Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
Author(s): James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin
Source: The American Political Science Review , Feb., 2003, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Feb., 2003),
pp. 75-90
Published by: American Political Science Association
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1 February 2003
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and
JAMES D. FEARON and DAVID
An influential conventional wisdom h
the Cold War and that the root cause
antagonisms. We show that the current p
accumulation of protracted conflicts sinc
with a new, post-Cold War international sys
more ethnically or religiously diverse coun
violence in this period. We argue for under
rural guerrilla warfare, a particular form
agendas. The factors that explain which cou
religious characteristics but rather the con
marks financially and bureaucratically wea
rough terrain, and large populations.
B etween 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle
deaths occurred in the 25 interstate wars that
killed at least 1,000 and had at least 100 dead
on each side. These wars involved just 25 states that
suffered casualties of at least 1,000 and had a median
duration of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same
period there were roughly 127 civil wars that killed at
least 1,000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A conservative
estimate of the total dead as a direct result of
these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate
toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states-more than a
third of the United Nations system-and had a median
duration of roughly six years.1 The civil conflicts in this
period surely produced refugee flows far greater than
their death toll and far greater than the refugee flows
associated with interstate wars since 1945. Cases such
as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon testify to the
economic devastation that civil wars can produce. By
these crude measures, civil war has been a far greater
scourge than interstate war in this period, though it has
been studied far less.
What explains the recent prevalence of violent civil
conflict around the world? Is it due to the end of the
Cold War and associated changes in the international
system, or is it the result of longer-term trends? Why
have some countries had civil wars while others have
not? and Why did the wars break out when they did?
We address these questions using data for the period
1945 to 1999 on the 161 countries that had a population
of at least half a million in 1990.
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin are Professors, Department
of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6044
(jfearon@stanford.edu and dlaitin@stanford.edu).
We wish to thank the many people who provided comments on
earlier versions of this paper in a series of seminar presentations.
The authors also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National
Science Foundation (Grants SES-9876477 and SES-9876530); support
from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
with funds from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; valuable
research assistance from Ebru Erdem, Nikolay Marinov, Quinn
Mecham, David Patel, and TQ Shang; sharing of data by Paul Collier.
1 The interstate war data derive from Singer and Small 1994, updated
to include the Kargil and Eritrean wars. The bases for the civil war
estimates are discussed below.
The data cast doubt on three influential conventional
wisdoms concerning political conflict before and after
the Cold War. First, contrary to common opinion, the
prevalence of civil war in the 1990s was not due to the
end of the Cold War and associated changes in the international
system. The current level of about one in
six countries had already been reached prior to the
breakup of the Soviet Union and resulted from a steady,
gradual accumulation of civil conflicts that began immediately
after World War II.
Second, it appears not to be true that a greater degree
of ethnic or religious diversity-or indeed any particular
cultural demography-by itself makes a country
more prone to civil war. This finding runs contrary to
a common view among journalists, policy makers, and
academics, which holds "plural" societies to be especially
conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious tensions
and antagonisms.
Third, we find little evidence that one can predict
where a civil war will break out by looking for where
ethnic or other broad political grievances are strongest.
Were this so, one would expect political democracies
and states that observe civil liberties to be less civil
war-prone than dictatorships. One would further anticipate
that state discrimination against minority religions
or languages would imply higher risks of civil war. We
show that when comparing states at similar levels of per
capita income, these expectations are not borne out.
The main factors determining both the secular trend
and the cross-sectional variation in civil violence in this
period are not ethnic or religious differences or broadly
held grievances but, rather, conditions that favor insurgency.
Insurgency is a technology of military conflict
characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing
guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. As a form of
warfare insurgency can be harnessed to diverse political
agendas, motivations, and grievances. The concept is
most closely associated with communist insurgency, but
the methods have equally served Islamic fundamentalists,
ethnic nationalists, or "rebels" who focus mainly
on traffic in coca or diamonds.
We hypothesize that financially, organizationally, and
politically weak central governments render insurgency
more feasible and attractive due to weak local
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil WarFebruary 2003
policing or inept and
tices. These often in
indiscriminate retal
ant locals into rebel f
weakness, we argue,
come. Shocks to cou
from political insta
loss of a foreign pat
is favored by rough
edge of the populat
and a large populati
from superior govern
financial support, an
Our data show that m
grievances fail to po
sures of conditions th
Surely ethnic antagon
grievances often mo
But such broad fact
the cases where civi
surgency can be suc
bers of rebels under
require only a small n
get going.
Using data on about 45 civil wars since 1960, Collier
and Hoeffler (1999, 2001) find similarly that measures
of "objective grievance" fare worse as predictors than
economic variables, which they initially interpreted as
measures of rebel "greed" (i.e., economic motivation).2
More recently, they argue that rebellion is better
explained by "opportunity" than by grievance (cf.
Eisinger 1973 and Tilly 1978) and that the main determinant
of opportunity is the availability of finance
and recruits for rebels. They proxy these with measures
of primary commodity exports and rates of secondaryschool
enrollment for males. We agree that financing
is one determinant of the viability of insurgency. We
argue, however, that economic variables such as per
capita income matter primarily because they proxy
for state administrative, military, and police capabilities.
We find no impact for primary commodity exports,
and none for secondary schooling rates distinct
from income. Our theoretical interpretation is more
Hobbesian than economic. Where states are relatively
weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage
the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough
local justice while arrogating the power to "tax" for
themselves and, often, for a larger cause.
CIVIL WAR SINCE 1945
Building on similar efforts by other civil war researchers,3
we constructed a list of violent civil conflicts
2 There are 79 wars in their sample, but they lose about 34 due to
missing values on explanatory variables, which are mainly economic.
Standard economic data tend to be missing for countries that are
poor and civil war-torn. This highly nonrandom listwise deletion may
account for some of the differences between our results.
3 In particular, Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Esty et al. (1998),
Gleditsch et al. (2002), the Institute for International and Strategic
Studies (2000), Licklider (1995), Singer and Small (1994), Sivard
(1996), and Valentino (2002).
that we presently believe to meet the following primary
criteria. (1) They involved fighting between agents of
(or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups
who sought either to take control of a government, to
take power in a region, or to use violence to change government
policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000
over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100.
(3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including
civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended
to rule out massacres where there is no organized
or effective opposition.4
These criteria are broadly similar to those stated
by the Correlates of War (COW) project, Doyle and
Sambanis (2000), and several others. We developed our
own list (working from these and other sources) mainly
because we wanted data for the whole 1945-99 period
and because of doubts about particular inclusions and
exclusions in each list.5
In one respect our data differ significantly from most
others: We see no reason in principle to exclude anticolonial
wars, such as the French versus the National
Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. We count these as
occuring within the colonial empire. Thus, the French
state/empire looks highly civil war-prone by our list,
with six colonial wars occuring in the 1950s. But
to drop such cases would be like dropping the current
conflict in Chechnya as a civil war in Russia
if the Chechens succeed in gaining independence. Alternatively,
it would make even less sense to include
them as wars within "states" that did not exist (such as
"Algeria" in 1954).
There are both practical and theoretical considerations
pointing the other way, however. In practical
terms, to include the anticolonial wars in the analysis
requires that we form estimates of possible explanatory
factors for whole empires, such as gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, ethnic fractionalization,
and democracy scores. Further, these estimates must
change almost by year, as the colonial empires gradually
diminished in size. We are able to use country-level
data to produce such estimates for ethnic fractionalization,
but our estimates for per capita income are more
4 We used the following secondary criteria to deal with several other
coding issues. (4) The start year is the first year in which 100 were
killed or in which a violent event occurred that was followed by a
sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria. (5) If a
main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the
fighting continues (e.g., Somalia gets a new civil war after Siad Barre is
defeated in 1991). (6) War ends are coded by observation of a victory,
wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at
least two years of peace. (7) Involvement by foreign troops does not
disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are
satisfied. (8) We code multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel
groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent central state
on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination. (9) If a state
seeks to incorporate and govern territory that is not a recognized
state, we consider it a "civil war" only if the fighting continues after
the state begins to govern the territory (thus, Indonesia/East Timor
1975, yes, and India/Hyderabad 1947, no).
