
SMER-SD openly subscribes to etatism as the foundation of its political
profile and advocates government’s strong role in a number of areas;
etatist paternalism of SMER-SD was fully exposed in a symptomatic statement
by its chairman Robert Fico who said at the beginning of 2008 that
government should be “the father of all citizens”, just like the church is the
“mother for believers”.17
The SNS considers an independent Slovak state to
be the greatest social value and embodiment of long-term emancipation
ambitions of the Slovak nation. The HZDS also emphasizes the importance
of independent Slovak statehood; besides, it claims special credit for direct
participation in the process of establishing it in 1993.
All ruling parties’ positions on the character of the state are affected by
ethnic and nationalist approach (i.e. obvious preference of the national principle
over the civic one) as well as tendencies to mythologize history, the
appropriation syndrome and negligence of issues related to the type of
regime, quality of democracy, liberal-democratic foundation of Slovakia’s
constitutional system and importance of abiding by the principles of constitutional
liberalism. Some measures the SNS proposed to ensure proper
performance of government’s functions directly contradicted basic principles
of liberal democracy, for instance repeated proposals to pass a repressive
bill on the protection of the republic or to outlaw the party that politically
represents the country’s ethnic Hungarians. Clear inclination to the
concept of national state that is based on the nation’s ethnic definition may
be demonstrated by peculiar notions about the Slovaks’ specific historic role
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that are presented by some SNS leaders; for instance, head of the SNS parliamentary
caucus Rafael Rafaj said that the consumerist Euro-Atlantic (i.e.
Western) culture should be reminded that it has already fulfilled its role in
the spiral of history and that it should now make room for Slavic culture
to carry on the torch of collective consciousness. According to Rafaj, the
chosen nation today is the Slovak nation that is the most moral and politically
sinless.18
Ever since the 2006 parliamentary elections, two ruling parties (SMERSD
and SNS) have striven to strengthen national (or ethnic) elements of the
Slovak statehood on the symbolic level. They do so under the pretext of
inevitability to promote patriotism, Slovak identity, national solidarity, etc.
Already the prime minister, Robert Fico declared in July 2007 that “the
Slovaks lack a national outburst” and that schools neglect education to
patriotism. According to him, Slovakia is being engulfed by “the cancer of
indifference, which is only one step away from national unconsciousness”.19
A display of such indifference was inadequate attention most Slovak media
paid to “patriotic celebrations” of the Day of St. Constantine and
Methodius. At the end of 2007, Fico announced that the cabinet and all ruling
parties would in the coming year focus on “awakening people’s national
consciousness, encouraging their respect for state symbols and deepening
general public’s patriotism and awareness of Slovak history and historical
figures”. “[People’s] relation to the country is unsatisfactory,” Fico
said. “Patriotism does not reach the quality one would expect in a developed
country in the heart of Europe.”20
In the past, Fico demonstrated his patriotic orientation through proposals
to launch a public debate over possible ways to strengthen people’s
patriotism and improve their relation to the Slovak state, Slovak statehood
and its symbols, for instance listening to the national anthem or raising the
national flag at the beginning of each school week. In 2004 he proposed
an amendment to the law on state symbols that sought to install a national
flag in front of every school in Slovakia.
According to SMER-SD and the SNS, encouraging the Slovaks’ patriotism
should take place as the process of distinguishing themselves from
the Hungarians (this aspect is emphasized by the SNS) as well as from nonnationally
oriented and cosmopolitan members of the majority with lukewarm
attitudes to patriotism (this aspect has recently become a favourite
issue of SMER-SD). This philosophy may be illustrated by Fico’s statement
from July 2008 in which he emphasized the need to strengthen togetherness
(“solidarity”) of the Slovaks that must be built as a “sturdy barrier
against activities of the peculiar sort of adventurers who undermine
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Slovakia’s spiritual integrity”.21
In 2007, Fico publicly complained that
Slovak media have become a shelter for “spiritual homeless [and] media
kibitzers who are unable to identify with their homeland’s fate or find their
state identity”.22
Typical for this interpretation are efforts to combine ethnic,
social and constitutional elements. A good example of this combination
was Fico’s public scolding of Sme, a daily that takes a critical approach
to his administration, as “anti-government, anti-national and anti-people”.23
Dividing the Slovaks into true, nationally-oriented ones and those who inadequately
identify themselves with independent Slovakia is typical of all parties
of the incumbent administration.
In 2000 Fico admitted he “was not happy about splitting Czechoslovakia
that had it all going [as a country]” and de facto distinguished himself from
the category of active protagonists of dissolving it (i.e. the ‘true Slovaks’)24
;
nine years later, though, SMER-SD leaders have succumbed to so-called
appropriation syndrome that previously afflicted mostly SNS and HZDS
representatives; symptoms of this syndrome include glorifying all those who
initiated and conducted the process of dissolving former Czechoslovakia,
criticizing all those who at the time advocated the common Czechoslovak
state and disparaging all the problems that accompanied the process of
founding independent Slovakia, particularly those caused by authoritarian
practices between 1994 and 1998. In 2002, SMER-SD Vice-Chairman
Dušan Èaploviè publicly expressed regret over the fact that on the occasion
of the 10th
anniversary of independent Slovakia’s emergence, the Dzurinda
administration proposed to bestow high state honours also to personalities
that not only did not embrace the concept of independent Slovakia but they
“actively opposed it and some of them demonstratively moved abroad after-
wards”.25
This view was seconded by HZDS Chairman Vladimír Meèiar
who publicly complained in 2002 that “a significant proportion of constitutional
posts are held by those who did not want the Slovak Republic as
an independent country”.26
According to Fico, loyalty to national values is an irreplaceable factor
determining a country’s survival in the modern world. “The only chance to
survive in this complicated and unjust environment with dignity and sovereignty
is to stick to Slovak national and state interests and pull together,
whether we are on the right, on the left or in the middle,” Fico declared.
