Introduction to
Hungarian Foreign Policy
History of Hungarian foreign policy; instructor: András Schweitzer
1. About me… and about you
ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences
Corvinus University
Viktor Orbán
Ferenc Gyurcsány
Péter Medgyessy
Lőrinc Mészáros
About the course
• Subject matter: History of Hungarian foreign policy
• Methodological approach: foreign policy analysis related to the
history of Hungarian political history (with comparative approach
applied here and there)
• Foreign policy as connected to internal power politics, culture and
identity politics…
• Foreign policy as formed by rational choice, group interests,
(mis)perceptions, ideology, culture…
• Intro + 5 blocs/10 sessions + exam; assigned texts (obligatory) and
recommended literature
• Active participation (think, ask, debate, compare!)
• Evaluation (pass/fail) based on a written exam of short essay
questions referring to the required literature and the lectures
Requests to the audience
Please participate actively:
• ask questions
• add insights
• give your opinion!
This will make the course more interactive, more
instructive, more interesting, and more fun.
Blocs and sessions
Bloc I. General ideas of Hungarian identity and the beginnings of Hungarian foreign
policy (-1920)
1. What (and since when) is “Hungarian” foreign politics? The idea of Hungarian
uniqueness, of the eternal westward travel, of being pagan, of being Turkic vs FinnoUgric,
of being Christian-European. The idea of the “1000 years kingdom”. The twinideas
of wars of independence and compromise.
Required reading: István Deák. The revolutionary tradition in Hungary and the
lessons of the 1956 struggle for independence. Hungarian Studies, Vol. 20 (2006),
No. 1.
2. The Károlyi-government and the pacifist option. The Hungarian Soviet Republic and
the idea of global Socialist revolution.
Required reading: Peter Pastor. Major trends in Hungarian foreign policy from the
collapse of the monarchy to the peace treaty of Trianon. Hungarian Studies, Vol.
17. (2003), No. 1.
Block II. Trianon-trauma, Conservatism, Fascism Hungarian style (1920-1945)
3. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national consciousness. Horthy-era:
(Alternatives to) alliance with Germany.
Required reading: Pál Pritz. Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period.
Hungarian Studies, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.
4. The “swing-politics” of the Kállay government, and the (non-)option for
“quitting”. Szálasi and the idea of “persistence”.
Required reading: Nándor Dreisziger. The long shadow of Trianon: Hungarian
alliance policies during world war II. Hungarian Studies, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.
Blocs and sessions
Block III. Sovietization, Stalinism, revolution (1945-1956)
5. Soviet liberation or occupation? Foreign policy considerations in times of
limited sovereignty.
Required reading: Lászlo Borhi. Hungary in the Soviet empire 1945-1956.
Hungarian Studies, Vol. 20 (2006), No. 1.
6. Foreign policy implications of the 1956 revolution, the vision of a neutral
Hungary.
Required reading: Csaba Békés. The 1956 Hungarian revolution and the
superpowers. Hungarian Studies, Vol. 17 (2003), No. 1.
Blocs and sessions
Blocks and sessions
Block IV. Goulash communism in the happiest barrack. Annus mirabilis and the
euroatlantic integration (1956-1989)
7. János Kádár and gulash communism. Economic reform (the “happiest
barrack”) and military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968
Required reading: Andrew Felkay. Hungarian foreign policy in the Kádár era.
Hungarian Studies, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.
8. System change, orientation change, the triple foreign policy priority,
fundamental treaties, NATO- and EU-accession
Required reading: András Simonyi. Hungarian foreign policy on the
threshold of the new millennium. Hungarian Studies, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.
Block V. (April 24.) the Hungarian return of history (2010-)
9. System of National Cooperation, “eastern opening”, “Stop
Brussels”, and the “peacock dance”
Required reading: András Bozóki & Dániel Hegedűs: An
externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the
European Union. Democratization, Vol. 25 (2018), No. 7.
10. Summary, the problem of path dependency, future
prospects for the region and Hungary.
Blocks and sessions
1. What is Hungarian foreign policy? What is Hungarian? What
is foreign policy?
2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history
3. Since when can we talk of Hungarian foreign policy
4. Fundamental dilemmas of the Hungarian identity and foreign
policy: western vs eastern; pagan vs Christian; 10 years, 100
years, 1000 years, 10000 years?
5. Recurring theme: (lost) revolutions and (false) compromises
6. István Deák: The revolutionary tradition (a comparative
theory)
7. Another possible comparative narrative: the reluctant ally
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 1
Hungarian history basics
1. What is Hungarian foreign policy? What is
Hungarian? What is foreign policy?
