Paradigms, Theory, and Social Research CHAPTER OVERVIEW Social scientific irqutry is an interplay of theory and research, logic arid operation,induction and deduction—and of the fundamental frames of reference known as paradigms. Introduction Some Social Science Paradigms Macrolheory and M tcrolheory Early Positivism social Darwinism Con fl id Paradigm Symbolic fnieractionism E l hnomet hodology Structural Functional Ism Feminist Paradigms Critical Race Theory Rational Objectivity Reconsidered Elements of Social Theory Two Logical Systems Revisited The Traditional Model of Science Deductive and Inductive Reasoning: A Case Illustration A Graphic Contrast Deductive Theory Construction Getting Started Constructing Your Theory An Example ol Deductive Theory: Distributive Justice Inductive Theory Construction An Example ol Inductive Theory: Why Do People Smoke Marijuana? The Links between Theory and Research Sociology® How-: Research Methods Use this online tool to help you make the grade on your next exam. After reading this chapter, go to the "Online Study Resources' al the end oJ the1 chapter lor instructions on hew to benefit from SodofajfiiNGW: Rmsnk Mahals. Some Social Science Paradigms ■ 31 Introduction There are restaurants in the United States fond of conducting political polls among their diners whenever an election is in the offing. Some take these polls very seriously because of their uncanny history or predicting winners. Some movie theaters have achieved simi [ar success by offering popcorn in bags picturing either donkeys or elephants. Years au.i>. eranaries in the _Mlih',v-:l l>:'Ili LtL farmers a chance to indicate their political preferences through the bags of grain they selected, Such idiosyncratic ways of determining trends, though interesting, all follow the same pattern over time: They work lor a while, and then they fail. Moreover, wc can't predict when or why they will fail. These unusual polling techniques point lo a significant shortcoming of "research findings" that □re based only on the observation of patterns. Unless we can offer logical explanations for such patterns, the regularities we've observed maybe mere flukes, chance occurrences. If you flip coins long enough, you'll gel ten heads in a row. Scientists might adapt a street expression to describe this situation: "Patterns happen." Logical explanations are what theories seek to provide. Theories function in three ways in research. First, ihey prevent our being taken in by flukes. If we can't explain why Ma's Diner has so successfully predicted elections, we run the risk of supporting a fluke, If we know why it has happened, we can anticipate whether or not it will work in the future. StatiiLL, :Jiei:^ ■ nia.^e .• of observed patterns in a way that can suggest other possibilities. If we understand the reasons why broken homes produce more juvenile delinquency than intact homes do—lack of supervision, for example—we can take effective action, such as after-school youth programs. Finally, theories shape and direct research efforts, pointing toward likely discoveries through empirical observation. If you were looking for your lost keys on a dark street, you could whip your flashlight around randomly, hoping to chance upon the errant keys—or you could use your memory of where you had been and limit your search lo more likely areas. Theories, by analogy, direct researchers' flashlights where they will most likely observe interesting patterns of social life. This is not to say that all social science research is tightly intertwined with social theory. Sometimes social scientists undertake investigations simply lo discover the stale of affairs, such as an evaluation of uiie;liei f.ii iniiova:ive -::via! pio^iam i-; iv:irkiL!ii or a poll to determine which candidate is winning a political race. Similarly, descriptive ethnographies, such as anthropological accounts of preliterate societies, produce valuable information and insights in and of themselves. However, even studies such as these often go beyond pure description lo ask "why." Theory relates directly to "why" questions, This chapter explores some specific ways theory and research work hand in hand during the adventure of inquiry into social lite. We'll begin by looking at some fundamental frames of reference, called paradigms, that underlie social theories and inquiry. Whereas theories seek to explain, paradigms provide ways of looking. In and <.11 1 he nisei ves, paradigms don't explain anything: however, they provide logical frameworks within which theories are created. As you'll see in this chapter, theories and paradigms intertwine in the search for meaning in social life. Some Social Science Paradigms There is usually more than one way to make sense of things. In daily life, lor example, liberals and conservatives often explain the same phenomenon—teenagers using guns at school, for example— quite differently, So might the parents and teenagers themselves. But underlying these different explanations, or theories, are paradigms—the fundamental models or frames of reference we use to organize our observations and reasoning. 32 ■ Chapter 2: Paradigms, Ttieoryj and Social Research Paradigms are often difficult in recognize as such, because they arc so implicit, assumed, taken for granted. They stem more like Mlhe way things are" than like tine possible poinl or view among many, Here's an ilium ration uf what I mean. Where ■:■ i yi:.; -Lr.-.-A ii~.c :-;siil- ■ iI human rights? Do you leel that individual human beings are sacred? Are they "endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights," as asserted by the U.S. Declaration of Independence? Are there some things that no government should do to its citizens? Let's get more concrete. In wa rtime, civilians arc sometimes used as human shields to protect military targets. Sometimes they are impressed imo fave labor or even used as mobile blood banks for military hospitals. How about organized programs of rape and murder in support oi "ethnic cleansing"? Those of us who are horrified and incensed by such practices probably find it difficult to see our individualistic paradigm as only one possible point of view among many. However, many cultures in today's world regard the Western (and particularly U.S.) commitment to the sanctity of the individual as bizarre. Historically, it is decidedly a minority viewpoint. Although many Asian countries, for example, now subscribe to some "rights" that belong to individuals, those are balanced against the "rights" of families, organizations, and the society at large. Criticized for violating human rights. Asian leaders often point to high crime rates and social disorganization in Western societies as the cost of what they see as our radical "cull of the individual." I won't try to change your point of view on individual human dignity, nor have I given up my own. It's useful, however, to recognize that our views and feelings in this matter result from the paradigm we have been socialized into. The sane-lily or the individual is not an objective fact of nature: it is a point of view, a paradigm. All of us operate within many such paradigms. paradigm A mode] or framework for observation and understanding., which shapes both what we see and bow we understand it. The conflict paradigm causes us Lo see social behavior one way, the inter-acllonist paradigm causes us to see it differently. A traditional Western view holds that the world you experience has an objective reality separate from your experience of it. As we saw in Chapter 1, however, the postmodern paradigm suggests that only the experience is real: The book in your hands right now is not real; only your experience of it is. Whether you think the book really exists or nol reflects: the paradigm you operate wiLhin, When we recognize that we are operating within a paradigm, two benefits accrue. First, we can better understand the seemingly bizarre views and actions of others who are operating from a different paradigm. Second, at times we can profiL from stepping outside our paradigm. Suddenly we can see new ways of seeing and explaining things. We can't do thai as long as we mistake our paradigm for reality Paradigms play a fundamental role in science, just as they do in daily life, Thomas Kuhn (1970) draws a lieu lion lo ibe role of paradigms in the history of the natural sciences. Major scientific paradigms have included such fundamental viewpoints as Copemieus's conception of the earlh moving around the sun (instead of the reverse), Darwin's theory of evolution, Newtonian mechanics, and Einstein's relativity Which scientific theories "make sense" tlepeml': <:\ ivh\l: pnmdiem seien:: Ms are maintaining, Although we sometimes think of science as developing gradually over time, marked by important discoveries and inventions, Kuhn says that scientific paradigms typically become entrenched, resisting substantial change. Thus, theories and research alike lend lo follow a given fundamental direction, Eventually, however, as the shortcomings of a particular paradigm became obvious, a new one emerges and supplants the old. The seemingly natural view that the rest of the universe revolves around the earth, for example, compelled astronomers to devise ever more elaborate ways lo account for the motions of heavenly bodies that they actually observed. Eventually this paradigm was supplanted by the view thaL the earth and other planets revolve around the sun. This was nothing less than a revolutionary change in perspective, which fundamentally altered the direction of theory and research. Kuhn's classic book on this subject is entitled, Seme Social Science Paradigms ■ 33 appropriately enough. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Social scientists hive developed several para-L:i;iLiis I■_-1" Lmik'r-iLinding social bdur. i:u\ Tl~v Jale :il supplanted paradigms in the social sciences, however, has differed from what Kuhn observed in the natural sciences, Natural scientists generally believe that the succession from one paradigm to another represents progress from a false view to a true one. For example, no modern astronomer believes thai the sun revolves around the earth. In the social sciences, on the other hand, theoretical paradigms may gain or lose popularity, but they are seldom discarded altogether. The paradigms of the social sciences offer a variety of. views, each of which offers insights the others lack and ignores aspects of social life that the others reveal. Ultimately paradigms are neither true nor false; as ways of looking, they are only more or less useful. Each of the paradigms we are about to examine offers a different way of looking at human social life. Each makes its own assumptions about the nature of social reality. As we'll sec, each can open up new understandings, suggest different kinds of theories, and inspire different kinds of research, Macmtheory and Microtheory Let's begin with a difference concerning focus, a difference that stretches across many ol the paradigms we'll discuss. Some social theorists focus their attention on society at large, or at least on large north:iis :il i:. Topics i::" study For sucli macro-theories include the struggle between economic classes in a society, international relations, or the interrelations among major institutions in society, such as government, religion, and family Macro-theory deals with large, aggregate entities of society or even whole societies. Some scholars have taken a more intimate view of social life. Microtheory deals with issues of social life tit the level of individual sand small groups. Dating behavior, jury deliberations, and student-faculty interactions are apt subjects for a microtheoretical perspective. Such studies often come close to the realm ol psychology, but whereas psychologists typi - cally focus on what goes on inside humans, social scientists study what goes on between them. The distinction between macro- and micro-theory cuts across the other paradigms we'll examine. Some of them, such as symbolic interactionism and ethnometfiodology, are often limited to the mi-crolevcl. Others, such as the c«mll:i" |ui~tiilL;m, can be pursued at either the micro- or the macrolevel. Early Positivism When the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1793-1357) coined the term todologie in 1S22. he launched an intellectual adventure that continues Lo unfold today, Most importantly. Comte identified society as a phenomenon that can be studied scientifically. {Initially he wanted to label his enterprise social physics, but that term was taken over by another scholar.) Prior to Comic's time, society simply was. To the extent that people recognized different kinds of societies or changes in society over time, religious paradigms generally predominated in explanations of such differences. People often saw the stale of social affairs as a reflection of God's will. Altema-Lhrlv. jv:i|ik* u-vre CLialie^^'il M nxw.u ii "(.liti^l God" on earth to replace sin and godlessness. Comte separated his inquiry from religion. He fell that religious belief could be replaced with scientific study and objectivity. His "positive philosophy" postulated three stages of history. A theological stage predominated throughout the world until about 1300 c.e. During the next five hundred years, a metaphysical stage replaced God with philosophical ideas such as "nature" and "natural law." macrotheory A theory aimed at understanding the 'big picture" of institutions, whole societies, and toe interactions among societies. Karl Marx's examination of the class struggle is an example ol macrotheory micro theory A theory aimed at understanding social liie at the intimate ieve! of Individ uals and their Interactions. Examining how the play behavior ol girls differs from that ol boys would Ik an example of microtheory. 34 ■ Qiapter 2: Paradigms, Ttieory, and Sedal Research Comte Fell he was launching the third stage of history, in which science would replace religion and metaphysics hy basing knowledge on observations through the five senses rather than on belie! or logic jlone. Comic It'll thai society could be observed and then explained logically and rationally and that sociology could be as scientific as biology or physics. In a sense, all social research descends tram Comte. His view that society could be studied scientifically formed the foundation lor subsequent development of the social sciences. In his optimism for the future, he coined the term positivism to describe this scientific approach, in contrast to what he regarded as negative elements in the Enlightenment. As we'll see later in this discussion, only in recent decades has positivism been seriously challenged. Social Darwinism Comte's major work on his posilivist philosophy was published between IS30 and 1342. One year alter the publication of Lhe first volume in thai series, a young British naturalist set sail on HfvlS Beagle, beginning a cruise that would profoundly affect the way we think ol ourselves and our place in the world. In IS53, when Charles Darwin published On ific Origin ofSpcaes, he set forth the idea ol evolution through natural selection, Simply put, the theory states that as a species coped with its environment, those individuals most suited to success would be the most likely Lo survive long enough to reproduce. Those less well suited would perish. Over time the traits o( the survivor would come to dominate the species. As later Darwinians put it, species evolved into different forms through the "survival oF the fittest." As scholars began to study society analytically, it was perhaps inevitable that they would apply Darwin's ideas to changes in the structure of human affairs. The journey from simple hunling-and-gathering tribes lo large, industrial civilizations was easily seen as the evolution of progressively "fitter" forms of society. Among others, Herbert Spencer (LK2Q-I903) concluded that society wa s getting better and better. Indeed, his native England had profited greatly from the developmenl of industrial capitalism, and Spencer favored a system of free competition, which he felt would insure continued progress and improvement. Spencer may even have coined the phrase "the survival of the finest," He certainly believed lliS luinciple was .i primary force shaping Lhe nature of society. Social Darwinism or social evolution was a popular view in Spencer's time, although it was not universally accepted. This excerpt Irom a social science methods textbook published in 1950 illustrates the long-term popularity ol the notion that things are getting better and better, The use of atomic energy as an explosive offers most interesting prospects in the civil as in the military field. Atomic explosives maybe used for transforming the landscape. They may be used for blasting great holes and trenches in the earth, which can be transformed into lakes and canals. In this way, it may become possible to produce lakes in Lhe midst of deserts, and thus convert some of the worst places in the world inlo oases and fertile countries, It may also be possible to make the Arctic regions comfortable by providing immense and consLanL sources of heat. The North Pole might be converted into a holiday resort. (Gee 1950:339-40) Quite aside from the widespread disenchantment with nuclear power, contemporary concerns over global warming and the threat of rising sea levels illustrate a growing consciousness that "progress" is often a Lwo-edged sword. Clearly, most of us operate today from a different paradigm. Conflict Paradigm Oik- ill Sricmvf'-: amluiiporarics \ wk a har^jy d:l-ierenl view of the evolution of capitalism. Karl iVIarx (1 SI S-l SS3} suggested thai social behavior could bestbeseenasai process of con flict: t he attempt to