Geoengineering the Climate:
The Social and Ethical
Implications
by Adam Corner and Nick Pidgeon
“The acceptability of
geoengineering will be
determined as much by
social, legal, and political
issues as by scientific
and technical factors”1
Preventing Dangerous
Climate Change
	 Anthropogenic climate change is
now a global political priority, and
governments across the world are devising
policies aimed at mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions from human
activities. This upsurge in political activity
reflects the increasing scientific
consensus that the effect of unmitigated
climate change for human and
non-human systems will be overwhelmingly
negative.2
The effects of
accelerated climatic change are already
being observed at the polar ice caps.3
With the United Nations negotiations
in December 2009 in Copenhagen a
focal point for policymakers everywhere,
discussion no longer centers on
whether climate change should be
tackled, but how.
	 Typically, policies are aimed at preventing
what the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) referred to as dangerous
anthropogenic interference with
the climate system. Although there are
significant difficulties in defining what
constitutes “dangerous” climate
change,4
a strong international consensus
has emerged that says that preventing
a rise in global temperatures of
more than two degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial revolution levels is critical
(corresponding to a level of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere of approximately
450 parts per million). Beyond
this level, feedback loops in the climate
system become increasingly likely—
and the threat of relatively rapid and
catastrophic changes becomes significantly
greater.
	 Unfortunately, the increasing attention
paid to mitigating dangerous climate
change has not prevented a continuing
rise in global greenhouse gas
emissions. In fact, emissions are increasing
more rapidly than even the
worst case scenario modeled by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), and predictions about
the likely effects of anthropogenic influence
on the climate have become
increasingly severe.5
The global population
continues to rise (particularly in
emerging economies such as China and
India), along with the per-capita emissions
of many millions of people.
	 It remains to be seen whether global
temperatures will exceed the two-degrees
limit. But some anthropogenic
climate change has already occurred
(global temperatures have risen by
around 0.74 degrees Celsius in the last
100 years) and because of the inertia in
the climate system, a further warming
of approximately 0.6 degrees Celsius is
inevitable.6
Thus, the window for effectively
mitigating against a two-degree
rise in global temperatures is extremely
narrow, and many prominent
members of the climate science community
have begun to question whether
preventing a rise in global temperatures
of this magnitude (or even
greater) is possible using existing mitigation
approaches.7
Scientists and policymakers
are increasingly asking what
will happen if the two-degrees “guardrail”
is breached, particularly if temperature
increases in excess of two degrees
lead to positive feedback loops
and further accelerate climate change.
Are existing mitigation and adaptation
policies enough to prevent catastrophic
changes in the climate from occurring?
In this context, geoengineering the
earth’s climate has started to be considered
as a serious candidate for both
mitigating against and adapting to dangerous
climate change.
Geoengineering
Geoengineering refers to the intentional
manipulation of the earth’s climate to
counteract anthropogenic climate
change or its warming effects.8
Most of
the technology implicated in geoengineering
proposals has yet to be developed,
let alone field tested. Some geoengineering
proposals may yet turn out
to be little more than imaginative science
fiction—for now, geoengineering
is at a pre-research and development
phase, with no major research initiatives
yet undertaken. But geoengineering
is beginning to be taken seriously
by scientists around the world, including
the American Meteorological Society
and the UK’s Royal Society.9
	 In the most comprehensive review
of geoengineering science to date, the
Royal Society identified two distinct
approaches: carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) techniques, which remove CO2
from the atmosphere, and solar radiation
management (SRM) techniques,
which reflect a small percentage of
the sun’s light and heat back into
space.10
CDR techniques include proposals
to imitate trees’ sequestration
of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
by using giant chemical vents
to “scrub” the atmosphere (analogous
to the carbon capture and storage
techniques currently being developed
for use on coal-fired power stations)
and plans to “fertilize” the oceans by
using particles of iron sulphate to stimulate
algal blooms (which absorb carbon
dioxide). Although not strictly an
engineering intervention, major global
reforestation could also be viewed as a
long-term method for CDR. By contrast,
SRM techniques include suggestions
for the placement of trillions of
tiny “sunshades” in orbit around the
earth to deflect a percentage of solar
radiation, and the enhancement of marine
cloud albedo using particles of sea
salt to deflect sunlight. (See Sidebar,
“Proposed Approaches to Geoengineering”
for further technical detail on
geoengineering proposals.)
	 The Royal Society report included a
preliminary assessment of the technical
feasibility and safety of specific geoengineering
proposals. The uncertainties
are considerable, and the potential
risks vary enormously across different
proposals—from concerns that SRM
techniques would do nothing to prevent
ocean acidification to fears that
ocean fertilization techniques would
have unpredictable (and undesirable)
ecological side effects. More generally,
there are significant concerns about the
masking effects of some geoengineering
approaches. In particular, SRM
techniques do not address the underlying
causes of climate change (i.e., the
build up of greenhouse gases), and
were such a program to unexpectedly
fail, a rapid acceleration of warming
might then ensue. Figure 1 (reproduced
from the Royal Society report) represents
an initial attempt to evaluate a
number of geoengineering techniques.
According to the Society’s analysis, it
is clear that there is substantial variation
in the estimates of the cost, effectiveness,
timeliness, and risk of putative
geoengineering approaches. A key
consideration is that many of the risks
of geoengineering are at present highly
26 Environment	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	VOLUME 52 NUMBER 1
January/February 201o	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	 Environment	 27
uncertain (effectively “unknown unknowns”),
making them particularly
difficult to analyze through conventional
risk assessment techniques.
	 The Royal Society emphasized that
none of the current proposals for geoengineering
should currently be considered
as acceptable policy responses
to climate change. However, despite
distancing itself from the application
of geoengineering techniques, the
Royal Society recommended that £10
million be invested annually into research
on their technical feasibility
and safety over the next 10 years (in
the UK). As a result, the UK Research
Councils plan to spend £3 million on
some preliminary research from late
2010 onward. Thus, despite the obvious
wariness with which geoengineering
proposals are treated by some
members of the scientific commu-
nity,11
research into the technical feasibility
and physical risks of geoengineering
is poised to begin.
	 The considerable uncertainty surrounding
geoengineering is of course
not confined to questions of technical
risk and feasibility. The prospect of
coordinated and large-scale attempts
to engineer the climate raises a host of
challenging legal, ethical, and social
questions. One of the key recommendations
in the Royal Society report
was that a process of dialogue and
engagement to explore public and
civil society attitudes, concerns, and
uncertainties about geoengineering
should begin immediately. In the following
section, we identify some of
the social and ethical questions that
geoengineering proposals may raise.
We then identify some methods by
which public responses to these questions
might be elicited. Finally, and
echoing the Royal Society’s sentiments,
we suggest that beginning a
process of legitimate and participative
public engagement is essential for
policymakers who are considering
proposals for geoengineering the climate.
As an issue potentially affecting
citizens of countries around the
globe—both rich and poor—dialogue
about the prospect of engineering the
earth’s climate should not be confined
to technical or political elites, nor for
that matter solely to the citizens of
industrialized Western nations.
The Royal Society has identified two broad types of
geo-engineering proposals. Carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) techniques remove CO2
from the atmosphere,
while solar radiation management (SRM) techniques
reflect a small percentage of the sun’s light and heat
back into space.
CDR Techniques
Chemical air capture and carbon sequestration: There are a number of
proposals to imitate trees’ sequestration of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
by using giant chemical vents to “scrub” the atmosphere. More
conventional carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques are currently
being developed for use on coal-fired power stations.
	Ocean fertilization: Plans to “fertilize” the oceans by using particles of
iron to stimulate algal blooms (which absorb carbon dioxide) have already
attracted interest from commercial investors, but small scale experiments
have thus far been unsuccessful.
	 Biomass/biochar/biomass with carbon sequestration (BECS): The use
of biofuels as a substitute for fossil fuels might not seem to qualify as
geoengineering, but the mass harvesting and sequestration of biomass
would constitute a major climatic intervention.
	Enhanced weathering: Adding silicate materials to soil would enhance
weathering processes which naturally sequester CO2
, while increasing the
levels of alkalinity in the ocean would have a similar effect.
	Afforestation: Large-scale ecosystem management at a local and global
level could provide significant increases in carbon sinks such as forests.
While few undesirable side effects would be expected, carbon stored in
vegetation is not securely sequestered in the long term.
SRM Techniques
Space-based reflectors: The placement of a fleet of artificial “sunshades”
in orbit around the earth would deflect solar radiation. One suggestion is
that a swarm of around 10 trillion extremely thin discs could be launched
into space in stacks of a million, once every minute, for about 30 years.
	 Stratospheric aerosols: Sulphate particles blasted into the stratosphere
would deflect sunlight. Based on the model of a volcano, rapid
reductions could be achieved in earth-bound solar radiation, but there
are serious concerns over unintended effects on the stratospheric
ozone.
	Enhanced surface albedo: Human settlements could be made more
reflective by painting them white, more reflective crop varieties and grassland
could be planted, and deserts could be covered with highly reflective
materials.
	Enhanced cloud albedo: The whitening of oceanic clouds could be
achieved by spraying salt-rich sea water into the sky—sometimes referred
to as “cloud seeding.”
Proposed Approaches to Geoengineering
The Social and Ethical
Implications of
Geoengineering
Intentional Manipulation of the
Global Climate
	 Perhaps the most fundamental question
that geoengineering raises is
whether the intentional manipulation of
the global climate is ethically acceptable.
On the one hand, few would disagree
that a global temperature rise of
three or four degrees (or even higher)
will have catastrophic consequences for
both people and ecosystems, providing
an ethical imperative for action if all
other options are likely to fail. There is
also a long history of anthropogenic
manipulation or modification of many
of the Earth’s systems (not just the
global climate).12
It is clear that humans
have the capacity to geoengineer and
have done so intentionally on a small
scale and unintentionally on a large
scale on many previous occasions: Anthropogenic
interference in the global
climate is precisely the problem that
geoengineering is designed to solve.
	 But the intentional large scale manipulation
of the climate has not previously
been attempted. Thus, it is the
intentionality of geoengineering proposals
that demarcates them from previous
anthropogenic interference in the
global climate. This asymmetry between
intended and unintended acts is
clearly observed in law (most legal
systems distinguish crimes on the basis
of intentionality), medical ethics (passive
vs. active euthanasia), and military
conduct (the intentional killing of civilians
vs. “collateral damage” of war).13
	 Some commentators have argued
that the fact that humans have already
caused climatic change is precisely the
reason why an intentional effort to
undo it should not be initiated.14
On
this view, the unintended consequences
of current human interference in the
climate system are a powerful indication
that “meddling” with the global
climate is inadvisable. Proponents of
geoengineering counter that even nongeoengineering
attempts at mitigation
constitute intentional interference in
the climate—as efforts to reduce the
greenhouse gas emissions of human
activity are aimed at slowing down
(and ultimately reversing) global
warming.15
But as several decades of
risk research have established, people’s
perceptions of the risks associated with
science and technology are filtered
through social and cultural lenses.16
This means that the prospect of largescale
technological manipulation of the
atmosphere is likely to produce radically
different responses from different
members of the public. People with opposing
cultural worldviews tend to
perceive risks and benefits very differ-
ently.17
While some may find the prospect
of large-scale engineering projects
worrisome, others will view programs
aimed at changing their consumption
28 Environment	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	VOLUME 52 NUMBER 1
Figure reproduced with full permission from The Royal Society. Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty
(Science Policy Centre Report 10/09, 2009, p. 49). Each of the geoengineering techniques is described in the Sidebar, “Proposed
Approaches to Geoengineering.”
An additional dimension on which geoengineering techniques vary is reversibility. While increasing urban surface albedo could quickly
be undone, reversing ocean fertilization programs would be more difficult. The degree to which any particular geoengineeing technique
could be halted and reversed might be a critical determinant of how people perceive them.
Figure 1. A preliminary evaluation of geoengineering techniques reviewed by
The Royal Society (2009)
January/February 201o	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	 Environment	 29
iStockPhoto/MarosMarkovic
Some scientists have proposed carbon dioxide removal systems to address pollutants
emitted by refineries such as this one.
morally unacceptable. While mitigation
through behavior change—for
some closer to an idea of “social engineering”—and
geoengineering may
both technically constitute intentional
interference with the climate, people
are unlikely to see the commonality.18
Consent
If agreement were to be reached that
climate modification was a technically
viable and politically acceptable
option, whose agreement would be
sought? In the industrialized nations,
the democratization (or otherwise) of
science and technology is a topic of
continuing interest. As the large academic
literature on how to engage
people with science demonstrates,
how and why to involve the public in
decisions about the appropriateness or
acceptability of novel scientific and
technological developments continues
to generate debate.19
The U.S. National
Research Council (in common
with many others) has argued that it is
beneficial for experts and policymakers
to involve citizens in discussion
about the societal aspects of emerging
areas of science, technology, and the
environment using appropriate analytic-deliberative
processes at the earliest
possible stage.20
The prospect of
controlling the global thermostat is
something that all citizens could reasonably
claim to have a legitimate
stake in. How will the public’s views
be adequately represented?
	 The issue of consent arguably has
more profound implications internationally.
It is well documented that
some of the poorest parts of the world
(e.g., Bangladesh, sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Pacific Island states) will be
disproportionally affected by climate
change—both because of their resource-limited
capacity to cope with
the changing climate, and because of
their low-lying or drought-prone geography.
Just as the citizens of developing
countries did little to contribute to
the adverse effects of the climate
change that they now face, it seems
unlikely that the poorest people in the
poorest countries will be adequately
represented in decisions about geoen-
gineering.21
Yet perversely, any adverse
consequences of geoengineering are
likely to be more difficult to address in
nations with limited financial resources.
Recognizing this concern, the
Royal Society recommended that it
would be inadvisable to pursue geoengineering
methods that would have effects
extending beyond national boundaries
(e.g., the deployment of sulphate
aerosols) before appropriate governance
mechanisms were in place. The
history of international climate negotiations
is of course fraught with difficulties,
suggesting that in practice,
geo-governance mechanisms will be
difficult to design and implement.
	 A more mundane issue of consent
arises from the literature on public attitudes
towards nuclear power. Recent
studies in the UK have asked people
about their views on nuclear power, in
light of the threat posed by climate
change. While outright support and
strong opposition to nuclear power was
evident, a significant proportion of
participants offered a “reluctant acceptance”—that
is, they agreed that nuclear
power (as a potential source of
low-carbon energy) could be a necessary
evil in the fight against climate
change.22
A key conclusion of the research
was that this was a conditional,
unstable attitude position with considerable
ambivalence associated with the
apparent support. In addition, participants
in qualitative discussion groups
expressed resistance to the pre-framing
of ‘nuclear vs. climate change’ rather
than ‘nuclear vs. other energy options
that might fight climate change’. Geoengineering
is being advocated in precisely
this way—as the lesser of two
evils. If a narrative of inevitability is
used to frame geoengineering without
fully evaluating its merits against other
policy options first, what effect will
this have on public acceptance of it?23
Global Security & Law
Research on geoengineering has its
roots in military strategies developed
for weather modification.24
Both the
United States and Russia expressed
significant interest (and invested significant
funds) in researching weather
modification for the purposes of military
conflict. However, concern over
this type of research led to the Environmental
Modification Convention
(passed by the United Nations in 1977),
banning the use of weather modification
for military or other hostile use.
Some commentators have suggested
that geoengineering proposals might
violate the terms of this treaty.25
	 While geoengineering’s military history
does not preclude benevolent uses,
it is clear that climate modification
schemes come with a potential for
global conflict that should be taken
seriously by policymakers. Conflict
might arise if the world views a nation
pursuing a climate modification program
as placing its own interests above
those of other nations. It is even conceivable
that a wealthy individual or
private company might develop geoengineering
technologies. But even if
multilateral agreement could be
reached, the potential for conflict
would remain. What if, in the process
of improving the climate of its own
country, a government inadvertently
affected the climate of another? What
if one nation attributed a change in its
climate to the geoengineering program
of another, or even instigated a counter-program
(to add greenhouse gases
to the atmosphere) if the geoengineering
program of another nation was felt
to inadvertently affect it?26
	 Picking apart the climatic effects
that could be attributed to a rival nation’s
geoengineering from those
which would have occurred naturally
would be extremely difficult. The
scope for conflict—even in the absence
of intentional provocation—would be
significant. While similar disputes
might be envisioned over the uneven
distribution of climatic changes from
unabated greenhouse gas emissions,
the act of geoengineering might well
be considered more problematic than
doing nothing. Finally, even if conflict
could be avoided in the initiation of
geoengineering proposals, significant
questions remain about whether the
world’s nations could create and maintain
the centuries of global political
stability that would be required to manage
such industrial projects on a global
scale. As the climate scientist Stephen
Schneider succinctly puts it, “Just
imagine if we needed to do all this in
1900 and then the rest of the 20th century
unfolded as it actually did!”27
Distraction from Mitigation and
the Lure of “Techno-Fixes”
The commercial potential of geoengineering
has already attracted interest
from private investors,28
but initial research
into geoengineering will almost
certainly be initiated by governmentfunded
research councils. Geoengineering
proposals will compete with
other mitigation and adaptation strategies
for research investment, which
will raise questions about the allocation
of sparse government resources.29
In fact, some pressure groups that have
previously been vocal opponents of
stringent political action to reduce
greenhouse gases (such as the Cato
Institute in the United States) have indicated
their support for geoengineering
as a “cost effective” method of
tackling climate change.30
Advocates
argue that the cost of geoengineering—
in terms of gross domestic product—is
substantially less than other mitigation
options (although the ETC Group has
dubbed geoengineering the “Big Mac”
of climate change responses—fast, unhealthy,
and deceptively cheap in the
short term).31
This suggests that as
awareness of geoengineering’s potential
grows, some powerful economic
and ideological interests will lobby
strongly for it. At a political level,
therefore, geoengineering might be
considered a dangerous distraction
(with momentum of its own) from the
task of mitigation through more traditional
methods of emissions reductions.
The Royal Society refers to this
as a “moral hazard” argument—the
phenomenon whereby people who feel
“insured” against a risk may take
greater risks (i.e., mitigate less) than
they would otherwise be prepared to
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Tree seedlings being grown for a reforestation project in Africa.
iStockPhoto/WARWICKLISTER-KAYEPHOTOGRAPHY
January/February 201o	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	 Environment	 31
take.32
Of course, whether geoengineering
will suppress individual and
group incentives for action (or alternatively
galvanize some sections of society)
is an empirical issue, pointing to
the need for quite subtle social research
on geoengineering’s impact on attitudes
to climate change, as well as behavioral
intentions and responses.
	 Geoengineering also does nothing to
challenge the systems of production
and consumption that might be considered
unsustainable for reasons other
than the greenhouse gas emissions associated
with them. For example, the
UK Energy Research Center recently
warned that conventional oil supplies
could peak by 2020 if current consumption
trends continue.33
While proposals
for capturing carbon dioxide
and storing it underground can mitigate
levels of CO2
in the atmosphere, oil
reserves will continue to be depleted
for as long as fossil fuels continue to be
burned. Similarly, increasing numbers
of commentators and economists have
questioned whether the globally dominant
economic model of consumptionbased
growth can deliver a truly sustainable
society, given that the
decoupling of economic growth and
energy use is typically relative, not
absolute.34
To what extent will the
promise of geoengineering detract attention
from the critical need to establish
more sustainable consumption and
production patterns across the globe?
	 As the climate scientist Mike Hulme
has observed, questions such as these
shed light on the deep ideological divides
that run through debates about
climate change and how to “solve” it.35
For groups and individuals who see
climate change as the symptom of a
social and economic order that is inherently
unsustainable, geoengineering
represents the worst kind of techno-fix.
These people may desire social change
independent from concern about climate
change—and are thus likely to
view proposals that do not address existing
inequalities between nations and
peoples with suspicion. Conversely,
those who place faith in the human
capacity for finding technological solutions
to environmental and other problems
might well see geoengineering as
a genuine opportunity rather than a
threat. Here, deeply held and culturally
ingrained narratives regarding human
dominance over (or conversely interconnectedness
with) nature are likely
to play a role.
	 As knowledge of geoengineering
proposals proliferates, the metaphors
that emerge in the public discourse
(and how they relate to different underlying
political and environmental ideologies)
will be telling. The recently
completed European nanotechnology
project DEEPEN36
found that among
discussion groups in the UK and Portugal,
five key narratives characterized
participants’ responses to nanotechnology:
1) “be careful what you wish for”;
2) “opening Pandora’s box”; 3) “messing
with nature”; 4) “kept in the dark”;
and 5) “the rich get richer and the poor
get poorer.” Interestingly, the technoscientific
vision of technology as driving
inexorably forward and bringing
inevitable social benefits tended to be
rejected. These narratives resonate
with the sorts of responses that might
be expected towards geoengineering,
and suggest that there are clear parallels
between these two emerging areas
of science and technology (a theme
that we develop in more detail be-
low).36
Unintended Consequences
	 Concerns about whether scientists
and engineers have the capacity to
safely mitigate the unintended technical
and environmental consequences of
geoengineering will play a central role
in the debate. But the issue of unintended
consequences also has a number
of social dimensions. For example,
history shows us that complex technical
and environmental systems often
fail because of unanticipated interactions
between their component parts,
while the processes of societal oversight
typically are insufficiently sensitive
to emerging warning signs.37
In an
analysis that broadly supports pursuing
geoengineering research, James Lovelock
questioned whether human societies
are sufficiently talented to take on
the role of permanently regulating the
global thermostat: “Consider what
might happen if we start by using a
stratospheric aerosol to ameliorate
global heating; even if it succeeds, it
would not be long before we face the
additional problem of ocean acidification.
This would need another medicine,
and so on. We could find ourselves
in a Kafka-like world from
which there is no escape.”38
	 Lovelock’s “Kafka-like world” is
purposefully dramatic. But the notion
that embarking on a course of geoengineering
could result in perpetual technological
“treatments” for the climate
system is one that should be taken seriously.
Aside from the moral questions
it raises about what this sort of society
and global environment would be like,
an increasingly technologically sophisticated
future may not be something
that can be taken for granted. Rapid
technological progress since the industrial
revolution has been inextricably
linked to the availability of cheap and
plentiful fossil fuels. Will a post-carbon
energy future be similarly catalytic
in driving technological innovation?
	 The ethical and social questions we
have identified are not intended to be
an exhaustive list, and neither are they
predictions about the likely trajectory
of public and ethical opinion towards
geoengineering. Inevitably, in focussing
on the disputes that geoengineering
might raise, we have not discussed
While proposals for capturing carbon dioxide
and storing it underground can
mitigate levels of CO2
in the atmosphere,
oil reserves will continue to be depleted
for as long as fossil fuels
continue to be burned.
in detail the benefits that proponents of
geoengineering research foresee. The
worst effects of geoengineering may
pale in comparison to the threats posed
by insufficiently mitigated climate
change. And, if at some critical juncture
in the future the survival of the
human race depended on our ability to
geoengineer a climate solution, proponents
of geoengineering research argue
that it would be better if we had already
done the fundamental research.39
	 The promise of a benignly controlled
climate may be appealing to some, although
most see geoengineering as a
contingency plan—a backup in case all
else fails. But even proponents of geoengineering
research urge caution in
pursuing such a radical agenda because
the social and ethical issues at stake are
substantial. In the next section, we outline
some possible methods for beginning
a process of upstream engagement
with members of the public. By drawing
on relevant public engagement research
on another emerging area of
science—nanotechnology—we seek to
identify ways to establish a dialogue
with society at large that may, if approached
open-mindedly, provide a legitimate
method for addressing broader
questions about geoengineering.
Involving Citizens Early in
Debate: The Challenge of
Upstream Public Engagement
	 “Public engagement” is typically
poorly specified.40
From purely communicative
projects aimed at improving
lay knowledge in some way, to
consultation processes that might be
more accurately described as market
research, to large-scale analytic-deliberative
processes involving both lay
and expert participants – the concept of
public engagement is broad and negotiable.
Debate over the best way to involve
members of the public in decisions
related to science and technology
has taken place for over a decade.41
Early discussions centered around the
deficit model of science communication,
which assumed that the public
had a deficit of knowledge that needed
to be addressed through engagement.
But the deficit hypothesis has been
discredited by both theoretical advances
and empirical data. From a
theoretical perspective, assuming a
deficit of knowledge is not conducive
to establishing a genuinely participatory
interaction between scientists,
communicators, and the broader public.
And from an empirical perspective,
studies have consistently shown that
people’s perception and acceptance of
science and technology is not straightforwardly
attributable to their level of
knowledge about it.42
The rejection of
the deficit model of science communication
has been accompanied by a concerted
effort to develop more deliberative
public engagement mechanisms,
and to move their use “upstream” in the
research and development process. A
technology is upstream if significant
research and development has not yet
begun, public controversy about the
topic is not currently present, and entrenched
attitudes or social representations
have not yet been established
(criteria that seem to fit geoengineering’s
current position). Upstream engagement
means encouraging the public
to play an active role in deliberating a
scientific or technological issue throughout
the entire process of scientific research
and development, and particularly
before significant commercial
realization has taken place.43
32 Environment	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	VOLUME 52 NUMBER 1
Direct Public Engagement
Citizens’ juries, panels, focus groups, and deliberative workshops
can allow significant ethical concerns to be identified and “desired
futures” to be discussed. We argue that an international process of
direct engagement with the public on geoengineering should be
initiated immediately—ideally prior to the commencement of a
physical research program.
Scenario Analysis with Stakeholders
Identifying different directions that a new technology might take can
help to identify significant uncertainties. Mapping out some possible
trajectories for geoengineering might permit some of the ethical issues
we identify to come to the forefront.
Decision Analytic Methods
Decision analytic methods consist of working with stakeholders or
the public to identify the frames and values that are ultimately necessary
for characterizing risks. Geoengineering is likely to be framed
using an initial narrative of necessity or inevitability. What effect will
this have on judgments? Can alternative decision structures be iden-
tified?
Multistage Methods
Multistage methods combine different approaches to framing
and risk assessment in a sequence of linked activities, often with
different groups of stakeholders and the public, and at different
times. It seems likely that multistage and multi-audience methods
will be necessary to establish a legitimate process of international
engagement on geoengineering.
Some Approaches to Upstream
Engagement
January/February 201o	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	 Environment	 33
	 Successful upstream engagement
requires finding new ways of listening
to and valuing diverse forms of public
knowledge and social intelligence,
and involving the public in more fundamental
questions about the pace and
direction of science and technology
(and the wider values that inform
this). Many authors have issued calls
for the social scientific (as well as
technical) aspects of new technologies
to be addressed early and simultaneously,
rather than simply allocating
the impacts or societal effects of a	
new technology to the social sciences
to assess post hoc.44
On this view, social
and ethical assessments of a new
technology must occur in real time in
order to address deeper social and political
questions about purpose, ownership,
control, and responsibility:
What is a development for, what is the
need, who owns it, and who will be
responsible if things go wrong? All of
these questions seem especially pertinent
for any future proposals to geoengineer
the climate.
	 Interest in upstream engagement in
Europe can be partly attributed to the
widely held perception that public engagement
over genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) came too late, and
resulted in something of a backlash.45
The lessons learned and the approaches
used in projects such as the British GM
Nation public debate in 2003 have informed
much of the research and practice
in Europe that has followed it.46
But most of the discussion over methods
of upstream engagement has related
to currently upstream topics (for
example, nanotechnology, hydrogen
energy technologies, and synthetic biology).
Tee Rogers-Hayden and Nick
Pidgeon have referred to nanotechnology—the
manufacture of nanoscale
structures and devices that have novel
chemical and electrical properties—as
the test case for upstream engagement.
A number of engagement mechanisms,
and their potential for upstream
engagement on geoengineering are
outlined in the Sidebar, “Some Approaches
to Upstream Engagement.”47
Several methods emerge as promising
ways to develop an upstream dialogue
with the public, and we focus here on
the use of citizens’ juries and deliberative
workshops.48
	 Citizens’ juries are a forum for public
debate and discussion, and are
based on the model of a legal jury (and
are related to the “consensus conference”
models used in Australia and
Scandinavian countries).49
They are
semi-structured and participatory sessions,
where a representative group of
the public is asked to consider a series
of questions relating to a particular
topic. The jury has the opportunity to
question “witnesses” (experts in the
field) and are asked to reach a “verdict.”
In this way, the sessions are guided by
the concerns and interests of the participants,
rather than solely determined
by the researcher. NanoJuryUK (held
in West Yorkshire over five weeks in
the summer of 2005) proved to be a
useful method to elicit public evaluations
of nanotechnology—something
that is scientifically complex, difficult
to visualize, and difficult to represent
psychologically.50
Although participants
initially struggled with the topic,
its ultimate success suggests that it is a
methodology that might conceivably
lead to substantive public engagement
with the social and ethical questions
that geoengineering raises.
	 In addition to citizens’ juries, upstream
deliberative workshops have
been trialled using members of the
British and American public. Using the
deliberative workshop format, quasirepresentative
groups of the public
from the United Kingdom and the
United States were convened to debate
nanotechnology.51
The groups discussed
the risks and benefits of specific
nanotechnology applications using a
combination of World Café discussion
sessions and written materials to draw
on. Interestingly, a firm conclusion
(echoing the findings of the DEEPEN
project described earlier) was that the
social trumped the technical in people’s
discussion of risk—that is, discussions
focused predominantly on the
social and ethical implications of nanotechnology,
rather than questions of
physical risk (despite the groups being
provided with information about physical
risks). A key question is whether
such deliberative workshops will be an
effective method of upstream engagement
on geoengineering (where social
and ethical questions are likely to be
pertinent). They seem to provide a forum
for precisely the type of nontechnical
concerns that traditional risk assessment
approaches to analysis
struggle to capture.
	 Our argument is that the upstream
public engagement tools that have
been developed for studying nanotechnology
may also be usefully applied
to assess people’s perceptions of
iStockPhoto/ktsimage
Reduced sea ice thickness is just one of the many signs of global climate change.
the social and ethical implications of
geoengineering. It will not be an easy
challenge to meet. Relocating public
debate about geoengineering to an
earlier point in its development will
not address the generic difficulties of
public engagement—who should participate,
the efficacy of different approaches,
the clarification of aims and
the need to ensure the results of any
engagement exercise are taken on
board by decision-makers, as well as
the means for locating dialogue within
existing modes of democratic and
public representation. Equally, upstream
engagement brings a range of
unique issues relating to the design of
participatory exercises. In the case of
nanotechnologies, the very absence of
products and easy everyday analogies
through which people can interpret
the science means they often struggle
(initially at least) to get a grip on the
topic. In turn, this means that engagement
mechanisms require at least
some level of information provision
about the issue, raising the question of
how this information is framed and
presented by the dialogue organizers.
	 Many attempts at upstream public
engagement suffer from two problems:
a profound ambivalence on behalf of
the public, and a general cynicism
about whether the results of engagement
exercises are taken seriously by
decision-makers and stakeholders.52
Decision-makers must be careful not to
use upstream public engagement as an
opportunity to “get in early” with progeoengineering
public relations campaigns,
but even more importantly, every
effort must be made to make public
engagement opportunities available to
as many people (and as many different
types of people) as possible.
	 The recent World Wide Views on
Global Warming project represents an
attempt to pursue public engagement
on a global scale.53
The project was a
global citizen consultation that took
place on September 26, 2009 in 38
countries, involving 4,400 citizens.
Each deliberation included around 100
participants, who were selected to be
demographically representative for the
region. Participants discussed and debated
views on the policy goals of the
United Nations Climate Change Negotiations
in Copenhagen. While 4,400
people still represent a tiny minority of
the worldwide population, the project
suggests that public participation projects
need not (and should not) be restricted
to the citizens of industrialized,
Western nations.
Conclusion
	 Research into the technical feasibility
and safety of geoengineering is
poised to begin, with guarded interest
from research funders, governments,
and academic bodies in the United
States and Europe. We have argued that
it is essential that a program of social
research and reflection be initiated as
well, prior to the physical program.
The deliberative techniques that have
been trialled in research on nanotechnology
offer potential opportunities for
meaningful public engagement.54
Even
under conditions of high uncertainty
that characterize emerging technologies
such as geoengineering (something
the philosophers Jerry Ravetz
and Silvio Funtowicz have termed
post-normal science),55
upstream deliberative
methods can play a critical
role in allowing a broader range of
voices to be heard and in extending the
dialogue between experts and society.
	 But while it is relatively straightforward
to elicit views and opinions from
members of the public, ensuring that
these views are given weight and legitimacy
by decision-makers is a major
undertaking. There is, therefore, a
significant challenge for public engagement
researchers and policy-	
makers to develop a genuinely partici-
34 Environment	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	VOLUME 52 NUMBER 1
iStockPhoto/ktsimage
January/February 201o	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	 Environment	 35
pative model of upstream public
engagement around geoengineering
that does more than simply move consultation
processes to an earlier phase
in the technology’s development. Public
engagement must be initiated before
the scientific community begins
to investigate the potential of geoengineering,
precisely because the social
and ethical questions that geoengineering
raises will be much more difficult
to address in a satisfactory way once
large-scale research is underway. If
experiments are to be conducted with
geoengineering at the level required to
adequately assess its impacts—that is,
real-world experiments with the
world’s climate—the opportunity to
engage the public in meaningful dialogue
may have already passed. The
need for upstream engagement on geoengineering
is, therefore, pressing.
	 Encouragingly, the Royal Society
report included a preliminary investigation
of public attitudes towards
geoengineering.56
Focus groups composed
of participants with different
environmental beliefs and behaviors
discussed possible risks, benefits, and
uncertainties of different geoengineering
technologies. Perceptions of
geoengineering were generally negative,
with concern over vested commercial
interests, environmental impact,
and transparency of regulation
(this can be contrasted with general
views about nanotechnology, which
have tended to be broadly positive)57
.
However, there was also a suggestion
that geoengineering proposals might
galvanize (rather than distract from)
mitigation strategies—several participants
who were generally sceptical
towards climate change perceived
government investment in geoengineering
research as a reason for increased
personal engagement.
	 Of course, upstream engagement on
geoengineering is not just about alerting
the public to risks and dangers they
might otherwise not be aware of; addressing
the ethical and social questions
that geoengineering raises may
actually increase the likelihood of a
technical program beginning. This is
not because upstream engagement offers
an early opportunity to allay fears,
but because previous experience with
biotechnology has suggested, for example,
that failing to effectively engage
the public led to GM food becoming
an iconic topic for broader political
debate and controversy.58
Engagement
exercises should not aim to stymie research
or limit academic freedom, but
to enrich societal debate and the decision-making
process. A good example
of this is a recent British dialogue with
members of the public about the use of
nanotechnologies in healthcare. As
well as identifying positive and negative
perceptions of the role of nanotechnologies
in health, the process provided
valuable input that aided the
development of the research program.59
	 Upstream engagement with the public
may also simply lead to neither acceptance
nor rejection. Some recent
studies of public attitudes towards nanotechnology
have suggested that people
with opposing views of science and
technology tend to polarize the more
they know about the risks and benefits
of nanotechnology.60
Different approaches
to geoengineering may also
raise different social and ethical issues—the
question of international
consent is arguably less pressing for
localised sequestration methods than it
is for the use of stratospheric aero-
sols.61
But whatever the outcome of
involving the public in a discourse
about the questions that geoengineering
raises, beginning this process at the
earliest possible stage seems essential.
Genuinely upstream research and engagement
asks not only what the impacts
of a particular new program of
technological innovation will be, but
whether that program is desirable in
the first place.
	 These concerns make clear that upstream
engagement is unlikely to be a
panacea for deeply ingrained tensions
between science and broader society. In
fact, the significant practical challenges
of implementing an ambitious program
of global upstream engagement on geoengineering
highlight the issues associated
with global risk assessment, engagement,
and governance more
generally. As demonstrated by analyses
of the international risk governance of
nanotechnology, increasing technological
globalization is not always matched
by a corresponding convergence of risk
assessment and governance.62
Geoengineering
proposals would seem to speak
directly to the environmental campaigner
George Monbiot’s concern that
everything has been globalized—except
our consent.63
Any legitimate process
of public engagement on geoengineering
will need to fight hard to reach
as broad a group of citizens as possible
(possibly including multistage and multimethod
approaches—see Sidebar,
“Some Approaches to Upstream Engagement”).
Initiating an international
program of social and ethical research
before making a decision about whether
to commence a technical program on
geoegineering is one way to ensure that
this goal is achieved.
	 In assessing the potential for upstream
engagement in light of lessons
learned from the debates over GM
food, Sheila Jasanoff has suggested that
the “hidden normative presumptions”
of science needed to be revealed in order
for genuinely participatory public
engagement to ensue.64
By being willing
to subject the central tenet of postEnlightenment
science (a firm conviction
in the positive value of scientific
and technological progress) to an openended
debate involving a broad range
of members of the public, Jasanoff proposes
that upstream engagement could
mitigate against a division between science
and society. It is our hope that a
comprehensive strategy of upstream
public engagement on geoengineering
can achieve a similar goal.
Acknowledgements
Preparation of this article was supported
primarily through grants from
the Economic and Social Research
Engagement exercises
should not aim to
stymie research or
limit academic
freedom, but to enrich
societal debate and
the decision-making
process.
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NOTES
Council (RES-066-27-00013) to Nick
Pidgeon, and from the U.S. National
Science Foundation (Grant No.
0531184) to the Centre for Nanotechnology
in Society, University of California,
Santa Barbara. Additional support
was provided by the Leverhulme
Trust (F/00 407/AG) to the Program on
Understanding Risk. The authors
would like to thank Mike Hulme, Steve
Rayner, Tim Kruger, Tim O’Riordan,
Christopher Bunting, and Anthony Leiserowitz
for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article, and the editorial
team at Environment.
Adam Corner is a research associate in the School
of Psychology at Cardiff University. His research
looks at how people evaluate scientific arguments and
evidence, the communication of climate change, and
the public understanding of emerging areas of science.
He may be contacted at corneraj@cardiff.ac.uk.
Nick Pidgeon is a professor at the School of
Psychology, Cardiff University, and Director of
the Understanding Risk research group at Cardiff
(www.understanding-risk.org). He conducts interdisciplinary
research on issues at the interface
of society, public policy, technology, risk and the
environment. He may be contacted at pidgeonn@
cardiff.ac.uk.
January/February 201o	 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG	 Environment	 37
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	 61. Personal communication from Tim Kruger,
Director of Oxford Geoengineering Research.
	 62. O. Renn & M. Rocco. Nanotechnology Risk
Governance, International Risk Governance Council
White Paper No. 2, (Geneva: International Risk Governance
Council, 2006); Royal Society & The Royal
Academy of Engineering, note 43.
	 63. G. Monbiot, The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for
a New World Order (NewYork: Harper Perrenial, 2004).
	 64. S. Jasanoff, “‘Let Them Eat Cake’: GM Foods
and the Democratic Imagination,” In M. Leach, I.
Scoones, and B.Wynne, Eds., Science and Citizens:
Globalization and the Challenges of Engagement
(London: Zed Books, 2005).
	 65. All information derived from techniques reviewed
by the Royal Society, note 1.
	 66. The approaches are adapted from Box 7.4 in
the Royal Society & Royal Society of Engineering
report on nanotechnology (p. 65), note 43.
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