2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history
„Honfoglalás”
(conquest of the
homeland)
2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history
„Historical Hungary” in three parts
Austria-Hungary,
1867-1918
2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history
3. Since when can we talk of Hungarian foreign policy
Ferenc Rákóczi II.,
1676-1735
Matthias Corvinus,
1443-1490
Lajos Kossuth,
1802-1894
Mihály Károlyi,
1875-1955
5. Fundamental dilemmas of the Hungarian identity
and foreign policy: Hungarians… alone in the
World 
4. Fundamental dilemmas of the Hungarian identity
and foreign policy: pagan vs Christian;
revolutionary or 1000ys tradition
5. Recurring theme: (lost) revolutions and (false)
compromises
Aladár Mód: „400 years
struggle for independent
Hungary”
Austria-Hungary,
1867-1918
Budapest, 1st
May, 1957
6. István Deák: The revolutionary tradition… (his
concept)
Hungarian revolutions (1703-1711, 1848-1849,
1918-1919, 1956)
• Grievences of the social elite (against foreign
rule, for social change = national cause
combined with social justice)
• Starts as a movement for reform
• Movement hijacked by people outside the
social elite
• Elite begins to yearn for law and order
• Order restored by the same foreign power
7. Another narrative: The reluctant ally
• Austria-Hungary (1867-1918)
• Hungary in East-Central Europe dominated by
Nazi Germany (1933-1945)
• Hungary in the Soviet orbit (1945-1989)
• Hungary in the European Union (2004-
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 2
1. The case for participation in the Great War
2. (How) could Austria-Hungary have been saved?
3. The Károlyi-government and the pacifist option
4. The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the idea of global
Socialist revolution
1. The case for participation in the Great War
István Tisza (1861-1918) vs
Mihály Károlyi (1875-1955)
„I had a hard time deciding to
recommend the war, but now I am
firmly convinced of its need”
1. The case for participation in the Great War
István Tisza
(prime minister:
1903-1905,
1913-1917
Mihály
Károlyi
(prime
minister:
1918,
president:
1919
2. (How) Could (Austria-)Hungary have been saved?
Danubean United States
European United States
1918-
Archduke
Franz
Ferdinand,
Aurel
Popovici,
1906
Oszkár Jászi
(1875-1957)
3. The Károlyi-government and the pacifist option
• 1918 Oct 17th. István Tisza: „We have lost this war”
• Nov 3rd. Padua armisice agreement by Austria-Hungary
• National Councils are formed (Slovak, Romanian, etc.
Wilsonovo mesto declares independence)
• Oct 24th. Hungarian National Council (Independence and 48
Party (or Károlyi Party), Citoyen Radical Party, Hungarian
Social Democratic Party)
• Oct. 31st. Mihály Károlyi is prime minister, István Tisza is
assassinated
Aster or Chrysanthemum Revolution
• Nov 7th. French general Franchet d’Esperey and the Belgrade
armistice (with Hungary): Hungarian civic administration to
remain
• Nov. 8th. Czech(oslovak) army moves into Nagyszombat
(Trnava) and Trencsény (Trenčín)
• Nov. 11th. New minister of defense (Albert Bartha instead of
Béla Linder), preparations for a new Hungarian army
• Nov. 13th. Charles the IV. suspends royal powers => Nov 16th
Hungarian National Council declares independent Hungarian
Peoples’ Republic
• Dec. 6th Albert Bartha – Milan Hodža temporary demarcation
line
• Jan. 11th Mihály Károlyi is first president of Hungary (Dénes
Berinkey PM)
Fundamental political priorities of Mihály Károlyi
• Pacifism: Hungary is not a successor state, not willingly at war
with the entente powers, ready to make peace based on the
14 points of Wilson (point 10: self-determination of
nationalities within Austria-Hungary)
• Territorial integrity of Hungary (ready to recognize Ukraine,
Poland, Czechia, South Slav state, Austria)
• Granting minority right to nationalities, federalization of
Hungary
• Democracy (electoral reform) and social reform (distribution
of land to the peasants)
Failure of Mihály Károlyi’s policies
• Pacifism of the Entente turns out to be illusory at best, 14
points does not matter much
• Entente does not recognize the new Hungarian state and its
government. Supports independence movements of the
neighbours and nationalities
• Territorial integrity of Hungary is violated (including the
Belgrade and the Bartha- Hodža agreement). Serb, Romanian
and Czech armies are moving in
• Nationalities are not content with the federalization of
Hungary, want to break away (no referendums but apparent
the majority)
Károlyi resigns and gives the power to the Social
Democrats who join the Communist governement of
Béla Kun
4. The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the idea of
global Socialist revolution
• Hungary is not a successor state, a completely new
Communist social system and government form is
implemented:
• Hungary is ready to defend itself against the entente and
bourgeois powers, but also ready to make peace or accept a
temporary cease-fire
• There will be a world revolution, in the end the world will
consist of (Communist) Soviet Republic
• Hungary’s territory should be based on ethnic not historical
lines
• Temporary dictatorship is needed until the social change is
complete, social reform should consist of expropriation
(collectivization) of latifundia and factories
Fundamental political ideas of Béla Kun and the
Hungarian Soviet Republic
Social change, with some initial support
• Red Army (should it be National
Army?)
• Advance in the North…
• But the proletar dictatorship is
getting more and more unpopular
International situation and „foreign policy”
Failure of the Hungarian Soviet Republic
• Military advance to the north (against the Czechoslovak
army), hesitant withdrawal
• the Romanian Army is stronger, marches on toward Budapest
• No outside recognition of the Hungarian government
• No help from Soviet Russia (Lenin sends a supportive
telegram to the Hungarian workers)
• Loss of internal support
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 3.
1. The Trianon-treaty and the new Hungarian state
2. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national consciousness
3. (Alternatives to) alliance with Germany
4. Horthy-era revisionism: limited successes
1. The Trianon-treaty and the new Hungarian state
After the pro-Entente Mihály Károlyi and the
government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic…
the proudly counter-revolutionary Horthy regime
was recognized by the Entente
June 4, 1920
Le Grand Trianon
2. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national
consciousness
Trianon
quartet
16th
Jan,
1921
by
Zsigmond
Kisfaludi
Strobl
2. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national
consciousness
Contemporary plan for the
centennial
How about the „others”?