SomeSotial Science Paradigms ■ 35 dominate others and to avoid being dominated. Marx focused primarily on the snuggle among economic classes. Specifically, he examined the way capitalism produced the oppression oi workers by the owners of industry. Marx's interest in this topic did not end with analytical study; he was also ideologically committed to restructuring economic relations to end the oppression he observed. The contrast between the views set forth by 5penccr and Marx indicates the influence of paradigms on research. These fundamental viewpoints shape the kinds oi observations we are likely to make, the sorts of facts we seek to discover, and the conclusions we draw 1mm those facts. Paradigms also help determine which concepts we see as relevant and important. Whereas economic classes were essential to Marx's analysis, lor example, 5pencer was more interested in the relationship between individuals and society—particularly the amount of freedom individuals had to surrender I it society to function. The conflict paradigm proved to he fruitful outside the realm of purely economic analyses. Georg Simmel (1353-191 St was especially interested it: small-scale conflict, in contrast to the class struggle that interested Marx, Simmel noted, for example, that conflicts among members of a tightly knit group tended to be more intense than those among people who did not share feelings of belonging and intimacy. In a more recent application ol the conflict paradigm, when Michel Chossudovsky's (1997) analysis of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank suggested that these two international organizations were increasing global poverty rather than eradicating it, he directed his attention to the competing interests involved in the process, [n theory, the chief interest being served should be the poor people of the world or perhaps the impoverished. Third World nations. The researcher's inquiry, however, identified many other interested pardes who benefited; the commercial lending in-slit tilions who made loans in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank and multinational corporations seeking cheap labor and markets for their goods, for example. Chossudovsky concluded that 111 l- interests iJ line hanks aiui Ci nitration:; tended to take precedence over those of the poor people. Moreover, he found many policies were weakening national economies in the Third World, as well as undermining democratic governments. Although the conflict paradigm often focuses on class, gender, and ethnic struggles, it would be appropriate to apply it whenever difFerenl groups have competing interests. For example; it could be fruitfully applied to understanding relations among different departments in an organization, fraternity and sorority rush weeks, or studcnl-faculty-admtnistrative relations, to name just a few. Symbolic Interadionism In his overall focus, Georg Simmel differed from both Spencer and Marx. Whereas they were chiefly concerned with macrotheoretical issues—large institutions and whole societies in their evolution through the course of history—Simme! was more interested in how individuals interacted with one another. In other words, his thinking and research took a "micro" turn, thus calling attention to aspects of social reality that are invisible in Marx's or Spencer's theory. For example, he began by examining dyads [groups; of two people) and triads (groups of three). Similarly, he wrote about "the web of group affiliations.' Simmel was one of the first European sociologists to influence the development of U.S. sociology. His focus on the nature of interactions particularly influenced George Herbert Mead (1363-1931), Charles Horton Cooley (1S64-1929), and others who took up the cause and developed it into a powerful paradigm for research, Cooley, for example, introduced the idea of the "primary group," those intimate associates with whom we share a sense of belonging, such as our family and friends. Cooley also wrote of the "looking-glass sell" we form by looking into the reactions of people around us. If everyone treats us as beautiful, lor example, we conclude that we are. Notice how fundamentally the concepts and theoretical focus inspired by this paradigm differ from the society-level concerns of Spencer and Marx. Mead emphasized the importance of our human ability to "take the role of the olher," 3£ ■ Chapter 2: Paradigms, Ttieoryj and Social Research imagining how others Feel and how they might behave in certain circumstances. As we gain an idea of hew people in general see things, we develop a sense ol what Mead called the 'generalized other." Mead, alio showed a special interest in the role of communications in human affairs. Most interactions, he ielt, revolved around the process of individuals reaching common understanding through the use of language and other such systems, hence the term symbolic mleracthnism. This paradigm can tend insights into the nature oF interactions in ordinary social life, but it can also help us understand unusual lorms ol interaction, as in the following ease, Robert Emerson. Kerry Ferris, and Carol Gardner (199S) set out to understand the nature of "stalking." Through interviews with numerous stalking victims, they came to identify diFIerent motivations among stalkers, stages in the development oFa stalking scenario, how people tan recognize if they are being stalked, and what they can do about it. Here's one way you might apply this paradigm to an examination of your own life, The next time you meet someone new, pay attention to how you get to know each other. To begin, what assumptions do you make about the other person based merely on appearances, how he or she talks, and the circumstances under which you've met, ("What's someone [ike you doing in a place tike this?") Then .vjidi hen'v.iuv knowledge ol uadi other unfolds through the process of interaction. Notice also any attempts you make to manage the image you are creating in the other person's mind Ethnomethodology Whereas some social scientific paradigms emphasize the impact of social structure on human behavior—that is, the effect of norms, values, control agents, and so Forth—other paradigms do not. Harold Garfinkel, a contemporary sociologist, claims that people are continually creating social structure through their actions and interactions— that they are, in fact, creating their realities. Thus, when you and your instructor meet to discuss your term paper, even though there are myriad expectations about how you both should act. your conversation will differ somewhat from any of those that have occurred before, and how you each act will somewhat modify your expectations in the future. That discussing your li-r::: paper i.l impact the interactions each ol you have with other professors and students in the future. Given the temativeness of reality in this view, Garfinkel suggests thai people are continuously trying to make sense of the life they experience. In a sense, he suggests that everyone is acting like a social scientist, hence the term elknoinethotiology, or "methodology of the people " How would you go about learning about people's expectations and how they make sense out ol their world? One technique elhnomethod-ologists use is to break the rules, to violate people's expectations. Thus, if you try to talk to me about your term paper but I keep talking about football, :his might reveal :Ju- expei ialioii; vim bad Ilt my behavior. We might also see how you make sen:ie i'tit "I my behavior. ("Maybe he's using football as an ana Fogy tor understanding social systems theory,") In another example of ethnomethodology, Johen Heritage and David Greatbatch (1992) examined the role of applause in British political speeches: How did the speakers evoke applause, and what function did it serve (for example, lo complete a topic}? Research within the ethno-methodological paradigm has often focused on communications. There is no end to the opportunities you have for trying out the ethnomethodological paradigm. For instance, the next time you gel on an elevator, spend your ride facing the rear of the elevator. Don't face front, watching the floor ntimbers whip by (that's the norm, or expected behavior|. Just stand quietly facing :In.- tear. See hov\ others reacl lo this behavior. Just as important, notice how you feel about it, If you do this experiment a lew limes, you should begirt to develop a feel for the ethnomethodological paradigm.1 *! am grateful lo my colleague, Bernard MeCrarie. for this experiment. Barney also has his students eat dinner with their hands, watch TV without turning it on. and engage in other strangely enlightening behavior |MtCrane 1994). SomeSodal Science Paradigms ■ 37 We'll return lo cthnomclhodology in Chapter I0r when wc discuss field research. For now, let's turn lo a very different paradigm, Structural Fundionaiism Structural functionalism. sometimes also known as social systems theory, has grown out of a notion introduced by Comte and Spencer: A social entity, such as an organization or a whole society, can be viewed as art organism. Like other organisms, a social system is made up of parts, each of which tun-tributes to the functioning ol the whole. By analogy, consider the human body. Each component—such as the heart, lungs, kidneys, skin, and brain—has a particular job to do. The body as a whole cannot survive unless each of these parts does its jobr and none of the parts can survive lva;v r example, is to exercise v icial mm im!