5 Sambanis (2002) discusses a number of conceptual and operational
ambiguities and problems with the COW civil war data. Collier and
Hoeffler (2001) base their list on COW data, breaking a number of
COW civil wars into multiple wars according to unspecified criteria
and including some colonial wars (coded in nonexistent "states," such
as Angola 1961) but not others.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
FIGURE 1. Number and Percent
o _ _ o
O) CO
# civil wars /
o _, - - - % with civil war ,
CClIU' \
'o O r/ \ :--
0) C~ )
-c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C 0
~~~~~0 'r~~~~~~~~~ \
0e', ?eo
- - o
1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
year
problematic and the question of how to code the e
pires on a democracy index is vexed. Regarding theory
the colonial empires differed so radically from oth
independent states, and faced such an inhospitable
ternational environment after the war (with press
from the United States and the new United Nations
system), that we need to be cautious about any empirical
results that depend wholly on these cases. Thus we
analyze the data both with and without the anticolonial
wars.
Descriptive Statistics
We identified 127 conflicts that meet the above criteria,
of which 13 were anticolonial wars.6 This makes for 127
civil war starts in a sample of 6,610 country years, a rate
of 1.92 per 100. The periods following major international
systemic change had the highest onset rates. Civil
wars broke out in the late 1940s and the 1950s at 4.6 and
2.2 per 100 country-years, respectively, followed by the
1990s, at 2.0. In absolute terms, the largest number of
civil wars began in the 1990s (31), followed by the 1960s
and 1970s (19 and 25, respectively).
Omitting the anticolonial conflicts, most civil wars
occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (34) and Asia (33),
followed by North Africa/the Middle East (17), Latin
America (15), Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union (13), and "the West" (2). The rate of outbreak
was highest in Asia, at three per 100 country-years;
Africa, North Africa/the Middle East, and Latin
America all had rates of about two per 100 countryyears.
"France," Indonesia, and the Soviet Union/
6 See Fearon and Laitin 2003 for a list of the conflicts.
Russia are the
sample, with six
most civil war-prone countries in the
onsets each.7
Trends over Time
Figure 1 shows the number of countries with ongoing
civil wars by year from 1945 to 1999. Since the number
of independent states grew sharply in this period, it
also shows the proportion of countries with at least one
ongoing war in each year.
The graph indicates that, contrary to popular belief,
the prevalence of civil wars in the 1990s is not due
to effects of the end of the Cold War. The 1999 level
of 25 ongoing wars had already been reached by the
mid 1980s. Conflicts associated with the Soviet collapse
were partly responsible for the sharp increase in the
early 1990s, but a marked decline has followed.8
One might conjecture that more and more civil wars
are breaking out over time, thus producing the secular
increase. This is incorrect. The rate of outbreak is
2.31 per year since 1945, highly variable but showing
no significant trend up or down. The secular increase
stems from the fact that civil wars have ended at a
rate of only about 1.85 per year. The result has been a
steady, almost-linear accumulation of unresolved conflicts
since 1945.
Put differently, states in the international system
have been subject to a more or less constant risk
7 Four outbreaks are coded in the Soviet Union in 1946, in the Baltics
and Ukraine, plus Russia's two Chechen wars in the 1990s.
8 Gurr (2000) notes the late-1990s decline in ethnic war and argues
that the trend reflects improved management strategies by states and
international organizations. The basic pattern in Figure 1 is not an
artifact of the way we have coded "civil war"; it is observed in a broad
range of other data sets on violent domestic conflict for this period
(e.g., Gleditsch et al. 2002).
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War February 2003
of violent civil conflic
flicts they suffer have
age duration of the civi
steadily from two y
in 1999. From a policy
tion about seeing as a
military and political pr
makers have faced re
Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Colombia, and
elsewhere.
ETHNICITY, DISCRIMINATION,
AND GRIEVANCES
During the Cold War, political scientists and sociologists
often sought to trace rebellion to economic inequality
(Muller 1985; Paige 1975; Russett 1964), to
rapid economic growth said to destabilize traditional
rural social systems (Huntington 1968; Scott 1976), or
to frustrations arising from the failure to gain expected
benefits of economic modernization (Gurr 1971). A
few scholars argued that the real source of rebellion
was often ethnic nationalism (Connor 1994), and a rich
literature on the sources nationalist mobilization developed
in comparative politics (e.g., Anderson 1983,
Deutsch 1953, and Gellner 1983). With the collapse
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, such culturalist
perspectives became a dominant frame for interpreting
inter- and intranational conflict (e.g., Huntington 1996).
Using a broad brush, we can distinguish between
perennialist and modernist (or constructivist) positions
on the nature and sources of ethnic nationalism. Given
in purest form by nationalist politicians and journalists
reporting on nationalist conflicts in progress, perennialist
arguments stress long-standing cultural practices
said to define and distinguish ethnic groups. Differences
between these practices are argued to have made
conflict more likely. Academics rarely make such arguments
as baldly as do nationalist leaders. But authors
who stress the long-standing, "deep" nature of
ethnic differences and suggest that these make domestic
peace difficult include Huntington (1996), Ignatieff
(1993), Moynihan (1993), Rabushka and Shepsle
(1972), and Smith (1986). Arguably, the main message
of Horowitz's (1985) influential book on ethnic conflict
is that plural societies face a host of pathologies that
render them especially prone to conflict and, at the
extreme, violence.
In contrast, modernist theories see the thoroughgoing
politicization of cultural difference that ethnic
nationalism represents as a development of the last 200
to 500 years. The core argument is that economic modernization
and the development of the modern state
make upward social mobility possible, but contingent
on sharing the culture of the group that dominates
state or society. When the state or society poses ascriptive
barriers to upward mobility for minority groups,
they may develop separatist nationalist movements: All
the more so, according to Anderson (1983), Deutsch
(1953), and Gellner (1983), the greater the preexisting
cultural differences between the minority group and
the dominant group. (When preexisting differences are
slight, assimilation is more likely.)
The two approaches thus imply the same hypothesis
about the relationship between cultural diversity and
civil conflict.
H1: Measures of a country's ethnic or religious diversity
should be associated with a higher risk of
civil war.
Seeking to explain anticolonial nationalist movements
in countries barely affected by economic modernization,
Gellner (1983, 108, nl) argued that even
"the advance shadow" of modernization was sufficient
to start nationalist dynamics in motion. For Anderson,
nationalism quickly became a "modular form" that
could be easily "pirated," even under conditions quite
different from those during its origination. Nonetheless,
if one took the modernist approach literally one
might infer that more modernization should imply
more discrimination and thus more nationalist contention
in culturally divided countries.
H2: The effect of ethnic diversity on the probability
of civil war should increase at higher levels of per
capita income (a proxy for economic moderniza-
tion).
Horowitz (1985) and several others argue that the
relationship between ethnic diversity and severe ethnic
conflict is nonmonotonic, with less violence for highly
homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries. The
politics of a highly diverse country might be strategically
similar to those of a homogeneous one, since
small ethnic groups must join coalitions to have political
influence, and there are many possibilities for crosscutting
and shifts in coalition membership. Horowitz
suggests that the most severe ethnic conflicts will arise
in countries where a substantial ethnic minority faces
an ethnic majority that can, given ethnic voting, win for
sure in any national election. Such arguments yield the
following hypothesis.
