

This chapter revealed the many dimensions and aspects that have to be considered when speaking about 'fighting the causes of refuge'. The topic is too serious and complicated, the 'causes' are too deep and long lasting, rooted in complex entanglements as to abuse the 'cause fighting' argument just for platitudes or as an excuse for doing nothing. For the EU and its member states – as well as for the rest of the global community – there is no alternative other than to really analyse and fight the causes of forced migration. From a realistic, a moral and a human rights point of view that is the only sustainable answer to the prevailing *organized non-responsibility*. The sustainable fight against the causes of forced migration and flight and the improvement of the protection of refugees are vital for the political project of European unification and deepened integration. Neither the EU nor its member countries like Germany will be able to *arrive at themselves when they do not provide the opportunity of arriving for those who are in need of protection*. This also holds for the global society of humankind. In the twenty-first century, granting refugee protection will be the litmus test for the world we want to live in (Fiddian-Qasimiyeh et al. 2014). Humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism will not arrive in the world when refugees have no opportunity to arrive at safe harbours. Taking mainly the historical experience of the 'refugee crisis' of 2015 in Germany, the next chapter will develop this idea of the need of *arriving*. Welcoming and letting arrive the refugees has also allowed different social groups to arrive at a deeper understanding of themselves. Arrival can be a central part of social integration.

6. Arrival – in Germany, in Europe and at oneself

Political instability, a lack of public and legal security and certainty, and violent conflicts have increased since the beginning of the twenty-first century. All continents are affected to a higher or lesser degree.¹ Forced migration in the two forms of internal displacement and international refugee movements is higher than ever since the Second World War. It mainly affects the areas neighbouring on crisis regions, but also rich and stable countries. In an increasingly interconnected and globalized world there are no 'tranquil islands of prosperity for the happy few'. Wars and crisis in any given region of the world will cause political and economic alterations in distant countries and trigger migratory movements with international repercussions. Everyone who does not *arrive* in this globalized and transnationalized world, and who does not acknowledge it as the actually existing basis for one's own actions, will hardly be able to develop a realistic strategy for himself or herself, for his or her environment. This is true for individual and collective as well as for corporative actors.

Baidy Sow is a Senegalese soccer player. Like many of his African colleagues, he had been lured into paying a trafficker for being brought to Turkey by false promises of a career as a soccer star. After all promises of being hired by a Turkish club had proved null and void he went on to Germany as an irregular migrant. In the end, he joined FC Wacker Munich.² Then he wrote a letter to Philipp Lahm, captain of FC Bayern Munich and captain of the German national soccer team from 2010 to 2014, and shared his experiences. Lahm asked him in his response: 'Do you know what you want to do after your career? Are you afraid of not being able to master another trade like you have been able to master playing soccer?' and Baidy Sow replied: 'I do not aim at making progress in my life. I want to arrive. I guess this can also be a good feeling.'³

¹ See: SIPRI et al. (2015, p. 6), and <http://www.warsintheworld.com/?http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflictrends.html>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts; <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>.

² Wacker Munich only competes on the local level but is well known for its successful efforts to integrate migrants.

³ *Die Zeit*, 41, 8 October 2015, p. 22.

A society that welcomes the arrival of refugees will be able to arrive at itself in a deeper and more sustainable way. In this context, *arrival* has many different meanings, which shall be introduced below: to physically reach a safe haven, to feel accepted or to get a realistic perception of social realities. Arrival can be understood as a binding concept. It implies a specific understanding of integration that contains certain challenges and opportunities for all those involved. Arrival can be useful and productive for all groups of a given society: for the new arrivals such as refugees as well as for those who have been living in a certain region for a long time but have not really arrived yet – either concerning their self-positioning or their appreciation by others.

6.1 WHAT DOES 'ARRIVAL' MEAN?

Arrival will be understood here as a comprehensive approach in the framework of the debate on refugees and integration. The experience of arrival is inextricably related to that of departure; who leaves from a certain place, as voluntary or forced migrant, wants to arrive somewhere. Since humankind shifted from nomad to sedentary life, migration as a sequence of departure, long journeys and arrivals always has been an important part of human experience. Leaving and arriving are the subjects of Homer's *Odyssey* (written around 700 BC) and of the less-known myth of Aeneas written by the Roman Virgil (70–19 BC). In almost all regions of the world, there are myths about those who had to flee their places and had to arrive elsewhere.⁴ Thereby, arrival is much more than the end of physical mobility.

The German word *ankommen* or *Ankommen*, like its English counterpart 'to arrive' or 'arrival' does not only mean to reach a certain destination physically but also 'to achieve success' or 'to reach by effort or thought'.⁵ Thus arrival means much more than just landing somewhere. It should not be understood as something passive but always as encompassing one's own activity. For refugees, arrival means in the first place to be – at least provisionally – in a safe haven and to have, at least temporarily, found accommodation.⁶ Arrival is always linked to satisfaction, a certain easing

⁴ Kingsley (2016) took the concept of the *Odyssey* for his book title and listed the Homer text in his 'Top 10 refugees' stories', see <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/may/18/top-10-refugees-stories>.

⁵ For German *ankommen*/*Ankommen* see: <http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/ankommen>; for English 'arrive' see: www.merriam-webster.com.

⁶ Interestingly, a mobile-phone application, which had been developed by the German Goethe Institute, the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees, the Federal Employment

of tension, being included and being accepted. Arrival is a part of socialization, of social integration and of system integration (see section 6.3 for more details); it is always an open process.

Following this concept of arrival, it always encompasses an interactive social practice. It describes a reciprocal process between those who arrive and those who already live there. When those who arrive are not received, their efforts cannot succeed. The millions of so-called *guest workers* who came to Germany between the 1960s and 1990s surely wanted to arrive somewhere but were only accepted as 'guests'. Even upon the arrival of their children many barriers were posed – not only by the society of arrival but also by their own parents who feared that the arrival of their children could mean the final break with their region and culture of origin. Actually, most societies of the twentieth century perceived the arrival of migrants as assimilation and called upon them to give up the social, cultural, political and economic orientations of their region of origin, and to adjust passively to the social conditions of the region of arrival (Williams 2013).

However, even this arrival by assimilation is often made impossible for the migrants. The societies of origin do not want to lose their influence on the emigrants. This is highlighted by the Turkish president's remark that it amounts to treason when an emigrant does no longer view himself as a Turk in the first place. The wooing for money transfers and votes by the heads of state of such emigration countries as Morocco, Mexico and Senegal is also a telling example of this effort. The equalization of arrival and assimilation leads the inhabitants of the countries of arrival to cast suspicion on any positive reminiscence linking immigrants to their (or their parents') country of origin. An ethnocentric or even racist equation of arrival and assimilation is reflected in questions like 'Your German is very good, where are you from?' or 'You do not look like a real German, where are your parents from?' Such questions make it difficult for so-called visible minorities actually to arrive (Schultz 2015).

The forms and eventual success of migrants' arrival depend on the arrivals themselves but also on the *society of origin as well as that of arrival*. Even in the twenty-first century, social arrival is denied to millions of migrants in many societies – by calling them 'foreigners' (in Germany), 'allochthons' (in the Netherlands) or 'irregulars' (in the USA) even if they have been born in that country as grand or great-grandchildren of first-generation

Agency and the educational programme of the ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands = Consortium of public broadcasters in Germany, the most important German public TV network and the world's largest public broadcaster) and which aimed at giving information and orientation for refugees, was named '*ankommenapp*', see <https://www.ankommenapp.de/>.

immigrants. At the same time, these people are denied any easy arrival in the country of their ancestors, because they are perceived as being out of place or even as traitors to the nation there. The refugees' process of arrival is normally even more complicated and tedious. Their migration was primarily caused by the desire to escape from a life-threatening situation and to find protection and security somewhere. They were not able to spend too much thought on planning their lives or a long-term arrival in a well-elaborated biographical plan. An arrival in the above-mentioned sense of a one-sided forced assimilation is very costly and harmful for those affected. Therefore, arrival should not be understood in an assimilationist sense as 'finally finding a new home' or 'irrevocably knowing where one belongs'. Arriving is *always an open-ended process* where the arrivals feel initially secure and accepted. Arrival implies the acceptance of the rules of the host but never any further and all-encompassing declarations of loyalty or dissociation explanations. Arrival means primarily to be received decently, accepted, respected and understood, and to get a chance to participate in the community of arrival. Arrival also means to share, to be able to express oneself and to disclose joy and sorrow. Arrival can only be successful when all those concerned share the same rights and when it is based on mutual acceptance.

