The War Powers Resolution:
Concepts and Practice
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
April 3, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42699
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service
Summary
This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment
in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in
which issues of its applicability were raised. It will be revised biannually.
In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into
potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War
Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7,
1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of
the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the
law’s enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in
Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited
procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia,
and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance
with the terms of the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution P.L. 93-148 was passed over the veto of President Nixon on
November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in
decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to
report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When
such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, Section 5(b) requires that the use of
forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends
the time period. Section 3 requires that the “President in every possible instance shall consult with
Congress before introducing” U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.
From 1975 through March 2015, Presidents have submitted 160 reports as the result of the War
Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which
triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement, and in this case the military action was completed
and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made. The
reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of
military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the
Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the antiterrorism
actions in Afghanistan. In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile
situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion,
Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) became
operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution
(P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against
Iraq. In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate
the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Provisions of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148).................................................................. 1
Title............................................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose and Policy .................................................................................................................... 2
Consultation Requirement......................................................................................................... 2
Reporting Requirements............................................................................................................ 3
Congressional Action................................................................................................................. 4
Priority Procedures.................................................................................................................... 4
Interpretive Provisions............................................................................................................... 5
Constitutional Questions Raised...................................................................................................... 6
War Powers of the President and Congress............................................................................... 7
Legislative Veto......................................................................................................................... 7
Automatic Withdrawal Provision .............................................................................................. 9
Major Cases and Issues Prior to the Persian Gulf War .................................................................. 10
Vietnam Evacuations and Mayaguez: What Is Consultation?................................................. 10
Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt: Is Consultation Always Necessary and Possible?................... 10
El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent Hostilities? ....................................... 11
Honduras: When Are Military Exercises More than Training?............................................... 12
Lebanon: How Can Congress Invoke the War Powers Resolution?........................................ 13
Grenada: Do the Expedited Procedures Work? ....................................................................... 15
Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake in Response to
International Terrorism? ....................................................................................................... 16
Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent?............................................................. 16
Invasion of Panama: Why Was the War Powers Issue Not Raised?........................................ 18
Major Cases and Issues in the Post-Cold War World..................................................................... 19
Persian Gulf War, 1991: How Does the War Powers Resolution Relate to the United
Nations and a Real War? ......................................................................................................21
Iraq-Post Gulf War: How Long Does an Authorization Last?................................................. 24
Somalia: When Does Humanitarian Assistance Require Congressional Authorization? ........ 26
Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo: What If No Consensus Exists? ...................................... 29
Bosnia................................................................................................................................ 29
Kosovo .............................................................................................................................. 34
Haiti: Can the President Order Enforcement of a U.N. Embargo?.......................................... 37
Terrorist Attacks against the United States (World Trade Center and the Pentagon)
2001: How Does the War Powers Resolution Apply?.......................................................... 39
Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002: A Classic Application of the War Powers
Resolution?........................................................................................................................... 42
Libya 2011: Establishing a New Definition of What Constitutes “Hostilities” for
Purposes of Full Compliance with the War Powers Resolution? ......................................... 44
Administration Report to Congress on “United States Activities in Libya”
Submitted on June 15, 2011........................................................................................... 45
The War Powers Resolution and Military Use of UAVs: Some Considerations............... 45
Military Campaign Against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 2014-2015............................ 47
Presidential Reporting on Individual Missions and the War Powers Resolution’s
Withdrawal Requirement ............................................................................................... 48
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Presidential Reliance on Prior Existing Authorizations to Meet War Powers
Resolution Requirements ............................................................................................... 50
Congressional Action Related to the Use of Military Force Against the
Islamic State................................................................................................................... 52
Proposed Amendments .................................................................................................................. 54
Return to Senate Version: Enumerating Exceptions for Emergency Use................................ 55
Shorten or Eliminate Time Limitation..................................................................................... 56
Replace Automatic Withdrawal Requirement ......................................................................... 56
Cutoff of Funds........................................................................................................................ 56
Elimination of Action by Concurrent Resolution.................................................................... 56
Expedited Procedures.............................................................................................................. 57
Consultation Group ................................................................................................................. 57
Judicial Review ....................................................................................................................... 58
Change of Name...................................................................................................................... 58
United Nations Actions............................................................................................................ 58
Appendixes
Appendix A. Instances Reported Under the War Powers Resolution ............................................ 59
Appendix B. Instances Not Formally Reported to the Congress Under the War Powers
Resolution................................................................................................................................... 87
Appendix C. Text of the War Powers Resolution .......................................................................... 89
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 94
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 94
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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Introduction
Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and the President. Among
other relevant grants, Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed
forces (Article I, Section 8), while the President is Commander-in-Chief (Article II, Section 2). It
is generally agreed that the Commander-in-Chief role gives the President power to utilize the
armed forces to repel attacks against the United States, but there has long been controversy over
whether he is constitutionally authorized to send forces into hostile situations abroad without a
declaration of war or other congressional authorization.
Congressional concern about presidential use of armed forces without congressional authorization
intensified after the Korean conflict. During the Vietnam War, Congress searched for a way to
assert authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the armed
forces be utilized in circumstances that might lead to hostilities. On November 7, 1973, it passed
the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) over the veto of President Nixon. The main purpose of
the Resolution was to establish procedures for both branches to share in decisions that might get
the United States involved in war. The drafters sought to circumscribe the President’s authority to
use armed forces abroad in hostilities or potential hostilities without a declaration of war or other
congressional authorization, yet provide enough flexibility to permit him to respond to attack or
other emergencies.
The record of the War Powers Resolution since its enactment has been mixed, and after 40 years
it remains controversial. Some Members of Congress believe the Resolution has on some
occasions served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by Presidents, provided a mode of
communication, and given Congress a vehicle for asserting its war powers. Others have sought to
amend the Resolution because they believe it has failed to assure a congressional voice in
committing U.S. troops to potential conflicts abroad. Others in Congress, along with executive
branch officials, contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy
and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical.
Some have argued for its repeal.
This report examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, actual experience in its use
from its enactment in 1973 through March 2015, and proposed amendments to it. Appendix A
lists instances which Presidents have reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution, and
Appendix B lists certain instances of the use of U.S. armed forces that were not reported.
Provisions of the War Powers Resolution
(P.L. 93-148)
Title
Section 1 establishes the title, “The War Powers Resolution.” The law is frequently referred to as
the “War Powers Act,” the title of the measure passed by the Senate. Although the latter is not
technically correct, it does serve to emphasize that the War Powers Resolution, embodied in a
joint resolution which complies with constitutional requirements for lawmaking, is a law.
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Purpose and Policy
Section 2 states the Resolution’s purpose and policy, with Section 2(a) citing as the primary
purpose to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply
to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”
Section 2(b) points to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as the basis for
legislation on the war powers. It provides that “Under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution it is
specifically provided that Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States.... ”
Section 2(c) states the policy that the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce U.S. armed forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities “are exercised
only pursuant to—
(1) a declaration of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.”
Consultation Requirement
Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President “in every possible instance” to
consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities and
imminent hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces remain in such
situations. The House report elaborated:
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of consultation. Rejected was
the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely being informed. Rather,
consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that
Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and opinions and, in
appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for
consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information
relevant to the situation must be made available.1
The House version specifically called for consultation between the President and the leadership
and appropriate committees. This was changed to less specific wording in conference, however,
in order to provide more flexibility.
1
U.S. Congress. H.R. 287, p. 6.
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Reporting Requirements
Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he introduces U.S. armed forces
abroad in certain situations. Of key importance is Section 4(a)(1) because it triggers the time limit
in Section 5(b). Section 4(a)(1) requires reporting within 48 hours, in the absence of a declaration
of war or congressional authorization, the introduction of U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.”
Some indication of the meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities is given in the House report
on its War Powers bill:
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee
drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a
situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of
confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger
of armed conflict. “Imminent hostilities” denotes a situation in which there is a clear
potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict.2
Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops “into the territory, airspace or
waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely
to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.” According to the House report this was
to cover
the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no actual fighting but some
risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A report would be required
any time combat military forces were sent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing
political status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for example, the dispatch of
Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have
required Presidential reports. Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls,
emergency aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncombat military activities.3
Section 4(a)(3) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops “in numbers which
substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a
foreign nation.” The House report elaborated:
While the word “substantially” designates a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a
common-sense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100% increase in numbers of
Marine guards at an embassy—say from 5 to 10—clearly would not be an occasion for a
report. A thousand additional men sent to Europe under present circumstances does not
significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about 300,000 already there. However,
the dispatch of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000
would mean an increase of 25%, which is substantial. Under this circumstance, President
Kennedy would have been required to report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number
of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.4
2
U.S. Congress. H.R. 287, p. 7.
3
U.S. Congress. H.R. 287, p. 7.
4
U.S. Congress. H.R. 287, p. 8.
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All of the reports under Section 4(a), which are to be submitted to the Speaker of the House and
the President pro tempore of the Senate, are to set forth:
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information as Congress may request to
fulfill its responsibilities relating to committing the nation to war.
Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically, and at least every six
months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or any other situation in Section 4(a).
The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, was to “ensure that the Congress
by right and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it requires to carry out its
constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of
United States Armed Forces abroad.”5
Congressional Action
Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a report under Section 4(a)(1). It
provides that if a report is transmitted during a congressional adjournment, the Speaker of the
House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, when they deem it advisable or if petitioned
by at least 30% of the Members of their respective Houses, shall jointly request the President to
convene Congress in order to consider the report and take appropriate action.
Section 5(b) was intended to provide teeth for the War Powers Resolution. After a report “is
submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier,” Section
5(b) requires the President to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces after 60 days unless
Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the period by law; or (3)
is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States. The 60 days can
be extended for 30 days by the President if he certifies that “unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces” requires their continued use in the course of
bringing about their removal.
Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by
concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983
Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. It is discussed in Part II of this report.
Priority Procedures
Section 6 establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration of a joint resolution or
bill introduced to authorize the use of armed forces under Section 5(b). They provide for:
5
U.S. Congress. H.R. 547, p. 8.
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(a) A referral to the House Foreign Affairs [International Relations] or Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the committee to report one measure not later than 24 calendar days
before the expiration of the 60 day period, unless the relevant House determines otherwise by
a vote;
(b) The reported measure to become the pending business of the relevant House and be voted
on within three calendar days, unless that House determines otherwise by vote; in the Senate
the debate is to be equally divided between proponents and opponents;
(c) A measure passed by one House to be referred to the relevant committee of the other
House and reported out not later than 14 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day
period, the reported bill to become the pending business of that House and be voted on within
3 calendar days unless determined otherwise by a vote;
(d) Conferees to file a report not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the 60
day period. If they cannot agree within 48 hours, the conferees are to report back in
disagreement, and such report is to be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of
the 60 day period.
Section 7 establishes similar priority procedures for a concurrent resolution to withdraw forces
under Section 5(c). For a recent use of these procedures see the section on the “Legislative Veto,”
below.
Interpretive Provisions
Section 8 sets forth certain interpretations relating to the Resolution. Section 8(a) states that
authority to introduce armed forces is not to be inferred from any provision of law or treaty unless
such law, or legislation implementing such treaty, specifically authorizes the introduction of
armed forces into hostilities or potential hostilities and states that it is “intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.” This language was
derived from a Senate measure and was intended to prevent a security treaty or military
appropriations act from being used to authorize the introduction of troops. It was also aimed
against using a broad resolution like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution6
to justify hostilities abroad. This
resolution had stated that the United States was prepared to take all necessary steps, including use
of armed force, to assist certain nations, and it was cited by Presidents and many Members as
congressional authorization for the Vietnam war.
Section 8(b) states that further specific statutory authorization is not required
to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the
armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level
military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint
resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United
States prior to such date.
This section was added by the Senate to make clear that the resolution did not prevent U.S. forces
from participating in certain joint military exercises with allied or friendly organizations or
6
P.L. 88-408, approved August 10, 1964; repealed in 1971 by P.L. 91-672.
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countries. The conference report stated that the “high-level” military commands meant the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO), the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)
and the United Nations command in Korea.
Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include the assignment of armed forces to
accompany regular or irregular military forces of other countries when engaged, or potentially
engaged, in hostilities. The conference report on the War Powers Resolution explained that this
was language modified from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory authorization for
assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes. The report of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on its bill said:
The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities
and to prevent a repetition of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in
Indochina. The ever deepening ground combat involvement of the United States in South
Vietnam began with the assignment of U.S. “advisers” to accompany South Vietnamese
units on combat patrols; and in Laos, secretly and without congressional authorization, U.S.
“advisers” were deeply engaged in the war in northern Laos.7
Section 8(d) states that nothing in the Resolution is intended to alter the constitutional authority
of either the Congress or the President. It also specifies that nothing is to be construed as granting
any authority to introduce troops that would not exist in the absence of the Resolution. The House
report said that this provision was to help insure the constitutionality of the Resolution by making
it clear that nothing in it could be interpreted as changing the powers delegated by the
Constitution.
Section 9 is a separability clause, stating that if any provision or its application is found invalid,
the remainder of the Resolution is not to be affected.
Constitutional Questions Raised
From its inception, the War Powers Resolution was controversial because it operated on the
national war powers, powers divided by the Constitution in no definitive fashion between the
President and Congress. Congress adopted the resolution in response to the perception that
Presidents had assumed more authority to send forces into hostilities than the framers of the
Constitution had intended for the Commander-in-Chief. President Nixon in his veto message
challenged the constitutionality of the essence of the War Powers Resolution, and particularly two
provisions.8
He argued that the legislative veto provision, permitting Congress to direct the
withdrawal of troops by concurrent resolution, was unconstitutional. He also argued that the
provision requiring withdrawal of troops after 60-90 days unless Congress passed legislation
authorizing such use was unconstitutional because it checked presidential powers without
affirmative congressional action. Every President since the enactment of the War Powers
Resolution has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s
authority as Commander-in-Chief.
7
U.S. Congress. S.Rept. 93-220, p. 24.
8
United States. President (Nixon). Message vetoing House Joint Resolution 542, A Joint Resolution Concerning the
War Powers of Congress and the President. October 24, 1973. H.Doc. 93-171.
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War Powers of the President and Congress
The heart of the challenge to the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution rests on differing
interpretations by the two branches of the respective war powers of the President and Congress.
These differing interpretations, especially the assertions of presidential authority to send forces
into hostile situations without a declaration of war or other authorization by Congress, were the
reason for the enactment of the Resolution.
The congressional view was that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the power to
declare war, meaning the ultimate decision whether or not to enter a war. Most Members of
Congress agreed that the President as Commander-in-Chief had power to lead the U.S. forces
once the decision to wage war had been made, to defend the nation against attack, and perhaps in
some instances to take other action such as rescuing American citizens. But, in this view, he did
not have the power to commit armed forces to war. By the early 1970s, the congressional majority
view was that the constitutional balance of war powers had swung too far toward the President
and needed to be corrected. Opponents argued that Congress always held the power to forbid or
terminate U.S. military action by statute or refusal of appropriations, and that without the clear
will to act the War Powers Resolution would be ineffective.
In his veto message, President Nixon said the Resolution would impose restrictions upon the
authority of the President which would be dangerous to the safety of the Nation and “attempt to
take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under
the Constitution for almost 200 years.”
The War Powers Resolution in Section 2(c) recognized the constitutional powers of the President
as Commander-in-Chief to introduce forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities as “exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.” The executive branch has contended that the President has much broader authority to use
forces, including for such purposes as to rescue American citizens abroad, rescue foreign
nationals where such action facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens, protect U.S. Embassies and
legations, suppress civil insurrection, implement the terms of an armistice or cease-fire involving
the United States, and carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties.9
Legislative Veto
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, ruled unconstitutional the legislative
veto provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.10
Although the case
involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the decision cast doubt on the validity of any
legislative veto device that was not presented to the President for signature. The Court held that to
accomplish what the House attempted to do in the Chadha case “requires action in conformity
with the express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action: passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.” On July 6, 1983, the Supreme Court
9
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test of Compliance relative to the
Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings, May 7
and June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1975. p. 69.
10
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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affirmed a lower court’s decision striking down a provision in another law11
that permitted
Congress to disapprove by concurrent (two-House) resolution.12
Since Section 5(c) requires forces to be removed by the President if Congress so directs by a
concurrent resolution, it is constitutionally suspect under the reasoning applied by the Court.13
A
concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the
President for signature or veto. Some legal analysts contend, nevertheless, that the War Powers
Resolution is in a unique category which differs from statutes containing a legislative veto over
delegated authorities.14
Perhaps more important, some observers contend, if a majority of both
Houses ever voted to withdraw U.S. forces, the President would be unlikely to continue the action
for long, and Congress could withhold appropriations to finance further action. Because the War
Powers Resolution contains a separability clause in Section 9, most analysts take the view that the
remainder of the joint resolution would not be affected even if Section 5(c) were found
unconstitutional.15
Congress has taken action to fill the gap left by the possible invalidity of the concurrent resolution
mechanism for the withdrawal of troops. On October 20, 1983, the Senate voted to amend the
War Powers Resolution by substituting a joint resolution, which requires presentment to the
President, for the concurrent resolution in Section 5(c), and providing that it would be handled
under the expedited procedures in Section 7. The House and Senate conferees agreed not to
amend the War Powers Resolution itself, but to adopt a free standing measure relating to the
withdrawal of troops. The measure, which became law, provided that any joint resolution or bill
to require the removal of U.S. armed forces engaged in hostilities outside the United States
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization would be considered in
accordance with the expedited procedures of Section 601(b) of the International Security and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976,16
except that it would be amendable and debate on a veto
limited to 20 hours.17
The priority procedures embraced by this provision applied in the Senate
only. Handling of such a joint resolution by the House was left to that Chamber’s discretion.
House Members attempted to use Section 5(c) to obtain a withdrawal of forces from Somalia. On
October 22, 1993, Representative Benjamin Gilman introduced H.Con.Res. 170, pursuant to
Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces
from Somalia by January 31, 1994. Using the expedited procedures called for in Section 5(c), the
Foreign Affairs Committee amended the date of withdrawal to March 31, 1994, (the date the
11
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980.
12
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
13
Celada, Raymond. J. Effect of the Legislative Veto Decision on the Two-House Disapproval Mechanism to
Terminate U.S. Involvement in Hostilities Pursuant to Unilateral Presidential Action. CRS Report, August 24, 1983.
14
Gressman, Prof. Eugene. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Concerning the Legislative Veto. Hearings, July 19, 20, and 21, 1983. 98th
Congress, 1st
sess. Washington, U.S. GPO,
1983, p. 155-157. Buchanan, G. Sidney. In Defense of the War Powers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply. Houston
Law Review, Vol. 22, p. 1155; Ely, John Hart. Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked. Columbia
Law Review, Vol. 88, p. 1379 (see p. 1395-1398).
15
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative
Veto, Hearings, p. 52.
16
P.L. 94-164, signed June 30, 1976.
17
Senate amendment to Section 1013, State Department Authorization Act for FY1984, P.L. 98-164, approved
November 22, 1983. Codified at 50 U.S.C., Section 1546a (1994).
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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President had already agreed to withdraw the forces), and the House adopted H.Con.Res. 170.
The Foreign Affairs Committee reported:18
Despite such genuine constitutionality questions, the committee acted in accordance with the
expedited procedures in section 7. The committee action was premised on a determination
that neither individual Members of Congress nor Committees of Congress should make
unilateral judgments about the constitutionality of provisions of law.
Despite the use of the phrase “directs the President,” the sponsor of the resolution and Speaker of
the House Thomas Foley expressed the view that because of the Chadha decision, the resolution
would be non-binding. The March 31, 1994, withdrawal date was later enacted as Section 8151 of
P.L. 103-139, signed November 11, 1993.
Automatic Withdrawal Provision
The automatic withdrawal provision has become perhaps the most controversial provision of the
War Powers Resolution. Section 5(b) requires the President to withdraw U.S. forces from
hostilities within 60-90 days after a report is submitted or required to be submitted under Section
4(a)(1). The triggering of the time limit has been a major factor in the reluctance of Presidents to
report, or Congress to insist upon a report, under Section 4(a)(1).
Drafters of the War Powers Resolution included a time limit to provide some teeth for Congress,
in the event a President assumed a power to act from provisions of resolutions, treaties, or the
Constitution which did not constitute an explicit authorization. The Senate report called the time
limit “the heart and core” of the bill that “represents, in an historic sense, a restoration of the
constitutional balance which has been distorted by practice in our history and, climatically, in
recent decades.”19
The House report emphasized that the Resolution did not grant the President
any new authority or any freedom of action during the time limits that he did not already have.
Administration officials have objected that the provision would require the withdrawal of U.S.
forces simply because of congressional inaction during an arbitrary period. Since the resolution
recognizes that the President has independent authority to use armed forces in certain
circumstances, they state, “on what basis can Congress seek to terminate such independent
authority by the mere passage of time?”20
In addition, they argue, the imposition of a deadline
interferes with successful action, signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a
basis for hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop an action, and
increases risk to U.S. forces in the field. This issue has not been dealt with by the courts.
18
H.Res. 293, November 5, 1993, p. 2. See below for further discussion of the Somalia case.
19
The Senate bill had a time limit of 30 days. See report to accompany S. 440. S.Rept. 93-220, 93d Congress, 1st
Session. p. 28.
20
Sofaer, Abraham D. Prepared statement in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The War Power
After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional Impasse. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on
War Powers. July 13-September 29, 1988. S.Hrng. 100-1012. p. 1059.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 10
Major Cases and Issues Prior to the
Persian Gulf War
Perceptions of the War Powers Resolution tended to be set during the Cold War. During the 1970s
the issues revolved largely around the adequacy of consultation. The 1980s raised more serious
issues of presidential compliance and congressional willingness to use the War Powers Resolution
to restrain presidential action. With regard to Lebanon in 1983, Congress itself invoked the War
Powers Resolution, but in the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf tanker war Congress chose not to do so.
Following is a summary of major U.S. military actions and the issues they raised relating to the
War Powers Resolution from its enactment in 1973 to August 1990.21
Vietnam Evacuations and Mayaguez: What Is Consultation?
As the Vietnam War ended, on three occasions, in April 1975, President Ford used U.S. forces to
help evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals. In addition, in May 1975 President Ford
ordered the retaking of a U.S. merchant vessel, the SS Mayaguez which had been seized by
Cambodian naval patrol vessels. All four actions were reported to Congress citing the War Powers
Resolution. The report on the Mayaguez recapture was the only War Powers report to date to
specifically cite Section 4(a)(1), but the question of the time limit was moot because the action
was over by the time the report was filed.
Among the problems revealed by these first four cases were differences of opinion between the
two branches on the meaning of consultation. The Ford Administration held that it had met the
consultation requirement because the President had directed that congressional leaders be notified
prior to the actual commencement of the introduction of armed forces. The prevailing
congressional view was that consultation meant that the President seek congressional opinion,
and take it into account, prior to making a decision to commit armed forces.22
Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt: Is Consultation Always Necessary
and Possible?
After an unsuccessful attempt on April 24, 1980, to rescue American hostages being held in Iran,
President Carter submitted a report to Congress to meet the requirements of the War Powers
Resolution, but he did not consult in advance. The Administration took the position that
consultation was not required because the mission was a rescue attempt, not an act of force or
aggression against Iran. In addition, the Administration contended that consultation was not
possible or required because the mission depended upon total surprise.
21
Appendix A lists in chronological order all reports to Congress related to the War Powers Resolution from the first
in 1975 through 2003. Appendix B lists representative instances of the deployment to or use of armed forces in
potentially hostile situations which were not reported under the Resolution. Appendix C gives the complete text of the
War Powers Resolution.
22
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the
Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings, May 7
and June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. p. 3.
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Some Members of Congress complained about the lack of consultation, especially because
legislative-executive meetings had been going on since the Iranian crisis had begun the previous
year. Just before the rescue attempt, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had sent a letter to
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requesting formal consultations under the War Powers Resolution.
Moreover, shortly before the rescue attempt, the President outlined plans for a rescue attempt to
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd but did not say it had begun. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Frank Church stressed as guidelines for the future: (1) consultation required
giving Congress an opportunity to participate in the decision making process, not just informing
Congress that an operation was underway; and (2) the judgment could not be made unilaterally
but should be made by the President and Congress.23
El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent Hostilities?
One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy because it was never reported under the
War Powers Resolution was the dispatch of U.S. military advisers to El Salvador. At the end of
February 1981, the Department of State announced the dispatch of 20 additional military advisers
to El Salvador to aid its government against guerilla warfare. There were already 19 military
advisers in El Salvador sent by the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration said the
insurgents were organized and armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba. By March 14,
the Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including experts in combat training.
The President did not report the situation under the War Powers Resolution. A State Department
memorandum said a report was not required because the U.S. personnel were not being
introduced into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. The memorandum asserted that if
a change in circumstances occurred that raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the
Resolution would be complied with. A justification for not reporting under Section 4(a)(2) was
that the military personnel being introduced were not equipped for combat.24
They would, it was
maintained, carry only personal side arms which they were authorized to use only in their own
defense or the defense of other Americans.
The State Department held that Section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution was not intended to
require a report when U.S. military personnel might be involved in training foreign military
personnel, if there were no imminent involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities. In the case of
El Salvador, the memorandum said, U.S. military personnel “will not act as combat advisors, and
will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in any other situation
where combat is likely.”
On May 1, 1981, 11 Members of Congress challenged the President’s action by filing suit on
grounds that he had violated the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by sending the
advisers to El Salvador. Eventually there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but by June 18, 1981, an equal
number of Members (13 Senators and 16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the suit,
contending that a number of legislative measures were then pending before Congress and that
Congress had ample opportunity to vote to end military assistance to El Salvador if it wished.
23
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The situation in Iran. Hearing, 96th
Congress, 2nd
session.
May 8, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. p. iii.
24
Congressional Record, March 5, 1981, V. 127, p. 3743.
