The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context

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ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Organizational infrastructure of social movements

Social movement organizations (SMOs) constitute crucial building blocks of the mobilizing structures of a social movement. But, as John McCarthy has pointed out in his introduction to Part II, they are by no means the only components of a movement's mobilizing structures. Other elements of these structures include kinship and friendship networks, informal networks among activists, movement communities, as well as a host of more formal organizations which contribute to the movement's cause without being directly engaged in the process of mobilization for collective action. In conceptualizing the more formal side of the mobilizing structure of a given movement, I would like to suggest that we distinguish between at least four types of formal organizations: SMOs, "supportive organizations," "movement associations," and "parties and interest groups." *SMOs* are distinguished from the other types of formal organizations by two criteria: (1) they mobilize their constituency for collective action, and (2) they do so with a political goal, that is, to obtain some collective good (avoid some collective ill) from authorities. By contrast, *supportive organizations* are service organizations such as friendly media, churches, restaurants, print shops, or educational institutions, which contribute to the social organization of the constituency of a given movement without directly taking part in the mobilization for collective action.[1] "Supportive organizations" may work on behalf of the movement, their personnel may sympathize with the movement, but their participation in the movement's mobilization for action is at best indirect or accidental. *Movement associations* are self-help organizations, voluntary as-

constituency/client orientation

service	self-help, altruism
supportive organizations "halfway houses"	movement associatons self-help group voluntary asso- ciation, club

no direct parti-
cipation of
constituency

direct participation
of constituency

| political representation interest group, party	political mobilization SMO

authorities' orientation

Figure 7.1. Typology of movement-related organizations.

sociations, or clubs created by the movement itself in order to cater to some daily needs of its members.[2] The mutual benefit societies of the labor move-ment provide a typical example.[3] Just as SMOs, "movement associations" contribute to the mobilization of a movement's constituency, but they do so in an exclusively constituency- or client-oriented way. That is, they contribute to the process of "consensus mobilization" (Klandermans 1988) or to the "creation of commitment" (Gamson 1975), but they do not directly contrib-ute to the "action mobilization" or the "activation of commitment" for a political goal.[4] Finally, SMOs are also to be distinguished from *parties and interest groups*. While they pursue political goals just as do SMOs, parties and interest groups do not normally depend on the direct participation of their constituents for attaining these goals. They are specialized in political representation. They have sufficient amounts of resources – in particular, in-stitutionalized access, authority, and expertise – which means that they nor-mally do not have to have recourse to the mobilization of their constituents. While parties and interest groups also mobilize their constituencies from time to time, this is not essential to their activities, which are typically carried out by an elite. Moreover, this mobilization usually takes place within established routines. Figure 7.1 summarizes these distinctions in a schematic way.[5] All SMOs of a given social movement form its *SMO-infrastructure* (SMI). The SMO-infrastructures of all the social movements in a given polity, in turn, constitute the *social movement sector* (SMS). The SMIs of a movement fam-ily, such as the new social movements (NSMs), represent a subsector of the

SMS.[6] Given that SMOs constitute only part of the mobilizing structures of a given movement, the SMS can also be considered to be a subset of the mobilizing structures of all the movements in a society.

Parameters of organizational development

The notion of "organizational development" refers to all levels of the organizational structure, to SMOs, SMIs, subsectors of the SMOs, and the whole SMS. It has a large number of aspects. I propose four sets of parameters for its analysis:[7] parameters capturing organizational growth and decline, internal organizational structuration, external organizational structuration, and goal orientations and action repertoires. First, *organizational growth and decline* refers to the changing size of the SMI – the number of SMOs in the SMI and the amount of resources available to the various SMOs. In the initial phases of a movement, the only resources available tend to be the "active commitment, courage and imagination" of the movement's activists and adherents (Koopmans 1992). In their early phases, the organizational networks of social movements tend to be weak and informally structured. Resources from conscience constituents and supportive elites are not easily forthcoming. Movements have to attract public attention to their cause, they have to create their constituency and elite patronage on their own, either by explicit consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1988), or as a by-product of their action mobilization (McAdam 1982: 125; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Typically, SMOs develop only in the course of the mobilization process of a social movement. The flow of resources into the organizational network of a given movement is a function of the stage reached by the series of action campaigns constituting it. A well-resourced SMI is one of the results of consensus and action mobilization of a newly developing social movement rather than its origin. The resource flow, in turn, constitutes a crucial determinant for the other aspects of the organizational development.

Internal structuration of SMOs is an immediate consequence of the resource flow. This second set of parameters refers to processes of formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation and integration. Formalization means the development of formal membership criteria, the introduction of formal statutes and established procedures, the creation of a formal leadership and office structure. Professionalization means the management by paid staff members who make careers out of movement work.[8] Internal differentiation concerns the functional division of labor (task-structure) and the territorial decentralization (territorial subunits). The integration of the differentiated functional and territorial subunits is achieved by horizontal coordinating mechanisms, and by centralization of decisions. Oligarchization – the concentration of power in the hands of a minority of the SMO members – is the most well known "integrative mechanism" of SMOs. As

SMOs grow, that is, as the amount of their resources increases, their internal structuration will become more elaborate with respect to all of these dimensions. The process of internal structuration is virtually inevitable, if the SMO is to have success in the long run. The German Greens, not an SMO but a party close to the NSMs, provide ample evidence of the inevitability of this process. Their internal structural deficits imposed important restrictions on their possible political success (Raschke 1991; Kleinert 1991). Internal structuration also contributes to the stabilization of an SMO in periods of organizational decline. McCarthy and Zald (1977) suggest that older, established SMOs are more likely than newer ones to persist throughout the cycle of organizational growth and decline. In a similar vein, Staggenborg (1988) argues that formalized SMOs are able to maintain themselves – and the movement – over a longer period of time than informal ones. This is particularly important in periods of demobilization, when movement issues are less pressing. Formal SMOs may perform important maintenance functions after the victory or demise of informal ones (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986: 827). Finally, as Staggenborg points out, formal SMOs which maintain themselves in periods of demobilization are also prepared to take advantage of new political opportunities which may arise at some point. Centralization contributes to stability of an SMO, too. Thus, Taylor (1989) shows that in a period of decline of the American women's movement, the major SMO of the movement functioned almost entirely on the national level with a federated structure in which local and state chapters had little autonomy. Centralization ensures a relatively advanced level of specialized skills among core activists.

External structuration refers to the integration of an SMO in its organizational environment. There are at least three dimensions to be taken into consideration in this regard: the SMO's relation with its constituency, its allies, and the authorities. By definition, an SMO is highly dependent on its constituency, since its main activity consists in mobilizing its constituency for collective action. Still, the dependency on the constituency can be of varying degrees. By providing selective incentives to its constituency, an SMO may be less dependent on fluctuating individual commitments. By appealing to conscience constituents, by providing services to the general public or acquiring public subsidies, the SMO may broaden its resource base. Diversification of the resource base generally decreases dependency on a single supportive group. This not only applies to the constituency, but also to allies and authorities. SMOs develop in close interaction with their allies and the authorities which they challenge. Support from a powerful ally is ambivalent from the point of view of the development of an SMO: On the one hand, such an ally may provide important resources; on the other hand, it may also reduce the autonomy of the SMO and threaten its stability in the long run. Similarly, the establishment of a working relationship with the authorities also has ambivalent implications for the development of the SMO: On the one hand,

public recognition, access to decision-making procedures and public subsidies may provide crucial resources and represent important successes for the SMO; on the other hand, the integration into established systems of interest intermediation may impose limits on the mobilization capacity of the SMO and alienate important parts of its constituency, with the consequence of weakening it in the long run.