When arrival is understood as an interactive relation of equals, it becomes obvious that you can only let others arrive if you have arrived yourself. Those who only seek arrival, happiness and a fulfilled life outside their own personal history and their own experience of life will neither be able to 'arrive' at other people (in the sense of having success or being accepted and recognized) nor will they be able to allow others to arrive. Thus, arrival is an *iterative and active negotiation* of one's own self and the foreign other. Arrival is always a station on a journey that has not been finished yet. This is even truer for refugees than for those who have voluntarily left a certain place. The writer and journalist Mely Kiyak, at a meeting of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation 'One Way Ticket – Willkommen in Europa?', said the following concerning the issues of belonging and arrival:

We say that you have arrived when you have reached your destination. Arrival is also the word for having reached a certain place. But most of the refugees who flee do not aim at a certain village or a specific city. Their aim is to get away from their conflict. Because there is war, because they are persecuted, because they can no longer live where they have lived. First, get away from here. Out of the city, out of the country. This way of leaving defines the path that is no trajectory in the traditional sense of the term. We know that from the refugees' own accounts. Almost all refugees tell us, that their later place of residence was chosen while they were on the way. Some have simply followed someone else

or joined a group. Others lost their group or got stuck somewhere. Some are arrested during their flight and deported. And they try again – using the same or another way [. . .]

What I would like to say, is, that unlike immigrants, refugees will experience no arrival. The immigrant knows his destination, he immigrates into something. But the refugee is always fleeing something. While the immigrant know his destination, the refugee cannot know, where his destination is. That is why many refugees answer that they want to go back to their old homes. After the war. And as time goes by the refugee realises more and more that this way back can be very difficult [. . .]

Arrival is more than just being somewhere. If you do not grasp that this is an anthropological premise of every human being you will not be able to engage in humane politics for refugees. When we have a look at those places in Germany, where we accommodate refugees, we do not need much imagination to recognise that arrival in the sense of finding rest does not work well in Germany [. . .] What else can we do except talk about it? I think that the refugees have to be supported in their efforts to talk themselves and to tell their stories of leaving and arrival.⁷

As arrival is something (inter)active, it is different from being stranded somewhere. This is also true for the refugees. They are never only passively suffering objects – even if public discourse and scientific research often treats them in this way. Krause (2015, p. 15) criticizes the infantilization and reduction of refugees to passively suffering beings without any individual history and options for action:

[T]he humanitarian discourse uses an image of refugees which is like the image of imbecile infants: the image of the infant as *tabula rasa* is only one in an extensive repertory of references to a basic humanity in the contemporary policy-oriented and humanitarian literature on refugees. An infant – a powerless being with no consciousness of history, traditions, culture, or nationality – embodies this elementary humanity.

To view refugees as childlike beings, without a biography, without their own choice of action and strategy, as helpless objects that need to be supported in a paternalist manner, will prevent an adequate understanding of arrival, like the above criticized perspective that equals arrival with assimilation. Our understanding of arrival has much to do with an understanding of hospitality, as proposed by Friese (2014). Arrival is only possible where hospitality is practised. Friese does not interpret hospitality as a romantic-moral idea but as a part of the idea – already

⁷ <https://www.boell.de/de/2015/02/05/ankommen-ist-mehr-als-sich-irgendwo-aufzuhalten>: concerning her disputed statements in the framework of the Sarrazin debate and her apologies, see: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mely_Kiyak.

developed by Kant – of a cosmopolitan cohabitation of humankind. Kant had proposed a cosmopolitan right to ‘universal hospitality’, which would not necessarily have to be based upon friendship or emotional attachment but should apply to all human beings and peoples for rational reasons:

We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere *hospitality* signifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again, if this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy. It is not a *right to be treated as a guest* to which the stranger can lay claim – a special friendly compact on his behalf would be required to make him for a given time an actual inmate – but he has a *right of visitation*. This right to present themselves to society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession on the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally no one individual had more right than another to live in any one particular spot. (Kant 1903, p. 138)

In this sense hospitality has to be understood as a minimum bid of arrival. Basing himself on the law of reason, Kant argues that all human beings have a legitimate claim of being treated without hostility when they enter foreign territory as ‘strangers’ as long as they conduct themselves peaceably. The right of visitation, according to Kant, is a minimum right of arrival. In this context, arrival always implies the identification of strangers, or others, because those who are already living at a certain place are in no need of arriving there. Hospitality (and in our context also arrival) is to ‘arrange the different, historically grown conceptions and notions of and the daily relationship to the other, to the stranger – in this sense they mark and make the stranger and address him at the same time. Thus, they also encompass the understanding of social bonds and solidarity, giving and taking, closeness and distance, territory and border, private and public space, ethical–moral demands, political affiliation, citizenship, rights and exclusion, in a nutshell: they affect the basis of our cohabitation’ (Friese 2014, p. 28).

Arrival does not mean at all that the arrivals merge with those already living there. It presupposes distinctions between self and other as well as it leads to renegotiations. Thus, arrival is *neither reception without preconditions nor unconditional surrender*. Arrival is neither an act of paternalist care and submission rooted in morals and emotions nor a utilitarian and well-calculated maximizing of self-interest. Following Zygmunt Bauman, ‘all societies produce strangers, but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way’ (Bauman

1997, p. 17; Elias and Scotson 1993). Friese’s statements (2014, p. 32) on hospitality are also valid for our notion of arrival:

As a mode of human sociability, ties, cooperation and solidarity hospitality is also bound to conflict and its opposites, negation, rejection, inhospitableness, enmity and hostility and always refers to its limits [. . .] Hospitality is no philanthropic–humanitarian gesture, charity, caritas, which come from heavenly commandments, divine order, *philia* or even *philoxenia*, although we speak of ‘friendship towards the guest’⁸ and might be driven by religious and ethical imperatives. Hospitality belongs to the realm of law and what we call the political. At the same time, hospitality establishes open relationships and she does not necessarily ask for the benefit, purpose and usefulness for the constitution of a political community. Hospitality encompasses the ethical, the social, the political, she relates to the very foundations of the society. She asks: ‘How to live together?’

That is why any arrival constitutes an intensive process of *negotiation of new demarcations*; it *needs self-reflection and induces social innovation*. This does not necessarily take the direction of tolerance and understanding. The increase of right-wing populist votes and right-wing terrorist acts following the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 show that the arrival of refugees can also be used as the pretext for new and aggressive demarcations. Arrival constitutes a complex process of *mutual perception and (re)constitution of the self and the others*. Usually the arrival has a cathartic influence on the cohabitation of those already living there. The arrival of newcomers makes the social relationships between the old inhabitants move. The arrival of refugees is not the basic cause for the growth of right-wing extremist tendencies but only a trigger. The refugees’ arrival reveals the social deprivation of certain groups, the feeling of social neglect and missing acceptance, of not having arrived in a society, of protest often long suppressed by ‘political correctness’. It also reveals dammed-up opinions and other social phenomena. Those who call for quotas for refugees, because the ‘limits of our society’s stress-resistance are reached’, or those who even want to hold all refugees accountable for the outburst of organized crime (as in the case of the massive sexual attacks in Cologne and other cities on New Year’s Eve 2015), or who want to use the (normal) social tensions between different groups of refugees arriving in Germany as an excuse for violent attacks on refugee hostels, distract our attention from an underlying fact: the arrival of refugees is only the trigger of conflicts, whose real cause is the insufficient arrival of the protesting groups in the society.

⁸ Literal translation of the German term *Gastfreundschaft*, which means hospitality, S.M.

