

with. In countries such as the United States, businessmen and industrialists have been the most hostile critics of the greens. In India and Malaysia they are joined by state officials and technocrats, with both private and public promoters of development attacking environmentalists as motivated by foreigners, as creating law-and-order problems, or as wishing only to keep tribals and rural people 'backward,' placed in a museum for themselves and their fellow romantics to gawk at. The most famous and powerful of these anti-environmentalists has been the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohammed. In 1990, he announced that he and his government did not

intend to turn the Penan into human zoological specimens to be gawked at by tourists and studied by anthropologists while the rest of the world passes them by . . . It's our policy to eventually bring all jungle dwellers into the mainstream . . . There is nothing romantic about these helpless, half-starved and disease-ridden people.

Two years later, in a document specially prepared for the Earth Summit, Mahathir's government insisted that

The transition from cave and forest dwelling to village and urban living is a phenomenon that has marked the transformation of human societies from time immemorial. The environmental activists have no right to stand in the way of the Penans in this process of change and human development.

Not only with regard to the Penan, not just in Malaysia, it has been the signal contributions of environmental activists to speak truth to power, to ask of politicians and other rulers the uncomfortable questions: Development at what cost? Progress at whose expense?

Socialism and Environmentalism (or the Lack Thereof)

EARLY SOVIET ENVIRONMENTALISM

The affluent societies of the Europe and North America, along with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, are collectively known as the 'First' World; the poorer nations of the South, located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as the 'Third' World. This book has highlighted thinkers and movements from the First and Third Worlds, but has thus far left unmentioned the people and territories in between. It now arrives at the Second World, the countries behind the Iron Curtain which are neither rich nor poor and were distinguished, before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, by their commitment to the ideology of state socialism. The discussion shall focus on the Soviet Union, the erstwhile superpower that was the Big Brother of the Second World.

The previous chapter has spoken of the obsession of Brazilian and Indian politicians with catching up with the affluent societies. This obsession in fact manifested itself much earlier in the Soviet Union, soon after the First rather than the Second World War. The leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 hoped to catch up in military as well as economic terms, for they believed that only breakneck industrialization would save their beleaguered country from being overrun by the capitalist powers. As Joseph Stalin once said, 'We are fifty to one hundred years behind the most advanced

countries. We must close this gap in the span of ten years. Either we do that or they will sweep us away.' The worship of technology, the faith in industrial production as a means of solving social problems, the arrogant neglect of natural constraints, all helped shade the difference between Soviet communism and American capitalism. Writing in 1933, Aldo Leopold wrote insightfully of what worked to unite political systems apparently opposed to each other:

As nearly as I can see, all the new isms—Socialism, Communism, Fascism . . . outdo even Capitalism itself in their preoccupation with one thing: the distribution of more machine-made commodities to more people. Though they despise each other they are competitive apostles of a single creed: *salvation by machinery*.

Soviet programs of industrial reconstruction were buttressed by Marxism, an ideology which has an unshakeable faith in the powers of modern technology to tame and conquer nature. Marxists also believed that the abolition of private property leads automatically to a diminution of pollution, for the victory of communism would eliminate the capitalists who stoop to anything—putting untreated effluents into the water, for example—to protect their profits. In this view, any residual contamination of the environment would be taken care of by the all-seeing and all-knowing system of centralized planning.

With regard to philosophy and practice, then, Soviet Marxism was characterized, in the main, by a deep indifference to nature and natural limits. 'The proper goal of communism,' remarked Leon Trotsky in the early 1920s, 'is the domination of nature by technology, and the domination of technology by planning, so that the raw materials of nature will yield up to mankind all that it needs and more besides.' A decade later a Soviet scientist claimed that 'the history of humankind has been the road from slavery and blind subjection to the elemental forces of nature to the struggle [and] conquest of her . . . In conditions of socialism . . . the natural resource base for the economy is not contracting, but has all of the ingredients for limitless development.'

The signs were unpropitious, but as it happened in the first ten years of communist rule a fledgling conservation movement was to take impressive strides. There already existed a rich pre-revolutionary tradition of natural history and nature protection societies which had helped set aside endangered habitats. In the first week of November 1917, concurrent with the Bolshevik assumption of power, a Conservation Conference in Petrograd discussed a proposal 'On the Types

of Sites where it is Necessary to Establish *Zapovedniki* on the Model of the American National Parks.' In fact the Russian understanding of *Zapovedniki*, or protected areas, was more sophisticated than the American. National Parks in the U.S. had been established for cultural and nationalist reasons, whereas Soviet scientists were asking for sites of virgin nature to be selected on *ecological* criteria, to act as a 'baseline' from which to judge the suitability of human intervention in other, so to say unprotected areas.

