Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity
Author(s): Loïc Wacquant
Source: Sociological Forum , JUNE 2010, Vol. 25, No. 2 (JUNE 2010), pp. 197-220
Published by: Wiley
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2010
DOI: 10.1 lll/j.1573-7861.2010.01 173.x
Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare,
and Social Insecurity1
Loïc Wacquant2
In Punishing the Poor, / show that the ascent of the penal state in the United States and other
advanced societies over the past quarter-century is a response to rising social insecurity, not criminal
insecurity; that changes in welfare and justice policies are interlinked, as restrictive "workfare" and
expansive "prisonfare" are coupled into a single organizational contraption to discipline the
precarious fractions of the postindustrial working class; and that a diligent carcerai system is not a
deviation from, but a constituent component of, the neoliberal Leviathan. In this article, I draw out
the theoretical implications of this diagnosis of the emerging government of social insecurity. I deploy
Bourdieu's concept of "bureaucratic field" to revise Piven and Cloward's classic thesis on the
regulation of poverty via public assistance, and contrast the model of penalization as technique for
the management of urban marginality to Michel Foucault' s vision of the "disciplinary society," David
Garland's account of the "culture of control," and David Harvey's characterization of neoliberal
politics. Against the thin economic conception of neoliberalism as market rule, I propose a thick
sociological specification entailing supervisory workfare, a proactive penal state, and the cultural
trope of "individual responsibility." This suggests that we must theorize the prison not as a technical
implement for law enforcement, but as a core political capacity whose selective and aggressive
deployment in the lower regions of social space violates the ideals of democratic citizenship.
1 This article is adapted from "A Sketch of the Neoliberal State," the theoretical coda to my
book Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham and London:
Duke University Press, "Politics, History, and Culture" series, 2009). It is part of a
transdisciplinary and transnational symposium, with responses by John Campbell, Bernard
Harcourt, Margit Mayer, Jamie Peck, Frances Piven, and Mariana Valverde (published in English
in Theoretical Criminology, 14, no. 1, February 2010), as well as critics from the corresponding
countries, published in German in Das Argument (Berlin); in French in Civilisations (Brussels); in
Spanish in Pensar (Rosario); in Brazilian in Discursos Sediciosos (Rio de Janeiro); in Italian in Aut
Aut (Rome); in Portuguese in Cadernos de Ciências Sociais (Porto); in Norwegian in Materialisten
(Oslo); in Danish in Social Kritik (Copenhagen); in Greek in Ikarian Journal of Social and Political
Research (Athens); in Ukrainian in Spiine (Kiev); in Russian in Skepsis (Moscow); in Hungarian in
Eszmelet (Budapest); in Slovenian in Novi Plamen (Ljubljana); in Romanian in Sociologie Romaneasca
(Bucarest); and in Japanese in Gendai Shiso (Tokyo). I am grateful to Mario Candeias and
the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung in Berlin for starting the ball rolling on this project, and to the editors
of the journals listed above for their enthusiastic support of this project. This article benefited
from reactions to presentations made at the 4th Conference on Putting Pierre Bourdieu to Work,
Manchester, United Kingdom, June 23-24, 2008, and to the Sociology Department Colloquium at
Yale University, February 26, 2009.
University of California, Berkeley, and Centre de sociologie européenne, Paris, France; e-mail:
loic@berkeley.edu.
197
© 2010 Eastern Sociological Society
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198 Wacquant
KEY WORDS: Bour
INTRODUCTION
In Punishing the Poor, I show that the return of the prison to th
tional forefront of advanced society over the past quarter-century is
response, not to rising criminal insecurity, but to the diffuse social
wrought by the fragmentation of wage labor and the shakeup of eth
chy (Wacquant, 2009a).3 The punitive slant of recent shifts in both
and justice policies points to a broader reconstruction of the state
restrictive "workfare" and expansive "prisonfare" under a phil
moral behaviorism. The paternalist penalization of poverty aims to
the urban disorders spawned by economic deregulation and to disci
precarious fractions of the postindustrial working class. Diligent an
ent programs of "law and order" entailing the enlargement and ex
the police, the courts, and the penitentiary have also spread across
world because they enable political elites to reassert the authority o
and shore up the deficit of legitimacy officials suffer when they ab
mission of social and economic protection established during th
Keynesian era.