6.2 ARRIVAL AT ONE'S OWN HISTORY: FLIGHT, DISPLACEMENT, 'GUEST WORKERS'

The arrival of new groups of people in a certain social space leads to new self-assurances and negotiations about the history and the social positioning amongst those who are already living there. Exactly because arrival is a complex and mutual process, it offers many chances but also challenges. There are regular fire drills in all schools in order to find out if all pupils, teachers and other staff know their roles and what to do in case of an emergency. Large organizations continuously conduct risk analyses in order to find out if the existing aims, structures and processes are tough enough to cope with unforeseen events. Fire drills and risk analyses are situations of crisis deliberately brought about in order to uncover weak points. The 'refugee crisis' of 2015 had, as shown above, been predictable to a certain degree, but it was not artificially triggered like a test alarm. Yet, it can be seen as a chance to deal with hidden risks and unsolved problems of social groups and societies.

The refugees nowadays arriving in Germany can remind us of the fact that many of those already living there have their own experiences with flight and displacement. However, this subject has been suppressed and hidden for half a century. The predominant collective suppression of the Nazi past after the Second World War hardly offered any chance for the refugees and deported people to have an adequate arrival. Something similar happened to another group: the mantra 'Germany is no immigration country' blocked a proper arrival for the so-called guest workers and ethnic German emigrants.⁹ It left them with the sole possibility of assimilation and keeping silent about the experiences of their lives.

It is therefore all the more important to use the recent refugee movement as a chance to launch a wider-ranging debate on immigration and arrival. A critical reflection on flight, displacement and 'guest work' in German history since the Second World War is a crucial prerequisite for alleviating people's arrival in this country. There is no appropriate critical and collective reflexion on the question as to which conflicts of identity and psychosocial wounds were caused by the suppression of flight and displacement, as topics of public concern. The Nazi regime had been responsible not only for 6 million murdered Jews and tens of millions of civilians and soldiers killed during the Second World War, but also for the refuge and

⁹ German law allows all those defined ethnic Germans to become citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus after the collapse of the USSR a lot of ethnic Germans migrated from the former Soviet Republics to the FRG. The German term for them is 'Aussiedler' or 'Spätaussiedler', S.M.

displacement of tens of millions in Europe. By marginalizing the issue of refuge and displacement from public discourse and concentrating on the economic and physical reconstruction of the country and on the myth of the 'economic miracle' Germany lost an opportunity of social arrival. Later on, anti-immigration policies and counter-factual slogans like 'Germany is not an immigration country' represent another vanished opportunity of arrival for generations of 'guest worker' immigrants. The corresponding social, cultural and political losses have not been estimated until now.

The arrival of entire generations in Germany and at themselves has thus been complicated or simply denied. The spontaneous willingness to help should not be dismissed as temporary romantic idealism in the light of the ongoing *organized non-responsibility* in Europe. In fact, it offers many possibilities to reshape one's own arrival in Germany by helping to shape the refugees' arrival. The head of the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Green Party of Germany) in the Bundestag (federal parliament), Katrin Göring-Eckardt, stated in the Bundestag: 'We are witnessing a veritable September-miracle in Germany at present [...] We have suddenly become world-champions of helpfulness and philanthropy [...] And for the first time in my life I can freely state that I am whole heartedly and without any restrictions proud of my country, with the sole exception of those arson attacks against refugee hostels. But the Nazis are a minority and they will remain one.'¹⁰

It depends on the people themselves how the collective experiences of 2015 will be processed – in Germany, in Europe and the world. History will judge whether the 'refugee crisis' will mark a social change comparable to German reunification, and the direction of this change will be moulded by civil society, by their organizations and by the political system. Here we can agree with Etienne Balibar: 'We can confidently transfer Angela Merkel's prognosis "What we are witnessing today will change our country" to our continent: it will change Europe. But it has not yet been decided in which direction.'¹¹ The 'refugee crisis' offers an opportunity for an extended arrival – of refugees and of societies.

This is the case, first, for the forced labourers, refugees and displaced people during and after the Second World War.¹² About 14 million so-called Reichsdeutsche (Germans from the territory of the former German Reich) and Volksdeutsche (Germans settling in other countries) fled west

¹⁰ <https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/parlament/bundestagsreden/2015/september/katrin-goring-eckardt-haushalt-2016-generaldebatte.html>.

¹¹ *Die Zeit*, 41, 8 October 2015, see. http://www.zeit.de/autoren/B/Etienne_Balibar/index.

¹² I use the most common translation of the German word, *Vertriebene*, 'displaced people', although *Vertriebener* implies that the people were forcibly expelled from their country.

in the final stage of the war, were expelled in that direction after the war or were deported to the East (Bade 2002, p. 297). There were an additional 11 million displaced persons at the end of the Second World War. Most of them had been forced labourers in Germany, interned in concentration camps or both. Their onward migration, settlement or repatriation sometimes took years. Often, these people did not have any place or home in the truest sense of the word, because they were often viewed as collaborators of the Nazis in their countries. In addition, there were an estimated 10 million internal migrants, who, for example, had fled to the countryside from the bombings of the cities (*ibid.*, p. 299). Finally, there were about 9 million prisoners of war (POWs), who returned to Germany from the end of the war to the 1950s. According to Bade, deportations, flight and displacement during (and as a result of) the national socialist dictatorship affected altogether about 44 million people.

About 69 million people lived in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) around 1950.¹³ Two-thirds of the total population had thus personally experienced flight, expulsion and forced displacement – as victims, perpetrators, spectators or fellow travellers. In addition, some of those who had fled from the Nazi regime to foreign countries returned to Germany. They had been persecuted for being Jews, political opponents, for their sexual orientation or as intellectuals. This was the complex mixture of those who had experienced forced migration. The other part of the population was confronted with issues of refugees and arrival by direct experiences in their living environment, at work or by the assignment of a part of their living space to refugee families by the authorities. One's own return as arrival and the participation in the arrival of others were mostly executed in a non-agitated and pragmatic way. The – often traumatic – experiences of flight and expulsion were seldom or never touched upon. Most people did not want to reopen their own and other peoples' wounds. Further, no one could be sure if the person he or she was talking to had not been part of, or a sympathizer with, the enemy party during the war.

This is how a culture of silence and the 'inability to mourn' (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1967) developed – and this holds for the Holocaust and crimes of the Nazi regime as well as for the experiences of flight and displacement of those living in Germany. Meanwhile, the first books about the Holocaust appeared in the mid-1950s; public debates about the crimes of the Nazi regime began slowly and it took more than a generation for historians and (auto) biographers to present the experience of flight and

¹³ See: <http://www.pdwb.de/deu50-00.htm>.

displacement in their scientific studies and biographical narratives to a broader public.¹⁴ These can be used to understand and support the arrival of today's refugees. This is also true for the pragmatic yet ambivalent impulse to suppress and forget, 'because life has to go on'. This can be helpful for the short-term arrival, but in the long run we also have to state in this case: he or she who does not learn from history is doomed to repeat it. Dialogues between refugees from the past and present can – if arranged in a careful and professional manner – function as a catharsis and facilitate the arrival in a country, of one's fellow human beings and at oneself.