LEON TROTSKY ON THE
SOCIALIST CONQUEST OF NATURE

One of the architects of the Russian Revolution outlines his vision of socialist man's domination of nature.

The present distribution of mountains and rivers, of fields, of meadows, of steppes, of forests and seashores, cannot be considered final. Man has already made changes in the map of nature that are not few nor insignificant. But they are mere pupil's practice in comparison with what is coming. Faith merely promises to move mountains; but technology, which takes nothing 'on faith', is actually able to cut down mountains and move them. Up to now this was done for industrial purposes (mines) or for railways (tunnels); in the future this will be done on an immeasurably larger scale, according to a general industrial and artistic plan. Man will occupy himself with re-registering mountains and rivers, and will earnestly and repeatedly make improvements in nature. In the end, he will have rebuilt the earth, if not in his own image, at least according to his taste. We have not the slightest fear that this taste will be bad . . .

. . . Through the machine, man in socialist society will command nature in its entirety . . . He will point out places for mountains and passes. He will change the course of the rivers, and he will lay down rules for the oceans. The idealist simpletons may say that this will be a bore, but that is why they are simpletons . . .

Source: Leon Trotsky, quoted in C. Wright Mills, *The Marxists* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 278–9.

Indeed, in the early years of Soviet rule both scientific research and university education flourished. The historian Douglas Weiner speaks of the 1920s as 'a golden age' for the teaching of biology in Russia. No longer subject to the 'shackles of the obscurantist Romanov censors, biology was free to introduce the most advanced notions into the classroom. An entire generation of geneticists, ecologists, and experimental biologists of world rank was in formation.'

Some names might be offered here. Among biologists of world repute were N. I. Vavilov, the great student, collector and classifier of crop races; and G. F. Gauze, who pioneered the idea of the 'ecological niche' of a species. One must also mention V. I. Vernadskii, the scholar to whom we owe the terms 'biosphere' and 'geosphere:' it was Vernadskii who, forty years before the publication of the *Limits to Growth* report of the Club of Rome, pointed out that natural productive forces 'have limits and that these limits are real; they are not imaginary and they are not theoretical. They may be ascertained by the scientific study of nature and represent for us an insuperable natural limit to our productive capacity.' A fourth scientist of note was the entomologist A. P. Semenov-tian-shanskii, who combined laboratory expertise with a romantic love of nature. Semenov-tian-shanskii was to will his collection of 700,000 insects to the Zoological Museum in Moscow; this included specimens of 900 species which he had discovered and first described himself. Little wonder that he thought nature to be the 'great book of the existence of all things,' a museum 'indispensable for our further enlightenment and mental development, a museum which, in the event of its destruction, cannot be reconstructed by the hand of man.' Society, believed Semenov-tian-shanskii, had 'a great moral obligation toward Nature,' yet industrial man was showing himself to be a 'geological parvenu . . . disrupting the harmony of nature,' determined to destroy 'that grand tableau which serves as the inspiration of the arts.'

This efflorescence of scientific research was accompanied by the creation and consolidation of conservation societies. These included the Central Bureau for the Study of Local Lore (TsBK, in its Russian acronym), which worked for the protection of natural as well as cultural heritage; a regional body, the All-Ukrainian Society for the Defense of Animals and Plants (ZhIVRAS); and the All-Russian Society for Conservation (VOOP), which drew into its fold some of the most distinguished Soviet scientists. By the late twenties TsBK boasted of 2000 branches and 60,000 members; the Ukrainian society claimed a membership of 9000; VOOP had only 1400 paid-up members, but it brought out the influential journal *Okbrana prirody*, an illustrated bi-monthly with a circulation in excess of 3000.

Scientists and their societies were encouraged by the Soviet dictator Vladimir Illyich Lenin, who was the brother of a biologist and a trekker and nature lover himself. It was Lenin who signed, in September 1921, a new decree for the 'Protection of Monuments of Nature, Gardens and Parks,' which prohibited hunting and fishing in existing

zapovedniki and encouraged the establishment of new ones. By 1929 there were 61 *zapovedniki* in the USSR, covering an area close to 4 million hectares. Woods falling outside these protected areas were governed by a Forest Code which was signed into law in July 1923: this promoted reforestation and sustained-yield logging while prohibiting clear-cutting in districts where forest cover was less than 8 per cent of the land area.