Punishing the Poor treats the United States after the acme of t
rights movement as the historic crucible of punitive containment as
for the management of marginality and living laboratory of the n
future where the convergent revamping of the social and penal win
state can be discerned with particular clarity. Its overarching argume
in four steps. Part 1 maps out the accelerating decline and abiding
the U.S. social state, climaxing with the replacement of protective w
disciplinary workfare in 1996. Part 2 tracks the modalities of the g
grandeur of the penal state and finds that the coming of "carcerai b
ment" was driven not by trends in criminality, but by the class an
backlash against the social advances of the 1960s. Part 3 heeds the
cative dimension of penality as a vehicle for symbolic boundary dra
explains why penal activism in the United States has been aime
"privileged targets," the black subproletariat trapped in the implodi
and the roaming sex offender. Part 4 follows recent declinations o
politics of social insecurity in Western Europe to offer a critiq
"scholarly myths" of the reigning law-and-order reason, prescript
3 The fragmentation of wage labor and its reverberations at the lower end of the cl
are documented by Freeman (2007) for the United States and by Gallie (2007) for t
Union. Ethnic hierarchy is anchored by the ethnoracial division between whites a
the United States (other categories finding their place in this dichotomous orderin
process of triangulation) and by the ethnonational duality between citizens and p
migrants in Western Europe. Massey (2007) and Schierup et al. (2006) display simi
differences in ethnic stratification on the two sides of the Atlantic, including
overrepresentation of dishonored populations behind bars.
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 199
escaping the punitive policy snare
shape and missions of the neoliber
Three analytic breaks proved ind
new government of social insecuri
tigatory "prisonfare," and to accou
United States and other advanced
economic deregulation and welfare
twentieth century. The first cons
poke, which continues to straig
incarceration, even as the divorce
barefaced.4 The second requires r
inasmuch these two strands of gov
to be informed by the same beha
surveillance, stigma, and gradua
revamped as workfare and the pri
now form a single organizational m
fissures and ditches of the dualizin
lize problem populations - by forci
side, and holding them under lock
into the peripheral sectors of the
rupture involves overcoming the c
and symbolic approaches, descen
Marx and Émile Durkheim, so as t
and the expressive functions of
concerns for control and commun
categories and the affirmation of
beyond an analysis couched in the
rolling out of the prison and its
criminal databases, swirling disco
public denigration of offenders) h
remade the state itself.
A single concept sufficed to effect those three breaks simultaneously: the
notion of bureaucratic field developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1994) in his lecture
course at the Collège de France in the early 1990s to rethink the state as the
agency that monopolizes the legitimate use not only of material violence (as in
4 A simple statistic suffices to demonstrate this disconnect and reveals the futility of trying to
explain rising incarceration by escalating crime: the United States held 21 prisoners for every
1,000 "index crimes" in 1975 compared to 113 convicts per 1,000 crimes in 2000, for an increase
of 438%; for "violent crimes," the jump is from 231 to 922 convicts per 1,000 offenses, an
increase of 299%. This means that the country became four to five times more punitive in a
quarter-century holding crime constant (a lagged index turns up the same trend). See Wacquant
(2009a: 125-1 33) for further elaboration and Blumstein and Wallman (2000) and Western
(2006:ch. 2) for different approaches leading to the same conclusion.
Garland (1989) dissects the materialist (Marxist) and symbolic (Durkheimian) lineages in the
study of punishment and proposes that they, along with Foucault, Weber, and Elias, offer
"resources to be drawn upon selectively rather than inviolable world- views which can only be
swallowed whole" (1989:278).
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200 W acquan t
Max Weber's we
social space and
species of capita
the theoretical u
government of
Poor. In the first section, I revise Piven and Cloward's classic thesis on
the regulation of poverty via public assistance and contrast penalization as a
technique for the management of marginality in the dual metropolis with
Michel Foucault's vision of the place of the prison in the "disciplinary
society," David Garland's account of the crystallization of the "culture of
control" in late modernity, and David Harvey's characterization of neoliberal
politics and its proliferation on the world stage. In the second section, I build
on these contrasts to elaborate a thick sociological specification of neoliberalism
that breaks with the thin economic conception of neoliberalism as market
rule that effectively echoes its ideology. I argue that a proactive penal system
is not a deviation from, but a constituent component of, the neoliberal
Leviathan, along with variants of supervisory workfare and the cultural trope
of "individual responsibility." This suggests that we need to theorize the
prison not as a technical implement for law enforcement, but as a core organ
of the state whose selective and aggressive deployment in the lower regions of
social space is constitutively injurious to the ideals of democratic citizenship.
WHEN WORKFARE JOINS PRISONFARE: THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS
In The Weight of the World and related essays, Pierre Bourdie
that we construe the state not as a monolithic and coordinated ens
as a splintered space of forces vying over the definition and dist
public goods, which he calls the "bureaucratic field."6 The constitu
space is the end result of a long-term process of concentration of
species of capital operative in a given social formation, and e
"juridical capital as the objectified and codified form of symboli
which enables the state to monopolize the official definition of id
promulgation of standards of conduct, and the administratio
(Bourdieu, 1994:4, 9). In the contemporary period, the bureaucratic
versed by two internecine struggles. The first pits the "higher state n
policymakers intent on promoting market-oriented reforms and
state nobility" of executants attached to the traditional m
6 The concept is sketched analytically in Bourdieu (1994), illustrated in Bourd
deployed to probe the political production of the economy of single homes
Bourdieu (2005). Several issues of the journal Actes de la recherche en sciences s
further cross-national empirical illustrations, including those on 'The History
(nos. 116 and 117, March 1997), "The Genesis of the State" (no. 118, June 1997),
"From Social State to Penal State" (no. 124, September 1998), and "Pacify and
173 and 174, June and September 2008).