A limited victory (Burgenland)
Do not trust the flattering songs!
Vote German!
I will not leave you Western Hungary.
A limited victory
3. (Alternatives to) alliance with Germany
Little Entente with
French support
Lukewarm British
opposition to
excessive French
demands
Soviet territorial
ambitions against
Romania… but
ideological
constraints
Italian territorial ambitions against Yugoslavia
(the first friendship treaty with a former opponent in 1927),
„First visits” to Rome (1932-1941), 1942- to Berlin
German territorial ambitions against Czechoslovakia
(from 1933)
Stereotype way of thinking :
• Czechoslovakia is a cancer
• Romanians steel, cheat, and lie
• Croats are good ordinary sailers
(matróz)
• Serbians are the best warriors of
the Little Entente
Two principles:
• Anti-bolsevism
• Revisionism
Foreign policy ideas of governer Horthy
Conservative governments, increasingly violent
nationalism, increasingly pro-German
Position (as German power rises)
National-conservative governments
Pál Teleki (1920), István Bethlen (1921-1931):
„pro-British”, aim: „armed neutrality” (being
prepared whatever the outcome of the war)
Gyula Gömbös (1932-1936), Kálmán Darányi (1936-
1938), Béla Imrédi (1938-1939), … , László Bárdossy
(1941-1942): „pro-German” expecting gratefulness
of Berlin
István Bethlen
László Bárdossy
1932 Gyula Gömbös prime minister – first official visit to Rome
(becomes a tradition till 1942). Common topics with Italy:
cooperation with independent Austria; weakening Yugoslavia
by supporting Croatian (Ustasha) separatism
1933 June Gömbös to Berlin – the first official visit of a
European head of gov to Hitler
1934 Diplomatic relations established with the Soviet Union
(but still Hungarian coldness towards Moscow)
1936-1940 Imrédi, Darányi, Teleki governments (all tries to
moderate German-orientation, but ends up going even further:
cooperation with Germany, anti-Jewish legislations, etc.)
1938 Anschluss – Hungary is the first to officially congratulate
Hungarian foreign policy steps (1932-1938)
1935 General conscription in Germany (violation of the
Versailles Treaty)
1936
March: Re-militarization of Rhein-land (Rheinlandbesetzung;
still no French, British reaction)
October: Berlin-Rome Axis formed
1938 Anschluss, München Agreement, First Vienna Award
1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, attack on Poland, refugees to
Hungary
1941 Soviet Union, United States enters the war
1941 summer: Invasion of Soviet Union (and Kamenets-
Podolsk)
1942 summer: the Hungarian 2nd Army goes to the front
1943 jan. Catastrophy at the Don (Voronez)
World War II timeline (Hungarian perspective)
4. Horthy-era revisionism: limited successes
„Trianon” of the
neigbours
First Vienna Award (1938):
South Sovakia
Hungarian initiative (1939):
Carpatho-Ukraine (from CS)
Hungarian initiative (1941):
Northern part of Voivodina
(from Serbia)
Second Vienna Award (1940):
Northern Transylvania
(from Romania)
Pál Pritz: Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period
Aim: restoration of Saint Stephen’s Hungary
Preconditions necessary:
1.) A relevant political force in the country
2.) Conducive international situation
3.) Former national minorities be willing to return into Saint
Stephen’s empire
In sum: Inevitable failure… plus foreign policy mistakes because of
serious miscalculations and ideological constraints:
- not understanding the essence of fascism: raw expansionism
- not being open for cooperating with Moscow
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 4.
1. „Hinta-politika” or „Kállay kettős” (“swing-politics”)
2. German occupation (?)/friendly assistance?
3. The (non-)option for “jumping out” (quitting)
4. Ferenc Szálasi and the idea of “persistence”
5. Soviet liberation or occupation
1. „Hinta-politika” or „Kállay kettős” (“swing-politics”)
Miklós
Kállay
(1887-
1967)
The
European
war theater
in 1942
Kállay
kettős (of
Nagykálló)
1942: Allies securing North Africa
1943: Stalingrad, Allied landing in Sicily, Italy (Pietro
Badoglio govenment), Teheran conference
2. German occupation –
no effective resistance
• March 18th, 1944 - Horthy visits the Führer in Klessheim.
Hitler tells him that German troops are ready to move into
Hungary as „a precautionary measure”
• Verbal resistance by Horthy… in the end gives order as
governor and leader of the national army not to resist the
German invasion…
• Edmund Veesenmayer , envoy of the Third Reich with full
powers arrives to Budapest
• New government of Döme Sztójay appointed by Horthy
(„so that evil Hitler should not put the far-right Arrow Cross
party to power)
2. German occupation –
no effective resistance
„How long will it take for the German army to take Hungary?
• If there will be no resistance then it can be done in 24 hours.
• If there will be resistance then it will only take 12 hours
because then there will be no welcome speeches.”
German soldiers at
the Buda Castle
Victims of
„German
occupation”?
German invasion, Eichmann to
Budapest (March, 1944)
Gettoisation, deportations from
the countryside (May-June-July,
1944)
…Numerus clausus (1920), Anti-Jewish laws (1938, 1939, 1941…),
Novi Sad, Kamenets-Podolsk (1941), Jaross-lists (1944), …”
3. The (non-)option for “quitting” –
Conspiracy of the Allies?