Finally, a fourth set of parameters of organizational development concerns an SMO's *goal orientations and action repertoires.* According to the well-known Weber-Michels model, SMOs typically undergo three types of changes as they age: oligarchization, goal transformation, and a shift to organizational maintenance. In this model, goal transformation inevitably takes the direction of greater conservatism – the accommodation of the SMO's goals to the dominant societal consensus. Organizational maintenance is a special form of goal transformation in which the primary activity of the SMO becomes the maintenance of membership, funds, and other requirements of organizational existence. In the process, the action repertoire of the SMO is also expected to be modified. It is expected to become more moderate, more conventional, more institutionalized. Zald and Ash (1966) have taken issue with this model, maintaining that this type of transformation is not inevitable, but that it depends on certain conditions. In a similar vein, I would like to suggest that there are at least four possible transformations of an SMO which correspond to the four types of movement-related organizations distinguished in Figure 7.1: An SMO can become more like a party or an interest group; it can take on characteristics of a supportive service organization; it can develop in the direction of a self-help group, a voluntary association or a club; or it can radicalize, that is, become an ever more exclusive organization for the mobilization for collective action. Figure 7.2 presents the different variants using the same format as the previous one.

Institutionalization implies a whole set of transformations in the course of which an SMO becomes more like a party or an interest group. This set includes the stabilization of an SMO's resource flow, the development of its internal structure, the moderation of its goals, the conventionalization of its action repertoire, and its integration into established systems of interest intermediation. *Commercialization* is the transformation in the direction of a service organization. Along this route, an SMO puts an increasing emphasis on the provision of paid services to the members of its constituency. Many SMOs use, of course, "selective incentives" to mobilize their constituencies for collective action. According to Olson's (1965) theory of collective action, there is actually no other way to get collective action going – except maybe coercion. But usually, for an SMO the provision of "selective incentives" is not an end in itself. To the extent that it becomes an end in itself, the SMO has turned into a service organization or a business enterprise. *Involution* is the path that leads to an exclusive emphasis on "social incentives," which

constituency/client orientation

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
Figure 7.2. Typology of transformations of goal orientations and action repertoires of SMOs.

may stem from the solidary services to the constituency or from the social activities with the other activists of the organization. In the first variant, the SMO becomes a self-help group or a voluntary association, depending on whether the beneficiaries are identical with its constituency or not. In the second variant, it becomes a club. *Radicalization,* finally, is the path to rein-vigorated mobilization. Classic discussions of the subject such as the one of Zald and Ash (1966) have focused on a juxtaposition of radicalization and institutionalization, but have not taken into consideration the other two pos-sibilities.

Determinants of organizational development

The organizational development is a function of factors both internal and external to the SMS. With respect to internal factors we may distinguish between the internal organizational dynamics and the type of the movement in question. With respect to external factors, there are general economic and cultural preconditions as well as political ones. Here, I shall focus on the impact of the political context on the organizational development, but I do not assume that the other aspects are unimportant, nor shall I neglect them in the subsequent analysis.[9] As far as *internal organizational dynamics* are concerned, I have already pointed out that the internal structuration may contribute to an SMO's stabilization over time. The internal structuration may also affect the strategic and tactical choices of SMOs (Staggenborg

1988). For example, formalized and professionalized SMOs tend to engage in institutionalized tactics and typically do not initiate disruptive direct-action tactics. They prefer institutionalized tactics, because they are more compatible with a formalized structure and with the schedules of professionals. Moreover, the internal structuration also contributes to the integration into established systems of interest-intermediation: SMOs with formalized and professionalized structures tend to have easier access to public authorities, because government bureaucracies prefer to deal with organizations with working procedures similar to their own.[10]

The *type of movement* is quite crucial for the development of its organizational infrastructure. Movements differ especially with respect to the composition of their respective constituency, their goal orientation, and their action repertoire. We shall deal here only with the so-called new social movements (NSMs), a set of movements that have mobilized since the early seventies in Western Europe. Instead of entering a theoretical discussion of what constitutes a "new social movement," I shall simply give a list of the major examples of NSMs: the ecology movement and its antinuclear branch; the solidarity movement with its branches for humanitarian aid, political refugees, political prisoners, human rights, and antiracism; the peace movement, the women's movement, and the urban autonomous movement. While it can be argued that these movements all share a common core constituency (Kriesi 1989a), it is useful to distinguish between three types of NSMs in the present context (Koopmans 1990b): instrumental, subcultural, and countercultural movements. *Instrumental* movements seek to obtain specific collective goods or to prevent specific collective "bads." They are not much concerned with the collective identity of their constituency. Typical examples are the peace movement, the ecology movement, and the solidarity movement. By contrast, *subcultural* movements, such as the gay movement or (parts of) the women's movement, aim at the (re)production of a collective identity that is primarily constituted in within-group interaction, but which depends on authority-oriented action as well. *Countercultural* movements, such as the urban autonomous movement, are also identity-oriented, but they constitute their identity mainly in conflictual interaction with authorities or third parties.

The differences in the general orientation of the three types of movements tend to affect their organizational development in significant ways. The level and type of resources of an SMI is likely to be a function of the movement's general orientation. Thus, SMOs of instrumental NSMs are typically inclusive: They try to mobilize as large a part of the population as possible to obtain their issue-specific goal. For this reason alone, they can be expected to accumulate more members and more financial resources than the identity-oriented movements. Identity is tied to certain specific characteristics of the constituency, which implies exclusivity and a more circumscribed member-

ship. On the other hand, exclusive, identity-oriented SMIs are likely to suc-
ceed in mobilizing a more intensive commitment from their constituency.
This provides them with an alternative to internal structuration for their
stabilization in the long run. Thus, Kanter's (1972) research on American
communes concludes that groups characterized by high commitment are
more likely to retain participants and to endure. Commitment is especially
important for holding an SMO alive between stages of mass mobilization
(Taylor 1989). This line of argument suggests the SMIs of sub- and counter-
cultural movements to be particularly resistant to their movement's decline.
Within the category of instrumental movements, the institutionalization of
the resource flow seems to be especially problematic for all the movements
which are highly issue-specific as well as for movements that focus on interna-
tional issues. The more a movement focuses exclusively on a single issue, the
more it becomes dependent on the issue-attention cycle. For international
issues, in particular, this cycle seems to be typically quite short. Moreover,
international issues tend to be highly polarized in party-political terms,
which introduces an additional unpredictable element (see below). Given
these considerations, the peace movement and the solidarity movement
should generally have greater difficulties in stabilizing their resource base
than the ecology movement. Except for its antinuclear branch, which is also
rather issue-specific, the latter is confronted with a highly differentiated, com-
plex and national problem-structure. Finally, the type of movement may also
be expected to have an effect on the pattern of transformation followed by the
SMI: Instrumental movements are most likely to institutionalize, subcultural
movements are likely to follow the paths of involution or commercialization,
whereas countercultural movements typically radicalize.

In addition to the factors internal to the SMS, external factors also deter-
mine its development. The *economic* development of a country determines
the level of resources generally available for the sector. According to the argu-
ment of McCarthy and Zald (1977), an expanding supply of resources in a
society will incite political entrepreneurs to found new professional SMOs,
which will compete for these resources and contribute to the organizational
development of the movement. *Cultural* factors may also play a role. Such
factors as the Anglo-Saxon political culture or a strong Protestant heritage
have, for example, been invoked to explain the differences that exist with
regard to the participation in "voluntary associations" of different countries
(see Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 1992).[11] In the present essay, I shall above all be
interested in the way *political* factors contribute to the organizational devel-
opment of NSMs. In order to study their impact, I shall rely on the conceptu-
alization of the political opportunity structure (POS), which I have developed
previously (Kriesi 1991) and which we have already applied to the compara-
tive analysis of the level of mobilization (Kriesi et al. 1992). As in that previ-
ous analysis, I shall use the same four countries – France, Germany, the

Netherlands, and Switzerland – to illustrate and test my propositions. If political factors are not likely to have a direct impact on the internal structuration of an SMI, they seem to be particularly relevant for the determination of the level and type of resources available to an SMI, for its external structuration as well as for the general patterns of its transformation in the course of its organizational development.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The POS can be decomposed into three broad sets of properties: the formal institutional structure of a political system, its informal procedures and prevailing strategies with regard to challengers, and the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers. The first two sets provide the general static setting for the organizational development, and they constrain the relevant configuration of power. The formal institutional structure determines the overall strength of the state. The latter may change over time, as a result of electoral changes, strategic decisions, or the dynamic of the interactions between challengers and authorities.