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On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed the suit. She ruled
that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador
were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation. While there might be situations in
which a court could conclude that U.S. forces were involved in hostilities, she ruled, the
“subtleties of fact-finding in this situation should be left to the political branches.” She noted that
Congress had taken no action to show it believed the President’s decision was subject to the War
Powers Resolution.25
On November 18, 1983, a federal circuit court affirmed the dismissal and on
June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court declined consideration of an appeal of that decision.26
As the involvement continued and casualties occurred among the U.S. military advisers, various
legislative proposals relating to the War Powers Resolution and El Salvador were introduced.
Some proposals required a specific authorization prior to the introduction of U.S. forces into
hostilities or combat in El Salvador.27
Other proposals declared that the commitment of U.S.
Armed Forces in El Salvador necessitated compliance with Section 4(a) of the War Powers
Resolution, requiring the President to submit a report.28
Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported that the President had “a clear obligation under the War Powers Resolution to consult
with Congress prior to any future decision to commit combat forces to El Salvador.”29
On July 26,
1983, the House rejected an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 2969) to limit the
number of active duty military advisers in El Salvador to 55, unless the President reported any
increase above that level under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.30
Nevertheless, the
Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55.
Honduras: When Are Military Exercises More than Training?
Military exercises in Honduras in 1983 and subsequent years raised the question of when military
exercises should be reported under the War Powers Resolution. Section 4(a)(2) requires the
reporting of introduction of troops equipped for combat, but exempts deployments which relate
solely to training.
On July 27, 1983, President Reagan announced “joint training exercises” planned for Central
America and the Caribbean. The first contingent of U.S. troops landed in Honduras on August 8,
1983, and the series of ground and ocean exercises continued for several years, involving
thousands of ground troops plus warships and fighter planes.
The President did not report the exercises under the War Powers Resolution. He characterized the
maneuvers as routine and said the United States had been regularly conducting joint exercises
25
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
26
720 F. 2d 1355 (D.C.Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
27
On March 8, 1982, Senator Robert Byrd introduced the War Powers Resolution Amendment of 1982 (S. 2179)
specifically providing that U.S. armed forces shall not be introduced into El Salvador for combat unless (1) the
Congress has declared war or specifically authorized such use; or (2) such introduction was necessary to meet a clear
and present danger of attack on the United States or to provide immediate evacuation of U.S. citizens. Similar bills
were introduced in the House, e.g. H.R. 1619 and H.R. 1777 in the 98th
Congress.
28
H.Con.Res. 87, 97th
Congress.
29
Report on S.J.Res. 158, Section III, S.Rept. 97-470, June 9, 1982.
30
Congressional Record, House, July 26, 1983, pp. 20924-20925.
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with Latin American countries since 1965. Some Members of Congress, on the other hand,
contended that the exercises were part of a policy to support the rebels or “contras” fighting the
Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, threatening that government, and increased the possibility
of U.S. military involvement in hostilities in Central America.
Several Members of Congress called for reporting the actions under the War Powers Resolution,
but some sought other vehicles for congressional control. In 1982, the Boland amendment to the
Defense Appropriations Act had already prohibited use of funds to overthrow the Government of
Nicaragua or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua or Honduras.31
Variations of this
amendment followed in subsequent years. After press reports in 1985 that the option of invading
Nicaragua was being discussed, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 stated the
sense of Congress that U.S. armed forces should not be introduced into or over Nicaragua for
combat.32
In 1986, after U.S. helicopters ferried Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan border area,
Congress prohibited U.S. personnel from participating in assistance within land areas of
Honduras and Costa Rica within 120 miles of the Nicaraguan border, or from entering Nicaragua
to provide military advice or support to paramilitary groups operating in that country.33
Gradually
the issue died with peace agreements in the region and the electoral defeat of the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua in 1990.
Lebanon: How Can Congress Invoke the War Powers Resolution?
The War Powers Resolution faced a major test when Marines sent to participate in a Multinational
Force in Lebanon in 1982 became the targets of hostile fire in August 1983. During this period
President Reagan filed three reports under the War Powers Resolution, but he did not report under
Section 4(a)(1) that the forces were being introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, thus
triggering the 60-90 day time limit.
On September 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution
determining that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became
operative on August 29, 1983.34
In the same resolution, Congress authorized the continued
participation of the Marines in the Multinational Force for 18 months. The resolution was a
compromise between Congress and the President. Congress obtained the President’s signature on
legislation invoking the War Powers Resolution for the first time, but the price for this concession
was a congressional authorization for the U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months.
The events began on July 6, 1982, when President Reagan announced he would send a small
contingent of U.S. troops to a multinational force for temporary peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Clement Zablocki wrote President Reagan
that if such a force were sent, the United States would be introducing forces into imminent
hostilities and a report under Section 4(a)(1) would be required. When the forces began to land on
August 25, President Reagan reported but did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and said the agreement with
31
The initial statutory restriction was contained in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for 1983, P.L. 97-377.
This was followed by a $24 million ceiling on intelligence agency support in FY1984.
32
Section 1451 of P.L. 99-145, approved November 8, 1985. A similar provision was contained in the defense
authorization for 1988-1989, Section1405 of P.L. 100-180, approved December 4, 1987.
33
Continuing Appropriations Resolution, P.L. 99-591, approved October 30, 1986. Continued in P.L. 100-202,
approved December 22, 1987.
34
P.L. 98-119, approved October 12, 1983.
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Lebanon ruled out any combat responsibilities. After overseeing the departure of the Palestine
Liberation Organization force, the Marines in the first Multinational Force left Lebanon on
September 10, 1982.
The second dispatch of Marines to Lebanon began on September 20, 1982. President Reagan
announced that the United States, France, and Italy had agreed to form a new multinational force
to return to Lebanon for a limited period of time to help maintain order until the lawful authorities
in Lebanon could discharge those duties. The action followed three events that took place after
the withdrawal of the first group of Marines: the assassination of Lebanon President-elect Bashir
Gemayel, the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians by
Lebanese Christian militiamen.
On September 29, 1982, President Reagan submitted a report that 1,200 Marines had begun to
arrive in Beirut, but again he did not cite Section 4(a)(1), saying instead that the American force
would not engage in combat. As a result of incidents in which Marines were killed or wounded,
there was again controversy in Congress on whether the President’s report should have been filed
under Section 4(a)(1). In mid-1983 Congress passed the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of
1983 requiring statutory authorization for any substantial expansion in the number or role of U.S.
Armed Forces in Lebanon. It also included Section 4(b) that stated:
Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, or suspend any of the standards and
procedures prescribed by the War Powers Resolution of 1983.35
President Reagan reported on the Lebanon situation for the third time on August 30, 1983, still
not citing Section 4(a)(1), after fighting broke out between various factions in Lebanon and two
Marines were killed.
The level of fighting heightened, and as the Marine casualties increased and the action enlarged,
there were more calls in Congress for invocation of the War Powers Resolution. Several Members
of Congress said the situation had changed since the President’s first report and introduced
legislation that took various approaches. Senator Charles Mathias introduced S.J.Res. 159 stating
that the time limit specified in the War Powers Resolution had begun on August 31, 1983, and
authorizing the forces to remain in Lebanon for a period of 120 days after the expiration of the
60-day period. Representative Thomas Downey introduced H.J.Res. 348 directing the President
to report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Senator Robert Byrd introduced
S.J.Res. 163 finding that Section 4(a)(1) of the war powers resolution applied to the present
circumstances in Lebanon. The House Appropriations Committee approved an amendment to the
continuing resolution for FY1984 (H.J.Res. 367), sponsored by Representative Clarence Long,
providing that after 60 days, funds could not be “obligated or expended for peacekeeping
activities in Lebanon by United States Armed Forces,” unless the President had submitted a report
under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. A similar amendment was later rejected by
the full body, but it reminded the Administration of possible congressional actions.
On September 20, congressional leaders and President Reagan agreed on a compromise
resolution invoking Section 4(a)(1) and authorizing the Marines to remain for 18 months. The
resolution became the first legislation to be handled under the expedited procedures of the War
Powers Resolution. On September 28, the House passed H.J.Res. 364 by a vote of 270 to 161.
35
P.L. 98-43, approved June 27, 1983.
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After 3 days of debate, on September 29, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 159 by a vote of 54 to 46.
The House accepted the Senate bill by a vote of 253 to 156. As passed, the resolution contained
four occurrences that would terminate the authorization before 18 months: (1) the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President certified continued U.S. participation was
required to accomplish specified purposes; (2) the assumption by the United Nations or the
Government of Lebanon of the responsibilities of the Multinational Force; (3) the implementation
of other effective security arrangements; or (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from
participation in the Multinational Force.36
Shortly afterward, on October 23, 1983, 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon were killed by a suicide
truck bombing, bringing new questions in Congress and U.S. public opinion about U.S.
participation. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan announced the Marines would be
redeployed and on March 30, 1984, reported to Congress that U.S. participation in the
Multinational Force in Lebanon had ended.
Grenada: Do the Expedited Procedures Work?
On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported to Congress “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution that he had ordered a landing of approximately 1,900 U.S. Army and Marine Corps
personnel in Grenada. He said that the action was in response to a request from the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States which had formed a collective security force to restore order in
Grenada, where anarchic conditions had developed, and to protect the lives of U.S. citizens.
Many Members of Congress contended that the President should have cited Section 4(a)(1) of the
War Powers Resolution, which would have triggered the 60-90 day time limitation. On November
1, 1983, the House supported this interpretation when it adopted, by a vote of 403-23, H.J.Res.
402 declaring that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) had become operative on October 25. The
Senate did not act on this measure and a conference was not held. The Senate had adopted a
similar measure on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20, but on November 17 the provision was
deleted in the conference report on the debt limit bill to which it was attached.37
Thus both
Houses had voted to invoke Section 4(a)(1), but the legislation was not completed.
On November 17, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the Administration had indicated
that there was no need for action as the combat troops would be out within the 60-90 day time
period. Speaker Thomas O’Neill took the position that, whether or not Congress passed specific
legislation, the War Powers Resolution had become operative on October 25. By December 15,
1983, all U.S. combat troops had been removed from Grenada.
Eleven Members of Congress filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of President Reagan’s
invasion of Grenada. A district judge held that courts should not decide such cases unless the
entire Congress used the institutional remedies available to it.38
An appellate court subsequently
held that the issue was moot because the invasion had been ended.39
36
P.L. 98-119, signed October 12, 1983.
37
U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 98-566 on H.J.Res. 308; Senate amendment numbered 3. Congressional Record November
17, 1983, p. H10189.
38
Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1984).
39
Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake in
Response to International Terrorism?
The use of U.S. forces against Libya in 1986 focused attention on the application of the War
Powers Resolution to use of military force against international terrorism.
Tensions between the United States and Libya under the leadership of Col. Muammar Qadhafi
had been mounting for several years, particularly after terrorist incidents at the Rome and Vienna
airports on December 27, 1985. On January 7, 1986, President Reagan said that the Rome and
Vienna incidents were the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi’s
backing that constituted armed aggression against the United States.
The War Powers issue was first raised on March 24, 1986, when Libyan forces fired missiles at
U.S. aircraft operating in the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the United States fired missiles at Libyan
vessels and at Sirte, the Libyan missile site involved. The U.S. presence in the Gulf of Sidra, an
area claimed by Libya, was justified as an exercise to maintain freedom of the seas, but it was
widely considered a response to terrorist activities.
Subsequently, on April 5, 1986, a terrorist bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin occurred and
an American soldier was killed. On April 14 President Reagan announced there was irrefutable
evidence that Libya had been responsible, and U.S. Air Force planes had conducted bombing
strikes on headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military installations in Libya in response.
The President reported both cases to Congress although the report on the bombing did not cite
Section 4(a)(1) and the Gulf of Sidra report did not mention the War Powers Resolution at all.
Since the actions were short lived, there was no issue of force withdrawal, but several Members
introduced bills to amend the War Powers Resolution. One bill called for improving consultation
by establishing a special consultative group in Congress.40
Others called for strengthening the
President’s hand in combating terrorism by authorizing the President, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, to use all measures he deems necessary to protect U.S. persons against terrorist
threats.41
Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent?
The War Powers Resolution became an issue in activities in the Persian Gulf after an Iraqi aircraft
fired a missile on the USS Stark on May 17, 1987, killing 37 U.S. sailors. The attack broached the
question of whether the Iran-Iraq war had made the Persian Gulf an area of hostilities or
imminent hostilities for U.S. forces. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. adoption of a policy of
reflagging and providing a naval escort of Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf raised full
force the question of whether U.S. policy was risking involvement in war without congressional
authorization. During 1987 U.S. Naval forces operating in the Gulf increased to 11 major
warships, 6 minesweepers, and over a dozen small patrol boats, and a battleship-led formation
was sent to the Northern Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean to augment an aircraft carrier battle group
already there.
40
S.J.Res. 340, introduced May 8, 1986. The bill was not acted upon, but the proposal was later incorporated in other
proposed amendments. See below, section on amendments.
41
S. 2335 and H.R. 4611, Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, introduced April 17, 1986. Not acted upon.
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For several months the President did not report any of the deployments or military incidents
under the War Powers Resolution, although on May 20, 1987, after the Stark incident, Secretary
of State Shultz submitted a report similar to previous ones consistent with War Powers provisions,
but not mentioning the Resolution. No reports were submitted after the USS Bridgeton struck a
mine on July 24, 1987, or the U.S.-chartered Texaco-Caribbean struck a mine on August 10 and a
U.S. F-14 fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian aircraft perceived as threatening.
Later, however, after various military incidents on September 23, 1987, and growing
congressional concern, the President began submitting reports “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution and on July 13, 1988, submitted the sixth report relating to the Persian Gulf.42
None of
the reports were submitted under Section 4(a)(1) or acknowledged that U.S. forces had been
introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The Reagan administration contended that the
military incidents in the Persian Gulf, or isolated incidents involving defensive reactions, did not
add up to hostilities or imminent hostilities as envisaged in the War Powers Resolution. It held
that “imminent danger” pay which was announced for military personnel in the Persian Gulf on
August 27, 1987, did not trigger Section 4(a)(1). Standards for danger pay, namely, “subject to the
threat of physical harm or danger on the basis of civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or
wartime conditions,” were broader than for hostilities of the War Powers Resolution, and had
been drafted to be available in situations to which the War Powers Resolution did not apply.43
Some Members of Congress contended that if the President did not report under Section 4(a)(1),
Congress itself should declare such a report should have been submitted, as it had in the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution. Several resolutions to this effect were introduced,
some authorizing the forces to remain, but none were passed.44
The decisive votes on the subject
took place in the Senate. On September 18, 1987, the Senate voted 50-41 to table an amendment
to the Defense authorization bill (S. 1174) to apply the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
The Senate also sustained points of order against consideration of S.J.Res. 217, which would have
invoked the War Powers Resolution, on December 4, 1987, and a similar bill the following year,
S.J.Res. 305, on June 6, 1988.
The Senate approach was to use legislation to assure a congressional role in the Persian Gulf
policy without invoking the War Powers Resolution. Early in the situation, both Chambers passed
measures requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress prior to the
implementation of any agreement between the United States and Kuwait for U.S. military
protection of Kuwaiti shipping, and such a report was submitted June 15, 1987. Later, the Senate
passed a measure that called for a comprehensive report by the President within 30 days and
provided expedited procedures for a joint resolution on the subject after an additional 30 days.45
The House did not take action on the bill.
As in the case of El Salvador, some Members took the War Powers issue to court. On August 7,
1987, Representative Lowry and 110 other Members of Congress filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, asking the court to declare that a report was required under
42
For the reports, see list above under section on “Reporting Requirements.”
43
Questions submitted to Department of State and responses thereto, March 30, 1988, in War Powers Resolution,
Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, p. 97-99.
44
Bills to this effect in the House included H.J.Res. 387, introduced October 22, 1987, which also authorized the
continued presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf.
45
Byrd-Warner amendment to S.J.Res. 194, adopted by Senate October 21, 1987.
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Section 4(a)(1). On December 18, 1987, the court dismissed the suit, holding it was a
nonjusticiable political question, and that the plaintiffs’ dispute was “primarily with fellow
legislators.”46
Compliance with the consultation requirement was also an issue. The Administration developed
its plan for reflagging and offered it to Kuwait on March 7, 1987, prior to discussing the plan with
Members of Congress. A June 15, 1987, report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated on
the reflagging policy, “As soon as Kuwait indicated its acceptance of our offer, we began
consultations with Congress which are still ongoing.”47
This was too late for congressional views
to be weighed in on the initial decision, after which it became more difficult to alter the policy.
Subsequently, however, considerable consultation developed and the President met with various
congressional leaders prior to some actions such as the retaliatory actions in April 1988 against an
Iranian oil platform involved in mine-laying.
With recurring military incidents, some Members of Congress took the position that the War
Powers Resolution was not being complied with, unless the President reported under Section
4(a)(1) or Congress itself voted to invoke the Resolution. Other Members contended the
Resolution was working by serving as a restraint on the President, who was now submitting
reports and consulting with Congress.48
Still other Members suggested the Persian Gulf situation
was demonstrating the need to amend the War Powers Resolution.
As a result of the Persian Gulf situation, in the summer of 1988 both the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which established a Special
Subcommittee on War Powers, undertook extensive assessments of the War Powers Resolution.
Interest in the issue waned after a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq began on August 20, 1988, and
the United States reduced its forces in the Persian Gulf area.
Invasion of Panama: Why Was the War Powers Issue Not Raised?
On December 20, 1989, President George H.W. Bush ordered 14,000 U.S. military forces to
Panama for combat, in addition to 13,000 already present. On December 21, he reported to
Congress under the War Powers Resolution but without citing Section 4(a)(1). His stated
objectives were to protect the 35,000 American citizens in Panama, restore the democratic
process, preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, and apprehend General Manuel
Noriega, who had been accused of massive electoral fraud in the Panamanian elections and
indicted on drug trafficking charges by two U.S. federal courts. The operation proceeded swiftly
and General Noriega surrendered to U.S. military authorities on January 3. President Bush said
the objectives had been met, and U.S. forces were gradually withdrawn. By February 13, all
combat forces deployed for the invasion had been withdrawn, leaving the strength just under the
13,597 forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion.
46
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). See also CRS Report RL30352, War Powers Litigation Initiated
by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution, by Michael John Garcia.
47
Weinberger, Caspar W., Secretary of Defense, A Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian
Gulf, June 15, 1987, p. 14.
48
When asked about abiding by the War Powers Resolution, President Reagan said “we are complying with a part of
that act, although we do not call it that. But we have been consulting the Congress, reporting to them and telling them
what we’re doing, and in advance ... ” Press conference of October 22, 1987. The New York Times, October 23, 1987,
p. A8.
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The President did not consult with congressional leaders before his decision, although he did
notify them a few hours in advance of the invasion. Some Members of Congress had been
discussing the problem of General Noriega for some time. Before Congress adjourned, it had
called for the President to intensify unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures and consult
with other nations on ways to coordinate efforts to remove General Noriega from power.49
The
Senate had adopted an amendment supporting the President’s use of appropriate diplomatic,
economic, and military options “to restore constitutional government to Panama and to remove
General Noriega from his illegal control of the Republic of Panama,” but had defeated an
amendment authorizing the President to use U.S. military force to secure the removal of General
Noriega “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”50
The Panama action did not raise much discussion in Congress about the War Powers Resolution.
This was in part because Congress was out of session. The first session of the 101st
Congress had
ended on November 22, 1989, and the second session did not begin until January 23, 1990, when
the operation was essentially over and it appeared likely the additional combat forces would be
out of Panama within 60 days of their deployment. The President’s action in Panama was popular
in American public opinion and supported by most Members of Congress because of the actions
of General Noriega. After it was over, on February 7, 1990, the House Passed H.Con.Res. 262
which stated that the President had acted “decisively and appropriately in ordering United States
forces to intervene in Panama.”
Major Cases and Issues in the Post-Cold War World
After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the United States began to move away from unilateral
military actions toward actions authorized or supported by the United Nations. Under the auspices
of U.N. Security Council resolutions, U.S. forces were deployed in Kuwait and Iraq, Somalia,
former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, and Haiti. This raised the new issue of whether the War
Powers Resolution applied to U.S. participation in U.N. military actions. It was not a problem
during the Cold War because the agreement among the five permanent members required for
Security Council actions seldom existed. An exception, the Korean War, occurred before the War
Powers Resolution was enacted.51
The more basic issue—under what circumstances congressional authorization is required for U.S.
participation in U.N. military operations—is an unfinished debate remaining from 1945. Whether
congressional authorization is required depends on the types of U.N. action and is governed by
the U.N. Participation Act (P.L. 79-264, as amended), as well as by the War Powers Resolution
and war powers under the Constitution. Appropriations action by Congress also may be
determinative as a practical matter.
49
P.L. 101-162, signed November 21, 1989.
50
Amendments to National Drug Control Strategy bill, S. 1711, October 5, 1989.
51
In that case, the Soviet Union had absented itself from the Council temporarily, and the Security Council requested
members to supply the Republic of Korea with sufficient military assistance to repel the invasion of North Korea.
President Truman ordered U.S. air, naval, and ground forces to Korea to repel the attack without authorization from
Congress. Senator Robert Taft complained on January 5, 1951, “The President simply usurped authority in violation of
the laws and the Constitution, when he sent troops to Korea to carry out the resolution of the United Nations in an
undeclared war.”
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For armed actions under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter, Section 6 of the U.N.
Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate special agreements with the Security
Council “which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint
resolution,” providing for the numbers and types of armed forces and facilities to be made
available to the Security Council. Once the agreements have been concluded, further
congressional authorization is not necessary, but no such agreements have been concluded.
Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act, added in 1949 by P.L. 81-341, authorizes the
detail of up to 1,000 personnel to serve in any noncombatant capacity for certain U.N. peaceful
settlement activities. The United States has provided personnel to several U.N. peacekeeping
missions, such as observers to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine since 1948,
that appear to fall within the authorization in Section 7 of the Participation Act. Controversy has
arisen when larger numbers of forces have been deployed or when it appears the forces might be
serving as combatants.
The War Powers Resolution neither excludes United Nations actions from its provisions nor
makes any special procedures for them. Section 8(a)(2) states that authority to introduce U. S.
Armed Forces into hostilities shall not be inferred from any treaty unless it is implemented by
legislation specifically authorizing the introduction and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers resolution.52
One purpose
of this provision was to ensure that both Houses of Congress be affirmatively involved in any
U.S. decision to engage in hostilities pursuant to a treaty, since only the Senate approved a
treaty.53
From 1990 through 1999, Congress primarily dealt with the issue on a case-by-case basis, but
Members also enacted some measures seeking more control over U.S. participation in future
peacekeeping actions wherever they might occur. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY1994
stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be expended for U.S. Armed Forces serving
under U.N. Security Council actions unless the President consults with Congress at least 15 days
prior to deployment and not later than 48 hours after such deployment, except for humanitarian
operations.54
The Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 required a report to Congress by April 1,
1994, including discussion of the requirement of congressional approval for participation of U.S.
Armed Forces in multinational peacekeeping missions, proposals to conclude military agreements
with the U.N. Security Council under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, and the applicability of the
War Powers Resolution and the U.N. Participation Act.55
In 1994 and 1995, Congress attempted
to gain a greater role in U.N. and other peacekeeping operations through authorization and
appropriation legislation. A major element of the House Republicans’ Contract with America,
H.R. 7, would have placed notable constraints on presidential authority to commit U.S. forces to
international peacekeeping operations. Senator Dole’s S. 5, The Peace Powers Act, introduced in
January 1995, would have also placed greater legislative controls on such operations. General and
specific funding restrictions and presidential reporting requirements were passed for
52
Such a statement was made in the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, P.L. 102-1, signed
January 14, 1991, and in S.J.Res. 45, authorizing the use of force in Somalia for one year, as passed by the Senate on
February 4, 1993, and amended by the House on May 25, 1993; a conference was not held.
53
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. War Powers; report to accompany S. 440. June 14, 1973.
S.Rept. 93-220.
54
Section 8153, Department of Defense Appropriation Act for FY1994, H.R. 3116, P.L. 103-139, signed November
11, 1993.
55
Section 1502 (11), Defense Authorization Act for FY1994, P.L. 103-160, signed November 30, 1993.
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peacekeeping operations underway or in prospect. Some of these legislative enactments led to
presidential vetoes. These representative legislative actions are reviewed below as they apply to
given cases.56
Persian Gulf War, 1991: How Does the War Powers Resolution
Relate to the United Nations and a Real War?
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops under the direction of President Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait, seized its oil fields, installed a new government in Kuwait City, and moved on toward the
border with Saudi Arabia. Action to repel the invasion led to the largest war in which the United
States had been involved since the passage of the War Powers Resolution. Throughout the effort
to repel the Iraqi invasion, President Bush worked in tandem with the United Nations, organizing
and obtaining international support and authorization for multilateral military action against Iraq.
A week after the invasion, on August 9, President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that he had deployed U.S. armed forces to the
region prepared to take action with others to deter Iraqi aggression. He did not cite Section
4(a)(1) and specifically stated, “I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent.”
The President did not consult with congressional leaders prior to the deployment, but both houses
of Congress had adopted legislation supporting efforts to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait,
particularly using economic sanctions and multilateral efforts. On August 2, shortly before its
recess, the Senate by a vote of 97-0 adopted S.Res. 318 urging the President “to act immediately,
using unilateral and multilateral measures, to seek the full and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory” and to work for collective international sanctions against Iraq
including, if economic sanctions prove inadequate, “additional multilateral actions, under Article
42 of the United Nations Charter, involving air, sea, and land forces as may be needed.... ” Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Pell stressed, however, that the measure did not authorize
unilateral U.S. military actions. Also on August 2, the House passed H.R. 5431 condemning the
Iraqi invasion and calling for an economic embargo against Iraq.
The United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq on August 7, and the United States
and United Kingdom organized an international naval interdiction effort.57
Later, on August 25,
the U.N. Security Council authorized “such measures as may be necessary” to halt shipping and
verify cargoes that might be going to Iraq.