“I hereby call on [embracing] such togetherness.”27
Fico also said it was
“our duty [to build] Slovak pride” and encouraged the Slovaks to draw
inspiration from “the Russians whose pride was restored by President
Putin”. To a follow-up question reminding him that Russia suffers from a
democratic deficit, Fico responded by saying that he did not know what
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national pride had to do with democracy.28
The formulation indicates that
in the process of building the state, the incumbent prime minister views the
national (or ethnic) element to be much more important than the quality (or
democratic substance) of the regime.
In November 2007, SMER-SD issued an official statement that placed
the Velvet Revolution of 1989 in the context with the Slovaks’ yearning
for state independence,29
this despite the fact that social turmoil in
November 1989 was completely free of such undertones; in fact, apart from
general opposition to the totalitarian regime, citizens showed mostly support
for the common Czechoslovak state and ‘return to Europe’.
For the SNS, the use of ‘patriotic’ motives forms an integral part of its
confrontational desire to distinguish the Slovaks particularly from the
Hungarians. This may be illustrated by the ongoing process of installing
typical Slovak double crosses in various regions of Slovakia, including
localities inhabited by mixed Slovak–Hungarian population. According to
party leaders, the goal of the entire campaign is to show “the whole world
that the Slovak nation is autochthonous on this territory, so that it is clear
to everybody where Slovakia is and who is at home here.”30
The element of confrontation is also obvious in party leaders’ references
to the Constantine-Methodist tradition as the foundation of the Slovaks’
statehood and identity. The SNS emphasizes the Slovaks’ exclusive ‘patent’
to this tradition and juxtaposes it to other cultural traditions, including those
that form the foundation of integration groupings Slovakia is part of.
According to SNS leaders, “the Constantine-Methodist tradition is the oldest
and the most solid part of the Slovaks’ identity. The Slovaks are ahead
of other nations because the Constantine–Methodist legacy amalgamated in
them both eastern and western values of European thinking. The existence
of the Slovak Republic shows that the Constantine-Methodist tradition is
stronger than Hungarian chauvinism, Prague-invented Czechoslovakism or
communist dictatorship.”31
In 2005, SNS Chairman Ján Slota declared that had the ConstantineMethodist
tradition been upheld in Slovakia, its national economy would
not have been massively sold out “to foreign hands”. Slota called Slovak
politicians “vassals who pledge their allegiance to further unspecified EuroAtlantic
values”, adding it was necessary to apply on an everyday basis the
message of the mission of St. Constantine and Methodius, which is to
“defend the Slovak land permanently”.32
The SNS is the most active of all Slovak parties in fuelling the sense
of danger to Slovak statehood and proposing such measures to defend it
whose repressive nature contradicts basic principles of liberal democracy.
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One of its favourite legislative measures is so-called ‘bill on the protection
of the republic’. The SNS comes up with some form of the bill in every
opportune moment, citing the need to neutralize consequences of Hungarian
politicians’ activities in Slovakia; the last time the SNS proposed such a
bill was in 2008. In the same year, Slota emphasized the principle of ethnic
solidarity as the foundation to build mutual relations between citizens
and government by stating that Slovak media were obliged to speak of
Slovakia being threatened by Hungarians: “Is this democracy to give a bad
name to one’s compatriots and one’s nation and give a good name to those
strangers who clearly wish to harm the interests of this nation and this
country?”33
Interpretation of Select Historic Events
In their interpretation of national history, national populists tend to mythologize
and ethnicize history, present the titular nation as older than it is,
place its ethnogenesis as far back in history as possible, show clear inclination
to positive evaluation of authoritarian historic figures and a tendency
to favourable evaluation of historic periods in which the nation was ruled
by authoritarian regimes. National populists reproach critics of the said
mythologizing approach, including representatives of established academic
circles, for insufficient national orientation and attempt to question their
professional credibility.
Premier Fico described his administration’s attitude to the issue of
Slovakia’s history as cultivating “sound historicism as part of government
policy” with respect to those who underrate the “national” element in history.
“Unfortunately, we live in a reality where so-called spin doctors consider
everything Slovak good enough to disparage it,” he said.34
In 2008, SMER-SD chairman attempted to introduce the term of
“ancient Slovaks” to the public and professional historical discourse.
According to him, “ancient Slovaks” led by King Svätopluk ruled over the
Great Moravian Empire while “other states had nothing – maybe some animals
wandering around but certainly no state entities”.35
Many academic
historians view the theory of “ancient Slovaks” who inhabited the Great
Moravian Empire as a mythological construct that does not correspond to
findings of historical science.
Fico openly demonstrated his inclination to mythologizing Slovakia’s
history early in 2008 when he defended the historical figure of highwayman
Juraj Janošík and called him the first socialist: “I want to ask the
media not to belittle Slovak legends,” Fico said. “It’s been enough. We
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have but [two options]: either respect the Jánošík tradition or replace the
nation … Anti-Slovakism still dwells as a hidden bacillus in some Slovak
historians. That is why these spiritually homeless people object to a free
discussion over new terminology that speaks of ancient Slovaks or King
Svätopluk.”36
According to Fico, “the media launched an inquisitorial witchhunt
against everything that is Slovak […]. Only spiritually homeless or
nationally ignorant may [strive to] deprive the nation of the legend about
Jánošík who struggled against social oppression.”37
National populists’ inclination to positive perception of “nationally-oriented”
historical figures with an authoritarian profile may be illustrated by
efforts to pass a special law on the merits of Andrej Hlinka, a Catholic
priest and one of the Slovak nation’s principal political leaders in the first
half of the 20th
century. The SNS proposed that Hlinka be officially referred
to as “the father of the nation”. One of the most active protagonists of the
idea to pass the special law on Hlinka was SMER-SD Vice-Chairman and
Minister of Culture Marek Maïariè who declared that Hlinka’s “personality
is unambiguous” and “his merits are extraordinary”. The positive evaluation
of Hlinka would be imposed in an authoritative fashion that, if
enforced in practice, could even restrict freedom of scientific research and
public discussion. Maïariè called voices arguing that Hlinka’s historical
profile deserves detailed discussion “perfidious”, arguing that “Hlinka’s personality
deserves mostly respect”.38
In line with this attitude, the SNS directly
proposed to punish critical evaluation of Hlinka as “defamation of
Hlinka’s name”. The HZDS also supported ‘enacting’ Hlinka’s merits;
according to Chairman Meèiar, his party endorsed the SNS position more
than that of the opposition KDH that submitted a more moderate bill on
Hlinka.
A special place among historic events whose interpretation is particularly
important in terms of impact on Slovakia’s socio-political development
is emergence and existence of the wartime Slovak State. The official state
doctrine of the Slovak Republic is based on the anti-fascist tradition embodied
in the Slovak National Uprising of 1944. The modern Slovak Republic
is considered a successor to the Czechoslovak Federation but neither legal
nor political successor to the wartime Slovak State proclaimed in March
1939; however, a revisionist perception of the period of 1939–1945 has
become part of the country’s public and political discourse regarding the
issue of national history after 1989. An integral part of this perception is
the thesis that the wartime state (also called “the first Slovak Republic”)
was de facto a predecessor of the modern Slovak Republic, efforts to separate
the totalitarian regime established by the fascist Hlinka’s Slovak
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People’s Party (HS¼S) from the state itself, portray life in Slovakia during
this period in a more positive light, disparage the regime’s repressive, undemocratic
and racist character, shift responsibility for perpetrated war crimes,
including deportations of Jews, from domestic actors onto their external
partners (i.e. Nazi Germany) and emphasize the positive role of its president
Jozef Tiso.
The said inclination to favourable perception of the wartime Slovak
State leads to (directly or indirectly) confrontational efforts to distinguish
from certain opinion or identity groups, including people with anti-fascist
and liberal-democratic views, supporters of the common Czechoslovak state,
the Jews, the Roma, the Czechs, non-Catholics, etc. After 1989, principal
upholders of revisionist views of the period of 1939–1945 included nationalistically-oriented
cultural associations and individuals (including some historians),
Matica slovenská, and a significant part of the Catholic Church
leaders; on the level of the country’s party system, it was primarily the
SNS.
The SNS began to advertise its positive views on Slovak statehood from
World War II immediately after its founding in 1990 and furthered them
every time it was part of government (i.e. in 1993–1994, 1994–1998 and
2006–2009). In March 1998 it issued a declaration in honour of founding
the Slovak State in 1939, calling it the beginning of the first sovereign
statehood of the modern Slovak nation. According to the SNS, March 14,
1939, “clearly showed the Christian values to which the Slovak nation must
be anchored”.39
The SNS insisted on introducing The History of Slovakia and the
Slovaks, a history textbook by revisionist historian Milan Ïurica, to primary
schools’ curriculum. SNS Vice-Chairperson Anna Malíková called the book
whose author strove to excuse deportations of Jews during World War II a
“very valuable and objective overview of Slovakia’s history”.40
In April
1998, the SNS publicly called Tiso a “martyr who defended the nation and
Christianity against Bolshevism and liberalism”. Addressing the nature of
Slovakia’s political and constitutional regime between 1939 and 1945, the
party declared: “The concept of harmonizing state of the estates that complied
with social teachings of the Catholic Church with a balancing role of
parliament surpassed European development in the sensitive social area during
this period”.41
In October 1998, SNS Chairman Slota openly called for Tiso’s rehabilitation,
stating: “Those who claim that the wartime Slovak State in
1939–1945 was fascist simply play their mean dirty tricks.”42
Then SNS
spokesman Rafael Rafaj who became the head of the party’s parliamentary
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caucus in 2006 argued it was misleading to use not only the term of ‘clerical
fascism’ but even the term of fascism as such with respect to the
Slovak State’s regime; according to him, the term was made up by the communist
propaganda that used it to refer to “everything that stands against
communism in any way”.43
Perhaps the most overt attempt to excuse the so-called solution to the
Jewish issue during World War II in Slovakia was presented by late MP
Bartolomej Kunc (SNS), former Chairman of the SNS Professional Club for
Christian Policy. In an interview for TV Nova in May 1996, Kunc resorted
to ‘explanatory’ arguments of socio-economic nature by stating: “The
Slovak Republic was not based on racist laws. Those economic aspects that
you apparently have in mind, those were brought to force even before
adopting the Jew Code that later paved the way for such things as deportations.
It was an attempt to correct in some way an unfortunate state of
affairs when too big a share of national wealth was controlled by too few
people – only 3.6 percent of the population. This concentration of wealth
in Jewish hands had its specifics. Those who did not live here and did not
study the issue have no idea about this. The point is that the Slovak people
were exploited and impoverished, which was a way to transfer ownership
of national wealth into the hands of that small group of citizens”.44
In 2000 Slota defended a decision by the Žilina municipal council to
unveil a plaque in honour of Jozef Tiso, arguing that other countries also
honoured their fascist leaders: “In Hungary’s capital [they have a statue of]
Horthy, who was a big time fascist, on a big horse,” Slota said. “All around
Italy you see countless busts of the fascist Mussolini, in Germany and
Austria you see loads of various plaques celebrating or commemorating
Hitler.”45
Two years later, Slota demanded that “all circumstances and true information
on the execution of Tiso be made available to the Slovak public”.
He declared that if political meddling with the trial and abuse of justice is
established, Tiso should be rehabilitated. Slota called conviction and execution
of Tiso a “vendetta” and a “murder commissioned by the Czechs and
communists”.46
Slota came up with a truly peculiar interpretation of the wartime Slovak
State, calling it an important survival factor of the Slovaks. “[This state]
saved the nation from liquidation by German and Hungarian anti-Slavic fascism,”
he said. In 2005, Rafaj declared that “time has come to [proclaim]
and socially accept March 14, 1939, as the date of establishing historically
first Slovak statehood”, placing the wartime Slovak State onto the “continGrigorij
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uum of unchanged endeavour to exercise the nation’s right of self-determination
within its own state”.47
SNS leaders’ positive views of the “first Slovak statehood” were automatically
reflected in their negative perception of the Slovak National
Uprising (SNP). In 2002 Slota declared that the SNP laid the ground for
communist totality and the country’s Soviet satellitization, adding that the
SNP “was abused for 40 years to promote red totality” and that it “has lost
its moral credit”.48
After 2006, official views presented by SNS representatives regarding
the period of 1939–1945 saw a slight shift. While party chairman Slota virtually
avoids making any public comments on the issue, positive views are
most frequently presented by a former emigrant and now MP for SNS Jozef
Rydlo. According to him, Slovakia’s constitutional history did not begin on
September 1, 1992, when the Slovak National Council passed the currently
valid Slovak Constitution but on July 21, 1939, the day of adopting the
constitution of the wartime Slovak State. “Without the first Slovak Republic
there would be no second,” Rydlo said, arguing that the Slovak State’s
political regime should be distinguished from the state itself. Like other
SNS leaders, Rydlo condemns deportations of Jews from Slovakia as abominable
practices; on the other hand, he opposes attempts to disparage the
state as such, reasoning that the former Czechoslovakia was also ruled by
a communist regime. “Nobody questions existence of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic just because it was undemocratic,” he said.49
But the most significant shift in SNS leaders’ interpretation of the World
War II period in recent years may be noticed with respect to the SNP. In
2004 SNS Vice-Chairperson Anna Malíková-Belousovová called the SNP an
act of “the Slovaks’ opposition to fascism” but refused that the move was
aimed against their own state. “The SNP shall enjoy an honourable place in
Slovakia’s history,” she said.50
In August 2006, Belousovová declared that
the SNS took its hat off to hundreds and thousands of victims claimed by
the struggle against “perverted fascist ideology and its upholders”.51
These
statements illustrate SNS leaders’ overall perception of Slovakia’s history
during World War II, which is full of confusing and ambiguous interpretations.
While these statements cannot be qualified as intentional nourishing
of pro-fascist sentiments, they were undoubtedly inspired by efforts to appeal
to those nationalist-oriented voters who view positive perception of ‘the first
Slovak statehood’ as a display of true ‘patriotism’.
On a declaratory level, SMER-SD fully embraces the ideological legacy
of the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising. Its chairman Robert Fico
repeatedly presented public statements in which he unambiguously conNational
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demned “the fascist regime” of the wartime Slovak State led by Tiso as
well as war crimes perpetrated during that period. In order to strengthen his
party’s image of a principled anti-fascist force, Fico declared in 2007 that
he would not have any attempts to revise the government’s official position
on the SNP, claiming that “the cabinet will clamp down on [anybody] questioning
the Slovak National Uprising”.52
However, several serious cracks recently appeared in this seemingly
integrated attitude of SMER-SD. It was not only its government cooperation
with the SNS whose leaders harbour ambiguous views of the wartime
Slovak State. Far more importantly, it was party leaders’ tolerance of the
fact that one MP for SMER-SD co-authored an anthology of odes to Jozef
Tiso and their repeated defence of professional credit of historians who
openly supported his views on particular issues of the Slovaks’ ancient history;
some of them were revisionist historians who openly advertise their
sympathies to the wartime Slovak State and its President Jozef Tiso.
Besides, the unambiguousness of officially declared anti-fascist positions
of SMER-SD has been rendered increasingly relative by the constant support
chairman Fico shows to leaders of Matica slovenská who are the most
vocal members of the opinion stream that demands a revision of the standing
official anti-fascist doctrine in interpretation of the World War II period,
including political rehabilitation of Jozef Tiso.
Although the HZDS has officially subscribed to the SNP legacy since
its founding, some representatives of the party’s nationalist wing between
1991 and 2002 presented apologetic statements regarding the wartime
Slovak State and critical views of the SNP, which put them on the same
platform with upholders of revisionist concepts. For instance, a group of
MPs for HZDS in 1997 visited the parental home of Jozef Tiso in Bytèa.
The visit was supposed to demonstrate the party’s endeavour to evaluate
the president of the wartime Slovak State in a more “balanced” manner in
order to “shed more light [onto his personality] … eliminate various lies
and bias … and assess all his negative but also positive acts with cool
head”.53
In summer 1997, then HZDS spokesman Vladimír Hagara defended the
already mentioned history textbook The History of Slovakia and the Slovaks
that featured actual adoration of the wartime Slovak State and tried to make
light of war crimes its regime perpetrated with respect to Jews, which was
the main reason why the book’s distribution to primary schools was halted
on a request by the European Commission. According to Hagara, Ïurica’s
publication was a “well researched piece of science work that deserves
admiration and respect of all Slovaks”.54
At that time, though, HZDS
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Chairman Vladimír Meèiar openly labelled the wartime Slovak State’s
regime as “fascist”.55
In recent years, ¼S-HZDS tried to avoid the public debate on issues
related to the wartime Slovak State and SNP; occasionally, it releases rather
general and vague statements. “Historians owe us a lot regarding the issue
of [wartime] Slovak State,” Meèiar declared in 2007. He also made light
of the fact that positive views about the wartime Slovak State appeared
increasingly frequently in Slovakia by alleging that “the entire [Czech] cabinet
visited the grave of [Czech Protectorate’s Prime Minister Emil] Hácha
and the entire Hungarian cabinet visited the grave of [Hungary’s Regent
Miklós] Horthy”. According to Meèiar, the issue of “the first Slovak
Republic” should not be turned into an acute political issue.56
SMER-SD leaders’ preference of ethno-national element over the civicdemocratic
one clearly showed on the occasion of commemorating the 90th
anniversary of founding the first Czechoslovak Republic (ÈSR). Party leaders
issued several public statements in which they emphasized that founding
of the Czechoslovak state in 1918 amounted to materialization of the
Slovaks’ emancipation efforts and desires to liberate from “an almost thousand-year
Hungarian hegemony” and terminate “an almost thousand-year
forced coexistence between Slovakia and Hungary”57
and that existence of
the ÈSR allowed for “further development of attributes such as Slovak
nation and Slovak statehood”. The fact that the ÈSR was primarily a state
with a democratic system of government was largely overlooked in public
statements by SMER-SD; while they did positively evaluate “democratic
environment” of the first ÈSR, they simultaneously pointed out that “a failure
to tackle social issues led the first ÈSR into a serious economic crisis
that befell Slovakia in particular”.58
Symptomatic for SMER-SD is its evaluation of the country’s communist
past. Here, the party applies a ‘balanced’ approach that combines general
acknowledgment of the fact that the pre-November regime was undemocratic
with assertions that communism was socially more just and provided
greater social security to citizens. When comparing the existing
regime to the communist one, party leaders tend to emphasize negative phenomena
of the country’s post-November development.
In 2003 Fico declared that the communist regime was more socially-oriented
and that people were better off back then. While acknowledging that
the Velvet Revolution of November 1989 did bring about important political
and civil rights, he claimed that these rights had become merely formal,
which was the biggest disappointment. Fico believes that strong financial
groups and corporations have seized control over Slovakia and that people’s
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standard of living is worse today than it was under the communist regime.
Also, he is convinced that the Velvet Revolution was a classic political
coup d’état that had been prepared long before from the outside – as
opposed to from within Czechoslovakia – and that students and other citizens
were brought to the streets only to make an impression of masses
demanding changes.59
When evaluating certain symbolic events related to the communist
regime (e.g. the anniversary of the communist putsch in February 1948),
SMER-SD opts for ‘emergency exits’ such as a declaration in which the
party claimed that it “looks into the future and leaves evaluation of historical
events up to historians. Everything negative from the past should be
condemned and everything positive should be made an example of”.60
While the party emphasizes positive aspects of particular Slovak protagonists
of the communist regime in specific historical periods (e.g. Gustáv
Husák during the SNP, Vladimír Clementis after World War II when he
was executed by the communist regime or Alexander Dubèek as a leading
figure of the Prague Spring), it tends to avoid addressing more controversial
aspects of their respective political careers.
The HZDS verbally subscribes to the legacy of November 1989 as a
historic event that removed totality and paved the way to restoring democracy
in the country. The HZDS presents itself as a direct successor to political
forces generated by the civic movement that led to toppling the oppressive
communist regime. In 1998, the official website of then-prime minister
Vladimír Meèiar featured information that he was “one of leading personalities
of 1989, which was the landmark of bringing down the communist
regime”. Since the said information was not even remotely true, it was
eventually removed from the website;61
however, the case illustrates that the
HZDS does not hesitate to resort to expedient interpretation of important
historic events that portrays the subject in a better, more ‘democratic’ light
with respect to November 1989.
On the other hand, the HZDS never took the initiative of entering public
debates on various aspects of the country’s development during the period
of communism and never used anti-communist rhetoric. The closest any
HZDS official ever came to criticizing the past regime was MP Ján Cuper
(HZDS) who in 1996 called the communist regime a “failed experiment”.62
During the period of democratic deformations caused by the authoritarian
rule by the populist coalition of HZDS – ZRS – SNS when democratic
opposition pointed out that government’s power practices contradicted basic
democratic principles and values of the Velvet Revolution and organized
protest rallies designed to revive the November legacy, the HZDS
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accused its representatives of “trying to usurp November 17 and score political
points from it”.63
Such diction clearly indicates that the HZDS never
quite embraced the legacy and values of November 1989.
Future Prospects Regarding Activities of National Populists in
Slovakia
Mobilization strategies used by national populists in Slovakia after 1989
have proven sufficiently effective not only in terms of drumming up voter
support and gaining a strong power position but also in the sense of influencing
the public discourse and overall atmosphere in society. Long-term
presence of national populism political forces on the country’s political
landscape gave birth to a certain communication culture that is based on
confrontation and conflict. This culture creates strong division lines between
different population groups by emphasizing their collective identity as a
solid bond used to distinguish themselves from other identity groups. The
said method of political communication complicates the civic dialogue by
its very non-dialogic nature.
On the verbal level, the national-populist appeal shows especially
through confrontational attitudes with respect to members of ethnic minorities
and upholders of different opinions. On the one hand, chief protagonists
of this appeal have toned down their radicalism after the 2006 elections;
on the other hand, patterns of the national-populist appeal have begun
to penetrate the general public discourse on a much more massive scale
compared to the period of 1998–2006. After 2006, national populists
enjoyed a much stronger power position; they strove to use it to transform
their concepts of various aspects of society development into government
policies, including those in the field of education, culture and ethnic minorities.
In other words, upholders of radical nationalistic views gained a chance
to bring their ideological views from the political spectrum’s margin into
its centre.
Naturally, effectiveness of national populists’ mobilization strategies has not
only an ethnic-nationalist dimension but also a social one. Strengthening
populist parties’ position in Slovakia in recent years should be viewed in
the context of socio-economic developments, an area where thorough liberal
reforms were implemented after 1998 but especially between 2002 and
2006. Some population groups’ aversion to these reforms’ social impact
(actual or fictitious) combined with lingering anti-capitalist and anti-liberal
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sentiments created a generally favourable social environment for populists
and elevated to power the segment of the political elite that is appreciated
by voters for its ability to lead confrontational struggles, use militant rhetoric,
expose imaginary enemies and defend collective entities national populists
like to identify themselves with (i.e. people, state or nation). The
nationalist appeal falls quite naturally within this formula.
For quite some time, Slovakia’s public discourse in general and political
discourse in particular has featured elements that do not encourage the
intercultural dialogue. Most importantly, it is deeply rooted vigilance with
respect to the country’s largest ethnic minority that is fuelled by the historical
legacy as well as by contemporary social actors’ efforts to capitalize
on this vigilance on a number of levels (e.g. education, culture, party
politics, international relations and foreign policy, etc.). Secondly, it is the
lingering perception of the national state that is defined purely ethnically.
Thirdly, it is ambivalence in evaluating certain key events of the Slovaks’
national history. Last but not least, it is relatively high voter support for
political forces that use the method of confrontation as the principal tool to
achieve the set goals, including the type of confrontation that has a potential
to mobilize large population groups.
Since the national-populist type of appealing to voters and preference of
confrontation is deeply rooted in all three parties of the incumbent ruling
coalition (particularly in the SNS and SMER-SD), it would be naïve to
expect a real improvement in conditions for intercultural civic dialogue in
Slovakia as long as these parties remain dominant ruling forces. Their evolution
toward more moderate forms of appealing to voters is very unlikely
in this situation; on the contrary, they may further step up their aggressive
rhetoric under certain circumstances (e.g. lingering problems in
Slovak–Hungarian relations, potential social and political turmoil caused by
the world economic crisis or declining voter support). Still, only declining
voter support for national populists may in the long term create favourable
conditions for resuming mutual dialogue and cooperation between representatives
of different social groups.
Notes
1 These methods include appeals to ordinary people via promises to protect their interests
against those who do not care for them in an apparent effort to attract so-called protest
voters; harsh criticism of the political establishment, incumbent administration and established
‘mainstream’ parties for their alleged corruption; unclear program orientation and
proclaiming ‘people’s character’ of one’s own political creed; attempts to appeal to the
broadest possible electorate combined with labelling certainly social groups as ‘isolated’
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from the common folk (e.g. the wealthy, capitalists, sophisticated intellectuals, etc.); egalitarian
motives in addressing voters and generally anti-elitist rhetoric; advertising one’s
own ‘know-how’ to solve existing social maladies; promises of swift changes for the better;
adapting proposed solutions to prevailing public opinion trends, etc.
2 For further information, please see Mesežnikov, Grigorij – Gyárfášová, O¾ga – Bútora,
Martin – Kollár, Miroslav: “Slovakia” in Mesežnikov, Grigorij – Gyárfášová, O¾ga –
Smilov, Daniel (eds.): Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2008).
3 Zala, Boris: “Kam smeruje cesta SMER-u” [‘Where Does SMER’s Path Lead?’], Sme
daily, September 26, 2002.
4 “Vladimír Meèiar tvrdí, že Slovensko potrebuje zákon na ochranu štátu” [‘Vladimír Meèiar
Claims Slovakia Needs State Protection Act’], Sme daily, April 1, 1996.
5 “Pod¾a I. Gašparovièa má Trestný zákon ochráni malú a mladú Slovenskú republiku pred
nerozumným konaním” [‘Criminal Code Is Supposed to Protect Small and Young Slovak
Republic from Imprudent Actions, says I. Gašparoviè’], Národná obroda daily, October
22, 1996.
6 “Pod¾a K. Haapku zo SNS treba predchádza útokom médií proti štátnosti a územnej
celistvosti SR” [‘Media Attacks on Statehood and Territorial Integrity of the Slovak
Republic Should Be Prevented, says K. Haapka of SNS’], Sme daily, October 16, 1996.
7 “D. Slobodník podozrieva opozíciu a èas novinárov z pokusov o deštrukciu slovenskej
štátnosti” [‘D. Slobodník Suspects Opposition, Some Journalists of Attempts to Destroy
Slovak Statehood’], Národná obroda daily, October 4, 1996.
8 “J. Slota: Chceme upozorni na nebezpeèenstvá” [‘J. Slota: We Mean to Warn about
Dangers’], Národná obroda daily, August 17, 1995.
9 Hrabko, Juraj – Kotian, Robert: “Ich záujmy musia by záujmami štátu” [‘Their Interests
Must be Identical with the State’s’], Sme daily, April 3, 1996.
10 Fajèíková, Kveta: “Pod¾a Húsku SR bola nechceným dieaom ve¾mocí, ktoré by nás radšej
videli v košiari” [‘The Slovak Republic Was an Unwanted Child of Superpowers that
Would Rather See It Sheep-Folded, Says Húska’], Sme daily, December 16, 1996.
11 Nemôžeme by abstraktní [‘We Cannot Afford to Be Abstract’], an interview of Nora
Slišková, Pavol Minárik and Ján Škoda with Vladimír Meèiar, Pravda daily, July 4, 1996.
12 “Keï strany prestanú znásilòova štát, niet zábrany, aby všetci mohli by znovu bratia –
tvrdí V. Meèiar” [‘Once Parties Stop Violating the State, There Is No Hindrance to All
People Being Brothers Again, Says V. Meèiar’], Sme daily, June 27, 1997.
13 “SNS: Budujeme Slovensko, aké sme si ho predstavovali” [‘SNS: We Build Slovakia as
We Imagined It’], Národná obroda daily, November 16, 1996.
14 “Za najcennejší výsledok „novembra“ považuje SNS zánik federácie” [‘SNS Views
Dissolution of Federation as the Most Valuable Result of ‘November’’], Sme daily,
November 18, 1996.
15 “Pod¾a J. ¼uptáka demokracia priniesla mnoho nešastia” [‘Democracy Brought a Lot of
Misfortune According to J. ¼upták’], Národná obroda daily, April 17, 1997.
16 “November 1989 bol pre niektorých politikov zážitkom, pre Jána ¼uptáka nièím” [‘Some
Politicians View November 1989 as Experience but to Ján ¼upták It Holds No
Importance’], Sme daily, November 17, 1997.
17 Ulièianska, Zuzana: “Fico: Cirkev matkou, štát otcom” [‘Fico: Mother Church, Father
State’], Sme daily, January 25, 2008.
18 Leško, Marián: “Rafael Rafaj: v službách Jána Slotu” [‘Rafael Rafaj: In Service of Ján
Slota’], Sme daily, May 26, 2008.
19 “Sviatok: Fico na Devíne vyzýval na výchovu k vlastenectvu” [‘Holiday: Fico in Devín
Called on Education to Patriotism’], SITA news agency, July 5, 2007.
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20 “Fico: Kritizuje Slovákov, že nie sú dos vlasteneckí, chce to zmeni” [‘Fico: Criticizes
the Slovaks for Lack of Patriotism, Aims to Change It’], SITA news agency, December
18, 2007.
21 “Politici vyzývali na vlastenectvo” [‘Politicians Appealed on Patriotism’], Sme daily, July
7, 2008.
22 “Fico: V médiách sú duchovní bezdomovci” [‘Fico: Media Home to Spiritual Homeless’],
www.sme.sk, August 29, 2007.
23 “Fico oprášil slovník 50. rokov” [‘Fico Brushed Up 1950s Vocabulary’], Sme daily,
September 19, 2008.
24 “Som pripravený by predsedom vlády” [‘I Am Prepared to Be Prime Minister’], an interview
of Štefan Hríb with Robert Fico, Domino forum weekly, No. 50/2000.
25 “: Sú proti niektorým návrhom na štátne vyznamenania” [‘ Opposes Some State Honour
Nominations’], SITA news agency, December 18, 2002.
26 Slovensko svoje pamätníky má [‘Slovakia Has Its Memorials’], an interview of Hana
Pravdová with ¼S-HZDS Chairman Vladimír Meèiar, Nový deò daily, September 2, 2002.
27 “Fico na oslavách znovu vyzval k zjednoteniu spoloènosti” [‘Fico at Celebration Again
Called for Society’s Unity’], ÈTK news agency, August 29, 2008.
28 “Fico sa pýtal, kto tu žil” [‘Fico Asked Who Lived Here’], Sme daily, April 22, 2008.
29 “Fico: Vláda si ctí výroèie pohybu k demokratizácii a ozajstnej slobode” [‘Fico: Cabinet
Honours Anniversary of Movement toward Democratization and True Freedom’], SITA
news agency, November 16, 2008.
30 Jesenský, Mikuláš: “Slota chce dvojkríže na juhu Slovenska” [‘Slota Wants to DoubleCross
Southern Slovakia’], Sme daily, January 9, 2008.
31 “SNS: Cyrilo-metodská tradícia si zaslúži väèšiu úctu” [‘SNS: Constantine-Methodist
Tradition Deserves Greater Respect’], SITA news agency, July 5, 2003.
32 “SNS: Vyhlásenie SNS k sviatku sv. Cyrila a Metoda” [‘SNS Declaration on Occasion of
Public Holiday to Commemorate St. Constantine and Methodius’], SITA news agency, July
5, 2008.
33 “SNS: Kauza Hedviga je humbug, organizovaný maïarskou tajnou službou” [‘SNS:
Hedviga Case is Humbug Organized by Hungarian Secret Service’], SITA news agency,
July 3, 2008.
34 “Fico: Premiér zapálil v Bánove vatru zvrchovanosti” [‘Fico: Premier Lit Sovereignty
Torch in Bánovo’], SITA news agency, July 18, 2008.
35 Kern, Miroslav: “Vláda a premiér menia dejiny” [‘Cabinet and Premier Alter History’],
Sme daily, January 3, 2008.
36 Vražda, Daniel: “Fico oslavoval Jánošíka ako Colotka” [‘Fico Celebrated Jánošík Like
Colotka’], Sme daily, January 26, 2008.
37 “Fico: Legendu o Jánošíkovi môžu národu vzia len duchovní bezdomovci” [‘Fico: Only
Spiritually Homeless May Deprive Nation of Jánošík Legend’], SITA news agency,
January 25, 2008.
