12
Media, Identity, and the Self
Jonathan Cohen, Markus Appel, and Michael D. Slater
Few social phenomena are more important, or complex, than the process through which we
come to form our identity. Virtually every action we take, and every interaction we are involved
in, is shaped by how we understand and experience ourselves. A comprehensive examination of
the question of media, self, and identity is far larger than can be encompassed in a single chapter.
Indeed, it would require a volume of its own. A fuller account would involve in-depth discussions
of the role of media in child development and adolescent socialization, in cognitive and social
cognitive processes by which media content may inﬂuence aspects of self and identity, in the sociology
of group membership and identity, and in shaping political identities and healthy lifestyles.
Our focus in this chapter is on a key element in understanding the relationship of media, self,
and identity: the individual’s experience of identity while using media (and mediated narratives
and social media, in particular). Understanding this phenomenon is central to an understanding
of how media shapes human experience, values, behaviors, and thus society as a whole. We
believe, too, that considering the relationship between mediated experience and the experience of
self provides valuable insights into understanding the human experience of identity and self.
Self and Identity
The terms “self” and “identity” are broadly conceived as the feelings, thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions
that individuals have about themselves. Current theory and research on media and the
self owes much to fundamental early research in psychology (Cooley, 1902; James, 1890/1981).
Since the beginning, theory has emphasized the multi-faceted and multi-dimensional nature of
the self. In his highly inﬂuential work, William James (1890/1981) distinguished between the
I (the aspect of the self that knows about the self) and the empirical self or me (all aspects of
the self that can be the object of self-perception, see also Comello, 2009). The latter is further
distinguished into the material self (the things an individual calls his or her own, such as one’s
body, one’s family, or one’s work), the social self (perceptions by others), and the spiritual self
(in which “spiritual” is used in a broad sense, incorporating all psychological aspects that an
individual perceives to be the case about him or herself, such as self-related feelings, interests,
or attitudes). In that sense, much of the research presented in this chapter deals with the social
179
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self or the spiritual/psychological self. However, new and future technologies may be able to
inﬂuence the perception of our material self, such as our body ownership. For example, research
in the ﬁeld of virtual reality (VR; see Chapter 26 in this volume) has shown that mediated
experiences can temporarily obfuscate the distinction between our own physical body and an
avatar body in a VR world (e.g., Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010).
Of particular interest to theory and research on media eﬀects is the psychological perception
of the self rather than the “true” attributes of a person. Research on self-esteem, for example,
deals with a person’s subjective evaluation of his or her worth as a person, self-respect, and
self-acceptance (Orth & Robins, 2014), which may substantially diverge from the person’s actual
talents and abilities or their achievement as perceived by others.
Psychological approaches to identity and the self diﬀer as to how malleable the self is
perceived to be in response to the potentially self-relevant information encountered on an
everyday basis, including mediated information. At one end of the malleability spectrum,
research on personality has emphasized the relative stability of traits such as extraversion or
openness. Such traits are considered to be a function of an individual’s genetic makeup to
a substantial degree (e.g., Dawes et al., 2014; Vukasović & Bratko, 2015). At the other end,
self-presentation theory (Goﬀman, 1959) has emphasized the ﬂexibility of the self. Based on
the metaphor of life as theater play, individuals are seen as actors who portray diﬀerent
roles for diﬀerent audiences. Thus, the self-concept is conceived to be extremely ﬂexible,
largely depending on situations and changing completely with the role played and the reactions
of the interaction partners. Contemporary psychological approaches suggest that one’s
self-concept consists of rather stable components but that situational factors determine
which aspects of the self are activated in a given moment. These salient characteristics of the
self represent the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986) or the active self of an individual
(Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). When thinking about how media may aﬀect
individuals and their sense of self, the question of the malleability of the self is crucial. This
framework highlights the need to distinguish media eﬀects that are conceptualized as a longlasting
inﬂuence on basic tenets of the self from media eﬀects that focus on the short-term
activation of self-related thoughts and feelings.
Thoughts and feelings about the self (and the questions asked by researchers) often refer to
the actual or real self, the (temporal) status quo. However, the self also encompasses thoughts
and feelings about potential selves. This includes the ideal self (i.e., who we want to be) and the
ought self (i.e., who we think others expect us to be; see Strauman, 1996). According to selfdiscrepancy
theory (Higgins, 1987), perceived discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves
increase the likelihood of negative aﬀect, while discrepancies between actual and ought selves
increase the likelihood of social anxiety. Potential future selves or possible selves are another
aspect of the self that goes beyond the status quo (Comello, 2009; Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Possible selves are a motivational force that may aﬀect behavior by providing personal and concrete
goals (e.g., Oyserman, Bybee, & Terry, 2006). Engaging with media characters can contribute
to developing possible selves, as we will outline in later parts of this chapter.