In retrospect the 1920s appear to have been a golden age for Soviet science and for Soviet environmentalism as well. 'Ecological conservation's moment in the Soviet sun,' remarks Weiner ruefully, 'was tragically brief.' There seem to be uncanny parallels between the defeat of Gandhism in India and the retreat of environmentalism in the USSR. Both streams, after promising beginnings, were vanquished by the rise to power of a philosophy of state-led industrialization that would not recognize natural constraints. But where the Gandhians merely went back to their *ashrams*, their Russian counterparts were less fortunate. Vernadskii, for example, spent many years in exile; Gauze was prohibited from designing new experiments; most tragic of all was the end of Vavilov, who, having crossed swords with the impostor Trofim Lysenko—Stalin's pet biologist—died in prison.

The demise of Soviet environmentalism was signalled by the first Five-Year Plan of 1929–34, which sought to radically alter production methods in agriculture and industry. The plan mandated an increase in timber production from 178 to 280 million cubic metres; other targets were equally far-reaching. There was now relentless pressure on ecologists to show 'results,' to make their research lead directly to the economic exploitation of natural resources. The collectivization of agriculture destroyed numerous protected areas on the steppes, converting natural biological communities into fields. Mining and logging were allowed in other wild areas. Where *zapovedniki* once covered 12.5 million hectares, by the early '50s this had declined to a mere 1.5 million hectares.

Ecologists and conservationists were on the defensive, in a professional as much as psychological sense. The attacks on them and their work were unforgiving. Commissars and communists thundered that there was no place any more for a 'saccharine-sentimental' approach to nature, for the 'naked idea of preservationism' which had, they thought, inhibited the further development of socialism. The TsBK was mocked as a 'Society for the Preservation of Antiquity,' a 'Society for Protection from the Revolution.' Scientific societies were compared to *zapovedniki* where protected professors roamed. The aim of

the societies, it was said, was to 'save nature from the Five-Year Plan.' Respected scholars known for their conservationist views were dismissed as un-Marxist or anti-revolutionary, even as 'agents of the world bourgeoisie.'

Soviet conservation in its first and most fruitful phase had room for three distinct varieties of environmentalism: for ecologists who favored the protection of undisturbed wilderness; for those who combined careful science with rural romanticism; and for practitioners of sustained-yield management. By the late '30s the first two orientations had disappeared into near-oblivion. The third strand, of scientific conservation, still existed, but in an uneasy coalition with state-planned industrialization. A scientist who found himself on the winning side wrote that it was

evident that the old theory of conservation of nature for nature's sake—a proposition that reeks of ancient cults of Nature's deification—stands in such sharp opposition to both our economic and our scientific interests that there is no place for it in our land of socialism-in-the-making . . . Not the preservation, come what may, of the existing state of nature, but the rational intervention, study, mastery, and regulation of natural productive forces—that is what should be emblazoned on the banners of our society.

When assessing the fate of Soviet environmentalism, the political climate in which it lived and died must never be overlooked. For the Russia of the 1930s and 1940s was the most totalitarian of societies, a place in which intellectual or political dissent was impermissible. N. I. Vavilov was one of an estimated 1,500,000 scholars, writers and revolutionaries who perished in the death camps for putting forward, however mildly, opinions that departed from the party line. Quite aside from the pressures of economics, then, there were very real constraints to the expression of environmentalist views that lay outside the narrow range of what was considered acceptable in Soviet Russia.

THE THREE GORGES PROJECT: A PROTEST THAT WASN'T

In 1956, the all-powerful Chairman of China's Communist Party took a swim in the great Yangtze river; coming out of the water, he looked forward to more spectacular demonstrations of man's powers over nature:

SWIMMING

by Mao Zedong

Great plans are being made;
A bridge will fly to join the north and south,
A deep chasm will become a thoroughfare;
Walls of stone will stand upstream to the west
To hold back Wushan's clouds and rain,
Till a smooth lake rises in the narrow gorges.
The mountain goddess, if she is still there
Will marvel at a world so changed.