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 201
government. The second opposes w
portrayal of the ruler, calls the
state. The Left hand, the feminin
"spendthrift" ministries in charg
health, housing, welfare, and labor
the social categories shorn of econ
the masculine side, is charged with
budget cuts, fiscal incentives, and
By inviting us to grasp in a si
sectors of the state that administer the life conditions and chances of the
working class, and to view these sectors as enmeshed in relations of antago
nistic cooperation as they vie for preeminence inside the bureaucratic field, this
conception has helped us map the ongoing shift from the social to the pena
treatment of urban marginality. In this regard, Punishing the Poor fills in a
gap in Bourdieu's model by inserting the police, the courts, and the prison a
core constituents of the "Right hand" of the state, alongside the ministries
the economy and the budget. It suggests that we need to bring penal polici
from the periphery to the center of our analysis of the redesign and deploy
ment of government programs aimed at coping with the entrenched poverty
and deepening disparities spawned in the polarizing city by the discarding
the Fordist-Keynesian social compact (Musterd et al., 2006; Wilson, 199
Wacquant, 2008a). The new government of social insecurity put in place in
the United States and offered as model to other advanced countries entails
both a shift from the social to the penal wing of the state (detectable in th
reallocation of public budgets, personnel, and discursive precedence) and th
colonization of the welfare sector by the panoptic and punitive logic characte
istic of the postrehabilitation penal bureaucracy. The slanting of state activit
from the social to the penal arm and the incipient penalization of welfare,
in turn, partake of the remasculinization of the state, in reaction to the wide
ranging changes provoked in the political field by the women's movement
and by the institutionalization of social rights antinomic to commodification
The new priority given to duties over rights, sanction over support, the ster
rhetoric of the "obligations of citizenship," and the martial reaffirmation
the capacity of the state to lock the trouble-making poor (welfare recipien
and criminals) "in a subordinate relation of dependence and obedience"
toward state managers portrayed as virile protectors of the society against
its wayward members (Young, 2005:16): all these policy planks pronounc
and promote the transition from the kindly "nanny state" of the FordistKeynesian
era to the strict "daddy state" of neoliberalism.
In their classic study Regulating the Poor, Frances Fox Piven and Richard
Cloward forged a germinal model of the management of poverty in industri
capitalism. According to this model, the state expands or contracts its relie
programs cyclically to respond to the ups and downs of the economy, the
corresponding slackening and tightening of the labor market, and the bout
of social disruption that increased unemployment and destitution trigg
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202 Wacquant
periodically a
"mute civil di
restriction aim
labor market
contends that,
ism and accoun
States during t
been rendered
quarter-centu
sharpening so
regulation of
and Cloward,
deployment of
social space. To
succeeds the do
turned-workf
of contractio
contraction of
This organizat
under the aeg
moralism can b
poor relief an
capitalism. Bot
and regulate
transition (P
overhauled in
socioeconomic
addition to re
expanding the
that "ended w
Violent Crime
the No Frills Prison Act of 1995.
The institutional pairing of public aid and incarceration as tools for
managing the unruly poor can also be understood by paying attention to
the structural, functional, and cultural similarities between workfare and
prisonfare as "people-processing institutions" targeted on kindred problem
7 By analogy with "welfare," I designate by "prisonfare" the policy stream through which the
state gives a penal response to festering urban ills and sociomoral disorders, as well as the imagery,
discourses, and bodies of lay and expert knowledge that accrete around the rolling out of
the police, the courts, jails, and prisons, and their extensions (probation, parole, computerized
databanks of criminal files, and the schemes of remote profiling and surveillance they enable).
Penalization joins socialization and medicalization as the three alternative strategies whereby the
state can opt to treat undesirable conditions and conduct (Wacquant, 2009a: 16-17).
8 Piven and Cloward (1993:20, note 23) acknowledge penal expansion and activism in the
sixteenth century in passing in the rich historical recapitulation of the trajectory of poor relief
in early modern Europe in which they ground their investigation of the functions of welfare in
the contemporary United States.
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 203
populations (Hasenfeld, 1972). It h
welfare in a punitive direction and
more of the traditional clientele
"penalization" of welfare matchin
Their concurrent reform over the p
zational convergence, even as they
erosion of public aid and its reva
restricting entry into the system,
up exit, resulting in a spectacular
plummeted from nearly 5 milli
decade later). Trends in penal poli
admission into jail and prison has
lengthened, and releases curtailed
of the population under lock (it j
opérant purpose of welfare has sh
active "people changing" after 198
in 1996, while the prison has trav
reform inmates (under the phil
the 1920s to the mid-1970s) to m
punishment was downgraded to re
The shared historical roots, org
convergence of the assistential and
the United States are further for
their beneficiaries are virtually i
both live near or below 50% of th
thirds of them, respectively); bo
(37% and 18% vs. 41% and 19%)
and are saddled with serious phys
their participation in the workfo
of jail inmates). And they are c
kin, marital and social ties, resid
households and barren neighborho
the bottom of the class and ethnic structure.
Punishing the Poor avers not only that the United States has shifted from
the single (welfare) to the double (social-cum-penal) regulation of the poor,
but also that that "the stunted development of American social policy"
skillfully dissected by Piven and Cloward (1993:409) stands in close causal and
functional relation to America's uniquely overgrown and hyperactive penal
policy. The misery of American welfare and the grandeur of American prisonfare
at century's turn are the two sides of the same political coin. The generosity
of the latter is in direct proportion to the stinginess of the former, and it
expands to the degree that both are driven by moral behaviorism. The same
structural features of the U.S. state - its bureaucratic fragmentation and
ethnoracial skew, the institutional bifurcation between universalist "social
insurance" and categorical "welfare," and the market-buttressing cast of
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204 Wacquant
assistance prog
tion to the racial crisis of the 1960s and the economic turmoil of the 1970s
have also fostered the uncontrolled hypertrophy of punishment aimed at the
same precarious population. Moreover, the "tortured impact of slavery and
institutionalized racism on the construction of the American polity" has been
felt, not only on the "underdevelopment" of public aid and the "decentralized
and fragmented government and party system" that distributes it to a select
segment of the dispossessed (Pi ven and Cloward, 1993:424-425), but also on
the overdevelopment and stupendous severity of its penal wing. Ethnoracial
division and the (re)activation of the stigma of blackness as dangerousness are
key to explaining the initial atrophy and accelerating decay of the U.S. social
state in the post civil rights epoch, on the one hand, and the astonishing ease
and celerity with which the penal state arose on its ruins, on the other.9
Reversing the historical bifurcation of the labor and crime questions
achieved in the late nineteenth century, punitive containment as a government
technique for managing deepening urban marginality has effectively rejoined
social and penal policy at the close of the twentieth century. It taps the diffuse
social anxiety coursing through the middle and lower regions of social space
in reaction to the splintering of wage work and the resurgence of inequality,
and converts it into popular animus toward welfare recipients and street criminals
cast as twin detached and defamed categories that sap the social order by
their dissolute morality and dissipated behavior and must therefore be placed
under severe tutelage. The new government of poverty invented by the United
States to enforce the normalization of social insecurity thus gives a whole new
meaning to the notion of "poor relief: punitive containment offers relief not
to the poor but from the poor by forcibly "disappearing" the most disruptive
of them, from the shrinking welfare rolls on the one hand and into the swelling
dungeons of the carcerai castle on the other.
Michel Foucault (1977) has put forth the single most influential analysis
of the rise and role of the prison in capitalist modernity, and it is useful to set
my thesis against the rich tapestry of analyses he has stretched and stimulated
I concur with the author of Discipline and Punish that penality is a protean
force that is eminently fertile and must be given pride of place in the study o
contemporary power.10 While its originary medium resides in the application
of legal coercion to enforce the core strictures of the sociomoral order
9 The catalytic role of ethnoracial division in the remaking of the state after the junking of the
Fordist-Keynesian social compact and the collapse of the dark ghetto is analyzed in full in my
book Deadly Symbiosis: Race and the Rise of the Penal State (Wacquant, 2010). The depth and
rigidity of racial partition is a major factor behind the abyssal gap between the incarceration
rates of the United States and European Union, just as it explains their divergent rates of
poverty (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).
u Foucault's writings on incarceration are dispersed and multifaceted, comprising some 60 texts
written over 15 years cutting across disciplinary domains and serving manifold purposes from
the analytic to the political, and it is not possible to consider them in their richness and
complexity here (these are captured by Boullant [2003]). Instead, I focus on the canonical tome,
Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Foucault, 1975). I give my own translation with
page references to the original French edition, followed by the pagination in the U.S. edition.
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 205
punishment must be viewed not th
repression, but by recourse to the n
out of the penal state has indeed en
novel administrative bodies and gov
associated forms of knowledge acros
(Wacquant, 2008b). But, from her
Foucault's view of the emergence and
least four ways.
To start with, Foucault erred in sp
Disciplines may have diversified an
control across the society, but the
historical stage and "lost its raison
On the contrary, penal confinem
reaffirmed itself among the central
his followers were forecasting its dem
and the consolidation of the 1800s,
the third "age of confinement" t
forewarned about in 1990. Next, wha
disciplinary technologies have no
and voracious carcerai system of ou
elaborate time schedules, nonidlenes
tion of the body: these technique
rendered wholly impracticable by
overpopulation, bureaucratic rigidit
indifference if not hostility of pena
of the dressage ("training" or "ta
productive bodies" postulated by Fou
toward brute neutralization, rote r
default if not by design. If there
"orthopedists of individuality" at w
today (Foucault, 1977: 301/294), they
of corrections.
In the third place, "devices for normalization" anchored in the carcerai
institution have not spread throughout the society, in the manner of capillaries
irrigating the entire body social. Rather, the widening of the penal dragnet
under neoliberalism has been remarkably discriminating: in spite of conspicuous
bursts of corporate crime (epitomized by the Savings and Loans scandal
of the late 1980s and the folding of Enron a decade later), it has affected
essentially the denizens of the lower regions of social and physical space.
Indeed, the fact that the social and ethnoracial selectivity of the prison has
been maintained, nay reinforced, as it vastly enlarged its intake demonstrates
11 This is particularly glaring in the country's second largest carcerai system (after the Federal
Bureau of Prisons), the California Department of Corrections, in which grotesque overcrowding
(the state packs 170,000 convicts in 33 prisons designed to hold 85,000) and systemic bureaucratic
dysfunction combine to make a mockery of any pretense at "rehabilitation" (Petersilia, 2008).
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206 Wacquant
that penalizati
the social orde
is a skewed te
place, and it
according to
twenty-first c
ety," but its m
import and ad
as zero toleran
juveniles - in
ers relegated
"ghettoizatio
(Wacquant, 20
Lastly, the cr
accelerating inf
implemented f
the authoritie
chain gangs i
"spectacle of t
"the whole eco
period has en
Foucault, but
proliferation b
was published.
social forms, in
and law enfor
penality has m
field in toto, a
pass the full p
low-income dis
The Place de g
thus been supp
of crime-and-
911, America's
Block F, etc.),
news and dram
say that the pr
and the garru
Rather, it now
guignol has be
to dramatize m
action, thereb
moment when
This brings u
theme centra
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 207
sweeping and stimulative account
forth since Foucault.12 Accordin
nomic, and cultural arrangements
collective experience of crime and
given a reactionary interpretation
cal adaptation via "preventative p
"punitive segregation" (Garland
reconfiguration of crime control
individuals and normalize contem
has made glaring to all the "limit
"culture of control" coalescing aro
pairing high crime rates with the
both marks and masks a political f
asserts that punitive containment
political strategy: far from "erodin
society," which holds that "the sov
order" (Garland, 2001:109), it has
United States, where the leader
consensus over the benefits of pun
(Chih Lin, 1998), but also in Europ
in Italy, and Chirac and Sarkozy
images of stern "crime fighters" in
the polls.13
By elevating criminal safety {sécurité, Sicherheit, sicurezza, etc.) to the
frontline of government priorities, state officials have condensed the diffuse
class anxiety and simmering ethnic resentment generated by the unraveling of
the Fordist-Keynesian compact and channeled them toward the (dark-skinned)
street criminal, designated as guilty of sowing social and moral disorder in the
city, alongside the profligate welfare recipient. Rolling out the penal state and
coupling it with workfare has given the high state nobility an effective tool
to both foster labor deregulation and contain the disorders that economic
deregulation provokes in the lower rungs of the sociospatial hierarchy. Most
importantly, it has allowed politicians to make up for the deficit of legitimacy
that besets them whenever they curtail the economic support and social
protections traditionally granted by Leviathan. Contra Garland, then, I find
that the penalization of urban poverty has served well as a vehicle for the
Since its publication in 2001, Garland has engaged in extensive debates on the "culture of control"
(e.g., Garland, 2004), revising and qualifying his thesis on multiple fronts. For reasons of
space and consistency, I concentrate on the model presented in the book and spotlight those
elements that contrast Garland's portrayal of the crime-and-punishment duet in "late modernity"
with the analysis of neoliberal penalization offered in Punishing the Poor (I do not discuss,
for instance, Garland's analysis of "shifts in private behaviors" spurred by cultural
adaptations to the "high-crime society" by households, businesses, victims, etc., as these are
irrelevant to the characterization of the penal state proper).
See Shea (2009) for a comparison of the electoral success of law-and-order campaigns in
France and Italy.
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208 Wacquant
ritual reassert
domain of law
when the sam
bodies, and sig
points to thre
punitive drift i
First, the fas
siècle is not a
more precise,
rooted in obje
whose material conditions have deteriorated with the diffusion of unstable and
underpaid wage labor shorn of the usual social "benefits," and subjective insecurity
among the middle classes, whose prospects for smooth reproduction or
upward mobility have dimmed as competition for valued social positions has
intensified and the state has reduced its provision of public goods. Garland's
notion that "high rates of crime have become a normal social fact - a routine
part of modern consciousness, an everyday risk to be assessed and managed"
by "the population at large," and especially by the middle class, is belied by
victimization studies. Official statistics show that law breaking in the United
States declined or stagnated for 20 years after the mid-1970s before falling precipitously
in the 1990s, while exposure to violent offenses varied widely by
location in social and physical space (Wacquant, 2009b: 144-147). Relatedly,
European countries sport crime rates similar to or higher than that of the United
States (except for the two specific categories of assault and homicide,
which compose but a tiny fraction of all offenses), and yet they have
responded quite differently to criminal activity, with rates of incarceration
one-fifth to one-tenth the American rate even as they have risen.
This takes us to the second difference: for Garland the reaction of the state
to the predicament of high crime and low justice efficiency has been disjointed
and even schizoid, whereas I have stressed its overall coherence. However, this
coherence becomes visible only when the analytic compass is fully extended
beyond the crime-punishment box and across policy realms to link penal trends to
the socioeconomic restructuring of the urban order, on the one side, and to join
workfare to prisonfare, on the other. What Garland characterizes as "the structured
ambivalence of the state's response" is not so much ambivalence as a
predictable organizational division in the labor of management of the disruptive
poor. Bourdieu's theory of the state is helpful here in enabling us to discern that
the "adaptive strategies" recognizing the state's limited capacity to stem crime
by stressing prevention and devolution are pursued in the penal sector of the
bureaucratic field, while what Garland calls the "nonadaptive strategies" of
"denial and acting out" to reassert that very capacity operate in the political
field, especially in its relation to the journalistic field.14
14 The analytic and historical differentiation of the political from the bureaucratic field, and their
respective locations inside the field of power, is discussed in Wacquant (2005 :esp 6-7, 14-17,
142-146).
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 209
Third, like other leading analysts
Jock Young (1999), Franklin Zimr
Tonry (2004), Garland sees the pun
right-wing politicians. But Punishing th
of poverty is not a simple return to
tutional innovation and, second, that
of neoconservative politics. If politici
was employed and refined by their
Indeed, the president who oversaw by
in U.S. history is not Ronald Reagan
the Atlantic, it is the Left of Blai
Germany, Jospin in France, d'Ale
negotiated the shift to proactive
predecessors. This is because the roo
modernity but neoliberalism, a proje
politicians of the Right or the Left.
The jumble of trends that Garlan
of late modernity - the "modernizin
market exchange," shifts in househo
in urban ecology and demography, th
media, the "democratization of socia
ingly vague and loosely correlated; th
decades of the twentieth century, sp
their most pronounced form in the
Europe that have not been submerge
tion.15 Moreover, the onset of late m
ary, whereas the recent permutat
revolutionary.
Punishing the Poor contends that it
of "the open, porous, mobile societ
(Garland, 2001:165) that have fostere
ries perceived as undeserving and dev
specific social insecurity generated b
hardening of class divisions, and the
hierarchy guaranteeing an effective
in the United States and to nation
expansion and consensual exaltation
not a culturally reactionary reading
15 Read the extended analysis of the sociopol
Finland, Sweden, and Norway by John Prat
social equality and welfare state security play
of Scandinavia to neoliberal nostrums. Anot
thesis is Canada, which is as "late modern" as
tion low and stable over the past three decad
100,000 residents between 1991 and 2004, wh
per 100,000).
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210 Wacquant
response aimin
establish a ne
flexibility and
order by the
retrenchment
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL SPECIFICATION OF NEOLIBERALISM
The invention of the double regulation of the insecure fra
the postindustrial proletariat via the wedding of social and penal p
bottom of the polarized class structure is a major structural inno
takes us beyond the model of the welfare-poverty nexus elaborat
and Cloward just as the Fordist-Keynesian regime was coming un
birth of this institutional contraption is also not captured b
Foucault's vision of the "disciplinary society" or by David Garland
of the "culture of control," neither of which can account for the
timing, steep socioethnic selectivity, and peculiar organizational p
abrupt turnaround in penal trends in the closing decades of the t
century. For the punitive containment of urban marginality through t
taneous rolling back of the social safety net and the rolling out of
and-prison dragnet and their knitting together into a carceral-as
lattice is not the spawn of some broad societal trend - whether it b
of "biopower" or the advent of "late modernity" - but, at bottom,
in state crafting. It partakes of the correlative revamping of the
missions, and capacities of public authority on the economic, soci
and penal fronts. This revamping has been uniquely swift, broad
in the United States, but it is in progress - or in question - in all
societies submitted to the relentless pressure to conform to the U.S
Consider trends in France: in recent years the country has eased
on part-time employment as well as limitations on night-time an
work. Its governments of both Left and Right have actively supp
development of short-term contracts, temporary jobs, and underp
ships, and expanded the latitude of employers in hiring, firing, an
overtime. The result is that the number of precarious wage earner
from 1.7 million in 1992 to 2.8 million in 2007- or from 8.6% to 12.4% of
the employed workforce (Maurin and Savidan, 2008). In June 2009, France
instituted the RSA (Revenu de solidarité active), set to gradually replace the
RMI (Revenu minimum d'insertion, the guaranteed minimum income grant
provided to some 1.3 million), a program designed to push public aid
recipients into the low-wage labor market via state subsidies to poor workers
premised on the obligation to accept employment (Grandquillot, 2009).
Simultaneously, the oversight of unemployment benefits is being farmed out to
private firms, which can terminate beneficiaries who reject two job offers and
receive a financial bonus for each recipient they place in a job. On the penal
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 211
front, accelerating the punitive t
Jospin in 1998-2002, the success
have adopted sweeping measures of
policing centered on low-income
recourse to incarceration for stree
zation of corporate crime), plea b
for low-level delinquents, mandato
annual targets for the expulsion of
civil commitment of certain catego
their sentence. The country's budg
euros for 22,000 guards confining
24,000 guards and 64,000 inmates i
Tracking the roots and modali
hyperincarceration opens a unique
Leviathan. It leads us to articulate t
the penal apparatus is a core organ of
instrumental in imposing categorie
and molding relations and behavior
and physical space. The police, the
appendages for the enforcement of
but vehicles for the political prod
deprived and defamed social cat
(Wacquant, 2008b). Students of ear
Elias to Charles Tilly to Gianfranc
polization of force, and thus the c
policing, judging, and punishing m
society, was central to the building o
the neoliberal era notice that the rem
Keynesian social compact has en
fostering international competiti
flexibility (Jessop, 1994; Levy 200
most distinctively, the forceful reas
a pornographic and managerialist k
Indeed, the second thesis advan
ongoing capitalist "revolution fro
entails the enlargement and exalta
field, so that the state may che
diffusion of social insecurity in th
chy as well as assuage popular disc
economic and social duties. Neolib
"culture of control" remains an en
the fact that "control is now being
with the singular and startling excep
ed domain most of today's major
emphasis supplied). The neoliber
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212 Wacquant
steep class, eth
of its social b
directly and a
market and pu
penal largesse
carcerai boom
ghetto. It is al
the expanding
postcolonial m
2009b:87-102).
Finally, neolib
punitive polic
accident that t
sures designed
variants of U.S
that also pursu
"free-market"
that remained
have best res
works."16 Sim
and South Afr
developments
did so not bec
but because t
retrenchmen
the upsurge o
necessary to d
discarding ne
"rather too s
must expand
sociological un
Neoliberalism
wardly suspen
terminology o
referent. Whe
the prevalent
array of mark
privatization,
16 In a major com
in 12 contempora
characterize as n
oriental corporati
two decades.
The international diffusion of "made in USA" penal categories and policies and its springs are
treated at length in Prisons de Poverty (Wacquant, 2009b). For further analyses of this nearplanetary
spread, read Jones and Newbura (2006) as well as Andreas and Nadelmann (2006).
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 213
liberalization, interplace competiti
expenditures.18 But this conceptio
sely bound up with the sermonizi
ism. We need to reach beyond thi
notion that identifies the instituti
which neoliberal tenets are being a
A minimalist sociological charac
Neoliberalism is a transnational po
market, state, and citizenship from
bal ruling class in the making, com
transnational firms, high-ranking
of multinational organizations (th
European Union), and cultural-tech
them economists, lawyers, and co
training and mental categories in t
the reassertion of the prerogatives
place, but the close articulation of
1. Economic deregulation, that i
market" or market-like mechan
guiding corporate strategies and
of the shareholder-value conceptio
gamut of human activities, in
public goods, on putative groun
disregard for distributive issues
2. Welfare state devolution, retract
tate the expansion and support
and, in particular, to submit re
labor via variants of "workf
relationship between the state a
citizens but as clients or subje
gations as condition for continu
3. An expansive, intrusive, and
the nether regions of social and
and disarray generated by diff
inequality, to unfurl disciplinar
tions of the postindustrial prol
Leviathan so as to bolster the evap
4. The cultural trope of individua
of life to provide a "vocabul
would say - for the construc
18 This is the common core one can extr
across the disciplines, among which can b
for sociology, Campbell and Pedersen (20
(2001) for anthropology, Brenner and Th
(2004) for economics.
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214 Wacquant
entrepreneur)
competition it
porate liabilit
ply reduced a
A central ideo
of "small gover
Keynesian welf
state, which "
and individual
ships" stressin
Punishing the
quite different
restraints on c
and cultural ca
when it comes
to impressing
itself to be fi
libertarian pro
authoritarian o
of the lower c
"big governme
Between 1982 a
police, crimina
165% in consta
1996, when "we
to accept inse
corrections ex
the country's
vaulted to thir
and Wal-Mart (
experiment in
in: the invasiv
neoliberalism bu
Remarkably, t
overlooked by
Anthony Gidde
platform of Ne
highlights high
cator of "civic
(not deindustri
left was noble in
verse consequen
a legacy of dec
crime, and redu
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 215
"community regeneration," and he e
"broken windows": "One of the mos
recent years has been the discovery
relates directly to criminality. ... D
citizens that the area is unsafe" (Gi
studiously omits the punishment sid
not a single mention of the priso
and carcerai boom that have everyw
deregulation and welfare devolution
startling in the case of Britain, sin
Wales jumped from 88 inmates per 1
in 2008, even as crime receded contin
(Hough and Mayhew, 2004), with
largest absolute increase of the conv
in the country's history - matching
"Third Way" on the other side of the
A similar oversight of the central
government of social insecurity is fou
liberalism. David Harvey's (2005) ext
state" in his Brief History of Neolib
spotlights the obdurate limitation
punishment that Punishing the P
neoliberalism aims at maximizing
"deregulation, privatization, and wit
social provision." As in previous era
"to facilitate conditions for profitab
domestic and foreign capital," but n
"The neoliberal state will resort to
(anti-picketing rules, for instance)
opposition to corporate power .... T
to protect corporate interests and, if
seems consistent with neoliberal th
emphases supplied).