— encouraging people to abide by the norms of soci-etyand bringing lo justice those who do not. Notice, though, that the researchers could just as reasonably ask what functions criminals serve in society. Within the functionalist paradigm, we might say that criminals serve as job security For the police. In a related observation, Emile Dürkheim (]S5S-1917| suggested that crimes and theirpun-ishmenl provide an opportunity Lo reaffirm society's values, By catching and punishing Lhieves. we reaffirm our collective respect for private property. To get a sense of the structural lunclional paradigm, suppose you were interested in explaining how your college or university works. You might thumb through the institution's catalog and begin assembling a list of the administrators and support staff (such as the president, deans, registrar. campus security staff, maintenance personnel). Then you might figure out what each of them does and relate iheir roles- and .li'livilies t!e ivr»rcseMl:ii}> onlv |Hfrtusv: i>< scdi'tv. in the United States, for example, such analyses have typically been written by middle-class white men— not surpri singly, they have written about the beliefs, values, and norms they themselves share. Though George Herbert Mead spoke of the "generalized other" that each of u s becomes aware of and can "take the role of," feminist paradigms question whether such a generalized other even exists. Fun her, whereas Mead used the example of learning to play baseball to illustrate how we leam about the generalized other, Janet Lever's research suggests that understanding the experience of boys may tell us little about girls. Girls' play and games are very different. They are mostly spontaneous, imaginative, and free of structure or rules. Tum-laking activities like jumprope may be played without setting explicit goals. Girls have far less experience with interpersonal competition. The style of their competition is indirect, rather than face to face, individual rather than team affiliated. Leadership roles are either missing or randomly filled. (Levtr 19S6:S6) Social researchers' growing recognition of the general intellectual differences between men and women led the psychologist M.iry rieÄL liek-nky and her colleagues to speak of Wtwejir Ways of Knowing (19SÖ>. Jn-depth interviews with 45 women led the researchers to distinguish five perspectives; on knowing that should challenge the view of inquiry as obvious and straightforward: Silence: Some women, especially early in life, feel themselves isolated from the world of knowledge, their lives largely determined by external authorities. Received knowledge: From this perspective, women feel themselves capable of taking in and holding knowledge originating with external authorities. Subjective knowledge:Th\s perspective opens up the possibility of personal, subjective knowledge, including intuition. Some Social Science Paradigms ■ 39 Procedural h:cwiedge: Some women feel they have (Lilly learned the ways of gaining knowledge through objective procedures. Constructed knowledge: The authors describe this perspective as "a position in which women view all knowledge as contextual, experience themselves as creators of knowledge, and value both subjective and objective strategies for knowing" (Belenky el al. 1936: 15). "Constructed knowledge" is pa rticularfy inter-esting in the context ol paradigms. The posilivislie paradigm ol Comte would have a place neither for "subjective knowledge" nor for the idea that truth might vary according to its context. The ethno-melhodological paradigm, on the other hand, would accommodate these ideas. To try out feminist paradigms, you might want to explore whether discrimination against women exists at your college or university. Are the top administrative positions held equally by men and women? How about secretarial and clerical positions? Are men's and women's sports supported equally? Read through the official history oFyour school; is it a history that includes men and women equally? (If you attend an aII-male or all-female school, of course, some oF these questions won't apply.) As we just saw. feminist paradigms reflect both a concern for the unequal treatment ol women but also an epistemological recognition that men and women overall perceive and understand society differently. Social theories created solely by men. which has been the norm, run the risk ol an unrecognized bias. A similar case can be made for theories created almost exclusively by white people. Critical Race Tlieory The roots of critical race theory are generally associated with the civil rights movement of the mid-1950s and race-related legislation ol the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, with fears thai the strides toward equality were beginning to bog down, civil rights activists and social scientists began the codification of a paradigm based on race awareness and a commitment to racial justice. This was not the first time sociologists paid attention to the status of nonwhites in American society. Perhaps the best known African American sociologist in the history of the discipline was W. E. B. DuBois, who published TSte Sen Is ofBlack Folk in 1903. Among other things, DuBois pointed out that African Americans lived their lives through a "dual consciousness": as Americans and as black people. By contrast while Americans sel-.l:im ivlkv: :ni [vine, while. II you are American, white is simply assumed. If you are not white, you are seen and feel like the exception. So imagine the difference between an African American sociologist and a white sociologist creating a theory of social identity. Their theories of identity would likely differ in some fundamental ways, even if they were not limiting their analyses to their own race. Much of the contemporary scholarship in critical race theory has to do with the role of race in politics and government, often undertaken by legal scholars as well as social scientists. Thus, for example, Derrick Bell (19S0) critiqued the Supreme Court's landmark Brown vs. Board of Education decision, which struck down the "separate but equal" system of school segregation. He suggested that the Court was motivated by the economic and political interests of the while majority, not by educational equality for African American students. In his analyse, he n n A .. .■: ihc concepl ■ 'I interest convergence, suggesting that laws will only be changed h benelil Allium American1: \ ll:-| when those changes are seen to further the interests of whiles. Richard Delgado (2002) provides an excellent overview of how Bell's reasoning has been pursued by subsequent critical race theory scholars. A-;e, iple he-haw rationally. In par;, the ::. ki • 11 ol positivism challenges the idea lhat scientisls can be as objective as the positivistic ideal assumes. Most scientists would agree thai personal feelings can and do influence the problems scientists choose to Some Social Science Paradigms ■ 41 study, what they choose to observe, and the conclusions lhey draw horn their observations. There is an even mom radical critique oľ the ideal of objectivity. As we glimpsed in the discussions of feminism and ethnomethodology, some contemporary researchers suggest that subjectivity might actually be preferable in some situations. Let's take a moment to return lo the dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity. To begin, all our experiences are inescapably subjective. There is no way out, We can see only through our own eyes, and anything peculiar lo hi i" eye:- 'Aill shape '.vlial 'W w. We tan Meat things only the way our particular cars an d brain transmit and interpret sound waves. You and I, to some extent, hear and see different realities. And both ol us experience quite different physical "realities" than, say, do bats. In what to us is lolal darkness, a hat "sees" things such as flying insects by emitting a sound we humans can't hear, The reflection of the bat's sound creates a "sound picture" precise enough for the bat to home in on the moving insect and snatch it up in its teelh. In a similar vein, scientists on the planet Xandu might develop theories of the physical world based on a sensory apparatus that we humans can't even imagine. Maybe they see X-rays or hear colors. Despite