Just after the migration movements caused by the Nazi regime and the Second World War had somewhat stopped, the so-called guest-worker migration started in the 1950s, which had drawn about 14 million migrant workers into the FRG until the ban on recruitment of foreign workers in 1973. About 3 million of them stayed permanently and brought their families over later. The GDR also massively used – not the least due to the severe labour shortage caused by the westward migration up to the building of the wall in 1961 – 'guest workers' applying a rotational principle (obligation to return to the country of origin, no right to bring their families over) and employing them in underprivileged jobs (immediate production area, toughest working conditions, up to three-quarters of them working shifts (Bade and Oltmer 2004, pp. 92 f.). Later on the GDR used forced labour in their prisons to procure foreign currency (Wunschik 2014). About 7.2 million people without German citizenship lived in Germany in 2014 and 16.4 million had either migrated themselves or had at least one parent who came from another country.¹⁵

The then prime minister of North Rhine Westphalia, Heinz Kühn, wrote a memorandum on behalf of chancellor Helmut Schmidt 'Status and further development of the integration of foreign workers and their family into the FRG' in the 1970s and found that Germany was a *de facto*

¹⁴ For the first compulsory books on the Holocaust in Germany see Poliakov and Wulf (1955) and Reitlinger (1956); concerning the flight and expulsion of Germans after the Second World War see [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_and_expulsion_of_Germans_\(1944-50\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_and_expulsion_of_Germans_(1944-50)); the corresponding wikipedia article in German states: 'Neither the West nor the East of Germany were able to integrate the refugees in a trouble-free, painless and harmonious way. Upon their arrival in the West they were confronted with widespread contempt. Due to their pronunciation of the character "R" they were insulted as Pollacks. Nobody was interested in the refugees' horrible experiences like abuses and rapes' (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flucht_und_Vertreibung_Deutscher_aus_Mittel-_und_Osteuropa_1945-1950); as interesting (auto)-biographical testimonies and novels about flight and displacement that began to appear mainly since the 2000s see for example Crott and Crott (2012); Jantzen and Niehuss (2003); Lorenz (2005); Orback (2015); Thimm (2012); Ustorf (2008).

¹⁵ See: http://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_1.html and <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Mikrozensus.html>.

immigration country. However, it took another two decades until the political elite and the majority of the population shared this point of view (Mehrländer and Schultze 2001). The coalition agreement between the SPD and the Green Party in 1998, the Law on Citizenship of 2000 and the Law on Immigration of 2005 marked a fundamental change in German politics at the federal level (SVR 2014). This consensus was not called into question by any of the larger established parties during the 'refugee crisis'.

In this respect, Germany has witnessed a historically unique turnaround since the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is true for the fundamental changes concerning the legal and institutional framework as well as for the change of the country's self-perception in the eyes of the people living there. Even in 2010, chancellor Merkel answered the question, whether Germany was an immigration country or not, in the old-fashioned way saying: 'In fact, it was an immigration country only between the 1950s and 1973.'¹⁶ But the chancellor even gained the respect of left-wing intellectuals like Etienne Balibar who used to be one of her harshest critics: 'Who (like me) had massively disapproved of the manner in which Merkel imposed her austerity policies on Europe and who had strongly criticised the humiliation and expropriation of Greece, must today acknowledge how invaluable her behaviour was during the refugee crisis.'¹⁷ Yet, Merkel's former statement, that Germany had 'in fact' only been an immigration country between the 1950s and 1973, highlights how complicated and contradictory the interpretations of reality and self-perceptions can be of even one single person – and in this case even a leading European politician.

During the second half of the twentieth century the slogan 'Germany is not an immigration country' was probably the worst injustice levelled against the millions of 'guest workers' and their families in the name of German politics and also in the name of the majority population. For those who had immigrated to Germany during this period, only the assimilationist way of arrival was offered: 'Either you become a good German or you go back to your country of origin.' Arrival was seen as a one-way obligation of the migrants. Neither language courses nor integration programmes were offered largely. The society of arrival did not see

¹⁶ See: <http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Interview/2010/11/2010-11-03-pnp-merkel.html>. See also the statement: 'Germany is no classic immigration country and will not become one due to its historical, geographic and social conditions' in the common position paper by CDU and CSU of 2 July 2001: <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/cdu-csu-deutschland-kein-klassisches-einwanderungsland-122873.html>.

¹⁷ *Die Zeit*, 41, 8 October 2015, see: http://www.zeit.de/autoren/B/Etienne_Balibar/index; see also for example *Financial Times*, 14 December 2015, p. 7: FT Person of the Year. Angela Merkel and Gustav Seibt in the *Süddeutschen Zeitung*, 2/3 January 2016, p. 15.

any obligations on its side.¹⁸ This one-sided assimilationist form of arrival also shaped the socialization and integration of the descendants of 'guest workers'. Lacking sufficient support from their parents, they often had to work twice as hard at school and during their apprenticeship in order to reach results similar to those who had acquired the dominant culture and language in their families. A lack of success in the educational and economic system was perceived as a result of their own and their parents' shortcomings but not of the receiving society's understanding of arrival. In addition, if they were successful they came under massive pressure to legitimize their achievements when confronted with stupid questions such as: how comes it that your German is that good? Where were you born? How did you manage to overcome the obstacle of a university education?

The constant pressure to explain and legitimize themselves has led some successful second-generation migrants to proclaim a post-migrant era.¹⁹ This is more than problematic. Even if the self-description as a country of immigration can thus be ex post adjusted to the decade-old reality of migration, we definitely do not live in a post-migrant period because neither the migratory process in the spatial sense of the word, nor the self-assurance of people with a migratory history living in Germany, can by any means be viewed as complete. A higher-than-average number of people who (or whose parents) have a migratory history became active in the refugee movement of 2015. They saw – consciously or unconsciously – the support for the arrival of refugees as a means to (re)organize their own arrival in Germany. They are well qualified – not only due to their possible lingual or cultural competences – to support the arriving refugees, drawing on their own experiences with the difficulties of arrival. Doing this they can presumably identify better with Germany – a country they have already been enriching for more than half a century concerning food, music, literature, sports and many other social spheres.

The refugees' arrival offers a special opportunity for – and challenge to – the emigrants arriving in Germany as 'Spätaussiedler' (persons having lived in Eastern European countries for generations and considered as 'ethnic

¹⁸ Seen from an instrumentalist perspective, its obligation had been to 'select' the 'guest workers' along principles focusing on their physical abilities already in their countries of origin, see: Oltmer et al. (2012); Rass (2010).

¹⁹ See: <https://www.projekte.hu-berlin.de/de/junited/deutschland-postmigrantisch>; 'The prefix "post" does not signify the end of migration but marks social negotiation processes taking place after the phase of migration itself' (Foroutan 2015). The quote highlights all the shortcomings of the concept: social negotiation processes *always* take place after the (physical-spatial) migration, during the process of arrival; and physical-spatial processes of migration are still under way and will take place in the future: more than 2 million people migrate to or from Germany every year. The post-migrant concept does not have a theoretical or empirical basis.

Germans') after the Second World War. Some of the ancestors of these 'ethnic Germans' had emigrated from Germany as early as the middle of the eighteenth century following the invitation by the German-born Tsarina Catherine II; they lived in several states of the former Eastern bloc, many were displaced during the Second World War by Stalin to Siberia; in different waves they came to (West) Germany soon after the Second World War or especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.²⁰ 'Two and a half million people migrated to Germany as "ethnic Germans" between 1990 and 2011 [...] 3.2 million immigrated Germans (including spouses and children who had entered Germany at the same time) declared in the Micro Census of 2011 to have come because of possessing the status of "ethnic Germans" (Aussiedler- oder Spätaussiedlerstatus). Thus, 71 per cent of the 4.5 million "ethnic Germans" who had come to Germany since 1950 were still in Germany.'²¹ According to a study sponsored by the Schader foundation the 'ethnic Germans' had been stigmatized as Germans or Nazis in their countries of origin. Later on, they were typed as Russians in Germany:

This verbal expression of exclusion was especially taken up by the young generation as a characteristic of their own identity and self-delineation and still results in massive problems concerning their integration. This kind of exclusion in their host country, which is at the same time brought upon them from outside as well as self-chosen and which mainly affects young male 'ethnic Germans', is closely linked to the time of their arrival in Germany around the mid-1990s. The 'ethnic Germans' had knowledge of the German culture and language and found good opportunities on the labour market of the Federal Republic; their structural integration was quick and successful. Yet, there were only few people amongst the later ('ethnic Germans') emigrant groups who had any command of the German language, and their cultural socialization was completely Russian or rather Soviet. The deteriorating situation on the German labour market and the reduction of funds, e.g. for language courses made the integration into the host country much more difficult. For these people, their history of migration is often a history of social decline.²²

The 'ethnic Germans' who had been interviewed summed up their experience of integration in three ways: getting along (earning their living,

²⁰ On a definition of the terms 'Aussiedler' and 'Spätaussiedler' (ethnic German emigrants, late-emigrants) see: <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/56394/aussiedler>; https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aussiedler_und_Sp%C3%A4taussiedler. There is no English language wikipedia entry and both terms do not have exact English equivalents, S.M.