H3: Countries with an ethnic majority and a significant
ethnic minority are at greater risk for civil
war.
We consider several measures for these concepts.
H1 we use (1) the commonly employed ethnoling
tic fractionalization (ELF) index based on data f
Atlas Narodov Mira 1964, which gives the probab
that two randomly drawn individuals in a countr
from different ethnolinguistic groups;9 (2) a me
of the share of population belonging to the largest
nic group that we constructed from the CIA Fact
and other sources (Fearon 2002); (3) the number
distinct languages spoken by groups exceeding 1
9 For this and several other variables we filled in values for m
country years whenever possible based on our own research
the sources were the CIA Factbook, Encyclopedia Brittanica
the Library of Congress Country Studies, though we used cou
specific sources when necessary.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
the country's population, based on Grim
1996; and (4) a measure of religious fr
(analogous to the ELF) that we construc
from the CIA Factbook and other sourc
interact these measures with per capit
H3, we use a dummy variable marking th
whose largest and second-largest ethnic
49% and 7% of the population, respecti
The mechanism that gives rise to nat
tention in modernist arguments is state o
crimination along the lines of cultural dif
is thought to create the grievances tha
bellions. Grievances are difficult to me
dently of our knowledge of the actions
to explain (rebellions, civil war), but me
age levels of discrimination are feasible
being equal, political democracy should
with less discrimination and repression
or other lines, since democracy endows
political power (the vote) they do not hav
ships. Even more directly, measures of st
of civil rights such as freedom of assoc
sion, and due process should be associa
repression and thus lower grievances. Stat
discriminate in favor of a particular gr
or religion should be associated with gr
grievances. Finally, it is often argued tha
nomic inequality creates broad grievanc
civil conflict (e.g., Muller 1985). Thus, we
lowing hypotheses.
H4: Measures of political democracy an
erties should be associated with lower risks of civil
war onset.
H5: Policies that discriminate in favor of a particular
language or religion should raise the risk of
civil war onset in states with religious or linguistic
minorities.
HS6: Greater income inequality should be associated
with higher risks of civil war onset.
We consider both the Polity IV and the Przeworski
et al. 2000 democracy measures, along with the Freedom
House indicator of the observance of civil
liberties.11 For income inequality we interpolated and
extended as necessary the Gini coefficients assembled
10 Alternative thresholds for the second-largest group, such as 10%,
make no difference in the results.
11 Freedom House codes countries annually from 1972 on a sevenpoint
scale based on a "checklist" that awards points for government
observance of a long list of civil liberties and rule of law, including
freedom of the press, religion, and association, independent judiciary,
equal treatment under the law, civilian control of police, "protection
from political terror," secure property rights, and equality of
opportunity. "Freedom from war and insurgency" is one element of
their checklist, so we are careful to lag this independent variable.
For Polity IV, we use the difference between the 11-point democracy
and autocracy scales. Following the Polity coders' suggestions, we
interpolate values for "transition period" years (-88), treat foreign
occupation years (-66) as missing, and treat "interruptions" (-77)
as zeros. See http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/.
by Deininger and Squire (1996); using the countryaverage
of Gini values produced the same results. For
policies on religion, we coded, by decade, indicators
for whether the state had an official religion, gave resources
to one religion not available to others, regulated
missionary activities, required religious groups
to get official approval for religious activities, or singled
out for or permitted harassment of a particular
religious group. For policies on language, we coded by
year whether a language spoken by at least 5% of the
population received no official recognition at any level
of government.12
One might argue, contrary to H, above, that we
should expect an association between measures of ethnic
diversity and the occurence of ethnic strife, but not
between ethnic diversity and civil war more broadly.
In the limit this argument borders on tautology, since
it would not be surprising if ethnic wars are rare in
countries whose citizens think of themselves as ethnically
homogeneous. However, one might ask if "ethnic
wars" become more likely as ethnic diversity increases
among those countries that have at least one nontrivial
ethnic minority.
H7: Among countries with an ethnic minority comprising
at least 5% of the population, greater ethnic
diversity should associate with a higher risk of
ethnic civil war.
The measurement problem here is to say what an
"ethnic" civil war is, and we suspect that under any
plausible statement of the concept there will be numerous
cases that are mixed or ambiguous. We coded as
"ethnic" conflicts in which the fighters were mobilized
primarily along ethnic lines, marking off 58 (51%) as
ethnic, 20 (18%) as mixed or ambiguous, and 36 (32%)
as not ethnic (excluding the anticolonial conflicts).
INSURGENCY
If many post-1945 civil wars have been "ethnic" or
"nationalist" as these terms are usually understood
then even more have been fought as insurgencies. I
surgency is a technology of military conflict character
ized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerri
warfare from rural base areas. To explain why som
countries have experienced civil wars in this period one
needs to understand the conditions that favor insurgency,
which are largely independent of cultural differences
between groups and even group grievances.
These conditions are best summarized by way of a brief
statement of the logic of insurgency.13
The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insurgents
are weak relative to the governments they are
12 "Official recognition" implies use by some public, officially sanctioned
entity. For language we relied mainly on Asher 1994 and
Gunnemark 1992; and for religion, the U.S. State Department's 1999
Annual Report on Religious Freedom.
13 Though our formulations differ, we have been influenced here
by Stathis Kalyvas's work on the Greek civil war. The literature on
guerrilla warfare is extensive; see, for examples, Desai and Eckstein
1990, Griffith 1961, and Laqueur 1976.
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War February 2003
fighting, at least at the
ment forces knew who the rebels were and how to find
them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured.
This is true even in states whose military and police
capacities are low. The total number of active rebels in
many wars in which thousands of civilians have been
killed (through the actions of both governments and
rebels) is often in the hundreds or low thousands.
The numerical weakness of the insurgents implies
that, to survive, the rebels must be able to hide from
government forces. Several hypotheses follow.
H8: The presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly
served by roads, at a distance from the centers
of state power, should favor insurgency and civil
war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, crossborder
sanctuaries and (c) a local population that
can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to
government agents.
Much scholarly writing holds that ethnic or class solidarity
and grievances are necessary for Hc, the local
population's support of active rebels. In line with
Kriger (1992) and some analysts of communist insurgencies
(e.g., Clutterbuck 1967, Leites and Wolf 1970,
and Thompson 1966), we argue that while grievances
and ethnic solidarity can be helpful in this regard, they
are not necessary. Instead, the key to inducing the local
population not to denounce the active rebels is
local knowledge, or information about who is doing
what at the village level. Local knowledge allows the
active rebels to threaten retribution for denunciation
credibly.14 Ethnic insurgents use this informational advantage
to great effect, often threatening and inflicting
unimaginably harsh sanctions on "their own" people
(Kalyvas 1999; Kriger 1992). The presence of an ethnic
insurgency does not imply that the members of the
ethnic group are of one mind in their determination to
fight the state till they realize a nationalist dream. The
immediate concern is how to survive in between government
forces using violence to gain information or
punish alleged rebel supporters and rebel forces using
violence to punish alleged informants, "moderates," or
government sympathizers.
An empirical implication of the importance of local
knowledge is hypothesis Hsd: Having a rural base
should greatly favor insurgency. In the city, anonymous
denunciation is easier to get away with, giving
the government an advantage in its counterinsurgent
efforts.
Given the basic constraints posed by numerical
weakness-the need to hide and not be denouncedvarious
factors determine insurgents' ability to wage
war. To survive, rebels need arms and materiel, money
to buy them, or smugglable goods to trade for them.
They need a supply of recruits to the insurgent way of
14 A "second-order" mechanism by which ethnicity may favor insurgency
is that ethnic minorities are sometimes marked by dense social
networks that are isolated from dominant group networks, thus giving
an informational advantage to local rebels (Fearon and Laitin 1996).