„Secret” negotiations with the Allies (the Americans and the
British) in neutral capitals: Stockholm, Bern, Lisbon, Istambul
(German plans for Operation Margarethe I is for long time ready)
László Borhi: The allies intentionally brought about German
occupation of Hungary by conducting „secret” negotiations with
Hungary and providing false hopes for a separate peace without
any care given to the fact that the occupation of Hungary would
put hundreds of thousands of Jews in mortal danger
Ferenc Laczo: Falsely blaming the Americans and the British for
something that happened later and was not inevitable
Krisztián Ungváry: German occupation was the result of Soviet
troops approaching the Hungarian border, not of negotiations
Miklós Horthy and the „kiugrás” (jump out)
Oct. 15th, 1944. Horthy’s order and announcement: Hungary is no
longer fighting against the allies. Asks cease-fire from Moscow.
Only a part of the army acts on the order, the Nazis put Ferenc Szálasi
in power, which Horthy sanctifies. New Arrow Cross government
Béla
Miklós
(Dálnoki)
Ferenc
Szálasi
4. Ferenc Szálasi and the idea of “persistence”
October, 1944Apr,
1945
Dr. Aurel Bakody, psychiatrist, neurologist about Szálasi in 1939:
On the basis of his writings Szálasi is mentally ill, a "neophrasic" (a
person constantly producing new words) who is particularly prone to
presenting insignificant „wisdoms” with pathos…
He is characterized by schizoid mysticism….
He is autistic, schizophrenic, who completely excludes reality from
his thoughts.
Szálasi in 1943-44 (believing in victory till April, 1945:
Germany, even if is withdrawing its forces, is completely in control of
the situation and will soon give a lethal blow to the Soviet Union.
German army will be transported to Britain with the use of 1000
Gigant carrier airplanes.
„We cannot win this war, since we have already won it. The German
military leadership has completed all that is necessary to crush the
enemy.”
The „Shoe Memorial”, Budapest
Map of the
Budapest Ghetto
5. Soviet liberation/occupation
The 100 days’
siege
• „Malenkiy robot”,
• davai guitar,
• promise of a new
society
Statue of liberty, Gellért Hill, Budapest
Liberation monument, Liberty Square, Budapest
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 5.
1. Occupation and sovietization of East-Central Europe
2. The era of (very) limited sovereignty
3. Paris Peace Treaty and the territorial issues
4. Official narratives of Hungary’s identity
1. Consequences of the pre-1945 period on post-
1945 Soviet policy toward „Eastern Europe”*
1.) Soviet claim: East-Central Europe should be a security zone to be a
counterweight of future German militarism, to counter any attack from the West
2.) The Soviet Union became politically and military-wise powerful enough to
spread its power to East-Central Europe
3.) East-Central European states are weekened, fractioned (power vacuum)
4.) Actions of the USA and Britain hint to Moscow that it has a free hand in the
region and can treat it as its shpere of interest (Warsaw uprising, percentages,
Roosevelt in Yalta on the need to withdraw US forces from Europe, Berlin és Prague
to be occupied by the Soviet Union)
5.) Gratitude (mostly Czechs and Bulgarians), need of protection (CzSl, Poland)
6.) Bitterness, reluctance and fears (Poland, HU and Rom, the „involuntary allies”)
7.) Substantially different political culture, negligable support for Communists
8.) For geographic and historical reasons primary attention of Moscow is on EastGermany,
Poland and Czechoslovakia
9.) „Balkanization” ends, territorial-historical conflicts are swept under the carpet
with Soviet occupation (there is a new political agenda)
*Mark Kramer: Stalin, Soviet Policy and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944-53. In: Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.):
Stalinism Revisited. The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe. Budapest-New York: CEU Press. 2009. pp. 59-71.
In the occupied enemy countries:
Allied Controll Commission with
Soviet leadership
Salami tactics (Mátyás Rákosi):
ousting, arresting deporting,
political adversaries; dividing and
gradually eliminating the opposition
1948 February: Putch in
Czechoslovakia – „Popular
democracies” everywhere
Sovietization 1945-1948
1947 September: Kominform (which
had been planned prior to the
Marshall plan)
1947 July: Hungary rejects
participation in the Paris conference
(Marshall plan)
1948 June: Yugoslav Communist
Party expelled from Kominform
Into the Soviet orbit 1945-1948
2. The era of very limited sovereignty
Sovereignty of Hungary:
From March 19th, 1944 (German occupation): politically limited,
legally full
From January, 1945 (Soviet occupation): politically limited,
legally very limited
From February 10th 1947: politically very limited, legally full
1947
2. The era of very limited sovereignty*
• Empire by coercion, hegemonic exploitation of preponderence:
Hungary was a country to be conquered, not liberated (war trophy,
USSR had been a victim of Hungarian aggression)
• Closed zone from the beginning. Voroshilov: „This is our zone of
occupation and we are going to ask information on every person
that comes in”
• „It would be easier for the US to get landing rights in the USSR
itself”
• Hungary part of the Soviet military space = unrestricted
maneuvering on Hungarian territory (by armistice agreement of
January 20, 1945, then bilateral military treaties from 1948)
• Little attention to the projection of soft-power (ideology, culture)
*László Borhi: Hungary in the Soviet Empire 1945-1956. Hungarian Studies, Vol. 20 (2006), No. 1.