The theory of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) highlights that one’s self
(the me in James’s terms) is only sometimes at the center of attention (objective self-awareness),
whereas in most instances we act without monitoring ourselves (subjective self-awareness).
Whenever individuals become self-aware, norms held in a society—but also personal goals and
aspirations and potential discrepancies between these goals and one’s status quo—are likely to
become salient. This motivates activities that are in line with these goals. Moreover, particularly
Media, Identity, and the Self • 181
if goal attainment is not easily achievable, activities that shift the focus of attention away from
the self are common. Media use can be one of these distractive activities, as shown in research
on escapist TV use (Moskalenko & Heine, 2003).
The state of self-awareness has often been induced in the lab by seating participants in front
of a mirror, resulting in diminished self-esteem. However, according to Gonzales and Hancock
(2011), one’s social media proﬁle might also be a source of self-awareness. In contrast to
a mirror, though, engaging with one’s own Facebook proﬁle increased self-esteem in their
study. Social media proﬁles represent the key aspects of one’s self, including one’s social connections.
Toma and Hancock (2013) demonstrated that engaging with one’s Facebook proﬁle
can be a potent source of self-aﬃrmation, as social media proﬁles raise the awareness of values,
meaningful relationships, and other essential aspects of the self-concept. Furthermore, unlike
a mirror, social media proﬁles are a form of self-presentation that are edited versions of the self
that allow people to put their best self forward.
From early on, research on self and identity has emphasized the social aspect of the self. To
answer questions about who we are, others’ reactions to one’s actions are of key importance
(looking glass self, Cooley, 1902). When people around an individual praise his or her manual
work, for example, the individual tends to associate high manual craftsmanship to the sense of
the self. And, of course, others may provide information for social comparison (see Festinger,
1954). Judgments about the self are often made with one or more targets of comparison in
mind (e.g., my siblings; Jay-Z; Chris on Instagram; supermodels), gauging the similarities and
diﬀerences on a salient dimension. These dimensions are often associated with a notion of
desirability (e.g., intelligence or attractiveness). A comparison with a target can therefore be
that of an upward social comparison (e.g., a rich person on the dimension of wealth) or
a downward social comparison (e.g., a poor person). And the consequences can be that of
evaluating oneself in line with (i.e., assimilation) or in contrast to the target. With other things
being equal, individuals tend to engage in upward rather than downward social comparison
when given the choice, as indicated by a meta-analysis of experiments from social psychology
(Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, 2018). The same meta-analysis further shows that the dominant
response to social comparison is that of contrast; that is, to perceive oneself to be dissimilar to
the target (e.g., the supermodel). It seems that humans have a general tendency to look upward,
which often leads to self-deﬂation (see more on social comparison processes below).
An important dimension of the social self is the perception of belonging to a larger group
of individuals. When asked about who we are, we might respond with our nationality (“I am
Israeli/American/German”), an aﬃliation to a political party, a sports franchise, a religious
group, and so on. Social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) explains the relationships
between the self, groups, and society. It suggests that the social categories an individual
identiﬁes with provide a crucial framework to deﬁne one’s self. Individuals have multiple
distinct category memberships at the same time and therefore multiple social identities, as
these group identities are typically linked to diﬀerent attributes and behaviors. In a given
situation, an individual’s experience and behavior depends on the salience of the social identity
that is active.
Self, Identity, and Mediated Relationships
As we as individuals mature and engage in more complex and diverse social interactions, we
experiment with various possible selves and shape our identity based on how we experience
182 • Jonathan Cohen et al.
ourselves in diﬀerent social environments (Erikson, 1968). In as much as media are an important
part of our social environment, media exposure and mediated interactions are important to
shaping our identity, as well as to helping us maintain and reinforce preferred social identities
in the face of competing inﬂuences and environmental threats (Slater, 2007, 2015).
Furthermore, the proliferation of social media has made media technologies and platforms
more central to social interaction. Even communication between close family members and
friends are now often mediated, and public interactions also generally take place through our
phones, computers, social networks, and other platforms. Our increasing exposure to information
via the internet exposes us to a plethora of new ideas, new behaviors, and new fashions.