Both Houses adopted measures supporting the deployment, but neither measure was enacted. On
October 1, 1990, the House passed H.J.Res. 658 supporting the action and citing the War Powers
Resolution without stating that Section 4(a)(1) had become operative. The resolution quoted the
President’s statement that involvement in hostilities was not imminent. Representative Fascell
stated that H.J.Res. 658 was not to be interpreted as a Gulf of Tonkin resolution that granted the
President open-ended authority, and that it made clear that “a congressional decision on the issue
56
For background see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military
Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.
57
On August 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt sent a formal letter to Congress (not mentioning
the War Powers Resolution) stating, “It is not our intention or expectation that the use of force will be required to carry
out these operations. However, if other means of enforcement fail, necessary and proportionate force will be employed
to deny passage to ships that are in violation of these sanctions.”
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of war or peace would have to be made through joint consultation.” The Senate did not act on
H.J.Res. 658.
On October 2, 1990, the Senate by a vote of 96-3 adopted S.Con.Res. 147, stating that “Congress
supports continued action by the President in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations
Security Council and in accordance with United States constitutional and statutory processes,
including the authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress, to deter Iraqi aggression
and to protect American lives and vital interest in the region.” As in the House, Senate leaders
emphasized that the resolution was not to be interpreted as an open-ended resolution similar to
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The resolution made no mention of the War Powers Resolution.
The House did not act on S.Con.Res. 147. Congress also supported the action by appropriating
funds for the preparatory operation, called Operation Desert Shield, and later for war activities
called Operation Desert Storm.
Some Members introduced legislation to establish a special consultation group, but the
Administration objected to a formally established group. On October 23, 1990, Senate Majority
Leader Mitchell announced that he and Speaker Foley had designated Members of the joint
bipartisan leadership and committees of jurisdiction to make themselves available as a group for
consultation on developments in the Persian Gulf. By this time U.S. land, naval, and air forces
numbering more than 200,000 had been deployed.
After the 101st
Congress had adjourned, President Bush on November 8, 1990, ordered an
estimated additional 150,000 troops to the Gulf. He incurred considerable criticism because he
had not informed the consultation group of the buildup although he had met with them on
October 30. On November 16, President Bush sent a second report to Congress describing the
continuing and increasing deployment of forces to the region. He stated that his opinion that
hostilities were not imminent had not changed. The President wrote, “The deployment will ensure
that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve
our common goals.” By the end of the year, approximately 350,000 U.S. forces had been
deployed to the area.
As the prospect of a war without congressional authorization increased, on November 20, 1990,
Representative Ron Dellums and 44 other Democratic Members of Congress sought a judicial
order enjoining the President from offensive military operations in connection with Operation
Desert Shield unless he consulted with and obtained an authorization from Congress. On
November 26, 11 prominent law professors filed a brief in favor of such a judicial action, arguing
that the Constitution clearly vested Congress with the authority to declare war and that federal
judges should not use the political questions doctrine to avoid ruling on the issue. The American
Civil Liberties Union also filed a memorandum in favor of the plaintiffs. On December 13, Judge
Harold Greene of the federal district court in Washington denied the injunction, holding that the
controversy was not ripe for judicial resolution because a majority of Congress had not sought
relief and the executive branch had not shown sufficient commitment to a definitive course of
action.58
However, throughout his opinion Judge Greene rejected the Administration’s arguments
for full presidential war powers.
On November 29, 1990, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized member states to use
“all necessary means” to implement the Council’s resolutions and restore peace and security in
58
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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the area, unless Iraq complied with the U.N. resolutions by January 15, 1991. As the deadline for
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait neared, President Bush indicated that if the Iraqi forces did not
withdraw from Kuwait, he was prepared to use force to implement the U.N. Security Council
resolutions. Administration officials contended that the President did not need any additional
congressional authorization for this purpose.59
After the 102nd
Congress convened, on January 4, 1991, House and Senate leaders announced
they would debate U.S. policy beginning January 10. A week before the January 15 deadline, on
January 8, 1991, President Bush, in a letter to the congressional leaders, requested a congressional
resolution supporting the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678. He stated that he was “determined to do whatever is necessary to protect
America’s security” and that he could “think of no better way than for Congress to express its
support for the President at this critical time.” It is noteworthy that the President’s request for a
resolution was a request for congressional “support” for his undertaking in the Persian Gulf, not
for “authority” to engage in the military operation. In a press conference on January 9, 1991,
President Bush reinforced this distinction in response to questions about the use of force
resolution being debated in Congress. He was asked whether he thought he needed the resolution,
and if he lost on it would he feel bound by that decision. President Bush in response stated: “I
don’t think I need it.... I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations
resolutions.” He added that he felt that he had “the constitutional authority—many attorneys
having so advised me.”60
On January 12, 1991, both houses passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution” (P.L. 102-1).61
Section 2(a) authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of the earlier
Security Council resolutions. Section 2(b) required that first the President would have to report
that the United States had used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain
compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolution and that those efforts had not been
successful. Section 2(c) stated that it was intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Section 3 required the
President to report every 60 days on efforts to obtain compliance of Iraq with the U.N. Security
Council resolution.
In his statement made after signing H.J.Res. 77 into law, President Bush said the following: “As I
made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not,
and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of
the executive branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to
defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.” He added that
59
Statement by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Crisis in
the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications. September 11-December 3, 1990, S.Hrg. 101-1071, pp.
701-2.
60
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. January 14, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp.17-18; pp. 24-25.
61
The House passed H.J.Res. 77 by a vote of 250 to 183. The Senate passed S.J.Res. 2 and then considered H.J.Res. 77
as passed. The Senate vote was 52 to 47. The bill became P.L. 102-1, signed January 14, 1991. On January 12, to
emphasize the congressional power to declare war, the House also adopted by a vote of 302 to 131 H.Con.Res. 32
expressing the sense that Congress must approve any offensive military actions against Iraq; the Senate did not act on
the measure.
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he was pleased that “differences on these issues between the President and many in the Congress
have not prevented us from uniting in a common objective.”62
On January 16, President Bush made the determination required by P.L. 102-1 that diplomatic
means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. On January 18, he reported
to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that he had directed U.S. forces to
commence combat operations on January 16.
After the beginning of the war many Members of Congress strongly supported the President as
Commander-in-Chief in his conduct of the war. On March 19, 1991, President Bush reported to
Congress that the military operations had been successful, Kuwait had been liberated, and combat
operations had been suspended on February 28, 1991.
Prior to passage of P.L. 102-1, some observers questioned the effectiveness of the War Powers
Resolution on grounds that the President had begun the action, deployed hundreds of thousands
of troops without consultation of Congress, and was moving the Nation increasingly close to war
without congressional authorization. After the passage of P.L. 102-1 and the war had begun,
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Fascell took the position that “the War
Powers Resolution is alive and well”; the President had submitted reports to Congress, and
Congress, in P.L. 102-1, had provided specific statutory authorization for the use of force. In his
view, the strength and wisdom of the War Powers Resolution was that it established a process by
which Congress could authorize the use of force in specific settings for limited purposes, short of
a total state of war.
The question is sometimes raised why Congress did not declare war against Iraq. Speaker Foley
told the National Press Club on February 7, 1991, that “The reason we did not declare a formal
war was not because there is any difference I think in the action that was taken and in a formal
declaration of war with respect to military operations, but because there is some question about
whether we wish to excite or enact some of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration of
war—seizure of property, censorship, and so forth, which the President neither sought nor
desired.”
Iraq-Post Gulf War: How Long Does an Authorization Last?
After the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces were used to deal with three
continuing situations in Iraq. These activities raised the issue of how long a congressional
authorization for the use of force lasts.
The first situation resulted from the Iraqi government’s repression of Kurdish and Shi’ite groups.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, condemned the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population and appealed for contributions to humanitarian relief efforts. On May 17,
1991, President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress that the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish
62
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. January 21, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.48-49. Subsequently, on June
20, 1992, during remarks to the Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas, President Bush said: “Some
people say, why can’t you bring the same kind of purpose and success to the domestic scene as you did in Desert Shield
and Desert Storm? And the answer is: I didn’t have to get permission from some old goat in the United States Congress
to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. That’s the reason.” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. June 29,
1992. Vol. 28, No. 26, pp.1120-1121.
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people had necessitated a limited introduction of U.S. forces into northern Iraq for emergency
relief purposes. On July 16, 1991, he reported that U.S. forces had withdrawn from northern Iraq
but that the U.S. remained prepared to take appropriate steps as the situation required and that, to
this end, an appropriate level of forces would be maintained in the region for “as long as
required.”
A second situation stemmed from the cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687 of
April 3, 1991, which called for Iraq to accept the destruction or removal of chemical and
biological weapons and international control of its nuclear materials. On September 16, 1991,
President Bush reported to Congress that Iraq continued to deny inspection teams access to
weapons facilities and that this violated the requirements of Resolution 687, and the United States
if necessary would take action to ensure Iraqi compliance with the Council’s decisions. He
reported similar non-cooperation on January 14, 1992, and May 15, 1992.
On July 16, 1992, President Bush reported particular concern about the refusal of Iraqi authorities
to grant U.N. inspectors access to the Agricultural Ministry. The President consulted
congressional leaders on July 27, and in early August the United States began a series of military
exercises to take 5,000 U.S. troops to Kuwait. On September 16, 1992, the President reported,
“We will remain prepared to use all necessary means, in accordance with U.N. Security Council
resolutions, to assist the United Nations in removing the threat posed by Iraq’s chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons capability.”
The third situation was related to both of the earlier ones. On August 26, 1992, the United States,
Britain, and France began a “no-fly” zone, banning Iraqi fixed wing and helicopter flights south
of the 32nd
parallel and creating a limited security zone in the south, where Shi’ite groups were
concentrated. After violations of the no-fly zones and various other actions by Iraq, on January
13, 1993, the Bush Administration announced that aircraft from the United States and coalition
partners had attacked missile bases in southern Iraq and that the United States was deploying a
battalion task force to Kuwait to underline the U.S. continuing commitment to Kuwait’s
independence. On January 19, 1993, President Bush reported to Congress that U.S. aircraft had
shot down an Iraqi aircraft on December 27, 1992, and had undertaken further military actions on
January 13, 17, and 18.
President Clinton said on January 21, 1993, that the United States would adhere to the policy
toward Iraq set by the Bush Administration. On January 22 and 23, April 9 and 18, June 19, and
August 19, 1993, U.S. aircraft fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft
fire directed at them. On September 23, 1993, President Clinton reported that since the August 19
action, the Iraqi installation fired upon had not displayed hostile intentions.
In a separate incident, on June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that on June 26 U.S. naval forces at his direction had launched a
Tomahawk cruise missile strike on the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s main command and control
complex in Baghdad and that the military action was completed upon the impact of the missiles.
He said the Iraqi Intelligence Service had planned the failed attempt to assassinate former
President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993.
The question was raised as to whether the Authorization for the Use of Force in Iraq (P.L. 102-1)
authorized military actions after the conclusion of the war. P.L. 102-1 authorized the President to
use U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve
implementation of previous Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
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The cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687, was adopted afterwards and therefore
not included in Resolution 678.
Congress endorsed the view that further specific authorization was not required for U.S. military
action to maintain the cease-fire agreement. Specifically, Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190 stated the
sense of Congress that it supported the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security
Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution. Section 1096 supported the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq’s
Kurdish minority, consistent with relevant U.N. resolutions and authorities contained in P.L. 102-
1. The issue of congressional authorization was debated again in 1998. On March 31, 1998, the
House passed a Supplemental Appropriations bill (H.R. 3579) that would have banned the use of
funds appropriated in it for the conduct of offensive operations against Iraq, unless such
operations were specifically authorized by law. This provision was dropped in the conference
with the Senate.
A more broad-gauged approach to the issue of congressional authorization of military force was
attempted in mid-1998. On June 24, 1998, the House passed H.R. 4103, the Defense Department
Appropriations bill for FY1999, with a provision by Representative David Skaggs that banned the
use of funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this act “to initiate or conduct offensive
military operations by United States Armed Forces except in accordance with the war powers
clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8), which vests in Congress the power to declare and
authorize war and to take certain specified, related actions.” The Skaggs provision was stricken
by the House-Senate conference committee on H.R. 4103.
As events developed, beginning in late 1998, and continuing into the period prior to the U.S.
military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States conducted a large number of ad-hoc air
attacks against Iraqi ground installations and military targets in response to violations of the
Northern and Southern “no-fly zones” by the Iraqi, and threatening actions taken against U.S. and
coalition aircraft enforcing these “no-fly” sectors. Congressional authorization to continue these
activities was not sought by the President, nor were these many incidents reported under the War
Powers Resolution. The “no-fly zones” activities were terminated following the 2003 War with
Iraq.
Somalia: When Does Humanitarian Assistance Require
Congressional Authorization?
In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N. operation to protect humanitarian
assistance became increasingly controversial as fighting and casualties increased and the
objectives of the operation appeared to be expanding.
On December 4, 1992, President George H.W. Bush ordered thousands of U.S. military forces to
Somalia to protect humanitarian relief from armed gangs. Earlier, on November 25, the President
had offered U.S. forces, and on December 3, the United Nations Security Council had adopted
Resolution 794 welcoming the U.S. offer and authorizing the Secretary-General and members
cooperating in the U.S. offer “to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” The resolution also called on
member states to provide military forces and authorized the Secretary-General and the states
concerned to arrange for unified command and control.
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On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that on December 8, U.S. armed forces entered Somalia to secure the air field and
port facility of Mogadishu and that other elements of the U.S. armed forces were being
introduced into Somalia to achieve the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. He
said the forces would remain only as long as necessary to establish a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations and would then turn over responsibility for maintaining this
environment to a U.N. peacekeeping force. The President said that it was not intended that the
U.S. armed forces become involved in hostilities, but that the forces were equipped and ready to
take such measures as might be needed to accomplish their humanitarian mission and defend
themselves. They would also have the support of any additional U.S. forces necessary. By midJanuary,
U.S. forces in Somalia numbered 25,000.
Since the President did not cite Section 4(a)(1), the 60-day time limit was not necessarily
triggered. By February, however, the U.S. force strength was being reduced, and it was
announced the United States expected to turn over responsibility for protecting humanitarian
relief shipments in Somalia to a U.N. force that would include U.S. troops. On March 26, 1993,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 814 expanding the mandate of the U.N. force and
bringing about a transition from a U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led force (UNOSOM II). By the
middle of May, when the change to U.N. control took place, the U.S. forces were down to
approximately 4,000 troops, primarily logistics and communications support teams, but also a
rapid deployment force of U.S. Marines stationed on Navy ships.
Violence within Somalia began to increase again. On June 5, 1993, attacks killed 23 Pakistani
peacekeepers, and a Somali regional leader, General Aidid, was believed responsible. The next
day the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 837 reaffirming the authority of UNOSOM II
to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks. On June 10, 1993,
President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that the U.S. Quick
Reaction Force had executed military strikes to assist UNOSOM II in quelling violence against it.
On July 1, President Clinton submitted another report, not mentioning the War Powers
Resolution, describing further air and ground military operations aimed at securing General
Aidid’s compound and neutralizing military capabilities that had been an obstacle to U.N. efforts
to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction.
From the beginning, a major issue for Congress was whether to authorize U.S. action in Somalia.
On February 4, 1993, the Senate had passed S.J.Res. 45 that would authorize the President to use
U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. S.J.Res. 45 stated it was
intended to constitute the specific statutory authorization under Section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution. On May 25, 1993, the House amended S.J.Res. 45 to authorize U.S. forces to remain
for one year. S.J.Res. 45 was then sent to the Senate for its concurrence, but the Senate did not
act on the measure.
As sporadic fighting resulted in the deaths of Somali and U.N. forces, including Americans,
controversy over the operation intensified, and Congress took action through other legislative
channels. In September 1993 the House and Senate adopted amendments to the Defense
Authorization Act for FY1994 asking that the President consult with Congress on policy toward
Somalia, and report the goals, objectives, and anticipated jurisdiction of the U.S. mission in
Somalia by October 15, 1993; the amendments expressed the sense that the President by
November 15, 1993, should seek and receive congressional authorization for the continued
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia.63
On October 7, the President consulted with congressional
leaders from both parties for over two hours on Somalia policy. On October 13, President Clinton
sent a 33-page report to Congress on his Somalia policy and its objectives.
Meanwhile, on October 7 President Clinton said that most U.S. forces would be withdrawn from
Somalia by March 31, 1994. To ensure this, the Defense Department Appropriations Act for
FY1994, cut off funds for U.S. military operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the
President obtained further spending authority from Congress.64
Congress approved the use of U.S.
military forces in Somalia only for the protection of American military personnel and bases and
for helping maintain the flow of relief aid by giving the U.N. forces security and logistical
support; it required that U.S. combat forces in Somalia remain under the command and control of
U.S. commanders under the ultimate direction of the President.
Earlier, some Members suggested that the U.S. forces in Somalia were clearly in a situation of
hostilities or imminent hostilities, and that if Congress did not authorize the troops to remain, the
forces should be withdrawn within 60 to 90 days. After a letter from House Foreign Affairs
Committee Ranking Minority Member Benjamin Gilman and Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Ranking Minority Member Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman replied
on July 21, 1993, that no previous Administrations had considered that intermittent military
engagements, whether constituting hostilities, would necessitate the withdrawal of forces
pursuant to Section 5(b); and the War Powers Resolution, in their view, was intended to apply to
sustained hostilities. The State Department did not believe congressional authorization was
necessary, although congressional support would be welcome. On August 4, 1993, Representative
Gilman asserted that August 4 might be remembered as the day the War Powers Resolution died
because combat broke out in Somalia on June 5 and the President had not withdrawn U.S. forces
and Congress had “decided to look the other way.” On October 22, 1993, Representative Gilman
introduced H.Con.Res. 170 directing the President pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers
Resolution to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994. The House adopted an
amended version calling for withdrawal by March 31, 1994.65
The Senate did not act on this nonbinding
measure.
However, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30,
1994) prohibited the use of funds for the continuous presence of U.S. forces in Somalia, except
for the protection of U.S. personnel, after September 30, 1994. Subsequently, on November 4,
1994, the U.N. Security Council decided to end the U.N. mission in Somalia by March 31, 1995.
On March 3, 1995, U.S. forces completed their assistance to United Nations forces evacuating
Somalia.
Another war powers issue was the adequacy of consultation before the dispatch of forces. On
December 4, 1992, President Bush had met with a number of congressional leaders to brief them
on the troop deployment. In his December 10 report, President Bush stressed that he had taken
into account the views expressed in H.Con.Res. 370, S.Con.Res. 132, and P.L. 102-274 on the
urgent need for action in Somalia. However, none of these resolutions explicitly authorized U.S.
military action.
63
Section 1512, P.L. 103-160, signed November 30, 1993.
64
Section 8151 of P.L. 103-139, signed November 11, 1993.
65
For additional discussion of H.Con.Res. 170, see section on “Legislative Veto,” above.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo: What If No Consensus Exists?
Bosnia
The issue of war powers and U.S. participation in United Nations actions was also raised by
efforts to halt fighting in the territory of former Yugoslavia, initially in Bosnia. Because some of
the U.S. action has been taken within a NATO framework, action in Bosnia has also raised the
issue of whether action under NATO is exempt from the requirements of the War Powers
Resolution or its standard for the exercise of war powers under the Constitution. Article 11 of the
North Atlantic Treaty states that its provisions are to be carried out by the parties “in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes,” inferring some role for Congress in the event of
war. Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that authority to introduce U.S. forces into
hostilities is not to be inferred from any treaty, ratified before or after 1973, unless implementing
legislation specifically authorizes such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an
authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(b) states that nothing
in the War Powers Resolution should be construed to require further authorization for U.S.
participation in the headquarters operations of military commands established before 1973, such
as NATO headquarters operations.
On August 13, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 770 calling on nations to take
“all measures necessary” to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. Many in
Congress had been advocating more assistance to the victims of the conflict. On August 11, 1992,
the Senate had passed S.Res. 330 urging the President to work for a U.N. Security Council
resolution such as was adopted, but saying that no U.S. military personnel should be introduced
into hostilities without clearly defined objectives. On the same day, the House passed H.Res. 554
urging the Security Council to authorize measures, including the use of force, to ensure
humanitarian relief.
During 1993 the United States participated in airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions,
and aerial enforcement of a “no-fly zone.” On February 10, 1993, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher announced that under President Clinton, the United States would try to convince the
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats to pursue a diplomatic solution and that if an agreement was reached,
U.S. forces, including ground forces, would help enforce the peace. On February 28, 1993, the
United States began an airdrop of relief supplies aimed at civilian populations, mainly Muslims,
surrounded by fighting in Bosnia.
On March 31, 1993, the U.N. Security Council authorized member states to take all necessary
measures to enforce the ban on military flights over Bosnia, the “no-fly zone.” NATO planes,
including U.S. planes, began patrolling over Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 12, 1993, to
enforce the Security Council ban, and the next day, President Clinton reported the U.S.
participation “consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.”
Conflict continued, but the situation was complicated and opinion in Congress and among U.N.
and NATO members was divided. President Clinton consulted with about two dozen
congressional leaders on potential further action on April 27 and received a wide range of views.
On May 2, the Administration began consultation with allies to build support for additional
military action to enforce a cease-fire and Bosnian Serb compliance with a peace agreement, but a
consensus on action was not reached.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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On June 10, 1993, Secretary of State Christopher announced the United States would send 300
U.S. troops to join 700 Scandinavians in the U.N. peacekeeping force in Macedonia.66
The
mission was established under U.N. Security Council Resolution 795 (1992), which sought to
prevent the war in Bosnia from spilling over to neighboring countries. President Clinton reported
this action “consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution” on July 9, 1993. He
identified U.S. troops as part of a peacekeeping force, and directed in accordance with Section 7
of the U.N. Participation Act.
Planning for U.N. and NATO action to implement a prospective peace agreement included the
possibility that the United States might supply 25,000 out of 50,000 NATO forces to enforce U.N.
decisions. This possibility brought proposals to require congressional approval before the
dispatch of further forces to Bosnia. On September 23, 1993, Senate Minority Leader Robert
Dole said he intended to offer an amendment stating that no additional U.S. forces should be
introduced into former Yugoslavia without advance approval from Congress. Assistant Secretary
of State Stephen Oxman said on October 5 that the Clinton Administration would consult with
Congress and not commit American troops to the implementation operation for a peace agreement
without congressional support, and that the Administration would act consistent with the War
Powers Resolution. Congress sought to assure this in Section 8146 of P.L. 103-139, the Defense
Appropriations Act for FY1994, stating the sense of Congress that funds should not be available
for U.S. forces to participate in new missions or operations to implement the peace settlement in
Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress. This provision was sponsored by the Senate by
leaders Mitchell and Dole.
At the NATO summit conference in Brussels on January 11, 1994, leaders, including President
Clinton, repeated an August threat to undertake air strikes on Serb positions to save Sarajevo and
to consider other steps to end the conflict in Bosnia. On February 17, 1994, President Clinton
reported “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution that the United States had expanded its
participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former
Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were available for participation in the authorized NATO
missions. On March 1, 1994, he reported that on the previous day U.S. planes patrolling the “nofly
zone” under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb
planes. On April 12, 1994, the President reported that on April 10 and 11, following shelling of
Gorazde, one of the “safe areas,” and a decision by U.N. and NATO leaders, U.S. planes bombed
Bosnian Serbian nationalist positions around Gorazde. On August 22, 1994, President Clinton
similarly reported that on August 5, U.S. planes under NATO had strafed a Bosnian Serb gun
position in an exclusion zone. On September 22, 1994, two British and one U.S. aircraft bombed
a Serbian tank in retaliation for Serb attacks on U.N. peacekeepers near Sarajevo; and on
November 21 more than 30 planes from the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands
bombed the runway of a Serb airfield in Croatia.
As the conflict in Bosnia continued, leaders in Congress called for greater congressional
involvement in decisions. Senator Dole introduced S. 2042, calling for the United States to end
unilaterally its arms embargo, conducted in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution,
against Bosnia and Herzegovina. On May 10, 1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
introduced an amendment to authorize and approve the President’s decision to carry out NATO
66
The name of this area is in dispute. The provisional name, which is used for its designation as a member of the
United Nations, is “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” This report uses the term “Macedonia” without
prejudice.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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decisions to support and protect UNPROFOR forces around designated safe areas; to use
airpower in the Sarajevo region; and to authorize air strikes against Serb weapons around certain
safe areas if these areas were attacked. The Mitchell amendment favored lifting the arms embargo
but not unilaterally; it also stated no U.S. ground combat troops should be deployed in Bosnia
unless previously authorized by Congress. The Senate adopted both the Dole proposal, as an
amendment, and the Mitchell amendment on May 12, 1994, by votes of 50-49. The less stringent
Mitchell amendment passed on a straight party line vote. Yet thirteen Democrats voted for the
Dole amendment, indicating a sentiment in both parties to assist the Bosnians in defending
themselves. The Senate then adopted S. 2042 as amended. The House did not act on the measure.
The Defense Authorization Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-337, signed October 5, 1994) provided, in
Section 1404, the sense of the Congress that if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Contact
Group proposal by October 15, 1994, the President should introduce a U.N. Security Council
resolution to end the arms embargo by December 1, 1994; if the Security Council had not acted
by November 15, 1994, no funds could be used to enforce the embargo other than those required
of all U.N. members under Security Council Resolution 713. That sequence of events occurred
and the United States stopped enforcing the embargo. In addition, Section 8100 of the Defense
Appropriations Act, FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), stated the sense of the
Congress that funds made available by this law should not be available for the purposes of
deploying U.S. armed forces to participate in implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia
unless previously authorized by Congress.
On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that
U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft continued to contribute to NATO’s
enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he noted, are
also available for close air support of U.N. forces in Croatia. Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers were still
deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). U.S. forces continue to support U.N. refugee and embargo
operations in this region.
On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,”
that “U.S. combat and support aircraft” had been used beginning on August 29, 1995, in a series
of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were
threatening the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde.” He noted that during
the first day of operations, “some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets in the vicinity of
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Mostar.”