²¹ <http://www.bpb.de/wissen/XRVWHC>.

²² <https://www.schader-stiftung.de/themen/vielfalt-und-integration/fokus/zuwanderung-im-laendlichen-raum/artikel/zuwanderer-auf-dem-land-forschung-integration-von-aussiedlern/>; see also the more detailed article: <https://www.schader-stiftung.de/themen/vielfalt-und-integration/fokus/zuwanderung-im-laendlichen-raum/artikel/migration-und-integration-im-laendlichen-raum/>.

being able to cope with the day-to-day demands), keeping up (to reach the level of the receiving society in certain areas of life) and equalling (the locals are no longer able to identify them as strangers). Overall, the 'ethnic Germans' experienced their arrival as great pressure to assimilate. In spite of the fact that they had been socialized in a totally different social context, that many of them had no sufficient command of the German language and that they had appropriated substantially different norms of behaviour, the 'ethnic Germans' (being status-Germans, who did not have to 'earn' their citizenship like those migrants coming from other contexts) felt an extremely high pressure of expectations to assimilate quickly and without any problems.

The arrival of the 'ethnic Germans' mainly took the form of a forced assimilation. German citizenship with all civic and social rights linked to it had been conceded to them from the beginning, because they came as ethnic Germans and followed a traditional *ius-sanguinis* way of thought. They were accordingly expected to adapt to 'the German identity' and 'the German culture' in the sense of a one-way adaptation to the (alleged) majority society – especially those 'ethnic Germans' who were not able or willing to fulfil the expectations of assimilation due to the deteriorating situation on the labour market, insufficient language skills or problems in dealing with, for example, the public authorities, accepted the external ascription as 'non-Germans' or 'Russo-Germans'²³ and developed it into a self-description rejecting assimilation. Due to their precarious material circumstances they, more frequently than other social groups, view the arriving refugees as potential competitors for jobs and social benefits.

It is not surprising, therefore, that – according to a representative survey conducted in late 2015/early 2016 – 'ethnic Germans' (together with immigrants from Turkey) underline the need for immediate integration courses (not for themselves, but for the refugees of 2015) much more frequently than other groups. The same is true for their opinion that the current number of asylum seekers was a threat to prosperity in Germany. There is a certain irony in these statements, as these groups have profited from welfare benefits on a much larger scale than the refugees have done since their arrival. In spite of this, or rather, especially because of this, their subjective experience must be taken seriously. Only open and public negotiation of everyone's rights and everyone's belonging can lead to an arrival of all groups in this country and in this society.

The subject of arrival is thus still relevant for those who have been living in Germany for a longer period of time and who themselves (or their

²³ The original term '*Russendeutsche*' is clearly pejorative, S.M.

ancestors) had experienced flight and displacement but have suppressed the memory of it for a long time: the forced migrants and refugees of the Second World War, the 'guest workers', their children and the 'ethnic Germans'. It is also true for those who had lived in either the FRG or the GDR until reunification. Have the West Germans really arrived at the cognitive framings of the world, the normative orientations conveyed during socialization and the present perspectives of their lives of the people in the new federal states (that formerly built the GDR)? In addition, do those people who have been socialized in the former GDR feel that they have arrived in Germany in the sense that they have been accepted as equals? Or have they often been faced with immense pressure to adapt and to function according to the standards of the West German 'dominant society'?

The subject of arrival, as we can see, does not only affect today's refugees. It is a subject for all people living in Germany. By making the experiences, fears, problems, frustrated expectations and the mutual behavioural expectations the normative orientations and mental maps, which are linked to arrival, the subject of personal dialogue and public discourse, this complex and sometimes painful process of social integration and socialization can be successful. This is important not only for Germany but for the EU member countries in general. The beginning of the European unification and integration process after the Second World War opened up the possibility for the participating states and societies to arrive in Europe; 75 years of military conflicts, from 1870 to 1945, had made the countries and different groups of people realize that the future of Europe could only be shaped by peaceful cooperation. They wanted to pursue their common aims such as maintaining freedom, the rule of law and individual as well as social security while acknowledging the cultural and institutional diversity of Europe. The reintroduction of border controls by some EU member states in 2015 highlighted how self-evident and quasi-natural these unifying standards and the underlying view of the world are for the people in the EU.

Neither the citizens, the companies nor the politicians wanted such a re-erection of the old country borders for themselves. The European unification is firmly rooted in the minds of the peoples and institutions – especially when their self-interests are concerned. However, neither civil societies nor politicians have sufficiently arrived in Europe on a normative and cognitive level, when other parts of the European integration process are concerned such as the common responsibility for the protection of refugees by the Common European Asylum System. Just as the European idea had been born out of the painful experience of two World Wars and could only have been pursued in practice and successfully shaped by discursive conflict management, the European responsibility for the

protection of refugees can only increase when confronted with real-life challenges and conflictual discourse. In this sense, the arrival in Europe – as any arrival – presupposes dispute, discursive agreement about cognitive situational interpretations, about the contents and the prioritization of interests and about differing interests.

It was the European debate on the refugee movement that formed a political dispute about the normative foundations of the European idea. Such a fundamental discussion on the common grounds of the EU had only occurred from 2009 to 2014 in the context of the Greek debt crisis and a possible Grexit. The temporary 'solution' of these conflicts by shifting the responsibility of border controls to Turkey and a general reduction of access to refugee protection were above all the result of the nationalist discourses and politics of many European governments and of the (renewed) rise of right-wing populist movements and parties. But we have already shown (in Chapter 4), that 'solutions' of 'refugee crises' like the ones attempted on the Canaries, in Ceuta and Melilla or on Lampedusa and the underlying European agreements to close the borders and shift the responsibilities to others do not provide sustainable solutions in accordance with the normative self-commitments of the EU.

The policy of St Florian or of NIMBY (not in my backyard) of externalizing problems and conflicts might have a transitional tranquilizing effect on politicians and parts of civil society. From a sociological point of view, a strategy would be more sustainable that keeps up the pressure to agree on the EU countries. The resulting (necessary) conflict could lead to a deepening of the cohabitation in Europe and of arrival of the people and governments in Europe. This conflict would not guarantee an extended arrival in Europe – an increasing dissolution or a higher degree of fragmentation of the EU would be possible. Any deepening of the social relations inside the EU can only be achieved by strengthening the normative and cognitive foundations of the union.

In general, the famous German sociologist Georg Simmel has already shown how dispute and conflict are positive for human relationships. According to him, dispute is an important form of 'coming together' and socializing; it does not only (and sometimes not in the first place) have disintegrative but also integrating effects (Simmel 1999 [1908]). Lewis Coser (1972) argued in a similar vein, saying that competition and conflict were fundamental for all entangled social relationships and that social conflicts had a stimulating, stabilizing and thus even positive function. Ralf Dahrendorf defended the necessity of social conflicts even more vigorously. According to him, every kind of domination generated social conflicts. Societies were always based on an extremely unstable equilibrium of power and interest groups and thus conflict was a permanent attendant

of any social intertwining (Dahrendorf 1961). Dahrendorf takes as his starting point that power is unequally distributed not only on the level of society as a whole but also on the individual level: people can be very powerful in certain social positions (for example as head of department of an enterprise), but comparatively powerless in other social positions (such as being a resident of a very busy road). That is why, according to him, social conflicts do not only arise between property or income classes but everywhere where aspects of human livelihood opportunities are concerned.