Such information serves as social cues that help form and manage our social identity. For
example, rather than having to imagine how friends, family, and peers will react to a new look,
behavior, or attitude, we can now post a story or selﬁe online and get immediate responses
from a wide array of social contacts. Thus, the social interactions that inform our identity are
wider-ranging, more frequent, and more immediate than they once were, making mediated
experience a more central inﬂuence on our self and identity.
One way that media play a role in shaping our identity is in allowing us to interact with
media characters. Such interactions and relationships with characters can help shape identity by
providing opportunities for social comparison (e.g., Nabi & Keblusek, 2014). Social comparisons
help people understand who they are relative to others in terms of important attributes (e.g.,
looks, status, and achievements) and thus shape their sense of actual self, possible self, and ideal
self. A second way media may aﬀect identity is through identiﬁcation, whereby audiences often
take on the identity of characters and come to see things through the perspective of characters.
Identifying with characters allows readers and viewers to experience themselves in roles they
would not otherwise experience. Third, media also provide audiences with opportunities to
vicariously learn ideas, behaviors, and attitudes that become part of their identity (e.g., Slater &
Hayes, 2010). Finally, media characters may also serve as imaginary or parasocial interaction
partners whose imagined responses may shape the self (e.g., Papa et al., 2000; Slater, Ewoldsen,
& Woods, 2017).
Perhaps the most obvious way that media characters impact our sense of self is through
modeling and imitation (Bandura, 2009; see also Chapter 7 of this volume). Because humans
are able to learn symbolically, media characters present a wide variety of learning opportunities.
In particular, viewers can observe mediated characters model attitudes and behaviors,
including how to enact these behaviors skillfully and eﬀectively; viewers can also observe
these characters rewarded (Bandura, 2009). Learning through observation of vicarious rewards
is central to social learning. When the model is reasonably similar to the observer, such
observation is likely to increase the observer’s self-eﬃcacy or belief that they, too, are capable
of enacting the behavior (Bandura, 2009).
But media not only provide us with models or information that shape our identity; they also
are venues for expression of social identity. Writing fan ﬁction, being active followers of fan Facebook
pages, or following celebrities on Twitter are ways to express aspects of identity and membership
in communities of interest. Yet another way media can be used to express identity is through
media choice (Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall, 2010). For example, audience members in the
U.S. may express their political identity by watching the right-leaning Fox News or the left-leaning
MSNBC, or their fashion savvy by being avid viewers of Project Runway. Finally, participatory
media such as social networks where people can post content that expresses some part of their
identity, or comment sections where people can express themselves, provide opportunities for
Media, Identity, and the Self • 183
people to express themselves and receive feedback from others. In these and other ways, media
platforms serve both as sources of information and feedback that is relevant to developing and
maintaining identity, and provide a means of expressing or conﬁrming one’s social identities.
Social Comparison
An important way that media exposure aﬀects the self is by providing ample, and constantly
novel, opportunities for social comparison. Perhaps the most researched topic in terms of
media eﬀects on the self relates to body image. Grabe, Ward, and Hyde (2008) conducted
a meta-analysis of research on media eﬀects on self-objectiﬁcation, preoccupation with the
body, internalization of thin ideals, and eating behaviors related to body image. The strongest
eﬀects of media exposure were found on internalization of thin ideals or the adoption of sociocultural
appearance ideals as a personal goal and standard. This suggests that the eﬀects of
media on the goals we set for ourselves, and how we judge ourselves in light of those goals, are
strong relative to eﬀects on behaviors or attitudes.
Studies with a focus on social media consistently show a positive relationship between global
social media use (e.g., time spent) and the internalization of a thin body ideal, as indicated by
a recent meta-analysis (Mingoia, Hutchinson, Wilson, & Gleaves, 2017; the average association
amounted to r = .18 [.12; .23]). With respect to the processes potentially underlying this relationship,
Vogel, Rose, Roberts, and Eckles (2014) found that frequent Facebook use was related
to lower self-esteem and that exposure to others’ Facebook proﬁles that instigated upward social
comparisons lowered state self-esteem, whereas proﬁles containing downward social comparisons
did not.
Two other recent meta-analyses summarized the evidence of cross-sectional studies on the
relationship between global social media use (e.g., time spent or log-in frequency) and selfesteem.