On September 7, 1995 the House passed an amendment to the FY1996 Department of Defense
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2126), offered by Representative Mark Neumann that prohibited the
obligation or expenditure of funds provided by the bill for any operations beyond those already
undertaken. However, in conference the provision was softened to a sense-of-the-Congress
provision that said that President must consult with Congress before deploying U.S. forces to
Bosnia. The conference report was rejected by the House over issues unrelated to Bosnia on
September 29, 1995 by a vote of 151-267. The substitute conference report on H.R. 2126, which
was subsequently passed and signed into law, did not include language on Bosnia, in part due to
the President’s earlier objections to any provision in the bill that might impinge on his powers as
Commander-in-Chief. On September 29, the Senate passed by a vote of 94-2 a sense-of-theSenate
amendment to H.R. 2076, the FY1996 State, Commerce, Justice Appropriations bill,
sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg that said no funds in the bill should be used for the deployment
of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina unless Congress approves the deployment in
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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advance or to evacuate endangered U.N. peacekeepers. The conference report on H.R. 2076,
agreed to by the House and the Senate, included the “sense of the Senate” language of the Gregg
amendment.
In response to mounting criticism of the Administration’s approach to Bosnian policy, on October
17-18, 1995, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Shalikashvili testified before House and Senate Committees on Bosnia policy and the
prospect of President Clinton deploying approximately 20,000 American ground forces as part of
a NATO peacekeeping operation. During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on October 17, Secretary Christopher stated that the President would not be bound by
a resolution of the Congress prohibiting sending of U.S. forces into Bosnia without the express
prior approval of Congress. Nevertheless, on October 19, 1995, President Clinton in a letter to
Senator Robert C. Byrd stated that “[w]hile maintaining the constitutional authorities of the
Presidency, I would welcome, encourage and, at the appropriate time, request an expression of
support by the Congress” for the commitment of U.S. troops to a NATO implementation force in
Bosnia, after a peace agreement is reached.
Subsequently, on October 30, 1995, the House, by a vote of 315-103, passed H.Res. 247,
expressing the sense of the House that “no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the
ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement
until the Congress has approved such a deployment.” On November 13, President Clinton’s 9page
letter to Speaker Gingrich stated he would send a request “for a congressional expression of
support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia ... before American
forces are deployed in Bosnia.” The President said there would be a “timely opportunity for
Congress to consider and act upon” his request for support. He added that despite his desire for
congressional support, he “must reserve” his “constitutional prerogatives in this area.” On
November 17, 1995, the House passed (243-171) H.R. 2606, which would “prohibit the use of
funds appropriated or otherwise available” to the Defense Department from “being used for the
deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
as part of any peacekeeping operation or as part of any implementation force, unless funds for
such deployment are specifically appropriated” by law.
On December 4, 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry announced the deployment of about 1,400 U.S.
military personnel (700 to Bosnia/700 to Croatia) as part of the advance elements of the roughly
60,000 person NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia, scheduled to deploy in force once the
Dayton Peace Agreement is signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Secretary Perry noted that
once the NATO I-Force was fully deployed, about 20,000 U.S. military personnel would be in
Bosnia, and about 5,000 in Croatia.
On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified the Congress, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” that he had “ordered the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel
to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO ‘enabling force’ to lay the groundwork
for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR),” which
would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing. The President also
noted that he had authorized deployment of roughly 3,000 other U.S. military personnel to
Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and the IFOR.
In response to these developments, Congress addressed the question of U.S. ground troop
deployments in Bosnia. Lawmakers sought to take action before the final Bosnian peace
agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, following which the bulk of American
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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military forces would be deployed to Bosnia. On December 13, 1995, the House considered H.R.
2770, sponsored by Representative Dornan, which would have prohibited the use of federal funds
for the deployment “on the ground” of U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina “as part of any
peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force.” H.R. 2770 was defeated in the
House by a vote of 210-218. On December 13, the House considered two other measures. It
approved H.Res. 302, offered by Representative Buyer, by a vote of 287-141. H.Res. 302, a
non-binding measure, reiterated “serious concerns and opposition” to the deployment of U.S.
ground troops to Bosnia, while expressing confidence, “pride and admiration” for U.S. soldiers
deployed there. It called on the President and Defense Secretary to rely on the judgement of the
U.S. ground commander in Bosnia and stated that he should be provided with sufficient resources
to ensure the safety and well-being of U.S. troops. H.Res. 302, further stated that the U.S.
government should “in all respects” be “impartial and evenhanded” with all parties to the Bosnian
conflict “as necessary to ensure the safety and protection” of American forces in the region.
Subsequently, the House defeated H.Res. 306, proposed by Representative Hamilton, by a vote
of 190-237. H.Res. 306 stated that the House “unequivocally supports the men and women of
the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery.”
On December 13, the Senate also considered three measures related to Bosnia and U.S. troop
deployments. The Senate defeated H.R. 2606 by a vote of 22-77. This bill would have prohibited
funds to be obligated or expended for U.S. participation in peacekeeping in Bosnia unless such
funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose. The Senate also defeated S.Con.Res. 35, a
non-binding resolution of Senators Hutchison and Inhofe. This resolution stated that “Congress
opposes President Clinton’s decision to deploy” U.S. troops to Bosnia, but noted that “Congress
strongly supports” the U.S. troops sent by the President to Bosnia.
The Senate did pass S.J.Res. 44, sponsored by Senators Dole and McCain, by a vote of 69-30.
This resolution stated that Congress “unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed
Forces” who were to be deployed to Bosnia. S.J.Res. 44 stated that “notwithstanding
reservations expressed about President Clinton’s decision” to deploy U.S. forces, “the President
may only fulfill his commitment” to deploy them to Bosnia “for approximately one year” if he
made a determination to Congress that the mission of the NATO peace implementation force
(IFOR) will be limited to implementing the military annex to the Bosnian peace agreement and to
protecting itself. The presidential determination must also state that the United States will “lead
an immediate international effort,” separate from IFOR, “to provide equipment, arms, training
and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality” to the Muslim-Croat Federation so
that it may provide for its own defense. The President could use “existing military drawdown
authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary.” S.J.Res. 44 also
required President Clinton to submit to Congress a detailed report on the armament effort within
30 days, and required regular presidential reports to Congress on the implementation of both the
military and non-military aspects of the peace accords.
The House and Senate did not appoint and direct conferees to meet to reconcile the conflicting
elements of the Bosnia related measures each had passed on December 13, 1995. A number of
Members and Senators had wished to express their views on the troop deployment before the
Dayton Accords were formally signed in Paris. That action had occurred, and the leadership of
both parties apparently believed nothing further would be achieved by a conference on the
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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measures passed. As result, no final consensus on a single specific measure was reached on the
issue by the two chambers.
The President meanwhile continued with the Bosnian deployment. On December 21, 1995,
President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that he had
ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel to participate in the
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states,
primarily in Croatia. In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would be deployed to Hungary,
Italy, Croatia, and other regional states in support of IFOR’s mission. The President ordered
participation of U.S. forces “pursuant to” his “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.”67
Subsequently,
President Clinton in December 1996, agreed to provide up to 8,500 ground troops to participate in
a NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia termed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). On March 18,
1998, the House defeated by a vote of 193-225, H.Con.Res. 227, a resolution of Representative
Tom Campbell, directing the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to
remove United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.(H.Rept.
105-442).68
Kosovo
The issue of presidential authority to deploy forces in the absence of congressional authorization,
under the War Powers Resolution, or otherwise, became an issue of renewed controversy in late
March 1999 when President Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to participate in a NATO-led
military operation in Kosovo. This action was the focus of a major policy debate over the purpose
and scope of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo. The President’s action to commit forces to the
NATO Kosovo operation also led to a suit in federal District Court for the District of Columbia
by Members of Congress seeking a judicial finding that the President was violating the War
Powers Resolution and the Constitution by using military forces in Yugoslavia in the absence of
authorization from the Congress.
The Kosovo controversy began in earnest when on March 26, 1999, President Clinton notified
Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military
forces, at his direction and in coalition with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against
Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government’s campaign of violence and repression
against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Prior to the President’s action, the Senate, on
March 23, 1999, had passed, by a vote of 58-41, S.Con.Res. 21, a non-binding resolution
expressing the sense of the Congress that the President was authorized to conduct “military air
operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”
Subsequently, the House voted on a number of measures relating to U.S. participation in the
NATO operation in Kosovo. On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1569,
by a vote of 249-180. This bill would prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Defense
67
For additional background see CRS Report RS22324, Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues, by Julie Kim.
68
For additional background see CRS Report RL32392, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Steven
Woehrel, and CRS Report RL32282, Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations, by Steve Bowman.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 35
Department from being used for the deployment of “ground elements” of the U.S. Armed Forces
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law.
On that same day the House defeated H.Con.Res. 82, by a vote of 139-290. This resolution
would have directed the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to
remove U.S. Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 28, 1999, the House also defeated H.J.Res. 44, by
a vote of 2-427. This joint resolution would have declared a state of war between the United
States and the “Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The House on that same day
also defeated, on a 213-213 tie vote, S.Con.Res. 21, the Senate resolution passed on March 23,
1999, that supported military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia. On April 30,
1999, Representative Tom Campbell and 17 other members of the House filed suit in federal
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the President to obtain
authorization from Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military action against
Yugoslavia.69
The Senate, on May 4, 1999, by a vote of 78-22, tabled S.J.Res. 20, a joint resolution, sponsored
by Senator John McCain, that would authorize the President “to use all necessary force and other
means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”70
The
House, meanwhile, on May 6, 1999, by a vote of 117-301, defeated an amendment by
Representative Ernest Istook to H.R. 1664, the FY1999 defense supplemental appropriations
bill, that would have prohibited the expenditure of funds in the bill to implement any plan to use
U.S. ground forces to invade Yugoslavia, except in time of war. Congress, meanwhile, on May
20, 1999 cleared for the President’s signature, H.R. 1141, an emergency supplemental
appropriations bill for FY1999, that provided billions in funding for the existing U.S. Kosovo
operation.
The Senate tabled two other amendments that would have restricted military operations by
President Clinton in Kosovo. On May 24, 1999, it tabled, by a vote of 52-48, an amendment
offered by Senator Arlen Specter to state that no funds available to the Defense Department may
be obligated or expended for the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia unless
authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. The
Specter amendment did not apply to certain actions, such as rescuing U.S. military personnel or
citizens.71
On May 26, 1999 the Senate tabled an amendment, by a vote of 77-21, offered by
Senator Bob Smith to prohibit, effective October 1, 1999, the use of funds for military operations
in Yugoslavia unless Congress enacted specific authorization in law for the conduct of these
operations.72
On May 25, 1999, the 60th
day had passed since the President notified Congress of his actions
regarding U.S. participation in military operations in Kosovo. Representative Campbell, and
those who joined his suit, noted to the federal Court that this was a clear violation of the language
69
Campbell v. Clinton. Civil Action No. 99-1072.
70
The McCain joint resolution (S.J.Res. 20) authorizing presidential action in Yugoslavia was forced to the Senate
floor by the Senator’s use of the expedited procedures set out in section 6 of the War Powers Resolution for
consideration of such resolutions. See debate and discussion in U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, May 3, 1999, pp.
S4514-S4572; and May 4, 1999, pp. S4611-S4616 [daily edition].
71
U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, May 24, 1999, pp. S5809-S5840 [daily edition].
72
U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, May 26, 1999, pp. S6034-S6040 [daily edition].
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 36
of the War Powers Resolution stipulating a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area of hostilities
after 60 days in the absence of congressional authorization to continue, or a presidential request to
Congress for an extra 30 day period to safely withdraw. The President did not seek such a 30 day
extension, noting instead his view that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective.
On June 8, 1999, Federal District Judge Paul L. Friedman dismissed the suit of Representative
Campbell and others that sought to have the court rule that President Clinton was in violation of
the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution by conducting military activities in Yugoslavia
without having received prior authorization from Congress. The judge ruled that Representative
Campbell and the other congressional plaintiffs lacked legal standing to bring the suit.73
On June
24, 1999, Representative Campbell appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. The appeals court subsequently agreed to hear the case on an expedited
basis before Judges Silberman, Randolph, and Tatel. On February 18, 2000, the appeals court
affirmed the opinion of the District Court that Representative Campbell and his co-plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue the President.74
On May 18, 2000, Representative Campbell and 30 other
Members of Congress appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court. On October 2,
2000, the United States Supreme Court, without comment, refused to hear the appeal of
Representative Campbell, thereby letting stand the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals.75
While Representative Campbell’s litigation was continuing, Yugoslavia, on June 10, 1999, agreed
to NATO conditions for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary
personnel from Kosovo, and the creation of a peacekeeping force (KFOR) which had the sanction
of the United Nations. Further, on June 10, 1999, the House of Representatives defeated, by a
vote of 328-97, an amendment to H.R. 1401, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000-FY2001, that would have prohibited the use of any Defense Department funding in
FY2000 for “military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” On that same day, the
House approved, by a vote of 270-155, an amendment that deleted, from the House reported
version of H.R. 1401, language that would have prohibited any funding for “combat or
peacekeeping operations” in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
On June 12, 1999, President Clinton announced and reported to Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution” that he had directed the deployment of about “7,000 U.S. military
personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led security force
(KFOR)” being assembled in Kosovo. He also noted that about “1,500 U.S. military personnel,
under separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in the region, as our
national support element, in support of KFOR.” Thus, by the summer of 1999, the President had
been able to proceed with his policy of intervention in the Kosovo crisis under the aegis of
NATO, the Congress had not achieved any position of consensus on what actions were
appropriate in Yugoslavia, and a U.S. District Court had dismissed a congressional lawsuit (a
position subsequently affirmed the following year by the Appeals Court, and the U.S. Supreme
Court) attempting to stop presidential military action in Yugoslavia in the absence of prior
congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution.76
73
Seethe June 8, 1999 decision of Judge Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia at 52 F. Supp.
2d 34 (1999).
74
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
75
Campbell v. Clinton, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 October 2, 2000).
76
For detailed discussion of major issues see CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy:
Background to Independence, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel, and CRS Report RL30352, War Powers Litigation
(continued...)
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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Haiti: Can the President Order Enforcement of a U.N. Embargo?
On July 3, 1993, Haitian military leader Raoul Cedras and deposed President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide signed an agreement providing for the restoration of President Aristide on October 30.
The United Nations and Organization of American States took responsibility for verifying
compliance. In conjunction with the agreement, President Clinton offered to send 350 troops and
military engineers to Haiti to help retrain the Haitian armed forces and work on construction
projects. A first group of American and Canadian troops arrived on October 6. When additional
U.S. forces arrived on October 11, a group of armed civilians appeared intent upon resisting their
landing, and on October 12 defense officials ordered the ship carrying them, the U.S.S. Harlan
County, to leave Haitian waters.
Because the Haitian authorities were not complying with the agreement, on October 13 the U.N.
Security Council voted to restore sanctions against Haiti. On October 20, President Clinton
reported “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that U.S. ships had begun to enforce the
U.N. embargo. Some Members of Congress complained that Congress had not been consulted on
or authorized the action. On October 18, Senator Dole said he would offer an amendment to the
Defense Appropriations bill (H.R. 3116) which would require congressional authorization for all
deployments into Haitian waters and airspace unless the President made specified certifications.
Congressional leaders and Administration officials negotiated on the terms of the amendment. As
enacted, Section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be
obligated or expended for U.S. military operations in Haiti unless the operations were (1)
authorized in advance by Congress, (2) necessary to protect or evacuate U.S. citizens, (3) vital to
the national security of the United States and there was not sufficient time to receive
congressional authorization, or (4) the President reported in advance that the intended deployment
met certain criteria.
Enforcement of the embargo intensified. On April 20, 1994, President Clinton further reported
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement in
the waters around Haiti and that 712 vessels had been boarded. On May 6, 1994, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 917 calling for measures to tighten the embargo. On June
10, 1994, President Clinton announced steps being taken to intensify the pressure on Haiti’s
military leaders that included assisting the Dominican Republic to seal its border with Haiti, using
U.S. naval patrol boats to detain ships suspected of violating the sanctions, a ban on commercial
air traffic, and sanctions on financial transactions.
As conditions in Haiti worsened, President Clinton stated he would not rule out the use of force,
and gradually this option appeared more certain. Many Members continued to contend
congressional authorization was necessary for any invasion of Haiti. On May 24, 1994, the House
adopted the Goss amendment to the Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 4301) by a vote of 223-
201. The amendment expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should not undertake
any military action against the mainland of Haiti unless the President first certified to Congress
that clear and present danger to U.S. citizens or interests required such action. Subsequently, on
June 9 the House voted on the Goss amendment again. This time the House reversed itself and
rejected the amendment by a vote of 195-226. On June 27, a point of order was sustained against
(...continued)
Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution, by Michael John Garcia.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 38
an amendment to the State Department appropriations bill that sought to prohibit use of funds for
any U.N. peacekeeping operation related to Haiti. On June 29, 1994, the Senate in action on H.R.
4226 repassed a provision identical to Section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 but rejected a measure
making advance congressional authorization a binding requirement. On August 5 it tabled
(rejected) by a vote of 31 to 63 an amendment to H.R. 4606 by Senator Specter prohibiting the
President from using U.S. armed forces to depose the military leadership unless authorized in
advance by Congress, necessary to protect U.S. citizens, or vital to U.S. interests.
President Clinton sought and obtained U.N. Security Council authorization for an invasion. On
July 31, the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational force to use “all necessary means to
facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership ... on the understanding that the cost
of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States”
(Resolution 940, 1994).
On August 3, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Department of Veterans Affairs
appropriation, H.R. 4624, by a vote of 100-0 expressing its sense that the Security Council
Resolution did not constitute authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces in Haiti under the
Constitution or the War Powers Resolution. The amendment, however, was rejected in
conference. President Clinton said the same day that he would welcome the support of Congress
but did not agree that he was constitutionally mandated to obtain it. Some Members introduced
resolutions, such as H.Con.Res. 276, calling for congressional authorization prior to the
invasion.
On September 15, 1994, in an address to the Nation, President Clinton said he had called up the
military reserve and ordered two aircraft carriers into the region. His message to the military
dictators was to leave now or the United States would force them from power. The first phase of
military action would remove the dictators from power and restore Haiti’s democratically elected
government. The second phase would involve a much smaller force joining with forces from
other U.N. members which would leave Haiti after 1995 elections were held and a new
government installed.
While the Defense Department continued to prepare for an invasion within days, on September
16 President Clinton sent to Haiti a negotiating team of former President Jimmy Carter, former
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman
Sam Nunn. Again addressing the Nation on September 18, President Clinton announced that the
military leaders had agreed to step down by October 15, and agreed to the immediate introduction
of troops, beginning September 19, from the 15,000 member international coalition. He said the
agreement was only possible because of the credible and imminent threat of multinational force.
He emphasized the mission still had risks and there remained possibilities of violence directed at
U.S. troops, but the agreement minimized those risks. He also said that under U.N. Security
Council resolution 940, a 25-nation international coalition would soon go to Haiti to begin the
task of restoring democratic government. Also on September 18, President Clinton reported to
Congress on the objectives in accordance with the sense expressed in Section 8147 (c) of P.L.
103-139, the FY1994 Defense Appropriations Act.
U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 1994. On September 21, President Clinton reported
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” the deployment of 1,500 troops, to be increased by
several thousand. (At the peak in September there were about 21,000 U.S. forces in Haiti.) He
said the U.S. presence would not be open-ended but would be replaced after a period of months
by a U.N. peacekeeping force, although some U.S. forces would participate in and be present for
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 39
the duration of the U.N. mission. The forces were involved in the first hostilities on September 24
when U.S. Marines killed 10 armed Haitian resisters in a fire-fight.
On September 19, the House agreed to H.Con.Res. 290 commending the President and the
special delegation to Haiti, and supporting the prompt and orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Haiti as soon as possible; on September 19, the Senate agreed to a similar measure, S.Res. 259.
On October 3, 1994, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res. 416 authorizing the
forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, and providing procedures for a joint resolution to withdraw
the forces. In House debate on October 6 the House voted against the original contents and for the
Dellums substitute. As passed, H.J.Res. 416 stated the sense that the President should have
sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. forces to Haiti, supporting a prompt and
orderly withdrawal as soon as possible, and requiring a monthly report on Haiti as well as other
reports. This same language was also adopted by the Senate on October 6 as S.J.Res. 229, and
on October 7 the House passed S.J.Res. 229. President Clinton signed S.J.Res. 229 on October
25, 1994 (P.L. 103-423).
After U.S. forces began to disarm Haitian military and paramilitary forces and President Aristide
returned on October 15, 1994, the United States began to withdraw some forces. On March 31,
1995, U.N. peacekeeping forces assumed responsibility for missions previously conducted by
U.S. military forces in Haiti. By September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported the United States
had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and
260 U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti. On February 29, 1996, the
U.S. Commander of the UNMIH was replaced and U.S. forces ceased to conduct security
operations in Haiti, except for self-defense. The majority of the 1,907 U.S. military personnel in
Haiti were withdrawn by mid-March 1996, and the remainder, who stayed to arrange the
dismantlement and repatriation of equipment, were withdrawn in mid-April 1996. After that, a
U.S. support unit of 300 to 500 troops, made up primarily of engineers, remained in Haiti
carrying out public works such as building bridges, repairing schools, and digging wells. In
December 1997, President Clinton ordered the Dept. of Defense to maintain hundreds of U.S.
troops in Haiti indefinitely. In September 1999, however, the 106th
Congress passed the FY2000
DOD authorization bill (P.L. 106-65) that prohibited DOD funding to maintain a continuous
U.S. military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000. The troops were withdrawn by the end of
January 2000. According to the conference report accompanying the FY2000 DOD authorization
bill (H.Rept. 106-301), the President is not prohibited from engaging in periodic theater
engagement activities in Haiti.77
Terrorist Attacks against the United States (World Trade Center and
the Pentagon) 2001: How Does the War Powers Resolution Apply?
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners, crashing two into the
twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and another into the Pentagon building
in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh,
after passengers struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft. The death toll from
these incidents was more than three thousand, making the attacks the most devastating of their
77
For further information on Haiti, see Haiti: Issues for Congress, CRS Report RL32294, Haiti: Developments and
U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales and Clare Ribando Seelke.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 40
kind in United States history. President George W. Bush characterized these attacks as more than
acts of terror. “They were acts of war,” he said. He added that “freedom and democracy are under
attack,” and he asserted that the United States would use “all of our resources to conquer this
enemy.”78
In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the President consulted with the leaders
of Congress on appropriate steps to take to deal with the situation confronting the United States.
One of the things that emerged from discussions with the White House and congressional leaders
was the concept of a joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the President to take military
steps to deal with the parties responsible for the attacks on the United States. Between September
13 and 14, draft language of such a resolution was discussed and negotiated by the President’s
representatives and the House and Senate leadership of both parties. Other members of both
Houses suggested language for consideration. On Friday, September 14, 2001, the text of a joint
resolution was introduced. It was first considered and passed by the Senate in the morning of
September 14, as Senate Joint Resolution 23, by a vote of 98-0. The House of Representatives
passed it later that evening, by a vote of 420-1, after tabling an identical resolution, H.J.Res. 64,
and rejecting a motion to recommit by Representative John Tierney that would have had the
effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report from the President on his actions under the
resolution every 60 days.79
Senate Joint Resolution 23, titled the “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” passed by
Congress on September 14, 2001, was signed into law on September 18, 2001.80
The joint
resolution authorizes the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.
The joint resolution further states that Congress declares that this resolution is intended to
“constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution.” Finally, the joint resolution also states that “[n]othing in this resolution supercedes
any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”
A notable feature of S.J.Res. 23 is that unlike all other major legislation authorizing the use of
military force by the President, this joint resolution authorizes military force against
“organizations and persons” linked to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Past
authorizations of the use of force have permitted action against unnamed nations in specific
regions of the world or against named individual nations. This authorization of military action
against “organizations or persons” is unprecedented in American history, with the scope of its
78
Presidential statement of September 12, 2001. Office of the White House Press Secretary. See White House website
at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
79
For background on discussions regarding the resolution see Washington Post, September 13, 2001, p.A3; CQ Daily
Monitor, September 13, 2001, p.2, 6; CQ Daily Monitor, September 14, 2001, p.2; Washington Post, September 14,
2001, p. A30; The New York Times, September 14, 2001, p.A19; Roll Call, September 20, 2001, p.17. The debate on
S.J.Res. 23 is found in U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, 107th
Congress, 1st
session, pp.S9416-S9421 (Senate);
H5638-H5683 [daily edition].
80
P.L. 107-40 (September 18, 2001); 115 Stat. 224.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 41
reach yet to be determined. The authorization of use of force against unnamed nations is more
consistent with some previous instances where authority was given to act against unnamed states
as appropriate when they became aggressors or took military action against the United States or
its citizens.81
President George W. Bush in signing S.J.Res. on September 18, 2001, noted the Congress had
acted “wisely, decisively, and in the finest traditions of our country.” He thanked the “leadership
of both Houses for their role in expeditiously passing this historic joint resolution.” He noted that
he had had the “benefit of meaningful consultations with members of the Congress” since the
September 11 attacks and that he would “continue to consult closely with them as our Nation
responds to this threat to our peace and security.” President Bush also asserted that S.J.Res. 23
“recognized the authority of the President under the Constitution to take action to deter and
prevent acts of terrorism against the United States.” He also stated: “In signing this resolution, I
maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the President’s
constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States and
regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.”82
Prior to its enactment, there was concern among some in Congress that the President might not
adhere to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution when he exercised the
authority provided in S.J.Res. 23. There appeared to be general agreement that the President had
committed himself to consult with Congress on matters related to his military actions against
terrorists and those associated with the attacks on the United States on September 11. On
September 24, 2001, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that in response to terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the “deployment of various combat-equipped and
combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas
of operations.” The President noted that as part of efforts to “prevent and deter terrorism” he
might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world.... ” He
stated that he could not now predict “the scope and duration of these deployments,” nor the
“actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States.”
Subsequently, on October 9, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that on October 7, 2001, U.S.
Armed Forces “began combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban
supporters.” The President stated that he had directed this military action in response to the
September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. “territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the
continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies.” This
military action was “part of our campaign against terrorism” and was “designed to disrupt the use
of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations.”