the inescapable subjectivity of our experience, we humans seem to be wired lo seek an agreement on what is really real, whal is objectively so. Objectivity is a conceptual attempt to get beyond our individual views, H is ultimately a matter of communication, as you and [ attempt to find a common ground in our subjective experiences. Whenever we ;ikvi.v;1 in 'Hi' seaivi:, we ::ay we ate dealing with objective reality. This is the agreement reality discussed in Chapter I. To this point, perhaps the most significant studies in the history of social science were conducted in the 19 JOs by a Turkish Ame rican social psycho! -ogist, ŕvluzafer Sherif (1935), who slyly said he wanted to study "auto-kinetic effects." To do this, he put small groups in totally darkened rooms, save lor a single point of light in the center of the waif in front of the participants. Sherif explained that the fight would soon begin to move about, and the subjects were to determine how far it was moving—a difficult task with nothing else visible as a gauge of length or distance. Amazingly, each of the groups was able lo agree as to the distance the point of light moved about. Oddly, however, the different groups of subjects arrived at very different conclusions. Strangest of all—as you may have guessed—the point of light had remained stationary. ]f you stare at a fixed point of light long enough it will seem to move about (Sherif s "auto-kinetic effect"). Notice, however, that each of the groups agreed t neees-sarily represented :n that reality. Thus, early anthropologists are now criticized for often making modern, Westernized "sense" out of the beliels and practices of iron literate tribes around the world, sometimes by portraying their subjects as superstitious savages. We otten call orally transmitted beliefs about the distant past "creation myth," whereas we speak of our own beliefs as "history," Increasingly today, there is a demand lo find the native logic by which various peoples make sense out of life and to understand it on its own terms. Ultimately, we'll never be able to distinguish completely between an objective reality and our subjective experience. We can't know whether our concepts correspond to an objective reality or are simply useful in allowing us to predict and control our environment. 5o desperate is our need to know what is really real, however, that both positivists and postmodernists are sometimes drawn into the belief that their own view is real and true. There is a dual irony in this. On the one hand, the positivisi's belief that science precisely mirrors ;he iii^eelive world mils: ulli:::alejy be based on faith; it cannot be proved by "objective" science, because that's precisely what's at issue. And the postmodernists, who say nothing is objectively so and everything is ultimately subjective, do at least feel that that is really the way things are. Postmodernism is often portrayed as a denial of the possibility of social science, Because this book has already expressed sympathy for some postmodern views and concerns, a word of explanation may be in order. This textbook makes no assumption about the existence or absence of an objective reality. At the same time, human beings demonstrate an extensive and robust ability to establish agreements as to what's "real." This appears in regard to rocks and trees, as well as ghosts and gods, and even more elusive ideas such as loyalty and treason. Whether something like "prejudice" really exists, research into its nature can take place, because enough people agree that prejudice does exist, and researchers can use agreed-on techniques of inquiry. This book will not require you to choose between positivism and postmodernism, In Tact, I invite you to look lor value in both as you seek to understand the world thai may or may not exist around you. Similarly, as social researchers we are not forced to align ourselves entirely with either of these approaches. Instead, we can treat them as lwo distinct arrows in our quiver, Each approach compensates for ihe weaknesses of ihe other by suggesting complementary perspectives that can produce useful lines of inquiry. For example, the renowned British physicist Stephen Hawking has elegantly described the appealing simplicity of the positivislic model but tempers his remarks with a recognition of the way science is practiced. According to this way of thinking, a scientific theory is a mathematical model that describes and codifies the observations we make. A good theory will describe a large range of phenomena on the basis of a few simple postulates and will make definite predictions that can be tested, if the predictions agree with the observations, the theory survives that test, though it can never be proved lo be correct. On the other hand, if the observations disagree with the predictions, one has to discard or modify the theory. (At least, that is what is supposed to happen. In practice, people of ten question the accuracy of the observations and the reliability and moral character of those making the observations.! (2001:31) In summary, a rich variety of theoretical paradigms can be brought to bear on the study of social life. With each of these fundamental frames of reference, use lu I theories can be const rue ted. We turn Elements of Social Theory ■ 43 now to some of the issues involved in theory construction, which arc of interest and tise to all social researchers, from positivists lo postmodernists— and all those in between. Elements of Social Theory As we have seen, paradigms are general frameworks or viewpoints: literally "points from which to view," They provide ways of looking al life and are grounded in sets of assumptions about the nature □f reality. Theories, by contrast, are sysLemauc seli :il interrelated statements intended to explain some aspect of social life. Thus, theories flesh out and specify paradigms. Whereas a paradigm offers a way of looking, a theory aims at explaining what we see. Let's look a little more deliberately now at some of the elements of a theory, As I mentioned in Chapter 1, science is based on observation. In social research, observation typically refers lo seeing, hearing, and—less commonly—touching. A corresponding idea is foci. Although for philosophers "fact" is as complex: a notion as "reality," social scientists generally use it to refer lo some phenomenon that has been observed, It is a fact, for example, that Bill Clinton defeated Robert Dole in the 1996 presidential election. Scientists aspire lo organize many facts under "rules" called laws. Abraham Kaplan (1964: 9] j defines /mis as universal generalizations about classes of facts, The law of gravily is a classic example: Bodies are attracted to each other in proportion to their masses and in inverse proportion lo the distance separating them. Laws must be truly universal, however, not merely accidental patterns found among a specific set of facts, II is a fact. Kaplan points out [1964: 92). that in each of the US, presidential elections from 1920 to 1960, the major candidate with the longest name won. That is not a law, however, as shown by the next three elections. The earlier pattern was a coincidence, Sometimes called principles, laws are important statements about what is so, We speak of them, as being "discovered." granting, of course, that our paradigms affect what we choose to look for and what we see. Laws in and of themselves do not explain anything. They j ust summarize the way things are. Explanation is a function of theory, as we'll see shortly, There are no social scientific laws that claim the universal certainty of those of the natural sciences. Social scientists debate among themselves whether such laws will ever be discovered. Perhaps social life essentially does not abide by invariant laws. This does not mean that social life is so chaotic as lo defy prediction and explanation. As we saw in Chapter I, social behavior Tails into patterns, and those patterns qui te often make perfect sense, although we may have to look below the surface to find the logic. As 1 just indicated, laws should not be confused with I henries. Whereas a law is an observed regularity, a theory is a systematic explanation for observations that relate to a particular aspect of life. For example, someone might offer a theory of juvenile delinquency, prejudice, or political revolution. Theories explain observations by means of concepts, Jonathan Turner (19S9: 5) calls concepts the "basic building blocks of theory" Concepts are ab-slracl elements representing classes ol phenomena within the field of study. The concepts relevant lo a theory of juvenile delinquency, for example, include "juvenile" and "delinquency," for starters. A "peer group"—the people you hang around with and identify with—is another relevant concept. "Social class" and "ethnicity" arc undoubtedly relevant concepts in a theory