But such an advantage does not require ethnic distinctiveness.
life, and they may also need information and instruction
in the practical details of running an insurgency.15
Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency,
however, are the government's police and military
capabilities and the reach of government institutions into
rural areas. Insurgents are better able to survive and
prosper if the government and military they oppose
are relatively weak-badly financed, organizationally
inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed
about goings-on at the local level.
Effective counterinsurgency requires government
forces to distinguish active rebels from noncombatants
without destroying the lives and living conditions of the
latter. This is an extremely difficult political, military,
and organizational problem even for well-equipped
and well-paid modern militaries; witness the U.S. military's
failures in Vietnam (Avant 1994; Krepinevich
1986), early British efforts in Northern Ireland
(Kennedy-Pipe 1997), or Soviet efforts in Afghanistan.
For less well-financed and bureaucratically competent
states, the problem appears to be nearly insoluble. Such
states either cannot prevent the abuse of local powers
by field commanders or may even permit these abuses
as a sort of tax farming to the military. That is, they
"pay" the soldiers with the opportunity to loot and pillage,
a practice that tends to sustain rather than end
insurgencies (see Keen 1998 for examples). Thus, we
have the following hypothesis.
Hg: Proxies for the relative weakness or strength of
the insurgents-their odds of being killed or captured
for a given level of counterinsurgent effort
by the government-should be associated with the
likelihood that a country develops a civil war. In
particular, a higherper capita income should be associated
with a lower risk of civil war onset because
(a) it is a proxy for a state's overall financial, administrative,
police, and military capabilities, and
(b) it will mark more developed countries with terrain
more "disciplined" by roads and rural society
more penetrated by central administration.
There is an additional reason why a lower per capita
income should favor the technology of insurgency:
(c) Recruiting young men to the life of a guerrilla is easier
when the economic alternatives are worse. Though
we try below, it is difficult to find measures to distinguish
among these three mechanisms associating a low per
capita income with civil war onset. We believe that the
strong results for per capita income reported below are
due largely to its acting as a proxy for state military and
police strength relative to potential insurgents (a and b
in H9). The fact that measures such as the percentage of
young males and male secondary schooling rates predict
less well than per capita income is consistent with
this conjecture, though not definitive.
15 In the case literature one frequently finds either that rebels leaders
have spent time at guerrilla training camps in, for example, Libya,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, or Mozambique (in the 1970s) or that they
gained guerrilla experience in one insurgency that they apply in pursuing
another.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
Additional factors that would be e
(or proxy) the strength of an insurg
a state follow.
H1o: The political and military technology of insurgency
will be favored, and thus civil war made
more likely, when potential rebels face or have
available the following.
(a) A newly independent state, which suddenly
loses the coercive backing of the former imperial
power and whose military capabilities
are new and untested (Fearon 1998).
(b) Political instability at the center, which may
indicate disorganization and weakness and
thus an opportunity for a separatist or centerseeking
rebellion.
(c) A regime that mixes democratic with autocratic
features, as this is likely to indicate political
contestation among competing forces and,
in consequence, state incapacity. (In contrast,
pure autocracy tends to reflect the successful
monopolization of state coercive and administrative
power by an individual or group.)
(d) A large country population, which makes it
necessary for the center to multiply layers of
agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the
local level and, also, increases the number of
potential recruits to an insurgency for a given
level of income.
(e) A territorial base separated from the state's
center by water or distance-for example,
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West
Pakistan or Angola from Portugal.
(f) Foreign governments or diasporas willing to
supply weapons, money, or training.
(g) Land that supports the production of highvalue,
low-weight goods such as coca, opium,
diamonds, and other contraband, which can be
used to finance an insurgency.
(h) A state whose revenues derive primarily from
oil exports. Oil producers tend to have weaker
state apparatuses than one would expect given
their level of income because the rulers have
less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate
bureaucratic system to raise revenues-a political
"Dutch disease" (Chaudhry 1989; Karl
1997; Wantchekon 2000). At the same time,
oil revenues raise the value of the "prize" of
controlling state power.
Partially excepting f, none of these conditions crucially
involves cultural differences, ethnic minority
status, or group grievances. We do not claim that these
factors provide no help to would-be insurgents in specific
cases. But, to reiterate, grievances and ethnic
differences are too common to help distinguish the
countries andy tat ee ii a nd years that see civil wars, and in any event
the technology of insurgency does not require strong
popular grievances or ethnic solidarities to operate effectively.
The latter point suggests a contrast to H4-Hk.
H1l: After controlling for per capita income (or
other measures of state strength), neither political
democracy, the presence of civil liberties, higher income
inequality, nor nondiscriminatory linguistic
or religious policies should associate strongly with
lower odds of civil war. Given the right environmental
conditions, insurgencies can thrive on the
basis of small numbers of rebels without strong,
widespread, popular support rooted in grievances
and, hence, even in democracies.
As for measures, for "rough terrain" we use the proportion
of the country that is "mountainous" according
to the codings of geographer A. J. Gerard.16 This does
not pick up other sorts of rough terrain that can be
favorable to guerrillas such as swamps and jungle, and
it takes no account of population distributions or food
availability in relation to mountains; but it is the best we
have been able to do for H8a. For H9 we use Penn World
Tables and World Bank data on per capita income, estimating
missing values using data on per capita energy
consumption.17 For H1oa (new states) we mark
countries in their first and second years of independence;
for H1ob (political instability) we use a dummy
variable indicating whether the country had a three-orgreater
change on the Polity IV regime index in any of
the three years prior to the country-year in question.18
For countries that mix democratic and autocratic features
(called "anocracies" or "semidemocracies" in
the international relations literature and "praetorian
regimes" by Huntington 1968) we mark regimes that
score between -5 and 5 on the difference between
Polity IV's democracy and autocracy measures (the
difference ranges from -10 to 10). Country population
(Hiod) is based largely on World Bank figures. For
oil exporters we marked country-years in which fuel
exports exceeded one-third of export revenues, using
World Bank data.19 We coded a dummy variable for
states with noncontiguous territory ourselves (H1ie).20
16 Gerard produced this measure for the DECRG project on civil
wars at the World Bank. Our sample of countries differs slightly,
so we estimated values for 21 missing countries using the difference
between the highest and the lowest point of elevation in each country,
which is well correlated with the mountains measure (0.78 in logs).
17 We used income growth rates from the World Development Indicators
2001 to extend the estimates in the Penn World Tables 5.6 and
then used the per capita energy consumption estimates provided by
the COW project to estimate additional missing values. For details
see Fearon and Laitin 2003.
18 For this variable, "transition periods" and "interruptions" (which
indicate a "complete collapse of central authority") are coded as
instability; foreign occupations are treated as missing.
19 The data are for five-year intervals beginning in 1960; we interpolated
for years after 1960, set the value to that in 1960 for years
prior to 1960, and used country-specific sources for a few countries
without World Bank coverage.
20 Countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated
from the land area containing the capital city either by land
or by 100 km of water were coded as "noncontiguous." Ignoring the
colonial empires, 25 of our 161 countries meet this criterion at some
time since 1945.
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War February 2003
The remaining hypotheses (H
Hiog) present more difficult mea
Whether availability of a rural
(HId) is better tested in a research
groups are the unit of analysis, so
ferent geographic concentrations
Although it is possible to code reb
for whether the rebels receive she
foreign countries (H3b, Hlof), the
of these aids to rebel strength is
prior to the onset of fighting. In t
potential availability of support f
to governments is observable-i
"Brezhnev doctrine") in Eastern
policy with regard to its former c
Africa.22 We would expect such su
relative advantage of governmen
tential insurgents and thus assoc
of civil war onset. We also consider a more tenuous
measure of potential support to rebels-the number
of civil wars ongoing in neighboring countries-which
might yield more easily available weapons, training, or
the presence of experienced guerrillas.23
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our central hypotheses concern the relationship between
ethnic and religious diversity or structure, on
the one hand, and the susceptibility of a country to civil
war, on the other. Several multivariate analyses of the
country-year data are presented below, but the main
story emerging from them is made clear by the contour
plot in Figure 2.