The general political context

On the basis of the first two sets, I have distinguished between four types of general settings, each of which corresponds to one of the four countries mentioned above. Figure 7.3 presents the four types. The combination of a strong state and an exclusive dominant strategy defines a situation of *selective exclusion* of challengers. In such a situation, the challenger can neither count on formal nor on informal access to the political system. Because of its strength, the state can often choose merely to ignore challengers; if it does react, however, it will most likely confront the challenger with repression. Moreover, since the state is strong, the challenger is unlikely to have some veto power. But, depending on the composition of government, he may obtain some substantive concessions. Thus, a government controlled by the Left may use the state's capacity to act for concessions on behalf of the challenging NSMs.[12] This type is represented by France. At the opposite end of "selective exclusion," we find the case of *full procedural integration,* which is characterized by the combination of a weak state with an inclusive dominant strategy. In such a situation, repression is comparatively weak and the challenger's access to the system is formally as well as informally facilitated. Given the weakness of the system, the challenger cannot count on important substantive concessions, but he may be able to block decisions by exercising a veto. This type is represented by Switzerland. The direct democratic institutions as well as the federalist structure of Switzerland provide for a large

Dominant strategy	Formal institutional structure	
	Weak state	Strong state
exclusive	**"formalistic inclusion"** - formal, but no informal facilitation of access; strong repression - possibility of veto, but no substantive concessions **(Germany)**	**"selective exclusion"** - neither formal nor informal facilitation of access; strong repression - neither possibility of veto, substantive concessions, depending on configuration of power **(France)**
inclusive	**"full procedural integration"** - formal and informal facilitation of access; weak repression - possibility of veto, but no substantive concessions **(Switzerland)**	**"informal cooptation"** - no formal, but informal facilitation of access; weak repression - no possibility of veto, but substantive concessions **(Netherlands)**

Figure 7.3. The general settings for the approach of members towards challengers.

number of formal access points for challengers. The traditionally integrative strategy enhances the general effect of the formal structure. Germany represents one of the two intermediate types, the one of *formalistic inclusion*. In this situation, the challenger can count on formal, but not on informal facilitation of access. There is a possibility of veto, but no concessions can be expected. The federal structure of the German Republic allows for a multiplication of points of access. Moreover, the strong position of the German judiciary provides the challengers with another set of independent access points. However, the repressive legacy of the system implies that those who articulate themselves outside of the formally available channels will be confronted with strong repression. The second intermediary case, the one of *informal cooptation,* is represented by the Netherlands. In such a setting, challengers do not have a lot of formal access, but they can count on informal facilitation. Since the Dutch state is also quite strong, it is able to make considerable substantive concessions, and it can prevent challengers from exerting a veto.

As Tocqueville has already observed, a strong state goes together with a weak society and vice versa. The lack of decentralized access to the state discourages self-organization at the local grassroots level. Similarly, a repres-

sive dominant strategy serves to discourage self-organization. In the tradition of the French revolution, the French state in particular has long resisted the formation of associations of any kind. Thus, the organizational development of most associations in France has traditionally been less solid than in many other countries. The comparative weakness of the French trade unions illustrates this point (Rosanvallon 1988; Visser 1987), as does the comparative weakness of French voluntary associations in general (Curtis et al. 1992). Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975: 43) have argued that this weakness of French organizations may be more apparent than real. They point out that, in France, associations often form as offshoots of organizations already in existence – the Catholic Church, the Communist Party, and so on; and though coherent and active, many do not acquire formal, legal existence. Moreover, the state's active resistance to formally constituted associations may have reinforced the tendency to form such groups in the shadows. But, informal structures and dependency on external support are no signs of organizational development. In fact, the arguments of the Tillys indicate an additional mechanism that serves to weaken the French organizational structure, to which I shall return below.

By contrast, Switzerland's weak state corresponds to a highly organized society. The self-organization of society has gone very far in this country, the central state having traditionally intervened only as a last resort. According to the principle of subsidiarity, societal problems are first tackled by private self-organization, then by the local or regional branches of the state. Only if these subsidiary instances are no longer able to deal with a given problem, it is up to the central state to find a solution. At first sight, the Netherlands' strong, centralized state is not as propitious to organizational development as the weak Swiss federal state. However, with respect to the stimulation of society's self-organization, Dutch pillarization has long served as a functional equivalent to Swiss federalism (Kriesi 1990). Pillarization implied the construction of parallel organizational infrastructures in different walks of social life; that is, it constituted a very strong stimulus to societal self-organization. If both federalism and pillarization stimulate self-organization, they have, however, quite different implications for organizational structuration: Federalism is a state structure that stimulates the self-organization of society but that also implies that the development of the societal organizations is, as long as possible, left to their own devices. By contrast, pillarization is a societal structure that, while having traditionally stimulated self-organization, always coexisted with a centralized, strong state, that has facilitated this self-organization, following its strategy of "informal co-optation." Such facilitation includes public recognition, consultation, and even subsidization. We would, therefore, expect the Dutch SMIs to be at least as well developed as the Swiss ones, but possibly even more than the latter. According to the comparative study of Curtis et al. (1992), the Dutch have,

indeed, a very high level of membership in voluntary associations. Excluding church and union memberships, their level turns out to the highest one of all the countries compared.[13] Although Switzerland has not been included in this study, comparable figures are available from a study on Swiss values (Melich 1992). It turns out that the Swiss level of membership in voluntary associations is exactly as high as the one in the Netherlands if we exclude both church and union memberships (which both are comparatively weak in this country).[14]

Germany, finally, presents an intermediary case. The openness of the weak state stimulates societal self-organization, but the repressive legacy and the traditional distance between the state and German society suggest that, with respect to the public sphere, this self-organization is less developed than in the two smaller countries. Sontheimer (1989: 111) argues that Germany is characterized by a well-organized private sphere, which is, however, not sufficiently integrated into the structure of the public space. Private and public spheres are not automatically complementary in this country. Thus, Almond and Verba (1963) had found a rather high level of membership in voluntary associations for Germany, but the percentage of *active* membership was as low as in Italy or Mexico. They interpreted this result as an indication that while the political structures in Germany were well developed, they did not (yet) play a significant role in the lives of the citizens. Since the early sixties, the attitude of the citizens toward their state has improved and political participation has substantially increased. Germany has become a "normal" Western democracy (Rudzio 1987; Koopmans 1992). According to the data of Curtis et al. (1992), German membership in voluntary associations, excluding church and unions, is slightly above the average of the countries compared. It is certainly higher than in France, but lower than in the Netherlands and Switzerland.