[translated by John Gittings]

Great plans had first been made, in fact, in the 1920s, when the nationalist leader Sun Yat-Sen suggested the building of a dam across the Three Gorges, on the river's upper reaches. The idea was revived by Mao in the '50s, but it took another thirty years for it to move from the politician's poems to the engineer's sketches. As now proposed by China's planners, the Three Gorges Dam will be 185 metres (620 feet) high, generate 17,000 megawatts of electricity, take twenty years to build, and cost a staggering 50 billion U.S. dollars (224 billion yuan). It will be a feat of 'engineering gigantism,' the last defiant symbol of state planning, the last of the heroic projects, comparable in the country's history only to the Great Wall itself.

Communist China treats dissent with the same arrogance as did Soviet Russia, but in early 1989 a group of brave journalists and scholars came together to publish a book, *Yangtze! Yangtze!*, which took a cold and critical look at the Three Gorges project. Printed in February, the book was at first widely and sympathetically covered in the media. It formed part of the 'Peking Thaw,' the wider pro-democracy movement that reached its peak with the students' peaceful capture of the city's Tiannenmen Square. After the military fired on the demonstrators in June, the movement collapsed, and the state came down heavily on the opponents of the dam. Several were jailed; *Yangtze! Yangtze!* was banned soon after the bloodbath, its remaining copies recalled from stores and pulped.

The contributors to *Yangtze! Yangtze!* included some of China's most respected hydrologists, physicists, ecologists and planners. Their criticisms of the Three Gorges project focused on its techno-economic unviability. These scientists argued that the massive borrowing of funds would generate unacceptably high levels of inflation; that the project's promoters had grossly over-estimated benefits and

under-estimated costs; that the dam would not help control floods; that it would seriously impede ship traffic on the Yangtze, which presently carried goods and passengers equivalent to fourteen railway lines; that it would increase sedimentation, leading to the decline of an important port, Chongqing; and that it would direct funds away from small-scale projects that were more practicable, less destructive and would produce quicker results.

These technical criticisms were accompanied by social, environmental and aesthetic ones. The dam would, when built, displace as many as 1.3 million people. Yet, as one scholar pointed out, for this 'massive population relocation' the planners offered a 'resettlement plan [which] is ridiculous.' The region, noted another expert, is 'already an overpopulated area where food is insufficient and the land depleted. To resettle a population as large as that of a small European country will certainly exceed the local environmental capacity of this mountainous region.' Most eloquent of all was the lament of the veteran botanist Hou Xueyu:

Apart from irreparable damage to the soil, the natural beauty and cultural heritage of the area would be permanently damaged as well. I think the Three Gorges is the most beautiful of all the world's gorges. The surrounding areas have many national treasures, some more than 5,000 years old. These include the famous ruins of the ancient Daxi culture, and tombs from the Warring States period, the Eastern Han and the Ming and Qing dynasties . . . Further, the Three Gorges has unique geological features that provide very important physical data for research. All this would be inundated if the reservoir were built, and tourism would suffer incalculable economic losses.

All over the world, large dams are being challenged as 'outdated monuments to an immodest era,' symbols of a centralizing, capital-intensive and environment-insensitive form of development that is no longer acceptable. The Chinese critics of the Three Gorges project are aware of, and take heart from, this world-wide movement. They grimly note that the construction of the Itaipu hydro-electric project—the grandest anywhere—was one of several such schemes that massively increased the Brazilian public debt, leading to an inflation rate of 365 per cent. They look hopefully across at the Silent Valley in south India and at the Franklin river in Australia, two instances where projected dams were called off after popular protest.

Tragically, the prospects of open and collective protest in China are close to zero. Elsewhere, in Brazil and India for example, people threatened with displacement have organized large processions, defiantly uprooted reservoir markers, marched on provincial and national

capitals and burnt effigies of offending politicians and technocrats. These protests have not always been successful in stopping the dam; but at least they happen. In China, on the other hand, the million and more victims of the Three Gorges project must silently suffer as it is being built: criticisms being offered only by courageous scientists who were themselves swiftly silenced. In April 1992, a committee of the Communist Party finally voted to give the go-ahead to the dam. The next January, a Three Gorges Project Development Corporation was set up to oversee construction. An array of foreign firms, including Nippon and Merrill Lynch, lined up to bid for contracts.

The conflict between environmental protection and authoritarian rule can only sharpen in China, a country which has liberalized its economic regime while remaining a one-party state. The industrial boom of the last decade has generated enormous amounts of pollution, but citizens are gravely inhibited from doing anything about it. In August 1993, villagers in Gansu Province protested against the contamination of their water by a chemical plant, leading to deaths of fish and livestock and an increase in respiratory illnesses. When the factory's managers, themselves well connected to the Communist Party, disregarded their complaints, peasants took to the streets. Riot police were called in; they killed two protesters and injured several others before restoring 'order.'