Both meta-analyses identiﬁed a signiﬁcant-though-small negative relationship (Huang,
2017: r = –.04 [–.08; –.00]; Liu & Baumeister, 2016: r = –.09 [–.14; –.03]). Thus, it seems that
using social media can be both a source of self-aﬃrmation (e.g., Toma & Hancock, 2013) and
a source of upward social comparison yielding lowered self-esteem. As a case in point, correlational
studies suggest that intention to blog is related to greater psychological distress (Baker &
Moore, 2008), whereas actual blogging is related to increased perceived well-being. This seeming
contradiction points to the possibility that passive engagement in social media may have deleterious
eﬀects on the self, whereas more active participation (e.g., posting) may have positive
eﬀects (Verduyn et al., 2015).
In sum, research suggests that both traditional mass media exposure as well as engagement
with social media serve as opportunities to learn about and reﬂect on ourselves, experiment with
our identities, and express ourselves in various ways. What content we are exposed to and create
and how we use media may be critical in determining whether such eﬀects will be positive or
negative. What is perhaps less clear—and a question to be explored in the coming years—is
whether and how traditional social connections diﬀer from various mediated platforms as forums
for the work of forming and maintaining self-identity.
Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation (Cohen, 2001) refers to an imaginative process that includes, among other dimensions,
taking the perspective of a narrative character. This, however, does not necessarily mean
184 • Jonathan Cohen et al.
that one fully loses oneself in the experience of being the character. Rather, identiﬁcation is
a merging of the character and audience member’s self rather than a replacing of the audience’s
self with that of the character. For example, identiﬁcation may occur in situations where audience
members know more or less than a character, but, through identiﬁcation, audiences are
still able to see narrative events, understand them, and experience them through the perspective
of the character. Under such conditions, identiﬁcation may not mean that the perspective is
identical to that of the character, but there can still be a deep appreciation for the character’s
feelings, goals, and understanding. Much like viewing an event through a GoPro camera
attached to someone else, audience members are able to gain an intimate understanding of
events but at the same time maintain their own sense of self.
Identiﬁcation is one way that stories mentally transport us out of our immediate environment
and into a world inhabited by characters and where the story takes place (Cohen, 2001). When
stories are well constructed, narrative characters feel real to us, and we can come to care deeply
about what they do and what happens to them. Though perhaps the most obvious question
regarding identiﬁcation is its impact on the way we experience entertainment (e.g., enjoyment
and interpretation) and whether it enhances the impact of narratives (e.g., persuasion, behavior),
it is also interesting to think about the eﬀects of identifying with a character on how we think and
feel about our own selves. It is not hard to imagine that feeling intimately, if vicariously, involved
in events that are beyond the scope of our immediate experience can change how we view ourselves
and our environment.
Audience members often identify with characters and come to adopt their goals and perspective
on events and to empathize with their emotions. Interestingly, people do not necessarily identify
more strongly with characters that are demographically similar to them (Cohen, Weimann-Saks, &
Mazor-Tregerman, 2017), suggesting that identiﬁcation is not limited in scope and can be an eﬀective
way to explore widely alternative selves. In seeing the world through the eyes of a character, we
can gain a better understanding of how others see the world and what they experience. Studies have
demonstrated several ways that media characters can impact audience members.
Tal-Or and Tsfati (2016) found that Jewish students who identiﬁed with an Arab character
had reduced stereotypes about Arabs, more willingness to interact with Arabs, and more positive
attitudes about the Arab-Israeli conﬂict. Similarly, Chung and Slater (2013) found that
identiﬁcation with a drug-addicted single mother in a Hollywood movie decreased social distance
with respect to persons with a history of drug addiction. In another study, ﬁndings indicated
that identifying with a disabled protagonist who tells a story about a job interview with
an abled interviewer impacted attitudes about laws regarding employment of disabled people
(de Graaf, Hoeken, Sanders, & Beentjes, 2012).
Furthermore, identifying with a character may result in adopting certain traits of characters.
For example, Appel (2011) found that participants who were exposed to a “stupid” character in
a narrative underperformed on a subsequent exam, suggesting that traits of characters were
assimilated into the self. Sestir and Green (2010) provide experimental evidence that identiﬁcation
with a character activates (in the short term) those traits in audience members that are
also relevant to the character. Under high-identiﬁcation conditions, viewers were able to more
quickly identify traits that they shared with the character as descriptive of themselves as compared
to viewers in a low-identiﬁcation condition or compared to traits not relevant to the
character. This suggests that media characters activate traits in the self that, over time, should
strengthen those traits. Identiﬁcation, then, has the ability to impact identity by allowing us to
see things from new perspectives.