The configuration of power

With respect to the configuration of power in the party system of relevance for NSMs, I have maintained that particular attention should be paid to the configuration of power on the Left (Kriesi 1991). The supporters of NSMs have typically been recruited from the political Left. Only more recently, the parties of the Right have made attempts – especially in the area of environmental politics – to take up some of the demands on the agenda of the NSMs. To the extent that they become more open to NSMs' demands, we would expect the configuration of power of the parties on the Right to become more relevant, too. Two aspects of the configuration on the Left are of particular importance: whether or not the Left is divided between a major Communist current and a Social Democratic/Socialist one, and whether or not the Left participates in government. Among our four countries, France

is the only one with a split Left. This has implied a strong polarization within
the Left as well as between the Left as a whole and the Right. Under condi-
tions of a split Left, both major currents within the Left try to instrumen-
talize the NSMs for their own purposes: first, to gain ascendancy on the Left
and then to win the electoral competition with the Right. From the point of
view of the organizational development of a movement's infrastructure, all
party political instrumentalization is likely to have a destabilizing effect. The
SMI becomes dependent on the vicissitudes of party politics. If the terms of
party competition change, the Left is likely to abandon its support for the
SMI in question. This has happened in France, when the Left came to power
in 1981 (Duyvendak 1992). The implications for the overall resource levels
of the SMIs of the NSMs can be expected to have been very serious, given
that these movements have become highly dependent on the support by the
Left. Moreover, the Communists' strategy with respect to NSMs has particu-
larly negative implications for the development of an SMI: while the Social
Democrats tend to ally themselves more loosely to already existing SMOs in
a given movement, the Communists tend to create their own SMOs in order
to dominate the SMI of the movement in question (see Garner and Zald
1987: 313f.). The presence of SMOs colonized by the Communist Party is
bound to introduce competitive tensions within the SMI, since not all SMOs
are likely to associate themselves with the Communist cause, and most are
unlikely to accept the Communists' claim to leadership. We should add that
the Communists' strategy to control SMIs has not touched all NSMs to the
same extent. It has been especially virulent in the case of instrumental NSMs
related to international issues that concern the competition between the for-
mer Communist regimes and the West, that is, in the case of the peace move-
ment and the solidarity movement. The ecology movement, by contrast, has
been much less affected by this strategy. Ceteris paribus, we, therefore, expect
that the French peace and solidarity movements have particularly weak
SMIs.

   Party political instrumentalization of NSMs with all its negative conse-
quences for the stabilization of the SMIs is less conspicuous in the other three
countries. But the Left in other countries has not been free of attempts to
instrumentalize certain movements for its own purposes: Thus, the Dutch
Social Democrats have been very supportive of the peace movement's cam-
paign against cruise missiles. After it had turned out that this support did
not pay off in electoral terms, the Social Democrats abandoned the move-
ment after their defeat in the 1986 elections, contributing to its decline (van
Praag, Jr. 1992). This is an example of the atypical case of a Social Demo-
cratic Party in the opposition that withdraws from supporting an NSM. By
moving closer to the center, the Dutch Social Democrats hoped to become a
viable coalition partner again for the governing Christian Democrats. There
is also an example of the unlikely case of a Socialist government supporting

the mobilization of a new movement: The French socialists in government lent a helping hand to SOS racism, thus reinvigorating the French solidarity movement beyond what I have just expected. The Socialists' support of this particular movement was part of their strategy against the extreme Right in France, which proved to be increasingly menacing in electoral terms (Duyvendak 1992). These two examples serve to relativize the general notion that the Left in government will not facilitate the mobilization of NSMs, while it will do so when in government.

<center>DATA</center>

In a research project on the development of NSMs in Western Europe during the eighties, systematic information has been gathered on the organizational development of five NSMs in the four countries introduced above.[15] The five NSMs studied include the three most important instrumental movements – the peace, ecology, and solidarity movements, a subcultural movement – the gay movement, and a countercultural movement – the urban autonomous movement. At the outset, we decided to study in detail at least the five most important SMOs of each movement. For various reasons, the number of SMOs finally studied is more variable than we had originally planned. In some cases, we have information on less than five SMOs, mainly because of problems of access (especially in the case of the urban autonomous movement), but also because there simply were not enough SMOs of some importance (in the cases of the gay movements in Germany and Switzerland). For some instrumental movements, considerably more than five SMOs have been studied, mainly for reasons linked to the respective country studies. This uneven character of the data base obviously poses a problem of comparability. At various points, I shall, therefore, analyze subsamples of organizations which are more comparable than the sample as a whole in order to check for the latter's representativeness. Table 7.1 gives a summary view of the set of organizations included in the study.

   The data were collected on the basis of documentary materials and of personal, highly structured interviews with representatives of the SMOs. They include information about all aspects of the organizational development that have been discussed. Most of the data concern the situation in 1988–89. For some aspects, we have obtained rough indicators of time trends during the eighties. In some instances, we have been able to obtain yearly figures for membership and financial resources concerning the period from 1975 to 1989. Unfortunately, the quality of the data is rather low. There are many missing values, and many rough estimates based on informed judgment by the interviewers or interpolations by the author. SMOs typically do not busy themselves with keeping detailed records of their own development. Moreover, to the extent that such records exist somewhere, the present-day staff

Table 7.1. *Data base*

Movement	Country				
	Netherlands	Germany	France	Switzerland	All
Peace movement	2	4	5	6	17
Ecology movement	10	11	4	10	35
Solidarity movement	7	8	8	13	36
Gay movement	4	3	7	3	17
Autonomous movement	1	2	1	5	9
Total	24	28	25	37	114

has often not been able or willing to unearth them and to make them available for research. Given the limited number of cases and the low level of measurement, the subsequent analysis will typically be quite simple.

Before turning to the presentation of some results with respect to each one of the four sets of parameters of organizational development, I would like to draw the reader's attention to one more limitation of this dataset: Data on the most important SMOs of a social movement give only a partial idea of the extent and the character of its organizational development. In fact, these SMOs constitute only the tip of a movement's organizational iceberg. Moreover, this tip is likely to represent the SMI's most developed part. The following analyses shall, therefore, without any doubt overestimate the extent of the organizational development of the organizational infrastructure of the NSMs as a whole. There is one exception to this limitation: With respect to the transformation of the movements' action repertoires some additional data are available. Following the lead of others (Kriesi et al. 1981; McAdam 1983b; Tarrow 1989a; Tilly et al. 1975), we have collected systematic data on protest events by analyzing the Monday editions of one major newspaper in each country for the period 1975–1989. For each event, we have coded a limited number of facts, among which the the identities of up to three (if any) SMOs that were associated with it. These data provide an opportunity to compare the development of the action repertoires of the various movements and of different parts of their organizational infrastructures in the four countries.

ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH AND DECLINE

The two indicators for the level of resources to be used here are membership size and amount of financial resources in 1988–89. The most important SMOs of a movement typically include those most richly endowed with re-

Table 7.2. *Membership of four international SMOs in 1989 by country (in thousands)*

SMO	Country			
	NL	G	F	CH
Greenpeace	640	600	5	24
WWF	100	75	—[a]	130
Amnesty International	120	23	21	47
Terre des Hommes	66	40	28	30
Total (absolute)	926	738	54	231
Total (per million inhabitants)	62	12	1	36

[a]No information.

sources, although this has not been the only criterion for their selection. Some SMOs may be important for their mobilization capacity, even if they do not have many members or much financial resources at their disposal. The German BBU (Federal League of Citizen Initiatives for Environmental Protection), for example, is a peak association of the ecology movement with no direct membership and only a small amount of resources, but with an impressive mobilization capacity and an important impact on public opinion during most of the period studied (Rucht 1989a: 73). I shall use three types of comparisons with respect to resource levels: (1) the comparison of four international SMOs with chapters in all four countries, (2) the comparison of the four largest SMOs per movement in each of the four countries, and (3) the comparison of our whole sample of SMOs across the four countries and the five movements. The four counties are, of course, of widely different size, with the German and French populations being about four times as large as that of the Netherlands and about ten times as large as that of Switzerland. To take these differences into account, I present not only absolute figures but also corresponding relative figures per 1 million inhabitants.