Are More Diverse Countries Prone
to Civil War?
Figure 2 shows how probabilities of civil war onset
vary at different percentiles for country income (on the
x axis, measured in lagged 1985 dollars) and ethnic
homogeneity (on the y axis, measured by the population
share of the largest ethnic group). The lines in
the plot show the probability of war onset in the next
five years for a country at the given level of income
and ethnic homogeneity. For example, countries at the
twentieth percentile in terms of the size of their largest
ethnic group-thus quite ethnically diverse-but at the
eightieth percentile on income have had about a 5%
21 Using the Phase III Minorities at Risk (MAR) data, Fearon and
Laitin (1999) found that groups without a rural base area were far less
likely to be engaged in violent conflict with the state, even after controlling
for various country- and group-specific factors. Toft (1996)
was the first to note and examine the strong bivariate relationship in
the MAR data.
22 U.S. support to rightist regimes in Latin America during the Cold
War might also qualify, although this was perhaps more offset by
support for armed insurgency in this area from the Soviet Union and
Cuba.
23 The presence of valuable minerals or the suitability of land for
the cultivation of narcotics is also codable in principle, but at present
we lack such measures (H10e). Nor do we have measures for the
comparative disadvantage of governments in access to village-level
information (Hs).
chance of civil war outbreak in the next five years. In
contrast, countries at the eightieth percentile on ethnic
homogeneity and at the twentieth percentile on income
had a 15% chance of war in the next five years.24
Note that for any level of ethnic diversity, as one
moves up the income scale (to the right in Figure 2),
the odds of civil war decrease, by substantial factors
in all cases and dramatically among the most homogeneous
countries. The richest fifth is practically immune
regardless of ethnic composition. In contrast, for given
levels of country income, no consistent effect is associated
with variation in ethnic homogeneity (i.e., moving
up or down the figure). Among the poorest countries
where we observe the highest rates of civil war, the data
indicate a tendency for more homogeneous countries to
be more civil war-prone. Among the richest countries
there may be a weak tendency for the most homogeneous
countries to have fewer civil wars, but the size of
the effect, if any, is small.
The empirical pattern is thus inconsistent with H1,
the common expectation that ethnic diversity is a major
and direct cause of civil violence. Nor is there strong
evidence in favor of H2, which expects ethnic strife to
be activated as modernization advances. Ethnic diversity
could still cause civil war indirectly, if it causes a
low per capita income (Easterly and Levine 1997) or
a weak state. But then the mechanisms that actually
produce the violence would more likely be those of the
insurgency perspective than the culturalist arguments
in either perennialist or modernist forms.
The data for Figure 2 omit the anticolonial wars, and
the analysis does not control for other possible influences
on civil strife enumerated earlier. We consider
these issues next.
Multivariate Results
We coded a variable onset as "1" for all country-years
in which a civil war started and "0" for all others.25
Model 1 in Table 1 shows the results of a logit analysis
using onset as the dependent variable and a fairly full
specification of independent variables discussed above.
Prior war is a control variable indexing whether the
24 The figure was produced using R's locfit package, with a smoothing
parameter of 0.9, and transforming annual probabilities of outbreak
to five-year equivalents. The figure looks highly similar if we use other
measures of ethnic diversity, such as fractionalization.
25 We do not code as ones years in which a civil war continues, which
would be relevant if our focus were causes of war duration rather
than onset. Nor do we drop country-years that have an ongoing
war (as in Collier and Hoeffler 2001), since this would omit the
14 wars in our data that start while another war is in progress. Other
approaches to the dependent variable and estimation-such as making
the dependent variable "1" for all war years and using dynamic
probit or Poisson models that interact independent variables with a
lagged dependent variable (Jackman 2001; Przeworski et al. 2001)produce
virtually identical results. Only one country-year in the data
has more than one onset (Soviet Union 1946, with one Ukrainian
and three Baltic rebellions). We treat this as a one in the analyses
reported here, though there are no significant changes if we use
Poisson regression instead (treating the dependent variable as a
count) or weight this observation four times in the logit likelihood.
Using "rare events logit" (King and Zeng 2001) had no appreciable
impact on any estimates reported.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
FIGURE 2. Probability of Civil War Onset per Five-Year Period
GDP/capita in lagged 1985 U.S. dollars
48 808 1433 2724 5689 17280
0
03 q00
i i i i i
d ao
O O. O
e0 /
0)
% . 5- 0)
Q /
U) C
. /
i U/
o - o - \
eCL
0
0o_~~
o \ \ \
0 20 40 60 80 99
Percentile
country had a distinct civil war ongoing in the previous
year.26
Per Capita Income. Per capita income (measured as
thousands of 1985 U.S. dollars and lagged one year) is
strongly significant in both a statistical and a substantive
sense: $1,000 less in per capita income is associated with
41% greater annual odds of civil war onset, on average.
Holding other variables at their median values, a country
in the tenth percentile on income has an 18% chance
of a civil war outbreak over a decade, compared to an
11% chance for a country at the median income and
a 1% chance for a country at the ninetieth percentile
($573, $1,995, and $9,505, respectively). The income
variable is not just a proxy for "the West," whose states
26 With onset as the dependent variable, the data are grouped duration
data and we need to consider the possibility of temporal dependence
between observations. One approach is dynamic probit; see
footnote 25. We also tried Beck et al.'s (1998) method of including
dummies for each successive "peace year" prior to an onset, or fitting
natural cubic splines. This had no appreciable effect on the estimates,
and the splines were jointly insignificant.
might have low rates of civil war for reasons of culture
or history that have little to do with income. The estimated
coefficient drops only to -0.28 when a dummy
for the West is included and remains strongly significant
despite the high correlation between the two variables.
The relationship holds even within the poorest regions.
Among the (mainly) former colonies of Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia, we estimate that $1,000 less
in income corresponds to 34% greater annual odds of
outbreak.27
Ethnic and Religious Composition. The estimates
for the effect of ethnic and religiousfractionalization are
substantively and statistically insignificant. Alternative
measures of ethnic and religious diversity-such as the
27 Contrary to Hibbs 1973 and Hegre et al. 2001, adding the square of
per capita income does not significantly improve the fit of the model.
Regarding H2, the interaction of income and ELF has the expected
sign but is not significant. For lack of space, we report the details of
these and other "nonresults" mentioned below in the tables included
in Fearon and Laitin 2003.