Thus, in light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against United States territory and
citizens, the President and Congress, after consultations, agreed to a course of legislative action
that did not invoke the War Powers Resolution itself, but substituted a specific authorization
81
For detailed legislative history of P.L. 107-40 see CRS Report RS22357, Authorization for Use of Military Force in
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History, by Richard F. Grimmett.
82
Statement of the President on September 18, 2001. President Signs Authorization for Use of Military Force bill.
Office of the White House Press Secretary. September 18, 2001. See White House website at http://whitehouse.gov/
news/releases.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 42
measure, S.J.Res. 23. Pursuit of such an action is contemplated by the language of the War
Powers Resolution itself. As of the end of October 2001, President Bush had chosen to state in his
reports to Congress that the military actions he had taken relating to the terrorists attacks were
“consistent with” both the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23. His actions
follow the practice of his White House predecessors in not formally citing the language of the
War Powers Resolution in Section 4(a)(1) that would trigger a military forces withdrawal
timetable. Congress for its part in S.J.Res. 23 stated that this legislation constituted “specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” It also
noted that “nothing” in S.J.Res. 23 “supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”
The President and Congress, in sum, maintained their respective positions on the constitutionality
of the War Powers Resolution and the responsibilities of the President under it, while finding a
legislative vehicle around which both branches could unite to support the President’s response to
the terrorist attacks on the United States.
Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002: A Classic Application of
the War Powers Resolution?
In summer 2002, the Bush Administration made public its views regarding what it deemed a
significant threat to U.S. interests and security posed by the prospect that Iraq had or was
acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Senior members of the Bush Administration cited a
number of violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions by Iraq regarding the obligation
imposed at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to end its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
programs. On September 4, 2002, President George W. Bush met with leaders from both Houses
and parties at the White House. At that meeting the President stated that he would seek
congressional support, in the near future, for action deemed necessary to deal with the threat
posed to the United States by the regime of Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The President also indicated
that he would speak to the United Nations shortly and set out his concerns about Iraq.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly and set out the
history of Iraqi misdeeds over the last two decades and the numerous times that Iraq had not
fulfilled its commitments to comply with various U.N. Security Council resolutions, including
disarmament, since the Gulf War of 1991. He stated that the United States would work with the
U.N. Security Council to deal with Iraq’s challenge. However, he emphasized that if Iraq refused
to fulfill its obligations to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United States
would see that those resolutions were enforced.83
Subsequently, on September 19, 2002, the White House sent a “draft” joint resolution to House
Speaker Dennis Hastert, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader
Thomas Daschle and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott. This draft would have authorized the
President to use military force not only against Iraq but “to restore international peace and
security in the region.” Subsequently introduced as S.J.Res. 45 on September 26, it served as the
basis for an extensive debate over the desirability, necessity, and scope of a new congressional
authorization for the use of force. The Senate used this bill as the focus for a debate which began,
after cloture was invoked, on October 3. The Senate debate continued from October 4 until
83
See the White House website for comments by the President to the congressional leaders and to the U.N. under news
(September) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 43
October 11, 2002, and involved consideration of numerous amendments to the measure. In the
end the Senate adopted H.J.Res. 114 in lieu of S.J.Res. 45.
The draft measure was not formally introduced in the House. Instead, the vehicle for House
consideration of the issue was H.J.Res. 114. Cosponsored by Speaker Hastert and Minority
Leader Gephardt and introduced on October 2, 2002, H.J.Res. 114 embodied modifications to
the White House draft that were agreeable to the White House, most House and Senate
Republicans, and the House Democratic leader. The House International Relations Committee
reported out a slightly amended version of the joint resolution on October 7, 2002 (H.R. 721).
The House adopted the rule governing debate on the joint resolution (H.R. 474) on October 8,
2002; and debated the measure until October 10, when it passed H.J.Res. 114 by a vote of 296-
133. Subsequently, the Senate passed the House version of H.J.Res. 114 on October 11 by a vote
of 77-23, and President Bush signed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq
Resolution of 2002” into law on October 16, 2002.84
In signing H.J.Res. 114 into law, President Bush noted that by passing this legislation Congress
had demonstrated that “the United States speaks with one voice on the threat to international
peace and security posed by Iraq.” He added that the legislation carried an important message that
“Iraq will either comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and
... its support for terrorists, or will be compelled to do so.” While the President noted he had
sought a “resolution of support” from Congress to use force against Iraq, and appreciated
receiving that support, he also stated that
my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in
the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President’s constitutional
authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S.
interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.
The President went on to state that on the “important question of the threat posed by Iraq,” his
views and goals and those of Congress were the same. He further observed that he had extensive
consultations with Congress in the past months, and that he looked forward to “continuing close
consultation in the months ahead.” He stated his intent to submit written reports to Congress
every 60 days on matters “relevant to this resolution.”85
The central element of P.L. 107-243 is the authorization for the President to use the armed forces
of the United States
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security
of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
As predicates for the use of force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress
his determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not “adequately protect
84
P.L. 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498. For a detailed side-by-side comparison of the House and Senate versions of the
authorization of force against Iraq legislation and proposed amendments see CRS Report RL31596, Iraq: Authorization
of Use of U.S. Armed Forces—Side-By-Side Comparison of Public Law 107-243 and Selected Legislative Proposals, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
85
For text of President Bush’s signing statement for H.J.Res. 114 see the State Department’s Washington File entry at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/02101606.htm.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 44
the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent” with the battle against terrorism. Like P.L.
102-1 and P.L. 107-40, the statute declares that it is “intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” It also requires
the President to make periodic reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.”
Finally, the statute expresses Congress’ “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain
“prompt and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
P.L. 107-243 clearly confers broad authority on the President to use force. In contrast to P.L.
102-1, the authority granted is not limited to the implementation of previously adopted Security
Council resolutions concerning Iraq but includes “all relevant ... resolutions.” Thus, it appears to
incorporate resolutions concerning Iraq that may be adopted by the Security Council in the future
as well as those already adopted. The authority also appears to extend beyond compelling Iraq’s
disarmament to implementing the full range of concerns expressed in those resolutions. Unlike
P.L. 107-40, the President’s exercise of the authority granted is not dependent upon a finding
that Iraq was associated in some direct way with the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Moreover, the authority conferred can be used for the broad purpose of defending “the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” Nevertheless,
P.L. 107-243 is narrower than P.L. 107-40 in that it limits the authorization for the use of force
to Iraq. It also requires as a predicate for the use of force that the President determine that
peaceful means cannot suffice and that the use of force against Iraq is consistent with the battle
against terrorism. It further limits the force used to that which the President determines is
“necessary and appropriate.” Finally, as with P.L. 107-40, the statutory authorization for use of
force granted to the President in P.L. 107-243 is not dependent for its exercise upon prior
authorization by the U.N. Security Council. In the form that P.L. 107-243 is drafted, and given
the context in which it was debated, one could argue that it is a classic example of an
authorization vehicle contemplated by the original War Powers Resolution.
Libya 2011: Establishing a New Definition of What Constitutes
“Hostilities” for Purposes of Full Compliance with the War Powers
Resolution?
During U.S. military operations in Libya from mid-March through June 2011, President Barack
Obama—having received legal advice from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Justice
Department and State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh—took the position that U.S.
military operations in Libya did not constitute “hostilities” for purposes of the language of the
War Powers Resolution nor was the United States involved in a “war” in Libya for purposes of
Article I of the Constitution.86
Given those conclusions by the Administration, the President’s
view was that express statutory authorization from Congress to conduct the military operations in
Libya was not required under the framework of the War Powers Resolution.
86
See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, President’s Authority to Use Military Force in Libya,
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (April 1, 2011). Also see prepared statement of
State Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, on War Powers and Libya, before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, June 28, 2011 found at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 45
The President did comply with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution, when
the Libya operation was first launched in March 2011, and followed up with a letter to
congressional leaders on May 20, 2011—the 60th
day after U.S. military forces were “introduced”
into the conflict in Libya. In his May 20 letter, the President pointed out that on April 4, 2011, the
United States had transferred responsibility for military operations in Libya to NATO forces, and
that from that time forward the U.S. had assumed only a supporting role for the NATO-led
operation. This support included, “since April 23, [36 days after the initial introduction of U.S.
military forces into Libya], precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of
clearly defined targets in support of the NATO-led coalition’s efforts.” The President held from
the outset that the actions he had directed were “in the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.” He took them, the President stated, “pursuant to my constitutional
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”
Administration Report to Congress on “United States Activities in Libya”
Submitted on June 15, 2011
On June 15, 2011 [86 days after the initial introduction of U.S. military forces into Libya], the
Obama Administration submitted a 32-page unclassified report, together with a classified annex,
that described U.S. actions in Libya to that date. On page 25 of that unclassified report was a
“Legal Analysis” consisting of one long paragraph summarizing the Administration’s view of
what the President’s authority was to take the actions he had taken in Libya, and his rationale for
not having to obtain congressional authorization to do so. This paragraph from the report states:
Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military operations in Libya and the
limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions, the President had constitutional
authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs
powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad. The President is of the view that
the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers Resolution
and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military
operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated by the Resolution’s 60 day
termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a
multinational coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and limited to the terms of
a United Nations Security Council Resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a
no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active
exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops,
U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a
conflict characterized by these factors.
There are various legal arguments available to the Administration to justify use of UAVs for
military action abroad against terrorist organizations and individuals. The following addresses the
potential interplay of the War Powers Resolution’s statutory requirements and the use of UAVs
for military operations abroad.
The War Powers Resolution and Military Use of UAVs: Some Considerations
In another situation, it is possible that the President might use the same basic formulation he and
his legal advisors set out regarding the application of the War Powers Resolution to U.S. military
actions in Libya discussed above. Directly put, if it is accepted that the President’s use of UAVs
for military attacks against terrorist targets abroad constitutes an action that is limited in scope
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 46
and duration, and does not require introduction of U.S. military forces directly and physically into
“hostilities,” then the War Powers Resolution, under this interpretation, does not apply to this
presidential action, nor require congressional statutory authorization. The President, under this
construction, has sufficient authority to act to defend the United States based only on his own
Constitutional authorities as Commander-in-Chief, as set out in the legal memorandum of the
Office of Legal Counsel of April 1, 2011, and in the President’s June 15, 2011, report to
Congress.
To date, based on public reports, instances of the use of UAVs to attack terrorist targets abroad
have not required a time period in excess of 60 days to execute, nor have U.S. military personnel
been placed directly into harm’s way or in places where hostilities that could directly involve
them were indicated. The very nature of UAV technology permits their employment from
locations remote from the places they are used to attack. Thus, the argument could be made that
in these circumstances, the War Powers Resolution, as currently drafted, does not require the
President to obtain statutory congressional approval for the use of UAVs in military operations
abroad.
In his War Powers Resolution report to Congress, on June 15, 2012, the President noted that he
had authorized, during the previous six months, the U.S. military to work closely with the
government of Yemen “to operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat
posed by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of
al-Qa’ida today.” The President added that
Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives
and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our
interests.87
While the term “direct action” is not defined in the President’s June 15, 2012, report quoted
above, its context, coupled with public reporting on the U.S. use of UAVs to attack al-Qa’ida
terrorist personnel in Yemen, strongly suggests that this is what the President is referring to in this
report. The President further notes in this report that similar actions may be undertaken by the
United States in the future. He stated:
The United States is committed to thwarting the efforts of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces
to carry out future acts of international terrorism, and we have continued to work with our
CT [counter-terrorism] partners to disrupt and degrade the capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its
associated forces. As necessary, in response to the terrorist threat, I will direct additional
measures against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and
interests.
The June 15, 2012, report also stated that a “classified annex” to it “would provide further
information” on such matters. That annex would perhaps elaborate on the specifics of the topics
alluded to in the unclassified text, and clarify the express meaning of “direct action,” and, in
particular, how it was employed by the United States.
In light of the above considerations, it appears that the existing statutory language of the War
Powers Resolution, as interpreted by the Administration, does not require congressional
87
Daily Comp. Pres. Docs., 2012 DCPD No. 00482. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Deployment of United
States Combat-Equipped Armed Forces. June 15, 2012. Emphasis added.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 47
authorization for the President to use UAVs in military operations against terrorists abroad, in
Yemen or in other countries. It does appear that the President may believe that in fulfilling his
reporting obligations to Congress under the WPR he should at least implicitly note the use of
UAVs in military attacks against terrorists when he submits his supplementary WPR report every
six months. Perhaps the President also believes he should, in keeping with WPR reporting
requirements, report more explicitly about such actions in classified reports every six months.
Even though the President has not publicly reported the specific use of UAVs in military
operations within 48 hours of their use, private consultations with the congressional leadership
about their use may have occurred in individual cases.
Should Congress agree with what appears to be the President’s position regarding his minimal
obligations under the War Powers Resolution regarding the military use of UAVs, it need do
nothing further. However, should Congress conclude that the War Powers Resolution should
unambiguously require statutory congressional authorization of the military use of UAVs for
counter-terrorism operations, then it would likely have to amend this statute, unless other
mutually agreeable alternatives can be devised with the President.
Military Campaign Against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
2014-2015
Beginning in June 2014, forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; or Islamic State
of Syria [ISIS]; or Islamic State [IS]) rapidly expanded their control of several Iraqi cities and
threatened attack on Baghdad. These developments caused worries of debilitating destabilization
of Iraq’s government and increased U.S. concerns for the safety of the U.S. embassy, other U.S.
facilities, and U.S. personnel in Iraq, as well as the Iraqi population.
After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic
personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and
reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in
August 2014. Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against
the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military
airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the “Khorasan Group,” identified by the
President as part of Al Qaeda. U.S. military engagement in hostilities against these groups in Iraq
and Syria has raised numerous questions in Congress and beyond about the President’s authority
to use military force in this conflict. Questions concerning the President’s WPR notifications to
Congress and his eventual reliance on existing authorizations for use of military force to meet the
requirements of the WPR have arisen, and Congress has considered proposals to enact a new
authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, including a February 2015
proposal from President Obama.88
88
For discussion of proposals for a new authorization for use of military force against the Islamic State, see CRS
Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current
Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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Presidential Reporting on Individual Missions and the War Powers
Resolution’s Withdrawal Requirement
President Obama began providing WPR notifications concerning the U.S. military response in
Iraq to the Islamic State crisis in June 2014. On June 16, 2014, President Obama notified the
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” that he had deployed combat-equipped troops to Iraq to provide security for U.S.
diplomatic personnel and facilities. On August 8, 2014, the President sent the first notification
during the current crisis concerning the use of military force in Iraq. Prior to the President’s
announcement of a wider, sustained military campaign against the Islamic State on September 10,
2014, President Obama made seven WPR notifications for deployments and actions in Iraq, four
concerning combat-equipped troop deployments with no hostilities active or imminent, and three
concerning airstrikes against ISIL forces:
• June 16, 2014, Security for U.S. Embassy Baghdad: notification89
informed
Congress of the deployment of up to 275 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to
provide support and security for U.S. personnel and the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad.
• June 26, 2014, Military Advisers: notification90
informed Congress of the
deployment of up to approximately 300 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel
in Iraq to “assess how we can best train, advise, and support Iraqi security forces
and to establish joint operations centers with Iraqi security forces to share
intelligence and coordinate planning to confront the threat posed by ISIL,” and
for presidential orders to “increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
that is focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL).”
• June 30, 2014, Increased Security Deployment: notification91
informed Congress
of the deployment of up to approximately 200 additional U.S. Armed Forces
personnel to Iraq to “reinforce security at the U.S. Embassy, its support facilities,
and the Baghdad International Airport.”
• August 8, 2014, Airstrikes and Humanitarian Assistance and Intervention:
notification92
informed Congress of airstrikes to protect U.S. personnel in Erbil
and to assist a humanitarian mission to protect Iraqi civilians trapped on Mount
Sinjar in northern Iraq.
• August 17, 2014, Airstrikes to Assist Iraq, Protect Civilians, Provide Security for
U.S. Facilities and Personnel: notification93
informed Congress of airstrikes
against ISIL forces to assist Iraqi security forces in retaking Mosul Dam in
northern Iraq.
89
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/16/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-
president-pro-te.
90
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/26/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-letter-regarding-iraq.
91
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/30/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-letter-regarding-iraq.
92
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/08/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
93
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/17/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
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• September 1, 2014, Airstrikes to Assist Iraq, Humanitarian Assistance and
Intervention: notification94
informed Congress of airstrikes near Amirli in
northern Iraq targeting ISIL forces besieging the town and as part of a mission to
provide humanitarian assistance.
• September 5, 2014, Increased Security Deployment: notification95
explained the
deployment of 350 additional combat-equipped troops to provide security for
diplomatic facilities and personnel in Baghdad.
• September 8, 2014, Airstrikes to Assist Iraq, Protect Civilians, Provide Security
for U.S. Facilities and Personnel: notification96
of airstrikes “in the vicinity of the
Haditha Dam in support of Iraqi forces in their efforts to retain control of and
defend this critical infrastructure site from ISIL,” stating that “[t]hese additional
military operations will be limited in their scope and duration as necessary to
address this threat and prevent endangerment of U.S. personnel and facilities and
large numbers of Iraqi civilians.”
In each of these notifications, President Obama cited no war declaration or legislative
authorization for use of military force that authorized his actions, but instead relied on his
constitutional authority under Article II as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. Without
such legislative authority, any engagement in hostilities could have been considered to trigger the
60-day withdrawal requirement under Section 5(b). Although there was no indication from the
President, the deployments announced in the June 16, June 24, June 30, and September 5 WPR
notifications could have been construed as falling under Section 4(a)(2) and/or (3) of the WPR;
such interpretation would not have triggered the WPR withdrawal requirement. The airstrikes
notifications of August 8, August 17, and September 1, 2014, seem more likely to concern
activities considered hostilities under the WPR, and therefore could be considered Section 4(a)(1)
notifications, triggering the 60-day withdrawal period, although again, neither the President nor
Congress took any action to definitively characterize such actions as triggering the WPR
withdrawal requirement.
President Obama’s multiple notifications, some of which involved hostilities, raised questions
about whether multiple WPR notifications for short-term, circumscribed military action in
relation to the same enemy in the same conflict should be considered separately or be combined
for purposes of the operation of the WPR withdrawal requirement. Analysts and Members of
Congress struggled with how to determine whether the 60-day period was running, on what date
it began, or whether it had reset each time one of the three discrete military operations had
ceased. From the description in the airstrikes notifications, the Mount Sinjar, Mosul Dam, and
Amirli operations involved operations by U.S. armed forces conducting airstrikes that lasted only
a few days at most, such forces engaged in airstrikes likely entered, fought, and withdrew from
Iraqi airspace in a matter of hours, and the troops that remained in Iraq after the airstrikes were
apparently not engaged in hostilities or present where hostilities were imminent. In addition, the
Obama Administration has been careful to state that the first airstrikes were solely to halt the
advance of ISIL on Erbil and break the siege of Mount Sinjar, both of which were accomplished
at the end of operations, that the second airstrikes were to help with the recapture of Mosul Dam,
94
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/01/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
95
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
96
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/08/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 50
which was also completed, and that the third airstrikes were solely to protect ISIL-besieged Iraqi
citizens in Amirli, and that objective also seemed to have been met, each within a matter of days.
Some analysts raised the question whether the President’s frequent notifications, each explaining
a discrete operation that would last only a few days, were intended simply to ensure that Congress
was kept informed in detail about ongoing U.S. military action in Iraq or, alternatively, whether
they were intended to have some consequence for assessing when and whether the WPR’s 60-day
deadline for termination of hostilities begins and ends—that is to say, that each of the particular
actions reported constitutes a separate military action that is subject to its own 60-day deadline
for termination.97
Because the operations were short in duration, considering each operation to
operate under its own 60-day period, despite seemingly being part of a larger campaign against
one enemy, would arguably undercut the WPR’s goal of ensuring that U.S. forces were not
engaged in hostilities against an enemy force for a sustained period of time without congressional
authorization.
Notifications of discrete, time-limited deployments and hostilities have occurred in the past. Since
Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, Presidents have made Section 4 notifications that
refer to military deployments and operations, including the use of military force, that are
relatively small in scope and duration, involving individual strikes.98
These limited WPR
notifications, however, often involve either planned strikes against foreign targets that can be
regarded as isolated and not part of a larger, connected military campaign against an enemy, or
address one-time defensive military action against armed attack.
Presidential Reliance on Prior Existing Authorizations to Meet War Powers
Resolution Requirements
After relying on Article II authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in his first seven
WPR notifications concerning military action against the Islamic State, President Obama changed
course and began relying on existing authorizations for the continuing and expanding military
campaign. Obama Administration officials and the President’s September 2014 notifications99
to
Congress for airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and Syria stated that two enacted authorizations
for use of military force (AUMFs) currently in force, the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243), provide authorization for certain U.S. military
strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda in
97
See Jack Goldsmith, “A New Tactic to Avoid War Powers Resolution Time Limits?”, Lawfare, September 2, 2014,
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/a-new-tactic-to-avoid-war-powers-resolution-time-limits/. The term
“hostilities” has been a subject of debate in recent years as well. The Obama Administration stated that its airstrikes in
Libya in 2011 that occurred after the passing of the WPR’s 60-day deadline did not amount to “hostilities” under the
WPR because they did not involve sustained fighting or exchanges of fighting with enemy forces, and because no
ground troops were involved. See “Libya 2011: Establishing a New Definition of What Constitutes ‘Hostilities’ for
Purposes of Full Compliance with the War Powers Resolution?”, above.
98
For example, President Reagan made a number of WPR notifications concerning a number of military actions taken
against Libya in 1986, and defensive military actions in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. See “Persian Gulf, 1987: When
Are Hostilities Imminent?”, and “Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake in Response to
International Terrorism?”, above.
99
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolutionregarding-iraq;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-
regarding-syria.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 51
Syria.100
As it regarded the requirements of the WPR, President Obama by citing 2001 and 2002
AUMF authority provided a legislative basis for his decision to engage U.S. armed forces in
hostilities against the Islamic State and other groups, which would meet the WPR’s notification
requirements, and prevent application of Section 5(b)’s 60-day withdrawal requirement and the
WPR’s provisions for consideration of legislative proposals to approve or disapprove of his
actions.
Congress enacted the 2001 AUMF in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
authorizing the President to use military force against “those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.... ” President Obama, as well as
President George W. Bush before him, has relied on the 2001 AUMF to fight Al Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan, and has stated that the 2001 AUMF authorizes limited, targeted U.S.
military strikes against Al Qaeda and associated forces that have been carried out in other
countries, including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. President Obama’s reliance on 2001
AUMF authority to undertake a large-scale, long-term military campaign outside Afghanistan to
fight the Islamic State represents to some observers an expansion of the interpretation of 2001
AUMF authority. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State can be targeted
under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and
coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighter and
operatives; the Islamic State employs tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its
intentions of creating a new Islamic caliphate, is the “true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s
legacy.”101
The 2002 AUMF authorizes the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to enforce relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions and to “defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.... ” Although the 2002 AUMF has no sunset provision
and Congress has not repealed it, one view is that after the establishment of a new Iraqi
government, the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, all
completed by the end of 2011, the 2002 AUMF no longer has force. Obama Administration
officials have recently voiced support for repealing the 2002 AUMF, reflecting the
Administration’s belief that it is no longer needed. Conversely, another view asserts that, although
its preamble focuses on the Saddam Hussein regime and its WMD programs, the 2002 AUMF’s
authorization language is broad, referring only to a “continuing threat” from Iraq, and that the
2002 AUMF could provide authority to defend against threats to Iraq as well as threats posed by
Iraq. Indeed, 2002 AUMF authority was the basis for the U.S. military presence in Iraq from the
fall of Saddam Hussein and completion of the WMD search to its 2011 withdrawal, a span of over
eight years, a period that could be characterized as dealing with threats to Iraq rather than threats
from Iraq. The IS threat in Iraq could therefore be seen as breathing new life into 2002 AUMF
authority. In addition, former supporters of Saddam Hussein reportedly provide support to the
Islamic State, possibly forming a link between the original aims of the 2002 AUMF and any
future actions taken against the Islamic State.
100
President Obama and Administration officials, prior to the military action against the Islamic State and the
President’s reliance on the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs as authority for such actions, had called for the repeal of the 2002
AUMF, and the amendment and ultimate repeal of the 2001 AUMF. The President has since September 2014 restated
his intentions to work to eventually repeal these measures, in connection with his proposal for Congress to enact a new
AUMF targeting the Islamic State.
101
White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,” press release, September 11, 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/11/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014.
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 52
Congressional Action Related to the Use of Military Force Against the
Islamic State
A number of legislative proposals have been introduced responding to the President’s decisions to
deploy U.S. armed forces and order the use of military force against the Islamic State and other
groups. Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation restricting military action against
the Islamic State under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, repealing these authorizations, and
authorizing military force against the Islamic State in a new standalone AUMF. Proposals related
to the WPR and its operation generally have been introduced during this period as well, possibly
spurred by current U.S. use of military force against the Islamic State.
On June 19, 2014, three days after President Obama’s first WPR notification concerning new
deployments to Iraq, Congress considered two amendments to a Department of Defense
appropriations bill (H.R. 4870 [113th
Congress]), the first of which prohibiting the use of funds
appropriated to the Department pursuant to the 2002 AUMF, and the second prohibiting use of
such funds under the 2001 AUMF after December 31, 2014.102
Both amendments were defeated
by roll-call vote.
Some Members of Congress also proposed legislation to require the President to either withdraw
troops from Iraq pursuant to the procedures of the WPR or seek a new authorization for use of
military force. A concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 105 [113th
Congress]) was introduced in the
House of Representatives on July 11, 2014 requiring withdrawal from Iraq:
SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM IRAQ.
Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), Congress
directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces, other than Armed Forces
required to protect United States diplomatic facilities and personnel, from Iraq—
(1) by no later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the day on which
this concurrent resolution is adopted; or
(2) if the President determines that it is not safe to remove such United States
Armed Forces before the end of that period, by no later than December 31, 2014, or
such earlier date as the President determines that the Armed Forces can safely be
removed.