Table 7.2 presents the first comparison for size of membership. The four SMOs compared include Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) from the ecology movement, and Amnesty International and Terre des Hommes from the solidarity movement. The results are quite clear: In absolute and in relative terms, these organizations are strongest in the Netherlands, followed by Germany (in absolute terms) and Switzerland (in relative terms), while their French counterparts are much weaker. The exceptional size of the Dutch and German branches of Greenpeace are particularly noticeable. Their weight will make itself felt in all the following analyses. If we take the four largest SMOs per movement and compare across countries, these first

results are largely confirmed.[16] Table 7.3 shows the French SMOs again to be by far the weakest. The Swiss SMOs now appear to be about as strong as the Dutch, if the different sizes of the countries are taken into account. In absolute terms, the Dutch SMOs can count on the largest membership, although the country is much smaller than Germany or France. Taking into account the size of the countries, German SMOs take an intermediary position. In addition, Table 7.3 indicates systematic differences between the membership levels of the various movements, which are largely independent of the country under study. In line with our expectations, instrumental movements typically have more members than the subcultural movement.[17] Moreover, among the former, the ecology movement has by far the largest number of members, and the peace movement by far the least. The only exception from this general pattern turns out to be France. In France, the four largest SMOs of the solidarity movement have more members than their counterparts in the ecology movement. The explanation rests with the fact that in France, as we have seen, the solidarity movement has received strong support from the Socialist government, whereas the same government has not been supportive at all with regard to the ecology movement. As a matter of fact, the French Socialist government has launched an outright attack on Greenpeace: With its consent, the French secret service bombed the *Rainbow Warrior* in New Zealand in 1985, killing one man. Greenpeace France suffered much from this blow, losing both members and financial support in its aftermath. The results for financial resources (not shown here) largely parallel those for membership, since, as we shall see below, membership contributions are generally the most important source of income of the SMOs. In particular, the analysis of the financial resources again reveals the striking weakness of the French ecology movement. As a matter of fact, roughly 80 percent of the financial resources of the French NSM subsector are in the hands of the SMOs of the solidarity movement.

Our data allow a more detailed analysis of membership growth of the ecology movement in the three countries, where this movement has come to dominate the NSM subsector. Figure 7.4 shows how the three (or four) largest SMOs of the movement have developed in the period 1975–1989. Overall, all three SMIs have grown impressively during this period. Analyzing the pattern of growth in more detail, we notice that traditional *conservationist* SMOs – such as the German association for bird protection (DBV) or the Dutch association for the protection of nature (*natuurmonumenten*) – which had been founded long before the rise of NSMs, grow very slowly or have an essentially stable membership. Somewhat older *environmentalist* SMOs – such as the WWF in Switzerland – which adopt a pragmatic attitude toward the preservation and improvement of the human environment, no longer grow very much either. In fact, the rapid growth of these SMIs in the eighties is primarily due to the spectacular growth of newly created environmentalist or *ecologist* SMOs – such as the Swiss transport association (VCS) and,

Table 7.3. *Membership of the four largest SMOs in 1989 per movement and country*[a]

SMO	Country			
	NL	G	F	CH
(in thousands)				
Ecology movement	1,026 (4)	1,024 (4)	12 (3)	373 (4)
Solidarity movement	165 (3)	113 (4)	77 (4)	93 (4)
Peace movement	—[b]	25 (3)	31 (4)	16 (4)
Gay movement	24 (3)	19 (3)	35 (4)	1 (3)
Total (absolute)	1,215 (10)	1,181 (14)	155 (15)	483 (15)
Total (per million inhabitants)	81	19	3	74
(in %)				
Ecology movement	84	86	8	77
Solidarity movement	14	10	50	19
Peace movement	—[b]	2	20	3
Gay movement	2	2	23	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

[a]In parentheses: number of cases.
[b]No information.

above all, Greenpeace.[18] The Swiss pattern proves to be particularly interesting, since it implies a diversification of the SMI to a new policy area – transport policy – which is accompanied by an increase in the division of labor and horizontal coordination among the SMOs in the sector. Thus, the newly founded VCS concentrates on transport issues, while the Swiss energy foundation focuses on energy policy, the small Swiss association for the protection of the environment on questions such as air pollution, and the WWF as well as the large, traditional Swiss federation for the protection of nature deal in the first place with the conservation of the environment. In comparison to the Swiss pattern, the development of the German and Dutch SMIs appear to be more fragile, given the competitive attitude Greenpeace has adopted with regard to the other SMOs in the field.

As I have argued here, early in the mobilization process of a social movement, its SMOs cannot yet count on a stable resource flow. Instead, they depend on ad hoc commitments of activists. To the extent that they survive the vicissitudes of the early phases of the mobilization process and that they are able to establish a certain reputation for themselves, SMOs are likely to acquire a stable membership and a continuous financial resource flow. In other words, we expect that the amount of resources of a given SMO is not

Figure 7.4. Membership growth of major SMOs of the ecology movement in three countries.

only a function of the political context and the type of SMI it is operating in, but also a function of its *age*. For a test of this hypothesis, I distinguish very roughly between SMOs founded before 1965 – that is, before the first mobilizations of the NSMs took – and those that have been founded later on. As the discussion of the patterns of growth of the ecology movement have already indicated, we have included SMOs of the movements in question that had been created long before the so-called NSMs were first mobilized. The fact that these SMOs had already been established when the NSMs first appeared does not exclude them from being part of the SMIs of the respective movements. As a matter of fact, many of the classic SMOs have been reinvigorated by the new waves of mobilization, they have transformed their goals and action repertoires in accordance with these NSMs, and they have integrated themselves into the SMIs of these movements. Independently of the political context of the specific SMI, these classic SMOs can be expected to have more members and more financial resources than the SMOs that have been founded by the NSMs themselves.

Table 7.4 shows that, in general, this is, indeed, the case. On the average, classic SMOs have more members and more financial resources than the more recently founded SMOs. But there is one exception to this generalization, which is so important that it reverses the relationship in one of our four countries, that is, in Germany. The exception concerns Greenpeace. If we include Greenpeace in the analysis, the more recently founded SMOs in Germany turn out to be more resourceful than the classic ones. If we exclude Greenpeace from the analysis, Germany joins the general pattern. Germany is special in that the enormous mobilization by Greenpeace far exceeds anything that has previously been known in this country. In a sense, this exceptional situation confirms our general discussion of the German political context. As I have argued, political participation has traditionally been low, which would explain the relatively low level of membership of the classic SMOs. With the rise in the level of political involvement, especially in the younger generations, it is the newcomers to the political scene who have been likely to profit the most. From this perspective, it is also quite telling that the resource level of the classic German SMOs is close to the French one, which is extraordinarily low compared to the corresponding levels in the Netherlands and Switzerland. By contrast, the resource level of the more recent German SMOs more closely resembles the corresponding levels in the smaller European countries. This result is in line with the general idea of Germany becoming a "normal" democracy.