2. The era of very limited sovereignty*
• Hungarian budget financed Soviet occupation (511 million forints =
50 million dollars)
• („formerly German owned”) 400 companies to Soviet ownership.
Soviet control of natural resources (aluminium, bauxite, later:
uranium as a strategic assets), mining, air traffic, Danube
shipping…
• Reparation and other payments altogether amounts to close to a
third of national income
• Result: worst hyperinflation in history
*László Borhi: Hungary in the Soviet Empire 1945-1956. Hungarian Studies, Vol. 20 (2006), No. 1.
3. Paris Peace Treaty and the territorial issues
• 1945, July, Potsdam: USA brings up for the last time the revision of
the Czechoslovak-Hungarian and the Yugoslav-Hungarian pre-1938
borders based on the ethnic principle
• 1945, September, Council of Foreign Ministers: USA-UK: revision of
the Romanian-Hungarian border  SU: pre-1940
• 1946, April, meeting of deputy foreign ministers: USA: revision of the
Romanian-Hungarian border based on direct talks  SU: pre-1940
• 1946, May: Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to Ferenc Nagy: If the
Soviets bring up the question of Transylvania the USA will support
Hungarian demands
• 1946, Aug, Paris Peace Conference: János Gyöngyösi, Hungarian FM
demands first 22’000 sq km-s then 4000 with less than half million
inhabitants
3. Paris Peace Treaty and the territorial issues
The only modification: 3 vilages to Czehoslovakia
4. Official narratives of Hungary’s identity
By Zsigmond Kisfaludi Strobl
Narratives of the downfall of the Hungarian
Soviet Republic
• Erzsébet Andics (1945): “Against the over-excessive demands of the Entente-powers (…)
Hungarian workers took power in their hands and organized national resistance (…) The
question was whether Hungary would become a democratic country and keep a
significant portion of its territories (…) or (…) would lose the majority of its territories and
the reaction would sit back to its throne and Hungary again be the country of the
thousand acres. Hungarian reactionaries decided for the latter without hesitation. Their
counter-revolutionary activities had a decisive role in the downfall of the armed
resistance (…), and that the Romanians robbed through the country and came Trianon.”
• László Zsigmond (1953): „The executioner of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 was
the American, English and French imperialism that endeavored to save Hungarian large
estates and big capital. (…) they did not want to tolerate that the power could stay in the
hands of the Hungarian workers and working peasants. (…) the attempt at the Hungarian
Soviet Republic was part of the robbery raid, which aimed the annihilation of the centre
of the revolution, i.e. Soviet-Russia.”
• Dezső Nemes (1956): „In Austria Social-Democrats sharpened the deadly dagger of the
Austrian bourgeoisie with the aim of helping to overthrow the Hungarian Soviet Republic
and grabbing away Burgenland from Hungary.”
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 6.
1. Developments leading to the
1956 revolution
2. The international context
3. The revolution
4. The neutrality attempt of prime
minister Imre Nagy
60, Andrássy avenue, Budapest
1. Developments leading to the 1956 revolution
Power struggles within Hungary
Imre Nagy
(relatively moderate,
„revisionist” Communist)
Prime minister (1953—1955)
Mátyás Rákosi
(„Stalin’s best Hungarian
student”)
General Secretary of the
Hungarian Working People's
Party (1948—1956)
Prime minister (1952-1953)
Nandor Hidegkuti scores Hungary's final goal in their 6-
3 win against England at Wembley on 25 November
1953. Photograph: Popperfoto
„Match of the Century” (Wembley, 1953)
„Hungary's 6-3 victory
at Wembley 60 years
ago resonates like no
other in the history of
English football. It
wasn't just that this
was a first home defeat
to non-British or Irish
opposition, the
magnitude of the
scoreline or the
brilliance of the
Hungarian display: it
was the sense of
shock.”
(The Guardian, Nov 25th, 2013)
“Das Wunder von Bern” (The Miracle of Bern, 1954)
„The global reaction was that of disbelief, The Mighty Magyars had been
defeated. The victors were the World's enemy West Germany. A wave of
euphoria captured the West German states - not only for the victory but for
what it would mean for its future. (….) The final in Bern was the first time the
German anthem was played since the War, symbolizing the turning of the tide
for Germany”
„From 1950-1956 the Hungarians
would play 50 games... - 42 wins, 7
draws and only a single defeat. The
match they lost? The 1954 World
Cup Final to West Germany”
From occupied state to
neutral state!
The international context: Austrian State Treaty
(15, May, 1955)
Nikita Khruschchev and the 20th Party Congress
(February 14th, 1956)
Stalin’s crimes exposed…
Secret 4 hours speech that was leaked and caused global consternation
Political changes in Hungary (1956)
March 27: Speaking at a meeting of regional party activists,
Rákosi admits that the 1949 treason trial of László Rajk was a
show trial.
July 13: Soviet Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan arrives
unexpectedly in Budapest to oversee the dismissal of Rákosi.
July 18: At a Hungarian Workers Party Central Committee
meeting, Rákosi, citing his “state of health,” steps down and
departs for the Soviet Union. He is replaced by Ernő Gerő.