The Chinese government, indeed, will not even permit the formation of a non-political group of nature-lovers. A celebrated historian, Lian Congjie, applied in 1993 to register a society to be called the 'Friends of Nature,' which would 'work to educate China's populace about the importance of environmental conservation.' Permission was not refused but was not granted either, the application being ignored by officials. The editor of *Yangtze! Yangtze!*, Dai Qing, notes that 'even though Liang Congjie says "I'm not interested in politics; I only want to help the environment," the government doesn't believe him.'

DEMOCRACY AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, AND THE TIES THAT BIND THEM

The president of the Chinese Banking Association, Qiao Peixin, remarked that in the 'debate over the Three Gorges project, I am afraid that there has not been enough democracy; the affirmative voices are allowed to be heard but the negative voices are often suppressed.' The woman journalist who edited *Yangtze! Yangtze!* likewise observed, after the book was banned, that

Today, many Chinese and foreign newspapers and magazines have labeled me an 'environmentalist.' I am quite flattered by the title. Although I have a great deal of respect for the environmental movement, neither I nor my colleagues considered ourselves environmentalists when we were compiling and publishing *Yangtze! Yangtze!* Our goal was to push China a little bit further towards freedom of speech on the issue of government decision making.

The ideology of state socialism is antithetical to environmentalism on a number of grounds: in its worship of technology; in its arrogant desire to conquer nature; through its system of central planning in which pollution control comes in the way of the fulfilment of production targets. Most of all, though, state socialism has inhibited environmentalism by throttling democracy, by denying to those it rules over the basic freedoms of association, combination, and expression.

DARING TO HOPE, HOPING
TO DARE

From an untitled poem by Bei Dao, translated by Geremie Barmé, and quoted at the very end of a book that presented the case against the mammoth Three Gorges dam project:

I do not believe that the Chinese will forever
refuse to think for themselves;
I do not believe that the Chinese will never
speak out through their writings;
I do not believe that morality and justice will
vanish in the face of repression;
I do not believe that in an age in which
we are in communication with the world,
'freedom of speech' will remain an empty phrase.

Source: Dai Qing, editor, *Yangtze! Yangtze!* (English edition: London: Earthscan, 1994), p. 265.

If in China protests against the Three Gorges dam surfaced in the brief thaw of 1988–89, elsewhere in the communist world environmental movements came to form part of a wider struggle for democracy. In Poland, where the trade union Solidarity led the opposition to Communism, it was also Solidarity which, through its local chapters, began studying and publicizing incidents of environmental abuse. All over Eastern Europe, as the struggle against totalitarianism gathered force in the 1980s, environmental groups began holding the state

to account for its 'crimes against nature.' These crimes spoke for themselves: that in Poland the contamination of the environment had reduced life expectancy between 1970 and 1985; that in Czechoslovakia more than 50 per cent of the forest area had been damaged by acid rain; that in Romania an independent study identified a massive 625 centers of serious pollution; that in Russia the great Lake Baikal was dying a slow and painful death due to eutrophication.

Previously there had been little opportunity to speak out against all this, a state of affairs remedied by the rise to power, in 1985, of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost*, openness, quickly spilled over from the Soviet Union to its satellite states. People were now allowed to breathe more freely, indeed to demand cleaner air. The impetus for the new environmentalism came from a variety of sources: from Solidarity and the Catholic Church in Poland; from evangelical clergy in East Germany; from scientists in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; from plain old-fashioned democrats in Bulgaria and Rumania—home, respectively, to Todor Zhivkov and Nikolai Ceuceascu, the most tyrannical of the Communist tyrants. In these countries environmentalists played a not unimportant role in the revolutions of 1989 that consigned one-party states to oblivion. In the elections which followed, Green parties found parliamentary representation in Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, while in Czechoslovakia environmentalists allied themselves to the victorious Civic Forum led by the green-minded playwright, Vaclav Havel.