INTERNAL STRUCTURATION

While the political context has been shown to have a strong influence on the resource level of the SMIs of NSMs, with respect to the internal structuration

Table 7.4. *Average resource levels by date of foundation and country*[a]

SMO	Before 1965	After 1965 (including Greenpeace)	After 1965 (without Greenpeace)	Total[b]
		Date of foundation		
Average membership (in thousands) per million inhabitants				
NL	5,710 (4)	3,530 (17)	1,080 (16)	3,940 (21)
G	790 (6)	1,140 (13)	411 (12)	1,020 (19)
F	250 (7)	80 (17)	80 (16)	130 (24)
CH	6,310 (6)	1,680 (26)	1,600 (25)	2,550 (32)
Total	2,920 (23)	1,640 (73)	920 (69)	1,950 (96)
Average financial resources (in thousand dollars) per million inhabitants				
NL	928 (2)	142 (11)	105 (12)	252 (13)
G	56 (7)	60 (20)	31 (19)	58 (27)
F	16 (6)	8 (15)	8 (14)	10 (21)
CH	827 (6)	89 (22)	69 (21)	246 (28)
Total	348 (21)	70 (68)	50 (64)	132 (89)

[a]Number of cases between parentheses.
[b]Corresponds to the respective columns in the previous table.

of the SMOs it is likely to be only of indirect significance. As suggested above, we expect the internal structuration to be mainly driven by the level of available resources and by the age of the SMO. The older and the more resourceful an SMO, the more likely it is to formalize, professionalize, and to differentiate its internal structure. Indirectly, by facilitating or constraining the amount of resources available to an SMO, the political context may contribute to the level of its internal structuration. As a first approximation, however, we may assume the internal structuration to result from internal organizational dynamics.

I have two indicators of internal structuration at my disposal, one for an SMO's degree of formalization and one for its degree of professionalization. *Formalization* is operationalized by a scale which takes into account whether an SMO has a legal status, whether it has a formal membership criterion (possibly based on financial obligations of one kind or another), whether it has institutionalized formal functions, and, if so, whether it has differentiated only the most basic functions (president, secretary, and treasurer) or also some more specialized ones. The resulting scale has a maximum value of 5. Only a small minority of the SMOs we studied have a structure which is not

formalized at all. More than half of them (57%) score on four or all five points considered. In other words: The overall level of formalization reached by the SMOs in our sample is quite considerable. It is a far cry from the decentralized, segmented, and informal organizational networks which have been said to be typical of NSMs. One should, of course, immediately add that our sample is not representative of the SMOs of the movements in question, since we have only considered the most important SMOs in each movement. Nevertheless, the relatively high level of formalization of these SMOs indicates that, at their center, the organizational networks of the NSMs have undergone substantial structural change by the end of the 1980s.

Professionalization is simply measured by the number of paid personnel. Admittedly, this gives us only an approximation of the actual level of professionalization, since not all the paid personnel are of a professionalized type. On the average, the SMOs in our sample have a paid staff of fourteen persons. The mean does not take into account large differences which exist in this respect: Roughly one-fourth of the SMOs do not have any paid staff at all, and about one-half do not have more than four paid staff members. On the other hand, about 10 percent of the SMOs have fifty paid staff members or more.

Formalization and professionalization are positively correlated, as are both of these indicators with the resource level and the age of an SMO. Table 7.5 presents these correlations (excluding Greenpeace). Independently of type of movement and country, the two parameters of internal structuration are a positive function of an SMO's age and resources, as we have expected.[19] But how are they precisely related to age and resources? We already know that resources are a positive function of age and I have already mentioned that financial resources are a direct function of a membership. In addition, it can be shown that the degree of formalization is a direct function of age and of the size of membership, but not of the level of financial resources. It is the complexity involved with large numbers of members which exerts pressure for formalization. Formalization, in turn, can be shown to be a first step in the direction of professionalization. Moreover, the greater the number of members and the larger the amount of financial resources available, the greater the need for professionalization, but also the more important the means allowing for this step to take place.[20] Given that, in absolute terms, they have a larger number of members and greater financial resources than their French and Swiss counterparts, the German and Dutch SMOs are more professionalized. The average number of persons employed varies between 23.5 and 18.2 for Germany and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and 9.2 and 8.6 for France and Switzerland, on the other hand. One may wonder why the Swiss SMOs are no more professionalized than the French, since they have considerably more resources at their disposal. The answer may again have to do with the peculiar political context of Switzerland: The fact

Table 7.5. *Bivariate correlations between characteristics of organizational structure* (n = *72; without Greenpeace*)

	1	2	3	4	5
1 age	–				
2 membership	.42	–			
3 financial resources	.33	.78	–		
4 formalization	.35	.39	.29	–	
5 professionalization	.32	.68	.64	.42	–

that the whole Swiss political system is still today functioning on a militia basis – another example of the pervasive applicability of the subsidiarity principle in this country – may account for the relative lack of professionalization of Swiss SMOs. Still, it should be noted that not all Swiss movements are unprofessional: The Swiss ecology movement turns out to be highly professionalized. In all the countries, the differences between the degree of professionalization of the various movements generally correspond to their levels of resources. Thus the ecology and solidarity movements are generally the most professionalized, while the urban autonomous movement and the peace movement are least professionalized.

EXTERNAL STRUCTURATION

Contrary to the internal structuration, the external structuration is, of course, a direct function of the political context. I have two indicators at hand for the analysis of this aspect of the organizational development of SMOs: the party preference of its membership base, and its alliances with partners outside of the subsector of the NSMs. With respect to the *party preferences* of the membership base, we find that virtually all the SMOs in all four countries have a membership preferring parties on the political Left. However, in addition to partisans of left-wing parties, some SMOs also recruit sympathizers of parties on the political Right. It comes as no surprise that, on the one hand, these SMOs are most numerous in Switzerland, where 43 percent of the SMOs also recruit sympathizers of the Right, and that, on the other hand, there exists not a single SMO recruiting sympathizers of the Right in France. The strong party-political polarization forces all the participants in French politics to take sides (Duyvendak 1992), while the less conspicuous character of the opposition between Left and Right in Switzerland allows for crossing the fault lines. Germany and the Netherlands lie between the extremes with 32 percent and 14 percent SMOs respectively that also recruit partisans from the Right.

Table 7.6. *Allies outside of the subsector of the NSMs: percentages of SMOs maintaining a given type of alliance*

Type of alliance	Country			
	NL	G	F	CH
All movements				
Left parties as a whole	38%	67%	68%	52%
Social Democrats	25	*67*	21	24
Communists	6	15	21	14
New Left/Greens	25	26	*53*	*48*
Unions	25	37	37	48
Churches	25	33	*5*	38
Authorities	*44*	4	0	5
n	(16)	(27)	(19)	(21)

In three of the four countries, a majority of the SMOs are also *allied* to parties on the Left, as is shown by Table 7.6.[21] Only two SMOs in our sample seem to be allied to a party on the Right – one in the Netherlands and one in Switzerland. Although SMOs of NSMs generally tend to have alliances with parties of the Left, there are some differences between the countries with respect to the most preferred alliance partner among the parties of the Left: While, in Germany, at the end of the 1980s the SPD was clearly the most likely alliance partner of the SMOs in our sample, in France and in Switzerland our SMOs preferred alliances with the Greens or with one of the small parties of the New or "Second" Left, which were founded in the aftermath of the students' movements of the late 1960s and have always been close to the cause of NSMs. The Dutch case is ambiguous in this regard. The Communists are a nonnegligible partner of these SMOs, but nowhere do they constitute their preferred ally, not even in France. It is tempting to interpret the differences between Germany, on the one hand, and Switzerland and France, on the other, by the fact that in Germany, the SPD has been out of government since the early 1980s, whereas the PS has been the governing party in France during most of the 1980s and, in Switzerland, it has participated in the governing coalition ever since 1959. While the SPD looked for a closer relationship with the NSMs in the course of the 1980s, chose a candidate for the chancellorship whose position was rather close to that of the supporters of NSMs, and allied itself with the Greens on the level of several Länder, the French PS has largely abandoned the NSMs' cause; Duyvendak (1992) even speaks of betrayal.