Media, Identity, and the Self • 185
As Mar and Oatley (2008) explain, experiencing stories simulates social experiences in our
mind. Such simulations help us understand others (Kidd & Castano, 2013) and, through that
experience, understand ourselves with greater clarity. Gabriel and her colleagues supported this
argument regarding characters that were liked by audiences (e.g., Derrick, Gabriel, & Tippin,
2008; Young, Gabriel, & Sechrist, 2012). These authors found that just thinking about a favorite
character was enough to enhance one’s self-esteem and satisfaction with one’s body image
(Young et al., 2012). Taken together, research has shown that identifying with media characters
tends to promote the assimilation of characters’ traits into the self and impacts our self-
perception.
Another way that identiﬁcation may aﬀect the self is through vicarious experimentation.
Because continuity is a key principle of the self (Breakwell, 2010), a signiﬁcant change in attitudes
or behaviors presents a challenge to the self (Murtagh, Gatersleben, & Uzzell, 2012). In
other words, changing attitudes or behaviors requires giving up a part of how we see ourselves
and adopting a change in our sense of self. And because identity is a system of interrelated
perceptions, traits, beliefs, and aﬃliations, changing a central part of one’s identity may threaten
one’s sense of self more generally. Identifying with characters may allow an audience member
to “see myself in a new light” (Kearney & O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 146), which can be a crucial step
to behavior change. From the perspective of vicarious experimentation, then, one advantage of
identiﬁcation as a tool for change is that it allows one to imagine alternative selves without the
social and psychological risks that are involved in changing a central behavior or attitude. For
example, if Jane sees herself as a lazy couch potato who enjoys watching TV and playing video
games but starts feeling that she needs to adopt a healthier lifestyle, she may have a hard time
imagining herself as someone who would get up early to run. Consequently, she is unlikely to
start running on a regular basis. The need to change one’s identity (from couch potato to
runner) is an important obstacle to behavior change. Identifying with a runner character in
a movie may help Jane imagine herself as a runner and thus make it more likely that she will
try running.
Furthermore, because identity is social and we tend to surround ourselves with similar
others, changing one’s identity also requires a social adjustment. Jane may need to distance herself
somewhat from her TV-watching friends and meet some new runner friends if she is to
become a runner for the long term. Indeed, the recent popularity of running groups suggests
that social support is important to help integrate running into runners’ identity (Stevens et al.,
2017). Similarly, Falomir and Invernizzi (1999) found that smoker identity was an important
predictor of intention to quit smoking and of resistance to anti-smoking messages, even among
adolescents who had not smoked for very long. Thus, a signiﬁcant change of behavior may
require an adjustment of both one’s personal identity and of one’s social networks. Identiﬁcation
with a character that embodies this new identity may help facilitate the process of change,
since one can vicariously experience a supportive social network that may ease the transition to
a new or expanded social network. Similarly, participating in social networks online, via blogs,
groups, or following people on Twitter may all provide a way to experiment with alternative
social identities consistent with new patterns of behavior.
Importantly, this notion of vicarious experimentation is distinct from, though related to,
social learning. Social learning, as discussed previously, involves observing reinforcements
experienced by a model and learning from that observed reinforcement. Identiﬁcation processes
suggest that one actually “tries on” (or vicariously experiences) reinforcements, including, in
some cases, being part of a supportive social network. Rather than learning new behaviors and
186 • Jonathan Cohen et al.
attitudes through observation, vicarious experimentation focuses on the importance of imaging
and trying on new identities related to new behaviors.
Parasocial Relationships
Parasocial relationships refer to imagined relationships and a sense of intimacy that audiences
develop with media personae through repeated exposure and imagined interaction (Horton &
Wohl, 1956). Since the social groups we belong to compose a crucial part of our identity, and our
friends serve as an important source of feedback that shapes our identity, it is likely that favorite
television shows and characters serve an important role in identity formation and maintenance. It
also makes sense that the less one feels part of social groups (e.g., work, friends), the more television
plays a central role with respect to self and identity. Derrick et al. (2008) found that thinking
of a parasocial relationship partner improved self-esteem among low-self-esteem adults. They
found that participants tended to develop parasocial relationships with characters who were close
to their ideal selves (rather than their actual selves) and that being reminded of these characters
made them feel closer to their own ideal selves. Derrick, Gabriel, and Hugenberg (2009) also found
that thinking of favorite television programs served to inhibit drops in self-esteem and negative
feelings among lonely people or people who feel a need to belong.