Reburial of László Rajk (October 6th, 1956)
„Poor Laci… If he was alive, he would surely get us shot” (comment
at the demonstration about the unjustified execution of László Rajk)
3.) Revolution: 1956 October 23rd – November 4th
The neutrality attempt of prime minister Imre Nagy
Oct. 25: ÁVH (State Defence Authority) snipers shoot into the crowd at Kossuth tér
Oct. 30: Attack on the Hungarian Workers Party, lynching of the defenders
Oct. 31: Soviet troops complete withdrawal from Budapest
Nov. 1, 1956: Suspension of the Warsaw Treaty, Declaration of neutrality, gov turns to the UN
Nov. 4, 1956: Full-scale invasion by Soviet troops
Popular views in connection with the failure on 1956 (and the reality)
1.) The USA did not come to help (as Radio Free Europe suggested it would): presidential
elections coming? Sec. of States Dulles to hospital? Austrian neutrality?
2.) All because of the Suez Crisis (Oct 29. Israeli invasion begins, Oct 31. French and British
bombing, Nov. 5. Paratroopers land near Suez…)
3.) UN did not help as it should have (see: Korea! Imre Nagy: „This is not so easy, kids”)
4.) Stupid step to announce neutrality by Imre Nagy.
5.) First nail in the coffin of Communism and the Soviet (half-)world order
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 7.
1. János Kádár, his personality
2. General features of „Kádárism”
3. „consolidation”, „megtorlás” (reprisals)
4. Economic reform and goulash communism
5. Military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968
6. Foreign policy re-orientation
1. János Kádár (1912-1989)
General Secretary of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (1956-1988)
Personality of János Kádár (by János Rainer):
A pragmatic, sober, narrow-minded*, but cunning power player.
* „able to express himself only through primitive derivatives of his
ideology”
1. János Kádár (1912-1989)
General Secretary of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (1956-1988)
„Kádár goes to retire”. 1972. (age: 60)
• 1968: the fall of Czechoslovak attempts to create a human-faced
socialism; forced revision of Hungarian economic reforms
• Citing future constraints on his abilities to serve the nation because
of his age…
• Surprise announcement of his request to retire
1.) => Changes mirror those in the Soviet Union
2.) => The main structure (essence of the Soviet-type system) did not change:
• undivided one-party rule
• same institutions with the same functions,
• state ownership of the means of production,
• one ideology,
• Warsaw Pact Alliance
• Burocratic redistribution
3.) => Important shifts in detail
• Diminishing role of coercive apparatuses and functions
• Rising importance of (informal) coordination and bargain
• Instead of the ideology of „world revolution” more talk of modernization
• Rationalization of central planning, elements of consumerism
(János Rainer M. on „Kádárizmus”)
2. Hungary: From „Salami” to „Goulash”
in the „happiest barrack” (i.e. Kádárism)
Post-1956Stalinism
is back:
imprisonments,
executions =>
International
isolation
Execution of Imre Nagy in 1958
(despite assurances to the Yugoslavs)
3. Consolidation, reprisals
Nov. 1956 -- early 1960s
4. Economic reform and goulash communism
Planning + market
• No injustices (as in capitalism
• No shortages and inefficient
production of garbage (when
there is only central planning)
„Magyarázom a
mechanizmust” by „Dr. Agy”
„Explaining the mechanism”
by Dr. Brain
5. Military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968
Hungarian tanks in the main square of Nové Zámky
(Érsekújvár)
Hungarian occupation zone
(Northest town: Nové Mesto nad
Váhom)
5. Military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968
• Reluctant participation
• Local opposition
Overturned Hungarian
tank on the bank of
the Ipoly/Ipel river
near Letkés in August,
1968
6. Foreign policy re-orientation: Reconciliation with the USA
Fits in the general tendency of reconciliation with the West. Start: relations to the
minimum (on the level of charge d’affaires) because of 1956, of execution of Imre
Nagy despite explicit promises to Yugoslavia
• 1962 General amnesty to political prisioners  removal of the Hungarian
question from the agenda of the UN.
• 1968 New Economic Mechanism
• 1971 departure of Cardinal Mindszenty from the US Embassy  historic crown
of St. Stephen returns to Hungary
• 1973 Hungary to GATT, 1982 Hungary to the IMF
• 1983 Vice-President George Bush in Hungary: „We in the United States are
heartened by Hungary’s efforts to expand contacts, to foster tolerance, and
meet commitments that bind our countries under the Helsinki Final Act”… USHungarian
relations „as a model for the rest of the world”.
6. Foreign policy re-orientation
Three waves of western orientation*
1.) 1956: uprising and war of independence (neutrality)
2.) 1968 economic reform, GATT (General Agreement on Tarrifs and
Trade) negotiations - 1973 GATT-membership; 1981 IMF and IBRD
(World Bank) membership
3.) from 1975 Comecon-EC (European Communities) ties, HungarianEC
comprehensive economic and trade agreement signed in January,
1989
+
Political manoevres toward America
and Western Europe
(e.g.: 1970s)**
*Balázs Péter: Magyarország és Európa. Napvilág Kiadó, 2011.
**see: Andrew Felkay: Hungarian foreign policy in the Kádár era
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Class no. 8.