Table 7.6 also contains some information with respect to three other possible alliance partners: the unions, the churches, and the authorities. With respect to *unions,* I have argued in a previous paper (Kriesi 1991) that highly encompassing, corporatist union systems – such as the German one – are not very likely to facilitate the mobilization of NSMs. In addition, I have suggested that in union systems which are fragmented along party lines and dominated by a Communist controlled federation – such as the French system, there is a chance that a minoritarian union might appeal to segments of the new middle class which tend to be neglected by the dominant federation. The CFDT in France provides an illustrative example. Finally, I have suggested that union systems – such as the Dutch and the Swiss systems, which are fragmented along religious lines, but integrated into policy networks and pacified, provide the most favorable context from the point of view of NSMs. Not only has the class struggle been pacified in these countries, but the fragmentation of the union system makes for competition among unions, from which NSMs stand to profit. The present results do not allow any confirmation of these hypotheses, since there are no significant differences in the extent of support received by the NSM subsectors in the four countries. In all four cases, union support is substantial. A more detailed analysis shows that union support in all four countries primarily goes to SMOs of the peace and the solidarity movement, that is, to the two movements that have typically been most politicized by the Left: 38 percent of the SMOs of the peace movement and 61 percent of those of the solidarity movement have been supported by unions. Germany is the only country where also some SMOs of the ecology movement receive union support.

The peace movement and the solidarity movement are also the only ones that receive *church* support in all countries except France: overall, 25 percent of the SMOs of the peace movement and 49 percent of those of the solidarity movement have received support from churches. It is, of course, well known that churches are involved in these two movements. But it comes as a surprise to me that churches in France do not seem to share this involvement. The question is, whether this apparent absence of the churches from the two French movements is also a consequence of the strong politicization of these two movements in terms of the polarization between Left and Right.

Finally, the Netherlands turn out to be exceptional with respect to the large share of their SMOs which count the *authorities* among their allies. Almost half of the Dutch SMOs of our sample seem to be allied to some authorities, while there are no such ties in France and only one case each in the two other countries. If we analyze in more detail, we note that it is above all in the Dutch ecology movement, where these ties are frequent: All of the SMOs of this movement maintain alliances with authorities! This is the result, on the one hand, of the "new realism" adopted by the Dutch ecology movement in the course of the eighties (Cramer 1989), but, on the other hand, it also re-

flects the strategy of "informal cooptation" so typical for the Dutch author-
ities.

   The *diversification of alliance relationships* may prove to be crucial for an
SMO. This point is illustrated by a Swiss organization of the solidarity move-
ment that mobilized for the solidarity with immigrant laborers in Switzerland
(Cattacin and Passy 1992). It received substantial financial support from the
major union of construction workers, a larger majority of whose members
are immigrants from Southern Europe. The SMO defended the cause of the
union in the delicate political issue of the statute for seasonal workers,
allowing the union to keep a low profile without losing face. When this issue
lost its political explosiveness, the union also lost interest in the SMO and
stopped its support, which left the SMO with insufficient resources for sur-
vival. The number of external allies may serve as a rough indicator of an
SMO's diversification of its external relations.[22] According to this indicator,
the Swiss SMOs generally have a more diversified network of alliances than
the SMOs in the other countries. Controlling for the impact of the political
context, SMOs from instrumental movements have more diversified net-
works than the sub- and countercultural ones, with the networks of the
SMOs from the peace and solidarity movements being most diversified.

TRANSFORMATION OF GOALS AND ACTION REPERTOIRES

Goal transformation is difficult to capture by the kind of structural data I
have at my disposal. However, indirectly, by analyzing the sources of revenue
of an SMO, it is possible to get some limited idea of the direction of goal
transformation. We have asked questions about the shares of an organiza-
tion's revenue coming from membership contributions, public subsidies, allies
and other sources. The lower the share of membership contributions to an
organization's budget, the more autonomous it is with respect to its members
and the greater the likelihood that goals which are not of immediate concern
to its members are playing an important role in the considerations of the
organization's dominant coalition. The overall distribution of an SMO's reve-
nue over the four sources of income gives an idea of the degree to which its
resource base is diversified and of its degree of autonomy with respect to any
specific type of environment. The share of public subsidies in particular not
only indicates the extent to which an SMO is integrated into established sys-
tems of interest intermediation, but also serves as an indicator of a certain
pragmatism in terms of its goal orientation.[23]

   As is shown by Table 7.7, there are important country-specific differences
with regard to the *sources of revenue.* Swiss SMOs turn out to be more depen-
dent on their membership than the SMOs in the other three countries.[24] This
means that the Swiss subsector which has the most diversified network of
alliances is at the same time the one most reliant on its own devices – a result

Table 7.7. *Sources of revenue of SMOs (average shares of total revenue)*

	Membership	Subsidies	Allies	Other sources	(*n*)
Country					
NL	55%	22%	7%	16%	(16)
G	60	16	14	9	(23)
F	61	9	8	22	(25)
CH[a]	81	5	1	13	(12)
Movement[b]					
Ecology	55	23	5	17	(22)
Solidarity	56	12	16	16	(18)
Peace	68	2	21	9	(9)
Gay	60	14	4	22	(13)
Autonomous	94	5	0	0	(2)
Grand mean	63%	13%	8%	16%	(78)

[a]Information on some SMOs of the solidarity movement only.
[b]Excluding the Swiss SMOs.

which perfectly reflects the specificity of the Swiss political context: It is a context which allows for extensive consultation and political concertation, but which also puts a prime on self-reliance and self-organization following the principle of subsidiarity (see Kriesi 1980). The Dutch context, by contrast, not only favors mutual concertation, but it tends to lend a helping hand as well. The ecology, solidarity, and the gay movements all receive important subsidies in the Netherlands. This difference is illustrated by the sources of income of the Dutch Nicaragua Committee and the corresponding Swiss Committee for Central America: while the former is 60 percent subsidized by public authorities, the latter depends 90 percent on its membership and 10 percent on "other" sources. Pursuing this example one step further, we may note that the French Nicaragua Committee gets 50 percent of its revenue from its membership and 50 percent from "other sources" – "other sources" which are generally more important in France than elsewhere – compensating for the lack of membership and government support in this country. Public subsidies are most prominent for the ecology movement and the gay movement, which have received such support not only in the Netherlands, but also in the other countries. Thus 45 percent of the budget of the German BBU – the peak association of the citizens' action groups for environmental

protection – is covered by public subsidies, as are roughly one-third of the budgets of the French Amis de la Terre and of the FFSPN – the French professional peak association for environmental protection. If, in Switzerland, public support is still not forthcoming for the ecology movement, it has become important with respect to the gay movement in this country, too, as a consequence of the AIDS crisis. Everywhere, the governments are now collaborating with the subcultural SMOs that serve as intermediaries with respect to a population at risk to which the authorities have little access otherwise. The AIDS crisis provides an example of "suddenly imposed grievances" which restructure the external relations of an SMI and transform its goal orientations in a dramatic fashion, irrespective of the political context.

Financial support from allies is most likely for SMOs of the peace movement (in France), and for those of the solidarity movement (in the Netherlands and Germany). In France, the major SMOs of the peace movement are either allied to the Communist Party – such as the Mouvement de la Paix and the Appel des Cent, or to the New Left (the "Second Left") – such as CODENE (the committee for nuclear disarmament in Europe). They receive between 40 percent and 50 percent of their revenue from these allies. Needless to say that such support comes with strings attached. It illustrates once again the general point made about the politicization of the French peace movement in particular.