A recent development in the study of parasocial relationships is the focus on retrospective
imaginative involvement (RII; Slater et al., 2017). For the most part, the study of parasocial relationships
has focused on how these relationships play out during exposure to media content
(i.e., parasocial experience, see Hartmann & Goldhoorn, 2011) or on the overall attachment to
personae and the eﬀects of these relationships. However, the psychological processes that determine
the impact of media content are not limited to the duration of exposure. As Slater and
colleagues (2017) note, we often think about books, ﬁlms, or TV shows for a long time after we
ﬁnish reading or watching them; we hum the soundtrack, discuss the content with friends, and
post about it on our social media. After exposure, we may continue to imaginatively engage
with a story or a character. For example, we may imagine characters in other situations or
making other decisions than those they made in the narrative, or we may imagine ourselves as
the character. Such retrospective imaginative involvement in media content is likely to have
long-term impact on identity, as these imaginative relationships may inﬂuence our perceived
social group membership, desirable personal and social attributes, and our personal values.
Exploration of such eﬀects is ripe for further empirical exploration.
Temporarily Expanded Boundaries of the Self: Narratives and the Limitations of
Personal and Social Identity
We have described many ways in which development and reinforcement of social identity intersect
with media use. Now, we examine a related but distinct aspect of the identity–media relationship:
how media content—notably narrative content—may provide a means for managing
the inherent stresses and demands of identity maintenance.
Demands and Constraints of Individual Identity
Maintaining the combination of personal qualities and social roles we call one’s identity is a lot of
work, taxing people both cognitively and emotionally (e.g., Preston & Wegner, 2005). Various
Media, Identity, and the Self • 187
aspects of personal and social identity, both actual and aspirational, can be in conﬂict (Higgins,
1989; Marks & MacDermid, 1996). People employ a variety of strategies to protect self-concept,
including attributing success to intrinsic and failure to extrinsic factors, and maintaining sometimes
unrealistic optimism about personal outcomes (e.g., Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Cooper, 2007;
Weinstein, 1980). Much of our ongoing mental activity, including daydreaming and other forms of
ruminative thought, serves to sustain—for better or for worse—key elements of our self-concept
(Martin & Tesser, 1989).
Moreover, there are good reasons for suggesting that being an individual self is not only
demanding but is also constraining of and frustrating to fundamental needs (see Slater, Johnson,
Cohen, Comello, & Ewoldsen, 2014, for a more detailed discussion). James (1890/1981; see
also Comello, 2009) points out that in becoming who we are socially and personally, we forego
many of the other possible selves we might have been, perhaps leading to some sense of regret
and loss.
Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1990) proposed that people have inherent
needs for competence and agency, choice and autonomy, and connectedness to and aﬃliation
with others. If we as human beings have these inherent needs, they can only be imperfectly
satisﬁed. Often enough, one may be frustrated with what one can do, with one’s freedom of
choice, or with one’s social and personal relationships. Even if each of these goes as well as can
be hoped in life, as James (1890/1981) suggests, one set of competencies precludes developing
others; one set of relationships may displace other possible relationships. However autonomous
and free one believes oneself to be, one has little choice about the inherent capacities of one’s
body and mind, limited choices about where one lives one’s life, and even less choice about
when in history one lives.
People have many ways of temporarily experiencing freedom from some of the inherent
limitations of individual selfhood. Alcohol and drugs may provide a temporary and illusory
sense of expanded capacity or diminish the perceptual boundaries of self and other. Ideology
and religion may permit a sense of merging of self with a group and surrender to a set of overarching
values. Artistic expression and aesthetic experience have a quality that transcends the
typical concerns of individual life. Mysticism and spirituality have, as their explicit objective,
merger of the subjective experience of individuality with universality (Huxley, 1945; James,
1911). We argue that stories, too, help meet, at least temporarily, this deep human yearning to
step beyond the constraints of the individual self.1
Stories and Expanded Boundaries of the Self
The Temporarily Expanded Boundaries of the Self or TEBOTS model (Slater et al., 2014) proposes
that one of the inherent appeals of stories to human beings is the temporary expansion of
the subjective experience of the self that results from immersion in stories. One way to understand
this idea is to consider the distinction that William James makes between the I and the
me (see Comello, 2009 for a more extended discussion). The me is our constructed set of social
and personal identities: profession, gender, religion, family roles, skills, and so on. The I is our
ontological self, our experience of being itself, which precedes these roles and identities.