Taking these basic sociological insights seriously, arrival in Europe means not to be satisfied with the regulative basis of a common European protection for refugees that has been established so far. The latter can only work and become effective when its normative and cognitive foundations are strengthened. Yet, this will not be possible without the real-life challenges of refugee movements and corresponding conflicts and disputes over their common European treatment. Those who want to cope with the refugees' challenge in Europe by keeping them away and using non-European countries for protecting their borders will not be able to achieve any substantial improvement of the CEAS. The latter means strengthening its normative and cognitive pillars. Entirely in line with Ralf Dahrendorf, the CEAS should support a system of open borders and of effective refugee protection:

I had already acquired three passports full of visa and other stamps at that time. At times, it was annoying to obtain them, but I never fell in with the choir of those who demanded the abolition of all borders. Borders create a welcome element of structure and certainty. It is necessary to make them porous, open for all who want to cross them to see the other side. A world without borders is a desert; a world with closed borders is a prison; freedom thrives in a world of open borders. (Dahrendorf 2002, p. 15)

After the EU had been a 'world without borders' for a little while in autumn 2015, it has again become somewhat of a 'world with closed borders' since the spring of 2016. It will depend on the civic societies' and politicians' strength to make the EU a 'world of open borders'. This would mean that Europe would arrive at itself – in the sense of the validated European norms of refugee protection. Societies in a transnational and global world can only be liveable and sustainable when they are open. Freedom, rule of law and civil as well as social security being the great European promises, imply open, caring and solidary societies. These European ideas claim to make a difference to other models of society – be it the Chinese, where freedom comes off badly, or the USA, where social security and the welfare state are less emphasized. As open borders and solidary societies are part of the European project, the seriousness and

stability of its refugee protection and the CEAS are the linchpin of the European idea. In sum, arrival in the broad sense of the word is not only of special importance for some groups of society but is in fact crucial for all social groups. In this sense, the refugee movement posed a challenge, but also provided a chance. It can further the arrival of all groups of people in the member countries of the EU and in Europe. Nevertheless, how is arrival linked to social integration and participation?

6.3 ARRIVAL AS A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE FOR ALL

A concept of arrival remains incomplete if it is not explicitly tied to the ideas and debates on social integration, social cohesion and on economic, political, cultural and social participation. What do arrivals expect from society and what does society expect from them? The German debate on integration (like that in many other countries) oscillates between the extremes of a liberal multiculturalism and a strict policy of assimilation to the majority population. We have recently heard the call – mainly in connection with the post-migrant position cited above – to do without any concept of integration. These three concepts shall be presented and discussed below before introducing a multidimensional and expanded model that incorporates arrival in the sense in which it is used here.

According to the concept of adaption and assimilation,²⁴ integration can be deemed successful when social cohesion is established by the immigrants' subordination to and integration into the existing dominant structure and culture. This position, also called monistic assimilation, had been dominant in Germany for centuries. Today, some politicians but no longer any relevant number of social scientists espouse this concept. A radical alternative is the position linked to radical debates on multiculturalism, which calls for erasing any concept and notion of integration. According to this model, any reflection on integration represents the attempt to cement or create a relationship of dominance between those who are to be integrated and the supposed whole of society into which they are to be integrated. After discussing these two extremes, the option of a broader concept of arrival and participation will be presented.

²⁴ The English word 'assimilation' has a multifaceted and broad meaning and more or less equals the German term 'Integration'. The German term 'Assimilation', as used in the German debate on migration, means the socio-cultural, linguistic and identificational adaptation of the immigrants to the – deemed as homogenous – culture and social system of the dominant society of arrival. Please mind these differences when reading the text below.

Table 6.1 Types of social integration of migrants according to Esser

	Inclusion into host society / host context	
	Yes	No
Inclusion into society of origin/ethnic context	Yes No	multiple inclusion assimilation segmentation marginality

Source: Own elaboration based on Esser 1999, p. 21, 2001; p. 19, 2009, p. 362.

The concept of assimilation is still important when it comes to debates in civil society, in politics and in science. Concerning science, this can be illustrated by the proposal of social integration of migrants and ethnic minorities as proposed by Hartmut Esser. Esser's point of departure is the idea that people can *either* be included in their society of origin (or ethnic community) *or* into their host society (or their host community). Taking into account these two criteria, we arrive at four possible kinds of integration (see Table 6.1). The first possibility of integration is the multiple inclusion or multiple integration.²⁵ Here the migrants are integrated into the host context as well as into the ethnic and cultural references of the country of origin. A second possibility is segmentation; it occurs when the migrants are included into their ethnic context but not into the host context. Assimilation, as a third possibility, means the inclusion into the host context and the abandonment of the ties to the migrants' ethnical context. The fourth kind of inclusion, which is called marginality, means that there is an inclusion neither into the host context, nor into the context of origin.

Like Esser, many migration scholars of the second half of the twentieth century argued that assimilation was the only way to arrive at a successful and lasting integration. Segmentation, meaning the non-inclusion and keeping up the ethnic ties of origin, could not be a stable and desired solution for neither the host context nor the immigrants. Of course, this was also true for marginality, the non-inclusion in neither the host nor the context of origin. Esser's appraisal of multiple inclusion was also very critical: 'At the logical level, multiple integration is a possibility, but in reality it is most unlikely. It demands a scope of learning activities and possibilities that most people are not able to shoulder. This is even truer for the average (labour) migrants. This type of multicultural social integration is at best fitted for the children of diplomats. And it is in fact empirically very rare' (Esser 1999, pp. 21 f.).

²⁵ Parts of the following paragraphs had been published first in Pries (2014).

This sceptical attitude towards multiple integration and inclusion is not an isolated case. Angela Merkel also declared in October 2010 that 'Multikulti' (multiculturalism) had reached a dead end.²⁶ This restraint concerning the model of multiple integration is linked to the ordinary view of how integration and inclusion normally take place. The general public debate as well as the scientific discourse were for a long time dominated by a *stage model of monistic assimilation*. Ronald Taft had, in 1953, already proposed this model, which dominated the debates in many immigration countries such as the USA and Australia. According to this model, the assimilation took the form of an 'absorption' of the migrants into the existing society in the sense of giving up the culture of the society of origin and the adoption of the culture of the society of arrival (Taft 1953, p. 45; see also Heckmann 2010, p. 2).

This monistic assimilation can be compared to climbing a flight of stairs. Taft (1957, pp. 142 ff.) distinguished between seven steps of the process of adjustment as assimilation. First, cultural learning in the host society takes place with a view to the language and the central elements of the culture. Second, a positive attitude develops towards the members and norms of the host society. This is followed by a third step where the migrant develops negative attitudes towards the members and norms of the society of origin and, fourth, the approval or accommodation to the perceived role expectations of the host society. The fifth step consists in the migrant's perception that the host society socially accepts him or her. This leads to identification with the host society on the sixth step and finally to the acceptance and perceived conformity to the dominant values and norms. The implicit assumptions of this model are obvious: integration is a directed process that has only one direction; integration is the migrants' obligation, it is they who have to adapt to the prevailing norms of the host society; the phases of the assimilationist integration are seen as stages in a hierarchical sequence.

This concept of monistic assimilation is (in different forms) still pervasive in societies and scientific publications. Taft had already stressed (1953, p. 46) that it was the idea of an 'American Core Culture' that immigrants had to assimilate. In France, the concept of universal republicanism had been the guiding line for integration for a long time (MITI 2008; Wihl de Wenden et al. 2013). In Germany, the models of a 'German guiding culture' (Deutsche Leitkultur) and a 'Christian-Western Community of Values' were important reference points of the public debate. Assimilation as an explicitly directed advancement in a linear process of adoption is

²⁶ See: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklart-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BE6dR7T-zIQ>.

part of the classic model of the different stages of integration, cultururation (in the sense of the acquisition of knowledge, abilities and above all the language of the society of arrival), placement (in the sense of positioning in the system of employment and the granting of rights), interaction (shaping a net of social relationships and getting socially accepted in the society of arrival) and identification (the cultural-normative distancing from the society of origin and turning to the society of arrival), when they are perceived as a sequence.²⁷ A monistic concept of assimilation leads to an understanding of arrival where only the arriving immigrant has to adapt to the people already living there, while these do not have to make any changes.