In his own land Gorbachev's agenda also resonated nicely with an environmental constituency that had been making itself visible from about a decade before his arrival. One might speak here of two waves of Soviet environmentalism, interrupted of course by a long period of totalitarian rule. Although Joseph Stalin died in 1953 and his 'personality cult' was dramatically disavowed three years later, it took another twenty years for environmentalist writings to start finding a place in the newspapers and literary magazines. But from the mid '70s writers and scientists began gently criticizing the foul-smelling residues of unchecked industrialization. These criticisms became more strident in the mid '80s, following Gorbachev's ascent to power and the near-simultaneous accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, this the biggest disaster in a disaster-ridden history of 'planned' development. Numerous groups and societies began banding together—one such was the Ecology and Peace Association, whose President, S. P. Zalygin, offered the stirring motto, 'Only the Public can save Nature.' This public now bestirred itself to save beloved and beleaguered water bodies: which included the rivers Volga and Don, eyed

by destructive dam-builders, and Lake Baikal, choked by the effluents of one of the world's biggest paper mills. Away from the great rivers and lakes, citizens came together to challenge polluting industries, forcing them to pay fines, to change over to cleaner processes, or to shut down altogether. By accident or design, many of the more dangerous factories had been sited outside Russia, in the subordinated republics of Estonia, Armenia, and Latvia. Here environmentalists allied themselves to nationalists, associating the offending factories with a Greater Russian Chauvinism, which they accused of craftily exporting polluting units to non-Russian areas.

But as Ze'ev Wolfson points out, this 'marriage of ecology and national history' has also been characteristic of 'a portion of Russia's [own] green movement.' Where Soviet novelists had once extolled steel mills and collective farms, there came to prominence, in the '70s and '80s, a school of writers which looked back lovingly to the peasants of the pre-revolutionary past. The best-known of these 'village' novelists, Valentin Rasputin, wrote a famous fictional defense of a rural community made to make way for a hydro-electric project. He also wrote feelingly of the threatened landscapes of his native Siberia and of Lake Baikal, near whose shores he lived. For Rasputin, as for his contemporary Vasiliy Belov, the village is 'the wellspring of morality, religious meaning, and harmony with the natural environment, and, moreover, the only reliable medium through which these values can be transmitted to future generations.' Or as Yuriy Bondarev put it,

If we do not stop the destruction of architectural monuments, if we do not stop the violence to the earth and rivers, if there does not take place a moral explosion in science and criticism, then one fine morning, which will be our last and that of our funeral, we, with our inexhaustible optimism, will wake up and realize that the national culture of great Russia—its spirit, its love for the paternal land, its beauty, its great literature, painting, and philosophy—has been effaced, has disappeared forever, murdered, destroyed forever, and we, naked and impoverished, will sit on the ashes, trying to remember the native alphabet which is so dear to our hearts, and we won't be able to remember, for thought, and feeling, and happiness, and historical memory will have disappeared.

[translated from the Russian by Robert G. Darst, Jr.]

This was spoken in 1986 at the annual Congress of the USSR Union of Writers, a body which would not have allowed, in 1966 or in 1946, such a forthright refutation of the economic ideology of communism, an ideology marked by disdain for the past and reverence for the

mighty powers of the modern. But dissent is the life-blood of democracy, and it is not only in communist states that environmentalists have pushed back the limits of what has been considered politically acceptable. Thus in the Indonesian island province of Bali, where militant protests might be met with a hail of bullets, greens who oppose destructive development projects have shrewdly used petitions, poetry readings, prayers in temples and cartoons in the press. As the anthropologist Carol Warren remarks, in this one-party state 'environmental issues had become a vehicle for the expression of disaffection on broader social and political questions.' The connection between environmental reform and political reform more generally was also made manifest in a 1990 manifesto of a Bulgarian green organization. Where the state and party are one, it observed, 'we have privileged chiefs and unprivileged consumers.' And since 'those who make the strategic decisions are not the same people as those who have to face the consequences,' the 'degree of an individual's responsibility in decision-making is in inverse proportion to the actual suffering caused [to] him by environmental pollution.'

This Bulgarian group is called *Ecoglasnost*, a name which bears testimony to the inseparable link between democracy and environmentalism. For authoritarian states cannot permit the rise of green movements; conversely green movements might—as in 1970s Brazil and 1980s Eastern Europe—help move communist or military dictatorships in the direction of multi-party, so to say more open societies. It is no accident that one of the more robust green movements in the South is to be found in India, a democracy for all but two of its fifty-two years as an independent republic; or that environmentalism is most influential in the United States and Western Europe, where the commitment to political democracy runs deeper than in any other place or at any other time in human history.