1. Characteristics of the political transformation (1989-)
2. Characteristics of the economic transformation (1989-)
3. The new foreign policy orientation (1990), fundamental
treaties, NATO- and EU-accession
4. Changing attitudes towards the EU
5. The European Union and Hungary 2004-2010
• Hungary: a forerunner in 1989
• Opposition movements from 1988,
parties from 1989 (MDF, SZKH-SZDSZ,
Fidesz, historical parties)
• Gradual, peaceful, negotiated transition
• Opposition Round Table, National Round
Table (the triangular one ☺)
• Political cleavages already before 1989 –
revival of the urbánus-népies („urbanist”
vs „populist”) cleavage
• Cultural issues dominate politics
• Uni-cameral parliament, weak president,
mixed electoral law with strong
majoritarian elements
1. Characteristics of the political transformation
• Successor party of the former
Communists remains a
significant player (MSZP =
Hungarian Socialist Party)
• Fidesz gradually grows to
dominate the political scene
• The two major (antagonistic)
opposition parties (MDF, SZDSZ)
shrink, merge, disappear
2. Characteristics of the economic transformation
(1989-)
1. Burocratic coordination -> market coordination
2. State ownership to be privatized
3. Comecon (Soviet) trade relation -> Western orientation
http://www.politikaievkonyv.hu/online/mp20/1-16_meszaros.html
Czechoslovakia: reprivatization and voucher privatization (kupony)
Hungary: spontanious privatization, partial compensation, foreign
investment
Methods of privatization
Result:
(distribution
of company
ownership)
Results of the economic transformation
✓ Market economy, ratio of state redistribution on an average WestEuropean
level
✓ Economy dominated by private ownership, high ratio of foreign
invesments (predominantly Western, specifically German companies:
Audi as no. 1. )
✓ Open, export-oriented economy, trade-ties mostly towards Western
Europe, specifically Germany
• Very high ratio of inactives
• „Premature welfare state”, deficit, debt, reforms + stop-go cycles
• Despite highway constructions East-West, Budapest-countryside gaps
remain
3. The new foreign policy priorities (1990)
• The fastest possible accession to „Euro-atlantic”
organizations
• Development of good neighbourly relations
• Support for Hungarians living outside the state
borders
• Visegrad initiative: first summit: 15 Feb. 1991 (~1335)
• Hungary invited to start negotiation about NATO-accession in 1997
(together with Czech Rep. and Poland)
• 1994 (April 1st ☺) official request for EU-accession, accession talks
begin in 1998-2002, membership from 2004 May 1st. (Big bang of 10)
• Fundamental treaties with Ukraine, Slovakia, Croatia, Romania
4. Changing attitudes towards the EU
Idealistic approach: Back to Europe, back to the west where we belong – join western
democratic community where we have always aimed to belong – the good, free side of
history
Utilitarian, pragmatic approach: People live better in the West. We want income
convergence. How many derogations from the 35 chapters of Acquis communautaire
Euro-scepticism: We are alway five years away from accession. There will be losers of
accession in certain sectors
Euro-fears: no poppy-seeds, no 1,5% milk, …
Disillusionment: Teacher-student relationship, „We expected a welcome on red, velvet
carpet instead there were body-guards and they asked for our ticket”
5. The European Union and Hungary 2004-2010
• Peaceful foreign relations
• Deepening internal political divisions
• Excessive deficit procedure against Hungary (2004-2013)
• Global financial crisis (2008-2009-), IMF-EU 20 billion euro
emergency loan to Hungary
Fidesz (1998-2002, , 2010-……)
• EU-accession talks (under Fidesz-led gov!)
• EU-accession in 2004 (MSZP-led gov)
• Election defeat of Fidesz in 2006 again
• Financial crisis 2008-2009
• Fidesz comes to power with a two-thirds majority
(2010- …………………………………………)
Thank you for your attention! ☺
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 9.
1. System of National Cooperation
2. “peacock dance”,“Eastern opening”, “Stop Brussels”
3. Externally constrained hybrid regime?
1. System of National Cooperation, 2010
Changing priorities
1. System of National Cooperation, 2010•
Fülkeforradalom („Revolution at the voting booths”)
• 98% tax on severance (dismission) pays
• New constitution: Fundamental law
• New media law: Media Authority…. („Worst practices”)
• New electoral law: compensating the winner
• Forced retirement of judges
• Revolver journalism
„Kiderült, hogy miért ilyen agresszív a nőverő Juhász Péter"
című cikkünkben valótlanul állítottuk Juhász Péterről, hogy
megverte, begyógyszerezte, majd a lakásában fogva tartotta
előző élettársát, és valótlanul állítottuk, hogy Juhász Péter
személyisége agresszívvá torzult.” (2018-02-17 => 2019-02-21;
https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20190221-helyreigazitas.html )
Internal power politics
Occupation of the political center; Stop Soros; anti-CEU; legal and
economic tools to silence independent media, opposition, NGOs…;
criminalization of homelessness; anti-LGBTQ measures; …
Macroeconomic reorientation
Centralization: friendly oligarchs getting richer; nationalization of
private pensions (cutting the deficit, ending the excessive deficit
proceedure 2013); buying up subsidiaries of major companies in
key industries; …
1. System of National Cooperation, power-politics, economy
Foreign policy reorientation
„We are sailing in Western waters, but the wind is blowing from the
East”
(Nov. 2010)
Changing attitude to diplomacy
„Peacock dance” (May. 2012)
New friends (and enemies)
Ramil Safarov (inprisoned in Hungary in 2004 for killing a fellow
Armenian peace-partnership soldier) allowed to leave prison in 2012
and go home to Azerbaijan, where he received a hero’s welcome.