An alternative model to monistic assimilation is that of multiculturalism or even the plea for abandoning any kind of integration concept.²⁸ Multiculturalism emerged as criticism and alternative to assimilation in the 1970s and played an important role in politics and science until the 1990s.²⁹ Multiculturalism is a concept of integration and socialization that assumes that diverse groups, which are culturally different, can permanently coexist in a given social context. While some countries are strongly influenced by Catholicism (Poland, Spain), or Protestantism (the Netherlands, Sweden), others are said to be pluri-religious (Germany, Japan, the USA). But multiculturalism can also relate to other fields of social cohabitation: gender norms, the dominant language and forms of self-government on the local level (for instance, Mexican communities have the right to decide not to follow the dominant pattern of political decision making and follow indigenous traditions instead).

The normative concept of multiculturalism is directed against the claim to power by the dominant cultural concepts, which require all inhabitants of the country – and especially the new arrivals – to adapt to them. Following a subsidiary logic, the state and common value concepts are to have a minimized impact on the areas of life. The latter shall be shaped as autonomously as possible. Social integration is mainly organized by and in the different cultural groups. Overall system integration is managed

²⁷ See: Esser (1999, pp. 24 f.), (2001, pp. 16 f.), (2009, pp. 358 f.); a lot of empirical studies apply this model, for example Heckmann (1997); Ohliger (2007); the 'monitorings of integration' (*Integrationsmonitorings*) for the municipal level also reflect this monistic understanding of assimilation. (Worbs 2010, p. 4).

²⁸ Taft (1953, pp. 46 f.) describes the 'pluralistic assimilation model' thus: 'The opposite bias to the monistic is the "pluralistic". According to this viewpoint, two or more cultural groups can form part of the same community and, at the same time, keep assimilation down to a minimum. The failure to assimilate, in this instance, is not the result of prejudice, but of agreement on both sides to preserve and tolerate differences.'

²⁹ See: Ackermann and Müller (2002); Goldberg (1994); Lischke and Rögl (1993); Mintzel (1997).

by maintaining mutual respect and universally recognized tolerance. The scientific foundation of multiculturalism is the assumption that culturally homogenous societies belong to the realm of political-ideological programmes (for example during the process of nation building) but are seldom found in social reality. Thus, the idea of a social melting pot (widespread in the USA and other immigration countries), in which all cultural peculiarities of the immigrant groups dissolve over time and form a new culture, does not match with diaspora groups, Chinatowns or ethnic segregation. The adherents of multiculturalism criticize the model of assimilationist integration as being functionalist, because it presupposes that societies were outwardly closed and inwardly differentiated functional systems integrated by common value systems and a common culture.³⁰ According to the model of monistic assimilation, successful assimilation presupposed (in the eyes of the critics) that the social system into which everyone was to be integrated was indeed a substantially stable, closed and homogenous functional system. Only then were steps of gradual adaptation as indicators of integration thinkable. Only if the society of arrival was actually perceived as a unified and functionally differentiated social system, based on normative integration by common values, could it be justified to interpret the development of a 'negative attitude towards the society of origin' – and thus towards a part of one's own self – as a step towards integration.

Multiculturalism juxtaposes the acceptance of diversity to this negation of the society of origin, which forms the third of seven steps towards adaptation in Taft's model of monistic assimilation. In fact, there are huge differences between the constructs of borders of affiliations, for example in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany. While the (still dominant) self-concept of French society is oriented towards the concept of homogenous republicanism, ethnic-national diversity plays a key role in the British definition of social integration. In the Netherlands, a more or less multicultural self-concept was partially revised after the murder of the Islam-critical filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist fanatic in 2004. In Germany, the acceptance of a multicultural reality seems to have become

³⁰ Accordingly, David Lockwood's distinction between social integration and system integration was criticized. His theory was rooted in systems theory but still proved to be useful for the analytical distinction between different investigation levels in integration research: 'Whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention upon the orderly or conflictual relationships between the actors, the problem of system integration focuses on the orderly or conflictual relationships between the parts of a social system' (Lockwood 1964, p. 371). When the term 'social system' is replaced by 'social groups', it becomes obvious that a differentiation between internal integration into social groups and social integration by social groups can really make sense.

part of the social self-description since the beginning of the new century (Pries 2013c).

Some social groups and scientists, as proponents of a radicalized version of multiculturalism, have been pleading for abandoning all normative rules since 2010. For them, this also includes to forego all empirical analyses of the contents and dynamics of integration, for example the category 'People with migrant background' used in the micro census. The initiative of 'Democracy not Integration', founded in 2010 against the backdrop of the Sarrazin-debate in Germany,³¹ is in following such post-colonial and constructivist criticisms of integration. A corresponding call was signed by about 3,800 persons, mainly people dealing with questions of migration and integration in practice, politics or science. Amongst them were also about 70 professors. The initiative holds that the concept of integration is superfluous and pleads for its abolition:

We are a country of immigration. This means, if we want to discuss the conditions of this society and the way in which we live together, then we have to stop talking about integration. Integration presumes that those who work in this country, have children here, and grow old and eventually die here, must adopt a particular code of conduct before they are allowed to belong. But democracy is not a country club. Democracy means that everyone has the right to determine for themselves and with others how they want to live together. The talk of integration is an enemy of democracy [. . .] If integration means anything, it is that we are all in this together!³²

The signatories' intentions are understandable if we take into account the background of the violent debate on the scientifically untenable, populist and racist categorizations in Sarrazin's theses (Hess et al. 2009; Foroutan 2010; Bade 2013). *Seemingly* neutral, *seemingly* biological or 'purely natural' categories are mobilized in many societies to impose certain definitions and interpretations of social reality. These 'policies of naming' can be specifically developed to discriminate against certain groups of people and to marginalize them. This is an ancient social practice. Certain features (red hair) and practices (healing using herbs) were consciously constructed into the focus of society by certain social groups in the Middle Ages, in order to be able to burn certain groups of

³¹ In 2010 the right-wing politician and former banker Thilo Sarrazin published a book titled *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany destroys itself) and argued that due to demographic shrinking, higher fertility rates of immigrants and increasing immigration from Muslim countries the core of 'ethnic Germans' would turn to be a minority in the future. The book was one of the most frequently sold in the second half of the twentieth century in Germany.

³² http://www.demokratie-statt-integration.kritnet.org/demokratie-statt-integration_en.pdf.

women as witches. Colonialism deprived – with the approval and blessing of the Christian churches – people of a certain colour of their rights and made them a commodity. National Socialism took up the categories 'Jew', 'Homosexual', 'Communist' or 'Gypsy' and attached colour symbols and juridical as well as social norms to them in order to exterminate human beings (Pries 2014a).

However, if we call for the general abolition of any notion of integration based on the aforementioned criticism of policies of naming, or if we only speak of a 'post-migrant society', we are led into a dead end. If we want to prove that people are socially excluded because of their (supposed) country of origin or their ancestors (determined for example by their name, the colour of their eyes or skin, their supposed religion), we cannot be against surveying their history of migration. The official French statisticians are not allowed to collect data on it and in Germany only data on citizenship, but not on the actual history of migration, was collected until 2005. Systematic discrimination against migrants will not be abolished by not measuring it. On the contrary: appropriate categorizations and concepts are necessary in order to analyse the social cohesion levels of a society as well as to uncover exclusions and discriminations based on migration-related factors. Social discriminations will not be reduced or undone by speaking of a 'post-migratory society' in the face of an annual 2 million immigrations and emigrations to and from Germany. A differentiated model of integration, which includes the diverse aspects of arrival, should look different.

Arrival and integration require an open debate and a basic consensus on (1) the common norms; (2) the treatment of diversity; and (3) the maximum promotion of opportunities for all people to participate in social life. Concerning the first, the legal provisions and the principle of the formal and material rule of law establish a clear framework. These imply, for example, the separation of powers and that their foundation are the constitution, basic and human rights.³³ The content of this consensus of a '*free democratic order*'³⁴ must be adapted to the changing social circumstances repeatedly. This can be achieved by civic debates, political-legislative initiatives and the jurisdiction's work. The basic order, which defines cohabitation in Germany, is – and this is the nature of all normative orientations and frameworks – evaluated and interpreted differently. If it was 'naturally

³³ See: <http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-demokratie/39300/rechtsstaat?p=all>.