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War February 2003
TABLE 1. Logit Analy
Model
(4) (5)
(1) (2) (3) Civil War Civil War
Civil War "Ethnic" War Civil War (Plus Empires) (COW)
Prior war -0.954** -0.849* -0.916** -0.688** -0.551
(0.314) (0.388) (0.312) (0.264) (0.374)
Per capita incomeab -0.344*** -0.379*** -0.318*** -0.305*** -0.309**
(0.072) (0.100) (0.071) (0.063) (0.079)
log(population)ab 0.263*** 0.389*** 0.272*** 0.267*** 0.223**
(0.073) (0.110) (0.074) (0.069) (0.079)
log(% mountainous) 0.219** 0.120 0.199* 0.192* 0.418***
(0.085) (0.106) (0.085) (0.082) (0.103)
Noncontiguous state 0.443 0.481 0.426 0.798** -0.171
(0.274) (0.398) (0.272) (0.241) (0.328)
Oil exporter 0.858** 0.809* 0.751** 0.548* 1.269***
(0.279) (0.352) (0.278) (0.262) (0.297)
New state 1.709*** 1.777*** 1.658*** 1.523*** 1.147**
(0.339) (0.415) (0.342) (0.332) (0.413)
Instabilitya 0.618** 0.385 0.513* 0.548* 0.584*
(0.235) (0.316) (0.242) (0.225) (0.268)
Democracya,c 0.021 0.013
(0.017) (0.022)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.166 0.146 0.164 0.490 -0.119
(0.373) (0.584) (0.368) (0.345) (0.396)
Religious fractionalization 0.285 1.533* 0.326 1.176*
(0.509) (0.724) (0.506) (0.563)
Anocracya 0.521 * 0.597*
(0.237) (0.261)
Democracya.d 0.127 0.219
(0.304) (0.354)
Constant -6.731*** -8.450*** -7.019*** -6.801*** -7.503***
(0.736) (1.092) (0.751) (0.681) (0.854)
N 6327 5186 6327 6360 5378
Note: The dependent variable is
parentheses. Estimations perform
a Lagged one year.
bIn 1000's.
c Polity IV; varies from -10 to 10.
d Dichotomous.
proportion of the largest group and the log of the number
of languages spoken by at least 1%-prove to be
just as unrelated. The ethnic diversity measures show
a strong bivariate relationship with civil war onset (not
so for the religion measures), but this evaporates when
we control for income.28
Nor are countries that are ethnically or religiously
polarized in the sense of H3 more likely to experience
major civil violence. When we add dummy variables for
countries that have an ethnic or religious majority and
a minority of at least 8% of the country's population,
both are incorrectly signed and neither comes close to
statistical significance. This finding does not depend on
which other variables are included in the model.
Ethnic War. The strong effect of per capita income remains
even when we restrict attention to "ethnic wars,"
28 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) find the interaction of ethnic and religious
fractionalization to be negatively related to onset. Others find
that fractionalization has a nonmonotonic relation to conflict. Neither
relationship appears in these data; we suspect that one reason
may be listwise deletion on missing economic data in other data sets.
while evidence of an independent effect of cultural diversity
is surprisingly weak. In Model 2 (Table 1), the
dependent variable marks the onset of wars that we
coded as "ethnic" or partially "ethnic," and we consider
only countries with at least a 5% ethnic minority. The
coefficient for ethnic fractionalization barely changes.
The same is true for our other measures of ethnic diversity.
Our two measures for religious diversity give weak
and inconsistent results, and support for H7 diminishes
further if we code the "partially" or "ambiguously" ethnic
wars as nonethnic.29
Democracy and Civil Liberties. Broad social and political
grievances should be lower, on average, in political
democracies. But contrary to H4 and consistent with
H11, civil war onsets are no less frequent in democracies
after controlling for income, as shown by the positive
and statistically insignificant coefficient for democracy,
29 Coefficients for political instability and mountains diminish in
this subsample, partly because the associations appear to have been
weaker for ethnic wars and partly due to the omission of highly homogeneous
countries.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
the (lagged) Polity IV measure. The resu
if we use Przeworski et al.'s dichotomous measure instead
(available for 1950-91) or the lag of Freedom
House's measure of observance of civil liberties (available
for 1972-99). In the former case the sign is
"wrong," while in the latter the sign is consistent with
H4 but the coefficient on civil liberties is thoroughly
insignificant.
Some past studies of civil strife found an "invertedU"
relationship with democracy and sought to explain
this by the observation that the most autocratic regimes
can repress dissent and thus avoid civil violence despite
facing the highest levels of popular grievance (Hegre
et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). This observation
does not explain why the leaders of a partially democratic
regime are not able to implement full autocracy
or democracy to avoid conflict and opposition. As suggested
in H1oc, we suspect that the answer is often that
"anocracies" are weak regimes, lacking the resources
to be successful autocrats or containing an unstable
mix of political forces that makes them unable to move
to crush nascent rebel groups. Consistent with this hypothesis
and with the prior studies, Model 3 (Table 1)
shows that a dummy variable marking anocracies takes
a positive coefficient. In substantive terms the estimate
suggests that these regimes have about 68% greater
odds of civil war outbreak in any given year than would
a full autocracy. This is so despite the fact that we are
controlling for recent political instability, which is much
more common in anocracies.30
Linguistic and Religious Discrimination. Added to
Model 3, our measures of state discrimination against
regional languages or against minority religions are not
associated with systematically higher risks of civil war
onset.31 This nonresult persists when we restrict the
sample to those countries with at least a 5% religious
or ethnic minority.
Inequality. Whether in a bivariate model or added
to Model 3, the Gini coefficient estimates of income
inequality do not come close to either statistical or substantive
significance. The poor quality of the inequality
data, available for only 108 countries, does not allow
us to go beyond the claim that there appears to be no
powerful cross-national relationship between inequality
and onset, consistent with H1.
30 In Model 3 Democracy is a dichotomous variable marking regimes
that scored higher than 5 on the Polity scale; the excluded category is
autocracies. For Model 3 we followed Polity IV's suggestion in coding
regime "interruptions" as anocracies; if these values are instead interpolated,
the resulting anocracy indicator gets a smaller estimated
coefficient that is not quite significant at the 5% level, while that for
political instability increases. Another issue, raised by Hegre et al.
(2001), is that the observation of some violence may lead Polity IV
to code democracies as less "democratic" and autocracies as less
autocratic (since there is mobilized opposition). So if there is lowlevel
violence preceding the reaching of our thresholds, some of the
effect of "anocracy" may be that it is picking up nascent civil war.
31 We tried the several religion indicators both separately and as a
single measure based on a factor analysis of the components. Discrimination
against regional languages is in fact associated with slightly
lower odds of civil war onset, consistent with Laitin 2000.
New States and Political Instability. Consistent with
H1Ja, the odds of civil war onset are estimated as
5.25 times greater in the first two years of a state's independent
existence than in other years, a huge effect
(Model 3). For the "median country," this translates to
an 11% chance in its first two years. Political instability
at the center matters in other years as well. The odds
of onset in a given year are estimated to increase by
67% if there was instability in governing arrangements
in any of the previous three years.32
Mountains and Noncontiguous Territory. Mountainous
terrain is significantly related to higher rates of
civil war. A country that is about half "mountainous"
(ninetieth percentile) and otherwise at the median has
an estimated 13.2% chance of civil war over the course
of a decade. A similar country that is not mountainous
at all (tenth percentile) has a 6.5% risk. The estimated
sign for states with noncontiguous territory is consistent
with H10e, but its 95% confidence interval includes the
possibility of no effect.33
Population. Holding other variables at medians, the
estimated risk of civil war over the course of a decade
for a country at the tenth percentile in population is
6.4%, versus 16.4% for a country at the ninetieth percentile
(1.4 versus 56.3 million, e.g., Botswana versus
Iran). This effect is not due to large states being more
ethnically diverse. We are controlling for ethnic diversity,
and in any event it turns out that there is essentially
no correlation between diversity measures and
log of size, even if we omit the relatively homogeneous
China.34
Oil, Islam, Young Males. Consistent with H1oh, deriving
at least one-third of export revenues from fossil
fuels is estimated to more than double a country's odds.
Based on Model 3, the "median country" had a 10%
chance of civil war over a decade, whereas the same
country as an oil exporter would have an estimated
21% chance.
Oil producers are disproportionately Middle
Eastern, which raises the question of whether this
variable might proxy some other relevant attribute of
these countries. But a dummy for the North Africa/
Middle East region is insignificant when added to
Model 3, while the estimate for oil is barely affected.
Huntington (1996) argues that "Islam has bloody
borders" and "bloody innards" because Islamic
societies have cultural and demographic features that
make them violence-prone. When we add a variable
32 Snyder (2000) argues that democratization puts states at greater
risk for civil war, ethnic in particular. Coding variables for three-orgreater
moves toward and away from democracy on the Polity index,
we find in these data that moves away from democracy are much
more strongly associated with civil war onset in the next year than
moves toward it, though both forms of instability elevate the risk.