H.Con.Res. 105 was later amended to remove the direction to withdraw U.S. armed forces,
replacing it with language stating that the “President shall not deploy or maintain United States
Armed Forces in a sustained combat role in Iraq without specific statutory authorization for such
use enacted after the date of the adoption of this concurrent resolution,” and that nothing in the
concurrent resolution supersedes the requirements of the WPR. This version of H.Con.Res. 105
passed the House by a vote of 370-40 on July 25, 2014. It was received in the Senate on July 28,
2014 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; no further action was taken.
After the President ordered airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq in August 2014, debate in Congress
for the most part turned toward crafting a new authorization for use of military force against the
Islamic State (IS AUMF), which would meet the requirements for continued military action after
102
H.Amdt. 912 (113th
Cong.; roll call vote 182-231); H.Amdt. 922 (113th
Cong.; roll call vote 157-260).
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 53
60 days, rather than proposals prohibiting the use of funds for military operations or requiring an
end to hostilities and withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Iraq. Beginning in September 2014,
several proposed IS AUMFs were introduced,103
many with provisions intended to define and
circumscribe U.S. military engagement, likely a reaction to a perceived over-expansive
interpretation and application of the 2001 AUMF by the executive branch since its initial
enactment. Provisions in these proposals that would have restricted or limited Congress’s overall
grant of authority included
• limiting the type of military action or military unit to be utilized, including broad
prohibitions on the use of U.S. ground forces;
• limiting the geographic area where military action was authorized;
• limiting the lawful targets of military force, including limitations on targeting
“associated forces” of the Islamic State; and
• terminating the authority automatically after a specific time period, from 120
days to three years after enactment.
One IS AUMF proposal, S.J.Res. 47 (113th
Congress), was debated, amended, and reported
favorably to the full Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations. After the resolution was
reported to the Senate, no further action was taken in the 113th
Congress.
On February 11, 2015, the President provided Congress with his draft proposal for a new IS
AUMF,104
The President’s proposal would authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces that he deems
“necessary and appropriate” against the Islamic State and associated persons or forces, meaning
“individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related
successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” The authorization
does not include authority for the use of U.S. Armed Forces for “enduring offensive ground
combat operations.” The proposal’s authorization would terminate three years after enactment.
The President would be required to report to Congress at least every six months on actions taken
under the proposed IS AUMF, matching the timing of the reporting requirement in Section 4(c) of
the WPR.
In the months since the President began military action against the Islamic State, a number of
proposals to repeal or sunset the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs were introduced, both as part of IS
AUMF and war declaration proposals105
as well as contained in standalone legislative vehicles.106
Proposed repeals were introduced both before and after the President announced his reliance on
103
IS AUMFs introduced in the 113th
and 114th
Congresses: H.J.Res. 123 (113th
Cong.); H.J.Res. 125 (113th
Cong.);
H.J.Res. 128 (113th
Cong.); S.J.Res. 42 (113th
Cong.); S.J.Res. 43 (113th
Cong.); S.J.Res. 44 (113th
Cong.); S.J.Res. 47
(113th
Cong.); H.J.Res. 27 (114th
Cong.); and H.J.Res. 33 (114th
Cong.). War declarations against the Islamic State:
H.J.Res. 127 (113th
Cong.); and S.J.Res. 46 (113th
Cong.).
104
Available at http://www.cq.com/doc/4622425?0&pos=alert&dlvid=115410051&agenttype=13.
105
H.J.Res. 123 (113th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal); H.J.Res. 125 (113th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF
sunset 18 months after enactment); H.J.Res. 128 (113th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset 2 years
after enactment); S.J.Res. 44 (113th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal); S.J.Res. 46 (113th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal);
S.J.Res. 47 (113th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset three years after enactment); H.J.Res. 27 (114th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal and 2001 AUMF sunset three years after enactment); and H.J.Res. 33 (114th
Cong.; 2002
AUMF repeal).
106
H.R. 1303 (114th
Cong.; 2001 AUMF repeal); H.R. 1304 (114th
Cong.; 2002 AUMF repeal); and S. 526 (114th
Cong.; 2001 AUMF sunset three years after enactment).
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice
Congressional Research Service 54
2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his decision to order a wider military campaign against IS
and other forces in September 2014.
In addition to Islamic State-specific measures, legislation was introduced to amend or repeal107
the WPR. The War Powers Consultation Act of 2014 (H.R. 5416; 113th
Congress) drew on
previous legislative efforts to create robust executive branch consultation with Congress prior to
engaging U.S. armed forces in hostilities, requiring the President to consult with a “Joint
Congressional Consultation Committee” made up of congressional leadership and certain
committee chairmen and ranking members prior to commencement of “significant armed
conflict,” with some exceptions.108
The War Powers Against Non-State Actors Act of 2014 (S.
3019; 113th
Congress) would have exempted military action against non-state actors from the
WPR’s withdrawal requirement, and would have authorized the President to continue such action
against a non-state actor after 60 days without specific legislative authority if he “notifies
Congress that continuing military action is necessary because the non-state organization or entity
is a terrorist organization that poses a continuing and imminent threat to the United States and
United States persons.... ” The War Powers Reform Act (H.R. 560; 114th
Congress) would amend
the WPR by (1) strengthening the language in Section 2(c) by stating the President’s war powers
“may be exercised only” when legislatively authorized or in response to a national emergency
caused by attack or imminent attack on the United States, its territories, possessions, or armed
forces; (2) removing the withdrawal requirement and expedited consideration provisions of the
resolution, and adding a prohibition on the use of funds available to the U.S. armed forces for
their introduction into hostilities without legislative authorization or a national emergency; and
(3) amending Section 3 to require, alongside prior consultation, a report “setting forth the
estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement” from the President before
introduction of U.S. armed forces into active or imminent hostilities. Each of these proposals
were referred to committee, and no further congressional action was or has been taken.
Proposed Amendments
After four decades in existence, controversy continues over the War Powers Resolution and its
effectiveness and appropriateness as a system for maintaining a congressional role in the use of
armed forces in conflict. One view is that the War Powers Resolution is basically sound and does
not need amendment.109
Those who hold this opinion believe it has brought about better
communication between the two branches in times of crisis, and has given Congress a vehicle by
which it can act when a majority of Members wish to do so. The Resolution served as a restraint
on the use of armed forces by the President in some cases because of awareness that certain
actions might invoke its provisions. For example, the threat of invoking the War Powers
Resolution may have been helpful in getting U.S. forces out of Grenada, in keeping the number of
military advisers in El Salvador limited to 55, and in prodding Congress to take a stand on
authorizing the war against Iraq.
107
H.R. 120 (114th
Cong.) contains one provision, which would repeal the WPR.
108
H.R. 5416
109
Fascell, Representative Dante B. Testimony. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The War
Powers after 200 years: Congress and the President at Constitutional Impasse. Hearings, July 13 - September 29, 1988.
P. 11.
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A contrary view is that the War Powers Resolution is an inappropriate instrument that restricts the
President’s effectiveness in foreign policy and should be repealed.110
Those with this perspective
believe that the basic premise of the War Powers Resolution is wrong because in it, Congress
attempts excessive control of the deployment of U.S. military forces, encroaching on the
responsibility of the President.111
Supporters of repeal contend that the President needs more
flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers
Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical. Some holding this view contend that Congress has
always had the power, through appropriations and general lawmaking, to inquire into, support,
limit, or prohibit specific uses of U.S. Armed Forces if there is majority support. The War Powers
Resolution does not fundamentally change this equation, it is argued, but it complicates action,
misleads military opponents, and diverts attention from key policy questions.
A third view is that the War Powers Resolution has not been adequate to accomplish its objectives
and needs to be strengthened or reshaped.112
Proponents of this view assert that Presidents have
continued to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities without consulting Congress and without
congressional authorization. Presidents have cited Section 4(a)(1) on only one occasion—
Mayaguez—and by the time the action was reported, it was virtually over.
Holders of this third view have proposed various types of amendments to the War Powers
Resolution. These include returning to the version originally passed by the Senate, establishing a
congressional consultation group, adding a cutoff of funds, and providing for judicial review. A
general discussion of these categories of possible changes follows.
Return to Senate Version: Enumerating Exceptions for
Emergency Use
In 1977, Senator Thomas Eagleton proposed that the War Powers Resolution return to the original
language of the version passed by the Senate, and this proposal has been made several times
since. This would require prior congressional authorization for the introduction of forces into
conflict abroad without a declaration of war except to respond to or forestall an armed attack
against the United States or its forces or to protect U.S. citizens while evacuating them. The
amendment would eliminate the construction that the President has 60 to 90 days in which he can
militarily act without authorization. Opponents fear the exceptions to forestall attacks or rescue
American citizens abroad would serve as a blanket authorization and might be abused, yet might
not allow the needed speed of action and provide adequate flexibility in other circumstances.
110
Examples of bills to repeal the War Powers Resolution include S. 2030 introduced by Senator Barry Goldwater on
October 31, 1983, H.R. 2525 introduced by Representative Robert Dornan on May 27, 1987, and S. 5 introduced by
Senator Robert Dole on January 4, 1995. See also the most recent major legislative floor debate on repeal of the War
Powers Resolution, held on June 7, 1995. This debate centered on an amendment to H.R. 1561, offered by
Representative Henry Hyde, which would have repealed most of the key elements of the War Powers Resolution. The
amendment was defeated by a vote of 217-201. Congressional Record, June 7, 1995, pp. H5655-H5674 [daily edition].
111
Congressional Record, July 12, 1983, p. S9670.
112
A broad-gauged proposal reflective of this view is S. 564, Use of Force Act, introduced by Senator Biden on March
15, 1995.
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Shorten or Eliminate Time Limitation
Another proposal is to shorten the time period that the President could maintain forces in hostile
situations abroad without congressional authorization from 60 to 30 days, or eliminate it
altogether. Some proponents of this amendment contend the current War Powers Resolution gives
the President 60 to 90 days to do as he chooses and that this provides too much opportunity for
mischief or irreversible action. The original Senate version provided that the use of armed forces
in hostilities or imminent hostilities in any of the emergency situations could not be sustained
beyond 30 days without specific congressional authorization, extendable by the President upon
certification of necessity for safe disengagement. Opponents of this and related measures argue
that they induce military opponents to adopt strategies to win given conflicts in Congress that
they could not win in the field over time.
Replace Automatic Withdrawal Requirement
The War Powers Resolution has an automatic requirement for withdrawal of troops 60 days after
the President submits a Section 4(a)(1) report. Some Members of Congress favor replacing this
provision with expedited procedures for a joint resolution to authorize the action or require
disengagement. One of the main executive branch objections to the War Powers Resolution has
been that the withdrawal requirement could be triggered by congressional inaction, and that
adversaries can simply wait out the 60 days. By providing for withdrawal by joint resolution, this
amendment would also deal with the provision for withdrawal by concurrent resolution, under a
cloud because of the Chadha decision. On the other hand, a joint resolution requiring
disengagement could be vetoed by the President and thus would require a two-thirds majority
vote in both Houses for enactment.
Cutoff of Funds
Some proposals call for prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of funds for any use of U.S.
armed forces in violation of the War Powers Resolution or laws passed under it except for the
purpose of removing troops.113
Congress could enforce this provision by refusing to appropriate
further funds to continue the military action. This has always been the case, some contend, and
would not work because Congress would remain reluctant to withhold financial support for U.S.
Armed Forces once they were abroad.
Elimination of Action by Concurrent Resolution
Many proposed amendments eliminate Section 5(c) providing that U.S. forces engaged in
hostilities abroad without congressional authorization are to be removed if Congress so directs by
113
S.J.Res. 323, introduced by Senators Byrd, Warner, and Nunn, May 19, 1988. On September 29, 1983, Senators
Cranston, Eagleton, and Stennis introduced an amendment to this effect that had been proposed in the Senate Foreign
Relations in July 1977 and known as Committee Print No. 2, July 1, 1977. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
Foreign Relations. War Powers. Hearings, July 13, 14 and 15, 1977. Wash., GPO, 1977. P.338. For a review of the use
of funding cutoffs by Congress since 1970 see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since
1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments, by Richard F. Grimmett and CRS Report RL33837,
Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia, and
Thomas J. Nicola.
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concurrent resolution, and Section 7 providing priority procedures for a concurrent resolution.
Those who hold this view contend the concurrent resolution section is invalid because of the
Chadha decision.
Expedited Procedures
Several proposals call for new and more detailed priority procedures for joint resolutions
introduced under the War Powers Resolution. These would apply to joint resolutions either
authorizing a military action or calling for the withdrawal of forces, and to congressional action to
sustain or override a presidential veto of the joint resolution.114
Consultation Group
Several proposed amendments have focused on improving consultation under the War Powers
Resolution, particularly by establishing a specific consultation group in Congress for this purpose.
Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell have proposed the President regularly consult with an
initial group of 6 Members—the majority and minority leaders of both Chambers plus the
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate. Upon a request from a majority of
this core group, the President is to consult with a permanent consultative group of 18 Members
consisting of the leadership and the ranking and minority members of the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence. The permanent consultative group would also be
able to determine that the President should have reported an introduction of forces and to
introduce a joint resolution of authorization or withdrawal that would receive expedited
procedures.115
Other Members have favored a consultation group, but consider that amendment of the War
Powers Resolution is not required for Congress to designate such a group.116
On October 28,
1993, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Lee Hamilton introduced H.R. 3405 to establish a
Standing Consultative Group. Its purpose would be to facilitate improved interaction between the
executive branch and Congress on the use of U.S. military forces abroad, including under the War
Powers Resolution or United Nations auspices. Members of the Consultative Group would be
appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, after consultation
with the minority leaders. The Group would include majority and minority representatives of the
leadership and the committees on foreign policy, armed services, intelligence, and appropriations.
Another proposal would attempt to improve consultation by broadening the instances in which
the President is required to consult. This proposal would cover all situations in which a President
is required to report, rather than only circumstances that invoke the time limitation, as is now the
case.117
114
See Krotoski, Mark L. Essential Elements of Reform of the War Powers Resolution. Santa Clara Law Review. Vol.
28, Summer 1989, p. 609-750.
115
S.J.Res. 323, introduced May 19, 1988.
116
Fascell, Representative Dante. Testimony before Foreign Relations Committee, July 13, 1988.
117
Strengthening Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs Committee Print, October
1983, p. 67.
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Judicial Review
Proposals have been made that any Member of Congress may bring an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for judgment and injunctive relief on the grounds that
the President or the U.S. Armed Forces have not complied with any provision of the War Powers
Resolution. The intent of this legislation is to give standing to Members to assert the interest of
the House or Senate, but whether it would impel courts to exercise jurisdiction is uncertain. Most
recent federal court decisions have rejected War Powers lawsuits by congressional litigants on the
grounds they lacked standing to sue. Proposals have also called for the court not to decline to
make a determination on the merits, on the grounds that the issue of compliance is a political
question or otherwise nonjusticiable; to accord expedited consideration to the matter; and to
prescribe judicial remedies including that the President submit a report or remove Armed Forces
from a situation.118
Change of Name
Other proposals would construct a Hostilities Act or Use of Force Act and repeal the War Powers
Resolution.119
A possible objection to invoking the War Powers Resolution is reluctance to
escalate international tension by implying that a situation is war. Some would see this as a step in
the wrong direction; in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, some contend, it was self-deceptive and
ultimately impractical not to recognize hostilities of that magnitude as war and bring to bear the
Constitutional provision giving Congress the power to declare war.
United Nations Actions
With the increase in United Nations actions since the end of the Cold War, the question has been
raised whether the War Powers Resolution should be amended to facilitate or restrain the
President from supplying forces for U.N. actions without congressional approval. Alternatively,
the United Nations Participation Act might be amended, or new legislation enacted, to specify
how the War Powers Resolution is to be applied, and whether the approval of Congress would be
required only for an initial framework agreement on providing forces to the United Nations, or
whether Congress would be required to approve an agreement to supply forces in specified
situations, particularly for U.N. peacekeeping operations.
118
H.J.Res. 95, War Powers Amendments of 1995, introduced by Representative DeFazio, June 16, 1995.
119
H.R. 3912, Introduced by Representative Lungren, February 4, 1988. Biden, Joseph R. Jr. and John B. Ritch. The
War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: a “Joint Decision” Solution. Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 77:367.
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Appendix A. Instances Reported Under the War
Powers Resolution
This appendix lists reports Presidents have made to Congress as the result of the War Powers
Resolution. Each entry contains the President’s reference to the War Powers Resolution.120
The
reports generally cite the President’s authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander-inChief;
each entry indicates any additional legislative authority a President cites for his action.
Several of the reports listed for the period since 1991, in particular, are reports regarding ongoing
operations previously reported by the President, rather than completely new instances of use of
the U.S. military overseas.
(1) Danang, Vietnam. On April 4, 1975, President Ford reported the use of naval vessels,
helicopters, and Marines to transport refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas in
Vietnam. His report mentioned Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution and authorization in
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for humanitarian assistance to refugees suffering from the
hostilities in South Vietnam. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, testified
later that the President “advised the members of the Senate and House leadership that a severe
emergency existed in the coastal communities of South Vietnam and that he was directing
American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from coastal
seaports.”121
(2) Cambodia. On April 12, 1975, President Ford reported the use of ground combat Marines,
helicopters, and supporting tactical air elements to assist with the evacuation of U.S. nationals
from Cambodia. The report took note of both Section 4 and Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers
Resolution. On April 3, 1975, the day the President authorized the Ambassador to evacuate the
American staff, he directed that the leaders of the Senate and House be advised of the general
plan of evacuation. On April 11, the day he ordered the final evacuation, President Ford again
directed that congressional leaders be notified.
(3) Vietnam. On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported the use of helicopters, Marines, and
fighter aircraft to aid in the evacuation of U.S. citizens and others from South Vietnam. The report
took note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. On April 10, the President had asked
Congress to clarify its limitation on the use of forces in Vietnam to insure evacuation of U.S.
citizens and to cover some Vietnamese nationals, but legislation to this effect was not completed.
On April 28, the President directed that congressional leaders be notified that the final phase of
the evacuation of Saigon would be carried out by military forces within the next few hours.122
120
Two of the reports did not mention the War Powers Resolution but met the basic requirement of reporting specified
deployments or uses of forces. For the text of the reports until April 12, 1994, and other key documents and
correspondence see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights. The War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Reports,
Correspondence. Committee Print., 103rd
Congress, second session, May 1994. 267 p.
121
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A test of compliance relative to the
Danang sealift, the evacuation of Phnom Penh, the evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident. Hearings, May 7
and June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1975. p. 3.
122
Ibid., p. 6.
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(4) Mayaguez. On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported that he had ordered U.S. military
forces to rescue the crew of and retake the ship Mayaguez that had been seized by Cambodian
naval patrol boats on May 12, that the ship had been retaken, and that the withdrawal of the forces
had been undertaken. The report took note of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. On
May 13, Administration aides contacted 10 Members from the House and 11 Senators regarding
the military measures directed by the President.123
(5) Iran. On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of six aircraft and eight helicopters
in an unsuccessful attempt of April 24 to rescue the American hostages in Iran. The report was
submitted “consistent with the reporting provision” of the War Powers Resolution. President
Carter said the United States was acting in accordance with its right under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in
which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them. The Administration did not inform
congressional leaders of the plan on grounds that consultation could endanger the success of the
mission.
(6) Sinai. The United States, Egypt, and Israel signed an executive agreement on August 3, 1981,
outlining U.S. participation in a Multinational Force and Observers unit to function as a
peacekeeping force in the Sinai after Israel withdrew its forces. In anticipation of this accord, on
July 21, 1981, President Reagan requested congressional authorization for U.S. participation.
Congress authorized President Reagan to deploy military personnel to the Sinai in the
Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution, P.L. 97-132, signed December 29,
1981. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of military personnel and
equipment to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The President said the report
was provided “consistent with Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution” and cited the
Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution.
(7) Lebanon. On August 24, 1982, President Reagan reported the dispatch of 800 Marines to
serve in the multinational force to assist in the withdrawal of members of the Palestine Liberation
force from Lebanon. The report was provided “consistent with” but did not cite any specific
provision of the War Powers Resolution. President Reagan had begun discussions with
congressional leaders on July 6, 1982 after the plan had been publicly announced, and after leaks
in the Israeli press indicated that he had approved the plan on July 2.124
(8) Lebanon. On September 29, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of 1,200
Marines to serve in a temporary multinational force to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese
government sovereignty. He said the report was being submitted “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution.” On this second Multinational Force in Lebanon there was a considerable amount of
negotiation between the executive branch and Congress, but most of it occurred after the decision
to participate had been made and the Marines were in Lebanon.125
(9) Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS
electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces
to Sudan to assist Chad and other friendly governments helping Chad against Libyan and rebel
forces. He said the report was being submitted consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers
123
Ibid., p. 78.
124
Oberdorfer, Don and John M. Goshko. Peace-keeping Force. Washington Post, July 7, 1982, p. 1.
125
Gwetzman, Bernard. U.S. To Send Back Marines to Beirut. New York Times, September 21, 1982, p. 1.
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Resolution. On August 23, 1983, a State Department spokesman announced that the planes were
being withdrawn.
(10) Lebanon. On August 30, 1983, after the Marines participating in the Multinational Force in
Lebanon were fired upon and two were killed, President Reagan submitted a report “consistent
with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.” In P.L. 98-119, the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution, signed October 12, 1983, Congress determined Section 4(a) had become
operative on August 29, 1983, and authorized the forces to remain for 18 months.
(11) Grenada. On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported that U.S. Army and Marine
personnel had begun landing in Grenada to join collective security forces of the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States in assisting in the restoration of law and order in Grenada and to
facilitate the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. He submitted the report “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution.” President Reagan met with several congressional leaders at 8 p.m.
on October 24.126
This was after the directive ordering the landing had been signed at 6 p.m., but
before the actual invasion that began at 5:30 a.m., October 25.
(12) Libya. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported (without any mention of the War
Powers Resolution) that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces conducting freedom of navigation
exercises in the Gulf of Sidra had been attacked by Libyan missiles. In response, the United
States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the missile site.
(13) Libya. On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” that on April 14 U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist
facilities and military installations in Libya. President Reagan had invited approximately a dozen
congressional leaders to the White House at about 4 p.m. on April 14 and discussed the situation
until 6 p.m. He indicated that he had ordered the bombing raid and that the aircraft from the
United Kingdom were on their way to Libya and would reach their targets about 7 p.m.
(14) Persian Gulf.127
On September 23, 1987, President Reagan reported that, on September 21,
two U.S. helicopters had fired on an Iranian landing craft observed laying mines in the Gulf. The
President said that while mindful of legislative-executive differences on the interpretation and
constitutionality of certain provisions of the War Powers Resolution, he was reporting in a spirit
of mutual cooperation.
(15) Persian Gulf. On October 10, 1987, President Reagan reported “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that, on October 8, three U.S. helicopters were fired upon by small Iranian
naval vessels and the helicopters returned fire and sank one of the vessels.
(16) Persian Gulf. On October 20, 1987, President Reagan reported an attack by an Iranian
Silkworm missile against the U.S.-flag tanker Sea Isle City on October 15 and U.S. destruction,
on October 19, of the Iranian Rashadat armed platform used to support attacks and mine-laying
operations. The report was submitted “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”
126
U.S. Declares Goal in to Protect Americans and Restore Order. Washington Post, October 26, 1983. P. A7.
127
Earlier, on September 21, 1987, Secretary of State George P. Shultz submitted a report concerning the Iraqi aircraft
missile attack on the U.S.S. Stark in the Persian Gulf similar to reports in this list submitted by Presidents. The report
did not mention the War Powers Resolution but said the U.S. presence had been maintained in the Gulf pursuant to the
authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief.
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(17) Persian Gulf. On April 19, 1988, President Reagan reported “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that in response to the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine on April 14,
U.S. Armed Forces attacked and “neutralized” two Iranian oil platforms on April 18 and, after
further Iranian attacks, damaged or sank Iranian vessels. The President called the actions
“necessary and proportionate.” Prior to this action, the President met with congressional leaders.
(18) Persian Gulf. On July 4, 1988, President Reagan reported that on July 3 the USS Vincennes
and USS Elmer Montgomery fired upon approaching Iranian small craft, sinking two. Firing in
self-defense at what it believed to be a hostile Iranian military aircraft, the Vincennes had shot
down an Iranian civilian airliner. The President expressed deep regret. The report was submitted
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”
(19) Persian Gulf. On July 14, 1988, President Reagan reported that, on July 12, two U.S.
helicopters, responding to a distress call from a Japanese-owned Panamanian tanker, were fired at
by two small Iranian boats and returned the fire. The report was submitted “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution.”
(20) Philippines. On December 2, 1989, President George H. W. Bush submitted a report to
congressional leaders “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution, describing assistance of
combat air patrols to help the Aquino government in the Philippines restore order and to protect
American lives. After the planes had taken off from Clark Air Base to provide air cover, Vice
President Quayle and other officials informed congressional leaders. On December 7, House
Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell wrote President Bush expressing his concern
for the lack of advance consultation. In reply, on February 10, 1990, National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft wrote Chairman Fascell that the President was “committed to consultations with
Congress prior to deployments of U.S. Forces into actual or imminent hostilities in all instances
where such consultations are possible. In this instance, the nature of the rapidly evolving situation
required an extremely rapid decision very late at night and consultation was simply not an
option.”
(21) Panama. On December 21, 1989, President George H. W. Bush reported “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that he had ordered U.S. military forces to Panama to protect the
lives of American citizens and bring General Noriega to justice. By February 13, 1990, all the
invasion forces had been withdrawn. President Bush informed several congressional leaders of
the approaching invasion of Panama at 6 p.m. on December 19, 1989. This was after the decision
to take action was made, but before the operation actually began at 1:00 a.m., December 20.
(22) Liberia. On August 6, 1990, President George H. W. Bush reported to Congress that
following discussions with congressional leaders, a reinforced rifle company had been sent to
provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia and helicopter teams had evacuated
U.S. citizens from Liberia. The report did not mention the War Powers Resolution or cite any
authority.