TEBOTS suggests that, when immersed in a story, we maintain our ontological experience of
I, while our me is temporarily supplanted (or at least supplemented) by the personal and social
roles of those we identify with in the story (Cohen, 2001). In that way, our subjective experience
of our capacities, competence, and agency can be expanded to incorporate the magic of
188 • Jonathan Cohen et al.
a Harry Potter or Hermione Granger, the powers of a superhero, or the agonizing limitations
on freedoms, capacities, and relationships of a slave in the antebellum American south. Stories
provide not only an expanded experience of agency or lack thereof but freedom from limitation
to any given social role or circumstance, time, or place. Similarly, we may have in this imaginative
world friendships, intimate relationships, or enmities with an endless variety of persons
with whom we have parasocial or imaginative interactions or relationships (Annese, 2004; Giles,
2002; Slater et al., 2017).
Several key hypotheses have been derived from the TEBOTS model and tested empirically.
Social identity theory (Turner, 1987) highlights the way outgroup members are seen as less differentiated
and less fully human than ingroup members. Therefore, identiﬁcation with an erstwhile
outgroup member in a narrative should increase diﬀerentiation and experience of the
humanness of that stigmatized other. This in turn, the TEBOTS model suggests, should reduce
social distance. This hypothesis was supported in an experiment in which a movie protagonist,
a single mother, was manipulated to be a drug addict in one condition but not in the other
(Chung & Slater, 2013).
Another hypothesis is that when one’s social or personal self is under threat or stress, stories
should be enjoyed more, as expansion of the boundaries of self should be particularly desirable,
regardless of how positive or negative the story is (so that eﬀects are not attributable to mood
management; see Knobloch, 2003; Zillmann, 2000). Johnson, Ewoldsen, and Slater (2015)
manipulated stress through a self-control depletion manipulation. As predicted, in the selfcontrol
depletion condition, stories were enjoyed more regardless of positive or negative story
valence. The inverse of this hypothesis was also tested, suggesting that persons whose sense of
personal identity is enhanced should enjoy stories less. Johnson, Slater, Silver, and Ewoldsen
(2016) used an aﬃrmation manipulation to increase positive self-concept. Again, the hypothesis
was supported: Those in the aﬃrmation condition reported less enjoyment of the stories, again
regardless of story valence.
The Self, Identity, and Eudaimonia: Mediated Wisdom of Experience
The TEBOTS model is explicitly about the attraction of stories, as long as the story is capable of
inducing immersion and engagement with story characters. TEBOTS does not address the possible
impacts of stories and possible diﬀerential eﬀects of distinct types of stories. In particular, the possibility
that eudaimonic stories—stories that are deeply moving and touch upon key elements of
human experience (Oliver & Bartsch, 2011; Oliver & Raney, 2011; see also Chapter 17 in this
volume)—may have some kind of signiﬁcant impact on audience members is especially tantalizing.
Two of the authors of this chapter, along with one of this book’s co-editors, Mary Beth
Oliver, have explored this possibility. Socio-emotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006)
suggests that people grow in terms of what they value and their willingness to plan for the
future as they age. Experience brings awareness of the ﬁniteness of the lifespan and one’s closeness
to one’s future self; even among younger people, poignant transitions such as graduation
can have a similar eﬀect (Ersner-Hershﬁeld, 2009).
The Mediated Wisdom of Experience perspective (MWOE: Slater, Oliver, & Appel, 2016;
Slater, Oliver, Appel, Tchernev, & Silver, 2018) argues that eudaimonic narratives in particular
should operate similarly on their audiences. To view or read a eudaimonic narrative, typically,
is to vicariously experience change, loss, the preciousness and fragility of life and relationships,
and the inevitable movement of the lifespan. In other words, as a reader or viewer, one
Media, Identity, and the Self • 189
experiences some taste of these verities of life without a full lifetime of personal experience. In
fact, the framing of the eudaimonic narrative is likely to emphasize the potential meaning and
purpose of life in a way that may or may not happen in the lived circumstances of a given
lifetime.