Hegre et al. (2001) found the same thing using COW civil war data.
33 Dropping this or other "insignificant" variables from Model 3
barely affects the remaining estimated coefficients.
34 Huntington (1996) argues that rapid population growth puts states
at greater risk for civil war. Using the average growth rate for the
three prior years, we find no significant impact.
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War February 2003
measuring the percentage of Mus
to our main specification,35 it take
is not statistically significant. The
strong.
Huntington also argues that societies with a surfeit of
young males will be prone to civil violence, suggesting
this as a part of the explanation for Islam's "bloody
innards." Given that young males have physical and
perhaps psychological characteristics that make them
apt guerrillas, our arguments on insurgency point in the
same general direction. If we include a lagged measure
of the proportion of males aged 15 to 24 in the population
in Model 3, it has the expected positive sign,36 but
the estimate is highly uncertain (p = .21); one problem
is that percentage of young males has a strong negative
correlation with income, and income gets the better of
it when both are included. The same is true for male secondary
schooling rates (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2001).
Foreign Support. One determinant of the prospects
for insurgency is the availability of third-party support
to either the rebels or the government of the state in
question. "Availability" is difficult to observe ex ante,
however. A possible proxy is the number of civil wars
ongoing in neighboring countries in the previous year,
which might increase the availability of arms, support,
and seasoned guerrillas. Adding the lagged version of
this variable to Model 3, its sign is as predicted, but it
is not significant (p = .33). Civil war next door is too
common, occuring in 44% of the country-years in the
sample.
Another possible proxy is foreign support to governments
against domestic challengers. A dummy variable
for "Soviet bloc" prior to 1991 cannot be included in the
logit analysis because it perfectly predicts peace. But by
itself this observation is consistent with our argument.3
In the late 1980s, Mitterand's government departed
from long-standing French foreign policy by supporting,
to a limited extent, democratization in some of its
former sub-Saharan colonies. This involved encouraging
"national conferences," elections, and some political
opposition, which all suggested that the prior policy
of immediate military support for French-speaking dictators
might have changed. Civil war rates for former
French African colonies had been much lower
than those for other sub-Saharan states. The 25 others
saw 17 civil war onsets before 1990, a rate of 2.4 per
100 country-years. The 16 former French colonies had
only three onsets in the same period, for a rate of
0.65 per 100 country-years (Chad in 1965, Senegal
[Casamance] in 1989, and Mali in 1989). If a variable
marking former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa
prior to 1990 is included in Model 3, its estimated coefficient
is -1.0, which implies an almost-threefold reduction
in the annual odds of civil war onset (p = .11;
35 Coded from the CIA Factbook and a variety of country-specific
sources.
36 Data from the World Bank, linearly interpolated for missing years
within countries.
37 Foreign support may be at least as important as communist party
structure in explaining Huntington's (1968) observation that the communist
countries rarely faced insurrections.
the other estimates remain stable). A dummy variable
for all former French colonies is unrelated to civil war
onset, which suggests that the observed effect in subSaharan
Africa is due to the mechanism behind Hlof
rather than the effects of French colonial administration
or law.
Other Variables and Robustness Checks
Anticolonial Wars. Figure 2 and the multivariate
analyses above omitted the 13 anticolonial wars in five
colonial empires (Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal,
and The Netherlands). Including them is problematic
for both theoretical and empirical reasons, but so is
ignoring them. The main practical obstacle is the lack
of comparable data. However, by using the ethnic
fractionalization, population, mountainousness, and income
data for each colony in its first year of independence,
we were able to produce annual estimates
of these variables for each empire. The income estimates
are systematically too high-we use, for example,
Nigerian GDP per capita in 1962 as an estimate of its
income as a British colony in 1945. This creates some
bias against the income variable and in favor of the ELF,
which has a median value of 0.83 for the 114 "empire
years," compared to 0.34 for nonempire years.
Model 4 reports a logit analysis parallel to our specification
in Model 1 (Table 1), omitting only the democracy
variable and religious fractionalization (which is
hard to estimate for the empires due to shared religions
between colonies and metropoles). Given that the empires
were quite civil war-prone and highly diverse, it
is not surprising that the estimated coefficient for ELF
increases. Surprisingly, though, it remains statistically
indistinguishable from zero, while, excepting noncontiguity,
the others change little. Noncontiguous states are
now estimated to have had 2.2 times the odds of civil
war in this period, other things being equal. Because the
empires are all noncontiguous and because noncontiguity
otherwise does a better job than the ELF at picking
out civil wars onsets, it is given greater substantive and
statistical significance by the logit. If we drop noncontiguity,
the estimate for ELF increases to 0.62-which
corresponds to a 59% increase in risk moving from the
tenth to the ninetieth percentile-but still fails statistical
significance at the 5% level (p = .07). Thus even
if we include the anticolonial wars, the evidence that
ethnic diversity directly causes states to be more civil
war prone remains slim at best.38
Stepping back from the statistical analysis, we observe
that these five imperial states managed their
empires for many years before World War II with
fairly little active rebellion despite the same levels of
ethnic fractionalization, noncontiguity, and mountainousness.
Nor did discrimination and oppression suddenly
increase in the empires after the war, causing
38 We created a democracy estimate for the empires by taking a
weighted average of the metropole's lagged Polity democracy score
and -10, weighting by the metropole's proportion of total imperial
population. Adding this or dummies for "anocracy" and democracy
to Model 5 has no substantive impact.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
anticolonial movements as a response. Rat
greatly weakened the main imperial state
and the new international legal order (the U
gave support to anticolonial movements.
to the relative power of the metropoles
"civil war onset" in these cases (Fearon 20
Regional Effects. Different regions of
share a variety of historical, cultural, an
traits. It is reasonable to wonder if any of t
considered in the multivariate analysis ju
such factors. Further, if regional dummy
not add to the model's explanatory powe
have managed to account for the influenc
characteristics with our more general indep
ables. We find that if we add all (but one) r
mies to Model 3, the coefficients and signif
for our other variables are little affected. A likelihoodratio
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that "regions
do not matter" beyond the included variables
(p = .22). Including region dummies individually reveals
that none has a rate of civil war onset significantly
different from what one would expect on the basis
of the country characteristics already included in the
model.
Period and Fixed Effects. If added to Model 3,
dummy variables marking each decade (but one) are
jointly significant in a likelihood-ratio test (p= .04),
showing evidence of a general upward trend in civil war
risk after the 1940s. Adding a dummy for the 1940s and
a variable marking the year indicates that from 1950
the odds of civil war outbreak rose about 2% per year,
controlling for the other variables. As noted earlier,
there is no secular trend when we do not control for
other factors. Part of the explanation is that the median
of country incomes roughly doubled from 1950 to 1999,
which "should have"-based on Model 3-reduced the
onset odds for the "median country" by about 35%.
The fact that the rate of outbreak remains fairly constant
while incomes generally increased in effect penalizes
income in Model 3. When year is added, the
effect estimate for income increases to -0.36 (the other
effect estimates stay steady, except for noncontiguity,
which becomes statistically significant at p = .035). We
do not know what accounts for steady rates of outbreak
despite increasing incomes. Increased international inequality
(so that there is a set of persistently poor countries
at risk for civil war), greater availability of small
arms, and diffusion of insurgency "know-how" come to
mind, but are just conjectures.
This observation also raises the question of how
much the estimated impact of income is due to crosscountry
comparisons and how much to increasing
income within given countries associating with civil
peace. Applying conditional fixed effects logit to
Model 3 without the variables that have little or no temporal
variation (mountains, noncontiguity, ethnic and
religious fractionalization) and with a control for year,
we find that the estimated coefficient for income drops
only to -0.24 but is no longer significant (p=.16).