38 Maïariè, Marek: “Ad Lex Hlinka” Sme daily, September 7, 2007.
39 “SNS o slovenskom štáte” [‘SNS on Slovak State’], Sme daily, March 16, 1998.
40 “Ïuricova kniha môže by nepríjemná pre tých, ktorí sa boja pravdivej histórie, tvrdí SNS”
[‘Ïurica’s Book May Be Inconvenient for Those who Fear Historical Truth, Claims SNS’],
Sme daily, June 27, 1997.
41 “SNS vyzýva na spoluuctenie si pamiatky J. Tisu” [‘SNS Calls for Joint Commemoration
of J. Tiso’s Memory’], Sme daily, April 19, 1997.
42 “J. Slota vyzval na rehabilitáciu dr. Tisa” [‘J. Slota Called for Rehabilitation of J. Tiso’],
Sme daily, October 7, 1998.
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43 Rafaj, Rafael: “Pravda nie je jednostranná, alebo nediskreditujte sa sami lžou” [‘Truth Is
Not One-Sided or Don’t Discredit Yourselves by Lies’] Národná obroda daily, October
22, 1998.
44 “Oficiálne miesta na slová poslanca B. Kunca v TV Nova o Tisovom režime zatia¾
nereagovali” [‘Official Authorities Still Quiet about MP B. Kunc’s Comments on Tiso’s
Regime on TV Nova’], Sme daily, May 30, 1996.
45 “Slota: Aj v Nemecku sú tabule na oslavu Hitlera” [‘Slota: Germany Has Plaques
Celebrating Hitler’], Sme daily, February 29, 2000.
46 “Slota: PSNS žiada zverejnenie všetkých okolností popravy J. Tisu” [‘Slota: PSNS
Demands All Circumstances of J. Tiso Execution Be Public’], SITA news agency, April,
18, 2002.
47 “SNS: 14. marec 1939 – historický fakt prvej slovenskej štátnosti” [‘SNS: March 14, 1939,
is a Historic Fact of the First Slovak Statehood’], SITA news agency, March 13, 2005.
48 “PSNS: SNP sa položili základy komunistickej totality a sovietskej satelizácie” [‘PSNS:
SNP Laid Foundation of Communist Totality and Soviet Satellization’], TASR news
agency, August 28, 2002.
49 “Rydlo: Bez prvej Slovenskej republiky by nebolo ani druhej” [‘Rydlo: There Would be
No Second Slovak Republic without the First One’], SITA news agency, March 14, 2008.
50 “Malíková: SNP bude ma èestné miesto v slovenskej histórii” [‘Malíková: SNP Shall
Have an Honourable Place in Slovakia’s History’], SITA news agency, August 26, 2004.
51 “SNS: Stanovisko k informáciám o oslavách 62. výroèia SNP” [‘SNS: Reaction to
Information on 62nd SNP Anniversary Celebrations’], SITA news agency, August 30,
2006.
52 Vražda, Daniel – Piško, Michal: “Fico: Vláda tvrdo zakroèí proti spochybòovaniu SNP”
Fico: Government Will Take Vigorous Action against Questioning SNP’], Sme daily, 30.
8. 2007.
53 “Poslanci HZDS v rodnom dome J. Tisa v Bytèi” [‘HZDS Deputies Visited Parental Home
of J. Tiso in Bytèa’], Sme daily, September 16, 1997.
54 “Pod¾a HZDS je kniha M.S. Ïuricu vedeckou prácou zasluhujúcou si obdiv a uznanie”
[‘Book by M.S. Ïurica Is a Piece of Research that Deserves Admiration and Accolade’],
Národná obroda daily, June 13, 1997.
55 “J. Prokeš na pietnych oslavách vzniku, V. Meèiar nemieni rehabilitova fašistický režim,
ktorý tu bol” [‘J. Prokeš Attends Celebration of Founding, V. Meèiar Refuses to
Rehabilitate Fascist Regime It Brought’], Národná obroda daily, March 15, 1997.
56 “Meèiar: V otázke slovenského štátu nám historici ve¾a dlhujú” [‘Meèiar: Historians Owe
a Lot to the Slovak State Issue’], SITA news agency, January 8, 2007.
57 “SMER-SD: Martinská deklarácia dôležitou udalosou v histórii Slovenska” [‘SMER–SD:
The Martin Declaration Is an Important Event in the History of Slovakia’], SITA news
agency, October 30, 2008.
58 “SMER-SD: Vznik prvej ÈSR je významná historická udalos” [‘SMER-SD: Founding of
the First Czechoslovak Republic Is an Important Historic Event’], SITA news agency,
October 27, 2008.
59 “Fico: Komunizmus bol sociálnejší a ¾udia sa mali lepšie” [‘Fico: Communism Was More
Socially-Oriented and People Were Better Off’], SITA news agency, November 17, 2003.
60 “Anketa: „Èo pre vás znamená 25. február 1948?” [‘Poll: What Does February 25, 1948,
Mean to You?’], Sme daily, February 23, 2008.
61 “Pod¾a vládnej stránky na Internete už V. Meèiar nie je jednou z vedúcich osobností roku
1989 [‘Meèiar No Longer a 1989 Leader According to Cabinet Website’], Sme daily, June
16, 1998.
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62 “J. Cuper: Komunistický režim bol experiment, ktorý sa nevydaril a treba s ním zúètova”
[‘J. Cuper: Communist Regime Was a Failed Experiment and Should Be Laid in the
Past’], Národná obroda daily, February 2, 1996.
63 “Pod¾a opozície vláda deformuje November, pod¾a HZDS sú študenti zneužívaní”
[‘Opposition Claims Cabinet Deforms November, HZDS Charges Students Are Being
Abused’], Sme daily, November 15, 1996.
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