Changing attitudes, new friends, 2010-
1. System of National Cooperation, 2010-
Refugee influx 2015, 2016- „emergency”
Change of flags…
(identities, values?)
„For us Hungary comes first”
Stop Brussels!
National Consultation, 2017
• Infringement procedures by the
European Commission
• Refugee influx 2015, 2016-
„emergency”
• Article 7 proceedure since 2018
• Coronavirus + Enabling law
Hungary & EU on a collision course
2019
„You too have the
right to know what
Brussels is
preparing to do”
„They would dismantle
the border barrier
together”
„The sanctions
of Brussels
destroy us!” +
the „pro-war
opposition”
„Brussels’ failure
of acquiring
vaccines” + the
„anti-vaccine
opposition”
2022
2021
3. Externally constrained hybrid regime?
EU interventions
• Infringement procedures by the European Commission (new
media law, 98% tax on severance pays, retirement of judges,
lex-NGO, lex-CEU, refugee-quota, …)
• Article Seven procedure according to the Constitution Treaty
(initiated by the European Parliament)
• EPP-membership of Fidesz – 2019 suspended, 2021 Fidesz
leaves EPP
• System constraining… but also:
• System sustain, support
• System legitimation
EU
Western confusion:
Hungarians...
- ... get substantial EU support, but constantly rebel against
„Brussels”
- … emigrated to the West but show a solidarity deficit towards
refugees
- ... have a great heritage of a democratic revolution (60ys!) and yet
keep an illiberal political regime in power.
Political-cultural-national traditions?
Revolutions and wars of independence?
Need for a strong leader?
Being a reluctant ally?
Hungarian national isolation?
Rational choice?
Psychology?
Revolving door?
Thank you for your attention! ☺
schweitzer.andras@tatk.elte.hu
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy
Contents of Session 10.
1. The possible rationale of the foreign policy change and the
results
2. Cultural factors of the transformation
3. Future prospects
1. The possible rationale: Structure not agency?
Nabucco versus South Stream rivalry (2008-2009)
Partial reversal of turning to the
West before Orbán!
1.) The possible rationale
3 pillars of the „illiberal” foreign policy change
IDEOLOGICAL: Illiberal state. The decline of the West. The decline
of Liberalism
POLITICAL: relations to Putin, Erdogan, Turkic Council, etc. (while
maintaining relations to the West)
ECONOMIC: targeting the raise of proportion in trade of Eastern
countries from 18% to one-third. Alternative source of financial and
political support (countries that don’t criticize lack of freedoms).
+1: Suspicions of financial interest (eg. Belgrade-Budapest railway line
with Chinese loan = no EU-regulations and oversight: OLAF, European
Anti-Fraud Office)
1.) The result: success or failure?
IDEOLOGY and FOREIGN POLICY: „Illiberal” states spread worldwide –
2017: the year of revolution against liberalism? – still in limbo (Matteo
Salvini/Lega Nord, Norbert Hofer/FPÖ, AfD, Marine Le Pen/Front
national, Rassemblement national…)
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: targeting the raise of proportion in
trade of Eastern countries from 18% to one-third. Alternative source
of financial and political support (countries that don’t criticize lack of
freedoms) – no real success
Miscalculation? (Károlyi) Ideologically determined? (Horthy) Bandwagoning,
balancing according to the changing international power relations? (Kádár)…
… or plain populist attempt to stay on power?
1.) The results: success or failure?
Friendly ties with Russia, China, Israel, Turkey, Azerbaidjan, Turkic Council, etc.
(while maintaining relations to the West)… to gain leverage?
„I think we are in a new era in the world and it’s an era of great power
competition and what we, the US, are seeing is that other great powers
are competing for Hungary. All of them want more influence in and
relations with Hungary. Previously, the United States wasn’t necessarily
strengthening the friendship between the two countries and its
approach was too critical and judgmental. I think now, in this new era,
we have decided that the job of the embassy is to make a friend of
Hungary and to keep it close to us. So that means we had to change our
approach and be less critical.” (April H. Foley, January 14th, 2019)
https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-is-a-predictor-interview-with-april-h-foley-former-us-ambassador-to-
hungary/?fbclid=IwAR2C6kIXN9n6fC7iPtRXdUVtFN-rZzdkVkcwRYoCqVacuEgQGgHGId7MkQ8
2. Cultural factors of the transformation
Cultural heritage and foreign policy
Tricks and resourcefulness
The little and poor can strike back
Professionalism at the back-burner
2. Leaders, images and legitimacy
Regent of Hungary,
1920-1944
General Secretary of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party, 1956-1988
Fidesz-leader
Viktor Orbán
1989-2021
Bravely navigating admiral in a
sea of enemies + precisely
calculating cunning Realpolitiker
• Article 7 proceedure continues (since 2018); Conditionality in
the new EU budget 2021-2027; HUXIT?
• Fidesz out of the EPP => European populists (far right) alliance?
• Multiple (two-) speed Europe? Biden 2020 => Republican
Senate 2022? => Trump 2024?
• Fudan Uni; Beograd-Budapest railway; Paks II; …
• Visegrad cooperation (?)
• Further democratic decline… ?
• Putin’s war: Ukraine? Moldova? … escalation?...
3.) Future prospects, possible scenarios
Thank you for your attention!
☺
schweitzer.andras@tatk.elte.hu