(23) Iraq. On August 9, 1990, President George H. W. Bush reported to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution” that he had ordered the forward deployment of substantial
elements of the U.S. Armed Forces into the Persian Gulf region to help defend Saudi Arabia after
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The Bush Administration notified congressional leaders that it
was deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia on August 7, the date of the deployment. After the
forces had been deployed, President Bush held several meetings with congressional leaders and
members of relevant committees, and committees held hearings to discuss the situation.
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(24) Iraq. On November 16, 1990, President George H. W. Bush reported, without mention of the
War Powers Resolution but referring to the August 9 letter, the continued buildup to ensure “an
adequate offensive military option.” Just prior to adjournment, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell
and Speaker Foley designated Members to form a consultation group, and the President held
meetings with the group on some occasions, but he did not consult the members in advance on the
major buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf area announced November 8.
(25) Iraq. On January 18, 1991, President George H. W. Bush reported to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution” that he had directed U.S. Armed Forces to commence combat
operations on January 16 against Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. On January
12, Congress had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution (P.L.
102-1), which stated it was the specific statutory authorization required by the War Powers
Resolution. P.L. 102-1 required the President to submit a report to the Congress at least once
every 60 days on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N. Security Council
resolution, and Presidents submitted subsequent reports on military actions in Iraq “consistent
with” P.L. 102-1. An exception is report submitted June 28, 1993, described below.
(26) Somalia. On December 10, 1992, President George H. W. Bush reported “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution” that U.S. armed forces had entered Somalia on December 8 in response
to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security Council Resolution determining that the situation
constituted a threat to international peace. He included as authority applicable treaties and laws,
and said he had also taken into account views expressed in H.Con.Res. 370, S.Con.Res. 132,
and the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act, P.L. 102-274. On December 4, the day
the President ordered the forces deployed, he briefed a number of congressional leaders on the
action.
(27) Bosnia. On April 13, 1993, President Clinton reported “consistent with Section 4 of the War
Powers Resolution” that U.S. forces were participating in a NATO air action to enforce a U.N.
ban on all unauthorized military flights over Bosnia-Hercegovina, pursuant to his authority as
Commander-in-Chief. Later, on April 27, President Clinton consulted with about two dozen
congressional leaders on potential further action.
(28) Somalia. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks against
U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had
participated in military action to quell the violence. He said the report was “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution, in light of the passage of 6 months since President Bush’s initial report....
” He said the action was in accordance with applicable treaties and laws, and said the deployment
was consistent with S.J.Res. 45 as adopted by the Senate and amended by the House. (The
Senate did not act on the House amendment, so Congress did not take final action on S.J.Res.
45.)
(29) Iraq. On June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that on June 26 U.S. naval forces had launched missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence
Service’s headquarters in Baghdad in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former
President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993.
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(30) Macedonia.128
On July 9, 1993, President Clinton reported “consistent with Section 4 of the
War Powers Resolution” the deployment of approximately 350 U.S. armed forces to Macedonia
to participate in the U.N. Protection Force to help maintain stability in the area of former
Yugoslavia. He said the deployment was directed in accordance with Section 7 of the United
Nations Participation Act.
(31) Bosnia. On October 13, 1993, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that U.S. military forces continued to support enforcement of the U.N. no-fly zone in
Bosnia, noting that more than 50 U.S. aircraft were now available for NATO efforts in this regard.
(32) Haiti. On October 20, 1993, President Clinton submitted a report “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that U.S. ships had begun to enforce a U.N. embargo against Haiti.
(33) Macedonia. On January 8, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that approximately 300 members of a reinforced company team (RCT) of the
U.S. Army’s 3rd
Infantry Division (Mechanized) had assumed a peacekeeping role in Macedonia
as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on January 6, 1994.
(34) Bosnia. On February 17, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that the United States had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO
efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were available
for participation in the authorized NATO missions.
(35) Bosnia. On March 1, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution that on February 28 U.S. planes patrolling the “no-fly zone” in former Yugoslavia
under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes.
(36) Bosnia. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution that on April 10 and 11, U.S. warplanes under NATO command had fired against
Bosnian Serb forces shelling the “safe” city of Gorazde.
(37) Rwanda. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution that combat-equipped U.S. military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct
possible non-combatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals
from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out.
(38) Macedonia. On April 19, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that the U.S. contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had been
augmented by a reinforced company of 200 personnel.
(39) Haiti. On April 20, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement in the waters around Haiti and that
712 vessels had been boarded.
(40) Bosnia. On August 22, 1994, President Clinton reported the use on August 5 of U.S. aircraft
under NATO to attack Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion
128
See footnote 66 above discussing Macedonia.
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zone upon request of the U.N. Protection Forces. He did not cite the War Powers Resolution but
referred to the April 12 report that cited the War Powers Resolution.
(41) Haiti. On September 21, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” the deployment of 1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy in Haiti. The troop
level was subsequently increased to 20,000.
(42) Bosnia. On November 22, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” the use of U.S. combat aircraft on November 21, 1994 under NATO to attack bases
used by Serbs to attack the town of Bihac in Bosnia.
(43) Macedonia. On December 22, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that the U.S. Army contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
continued its peacekeeping mission and that the current contingent would soon be replaced by
about 500 soldiers from the 3rd
Battalion, 5th
Cavalry Regiment, 1st
Armored Division from
Kirchgons, Germany.
(44) Somalia. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. armed forces personnel
began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned
there to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).
(45) Haiti. On March 21, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that U.S. military forces in Haiti as part of a U.N. Multinational Force had been
reduced to just under 5,300 personnel. He noted that as of March 31, 1995, approximately 2,500
U.S. personnel would remain in Haiti as part of the U.N. Mission in Haiti UNMIH).
(46) Bosnia. On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft continued to contribute
to NATO’s enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he
noted, are also available for close air support of U.N. forces in Croatia. Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers
continue to be deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N.
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). U.S. forces continue to support U.N. refugee and
embargo operations in this region.
(47) Bosnia. On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution,” that “U.S. combat and support aircraft” had been used beginning on August 29,
1995, in a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in BosniaHerzegovina
that were threatening the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde.”
He noted that during the first day of operations, “some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets
in the vicinity of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Goradzde and Mostar.”
(48) Haiti. On September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that the United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the
U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In addition, 260 U.S. military personnel are assigned to the U.S.
Support Group Haiti.
(49) Bosnia. On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that he had “ordered the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military
personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO ‘enabling force’ to lay the
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groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force
(IFOR),” which would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing. The
President also noted that he had authorized deployment of roughly 3,000 other U.S. military
personnel to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and the
IFOR.
(50) Bosnia. On December 21, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution” that he had ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S.
military personnel to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in
other former Yugoslav states, primarily in Croatia. In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces
would be deployed to Hungary, Italy and Croatia and other regional states in support of IFOR’s
mission. The President ordered participation of U.S. forces “pursuant to” his “constitutional
authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief and
Chief Executive.”
(51) Haiti. On March 21, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that beginning in January 1996 there had been a “phased reduction” in the
number of United States personnel assigned to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). As
of March 21, 309 U.S. personnel remained a part of UNMIH. These U.S. forces were “equipped
for combat.”
(52) Liberia. On April 11, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that on April 9, 1996 due to the “deterioration of the security situation and
the resulting threat to American citizens” in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to
evacuate from that country “private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had
taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound.... ”
(53) Liberia. On May 20, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” of the continued deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate
both American citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated “attacks on
the American Embassy complex” in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of U.S.
forces would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy
and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.
(54) Central African Republic. On May 23, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” of the deployment of U.S. military personnel to
Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of “private U.S.
citizens and certain U.S. Government employees,” and to provide “enhanced security” for the
American Embassy in Bangui.
(55) Bosnia. On June 21, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that United States forces totaling about 17,000 remain deployed in Bosnia
“under NATO operational command and control” as part of the NATO Implementation Force
(IFOR). In addition, about 5,500 U.S. military personnel are deployed in Hungary, Italy and
Croatia, and other regional states to provide “logistical and other support to IFOR.” The President
noted that it was the intention that IFOR would complete the withdrawal of all troops in the
weeks after December 20, 1996, on a schedule “set by NATO commanders consistent with the
safety of troops and the logistical requirements for an orderly withdrawal.” He also noted that a
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U.S. Army contingent (of about 500 U.S. soldiers) remains in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia as part of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
(56) Rwanda and Zaire. On December 2, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that in support of the humanitarian efforts of the United
Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had
authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying
the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area,
and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.
(57) Bosnia. On December 20, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that he had authorized U.S. participation in an IFOR follow-on force in
Bosnia, known as SFOR (Stabilization Force), under NATO command. The President said the
U.S. forces contribution to SFOR was to be “about 8,500” personnel whose primary mission was
to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace in Bosnia. SFOR’s duration
was Bosnia is expected to be 18 months, with progressive reductions and eventual withdrawal.
(58) Albania. On March 15, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that on March 13, 1997, he had utilized U.S. military forces to evacuate
certain U.S. Government employees and private U.S. citizens from Tirana, Albania, and to
enhance security for the U.S. embassy in that city.
(59) Congo and Gabon. On March 27, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S.
military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for
American private citizens, government employees and selected third country nationals in Zaire,
and be available for any necessary evacuation operation.
(60) Sierra Leone. On May 30, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that on May 29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were
deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S.
Government employees and private U.S. citizens.
(61) Bosnia. On June 20, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that U.S. Armed Forces continued to support peacekeeping operations in
Bosnia and other states in the region in support of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). He
reported that most U.S. military personnel then involved in SFOR were in Bosnia, near Tuzla, and
about 2,800 U.S. troops were deployed in Hungary, Croatia, Italy, and other regional states to
provide logistics and other support to SFOR. A U.S. Army contingent of about 500 also remained
deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventative
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
(62) Cambodia. On July 11, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that in an effort to ensure the security of American citizens in Cambodia
during a period of domestic conflict there, he had deployed a Task Force of about 550 U.S.
military personnel to Utapao Air Base in Thailand. These personnel were to be available for
possible emergency evacuation operations in Cambodia.
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(63) Bosnia. On December 19, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that he intended “in principle” to have the United States participate in a
security presence in Bosnia when the NATO SFOR contingent withdrew in the summer of 1998.
(64) Guinea-Bissau. On June 12, 1998 President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that, on June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in GuineaBissau
endangering the U.S. Embassy and U.S. government employees and citizens in that
country, he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal,
to remove such individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau.
(65) Bosnia. On June 19, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” regarding activities in the last six months of combat-equipped U.S. forces in
support of NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia and surrounding areas of former Yugoslavia.
(66) Kenya and Tanzania. On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint
Task Force of U.S. military personnel to Nairobi, Kenya to coordinate the medical and disaster
assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported
that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania to enhance the security of the U.S. embassies and citizens there.
(67) Albania. On August 18, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress, “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that he had, on August 16, 1998, deployed 200 U.S. Marines and 10
Navy SEALS to the U.S. Embassy compound in Tirana, Albania to enhance security against
reported threats against U.S. personnel.
(68) Afghanistan and Sudan. On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20th
against camps and installations in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist
organization. The President did so based on what he termed convincing information that the bin
Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania.
(69) Liberia. On September 29, 1998, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution” that he had deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force
to Liberia to augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a
rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel from
the country.
(70) Bosnia. On January 19, 1999, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that pursuant to his authority as Commander-in-Chief he was
continuing to authorize the use of combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and other states
in the region to participate in and support the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). He noted
that U.S. SFOR military personnel totaled about 6,900, with about 2,300 U.S. military personnel
deployed to Hungary, Croatia, Italy and other regional states. Also some 350 U.S. military
personnel remain deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as part of
the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
(71) Kenya. On February 25, 1999, President Clinton submitted a supplemental report to
Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” describing the continuing deployment of
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U.S. military personnel in Kenya to provide continuing security for U.S. embassy and American
citizens in Nairobi in the aftermath of the terrorist bombing there.
(72) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On March 26, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction
and acting jointly with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to
the Yugoslav government’s campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian
population in Kosovo.
(73) Yugoslavia/Albania. On April 7, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” that he had ordered additional U.S. military forces to Albania,
including rotary wing aircraft, artillery, and tactical missiles systems to enhance NATO’s ability
to conduct effective air operations in Yugoslavia. About 2,500 soldiers and aviators are to be
deployed as part of this task force.
(74) Yugoslavia/Albania. On May 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution” that he had directed “deployment of additional aircraft and
forces to support NATO’s ongoing efforts [against Yugoslavia], including several thousand
additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Albania in support of the deep strike force located
there.” He also directed that additional U.S. forces be deployed to the region to assist in
“humanitarian operations.”
(75) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On June 12, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that he had directed the deployment of about “7,000 U.S.
military personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led
security force (KFOR)” being assembled in Kosovo. He also noted that about “1,500 U.S.
military personnel, under separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in
the region, as our national support element, in support of KFOR.”
(76) Bosnia. On July 19, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that about 6,200 U.S. military personnel were continuing to participate in the
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and that another 2,200 personnel were
supporting SFOR operations from Hungary, Croatia, and Italy. He also noted that U.S. military
personnel remain in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to support the international
security presence in Kososo (KFOR).
(77) East Timor. On October 8, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that he had directed the deployment of a limited number of U.S.
military forces to East Timor to support the U.N. multinational force (INTERFET) aimed at
restoring peace to East Timor. U.S. support had been limited initially to “communications,
logistics, planning assistance and transportation.” The President further noted that he had
authorized deployment of the amphibious ship USS Belleau Wood, together with its helicopters
and her complement of personnel from the 31st
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable) (MEU SOC) to the East Timor region, to provide helicopter airlift and search and rescue
support to the multinational operation. U.S. participation was anticipated to continue until the
transition to a U.N. peacekeeping operation was complete.
(78) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On December 15, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel
continued to serve as part of the NATO-led security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that the
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American contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was “approximately 8,500 U.S. military personnel.”
U.S. forces were deployed in a sector centered around “Urosevac in the eastern portion of
Kosovo.” For U.S. KFOR forces, “maintaining public security is a key task.” Other U.S. military
personnel are deployed to other countries in the region to serve in administrative and logistics
support roles for U.S. forces in KFOR. Of these forces, about 1,500 U.S. military personnel are in
Macedonia and Greece, and occasionally in Albania.
(79) Bosnia. On January 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution” that the U.S. continued to provide combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces
to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other states in the region as part of the NATO-led Stabilization
Force (SFOR). The President noted that the U.S. force contribution was being reduced from
“approximately 6,200 to 4,600 personnel,” with the U.S. forces assigned to Multinational
Division, North, centered around the city of Tuzla. He added that approximately 1,500 U.S.
military personnel were deployed to Hungary, Croatia, and Italy to provide “logistical and other
support to SFOR,” and that U.S. forces continue to support SFOR in “efforts to apprehend
persons indicted for war crimes.”
(80) East Timor. On February 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that he had authorized the participation of a small number of U.S.
military personnel in support of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), with a mandate to maintain law and order throughout East Timor, facilitate
establishment of an effective administration there, deliver humanitarian assistance, and support
the building of self-government. The President reported that the U.S. contingent was small: three
military observers, and one judge advocate. To facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in
East Timor, the President also authorized the deployment of a support group (USGET), consisting
of 30 U.S. personnel. U.S. personnel would be temporarily deployed to East Timor, on a
rotational basis, and through periodic ship visits, during which U.S. forces would conduct
“humanitarian and assistance activities throughout East Timor.” Rotational activities should
continue through the summer of 2000.
(81) Sierra Leone. On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra
Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also
authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver “ammunition, and other supplies and equipment” to
Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.
(82) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On June 16, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that the U.S. was continuing to provide military personnel to
the NATO-led KFOR security force in Kosovo. U.S. forces were numbered at 7,500, but were
scheduled to be reduced to 6,000 when ongoing troop rotations were completed. U.S. forces in
Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered near Gnjilane in eastern Kosovo. Other U.S. military
personnel are deployed to other countries to serve in administrative and logistics support roles,
with approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel in Macedonia, Albania, and Greece.
(83) Bosnia. On July 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to participate in the
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being deployed to Bosnia, and
other states in the region in support of peacekeeping efforts in former Yugoslavia. U.S. military
personnel levels have been reduced from 6,200 to 4,600. Apart from the forces in Bosnia,
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approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel continue to be deployed in support roles in Hungary, Croatia,
and Italy.
(84) East Timor. On August 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress,” consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” that the United States was contributing three military observers to
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) that is charged by the
UN with restoring and maintaining peace and security there. He also noted that the U.S. was
maintaining a military presence in East Timor separate from UNTAET, comprised of about 30
U.S. personnel who facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor and rotational
operations of U.S. forces there. U.S. forces conduct humanitarian and civic assistance activities
for East Timor’s citizens. U.S. rotational presence operations in East Timor were presently
expected, the President said, to continue through December 2000.
(85) Yemen. On October 14, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that on October 12, 2000, in the wake of an attack on the USS COLE in
the port of Aden, Yemen, he had authorized deployment of about 45 military personnel from U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command to Aden to provide “medical, security, and disaster response
assistance.” The President further reported that on October 13, 2000 about 50 U.S. military
security personnel arrived in Aden, and that additional “security elements” may be deployed to
the area, to enhance the ability of the U.S. to ensure the security of the USS COLE and the
personnel responding to the incident. In addition, two U.S. Navy surface combatant vessels are
operating in or near Yemeni territorial waters to provide communications and other support, as
required.
(86) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On December 18, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the United States was continuing to provide
approximately 5,600 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part
of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military
personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional
presence in Albania and Greece. U.S. forces are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in
the eastern portion of Kosovo. The President noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces
is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting “security patrols in urban areas
and in the countryside throughout their sector.”
(87) Bosnia. On January 25, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that about 4,400 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces
continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 650 others
were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.
(88) East Timor. On March 2, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that the U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the
United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining
law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and helping
establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The U.S. had three military observers
attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United
States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), of
approximately 12 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which “facilitates and
coordinates” U.S. military activities in East Timor.
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(89) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On May 18, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the United States was continuing to provide
approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part
of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military
personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional
presence in Greece and Albania. U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered around
Gnjilane in the eastern portion. President Bush noted that the mission for these U.S. military
forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting security patrols in urban
areas and in the countryside through their sector.
(90) Bosnia. On July 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” about 3,800 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be
deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 500 others were based in
Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.
(91) East Timor. On August 31, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the U. S. armed forces were continuing to
support the United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and
maintaining law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and
helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The U.S. had three military
observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor
(USGET), of approximately 20 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which
“facilitates and coordinates” U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational presence
of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor. The President stated that U.S.
forces would continue a presence through December 2001, while options for a U.S. presence in
2002 are being reviewed, with the President’s objective being redeployment of USGET
personnel, as circumstances permit.
(92) Anti-terrorist operations. On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to
Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that in
response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the
“deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign
nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations.” The President noted in efforts
to “prevent and deter terrorism” he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these
and other areas of the world.... ” He stated that he could not now predict “the scope and duration
of these deployments,” nor the “actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United
States.”
(93) Afghanistan. On October 9, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and “Senate Joint Resolution 23” that on October
7, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces “began combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and
their Taliban supporters.” The President stated that he had directed this military action in response
to the September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. “territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the
continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies.” This
military action was “part of our campaign against terrorism” and was “designed to disrupt the use
of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations.”
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(94) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On November 19, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to
Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the United States was continuing to
provide approximately 5,500 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in
Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional
500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an
occasional presence in Greece and Albania. U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector
centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion. President Bush noted that the mission for these
U.S. military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting security
patrols in urban areas and in the countryside through their sector.
(95) Bosnia. On January 21, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that about 3,100 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces
continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 500 others
were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.
(96) East Timor. On February 28, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U. S. armed forces were continuing to support
the United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and
maintaining law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and
helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The U.S. had three military
observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor
(USGET), comprised of approximately 10 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which
“facilitates and coordinates” U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational presence
of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor. The President stated that U.S.
forces would continue a presence through 2002. The President noted his objective was to
gradually reduce the “rotational presence operations,” and to redeploy USGET personnel, as
circumstances permitted.
(97) Anti-terrorist operations. On March 20, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to
Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” on U.S. efforts in the “global war on
Terrorism.” He noted that the “heart of the al-Qaeda training capability” had been “seriously
degraded,” and that the remainder of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters were being “actively
pursued and engaged by the U.S., coalition and Afghan forces.” The United States was also
conducting “maritime interception operations ... to locate and detain suspected al-Qaeda or
Taliban leadership fleeing Afghanistan by sea.” At the Philippine Government’s invitation, the
President had ordered deployed “combat-equipped and combat support forces to train with,
advise, and assist” the Philippines’Armed Forces in enhancing their “existing counterterrorist
capabilities.” The strength of U.S. military forces working with the Philippines was projected to
be 600 personnel. The President noted that he was “assessing options” for assisting other nations,
including Georgia and Yemen, in enhancing their “counterterrorism capabilities, including
training and equipping their armed forces.” He stated that U.S. combat-equipped and combat
support forces would be necessary for these efforts, if undertaken.
(98) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On May 17, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that the U.S. military was continuing to support
peacekeeping efforts of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted
that the current U.S. contribution was about 5,100 military personnel, with an additional 468
personnel in Macedonia; and an occasional presence in Albania and Greece.
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(99) Bosnia. On July 22, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution,” that the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping
efforts of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other
regional states. He noted that the current U.S. contribution was “approximately 2,400 personnel.”
Most U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are assigned to the Multinational Division, North
headquartered in Tuzla. An additional 60 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Hungary and
Croatia to provide logistical and other support.
(100) Anti-terrorist operations. On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support
forces” have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise
the Philippines’Armed Forces in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.” He added that
U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European
Command areas to combat movement, arming, or financing of “international terrorists.” He also
noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the
“counterterrorist capabilities” of their armed forces.
(101) Cote d’Ivoire. On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that in response to a rebellion in Cote d’Ivoire that he had on
September 25, 2002 sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d’Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of
American citizens and third country nationals from the city of Bouake; and otherwise assist in
other evacuations as necessary.
(102) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On November 15, 2002, the President reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that the U.S. was continuing to deploy combat
equipped military personnel as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo
(KFOR). The U.S. had approximately 4,350 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo, with an
additional 266 military personnel in Macedonia. The U.S. also has an occasional presence in
Albania and Greece, associated with the KFOR mission.
(103) Bosnia. On January 21, 2003, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that about 1,800 U.S. Armed Forces personnel continued to be
deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 80 others were based in
Hungary and Croatia, providing logistical and other support.
(104) Anti-terrorist operations. On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” as well as P.L. 107-40, and “pursuant to” his
authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations
globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S. actions
against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations with forces of
Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; “maritime interception operations on the high
seas” in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist
movement and other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen
in counter-terrorism operations.
(105) War against Iraq. On March 21, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” as well as P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-243, and “pursuant to” his
authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had “directed U.S. Armed Forces, operating with other
coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq.” He further stated that
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it was not possible to know at present the duration of active combat operations or the scope
necessary to accomplish the goals of the operation—“to disarm Iraq in pursuit of peace, stability,
and security both in the Gulf region and in the United States.”
(106) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On May 14, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” that combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to be
deployed as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that
about 2,250 U.S. military personnel were deployed in Kosovo, and additional military personnel
operated, on occasion, from Macedonia, Albania, and Greece in support of KFOR operations.
(107) Liberia. On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military
personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible
evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that he had sent about 34
combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S. embassy in Nouakchott,
Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if required. They were expected to
arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar,
Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.
(108) Bosnia. On July 22, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that the United States continued to provide about 1,800 combat-equipped
military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR)
and its peacekeeping efforts in this country.
(109) Liberia. On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had
authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial
waters in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore order and provide
humanitarian assistance in Liberia.
(110) Anti-terrorist operations. On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that U.S. “combat-equipped and combat support
forces” continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as part of U.S. antiterrorism
efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the Philippines, and maritime
interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central, European and Pacific Command
areas of responsibility, to “prevent the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists.”
He also noted that “U.S. combat equipped and support forces” had been deployed to Georgia and
Djibouti to help in enhancing their “counterterrorist capabilities.”
(111) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On November 14, 2003, the President reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that the United States was continuing to deploy
combat equipped military personnel as part of the NATO-led international security force in
Kosovo (KFOR). The United States had approximately 2,100 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo,
with additional American military personnel operating out of Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, in
support of KFOR operations.
(112) Bosnia. On January 22, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that the United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped military
personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) and its
peacekeeping efforts in this country. About 1,800 U.S. personnel are participating.
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(113) Haiti. On February 25, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that, on February 23, he had sent a combat-equipped “security force” of
about “55 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command” to Port-au-Prince, Haiti
to augment the U.S. Embassy security forces there and to protect American citizens and property
in light of the instability created by the armed rebellion in Haiti.
(114) Haiti. On March 2, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that on February 29 he had sent about “200 additional U.S. combat-equipped,
military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command” to Port-au-Prince, Haiti for a variety of
purposes, including preparing the way for a UN Multinational Interim Force, and otherwise
supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1529 (2004).
(115) Anti-terrorist operations. On March 20, 2004, the President sent to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United
States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism (including
in Afghanistan),” as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this
report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia,
Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped
military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900
personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel);
and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N.
Multinational Interim Force.
(116) Anti-terrorist operations. On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple
ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on
terrorism.” These deployments, support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan,
Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report,
the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel
continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel); and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel). Meanwhile, he
stated that the United States continued to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.
(117) Anti-terrorist operations. On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United
States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism,” as well as
operations in Iraq, where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed. U.S. forces are
also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in “enhancing counterterrorism
capabilities” of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped
military personnel were deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel).
Approximately 235 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the
NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such
as counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.
(118) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress
“consistent” with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple
ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on
terrorism,” and in support of the Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160, 000 U.S. military
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personnel are deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya,
Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in “enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities” of these
nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to
be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 220
U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO HeadquartersSarajevo
who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as “counter-terrorism
and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.”