Using log of income, however, returns the same coefficient
that log of income takes in the standard logit
on the full sample (-0.78), significant at p =.02.39 In
addition, the effect estimates for the other variables
are, with one exception, virtually identical to the estimates
in the full, "pooled" model, the significance
remaining high for all but anocracy and oil (which has
little temporal variation). The exception is population,
which varies vastly more across countries than within
them over time. While bigger countries are more civil
war-prone, there is no evidence that population growth
within a country raises the risk.
Primary Commodity Exports. Using an "expanded"
version of the COW data, Collier and Hoeffler (2001)
find that the risk of civil war onset is maximized when
primary commodity exports comprise about 32% of the
country's GDP, with risk declining on either side of this
figure. They propose that, up to a point, higher levels
of primary commodity exports provide more motivation
and opportunity for rebels to support themselves
through "looting." Beyond this point, the revenue gains
available to the state are said to be large enough to
make civil war less likely.
We find little evidence of such a relationship in our
data. Neither the share of primary commodity exports
in GDP nor its square is remotely significant when
added to Model 3.
We agree with the general argument behind Collier
and Hoeffler's hypothesis. In our terms, insurgency
should be more feasible if sources of financing are readily
available. But we doubt that primary commodity
exports are a good measure of financing potential for
rebels. This measure combines oil, agricultural products,
and metals and minerals, which, except for some
minerals, are hard to exploit without control of a national
distribution system and ports. Oil exports may be
relevant not so much because they finance rebel groups
but, as we argued, because they mark relative state
weakness at a given level of income.41 A better measure
for financing potential would focus on the presence of
minerals or contraband that can reward control of a
small enclave with huge profits (Leonard and Strauss
2001).
Trade Openness. Using a measure of "state failure"
that includes both civil war and "disruptive regime transitions,"
Esty et al. (1998) found that trade share of
GDP strongly predicted civil peace. Using the Penn
World Tables measure of trade as a share of the GDP,
we find no such relationship in our data. Trade is related
to civil peace in a bivariate logit, but this is because
smaller countries have more trade and less civil war.
39 Whether we use income or logged income in the standard logit
makes for no significant differences.
40 The data series on primary commodity exports begins in 1960 and is
available only at five-year intervals. We interpolated missing values
and extended the 1995 values through 1999. We also tried Collier
and Hoeffler's procedure of grouping the data by five-year periods
beginning in 1960, again finding no relationship.
41 Our oil variable is moderately correlated with the primary commodities
measure, at r =.46, but the latter and its square remain
insignificant when oil is dropped from the model.
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War February 2003
Alternative Definitions and C
Our coding rules admit civil con
1,000 have been killed. Some
threshold is too low to disting
"civil war" and, say, terrorism.
conflicts in our sample estima
than 5,000 as zeros, the result
identical.42
We also checked to see how our results differed if
we based the coding of civil war onset on the lists
given by Collier and Hoeffler (2001), the COW project,
and Doyle and Sambanis (2000). As shown in Model 5
(Table 1), which bases onset on the COW data (1945-
92), the coefficients and significance levels for the "insurgency"
variables are remarkably stable.43 We obtain
quite similar results for the other two coding schemes.
Although these four civil war lists differ on many specific
start years and, to some extent, on what cases constitute
"civil wars" at all, there proves to be substantial
shared variation. For example, 53 of the 93 COW civil
wars in the sample start in the same year as an onset
in our data, and 68 start within two years of one of our
onsets. At the country level, the bivariate correlation
between our estimate of the total number of wars by
country and the equivalent for the others ranges from
0.71 with Collier and Hoeffler to 0.82 with Doyle and
Sambanis.
CONCLUSION
The prevalence of internal war in the 1990s is mainly
the result of an accumulation of protracted conflicts
since the 1950s rather than a sudden change associated
with a new, post-Cold War international system. Decolonization
from the 1940s through the 1970s gave birth
to a large number of financially, bureaucratically, and
militarily weak states. These states have been at risk
for civil violence for the whole period, almost entirely
in the form of insurgency, or rural guerrilla warfare.
Insurgency is a mode of military practice that can be
harnessed to various political agendas, be it communism
in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Islamic
fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Algeria, or Kashmir,
right-wing "reaction" in Nicaragua, or ethnic nationalism
in a great many states. The conditions that favor
insurgency-in particular, state weakness marked by
poverty, a large population, and instability-are better
predictors of which countries are at risk for civil war
than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or
measures of grievances such as economic inequality,
lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination
against minority religions or languages.
42 The coefficient on income increases 21%, noncontiguity becomes
significant, and anocracy weakens slightly. We coded total deaths
ourselves, based on Brogan 1998, Institute for International and
Strategic Studies 2000, Sivard 1996, Valentino 2002, and countryspecific
sources.
43 The one exception is religious fractionalization, which just manages
significance at the 5% level here. This does not occur in the
other data sets, and even with the COW data the estimate for religious
fractionalization is highly sensitive to which other variables are
included in the model.
How could democracy and cultural or religious homogeneity
fail to associate with civil peace across countries?
Viewing "ethnic wars" as a species of insurgency
may help explain this paradoxical result. If, under the
right environmental conditions, just 500 to 2,000 active
guerrillas can make for a long-running, destructive
internal war, then the average level of grievance
in a group may not matter that much. What matters is
whether active rebels can hide from government forces
and whether economic opportunities are so poor that
the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2,000 young
men. Grievance may favor rebellion by leading nonactive
rebels to help in hiding the active rebels. But all
the guerrillas really need is superior local knowledge,
which enables them to threaten reprisal for denun-
ciation.
If our analysis is correct, then policy makers should
not assume that civil wars and the "failed states" they
sometimes produce are temporary phenomena of the
immediate post-Cold War world. Nor should policy
makers or academics infer that ethnic diversity is the
root cause of civil conflict when they observe insurgents
in a poor country who mobilize fighters along
ethnic lines. Instead, the civil wars of the period have
structural roots, in the combination of a simple, robust
military technology and decolonization, which created
an international system numerically dominated by fragile
states with limited administrative control of their
peripheries.
Regarding policy implications, the spread of democracy
and tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities
should be major foreign policy goals because they are
desirable for their own sake, but not with the expectation
that they are "magic bullets" for the prevention
or resolution of civil war. Sometimes recommended as
a general international policy for resolving ethnic civil
wars (e.g., Kaufmann 1996), ethnic partitions should be
viewed as having large international implications and
high costs. International support for partition would
increase the expected benefits for rebels, who, we have
argued, may be able to get a nasty civil war going on
the basis of small numbers when the conditions for insurgency
are right.
Policies to redress grievances, or, in the limit, partition,
could be important to resolve ongoing conflicts.
We cannot say on the basis of this research, which focused
on civil war onset rather than termination. We
find little evidence that civil war is predicted by large
cultural divisions or broadly held grievances. But it
seems quite clear that intense grievances are produced
by civil war-indeed, this is often a central objective
of rebel strategy. These could well pose obstacles to
settlement.
Regarding prevention, our analysis suggests that
while economic growth may correlate with fewer civil
wars, the causal mechanism is more likely a wellfinanced
and administratively competent government.
In specific terms, international and nongovernmental
organizations should develop programs that improve
legal accountability within developing world
militaries and police, and make aid to governments
fighting civil wars conditional on the state observing
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American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1
counterinsurgency practices
cruit militias. Government
perpetuating counterinsurge
rupt as to be hopeless shou
when there are major implic
or international terrorism,
"neotrusteeship" under the
military and political orga
the European Union. The l
ready see operating, in eff
East Timor, should be rat
internal coordination among
in such operations.
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