of juvenile delinquency. "School performance" might also be relevant. A variable is a special kind of concept, Some of the concepts just mentioned refer to things, and others refer to sets of things, As we saw in Chapter ]. each variable comprises a set of attributes: thus, delinquency, in the simplest case, is made up of delinquent and not delinquent. A theory of delinquency would aim al explaining why some juveniles are delinquent and others are not. Axioms or pcstutoles are fundamental assertions, taken to be true, on which a theory is grounded. In a theory or juvenile delinquency, we might begin with axioms such as "Everyone desires material 44 Chapter 2: Paradigms, Theory, and Social Research comforts" and "The ability to obtain material comforts legally is greater for the wealthy than for the poor." From these ire might proceed to propositions: specific conclusions, derived from the axiomatic groundwork, about the relationships among concepts, From our beginning axioms about juvenile delinquency, for example, we might reasonably formulate the proposition that poor youths are more likely to break the law to gain material comforts than are rich youths. This proposition, incidentally, accords with Robert rvlerton's classic attempt to account for deviance in society, Merton \ 1957: 139-57) spoke of the agreed-on means and ends of a society, In Morton's model, nondeviants are those who share the societal agreement as to desired ends (such as a new car) and the means prescribed for achieving them (such as to buy it). One type of deviant—Merton called this type the "innovator"—agrees on the desired end but does not have access Lo the prescribed means for achieving it, Innovators find another method, such as crime, of getting the desired end. From propositions, in turn, we can derive hypotheses. A hypothesis is a speci ficd testable expectation about empirical reality that follows from a more general proposition. Thus, a researcher might formulate the hypothesis, "Poor youths have higher delinquency rates than do rich youths." Research is designed to lest hypotheses. In other words, research will support (or fail to support) a theory only indireedy—by testing specific hypotheses that are derived from theories and propositions. Let's look more clearly at how theory and re-sea rch come together. hypothesis A speci fied testable expectation about empirical reality that follows from a more general proposition; more generally, an expectation about Hie nature ol things derived Jrojn a theory. II is a statement of something [hat ought to be observed in the real world il the theory is correct. opeiallonalization One step beyond conceptualization. Opcrationaliialion Is the process ol developing operational definitions, or specifying the exact operations invoived in measuring, a variable. Two Logical Systems Revisited In Chapter 1.1 introduced deductive and inductive reasoning, with a promise that we would return lo them later. It's later. 77?e Traditional Mode! of Science Most of us have a somewhat idealized picture of "the scientific method," a view gained from science instruction ever since elementary school, especially in the physical sciences. Although this traditional model of science tells only a part of the story, it's helpful Lo understand its logic. There are three main elements in Lhe tradi-lional mode] of science: theory, operationalization, and observation. At this poinl we're already welt acquainted with the idea of theory. Theory According to Lhe traditional model of science, scientists begin with a Lhing, from which they derive testable hypotheses. So, for example, as social scientists we might have a theory abo ul the causes of juvenile delinquency. Let's assume that we have arrived at the hypothesis that delinquency is inversely related to social class. That is, as social class goes up, delinquency goes down. OperationaHzation To lest any hypothesis, we must specify the meaning ol all (he vari.i'^.l' invo'ivii in :l in observational turns, [n Lhe present case, the variables are social doss and delinquency. To give these terms specific meaning, we might define delinquency as "being arrested for a crime," "being convicted of a crime," or some other plausible phrase, whereas social class might be specified in terms of family income, for the purposes of lEiin particular study. Once we have defined our variables, we need lo specify how we'll measure them. (Recall from Chapter 1 that science, in the classical ideal, depends on measurable observations.) Operational-i/iiLion literally means specifying the exact operations involved in measuring a variable. There are Two Logical Systems Revisited ■ 45 many ways we can attempt to test our hypothesis, each of which allows fordilferent ways of measuring our variables. For simplicity, let's assume we're planning to conduct a survey of high school students. We might ope rational tie delinquency in the form of the question "Have you ever stolen anything?" Those who answer "yes" will be classified as delinquents in our study; those who say "no" will be classified as non-delinquents. Similarly, we might operationatiie social class by asking respondents, "What was your family's income last year?" and providing them with a set of family income categories: under 510,000; SI 0.000-524.999; $25.000 -$49,999; and 550,000 and above. At this point someone might object mat delinquency can mean something more than or different from having stolen something at one lime or another, or that social class isn't necessarily the same as family income. Some parents might think body piercing is a sign of delinquency even if their children don't steal, and to some social class might include an element of prestige or community standing as well as how much money a family has. For the researcher testing a hypothe -sis, however, the meaning of variables is exactly and only what the operational definition specifies. In this respect, scientists are very much like Humply Dumply in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass. "When I use a word," Humply Dumply tells Alice, "it means just what f choose it to mean—neither more nor less." "The question is," Alice replies, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." To which Humply Dumpty responds, "The question is, which is to be master—that's all." Scientists have to be "masters" of their operational definitions for the sake of precision in observation, measurement, and communication. Otherwise, we would never know whether a study that contradicted ours did so only because it used a different set of procedures to measure one of the variables and thus changed the meaning of the hypothesis being tested. Of course, this also means that to evaluate a study's conclusions about juvenile delinquency and social class, or any other vari- ables, we need :o know how those variables were operationalized. The way we have operationalized the variables in our imaginary study could be open to other problems, however. Perhaps some respondents will lie about having stolen anything, in which cases we'll misclassily them as nondeliquent. Some respondents will not know their lamily incomes and will give mistaken answers: others maybe embarrassed and lie. Well consider issues like these in detail in Part 2. Our operationalized hypothesis now is that the highest incidence of delinquents will be found among respondents who select the lowest family income category (under J 10,000); a lower percentage of delinquents will be found in the $ 10,000-$24,999 category; sdll fewer delinquents will be found in the $2 5,000-$49,999 category; and the lowest licrcenrajy M ili.iijH|:i; lit; will :>e funnel in the $50,000-and-above category. Now we're ready for the final step in the traditional model of science—observation. Having developed theoretical clarity and specific expectations, and having created a strategy for looking, all that remains is lo look at the way things actually are. Observation The final step in the traditional model of science involves actual observation, looking al the world and making measurements of what is seen. Let's suppose our survey produced the following data: Pexetitdelmqueftl Under Si 0,000 i[! STCrM0-S24,9» 15 $25,MM49,999 10 $50,000 and abow 5 operational definition The concrete and specilic definition ol something in terms ol the operations, by which observations are to be categorized. The opera -lional definition ol "earning an A in this course" might be "correctly answering at least 90 percent of the final exam questions." 