Turning now to the *transformation of the action repertoires,* we should first note that there are country-specific differences of action repertoires which correspond to what we would have expected on the basis of the differences in the political contexts (Kriesi et al. 1992): The French movements tend to be most radical; that is, they use unconventional and even violent forms of action more frequently than the movements in the other countries. The Swiss movements tend to be most moderate, given their frequent use of conventional channels of articulation of protest, while, overall, the action repertoires of Dutch and German movements tend to be of an intermediary degree of radicality.[25] In addition to these systematic overall differences, we also find important differences with respect to the transformation of the action repertoires over time which are related to differences in the corresponding political contexts. I would like to illustrate this point by studying more closely the development of the action repertoire of the *ecology movement* in particular. Figure 7.5 presents the development of the yearly percentages of unconventional events, smoothed over adjacent periods of three years for the ecology movement in each one of the four countries.[26] For France, we note that the percentage of unconventional events increases during the period 1975–1989. This indicates that the French ecology movement, which was already the most radical at the beginning of the period, radicalized even more throughout the 1980s. This development is in stark contrast with the strongly increasing conventionalization of the Dutch and the German branches. At the end

Figure 7.5. Development of the action repertoire of the ecology movement in the four countries.

of the 1970s, the action repertoires of both the German and the Dutch movements were about as radical as that of their French colleagues as a result of their radicalization in the course of the conflict about nuclear energy. Since the early 1980s, however, the repertoires of the German and Dutch movements have become more conventional, developing in the direction of the very conventional Swiss movement. These differences reflect the inverse changes in the configuration of power in France and Germany: Although the ecology movement lost its strongest ally, when the PS came to power in France in 1981, it gained an ally in Germany with the SPD losing power in 1982. In the case of the Netherlands, the conventionalization rather reflects the "new realism" of the ecology movement which came to dominate it after the defeat of its antinuclear energy branch in the early 1980s. However, not all the new social movements in a given country follow the same pattern of transformation of their action repertoire. There are differences in this respect between the various movements within a given country, which can, at least in part, be explained by movement-specific differences in political opportunities within one and the same country. This is illustrated by a comparison of the French ecology and solidarity movements (Figure 7.6). While the French ecology movement radicalized in the eighties, the French solidarity movement, which was also quite radical at the beginning of the eighties, deradicalized as it received increasing support from the governing PS.

It is possible to refine the analysis of the transformation of the action repertoire of the ecology movement somewhat further by looking more specifically at the organizations responsible for the various types of protest events. Even if not all events of a given movement are produced by its own SMOs, the general trend of the action repertoire of the movement as a whole is likely

Figure 7.6. Development of the action repertoire of the French ecology and solidarity movements.

to bear the marks of the development of its organizational base, and, in turn, is bound to have repercussions on it.[27] For this analysis, I introduce a distinction between the most important, relatively professional SMOs – that is, between the most developed part of the SMI of the ecology movement and organizationally less developed, more informal citizens' action groups.[28] Given the assumption that the large professional SMOs typically have a more moderate action repertoire than the latter groups, the development of the action repertoire of a given movement may be the result of a transformation of the action repertoire of each one of the two types of organizations or of a shift of the initiative from the one type to the other. Figure 7.7 allows a separation of these two effects for three of the four countries under study.[29] It shows the development of the total number of events and of the number of unconventional events for both professional SMOs and citizens' action groups for Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands. In other words, it not only shows trends (as the previous two figures) but it also gives an idea of the level of mobilization by the different types of SMOs. As we can see, in all three countries, the citizens' action groups have demobilized to a considerable extent toward the end of the 1980s. This demobilization has contributed to the deradicalization of the movements in Germany and the Netherlands, but not in Switzerland, since the Swiss citizens' action groups have always been rather conventional and since they have above all reduced the conventional part of their activities. In Germany and Switzerland, the demobilization of citizens' action groups was accompanied by a parallel increase of the protest activities of the professional SMOs. As far as the latter are concerned, their mobilization was almost exclusively conventional in Switzerland, some-

Figure 7.7. Development of the action repertoire of the SMOs of the ecology movement: professional SMOs and citizens' action groups in the four countries.

what more radical in Germany. In the Netherlands, finally, the initiative did not go over to the professional SMOs. With the demobilization of the citizens' action groups, the whole movement seemed to demobilize. This difference between Germany and Switzerland, on the one hand, and the Netherlands, on the other hand, may be interpreted in the light of an earlier result: As we have seen, the Dutch ecology movement has been integrated into established systems of interest intermediation; it is recognized and sub-sidized by the authorities to an extent which is as yet unknown in Switzer-land. In other words, the Dutch professional SMOs no longer need to mobi-lize at all, in order to introduce their points of view into the political process and to get things done. In Switzerland and Germany, the movement has also gained more access to the system, which is reflected in the conventionaliza-tion of its action repertoire. But even the professional SMOs still rely on (mainly conventional) mobilization of protest in order to get things done. If the ecology movement as a whole is by far the most institutionalized move-ment among the five compared, the SMOs of the Dutch ecology movement seem to have traveled farthest in the direction of becoming established inter-est groups.[30]

CONCLUSION

In this essay I have analyzed the internal and external determinants of the organizational development of NSMs, putting most emphasis on the impact of the political context without, however, focusing exclusively on political factors. If the general political setting and the configuration of power in the political system are important for the development of the organizational in-frastructure of NSMs, they are not the only factors of some relevance. First, this analysis has confirmed the idea that the internal structuration mainly follows internal organizational dynamics. Moreover, it has also indicated that there exist important differences between the organizational development of different movements, which are independent of the political context. Thus, the ecology movement is typically the most richly endowed, whereas the peace movement, the gay movement, and the urban autonomous movement have generally only few resources. We have also found movement-specific differences of external support: in general, the peace and solidarity move-ments are strongly supported by the Left – including unions – and by churches, whereas the gay movement, as a result of the AIDS crisis, receives public aid in all the countries. In addition, as we have expected, the different types of movements typically undergo different forms of transformation: although our indicators are far from optimal, they support the hypothesis that subcultural movements tend to commercialize or to follow the path of involution, while instrumental movements tend to institutionalize. Among the latter, the solidarity and peace movements typically have more difficulties

stabilizing than the ecology movement, given their particular problem struc-
ture, which makes them susceptible to conjunctural variations in public atten-
tion cycles and party politics. The ecology movements have typically gone
farthest in the direction of institutionalization as an interest group.

There are exceptions to these general patterns – exceptions which can be
accounted for by country-specific variations in the political context. Thus,
the particular weakness and the low level of institutionalization of the ecol-
ogy movement as well as the comparative strength of the solidarity move-
ment in France have been related to the specific strategies of the socialist
government. The unexpectedly weak professionalization of Swiss SMOs
made sense, if interpreted in terms of the prevalence of the militia system in
Swiss politics, and the unexpected impact of an SMO's age on its resource
level in the case of Germany could be interpreted in the light of the distant
relationship that traditionally existed between the state and society in that
country. But the political context is not only relevant for the explanation of
deviant cases with respect to movement-specific patterns. Its impact on re-
source levels, external structuration, and the transformation of goal orienta-
tions and action repertoires has been shown to be pervasive and systematic.
Thus, the French SMOs are generally weak, most radical, and most strongly
politicized by their partisan environment. By contrast, the SMOs in the two
smaller European democracies have a comparatively large membership, are
relatively well endowed with resources, relatively well integrated into estab-
lished systems of interest intermediation and comparatively moderate. The
Dutch SMOs not only have the highest resource levels (in absolute terms),
but they also have the most elaborate relations with authorities. The Swiss
SMOs are different from the Dutch to the extent that they have the most
diversified alliances and political recruitment patterns, but receive hardly any
support from authorities. German SMOs finally take an intermediary posi-
tion with respect to most aspects of the organizational development we have
been discussing here. These results generally confirm the relevance of the
political context for the mobilization of NSMs as well as the specific hypothe-
ses that have been formulated with regard to context-specific differences in
the organizational development of these movements.