(119) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress “consistent”
with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United
States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in Kosovo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. Presently, about
131, 000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of
Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other
international terrorists operating in the region. U.S. military personnel continue to support the
NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The current U.S. contribution to KFOR is about 1,700 military
personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004 as a
successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in
implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 250 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO
Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as
“counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.”
(120) Lebanon. On July 18, 2006, the President reported to Congress “consistent” with the War
Powers Resolution, that in response to the security threat posed in Lebanon to U.S. Embassy
personnel and citizens and designated third country personnel,” he had deployed combatequipped
military helicopters and military personnel to Beirut to assist in the departure of the
persons under threat from Lebanon. The President noted that additional combat-equipped U.S.
military forces may be deployed “to Lebanon, Cyprus and other locations, as necessary” to assist
further departures of persons from Lebanon and to provide security. He further stated that once
the threat to U.S. citizens and property has ended, the U.S. military forces would redeploy.
(121) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress
“consistent” with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple
ongoing United States military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” in
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq.
Presently, about 134, 000 military personnel are deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed
in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and
other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen. U.S. military personnel
continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was
about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November
22, 2004 as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist
in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel are assigned to the
NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such
as “counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.”
(122) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 15, 2007, the President sent to Congress, “consistent”
with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military
deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led
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Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combatsupport
forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European
(KFOR), and Southern Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations
against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters. The United States was “pursuing and engaging
remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled
approximately 25,945. Of this total, “approximately 14,340 were assigned to the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” The U.S. military continued to support
peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S.
contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 1,584 military personnel.
(123) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 14, 2007, the President sent to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S.
military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the
NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped
and combat-support forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific,
European, and Southern Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations
against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters. The United States was “pursuing and engaging
remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled
approximately 25,900. Of this total, “approximately 15,180 were assigned to the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” The U.S. military supports peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution
to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 1,498 military personnel.
(124) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 13, 2008, the President sent to Congress “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military
deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in support of the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. “combat-equipped and combatsupport
forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and
Southern Command areas of operation” and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida
terrorists and their supporters. The United States is “pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 31,122. Of this
total, “approximately 14,275 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan.” The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo,
specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo
was about 1,500 military personnel.
(125) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 16, 2008, President George W. Bush sent to
Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of
ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations “in support of the war on terror,” and in
support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S.
“combat-equipped and combat-support forces” were deployed to “a number of locations in the
Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command areas of operation” and were engaged
in combat operations against al-Qaida and their supporters. The United States is “actively
pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” U.S. forces in
Afghanistan total approximately 31,000. Of this total, “approximately 13,000 are assigned to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” The U.S. military continued to
support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was about 1,500 military personnel.
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(126) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 15, 2009, President Barack Obama sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” a supplemental consolidated report giving details of
“ongoing contingency operations overseas.” The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces
in Afghanistan was “approximately 58,000,” of which approximately 20,000 were assigned to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” The United States continued to
pursue and engage “remaining al-Qa’ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.” The U.S. also
continued to deploy military forces in support of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. The
current U.S. contribution to this effort is “approximately 138,000 U.S. military personnel.” U.S.
military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Presently the United States contributed approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. In
addition, the United States continued to deploy “U.S. combat-equipped forces to help enhance the
counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies” not only in the Horn of Africa region, but
globally through “maritime interception operations on the high seas” aimed at blocking the
“movement, arming and financing of international terrorists.”
(127) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 5, 2009, the President sent to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of “global
deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed “ongoing U.S.
contingency operations overseas.” The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan was “approximately 68,000,” of which approximately 34,000 are assigned to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continued to
pursue and engage “remaining al-Qa’ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.” The United States
has deployed “various combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific,
European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation” in support of anti-terrorist and
anti-al-Qa’ida actions. The U.S. also continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to “maintain
security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral
agreement between the U.S. and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The U.S.
force level in Iraq was “approximately 116,000 U.S. military personnel.” U.S. military operations
continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The United States
contributed approximately 1,475 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. In addition, the United States
continued to deploy “U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism
capabilities of our friends and allies” not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through
“maritime interception operations on the high seas” aimed at blocking the “movement, arming
and financing of international terrorists.”
(128) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 15, 2010, the President sent to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report, giving details of “deployments of U.S.
Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan was “approximately 87,000,” of which over 62,000 are assigned to the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues combat operations
“against al-Qa’ida terrorists and their Taliban supporters” in Afghanistan. The United States has
deployed “combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific,
European, Southern and African Command areas of operation” in support of anti-terrorist and
anti-al-Qa’ida actions. The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to
“maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a
bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1,
2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is “approximately 95,000 U.S. military personnel.” U.S.
military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Presently, the United States contributes approximately 1,074 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. In
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addition, the United States continues to “conduct maritime interception operations on the high
seas” directed at “stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups.”
(129) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 15, 2010, the President submitted to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report, detailing “deployments of
U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan was “approximately 97,500,” of which over 81,500 were assigned to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States is continuing
combat operations “against al-Qa’ida terrorists and their Taliban supporters” in Afghanistan. The
United States has deployed “combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central,
Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation” in support of antiterrorist
and anti-al-Qa’ida actions. In addition, the United States continues to conduct “maritime
interception operations on the high seas in the areas of responsibility of the geographic combatant
commands” directed at “stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist
groups.” The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq in support of Iraqi
efforts to “maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the
terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on
January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is “approximately 48,400 U.S. military
personnel.” U.S. military operations also continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR). The United States currently contributes approximately 808 U.S. military
personnel to KFOR.
(130) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 15, 2011, the President sent to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of “global
deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed ongoing U.S.
contingency operations overseas. The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan was “approximately 99,000,” of which approximately 83,000 are assigned to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to
pursue and engage “remaining al-Qa’ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” The United States
has deployed various “combat-equipped forces” to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific,
European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation” in support of anti-terrorist and
anti-al-Qa’ida actions. This includes the deployment of U.S. military forces globally to assist in
enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies through maritime
interception operations on the high seas “aimed at stopping the movement, arming and financing
of certain international terrorist groups.” A combat-equipped security force of about “40 U.S.
military personnel from the U.S. Central Command” were deployed to Cairo, Egypt, on January
31, 2011, for the sole purpose of “protecting American citizens and property.” That force remains
at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to
help it “maintain security and stability” there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the
terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on
January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is “approximately 45,000 U.S. military
personnel.” In Libya, since April 4, 2011, the United States has transferred responsibility for
military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement “has assumed a supporting role in the
coalition’s efforts.” U.S. support in Libya has been limited to “intelligence, logistical support, and
search and rescue assistance.” The U.S. military aircraft have also been used to assist in the
“suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone” over Libya. Since
April 23, 2011, the United States has supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of
“unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets” there. Except in the
case of operations to “rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft” on March 21, 2011, “the United States
has deployed no ground forces to Libya.” U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of
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the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Presently the United States contributes approximately 800
U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
(131) Libya. On March 21, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” a report stating that at “approximately 3:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, on
March 19, 2011,” he had directed U.S. military forces to commence “operations to assist an
international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and undertaken
with the support of European allies and Arab partners, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and
address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya.” He further
stated that U.S. military forces, “under the command of Commander, U.S. Africa Command,
began a series of strikes against air defense systems and military airfields for the purposes of
preparing a no-fly zone.” These actions were part of “the multilateral response authorized under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973,” and the President added that “these strikes will be
limited in their nature, duration, and scope. Their purpose is to support an international coalition
as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.
These limited U.S. actions will set the stage for further action by other coalition partners.”
The President noted that
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized Member States, under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, including the establishment and enforcement
of a “no-fly zone” in the airspace of Libya. United States military efforts are discrete and
focused on employing unique U.S. military capabilities to set the conditions for our
European allies and Arab partners to carry out the measures authorized by the U.N. Security
Council Resolution.
The President stated further that the “United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya.
United States forces are conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international
efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster.” Accordingly, he added, “U.S.
forces have targeted the Qadhafi regime’s air defense systems, command and control structures,
and other capabilities of Qadhafi’s armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated
areas.” It was the intent of the United States, he said, to “seek a rapid, but responsible, transition
of operations to coalition, regional, or international organizations that are postured to continue
activities as may be necessary to realize the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970
and 1973.” The President said that the actions he had directed were “in the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States.” He took them, the President stated, “pursuant to my
constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive.”
(132) Central Africa. On October 14, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” a report stating that “he had authorized a small number of
combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces
that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony,” leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA), from the battlefield. For over two decades, the LRA has murdered, kidnapped, and raped
tens of thousands of men, women, and children throughout central Africa, and has continued to
commit atrocities in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African
Republic. The U.S. Armed Forces, the President noted, would be a “significant contribution
toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa.” The President stated that on “October 12, 2011, the
initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda.”
In the “next month, additional forces will deploy, including a second combat-equipped team and
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associated headquarters, communications, and logistics personnel.” The President further stated
that the “total number of U.S. military personnel deploying for this mission is approximately 100.
These forces will act as advisors to partner forces that have the goals of removing from the
battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA.” U.S. forces “will provide
information, advice, and assistance to select partner nation forces.” With the approval of the
respective host nations, “elements of these U.S. forces will deploy into Uganda, South Sudan, the
Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The support provided by
U.S. forces will enhance regional efforts against the LRA.” The President emphasized that even
though the “U.S. forces are combat-equipped, they will only be providing information, advice,
and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless
necessary for self-defense. All appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of
U.S. military personnel during their deployment.” The President took note in his report that
Congress had previously “expressed support for increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help
mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA to civilians and regional stability” through the
passage of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of
2009, P.L. 111-172, enacted May 24, 2010.
(133) Anti-terrorist operations. On December 15, 2011, the President submitted to Congress,
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” a supplemental consolidated report, giving details
of “deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The report detailed ongoing U.S.
contingency operations overseas. The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan was “approximately 93,000,” of which approximately 78,000 are assigned to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to
pursue and engage “remaining al-Qa’ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” The United States
has deployed various “combat-equipped forces” to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific,
European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation in support of anti-terrorist and
anti-al-Qa’ida actions. This includes the deployment of U.S. military forces globally: “including
special operations and other forces” for “sensitive operations” in various places, as well as forces
to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies. U.S. forces also
have engaged in maritime interception operations on the high seas “aimed at stopping the
movement, arming and financing of certain international terrorist groups.” The United States
continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it “maintain security and stability” there. These
Iraqi operations were undertaken pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the
United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The U.S. force level in Iraq
on October 28, 2011, was “36,001 U.S. military personnel.” The U.S. was committed to withdraw
U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. [This occurred, as scheduled, after this report was
submitted]. In Libya, after April 4, 2011, the United States transferred responsibility for military
operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement “assumed a supporting role in the coalition’s
efforts.” U.S. support in Libya was limited to “intelligence, logistical support, and search and
rescue assistance.” The U.S. military aircraft were also used to assist in the “suppression and
destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone” over Libya. After April 23, 2011, the
United States supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of “unmanned aerial vehicles
against a limited set of clearly defined targets” there. Except in the case of operations to “rescue
the crew of a U.S. aircraft” on March 21, 2011, and deploying 16 U.S. military personnel to aid in
re-establishing the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in September 2011, “the U.S. deployed no ground
forces to Libya.” On October 27, 2011, the United Nations terminated the “no-fly zone” effective
October 31, 2011. NATO terminated its mission during this same time. U.S. military operations
continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Presently the United States
contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR.
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(134) Somalia. On January 26, 2012, the President submitted to Congress, “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution,” a report detailing a successful U.S. Special Operations Forces operation
in Somalia of January 24, 2012, to rescue Ms. Jessica Buchanan, a U.S. citizen who had been
kidnapped by a group linked to Somali pirates and financiers. This operation was undertaken “by
a small number of joint combat-equipped U.S. forces” following receipt of reliable intelligence
establishing her location in Somalia. A Danish national Poul Hagen Thisted, kidnapped with Ms.
Buchanan, was also rescued with her.
(135) Anti-terrorist operations. On June 15, 2012, the President reported to Congress,
“consistent with” the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report regarding various
deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat. In the efforts in support of U.S.
counterterrorism (CT) objectives against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban and, associated forces, he noted
that U.S. forces were engaged in Afghanistan in the above effort were “approximately 90,000.”
With regard to other counter-terrorism operations, the President stated that the United States had
deployed “U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the CT capabilities of our friends
and allies including special operations and other forces for sensitive operations in various
locations around the world.” He noted that the “U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia
against members of al-Qa’ida, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are
engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests.” The
President further stated that the U.S. military had been “working closely with the Yemini
government to operationally and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa-ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa’ida today.” He added
that these “joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP
operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and
our interests.” The President noted that he would direct “additional measures against al-Qa’ida,
the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests.” Further information on
such matters is provided in a “classified annex to this report.... ” Other military operations
reported by the President include the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to
Uganda “to serve as advisors to regional forces that are working to apprehend or remove Joseph
Kony and other senior Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leaders from the battlefield and to protect
local populations.” The total number of U.S. military personnel deployed for this mission is
“approximately 90,” and elements of these U.S. forces have been sent to “forward locations in the
LRA-affected areas of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
the Central African Republic.” These U.S. forces “will not engage LRA forces except in selfdefense.”
The President also reported that presently the U.S. was contributing “approximately
817 military personnel” to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. He also reported that
the U.S. remained prepared to engage in “maritime interception operations” intended to stop the
“movement, arming, and financing of certain international terrorist groups,” as well as stopping
“proliferation by sea of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.” Additional details
about these efforts are included in “the classified annex” to this report.
(136) Libya/Yemen. On September 14, 2012, the President reported to Congress, “consistent
with” the War Powers Resolution, that on September 12, 2012, he ordered deployed to Libya “a
security force from the U.S. Africa Command” to “support the security of U.S. personnel in
Libya.” This action was taken in response to the attack on the U.S. “diplomatic post in Benghazi,
Libya,” that had killed four America citizens, including U.S. Ambassador John Christopher
Stevens. The President added on September 13, 2012, that “an additional security force arrived in
Yemen in response to security threats there.” He further stated that “Although these security
forces are equipped for combat, these movements have been undertaken solely for the purpose of
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protecting American citizens and property.” These security forces will remain in Libya and in
Yemen, he noted, “until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed.”
(137) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 14, 2012, President Obama reported to
Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military
operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt,
U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen.
(138) Chad/Central African Republic. On December 29, 2012, President Obama reported to
Congress that he had ordered deployment of “a stand-by response and evacuation force of
approximately 50 U.S. military personnel from U.S. Africa Command” to Chad “to support the
evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and U.S. citizens from the Central African Republic,” due
to the “the deteriorating security situation” in that country.
(139) Somalia. On January 13, 2013, the President notified Congress that U.S. combat aircraft
entered Somali airspace on January 11, 2013, in support of a French mission to rescue a French
citizen held hostage by the al-Shabaab terror group, but did not “employ weapons” and departed
Somali airspace the same day.
(140) Niger. On February 22, 2013, the President notified Congress of deployment of “the last
elements of ... approximately 40 additional U.S. military personnel” to Niger to “provide support
for intelligence collection and will also facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces
conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region.” The President stated that
the forces are combat-equipped “for the purpose of providing their own force protection and
security.”
(141) Six-Month Periodic Report. On June 14, 2013, President Obama reported to Congress
concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military
operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt,
U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen. He also
notified Congress that forces deployed to Chad in December 2012 had withdrawn.
(142) Jordan. On June 21, 2013, the President reported to Congress on deploying U.S. armed
forces to Jordan “solely to participate in a training exercise,” and “a combat-equipped detachment
of approximately 700 of these forces remained in Jordan after the conclusion of the exercise to
join other U.S. forces already in Jordan.”
(143) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 13, 2013, President Obama reported to
Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military
operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt,
military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations
in Libya and Yemen.
(144) South Sudan. On December 19, 2013, the President notified Congress that “45 U.S. Armed
Forces personnel deployed to South Sudan to support the security of U.S. personnel and our
Embassy” for “the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and property.”
(145) South Sudan. On December 22, 2013, the President notified Congress of deployment of
“46 additional U.S. military personnel deployed by military aircraft to the area of Bor, South
Sudan, to conduct an operation to evacuate U.S. citizens and personnel.” According to the
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notification, U.S. aircraft “came under fire” and withdrew from South Sudan without completing
the evacuation.
(146) Uganda/South Sudan/Democratic Republic of the Congo/Central African Republic.
On March 25, 2014, the President notified Congress of a new deployment of U.S. aircraft and 150
U.S. aircrew and support personnel to Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and the Central African Republic “to support regional forces from the African Union’s
Regional Task Force that are working to apprehend or remove Lord’s Resistance Army leader
Joseph Kony and other senior leaders from the battlefield and to protect local populations.”
(147) Chad. On May 21, 2014, the President notified Congress that “[a]pproximately 80 U.S.
Armed Forces personnel have deployed to Chad as part of the U.S. efforts to locate and support
the safe return of over 200 schoolgirls who are reported to have been kidnapped in Nigeria” in
support of the “operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft for missions
over northern Nigeria and the surrounding area.”
(148) Six-Month Periodic Report. On June 12, 2014, President Obama reported to Congress
concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military
operations related to the Lord’s Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military
operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya
and Yemen.
(149) Iraq. On June 16, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to 275
U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to provide support and security for U.S. personnel and the
U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
(150) Iraq. On June 26, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to
approximately 300 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Iraq to “assess how we can best
train, advise, and support Iraqi security forces and to establish joint operations centers with Iraqi
security forces to share intelligence and coordinate planning to confront the threat posed by
ISIL,” and for presidential orders to “increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that
is focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).”
(151) Iraq. On June 30, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to
approximately 200 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to “reinforce security at the
U.S. Embassy, its support facilities, and the Baghdad International Airport.”
(152) Iraq. On August 8, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes against Islamic State
(IS) forces to protect U.S. personnel in Erbil and to assist a humanitarian mission to protect Iraqi
civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq.
(153) Iraq. On August 17, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes against IS forces to
assist Iraqi security forces in retaking Mosul Dam in northern Iraq.
(154) Iraq. On September 1, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes near Amirli in
northern Iraq targeting IS forces besieging the town and as part of a mission to provide
humanitarian assistance.
(155) Iraq. On September 5, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of 350
additional combat-equipped troops to provide security for diplomatic facilities and personnel in
Baghdad.
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(156) Iraq. On September 8, 2014, President Obama notified Congress of airstrikes “in the
vicinity of the Haditha Dam in support of Iraqi forces in their efforts to retain control of and
defend this critical infrastructure site from ISIL,” stating that “[t]hese additional military
operations will be limited in their scope and duration as necessary to address this threat and
prevent endangerment of U.S. personnel and facilities and large numbers of Iraqi civilians.”
(157) Central African Republic. President Obama notified Congress on September 11, 2014, of
the deployment of “approximately 20 U.S. Armed Forces personnel” to the Central African
Republic “to support the resumption of the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Bangui.”
(158) Syria/Khorasan Group. On September 23, 2014, the President notified Congress that he
directed U.S. armed forces to begin “a series of strikes in Syria against elements of al-Qa'ida
known as the Khorasan Group.”
(159) Iraq/Syria/Islamic State. On September 23, 2014, President Obama notified Congress that
he had “ordered implementation of a new comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy
to degrade, and ultimately defeat, ISIL,” The notification states that the President deployed “475
additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq,” and “that it is necessary and appropriate to use
the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct coordination with Iraqi forces and to provide training,
communications support, intelligence support, and other support, to select elements of the Iraqi
security forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga forces.” The President also notified Congress that
he had ordered U.S. forces “to conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other necessary
actions against these terrorists in Iraq and Syria,” “in coordination with and at the request of the
Government of Iraq and in conjunction with coalition partners.” The President stated that the
duration of the deployments and operations is not known.
(160) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 11, 2014, President Obama reported to
Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations,
including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations
related to the Lord’s Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan,
U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in the Central African
Republic, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen.
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Appendix B. Instances Not Formally Reported to the
Congress Under the War Powers Resolution
In some instances where U.S. Armed Forces have been deployed in potentially hostile situations
abroad, Presidents did not submit reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution and the
question of whether a report was required could be raised. Representative examples of these
instances since 1973 include129
• evacuation of civilians from Cyprus in 1974
• evacuation of civilians from Lebanon in 1976
• Korean DMZ tree-cutting incident of 1976
• transport of European troops to Zaire in 1978
• dispatch of additional military advisers to El Salvador in 1981
• shooting down of two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra on August 19, 1981,
after one had fired a heat-seeking missile
• the use of training forces in Honduras after 1983
• dispatch of AWACS to Egypt after a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan March
18, 1983
• shooting down of two Iranian fighter planes over Persian Gulf on June 5, 1984,
by Saudi Arabian jet fighter planes aided by intelligence from a U.S. AWACS
• interception by U.S. Navy pilots on October 10, 1985, of an Egyptian airliner
carrying hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro
• use of U.S. Army personnel and aircraft in Bolivia for anti-drug assistance on
July 14, 1986
• buildup of fleet in Persian Gulf area in 1987
• force augmentations in Panama in 1988 and 1989
• shooting down 2 Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea on January 4,
1989
• dispatch of military advisers and Special Forces teams to Colombia, Bolivia, and
Peru, in the Andean initiative, announced September 5, 1989, to help those
nations combat illicit drug traffickers
• transport of Belgian troops and equipment into Zaire September 25-27, 1991
129
The list does not include military assistance or training operations generally considered routine, forces dispatched
for humanitarian reasons such as disaster relief, or covert actions. War powers questions have not been raised about
U.S. armed forces dispatched for humanitarian aid in peaceful situations, such as 8,000 marines and sailors sent to
Bangladesh on May 12, 1991, to provide disaster relief after a cyclone. The War Powers Resolution applies only to the
introduction of forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities and to forces equipped for combat.
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• evacuation of non-essential U.S. government workers and families from Sierra
Leone, May 3, 1992
• a bombing campaign against Iraq, termed Operation Desert Fox, aimed at
destroying Iraqi industrial facilities deemed capable of producing weapons of
mass destruction, as well as other Iraqi military and security targets, December
16-23, 1998.
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Appendix C. Text of the War Powers Resolution
War Powers Resolution130
P.L. 93-148 [H.J.Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, passed over President’s veto November 7, 1973
JOINT RESOLUTION Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the “War Powers Resolution.”
PURPOSE AND POLICY
SECTION 2.131
(a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress
shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only
its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
130
As presented in Legislation on Foreign Relations, volume II, Joint Committee Print of the House Committee on
International Relations and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
131
50 U.S.C. 1541.
See also the authorization for participation in a multinational force in Lebanon, 1983 (P.L. 98-119; 97 Stat. 805).
See also the sense of Congress regarding the possible introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into El Salvador, 1984 (P.L.
98-473; 98 Stat. 1904, 1942).
See also the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Central America for combat, 1984 (Section 310 of P.L. 98-525; 98
Stat. 2516).
See also the authorization for use of U.S. military force against Iraq, 1991 (P.L. 102-1; 105 Stat. 3).
See also congressional findings and conditional authorization for use of U.S. military force in Somalia, 1993 (Section
8151 of P.L. 103-139; 107 Stat. 1475), and the sense of the Congress and a statement of congressional policy on U.S.
armed forces in Somalia, 1993 (Section 1512 of P.L. 103-160; 107 Stat. 1840).
See also the Joint Resolution regarding U.S. policy toward Haiti, 1994 (P.L. 103-423; 108 Stat. 4358).
See also the limitation on deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti during Fiscal Year 2000 and congressional
notification of deployments, 1999 (Section 1232 of P.L. 106-65, 113 Stat. 788).
See also the authorization for use of military force in the global war against terrorism, 2001 (P.L. 107-40; 115 Stat.
224).
See also the authorization for use of military force against Iraq, 2002 (P.L. 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498).
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specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
CONSULTATION
SECTION 3.132
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such
introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no
longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.
REPORTING
SECTION 4.133
(a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced—
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat,
except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such
forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat
already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to
the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the
fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and
to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation
described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces
continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the
status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or
situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.
132
50 U.S.C. 1542.
133
50 U.S.C. 1543.
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CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SECTION 5.134
(a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the
same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs135
of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine
die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if
petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly
request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take
appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant
to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States
Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted),
unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically
unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall
be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to
the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States
Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in
hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the
President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL
SECTION 6.136
(a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, shall be
134
50 U.S.C. 1544.
Consider also Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (P.L. 98-164; 97
Stat. 1062; 50 U.S.C. 1546a) which provides:
“Expedited procedures for certain joint resolution and bills.”
“SEC. 1013. Any joint resolution or bill introduced in either House which requires the removal of United States Armed
Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories, without a
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization shall be considered in accordance with the procedures of section
601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, except that any such resolution
or bill shall be amendable. If such a joint resolution or bill should be vetoed by the President, the time for debate in
consideration of the veto message on such measure shall be limited to twenty hours in the Senate and in the House shall
be determined in accordance with the Rules of the House.”
For text of Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, see
Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002, vol. I-A.
135
Section 1(a)(5) of P.L. 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
136
50 U.S.C. 1545.
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referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such
joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar
days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in
question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the
proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless
such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the
other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar
days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or
bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on
within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine
by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint
resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the
committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not
later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section
5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their
respective House in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the
printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such
reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixtyday
period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
SECTION 7.137
(a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be
reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in
question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the
proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless
such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the
other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with
its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending
business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
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50 U.S.C. 1546.
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(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a
concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the
committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution
within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the
Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on
by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective
Houses in disagreement.
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION
SECTION 8.138
(a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be
inferred—
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of
this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such
provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by
legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory
authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with
members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of
high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint
resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States
prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term “introduction of United States Armed Forces”
includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in
the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or
government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such
forces will become engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution—
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the
provisions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein
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Congressional Research Service 94
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would
not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SECTION 9.139
If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such
provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SECTION 10.140
This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
Author Contact Information
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589
Acknowledgments
This report was previously authored and updated by former CRS specialists Ellen C. Collier and Richard F.
Grimmett.
139
50 U.S.C. 1548.
140
50 U.S.C. 1541 note.