³⁴ See: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freiheitliche_demokratische_Grundordnung and <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/pocket-politik/16414/freiheitliche-demokratische-grundordnung>.

lived' by all people (as all people do naturally breathe), such a basic order would not have to be formulated and defended. The nature of all norms is that people deviate from them (leading to sanctions when the norms are effective) and that they are – although designed for being stable in the medium term – subject to change in the long run.

Concerning Germany's *free democratic order*, there are a lot of opinions and practices that differ in detail. Some groups demand more direct democracy, such as in Switzerland. Others want to treat private property from the point of view of equality of chances and put more taxes on it. All major deviations from the formal legal framework are punished by police and justice and sanctioned by penalties if necessary. Most deviations (above all the minor ones) are not formally registered and punished but punished socially at most. This is true for many forms of domestic violence or tax evasion. Yet there are attitudes towards this basic order and systematic efforts that a militant democracy must systematically reject or even combat.³⁵ That is true, for example, for any attempt to limit the existing basic order to Christian–Western basic values. It is true that Germany experienced a Christian–Western tradition and history that all people living in the country should be familiar with. But in the course of the twentieth century the country has become more diverse concerning cultural and religious orientations (above all by Muslims and non-religious people), which makes the demand for a commitment to Christian–Western basic values an exclusive one. We also have to reject an attitude that puts its own religious values and orientations above the free democratic order. Certain sections of the Islamic population do not accept the separation of religion and state and even put the authority of religion above that of the state. This also applies to right-wing extremist conceptions and aspirations, which aim at replacing the free democratic order by an order that is based on authoritarian–racial and national–racist ideas and excludes certain social groups based on their religion, ethnical ascription or political orientation.

The critiques and opponents of a militant democracy outlined above lead directly to the second aspect of arrival and integration, the *treatment of diversity*. Here, too, a sustainable strategy of arrival and integration must steer between the Scylla of not recognizing and blotting out diversity and the Charybdis of an inconsequential arbitrariness of diversity. The concept of a militant democracy is directed against this kind of arbitrariness that calls for recognition of and tolerance towards those forces whose

³⁵ Concerning the concept of militant democracy see: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streiftbare_Demokratie and <http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/41891/streitbare-demokratie>.

thinking and actions are clearly outside this basic order and who want to abolish it, when possible. This applies to Islamist as well as right-wing extremist perpetrators of violence. The trial against the National Socialist Underground (NSU) shows most clearly how criminal energy to abolish the basic order erroneously has been treated as an acceptable diversity of opinions for more than a decade.³⁶

The debates and the jurisdiction on wearing headscarves, swimming instruction for girls at school, or the circumcision of boys (SVR 2016) have shown how difficult it is to differentiate between an acceptable diversity of values and practices on the one hand and intolerable violations of human and basic rights on the other hand. You cannot escape from the necessary debates and the permanent redefinition of borders by propagating an inconsequential arbitrariness of diversity or even the end of differences and designations. This is more or less the case with the above-mentioned initiative 'Democracy not integration' or the concept of the 'post-migrant society'. The socially appropriate naming of socially relevant diversity must be a point of contention on open societies, which are oriented towards arrival and participation. The detection of group-related discrimination, the recognition of certain social groups with their particular needs and requirements, the facilitation of arrival and equal participation are not possible if we are not able to name diversities. It is often these social groups themselves who claim to have a different ethnic, religious or national origin in their struggle for recognition. This was true for the 'ethnic Germans' in Germany, the Harki in France or the Gurkhas in Great Britain.³⁷ Canada traditionally follows a policy of recognition and promotion of diversity, aiming at strengthening social cohesion. When Canada drew up certain programmes for the advancement of the descendants of the indigenous people, the number of those identifying with these ethnic groups rose significantly.³⁸ Thus, the identification and acceptance of diversity is always a complex process of group-oriented internal and external ascriptions.

³⁶ The 'Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund' (NSU) was a terrorist ultra-right-wing group that during the 1990s and 2000s murdered at random immigrants, a policewoman, was responsible for a number of violent bank hold-ups and other violent attacks. The NSU had many supporters in the right-wing political scene. Prosecution offices and police were criticized for not seriously following the cases; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Socialist_Underground.

³⁷ The term 'Harki' is often used for Algerian Muslims who fought against Algerian independence on the French side and who assert certain claims in France now. The Gurkhas fought as Nepalese for the British colonial regime in the nineteenth century. Stressing their peculiarities and identity, they claimed rights to settlement and pensions in Great Britain later on.

³⁸ See concerning the Canadian situation: <http://www.horizons.gc.ca/eng/content/diversity-identity-and-social-cohesion-advantage>.

Contrary to Canada, France had for a long time been dominated by a republican-egalitarian concept of society, where issues of ethnic or religious allegiances had been banned from public life (and official statistics) and confined to the protected private sphere. It was hardly possible, for example, to analyse systematic discrimination against immigrants from the Maghreb region by using the official statistics, because generating data on features like 'migration history' or 'migrant background' would have been contrary to the egalitarian citizen-principle. The same is true for the religious affiliation, which had not been discussed for a long time. It is mainly the right-wing populist Front National, which has established (not religious affiliation in general, but) Islam as a new distinguishing feature in public discourse since the 1990s (Allgias 2010). Despite all republican traditions of paying no attention to differences of belief, religion or ethnicity in the public sphere, it is exactly these differences that have become more and more important for the political debates over the last two decades (Witkol de Wenden et al. 2013).

The White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant (WASP) category served to identify a group of people in the USA defined by colour, belief and region of origin and which had had privileged access to socially sought-after positions for a long time. A distinction between 'allochthon' (the others/strangers) and 'autochthon' (the natives) (which is rather problematic when used in political discourse) has gained ground in the Netherlands after decades of a dominant multicultural understanding of integration (Doomenik 2013). Great Britain has extended the number of personal attributes and introduced internal differentiations (colour, languages spoken, country of origin, ethnic and national self-attribution, religion; Green and Skeldon 2013) for the official censuses for the last 25 years. In Germany, the new characteristic 'person with (or without) migration background' – first used in the Micro Census of 2005 – has had massive repercussions on the public, political and scientific debates on migration (Pries 2013c). On the one hand, it was thus possible to analyse the educational outcomes and the employment situation of migrants and their descendants in more detail, while, on the other hand, millions of people were suddenly pushed into a new category of 'being different', a category mainly perceived as deficient or problematic.³⁹

Generally speaking: the social construct of diversity and the policies of naming linked to it can produce stigmatization and marginalization but

³⁹ Concerning the making of belongings and affiliations by discourse and the linear or zonal demarcations used in this process, see also: Langenhil and Rauser (2011); for inclusion and exclusion as a relational concept of integration in a political-legal science perspective see Atay and Rosenberger (2013).

also their criticism. It depends on social policies and political discourse as to which of the two will prevail. The strategy to avoid exclusion by forbidding migration-related descriptions of diversity has not met success in any given country so far. Forbidding migration-related diversity is part of the model of monistic assimilation or of the 'post-migrant' discourse. Social problems and challenges are not diminished or solved – this is highlighted by the decades-long taboo of migration-related uneven chances in France – by ignoring them. This leads directly to the question of how arrival and integration can be shaped in order to open up chances of participation, not only in Germany or the EU member states, but also all over the world.

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Refugees, Civil Society and the State

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Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany



Edward Elgar
PUBLISHING

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA



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Published in German as 'Migration und Ankommen. Die Chancen der Flüchtlingsbewegung. Frankfurt/New York 2016: Campus'. The English version was updated and substantially extended (Chapter 5 and section 7.1 were written newly for this edition).

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Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
The Lypiatts
15 Lansdown Road
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 2JA
UK

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA

A catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017959999

This book is available electronically in the **Elgaronline**
Social and Political Science subject collection
DOI 10.4337/9781788116534



ISBN 978 1 78811 652 7 (cased)
ISBN 978 1 78811 653 4 (eBook)

Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire
Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY