

**M U N I**  
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# **The Use of Sanctions by The People's Republic of China**

International Sanctions  
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## **Abstract**

Using international sanctions is becoming one of the most essential implementations to advance foreign policy objectives within the global sphere. Sanctions are defined as “restrictions maintained by a government (sender) with respect to... activities with foreign countries or persons (target)” (Zhao, 2010). Generally, sanctions are used for three objectives: national security, foreign policy purposes other than national security, and dispute resolution in international commerce and investment (Frank, 2006). The People’s Republic of China is one of the very few nations that has experienced imposing sanctions on others, in addition to having experienced multiple significant sanctions on itself. China has used sanctions to advance its foreign policy, national security, and international trade and investment objectives unilaterally and in conjunction with other nations; while also having sanctions imposed on the country for defying international norms (Zhao, 2010). This research evaluates and analyzes China’s use of sanctions within the international sphere.

***Keywords: China, International Sanctions, Foreign Policy, National Security, International Trade and Investments***

## **Evolution of the Regime**

There has been extensive debate and disagreement concerning China's use of sanctions. China has historically hesitated to employ sanctions as a tool for foreign policy; however, in recent years, the state has become more active in utilizing sanctions to further its policy objectives (Lee and Kim, 2017, p. 3). China's foreign policy initiatives focused on maintaining a low profile and hiding capabilities for almost two decades due to Deng Xiaoping's 24-character instruction (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 4). China was economically weak and struggled as a target of many international sanctions. Due to the nation's success in defying strategic economic sanctions, the Chinese leadership remained wary of imposing international sanctions (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 6). However, following the financial crisis (2008), China increased its assertiveness on the global stage and changed its foreign policy initiatives to become a global superpower. The United States' decline on the worldwide stage initiated a shift in the balance of powers in China's favor during the "Third Revolution" under Xi Jinping's governance (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 4). This allowed China to change its foreign policy objectives regarding international sanctions to become more ambitious. This trend has continued today as Chinese foreign policy, GDP, outbound FDI, military spending and capabilities, foreign military bases, etc., have allowed China to become a global power player regarding international sanctions (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 4).

China's economic sanctions teeter on the fine line of economic coercion. To successfully impose an international sanction on another country, it involves a "legal act issued by a relevant authority of the sender state, accompanied by public declaration specifying the objectionable political actions of the target state and changes to which the sanctions are meant to effect"

(Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 5). Despite these requirements, the domestic legal framework of the country does not require China to follow these sets of international norms. The Chinese government does not abide by the principles established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when applying sanctions, and it has not ratified multilateral sanctions treaties or accords (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 5). As a result, international law generally does not regulate China's use of sanctions.

China's goals and motivations when implementing international sanctions are varied and incredibly complex. Currently, Chinese leadership limits the reach of sanctions to specific, practical objectives (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 7). China responds to perceived infringements on its "core interests" by attempting to convince the targets of such actions to change their behavior or abstain from it in the future. An example would be that China might seek to punish countries or individuals for supporting Taiwan or the Dalai Lama (Zhao, 2010). Additionally, China might use sanctions to enforce its objectives on other nations, as in the case of the South China Sea dispute (Zhao, 2010). China would also use sanctions to protect its economic interests, such as in the case of North Korea, when China imposed limited sanctions on the state in response to North Korea's nuclear program (Zhao, 2010). The nation also imposes sanctions unilaterally, without the support of the UNSC, which causes grave concern to Western powers and international law (Zhao, 2010). Overall, Chinese sanctions aim to eliminate unwanted behavior without consideration for international norms and law.

Over the past decade, China has primarily targeted smaller and more democratic states (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 8). China imposes sanctions where the nation has acute disputes, and democratic nations are more likely to be influenced by domestic political pressure to concede to the sanctions demands (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 8). However, the government often faces challenges

in enforcing them. Monitoring and enacting penalties within Chinese sanctions may be challenging due to the nation's reliance on state-owned firms and lack of transparency in its financial system (Harrell et al., 2018). Chinese sanctions might also be ineffective due to the nation's dependence on specific countries for crucial imports and exports (Harrell et al., 2018). However, China might be undergoing a new regime approach towards a more "Western" style of sanctions implementation. Scholars believe this is a retaliatory reaction, with the goals of punishment and posturing due to changes in China's sanctions policy in 2020-21 (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 9). Although, it is too early to see if this shift will become more permanent. Nonetheless, China has successfully imposed sanctions within the international sphere due to its swift, compelling nature of concessions from democratic regimes, hard pressure, short time frames, and specific objectives.

China's rise in global influence after the 2008 financial crisis changed the way China implemented sanctions within the international sphere. China is no longer keeping a low profile or hiding its capabilities as it did during the past two decades. China's ambitions of becoming a global superpower, violations of international norms, and their targeting effectiveness will allow for the evolution of their international sanctions within the global sphere.

## **Theories Applied**

The People's Republic of China employs various sanctions approaches, including several international theories. Realism, economic interdependence, and constructivism are some of these theories that could explain why and how China implements its international sanctions.

According to the international relations theory of realism, states are the primary actors in international affairs, and their fundamental objective is to safeguard their own national interests (Donnelly, 2000, p. 31). Realists contend that states behave rationally and will take measures to maximize their own power and security (Donnelly, 2000, p. 31). The use of sanctions by China indicates realism as the nation attempts to advance its own interests by applying pressure to other nations. China predominantly bases its sanctions policies on strategic considerations to preserve its national security and regional hegemony (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 7). For instance, China has sanctioned states it perceives as endangering its sovereignty, like Taiwan, and those it perceives as undermining its interests, such as the United States of America (Zhao, 2010). The theory of realism provides a theoretical framework as to why and how China implements its international sanctions.

Another theory that might explain why and how China implements its international sanctions is the theory of economic interdependence. According to the theory, interactions in trade and investment bind states together (Copeland, 1996, p. 39). The theory contends that nations' shared interest in preserving their economic relationships makes them less inclined to engage in conflict (Copeland, 1996, p. 40). China exerts this theory based on the revelation that China is a growing economic superpower and that it has become a key player in international trade. An example of this would be when China influenced North Korea's behavior through its economic ties with the country, particularly by applying sanctions in reaction to the nation's

nuclear weapons program (Zhao, 2010). Economic interdependence provides an excellent structure as an explanation as to why and how China implements its international sanctions.

The theory of constructivism provides another theoretical framework that might explain why and how China implements its international sanctions. Constructivism focuses on how concepts, standards, and identities influence international relations (Guzzini, 2000, p. 156). Constructivist scholars claim that perceptions of one's interests and worldviews impact the behavior of governments (Guzzini, 2000, p. 156). When one considers that China aims to influence other states' behavior through norms and ideas, its sanction policies can also be understood in the context of constructivism. For instance, China has promoted its view of international norms and regulations by being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (Wiśniewsk, 2021, p. 5). China has also promoted its beliefs and customs to other states by leveraging its cultural influence, particularly Confucianism (Wang and Blyth, 2013, p. 1291). Constructivism theory is another international relations theoretical structure that explains why and how China implements sanctions.

Various international theories, including constructivism, realism, and economic interdependence, influence China's use of sanctions. China's policies result from a complex calculation designed to safeguard its national interests, exert pressure on other states, and influence how other governments behave through norms and ideas. By comprehending these perspectives, these international relations theories provide excellent theoretical structures to understand better China's role in international relations and its approach to sanctions.



## **How China Executes Sanctions**

Unlike The United States of America, China does not have the means and tools to apply and execute sanctions on its targeted countries. The USA has the luxury of using; the US Dollar, the global reserve currency, and the SWIFT system, the leading method for providing financial messaging to impose and execute its economic sanctions against targeted individuals, institutions, and countries all around the world.

China does not have those measures like the USA does to execute sanctions. China uses its own ways and methods to execute its sanctions on individuals, institutions, and countries:

**1. Restrictions to the domestic Chinese market:** When China decides to impose and execute sanctions on its perceived enemy countries, one of the everyday things that China does is: Restrict the targeted country's and its companies' access to the massive Chinese domestic market. China has a long history of using denial of access to its markets as a tool of economic coercion, going back to the early 20th century when there was an orchestrated boycott of American products to pressure the US to shift its then–racially based immigration policy. In recent times, there have been numerous episodes of China closing its markets to particular nations over perceived grievances, ranging from Norwegian salmon following the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese dissident Liu Xiabao to the blockages to French products after the 2008 Olympic torch relay was disrupted in Paris (Uren, 2023).

**2. Trade agreements:** China doesn't shy away from using its bilateral trade agreements to punish those countries it imposes official and unofficial sanctions. The most prominent example of China using its trade agreements to punish another state would be its trade war and unofficial sanctions against Australia. China and Australia have had a bilateral trade deal since 2015. The China–Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) entered force on 20 December 2015

(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 2023). Since diplomatic relations started to sour in 2019, China has imposed various types of restrictions on coal, barley, beef, cotton, wine, lobsters, and grapes imports from Australia which has sent quite an initial shock wave through Australia's economy (Patton, 2023).

**3. Centralized Banking System:** China has a centralized and heavily state-restricted banking system that can be used to freeze assets or limit financial transactions with targeted individuals or entities or countries if they get on the red list of the country.

**4. By leveraging its influence on state-owned enterprises:** State-owned enterprises are companies owned and controlled by the Chinese government. They can be used to implement economic sanctions by restricting exports or imports or by reducing foreign direct investment in targeted countries.

**5. China's Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law:** The new Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) passed by the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress on June 10, 2021, is a signal to the rest of the world of what China is willing to do to protect its interests and preserve the stability of its political system. Official sources have framed it as a self-defense mechanism that allows China to counteract foreign sanctions, but the law is much more expensive. Despite its title, the new Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law goes far beyond countering sanctions imposed by other states. It allows for countermeasures against various actors and actions China perceives as harming its interests (Drinhausen & Legarda, 2021).

## **How China Engages with International Sanctions**

Regarding following and enforcing international sanctions, China has a mixed track record.

China is a global superpower and one of the five permanent United Nations Security Council members, along with The USA, The UK, France, and Russia. As such, it is frequently involved in formulating and implementing international sanctions undertaken under the umbrella of the United Nations. China's approach to international sanctions is complex and influenced by various political, economic, and security factors.

China's involvement and willingness to impose and execute sanctions on entities heavily depends on its foreign policy, self-interest, and bilateral relations with those entities.

For example, China has backed the creation of sanctions against North Korea on the platform of the United Nations a few times. For instance, after North Korea's Nuclear test in 2017, China agreed to impose heavy economic sanctions on North Korea and the international community (China to Enforce, 2017).

At the same time, China has been accused of violating international sanctions, particularly concerning North Korea. Some observers believe China has insufficiently enforced UN-mandated sanctions against North Korea, allowing it to continue its nuclear and missile programs.

China has been multiple times accused of helping countries like Iran and Venezuela to bypass sanctions by the international community.

The same thing is happening now with the sanctions imposed on Russia after Vladimir Putin's army invaded Ukraine. Chinese instruments and technology used to make Iranian drones have been used to attack Ukraine. This way, China is indirectly helping Russia to continue its

war in Ukraine despite heavy international sanctions. But The USA and its allies are also taking measures to prevent that. The US has already imposed sanctions on Chinese companies and institutions for supplying parts to Iranian drones used in the Ukraine war (Best, 2023).

China's relationship with international sanctions is complicated and influenced by various political, economic, and strategic factors. While it generally supports using sanctions as a diplomatic tool, it is also concerned with protecting its interests and maintaining relationships with other countries.

## **Design Limitations**

China's peculiar application of sanctions is also characterized by a certain number of limitations which are often at the heart of balancing struggles, typically in terms of state relations, core interests, institutional weaknesses, and governmental centrality. The North Korean case study is an excellent template for exploring limitations in this particular context.

The first point made correlates with state relations and country blocks. At the same time, Chinese influence has grown significantly in the international sphere. However, it remains wary of traditional alliance blocks, typically the Western Block, and more particularly of American influence, tending to associate imposed sanctions to expand that influence in the region. Removing the North Korean threat at the profit of the American upper hand would provide the USA with strategic supremacy in the region, which China is not ready to concede (Kihyun & Jangho, 2017). This position transpired mainly, for instance, through China's apparent opposition to the deployment of THAAD anti-missile systems in South Korea under American influence (Kim Tong-Hyung, 2022).

However, by acting more independently in terms of the application of international sanctions, however, China also exposes itself to the "China responsibility theory" and accusations. In the case of North Korea, while it is suggested that China's lack of application of sanctions would render it responsible to some extent, China views the US as the trustworthy source of the tensions in the region through its hostile policies, which would have encouraged North Korean nuclear development. These accusations attack Chinese image in the international sphere and further discourage it from adhering to international sanctions (Kihyun & Jangho, 2017).

The struggle for balance between national interests and alignment with international sanctions is another limitation which has recurrently emerged, with North Korea being a particularly illustrative case study. In this particular example, China views the imposition of international sanction as a heavyweight susceptible of triggering regime instability in the target country. The increasing international pressure has isolated China as the sole grantor of North Korea, primarily due to its trade importance; the application of sanctions and its following regime consequences would therefore be borne mainly by China, both on a responsibility level and on a practical humanitarian level. In addition to highlighting risks, consequently, it also transfers additional responsibility to China (Kihyun & Jangho, 2017)

A fourth design limitation that could be pointed at China's international sanction policy belongs more to the institutional realm, as a gap is sometimes observed between domestic legislation and resolutions adopted through the UN Security Council. The gap between domestic and international laws possibly creates space for misunderstanding between international actors. For instance, Chinese trucks sent to North Korea for timber collection ended up being used in military parades, which was not problematic from China's perspective but posed a visible issue to the international community (Kihyun & Jangho, 2017).

## **Targeting Deficiencies**

China's sanctioning measures usually consist of diplomatic pressure and appear focused and short-term (Reilly, 2012, p. 123). These characteristics or factors differ somewhat from the sanctions designed and implemented by the UN and the US (which usually have a longer time horizon). In theory, the sanctioned party will value the economic relationship with China more than the actual political dilemma. Based on this, Chinese sanctions appear partly executive and relatively flexible, with the possibility of reversal within a short time (Reilly, 2012, p. 123). Based on this, Reilly argues that China's capacity to exert pressure, specifically economic sanctions, is relatively limited due to its deficiencies (Reilly, 2012, p. 130).

Another central element regarding Chinese sanctions is that they often appear informal and unofficial (especially economic sanctions); this also differs from Western sanctions transmitters such as the UN and the USA (Cheng, 2021, p. 497). Cheng argues here that China is not in the habit of formalizing the institutional practices and procedures regarding economic sanctions; this means that they also do not provide an official statement on whether economic sanctions will be enforced. On the other hand, Beijing prefers to use an ambiguous process consisting of verbal threats, selective buy/non-buy, and other informal measures (Cheng, 2021, p. 498). Another difference is that most states that impose international sanctions on a state have the associated high costs of sustained economic isolation. China, for its part, does not set equally high prices on the receiving form; this can be seen by Beijing issuing threats of sanctions in an attempt to signal its frustration. This aims to warn about what measures will be implemented if specific actions or policies are not welcome (Reilly, 2012, p. 123). These elements and characteristics of China's sanctions may provide deficiencies in the sanctions' regimes and weaken their effectiveness against the target.

With an evident absence of justifications and promises regarding the maintenance of the sanction regime, this phenomenon can undermine the regime itself because China displays unclear and confusing signals regarding determination and assertiveness (Lai, 2018, p. 172). This dissonance in China's sanctions strategy also gives Beijing flexibility in that the targeted states can resume interaction after the crisis and official denials after the sanctions are lifted again (Lai, 2018, p. 173). It is also worth pointing out here that large parts of the basis of China's trade surplus relate to the import of intermediate materials and the export of finished products. Based on this, economic sanctions will be able to disrupt the complex and elementary production chains to a large extent (Reilly, 2012, p. 130). Based on this, it can also be argued that Chinese leaders cannot pay the high price by undermining their export-driven manufacturing sector. Maintaining informal and undeclared sanctions will be particularly difficult for these arguments, especially if the companies face high financial costs and the sanctions extend over a long period or cover a wide range of products (Reilly, 2012, p. 130).



## **Circumvention Challenges and Prevention**

Ferguson, Waldron, and Lim argue that the impact of China's sanctions can be reduced through three mechanisms: redistribution (selling sanctioned products to alternative markets), deflection (circumventing sanctions via intermediaries), and transformation (adjusting production processes to produce and sell different products) (Ferguson et al., 2022, p. 3). Ferguson et al. consider reallocation in relation to sanctions circumvention as selling the sanctioned goods to other players and markets (Ferguson et al. 2022, p. 6).

On the other hand, trade deflection appears to be relatively similar to trade redistribution, of which the clear difference is mainly the product's final destination. The primary purpose is to circumvent import sanctions and thus maintain trade with the sender through intermediaries (Ferguson et al. 2022, p. 15). Finally, one way to bypass Chinese sanctions is for the exporters to change the production process or the product itself physically; this is called transformation (Ferguson et al., 2022, p. 16).