With barely a few passing mentio
workfare, Harvey's account of the r
His conception of the neoliberal stat
first, because he remains wedded
instead of construing the manifold m
category of production. Subsuming p
cion leads him to ignore the expressi
of the law and its enforcement, wh
public categories, to stoke collectiv
boundaries, and well as to activate s
and strategies. Next, Harvey port
opponents to corporate rule and "dissident internal movements" that
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216 Wacquant
challenge the
Davidians at W
in 1991, and t
Seattle in 1999
the post-Ford
concentrated i
who, being squ
capacity or car
Third, for th
through coer
economic tran
By contrast, P
state - translat
throughout W
Indeed, it is n
aggressive dep
social and phy
go-round are a
weakness. Harv
larger and larg
that "the socia
that emphasize
(Harvey, 2005:
disorders, infli
managed by the
fare. Instead, H
suggesting tha
accumulation
public coffers a
Fourth and la
order restorat
failings of neo
gral constitue
rungs of the p
dichotomize "neoliberalism" and "neoconservatism" to account for the
reassertion of the supervisory authority of the state over the poor because his
narrow economistic definition of neoliberalism replicates its ideology and truncates
its sociology. To elucidate the paternalist transformation of penality at
century's turn, then, we must imperatively escape the "crime-and-punishment"
box, but also exorcise once and for all the ghost of Louis Althusser (1971),
whose instrumentalist conception of Leviathan and crude duality of ideological
and repressive apparatuses gravely hamstring the historical anthropology
of the state in the neoliberal age. Following Bourdieu, we must fully attend to
the internal complexity and dynamic recomposition of the bureaucratic field,
as well as to the constitutive power of the symbolic structures of penality to
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 217
trace the intricate meshing of mar
nomic, welfare, and criminal justic
2005:133-150).
CONCLUSION: PENALITY IN THE BUILDING OF A CENTAUR STATE
In his meticulous comparison of eugenic measures in the 1920s
sory work camps in the 1930s, and workfare schemes in the 1
United Kingdom and the United States, Desmond King (1999:26) h
that "illiberal social policies" that seek to direct citizens' conduct
are "intrinsic to liberal democratic politics" and reflective of the
contradictions. Even as they contravene standards of equality and
liberty, such programs are periodically pursued because they are id
to highlighting and enforcing the boundaries of membership in ti
moil; they are fleet vehicles for broadcasting the newfound resol
elites to tackle offensive conditions and assuage popular resentme
derelict or deviant categories; and they diffuse conceptions of oth
materialize the symbolic opposition anchoring the social order
advent of the neoliberal government of social insecurity mating
workfare and expansive prisonfare, however, it is not just th
the state that are illiberal but its very architecture. Tracking the
workings of America's punitive politics of poverty after the dissolu
Fordist-Keynesian order and the implosion of the black ghetto re
neoliberalism brings about not the shrinking of government, but
of a centaur state, liberal at the top and paternalistic at the botto
presents radically different faces at the two ends of the social hi
comely and caring visage toward the middle and upper classes, and
and frowning mug toward the lower class.
It bears stressing in closing that the building of a Janus-faced
practicing liberal paternalism has not proceeded according to som
scheme concocted by omniscient rulers. Nor does it spring mechan
the systemic necessities of some grand structure such as late capital
or panopticism (as in various neo-Marxist and neo-Foucauldian
as well as in the activist demonology of the "prison-industrial
Rather, it arises from struggles over and within the bureaucratic field,
redefine the perimeter, missions, priorities, and modalities of acti
authorities with respect to definite problem territories and categ
struggles involve, crucially, not only battles pitting organization
from civil society and state agencies, but also internecine contests b
various sectors of the bureaucratic field, which vie to gain "owner
social problem at hand and thus valorize the specific forms of au
expertise they anchor (medical, educational, social welfare, penal,
etc., and within the penal domain, the police, courts, and co
institutions and postcustodial means of control). The overall fitness
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218 Wacquant
containment t
post hoc funct
cratic adjustm
the point of co
sures concerni
justice. The com
realms is part
practical need
through the le
ing their routi
to figuring a
welfare retrenc
Whatever the
stinginess of
guidance of m
in ways that a
converge on th
and the neutra
citizenship acr
fundamental p
abridge the in
consent of the
programs stip
the institution
social and econ
proletariat fro
ble seal of unw
ship along clas
of republican
insecurity dis
democracy.
By enabling u
welfare and ju
dimensions of
powerful too
Leviathan. It s
tury's turn - if
tion between t
the state, but
public bureauc
marginality an
and social inse
19 For a specifica
David Held's (1996
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Crafting the Neoliberal State 219
technical section in the criminologica
ology of the state and social inequalit
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