This model was tested ﬁrst using four short paired videos, each pair of diﬀerent genres but
similar topics and production approach (ads, news stories, etc.), selected to be high or low in
eudaimonic qualities (Slater et al., 2016). The primary dependent variable of interest was delay
discounting. Delay discounting (Kirby & Maraković, 1996) is typically viewed as a dispositional
variable representing the additional reward someone requires to postpone a beneﬁt. A typical
item might ask, “Would you prefer receiving $55 right now or $60 in two weeks?” As predicted,
the eudaimonic video clips decreased delay discounting—that is, people were more willing to
accept delayed rewards. Also as predicted, this eﬀect was in part mediated by poignancy—the
extent to which the audience members experienced mixed happiness and sadness, a mixed emotion
believed to be associated with perception of life’s complexity—in response to the video clips.
A subsequent study (Slater et al., 2018) extended these ﬁndings by using tighter and more
ecologically valid experimental manipulations, testing a mediator (closeness to future self) more
directly associated with SST, and adding a dependent variable, acceptance of the prospect of
death, as a way to assess impact on maturity of responses and to develop ﬁndings that suggested
eudaimonic videos could buﬀer the eﬀects of mortality salience (Rieger et al., 2015). Three
Hollywood movies were edited to show scenes higher in eudaimonic content versus more
action-oriented scenes from the same movie that were less clearly eudaimonic. Again, the eudaimonic
versions of the videos increased willingness to accept delayed rewards (i.e., reduced delay
discounting) and, extending the Rieger et al. (2015) ﬁndings, increased self-reported death
acceptance. Poignancy in this case did not signiﬁcantly mediate these eﬀects. However,
a measure of closeness to future self did serve as such a mediator, consistent with a socioemotional
selectivity theory perspective.
Finally, it may be useful to further distinguish the TEBOTS and MWOE theoretical domains.
TEBOTS focuses on the drive to expand the possibilities of our experiences of social and personal
identity. In contrast, MWOE suggests that in eudaimonic stories there is typically recognition
that the many things we value about me, our social and personal identities—love of family
members, our capacities, etc.—are transient and are lost in the course of time. But in the recognition
of their transience, there may also be, at least implicitly, an experience of the I that persists
apart from these social and personal identities. This I may grow and deepen in
understanding and appreciation of what life is, and in acceptance of the passage of time and
the inevitabilities that passage brings. The impact of eudaimonic narratives on the salience of
the experience of I apart from transient social identities, and whether this impact may be the
result of certain types of eudaimonic narratives, are promising prospects for future research.
Summary and Conclusion
Looking back over the foregoing chapter, it is evident that identity plays a role in each
phase of the media-eﬀects process. Our identity can be thought of as an independent variable
aﬀecting how we interact with media, including what media we select and attend to
and how we interpret what we encounter. Social and personal identity variables can moderate
how media exposures aﬀect attitudes and behaviors, and can also serve as dependent
or mediating variables. We argue there are few things more important to a human being
190 • Jonathan Cohen et al.
than their personal and social identity. To the extent that media may inﬂuence one’s
experience of identity, this area of research represents a media-eﬀects question of fundamental
interest. As the way people deﬁne their personal and social identity profoundly
inﬂuences their behavior (consider a jihadi, for example), these processes are also of
signiﬁcant social concern.
In this chapter, we have reviewed concepts and theories of self and identity insofar as they
bear on mediated experience. In particular, we reviewed how the boundaries of identity are
blurred at least temporarily, and potentially reshaped, by mediated experiences such as identiﬁcation
or parasocial relationships with persons portrayed in media or via choice of social networks
in social media. In so doing, we highlighted ways in which the experience of personal
and social identity can be at least temporarily malleable, and thus perhaps subject to evolution
and change, for better or for worse.
In sum, the experiences of the self are the most intimate dimensions of each person’s experience
and provide the ﬁlters through which life is experienced; few things are more important to explore
than how we come to understand and experience ourselves. As media scholars, it is important that
we consider the various roles media play in shaping the various dimensions of the self and how
these eﬀects are, in turn, implicated in attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Media research that focuses
on the self is likely to become even more central as research evolves from a mass media model to
a model in which the individual is more central as both producer and consumer, in which social
networks exist via the media and in which presentation of self and identity is executed largely via
the media. The study of media and the self thus promises to be a fruitful avenue for continued
scholarship. We hope this chapter, by considering some fundamental issues regarding the nature of
self and identity while attending to media content (particularly narrative content), serves as a useful
foundation for such future research.
Note
1 This argument may be new to the social science literature but it goes back historically. Abhivanagupta,
the 10th century Indian mystic, philosopher, and aesthetic theorist, suggested that the love of drama
has its roots in the momentary freedom audience members gain from the experience of their own
limited, egoic self (Mishra, 2006).
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