In situations where China restricts imports from other countries, there is no guarantee that sanctions will manage and eliminate consumer demand, which may result in economic actors wanting to secure trade from target industries indirectly, for example, through smuggling or transshipment through third markets (Ferguson et al., 2022, p. 5). Ferguson et al. argues that this phenomenon is highly probable when China's authorities cannot effectively monitor and enforce sanctions regimes. In addition, they say that this market dynamic in China, especially its relationship to Chinese import sanctions, has not received sufficient attention in the research literature (Ferguson et al., 2022, p. 5).

An example of sanctions-busting of Chinese sanctions was when China implemented sanctions on the import of Norwegian salmon. In this case, Chinese importers, through domestic

and international trade connections, circumvented by importing salmon through airports that were less controlled by the authorities, falsification of documents, as well as the use of smuggling routes via Hong Kong and Vietnam (Chen & Garcia, 2016, p. 48).

Chen and Garcia argue that to deter and thus stop violations of sanctions, the government must punish any party that participates in circumvention of the implemented sanctions. Furthermore, they argue that the characteristics and nature of Chinese sanctions make it somewhat more challenging to initiate preventative measures to prevent sanctions-busting (Chen & Garcia, 2016, p. 34). This is with particular reference to the difficulty in avoiding transshipment and smuggling through a third party, which can mainly be countered through multilateral cooperation with foreign allies. This multilateral approach to stop sanctions circumvention through diplomatic work has been largely unused by China (Ferguson et al., 2022, p. 20). This limits the country's fundamental capacity to effectively eradicate the market for a target and impose costs on those sanctioned (Ferguson et al., 2022, p. 20). This is something that is prevented by China's informal sanctions, whereupon China can command official agencies and state-owned firms to a greater extent, but to a lesser extent private firms and actors; this was clearly shown in China's salmon trade (Chen & Garcia, 2016, p. 34).

## **Side effects and opportunities**

China's unique position and power regarding international sanctioning has allowed for room to navigate between institutions and secure Chinese interests, whether they be economic, political, or even domestic. More negatively connoted side effects can be found in the limitation section; hence this section will focus on illustrating more positive or alternative side effects.

A first side effect of China's use of sanctions would be its capacity to circumvent international sanction norms in order to serve different interests, thus balancing world powers, but also having the ability to initiate a set of sanctions of its own without lengthy institutional processing. Not only is this possible from an institutional/ structural approach, but the significance of sanctions, when imposed by China, is usually of significant consequence due to its economic and influence power in the world, therefore more likely to pressure the target to fold. China's unique situation in the case of North Korea is a relevant indicator; as a side effect of its unique position in the system of imposed sanctions, 80-90% of North Korea's trade is with China. Thus, provided the will or need, China would most likely be capable of having a strong impact on North Korean policies (Kihyun & Jangho, 2017).

A second point that could be made, in alignment with the previous one, is, to some extent, the development of China's own global sanction regime. At times compliant with existing international sanctions, China has also developed its own laws as a side effect to Western jurisdictions. The phenomenon became particularly visible after China's passing of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and set unique attributes. It expanded to non-political figures, including Boeing Defense, for instance, as of the 2020 October sanctions. However, a consequence of this side effect is the increasing complexity of meeting compliance criteria from both Western and Chinese sanction regimes (Comply Advantage, 2022).

In addition and at the same time linked to the previously made point related to China's own global sanction regime, navigating between international sanctions gives more freedom to the state to pursue more subtle negotiations and relations. The ties which China is entertaining with Russia could illustrate the point. At the same time, China has been cautious in terms of sanctions imposed on Russia, calling upon its inefficiency, and has carefully avoided condemning Russia's attack on Ukraine, evidence also suggests China is not actively helping the Russian economy. For instance, Beijing allowed the ruble to fall against the yuan, which has a particular significance with Chinese imports of smartphones and automobiles. China has also refused to provide aircraft spare parts to Russia, despite sanctions depriving them of Boeing and Airbus part-provision. When questioned about it, China reiterated they would maintain "normal economic and trade cooperation" (He, 2022). It could therefore be supposed that China might be running more private pressure points on regimes imposed by international sanctions.

Last but not least, it should be pointed out that by resisting Western influence through the application, or not, of sanctions, a significant side effect visit serves domestic purposes, creating nationalistic unity against common foreign threats. The economic benefits yield from sanction circumvention also directly benefit the country, helping the central government build a solid uniting image of a powerful state (Kihyun & Jangho, 2017).

## **Crystalizing Policies**

The crystallized policy is an approach to policymaking that is explicit and clear, and that outlines the criteria for when a nation will apply or lift sanctions. It offers stability and predictability, increasing punishments' legitimacy and potency. A more specified policy approach may alleviate concerns regarding China's recourse to sanctions, which lack transparency and predictability.

Establishing a set of crystal clear policies or norms for applying or lifting sanctions is one potential technique to put a more refined policy approach into practice. This may consider elements including the seriousness of the threat to China's national security, the likelihood that sanctions will have the desired effect, and the potential financial and diplomatic consequences of sanctions. China should increase the consistency and predictability of its sanctions policy and lower the possibility of unforeseen repercussions by establishing these criteria in advance.

A different approach would be to create a specific organization or group in charge of monitoring China's application of sanctions. This organization might be responsible for developing and implementing a precise policy framework for punishments and carrying out routine evaluations of their efficacy and effects. China may more effectively coordinate its sanctions strategy and guarantee that it is consistent with its larger foreign policy objectives by having a specialized agency.

China should look at alternative policy tools and adopt a more crystalized policy approach to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This might entail putting more of a focus on diplomacy and engagement in addition to making use of motivating factors like trade and investment agreements. China may more effectively respond to complex and changing

difficulties in the international system by broadening its toolkit for policymaking and taking a more nuanced stance.

In a nutshell, China might increase the efficacy and legitimacy of its use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool by adopting a more crystalized policy approach and investigating alternative policy instruments. This would improve China's capacity to carry out its foreign policy goals and resolve concerns about the invisibility and unpredictability of its sanctions policy.

## **Viable Improvements and Alternatives to the Regime**

Sanctions have become a more familiar instrument for the People's Republic of China's foreign policy in recent years. With its sanctions, it has targeted a number of nations, people, and organizations that it feels are acting against its interests but also the United States, Canada, and Australia. Although sanctions are a legal tool for foreign policy, China's use of them has come under fire for being murky, overly harsh, and damaging to innocent parties.

Chinese sanctions differ from Western sanctions transmitters like the United Nations and the United States of America because they frequently appear informal and unofficial (Cheng, 2021, p. 497). With an evident absence of justifications and promises regarding the maintenance of the sanction regime, this phenomenon can undermine the regime itself because China displays unclear and confusing signals regarding determination and assertiveness (Lai, 2018, p. 172). Any sanctions regime must include transparency as a fundamental component. Lacking it, the measures' validity is in jeopardy. Beijing, on the other hand, favors a complex method that includes verbal threats, a selective buy/non-buy policy, and other unofficial measures (Cheng, 2021, p. 498). Because the People's Republic of China has frequently lacked openness in its use of sanctions, the international community has questioned its motivations. The lack of transparency is troubling because it casts doubt on the propriety of China's sanctions policy.

China's use of penalties could be made more effective by increasing procedural transparency. This can entail presenting convincing proof of the alleged misbehavior by the parties subject to the sanctions and being more explicit about their aims. Transparency could also help the People's Republic of China avoid enacting disproportionate measures because it would allow other countries to determine if the sanctions are appropriate.

Instead of sanctions, China might try more diplomatic and beneficial dialogue with the nations it believes are working against its interests. This could entail attempting to settle conflicts amicably rather than using harsh penalties, such as mediation or dialogue. The economy recommends that rather than imposing sanctions on entire nations or sectors, China could adopt more focused sanctions that concentrate on people and organizations allegedly directly implicated in the violation. Since no harm would be done to innocent people, more concentrated sanctions may result in less collateral damage.

If internal policies are improved, China might be less likely to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The People's Republic of China may raise its international stature and ease tensions with other nations by increasing its human rights, environmental, and market reforms. By addressing some of the fundamental problems that have caused conflicts with other countries, China might also help its citizens.

The People's Republic of China believes that some nations, including the United States, strive to prevent their rise to global power. By improving its domestic policies, China may lessen the possibility that other countries will view it as a danger. It would also alleviate the necessity for sanctions as foreign policy instruments.

In summary, China's use of sanctions has come under question for being unjustified, out of proportion, and harming innocent people. The People's Republic of China might enhance its use of sanctions by being more transparent, employing more focused penalties, engaging in positive diplomatic relations, and reforming its domestic policies. These options might improve its standing abroad, ease tensions with other nations, and benefit its people.



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