46 ■ Chapter 2: Paradigms, Theory, and Social Research Observations producing such data would confirm our hypothesis. But suppose our findings were as I'll ■wr* PerceM delinquent Under 510,000 15 $10,0OO-$24,°99 15 $25,000-549,999 15 $50,000 and above 15 Idea/interest "What causes XI" THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING Vcauses X HYPOTHESIS X=tiY] Theoretical expectation Operational ization y - f(y) Testable hypothesis _-x=t[y) Obaeivation {hypothesis testing) FIGURE 2-2 The Traditional Image of Science. The deductive model of scientific inquiry begins with a sometimes vague or general Question, which is subjected to a process of spedficauon, resulting in hypotheses that can be tested through empirical objurations. self-reported thelt is a function of family income Observations aimed at finding out whether this statement accurately describes reality are pan of what is typically called hypclhesis testily. (See "Hints lor Stating Hypotheses" for more on the process ol formulating hypotheses.) Deductive and inductive Reasoning: A Case Illustration As you probably recognized, the traditional model of science just described is a nice example of deductive reasoning: From a general theoretical understanding, the researcher derives (deduces) an expectation and finally a testable hypothesis. This picture is tidy, but in reality science uses inductive masoning as well. Let's consider a real research example as a vehicle for comparing the deductive and inductive These findings would disconfirm our hypothesis regarding family income and delinquency, Discon-firmability—the possibility that observations may not support our expectations—is an essential quality in any hypothesis, in other words, if there is no chance that our hypothesis will be disconfirmed, it hasn't said any tiling meaningful. ["■ if example, the hypothesis thai "juvenile delinquents" commit more crimes than do "non-:kl:iu; nenl:;" tamml ;ssibl^ be disconfirmed, he-cause criminal behavior is intrinsic to the idea of delinquency. Even if we recognize that some young people commit crimes without being caught and labeled as delinquents, ihey couldn't threaten our hypothesis, because our actual observations would lead us to conclude they were law-abiding non-delinquents, Figure 2-2 provides a schematic diagram of the traditional model of scientific inquiry, In it we see the researcher beginning with an interest in a phenomenon (such as juvenile delinquency'). Next i.vi::vs \\w devL.'!'iV':::eii; and (5). As you identify the relevant concepts and discover what's already been learned about them, you can begin to create a propositional structure that explains the topic under study. Let's look now at an example of how these building blocks fit together in deductive theory construction and empirical research. An Example of Deductive Theory: Distributive Justice A topic of interest to scholars is the concept of distributive justice, people's perceptions of whether they are being treated fairly by life, whether they are getting "their share." Guillermrna Jasso describes the theory of distributive justice more formally, as follows: The theory provides a mathematical description of the process whereby individuals, reflecting on their holdings of the goods they value (such as beauty, intelligence, or wealth), compare themselves to others, experiencing a fundamental instantaneous magnitude ol the justice evaluation (J), which captures their sense of being fairly or unfairly treated in the distributions of natural and social goods. (JmsB 19SS: US Notice that Jasso has assigned a symbolic representation for her key variable: J will stand for distributive justice, She does this to support her intention of stating her theory in mathematical formulas, Though theories are often expressed mathematically, we'll not delve too deeply into that practice here. Jasso indicates that there are three kinds of postulates in her theory. "The first makes explicit the fundamental axiom which represents the substantive point of departure for the theory." She elaborates as follows: "The theory begins with the received Axiom of Comparison, which formalizes the long-held view dial a wide cfass of phenomena, including happiness, self-esteem, and the sense ol distributive justice, may be understood as the product of a comparison process" (Jasso 19SS: 11). Thus, your sense of whether you're receiving a "fair" share of the good things of life comes from comparing yourself with others. If this seems obvious to you, that's not a shortcoming of the axiom. Remember, axioms are the taken-for-grantcd beginnings of theory. Jasso continues to do the groundwork for her theory, First, she indicates that our sense of distributive justice is a function of "Actual Holdings (A)" and "Comparison Holdings (C)" of some good, Let's consider money, lor example. My sense of justice in this regard is a function oi how much I actually have, compared with how much others have, By specifying the two components of the comparison, Jasso can u se them as va riables in her theory. Next, Jasso offers a "measurement rule" that furlher specifies how the two variables. A and C. will be conceptualized. This step is needed because some of the goods to be examined are concrete and commonly measured (such as money), whereas others are less tangible (such as respect). The former kind, she says, will be measured □eductiv€ Theufy Corslnjcliori ■ 53 conventionally, whereas the latter will be measured "by the individuals relative rank ., . within a specially selected comparison group," The theory will provide a formula [or making that measurement (Jasso I9SS: 13). Jasso continues in this fashion to introduce additional elements, weaving them into mathematical formulas to be used in deriving predictions about the workings of distributive justice in a variety of social settings. Here is just a sampling of where her theorizing takes her(l9HH: 14—15), * Other things [being] the same, a person will prefer to steal from a fellow group member rather than from an outsider. * The preference to steal from a fellow group member is more pronounced in poor equips, than in rich groups. * In the case of theft, informants arise only in cross-group theft, in which case they are members of the thie f's group. * Persons who arrive a week late at summer camp or for freshman year of college are more likefy to become friends of persons who play games of chance than of persons who play games of skill. * A society becomes more vulnerable to deficit spending as its wealth increases. « Societies in which population growth is welcomed must be societies in which the set of valued goods includes at least one quantity-good, such as wealth. Jassos theory leads lo many other propositions, but this sampling should provide a good sense of where deductive theorizing can take you.. To get a feeling for how she reasons her way to these propositions, let's look briefly at the logic involved in two of the propositions that relate to theft within and outside one's group, * Other things [being] the same, a person will prefer to steal from a fellow group member rather than from an outsider, ueginnine. with the assumption thai thieves want to maximize their relative wealth, ask yourself whether thai goal would be best served by stealing from those you compare yourself with or from outsiders. In each case, stealing will increase your Actual Holdings, but what about your Comparison Holdings? A moment's thought should suggest that stealing from people in your comparison group will lower their holdings, further increasing your relative wealth. To simplify, imagine there are only two people in your comparison group: you and 1. Suppose we each have $100, If you steal $50 from someone outside our group, you will have increased your relative wealth by 50 percent compared with me; $1 50 versus $100, But il you steal i^ti from me, you will have increased yo.Lr relative wealth 200 percent: SI50 to my S50. Your goal is best served by stealing from within the comparison group, * In the case of theft, informants arise only in cross-group theft, in which case they are members of the thief's group. Can you sec why it would make sense for informants (1) to arise only in the case of cross-group theft and (2) to come from the thief's comparison uriuip? This proposi:Mil jja:n tiqietid ; on the k.n-damental assumption that everyone wants to increase his or her relative standing. Suppose you and I arc in the same comparison group, but this time the group contains additional people. If you steal from someone else within our comparison group, my relative standing in the group does not change. Although your wealth has increased, the average wealth in the group remains the same (because someone else's wealth has decreased by the same amount). So my relative standing remains the same. 1 have no incentive to inform on you. If you steal from someone outside our comparison group, however, your nefarious income increases the total wealth in our group. Mow my own wealth relative lo that total is diminished. Because my relative wealth has suffered, I'm more likely lo inform on you in order lo bring an end to your stealing. Hence, informants arise only in cross-group thelt. This lasl deduction also begins to explain why these informants come from ihe thief's own comparison group. We've just seen how your theft 54 ■ Chapter 2: ParadigrnSj Theory, and Social Research decreased my relative standing, How about members tiuli::i; block' of lhe theory itself). Two Logical Systems Revisited • In the traditional image of science, scien Lists proceed from theory lo operationalization to observation, But this image is not an accurate picture of how scientific research is actually done. • Social scientific theory and research are linked through the two logical methods of deduction (the derivation of expectations and hypotheses from theories) and induction (the developmenL of generalizations from specific observations). • In praclice, science is a process involving an alternation of deduction and induction. Deductive TheoTy Construction ■ GuiHermina Jasso's theory ol distributive justice illustrates how Formal reasoning can lead lo a \.I.v :il ib.ciirnlcLL ,. in - :hai can be tested by observation. Inductive Theory Construction • David Takeuehi's study of factors influencing marijuana smoking among University of Hawaii students illustrates how collecting observations can lead to generalizations and an explanatory theory. The Links between Theory jnd Research ■ Ln practice, there are many possible links between theory and research and many ways of going about social inquiry. KEY TERMS The following Eerms are defined in context in the chapter and at the boLtom of the page where the term is introduced, as well as in the comprehensive glossary at the back of the book. hypothesis interest convergence macrotheory microlheory null hypothesis operational definition operationalizaLion paradigm 58 ■ Chapter 2: PararügriiSj Theory, and Social Research REVIEW QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 1. Consider ihe possible rel.nlLonship between education and prejudice that was mentioned in Chapter I. Describe how you might examine that relationship through {a} deductive and (b) inductive methods. 2, Review the relationships between theory and research discussed in ihis chapter. Select a research article from an academic journal and classify the relationship between theory and research you find there. ~i. Using one of the many search engines (such as Google, Excite. HotBot, Ask Jeeves. LookSmarl. Lycos, Netscape, l"VebCraw]er, or Yahoo}, find information on the web concerning at least three of the following paradigms. Give the web locations and report on the theorists discussed in connection with the discussions you found. conflict theory critical race theory exchange theory ethnometbodology feminism functionalism interaction Ism positivism postmodernism Using InfoTrac College Edition (Article A6705I613} or the library, locate Judith A. Howard (2000), *5ocial Psychology of Identities," Annual Review of Sociology 26: 367-9 3, What paradigm does she find most useful for the study of social identities? Explain why she [eels that it is the appropriate paradigm. Do you agree? Why or why not? ADDITIONAL READINGS Cha(etz, Janet. I97S. A Primer on list Construction and Testing ofTheories in Sociology. Itasca, 1L: Peacock. In one of the few books on theory construction written expressly for undergraduates, Chafetz provides a rudimentary understanding of the philosophy of science through simple language and everyday examples. She describes the nature of explanation, the role assumptions and concepts, and the building and testing of theories. Delgado. Richard, and Jean Slefancic. 2001. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, New Yorkr New York University Press. This is a good introduction to this alternative paradigm [or viewing racial and ethnic issues, presenting key concepts and iindings. Denzin. Norman K... and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Neivbury Park, CA: Sage, Various authors discuss the process of qualitative research from the perspective of various paradigms, showing how they influence the nature of inquiry, The editors also critique positivism from a postmodern perspective. DeVault, Marjorie L. 1999. Liberating Method: Feminism and Social Research. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. This book elaborates on some of the methods associated with the feminist paradigm and is committed to both rigorous inquiry and the use of social research to combat oppression. Harvey, David. 1990. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enauiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge, MA: Black well. Here's a wide-ranging analysis o[ the history and meaning of postmodernism, linking political and historical factors to experiences of time and space. Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, In this exciting and innovative recasting of the nature o[ scientific development, Kuhn disputes the notion of gradual change and modification in science, arguing instead that established paradigms lend to persist until the weight of contradictory evidence brings about their rejection and replacement by new paradigms. This short book is at once stimulating and informative. Lofland, John, and Lyn H. Lolland. 1995. Analyzing Social Sellings: A Cuide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis. 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. An excellent text on how to conduct qualitative inquiry with an eye toward discovering the rules of social life. Includes a critique of postmodernism. McCrane, Bernard. 1994. The Un-TV and lOmphCar: Experiments in Persona! Freedom and Everyday Life. Fort Bragg, CA: Small Press, Some excellent and imaginative examples of an ethnomethodologi-calapproach lo society and to the craft of sociology. The book is useful for both students and faculty. Reinharz. Shulamit. 1992, Feminist Methods in Social Research. New York: Oxford University Press. This book explores several social research techniques (such as interviewing, experiments, and content analysis) from a feminist perspective. Online Slwdy Resources ■ 59 Ritzer. George. 19S6. Sociological Theory. New York: Knopf. This is an excellent overview of the major theoretical traditions in sociology. Rosenau, Pauline Marie, 1992. Post-Modernism and che Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Regarded as a modern classic, this book examines some of the main variations on postmodernism and shows how they have impacted different realms of society. Turner, Jonathan H., ed. 1989. Theory Building in Sociology: Assessing Theoretical Cumulation, New-bury Park, CA: Sage, This collection of essays on sociological theory construction focuses specifically on the question posed by Turner's introductory chapter, 'Can Sociology Be a Cumulative Science?" Turner. 5tephen Park, and Jonathan H. Turner. 1990. The Impossible Science: An Institutional Analysis of American Sociology. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Two authors bring two very different points of view lo the history of L". 5. sociologists' attempt to establish a science of society. SPSS EXERCISES See the booklet that accompanies your text for exercises using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). There are exercises olfered for each chapter, and you'll also find a detailed primer on using SPSS. Online Study Resources SccinlngymNow": Reseaich Methods 1. Before you do your final review of the chapter, take the SocioloayNow: Research Methodsdiagnostic quiz to help identify the areas on which you should concentrate. You'll find information on this online tool, as well as instructions on how to access all of its great resources, in the front of the book, 2, As you review, take advantage of the Sociology Now: Research Methods customized study plan, based on your quiz results. Use this study plan with its interactive exercises and other resources lo master the material. 3, When you're finished with your review, take the posllesl to confirm that you're ready to move on to the next chapter. WEBSITE FOR THE PRACTICE OFSOCIAI SHEAAO/11TH EDITION Co lo your book's website at htlp://sociology wadsworth.com/babbie_practicel le for tools to aid you in studying for your exams. You'll find Tutorial Quizzes with feedback. Internet Exercises, Flaslicards, and Chapter Tutorials, as well as Extended Projects. Info-Tntc College Edition search terms, Social Research in Cyberspace, CSS Data, Web Links, and primers for using various data-analysis software such as 5PSS and NVivo. WEB LINKS FOR THIS CHAPTER ^■^1 Please realize that the Internet is an evolv-■rwy ing entity, subject lo change. Nevertheless. thesefew websites should be fairly stable. Also, check your bimk's websile for even more Web Links. Dead Sociologists' Homepage hlrp://staff.uwsuper.ed u/hps /mball Zdead_soc.htm WWW Virtual Library: Sociology, Sociological Theory and Theorists http:J / www. mcmasler.ea /socscidocs/ w5 virtsodib/ theories.htm Sociology Online Gallery http:J / www.sociologyonline.co.uk /